



South

International Conference on Economic Sanctions against South Africa

London 14–17 April 1964

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Edited by Ronald Segal

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Introduction

The aim of the International Conference on Economic Sanctions against South Africa was to root the whole issue in reality. Most exponents, including myself, of economic sanctions – as most antagonists – were issuing proclamations from postures of principle. Those who wanted sanctions dismissed all arguments against them as trivial or irrelevant, while those who opposed such action denounced it as illegal, impractical, and economically calamitous. It was a dialogue of pulpits, with the phrases of revelation.

Economic sanctions appeared to me merely an instrument to be employed if it was useful in the struggle against *apartheid*, and discarded if not. I believed that international intervention was necessary and inevitable if the South African crisis was to be resolved without continental or even worldwide racial war, and economic sanctions seemed likely to produce this resolution at the smallest reasonable cost. Yet such a proposition required examination and evidence if it was ever to become widely persuasive, and so I decided to organize a conference which would bring together those with political power and those with specialist knowledge of the various issues involved in an international sanctions campaign.

Organizing an international conference of any significance at all demands a large sum of money and a large number of workers.

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I had neither. As a first step, therefore, I called together in the middle of last year representatives of various organizations – principally, the African National Congress and the British Anti-Apartheid Movement – and we decided to establish a working committee, with myself as Convenor. The Anti-Apartheid Movement provided us with its sponsorship and an initial subsidy of £100, while we supplied ourselves with a name that was at least explicit if also so long as to be virtually unintelligible over the telephone. We then set about acquiring influential sponsors, since our own names were unlikely to commend our project to the influential participants for whom we were aiming. Within a few weeks we had letters of support from some fifty men and women of distinction, almost all of them British and American – the final sponsorship list would contain 138 names from 17 countries – and our respectability seemed secured.

When the idea of a conference had first taken shape in my mind, I had seen it as a discussion around a series of expert papers, specially commissioned to cover all the main problems of sanctions. Any other form of organization had promised days of floating argument, while participants stretched for priorities of agreement. As soon as the working committee was established, therefore, and we had a few sponsors to flourish, we went in search of the appropriate experts.

I was strongly opposed to the commissioning of experts whose nationality or known political sympathies would lead a hostile Western press to discount – however unfairly – their findings in advance. It was the West, and within the West Britain, which enjoyed the bulk of trade with South Africa and whose support would be essential if a sanctions campaign was to possess any prospect of success. Accordingly, I believed, we should as far as possible commission experts in Britain, and from among the apparently uncommitted. Such investigations as they undertook would be generally regarded as objective, and their findings would enjoy a commensurate respect.

I was engaging, of course, in a gigantic gamble, since if the selected experts found against the practicability of economic sanctions there would be no way of effectively counteracting their conclusions. Yet we decided that the gamble was, after all, worth taking, that it was essential to discover just how practical a pro-

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position sanctions were if successful agitation for their employment against South Africa was ever to be mounted.

The papers that follow, unedited, constituting the bulk of this book, are the results. All but an obvious few have been written by British experts – economists, jurists, and strategists – whose reputations and capabilities not even the most hostile critic has attempted to impugn. It was these papers that formed the basis for the discussions at the Conference and provided the participants with the evidence for concluding that total economic sanctions against South Africa, internationally organized, are necessary, legal, practical, enforceable, and much less costly – even to Britain – than has previously been assumed.

The association of the African National Congress with the Conference working committee gave us easy access to a number of African governments, and I began the long exploration of embassies in search of money. It is always distasteful to ask for money, even on behalf of a cause that commands a ready response, and it is an indication of the degree to which African governments have involved themselves in the struggle against *apartheid* that I found it so easy in the end to make and succeed in my approaches. Of course, between the promise and the presentation there stretches a vast anxiety; for banks do not, unhappily, pay official letters of intention the same respect that they accord to cheques. Yet somehow we sold our dependability, and received the credit we required.

In canvassing for sponsors, we had excluded Africa and Asia as sources, since it seemed silly to invite individual sponsors where governments themselves were our allies. We therefore invited several heads of government to become patrons; and by the time that the Conference opened, eleven had agreed, associating Algeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Kenya, Libya, Malaysia, Senegal, Tanganyika, and Tunisia directly with the project.

We selected a date for the Conference – from 14 to 17 April 1964 – long before we selected the place, primarily because a conference appears to have no meaning until it has a date attached to it. One African capital rather than another might have proved invidious, and in any event, since most of the expert participants were British, would entail far greater travel expenses than it seemed likely we would ever be able to meet. A Scandinavian

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capital, though reducing travel costs for most of the expert delegates, would equally have necessitated the transportation of the whole Conference secretariat several weeks before the Conference itself began, and so in the end we selected London, although we were widely warned of visa difficulties for some of our delegates. In the event, I am glad to report, the difficulties did not materialize, and the British Government acted promptly on every application for entry by Conference participants.

We had decided at an early stage in the organization of the Conference to pursue as far as reasonably possible the principle of universality in our invitations. From countries in the forefront of the campaign for economic sanctions we invited the governing parties, while from countries opposing sanctions and trading with South Africa we invited representatives from all established parliamentary parties, as well as from sympathetic or 'solidarity' organizations. Our principal difficulty arose with international organizations, like the trade-union federations, whose representation at the Conference was clearly desirable. Even had I wanted to restrict our invitations to international organizations in the West, I doubt if I would have been able to carry the agreement of all the groups associated with the working committee of the Conference; but I had, in any event, no such wish. I refused to involve the Conference and so, by implication, the international struggle against *apartheid* in the overwhelming distractions of the cold war. We therefore decided to invite the World Federation of Trade Unions (W.F.T.U.) as well as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (I.C.F.T.U.) and the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (I.F.C.T.U.); the World Federation of Democratic Youth as well as the International Union of Socialist Youth and the World Assembly of Youth. In the event, the youth organizations, which were all represented, conducted themselves with a clearer sense of political priorities than the trade-union federations. The communist W.F.T.U. sent an observer, while the I.C.F.T.U., the major trade-union movement in the West, refused to send representatives explicitly because the W.F.T.U. had been invited. Perhaps because of the attitude of the I.C.F.T.U., the Socialist International also refused to participate – the Liberal International sent observers – and its refusal doubtless had an effect on the Scandinavian Social

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Democratic Parties, some of which had agreed to be officially represented but subsequently discovered that they had no delegates of adequate status to send. I can only repeat here what I said in my Convenor's Address to the Conference. 'Those who have expressed sympathy with the objectives of this Conference but have stayed away because they disapproved of some of those invited to participate must learn that the release of South Africa's subject peoples from their suffering takes precedence even over the propriety of ideological credentials.'

In the end thirty countries decided to send official delegations to the Conference – Algeria, Bulgaria, Cameroun, China, Congo (Leopoldville), Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jugoslavia, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Northern Rhodesia, Pakistan, Poland, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Syria, Tanganyika, Tunisia, U.A.R., U.S.S.R., and Zanzibar – and most of those delegations were led by Cabinet Ministers or senior diplomats. Unofficial delegations – comprising individual experts or the representatives of political parties and sympathetic organizations – came from fourteen other states: Canada, Denmark, Eire, France, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, South-West Africa, Sweden, Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In all, some 250 delegates and observers gathered at Friends House, Euston Road, London, for the four days of the Conference.

On 12 April, two days before the Conference opened, the London *Sunday Telegraph* engaged in one of its characteristic smear campaigns by heading a report on the Conference 'Field Day for Communists'. Projecting the Conference as an exercise of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, it progressed through a series of easy inaccuracies to the innuendo that the Anti-Apartheid Movement, and so the Conference, was dominated by communists. A few weeks before I might have been dismayed by so twisted an attempt at injuring the work of the Conference even before it had begun. But with the expert papers in my hands, and with a widespread and influential Conference participation assured, I believed that the Conference would itself constitute the best reply. The *Observer* appeared with a full-page article in favour of economic sanctions, while the *Sunday Times*, with a nod of

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recognition towards the quality of the expert papers and the Conference sponsorship, suggested in a leader page article that Britain might not for long be able to evade the necessity of international economic sanctions against South Africa.

In order to prevent the four days of the Conference from being dissipated in purely political discussion, we had decided to hold only an opening and closing plenary session, with the delegates distributed during the second and third days into five commissions – Commission I on the probable impact of sanctions upon international trade and finance; Commission II on sanctions and their impact on individual economies; Commission III on South Africa itself, the international implications of its racial crisis, and the likely effect of economic sanctions on the country; Commission IV on the legal and political aspects of sanctions; and Commission V on the policing problems involved in the enforcement of any international sanctions campaign. Mr A. Z. N. Swai, Tanganyika Minister of Development Planning, had agreed to act as Chairman of Commission I; Professor V. K. R. V. Rao, member of the Indian Planning Commission, as Chairman of Commission II; Dr Ambrose Reeves, former Bishop of Johannesburg, as Chairman of Commission III; Mr Joseph Thorson, President of the Exchequer Court of Canada and Honorary President of the International Commission of Jurists, and Mr Mainza Chona, Northern Rhodesia Minister of Justice, as Co-Chairmen of Commission IV; and Mr Tom Mboya, Kenya Minister of Justice, as Chairman of Commission V. Mr Mongi Slim, Foreign Minister of Tunisia, had agreed to act as Chairman of the Conference. All but a few of the expert papers were to be introduced by their authors to the commissions with which their subject matter was principally concerned.

The Conference itself assembled in plenary session on the first day to hear addresses from the Chairman, Mongi Slim; the Convenor; and Per Haekkerup, Foreign Minister of Denmark, who was unable to attend and whose paper I introduced on his behalf. Greetings from several African heads of government were read, together with a message from Mr Harold Wilson, Leader of the British Labour Party, which expressed opposition to economic sanctions but did so with such finesse as to allow almost limitless room for subsequent manoeuvre. Then, at lunch-time,

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the Chairman of the Conference, the Commission Chairmen, and members of the Conference Steering Committee – which had been elected by the original working committee – met leaders of official delegations to discuss the Conference agenda. There it was decided that the Conference should dispense with plenary discussion – such delegations as wished to make official statements might have them duplicated and issued by the secretariat – and continue the plenary session in the afternoon only to hear Oliver Tambo, Deputy President-General of the African National Congress, introduce his paper, after which the Conference would split into its Commissions.

The two Economics Commissions (I and II) met together to hear their own expert papers introduced, as did the Legal and Political Commission (IV) and the Policing Commission (V); and this procedure, planned only for the second day, was pursued for the discussions of the third day as well, since the delegates concerned decided that their subjects of study overlapped. In consequence there were only three commission reports issued – one from Commissions I and II jointly; one from Commission III; and one from Commissions IV and V jointly – the full versions of which are published in this book after the expert papers. On the final day of the Conference, the delegates met in plenary session and adopted the three reports, with their various findings and recommendations, unanimously.

This must not, however, be held to imply a rigid uniformity of view or interpretation. There were issues of principle or tactics significantly separating participants. The Chinese delegation – not unintelligibly – objected to the emphasis constantly placed in discussion on the United Nations; members of the delegation made clear their criticisms of the Organization, but they also proclaimed their intention to support United Nations action where they regarded it as just and announced that China itself would have no diplomatic or economic relations with the Government of South Africa. Some of the official delegates and some of the individual experts clashed strongly over strategy. But at no stage during the Conference did any real danger arise of a walk-out by any of the participants. Academics and politicians agreed on the main objectives and conclusions of the Conference. And this was not the accomplishment of the Conference organization: it was

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a reflection of the will among all participants that the world, for the sake of all its peoples, should resolve the South African racial crisis at once.

The Conference, of course, has only set in motion an enormous project. Its recommendations – published together at the end of this book – must now be pursued until they are adopted and economic sanctions enforced by the international community. The Conference has shown sanctions to be necessary, urgent, legal, and practical, but likely to succeed only with the full cooperation of Britain and the United States. How the Governments of those two countries are to be drawn from their present policy of profitable neglect – under which they do nothing calculated to disturb white supremacy while allowing their trade and the investments of their citizens in South Africa to grow – must be the subject of not only sustained effort by African and Asian governments, but of public pressure in Britain and the United States themselves. The bringing of peace and sanity to South Africa is everyone's concern, and everyone has a duty – in the final analysis, a deeply selfish one – to force the international and organized promotion of change.

Ronald Segal
May 1964

Apartheid – the indictment

Oliver Tambo

Deputy President-General of the African
National Congress of South Africa

One of the biggest failures of any group of people this century has been the failure of the ruling white minority in South Africa to discard policies which have nothing but destruction and disaster to offer for the future of the country. The failure is the bigger for the insane determination of the authors and high priests of these policies to push them to their logical extremities against a rising tide of indignant world opposition and in defiant unconcern for the consequences.

‘If we are destroyed,’ they say, ‘it will be our fate, not our fault.’ But if they are destroyed, it cannot help them to argue or complain afterwards that it was their fate. The fate-not-fault theory is, however, important because it reflects an attitude of mind which is basic to the policy of *apartheid*, namely, that South Africa is populated by people and non-people. In the following discussion the situation in South Africa will be examined with special reference to this attitude of mind on the part of the Whites.

Apartheid, in its more comprehensive connotation, is the sum total of all the policies and practices, stratagems and methods, beliefs and attitudes that have been marshalled and are being employed in an attempt to ensure and entrench the political domination and economic exploitation of the African people by the White minority.

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Paramount in the strategy of the South African rulers, therefore, is the use they make of colour or race differences. In the workings of *apartheid*, colour comes first in importance, race next, and human beings last. In the terminology of *apartheid*, it may be correct to say 'the population of South Africa is 16 million', but it would be incorrect to say 'there are 16 million people in South Africa'. There are only 3 million people. In their public speeches, the political leaders of the Nationalist Party are always meticulously careful not to exaggerate the number of people in South Africa. Seldom if ever does the Government in its publications and official documents refer to the 'people of South Africa' in a meaning that extends beyond the 3 million Whites.

The very first clause of the current Constitution of the country states:

The people of the Republic of South Africa acknowledge the sovereignty and guidance of God.

The Constitution was conceived of, drawn up, discussed, approved, and adopted as an Act of Parliament (No. 32 of 1961) by Whites only, to the deliberate exclusion of all other South African inhabitants. Its provisions express their wishes and nobody else's.

The 'people' referred to are therefore the Whites. The Constitution of the Union of South Africa (South Africa Act, 1909) contained an identical clause with 'Union' instead of 'Republic' of South Africa. That Constitution was, like the present, the exclusive creation of Whites. But the 'guidance' clause was only inserted in 1925 through an amendment introduced by the then Nationalist Party Government led by General J. B. M. Hertzog. Because of the importance attached to it, the new clause was made Article No. 1 of the South Africa Act, 1909, as amended.

But Hertzog and his Party were not the originators of the concept of 'people' as covering Whites only. They had brought it down from an earlier page of their history. The Constitution of the Boer Republic of the Transvaal prior to its annexation by Britain in 1877 had the following provisions:

The people will permit no equality between whites and coloured inhabitants, either in Church or State.

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In 1896, the Transvaal Republic, having been reconstituted, declared, in its laws, that

The people will not permit the equalization of coloured with white inhabitants.

The Free State Republic had similar provisions, the word 'people' being used in the same context.

The distinction between people and 'non-people' can be traced to two further successive sources. Before doing so, however, reference should be made to its other manifestations in the political jargon of the exponents of *apartheid*.

Until very recently, Nationalist Party politicians seeking votes or support spoke of the 'two nations', meaning the English- and the Afrikaans-speaking Whites. Needless to say, a discreet distance between Afrikanerdom and the other nation was cautiously maintained. Now that South Africa is a Republic, there is more frequent talk of 'the nation'. The rest of the inhabitants of South Africa, who constitute the majority, have never been either a nation or part of 'the nation'. They are 'non-people', and are identified as Bantu (formerly 'native', formerly 'kaffir'), Coloureds (formerly 'Hotnots'), and Indians (formerly 'Coolies'). Chinese and other Asians – excluding the Japanese – belong to this last category.

Consciousness of these colour and race differences is nurtured, encouraged, maintained, and even enforced by means of numerous devices transcending every conceivable sphere of life, and invariably placing the African, with his black skin, at the rock bottom of the human scale, the white man at the top, and the rest at an intermediary level close to the African. So long as this consciousness of colour and racial dissimilarity, with its concomitant stratifications, is kept alive in the minds of the inhabitants, it is hoped, colour and race can serve the interests of domination and exploitation, with the 'people' living off the 'non-people'.

We have followed the history of this relationship, in so far as it is a matter of Government policy in South Africa, to the late nineteenth century. Its true origin, however, is neither governmental nor political. It emanates from the pitch-dark days of slavery.

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The unexampled profits which slave labour yielded to slave masters and investors in an expanding world trade between European powers and their colonies, with the clamorous demand for more slaves and more slave labour, initiated a wholesale invasion of the African coast and interior by slave traders, who seized thousands of Africans and flooded the slave market with slaves from Africa, to the total eclipse of non-African slaves. The result was that 'slave' came to mean 'African slave' and the black skin became the universal badge of slavery and inferiority.

As Europe and America grew more prosperous, and in order that they might grow even more prosperous, the humiliation, degradation, and dehumanization of man by man continued as black African slaves were beaten, tortured, hanged, exposed to conditions which killed them in tens of thousands year after year, persecuted and terrorized, and in general confined to a separate existence of their own – an existence more animal than human, nearer death than life. All this was done in an attempt to subdue and subordinate them to rigid control and to extract more and more labour from them without the risk of a revolt. It was the status of the slave, the purpose for keeping him in that status, and the methods which it became unavoidable to use which were later to lend force to the movement for the abolition of slavery.

But the slaves were the private property of their owners and a vital economic asset. The Cape had not lagged behind in availing itself of this asset. By 1806, 25,000 settlers owned a population of 30,000 slaves. Thus it was that the decision of the British Government to order the emancipation of slaves in all British colonies was deeply resented by slave-owners at the Cape as being an unwarranted interference in their domestic affairs and personal rights, and as showing disrespect for their doctrines and beliefs. The slaves were emancipated, but the grievances remained and for many of the dispossessed owners became the chief of several causes of the Great Trek, which culminated in the establishment of the Boer Republics. Something else remained: the mental attitude which had learnt to recognize in a slave a black man, in the black man a slave, and in both a sub-human. This was not peculiar to South Africa, but while the rest of the world has now acknowledged that all men are equal the

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'people' of the Republic of South Africa will permit no equality between White and Coloured inhabitants.

There is no African, Coloured, or Indian member of the South African Parliament, and there never has been. For the African and Indian there is not even the pretence of a franchise. The Transkeian gathering of Africans called a 'Parliament' represents no extension of franchise or political rights to Africans in South Africa. In the context of the South African political situation, as also in the extent to which the Government, an interested party, interfered in the conduct of the election campaign and in the actual voting, the make-believe elections, at which the 'M.P.s' were elected for the 'Transkeian Parliament', were patently farcical. Since the people could not stop the elections, however, they took the opportunity to protest at *apartheid* by casting their votes overwhelmingly against Government-supported candidates in spite of pressures and techniques, sometimes subtle and often crude, to swing the votes in the opposite direction.

The so-called Parliament is at best an administrative institution. By clear intention and design, it is dominated by chiefs who are civil servants in the pay of the Government, and whose first loyalty is to their government and employer. No decision that this 'Parliament' takes will have any validity unless approved by the Government, and the latter will approve nothing which is not in the interests of racial discrimination and white domination. And the Bantustan scheme is nothing if it is not an attempt to entrench racial discrimination and white domination throughout the length and breadth of South Africa. That is why the Transkeian Bantustan has had to be constituted over the dead bodies of scores of African people, and under the crushing grip of a State of Emergency.

The Coloured people of the Cape Province may elect a meagre 4 Whites to represent them in a House of Assembly that contains 160 members. But this represents a loss, not an increase of rights. In 1909, 10.1 per cent of the registered voters were Coloured, as against the 85.2 per cent European. The Africans, although their population was more than double the number of Whites, accounted for 4.7 per cent of the registered votes. Africans and Coloured could not be members of Parliament.

In Natal, also a 'liberal' colony, the franchise for non-Whites

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was a burlesque. Figures for the year 1907 show that the Whites constituted 99.1 per cent of the registered votes. The remaining 0.9 per cent was made up of 150 Indians who had managed to qualify for registration, 50 Coloured, and exactly 6 lonely Africans. And yet the non-Whites comprised 91 per cent of the colony's population.

It could be justifiably claimed, however, that for the years 1907 and 1909 these franchise rights, however limited, represented at least a faint glimmer of light which would grow, given enough time, into the brightness of a full day. It did not grow. It faded when Union was formed in 1910 and was later to vanish altogether under Nationalist Party rule.

In the fifty-three years that have passed since Union, the South African Parliament has produced the most appalling collection of racist laws to be found in any single country anywhere in the world. Their cumulative effect and the increasing ferocity with which they have been enforced during the past sixteen years have given to *apartheid* the basic characteristics, if not the exact dimensions, of slavery. But to the African, for whom the policy has meant humiliation and degradation, starvation, disease and death, jail, beatings, torture, and hangings, the difference is academic.

Masters and Servants Laws, a relic of pre-Union times, make it an offence against the State for an African to disobey his master, to absent himself from work without permission or good cause, or to commit some breach of contract of employment. These laws serve to invest the employer with powers to exact submissiveness and docility from the African so that his labour can be the more effectively exploited. They are supplemented by and are themselves part of an elaborate network of discriminatory laws, such as the Industrial Conciliation Act, and the Natives (Settlement of Disputes) Act, which make strikes by Africans illegal; the Mines and Works Act, which confines Africans to unskilled employment; the Native Land Act, which robs Africans of rights to all but a final 13 per cent of the land; the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, and a long list of other laws, all amended from time to time for greater effectiveness, and supported by numerous regulations, ordinances, and proclamations. By this network of laws the African population is held in the

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compulsory service of South Africa's Whites. Interlocking systematically with the entire range of racialist legislation, and knitting it into a fine mesh, the notorious Pass Laws guarantee to the Whites that this service is not only compulsory but also incredibly cheap. How else could the 'people' prevent the 'equalization of persons of colour with white inhabitants'?

'*Abantwana balala ngendlala!*' This is the anguished but all too familiar cry of a starving mother in South Africa's Reserves, writing to her husband, telling him that the children are starving. He is working on a White farm, in competition with convict labour, or he is in a mine receiving wages far below those enjoyed by White miners, or maybe he is sweeping the streets of some city, and earning £3 a week, from which he pays for his food, rent, train or bus fare to and from work. Wherever he may be working, if he sends any money, it is all spent within a few days of its receipt. His wife writes a second letter reporting how many of the children are ill, and a third one telling which of them has already died. But, precisely because the children are starving and dying of starvation, he must remain working. He must find work and accept any wage.

The Reserves are overcrowded, poor, and unproductive and are the scene of perennial famines. He must seek work outside the Reserves. If he goes to the mines, he may never return, and if he does he may bring back a broken limb or miner's phthisis. If he goes to work on a farm, he may be beaten to death. At the very least there will be a *sjambok* and a boot urging him to work harder and yet harder, and at the end of the contract his earnings will have accumulated to a mere pittance. Where he offers himself for either the mines or farm labour, he will have little difficulty in proceeding to his place of employment. His travelling expenses will be met by way of a loan, to be recovered by compulsory deduction from his wages. But if, because of the unpopularity of the work in the mines or on farms, he enters an urban area for the purpose of seeking work, then from the time of such entry he is like a convict at large, liable to be taken to the nearest prison on meeting the first policeman; for the Urban Areas Act and the Pass Laws make it practically impossible for him to escape arrest, unless he plays a cat-and-mouse game with the police – spending the night in a wide variety of back-yards, taking illegal shelter

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with friends, if any, while during the day, as he moves from place to place, exploring various avenues to lawful residence and employment, he avoids the police as if they were wild carnivorous beasts waylaying their black-skinned booty at street corners. The obstacles placed in the way of taking up a job completely deprive the African of the power to bargain for satisfactory terms of employment and place him at the unrestricted mercy of the employer. The result is cheap labour.

Another device by which African labour is kept cheap is the insecurity of homelessness. The true essence of a home is not where one is forced to live, against one's will and against all reason, but where one chooses to live, and it includes the right to live with one's family.

If ever the Reserves were anyone's home, they have long ceased to be so for most Africans. Besides, the Government has given itself powers to remove any African or group or community of Africans from any part of the country to any other part if it considers this desirable 'in the interests of good government'. Many Africans and African communities have been forcibly removed from their houses under these arbitrary powers.

On the farms, the regular farm-labourer lives on his employer's property. If he loses his job, he loses his home simultaneously. He cannot enter an urban area because of pass and influx control regulations; he cannot eke out an existence from the barren hillsides of the Reserves. He therefore wanders from farm to farm with his family and belongings, seeking employment. In general the fact that he has been expelled from one farm makes him an undesirable character in the eyes of other farmers. In these circumstances he is open to ruthless exploitation.

In urban areas, Africans are huddled into depressing and soul-destroying 'native locations', which are clusters of little houses largely built to the same monotonous pattern and arranged in rows. In these locations, as in all areas set aside for African occupation, the numerous conditions governing such occupation are such as to reduce the African's residential rights to a precarious tenancy.

The village of Sophiatown was literally razed to the ground with bulldozers to force its residents out of their properties and move

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them to locations. A series of these mass removals has been carried out in different parts of the country. The latest is taking place in Alexandra Township, an African village on the outskirts of Johannesburg. This has been an established community with many of the families living there already in the third generation. Thousands of families have already been forcibly removed to locations. There remain 10,000 married couples and 21,000 children. These are now to be eliminated. The village is to be bulldozed out of existence, and in its place eight hostels are to be built, each to house 2,500 single Africans. The women and children, remnants of the broken families, will presumably be driven into the overcrowded and denuded Reserves. It is as if a farmer was taking part of his cattle to a camp on one part of his farm, picking out the oxen from the remainder, and placing them in another camp in another part of the farm, and driving the cows and calves to a third camp some distance away. He can of course not be expected to consult, much less seek the approval of, his cattle, and he does neither.

The destruction of the sense of security that comes from having a home and family is therefore the aim and effect of Government policy for the Africans in urban as well as in the rural areas. It has contributed enormously to the maintenance of a regular supply of cheap labour, and has helped, as few other things could do, to highlight and preserve the time-honoured difference between the 'people' and the 'non-people'. Although South Africa is by all accounts 'blessed' with a vast reservoir of cheap labour, the guilty try to soothe their consciences by stating, in a blind comparison, that Africans are better paid in South Africa than in most countries in Africa. Yet wages have reality only in relation to the cost of living. Instead of comparing an African worker in South Africa with another in another country, let us compare the wages of two workers in South Africa: an African and a White labourer. In 1946, the average earnings of an African worker employed by manufacturing industry amounted to £159.1 per annum, as against £734.28 for a White employee in the same industry. A White employee therefore received 4.6 times an African's wages.

In 1958, the corresponding figures were, for an African employee, £173.25, against £915.89 for a White worker, giving a

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ratio of 5.28:1. In 1961, an African received £176.6 as against £991.28. The ratio became 5.6:1.

These figures show that between 1946 and 1961 White earnings rose by 35 per cent while African wages increased by only 11 per cent. In that period the cost of living far outstripped the negligible increase in African wages.

The wages paid to an African mine-worker have hardly improved since the nineteenth century. He receives one sixteenth of a White worker's wages. In 1962 mining profits exceeded £140 million. The African mine-worker, however, is still paid 3s. per shift, plus a ration of third-grade mealie meal, some inexpensive meat, potatoes, and a few items produced on White farms where African wages are even lower, with a White employee earning 17 times what an African earns. The forcible sale of a man's labour by another for the other's sole benefit is a right enjoyed only by an owner with respect to his property. The subtleties of *apartheid* do not make it obvious that a mechanism exists in South Africa by means of which Africans are forced to work for wages that the employers pay to the Government for its sole benefit.

It is now common knowledge that at least one thousand Africans per day are convicted by South African courts for petty pass offences. There are also convictions for tax offences, failure to pay municipal rents, breaches of numerous Government proclamations and ordinances in urban and rural areas, as well as convictions for offences the commission of which is the inevitable result of the drastically repressive conditions under which Africans live.

When all these are taken into consideration, the number of Africans driven into South African jails every day, year in and year out, must be of the order of 2,000. From the jails they are distributed as convict labour to farmers and other employers, and payment for the labour thus given is made to the Government. The practice makes the law, the police, and the courts appear as a simple device whereby the African is summarily stripped of his rudimentary rights and then forced to work as if he were a slave.

The practice of *apartheid* has made South Africa a lively cemetery. Between 1948 and 1960 the total number of Africans

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killed by police bullets in the course of political protest, including the victims of the Sharpeville massacre, was approximately 300 according to official records. Since then there have been scores of Africans killed in the Transkei when the African people opposed the Government's attempt to impose a Bantustan on them.

Some Africans have been killed, not by the police but in circumstances initiated by general opposition to *apartheid*. Others have been sentenced to death for alleged offences committed in similar circumstances. The total number of unnatural deaths accountable to *apartheid* and resulting directly or indirectly from some Government provocation must be well in excess of 500.

It is, however, in the matter of health that the inherent evil of White domination appears at its most heartless. One of the topics which the South African Government discusses least in its propaganda material is the state of health of the African people. The only information that seems to be available relates to Baragwanath Hospital. We are repeatedly told that this hospital has *three miles of beds* and the best and highest of everything. No other hospital seems to exist in South Africa. There is not the faintest hint as to the annual mileage covered by African graves. The reason is not far to seek.

Apartheid keeps African labour cheap. It has to in the interests of the 'people'. Cheap labour keeps Africans underfed. In the urban areas 4 out of every 5 families are starving. The rate is higher in the country areas. The result is that the African population is exposed to the ravages of diseases easily traceable to poverty. The average life expectancy of an African is 37–42 years. For Whites it is 67–72 years, a difference of 30 years!

In breathless praise of the Government's 'show-piece' hospital, Baragwanath, the Director of Information of the South African Embassy in London declares: 'Every hour of the day and night a baby is born in the maternity ward.' But out of every 100 African babies born, 57 die before they reach their fifth birthday. The rate for Whites is 5 per cent.

This mass destruction of innocent babies is the work of *apartheid*. In the midst of so much wealth and so much food, there has to be so much poverty, and so many deliberately starved to death.

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And yet the boast persists: 'South Africa has never had it so good.' Indeed it has not. On the weary and laden shoulders of African labourers stand the great finance houses of the Western world. South Africa is pulling down its old buildings and replacing them with skyscrapers that rise to dizzy heights. The London Stock Exchange is pouring fortunes into the bulging treasure bags of British investors. Cheques are dropping on the marble desks of United States financiers with unfailing regularity, each fatter than the last. And what goes into the roughened and empty hands of the African who digs up all the wealth? Nothing but poverty and early death – and on top of it all, taxation.

There is a sharp contrast between the system of taxation for the Africans and that for the Whites, because the purposes of the two systems differ. The taxation imposed on the African people is another ruthless instrument designed to compel them to accept work on the White-owned mines and farms. To this end, for Africans, but not for Whites, failure to pay tax is a criminal offence.

While an African man above the age of 18 years must pay a minimum of R3.50¹ per annum, irrespective of whether he earns an income or not, Whites are only liable to pay income tax if they earn R600 per annum or more. For Whites anything less than R600 is regarded as inadequate for the purposes of taxation. For Africans no distinction is made between married and single, and no rebates are granted for dependants or the possession of Insurance Policies, as in the case of Whites.

In addition to poll tax, Africans have to pay local tax; tribal levies; levies to Bantu Authorities; a Bantu Education tax; ploughing, dipping, and grazing fees.

Apart from direct taxation, statistics for 1957 show that Africans contribute between £42,500,000 and £50,000,000 per annum in indirect taxation. Despite this huge contribution there are hardly any social amenities for the African people. The Government uses the revenue from African taxation to develop *apartheid* institutions which the people reject, such as Bantu Education. It has often been said that 'taxation without representation is tyranny'. In South Africa the Africans are

1. 1R (Rand) = 10s.

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taxed by a White minority government in order that it may forge and build the instrument of its tyrannical rule.

Not satisfied that the interests of White domination have been fully secured, and anxious to perfect the machinery of exploitation of the African people for the benefit of White South Africa and her friends, Dr Verwoerd has now thought up the 'Bantu Laws Amendment Bill'. It is suitably colour-washed with such sugared phrases as 'Peace Officer', 'law courts', and 'Aid Centres'. But the savagery of the Bill is the product of a mind that combines the ruthlessness of a slave-driver with a sadistic admiration for Hitler's system of labour camps.

So far, only limited reference has been made to the impact of *apartheid* on the other Coloured races in South Africa. This is not because this policy is any less inhuman to them. Racialism is an essential element in *apartheid* and is incapable of humanity. What has been said in relation to the African people covers the fate of the other non-Whites but with slight variations in degree. Mention must be made, however, of two laws, both passed in 1950 and both intended to affect everyone in South Africa.

The Group Areas Act 1950, amended in 1957, sets out to carve up South Africa into racial group areas and force each group to live in an assigned area. In practice it turned out to be a vehicle of hate and an instrument for the persecution in particular of the Indian Community. Government representatives openly admitted that its aim was to ruin the Indian people economically. Its harsh provisions were carried out with a callousness more suited to a society of jungle-bred head-hunters than a 'Christian' country. Under this Act Africans have been pushed from area to area and forcibly broken up into ethnic and tribal groups to facilitate their suppression.

The Population Registration Act, 1950, required the registration of every person in South Africa, with particulars of race and other detailed information. The Act created a Board to classify border-line cases between the racial groups. As soon as members were appointed to this Classification Board, it summoned some Whites to appear before it to prove that they were not 'natives'. Guided by the Act's meticulous definitions of 'white person', 'Coloured', and 'native', they carried out a witch hunt into their victims' past ancestry and unearthed ancient birth, marriage,

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or death certificates and other documentary evidence in their quest for the truth. They perused sworn affidavits and heard oral testimony. They scrutinized the hair, nose, eyes, lips, and skin of the 'suspect'. They questioned and cross-questioned him or her for hours, and having retired for a few days or weeks to consider the verdict, they ultimately arrived at a decision, and communicated their judgement to the person under investigation.

A White woman suddenly discovered, to her horror, that her husband was not White but Coloured and that her own beloved children had suddenly become Coloured. A shocked White man was told that his wife did not have pure blood, and his children promptly ceased to be White and automatically dropped out of White society.

The Board tore into the Coloured community with added vigour, setting off a paralysing wave of panic in every household as one Coloured person after another was adjudged a 'native'. No medieval Inquisition was ever more thorough or derived more satisfaction from its task.

Following the letter and the spirit of Government policy, the Classification Board broke families and careers to pieces as husband and wife, parent and child, and brother and sister were wrenched apart and many cast into the caste below. Reportedly, at least one child in Cape Town, unable to bear the mental strain of it all, committed suicide.

As the wave of panic began to sweep into the White community, causing understandable unease among those who had been shouting loudest about the purity of their blood, the Classification Board was called off and disbanded, but not before its activities had demonstrated: what needless damage racialism had done in South Africa; to what bottomless depths one has to sink one's soul to be an advocate of *apartheid*, or its supporter, open or secret; and yet, what impenetrable emptiness pervades the noisy myth that there is a pure race to be protected, to the last drop of its blood, against ordinary human beings living in their motherland.

The inhumanity of the Population Registration Act is the inhumanity of *apartheid* as reviewed in the foregoing pages. It will be observed that, for this grisly and ever-widening trail of persecution, death, and destruction, the Constitution adopted by

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the select 'people' in 1961 claims the 'guidance of the Almighty God'. But what a sordid record for such a claim!

The outline given so far of the diversified manifestations of *apartheid* makes no mention of the reactions of those affected by this policy. The impression may have been created that the oppressed have been the passive and meek victims of ruthlessness. Nothing could be further from the truth.

If the South African Government's defence budget for the current year has had to be raised to the monstrous figure of £105 million, if the White population has taken to sleeping with loaded pistols under its pillows, if it has become necessary to maintain a large police force and army – both heavily armed and perpetually on the alert – it is because South Africa is in the thick of a vicious political struggle which has now reached a stage where women's pistols, police arms, and a White army are all that separates the majority of the people of South Africa from their historic objective – the destruction of *apartheid* and everything that goes with it, and the establishment of a South African state of which all its people will be justly proud.

The struggle against *apartheid* and white domination has consumed half a century of patience, leaving in its place a yawning vacuum soon to be filled with bitterness, hate, and worse. But it has shown, as the experience of the African National Congress demonstrates, that there are South Africans, no less White than Mr Vorster, and Afrikaans- as well as English-speaking, whose hatred of White domination, racial discrimination, and exploitation is second to none. Side by side with the Africans, they have fought against these evils, and so have been ostracized by their neighbours and friends. Like the oppressed, they have been banned, imprisoned in the solitude of their houses, held in solitary confinement, and subjected to torture; they are with the oppressed, facing trial – even death sentences; no less than Chief Lutuli, Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Robert Sobukwe, George Peake, Monty Naicker, and many others, they reject white supremacy and suffer for doing so. They are few. But this is precisely where the greatness of their courage lies. Their White countrymen have rallied to the support of a White regime. Other South Africans are abroad, in the company of the peoples of the world who have demanded a halt to racialism. Some have given

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and are giving of their best in the humanitarian cause which is no less vital in the final result. But what is to be the end of the world's abhorrence of *apartheid*, if the world supports *apartheid* materially?

If this Conference should find, as the opponents of White domination in South Africa have insisted, that there is nothing the world can do if it does not impose sanctions to destroy *apartheid*, then let this Conference throw its full weight behind the demands of African, Asian, and other nations upon South Africa's trading partners to stop trading with a country which refuses to abandon a slave system.

Power in South Africa

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The case for concerted international sanctions against South Africa has moral and political implications. We are here concerned only with the political case which rests on four propositions: that the confrontation of opposing forces within South Africa cannot be resolved unless a catalyst is introduced from without; that the present political currents will lead inexorably to a violent and possibly prolonged race war; that there is no way of preventing external intervention, which is already a reality: the only question is whether or not it will take the form of collective international action; that an eventual race war represents not only an appalling outlook for South Africa but also a threat to international peace. It is the mandate of this paper to examine only the first three of these propositions.

The South African crisis cannot be resolved on terms other than the ending of white supremacy and the sharing of power between all the country's people so as to provide for effective, representative government. Two questions arise. Are there any conceivable circumstances under which the white minority, which now holds all effective power, could be persuaded voluntarily to concede the essential conditions for such a settlement? If not, what are the chances of achieving this objective without bloodshed and chaos? The answers must follow an analysis of the structure of power in the Republic.

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Fundamental to an understanding of this structure is the recognition of the disparity between political power, economic power, and labour power. These are more or less neatly divided into racial compartments: political power is held by the Afrikaners; English-speaking South Africans hold the lion's share of economic power; while the power of labour is largely in the hands of the Africans, Coloureds, and Indians. The two white communities have one overriding interest in common – to maintain the *status quo*, the essential nature of which is the rule of 3½ million whites over 14 million non-whites. But they are in deep conflict about the methods – and concessions – necessary to maintain their power. Afrikanerdom is committed to using its political power to foster *apartheid*, while the capitalist forces seek to replace *apartheid* with a system of social and political segregation and economic integration. These generalizations require only minor qualification, which will become apparent.

These distinctions are important. They clarify the limits of change which might follow the defeat of the present Government by its main challenger, the United Party, the political home of economic power. The immediate effect would be the abandonment of the cruder aspects of *apartheid* and the unrealistic attempt to produce 'Separate Development' through the Bantustans. But it would not change the power position between whites and non-whites.

The fundamental characteristic of labour power in South Africa is that it cannot operate on the Government through the vote, which is reserved exclusively for whites.¹ This has ensured the maintenance of comprehensive privilege by the white 'in-group' against the much larger non-white 'out-group'. This electoral dichotomy gives South Africa a unique status as an authoritarian state: it is the world's only racial autocracy. The combined power of the 'in-group' is committed to defending a system which gives its members considerable material privilege. But not only material interests are involved. Political commitment to the *status quo* reflects the prevailing cultural influences in white society. It also reflects the sincere fear of revenge and counter-domination for centuries of repression if the non-white

1. With the minor exception that the Cape Coloureds at present elect four white Members of Parliament.

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'out-group' were to take power. Thus material vested interests are reinforced by deepening fears and traditional prejudices.

In this situation there is no question of the ruling oligarchy voluntarily agreeing to transfer political power to the majority. The deadlock is the predictable outcome of the terms of independence granted to South Africa in 1910. No political party proposing a dilution of white political exclusivity has even glimpsed the possibility of office. In boom times the overwhelming majority of whites have seen no reason to alter the *status quo*; and in times of depression they have shown themselves solely concerned to shore up their own standard of living at the expense of those unable to protect themselves – the voteless non-whites. The maintenance of the racial caste society has been fundamental to the programme of every government since the Union, though some have preferred persuasion and consultation if – and only if – coercion was unnecessary.

If, then, there is no chance that the white minority might voluntarily relinquish power, what is the possibility of preventing the struggle becoming a racial war? Here it becomes necessary to examine more closely the different elements in the power structure.

Since 1948 political power has been increasingly entrenched in the hands of Afrikanerdom. This is the organized coalescence of political, religious, social, and economic forces which represent the apex of Afrikaner nationalism. These forces combine to produce the situation that the National Party of the Afrikaners is, for them, not simply one contender for political office, but the embodiment of the entire social and historical heritage of the *Volk*. The Dutch Reformed Church is, in a meaningful sense, the Nationalist Party at prayer for the successful hegemony of its culture throughout South Africa; the *Broederbond*, the secret society of Afrikanerdom, is the mechanism for ensuring its control at every key point of national importance; the Afrikaner Universities, together with the cultural organizations, are the dedicated purveyors of exclusive nationalism, upon which the Party's platform is based; the *Broederbond*-inspired *Reddingsdaad* is the weapon devised to end English-speaking South Africa's predominant control of capitalist power. All these conspire to ensure that political power is buttressed by social control.

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Afrikanerdom's political power rests on the electoral base of the lower-paid white workers in the towns and the Afrikaner farmers. Owing to the distribution of the Afrikaner population and the weighting of the rural constituencies, these two groups in effect decide the fate of governments – though they represent less than 40 per cent of the electorate, and of course a much smaller fraction of the total population.

The crucial significance of this section of the electorate is that it constitutes that area of white society which feels itself, with justification, most immediately threatened by competition from the non-whites. Its standards of living and its status depend substantially upon its membership of the white 'in-group'. And it is likely that its circumstances would be adversely affected by a transfer of power, even under the most benign conditions. Thus this group swung overwhelmingly behind the National Party's 1948 election programme of *apartheid*, with its accompanying assurance that white *baasskap* (overlordship) would be maintained. Before 1948, the votes of this group had been divided between the main contending parties. But during the war it took fright at the growing assertiveness of black labour power, strengthened by industrial expansion and encouraged by war-time idealism in the white world.

The *baasskap* promised under the *apartheid* programme of the Malan and Strijdom Governments was transformed in 1958 into Verwoerd's offer of 'Separate Development' as the formula which would save the country both from political integration and from external intervention. It promised the white man *baasskap* in 87 per cent of the country, which represents the 'white areas', and the black man eventual *baasskap* in the other 13 per cent, which presently constitutes the tribal reserves. Partition in any meaningful sense is not intended – the Bantustans are not, and cannot become, viable political or economic units; and there is no possibility or intention of robbing the white economy of its necessary black labour.

Thus, whatever the changes forced on Afrikanerdom's leaders, their appeal to the white electorate has not diminished. On the contrary, the more the voter is made aware of the dangers of explosion created by the Government's policies, the more desperately he clings to exclusive white power. This mood will

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continue until potential dangers become actual and irresistible. Until then, Afrikanerdom cannot lose its political base, for there is no present alternative which offers more to the crucial 40 per cent of the electorate.

Indeed, Afrikanerdom's political power has been considerably reinforced by the possession of office. Today it exercises control not only socially, through its cultural, religious, and economic organs, but also bureaucratically. It is assured of the loyalty of the civil service, the powerful state-owned corporations, the army, and the police, each of which is strongly manned by hand-picked supporters.

Before the Second World War, the Afrikaner's share of economic power was relatively insignificant; but the past twenty years have seen a concerted effort to reinforce its political gains with an economic base. The Government's agricultural policies helped to create a class of rich farmers, whose capital was diverted to seed the *Reddingsdaad* – the financing company for a chain of industrial and mining enterprises with Afrikaner share-capital. As a result, the Afrikaner has become a factor in the business world, as well as controlling all the large state-owned industrial corporations.

But despite the efforts of Afrikanerdom, the dominant position in commerce, industry, and mining is still in the hands of the English-speaking community. It controls 99 per cent of mining capital, 94 per cent of industrial capital, 88 per cent of finance capital, and 75 per cent of commercial capital. This economic power is also highly concentrated. Seven finance houses control between them over a thousand of the largest companies, with combined resources exceeding £1,000 million. The financial power of English-speaking South Africa is further entrenched by its association with international finance, with a stake of about £1,800 million in the Republic.

Yet since 1948 the political interests which Big Business supports – mainly the United Party, though also the Progressive Party – have seen their hopes of achieving political power steadily diminishing. From the birth of Afrikaner nationalism in the last century, Big Business saw it as an enemy, and used its own economic resources to divide and oppose it. In the vital 1948 elections, the business world made a supreme but un-

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successful effort to keep Smuts in power through financial contributions to his party and through collective opposition to the ideas of *apartheid* through the English-language press.

This is not the first time that capitalist power has clashed with political power. The fundamental quarrel since 1910 has been over the industrial colour bar, which notoriously inhibits industrial and mining efficiency. It is not necessary to ascribe humanitarian virtues to the business world's attempts at 'dilution' of skilled labour to create opportunities for the employment of lower-paid African labour. The fact is that it has frequently thrown its weight in behind the abolition of the industrial colour bar – with conspicuous lack of success, even when the parties of its own choice were in power.

But the assumption of office by the Afrikaner Nationalist Party sharpened the conflict between political power and capitalist interest. Big Business sees the policy of Separate Development as a threat to economic expansion, a provocation to the international community, and a danger to the long-term security of the whites in South Africa. On the other hand, the business world cannot carry its opposition to the point of open defiance without undermining its own interests. There are only two measures which lie within its power and which could shake the government's hold on political power: it could deliberately slow down economic expansion – the strike weapon; and it could discourage overseas investment in South Africa. Both are damaging to its own interests. Thus, since adding the authority of office to its social and political power, Afrikanerdom has effectively neutralized, if not altogether subdued, the economic power of English-speaking South Africa.

The predictable reaction of the business community has been to seek an accommodation with Afrikanerdom, wherever the interests of the two coincide. There are two issues of importance to both. The first is economic expansion; the second the confidence of political and financial circles in the West. Thus an uneasy but viable accommodation has been made, which finds its main expression in the South African Foundation.

The Foundation describes itself as 'an association of leaders of every sphere of national activity who have come together with a single objective – to present to the world a true picture of

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South Africa'. It has brought together a widely divergent group of men, ranging from supporters of the Progressive Party to *Broederbonders*. They have in common only their fear that the political and economic *status quo* might be upset by outside intervention. It is represented as unpatriotic for a businessman not to join or to contribute to its funds: nearly £500,000 has been raised so far from the business community.

Though ostensibly non-political, the effect of the Foundation's propaganda is of course highly political. Mr Laurence Gandar, the Editor of the *Rand Daily Mail*, wrote this of the Foundation in 1962: '[It] almost automatically adopts the posture of champion and apologist for the *status quo* in South Africa. . . . [There is] a very real danger that the entire business leadership of the nation will find itself politically immunized through enrolment in a movement which is ostensibly non-political, but which is none the less committed to the defence of the existing order.'

The disparity between the interests of labour and those of political and economic power is more obvious. The overwhelming majority of South African workers is, of course, non-white. They constitute 99 per cent of the unskilled workers in industry, 66 per cent of the semi-skilled, and 17 per cent of the skilled workers. Mining and industry are wholly dependent upon African labour, and so is agriculture.

Up to the end of the 1930s South Africa's labour movement was multi-racial and united in the Trades and Labour Council. Partly as a result of a *Broederbond* campaign, however, the movement split, with the formation of the all-white South African Confederation of Labour. It has subsequently divided still further; and although some cooperation still takes place between white and non-white unions, the movement as a whole has been robbed of unity and effective militancy. White workers do not regard themselves primarily as part of the country's proletariat; and 'working-class solidarity' is of much less importance than the maintenance of the traditional caste structure of society. This was clearly exemplified by white labour's support for the 'civilized labour policy', where 'civilized' meant white.

Although African trade unions are not specifically outlawed, they are denied any of the rights essential for effective union activity. A strike by African workers is illegal; and African union

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officials are not permitted to negotiate with employers on behalf of their members: they are represented at negotiations by an official of the Department of Labour. The whole complex and comprehensive network of laws from the '90-day Detention' Act, and deportation as 'undesirable', to the ordinary Pass Laws, are invoked against the effective union official.

Nevertheless, a number of African trade unions contrive to exist, and a few have succeeded in making an impact upon industrial conditions in the urban areas. But there is no organization among agricultural workers; they are a passive working force, living for the most part on the edge of starvation and in pawn to the employers. Thus the prevailing conditions make it impossible to organize the majority of workers as an effective industrial or political force.

The potential industrial power of South Africa's workers remains, therefore, latent. The Bantu Laws Amendment Act gives the Government the final powers needed for a complete system of labour direction. No African, whatever his previous record of service or residence, will have the legal right to live or work anywhere outside a Bantustan. Unless he is one of the minority with a permanent stake in one of the reserves, he will be legally a migrant labourer, subject to direction by officials. Under these circumstances, trade-union activity becomes virtually impossible; and the industrial power of labour will remain crippled. Therefore the chance that a change in political direction might be forced through non-violent industrial action must be dismissed as highly improbable.

Thus coercive laws, reinforced by the police and the army, are able to prevent effective mobilization of African power for non-violent action. They also undermine African attempts to unite the reserves, the rural areas, and the towns. In time, of course, repression will prove insufficient to stop the militant urban African leadership from becoming predominant throughout the country. Today, however, coercion weakens the militant leadership and reinforces the insecurity of the rootless mass of workers, concerned primarily with economic survival.

Nevertheless, the Government has not, and cannot, exert an effective authority over the African population. The attempt by the Government to convert coercion into persuasion so as to

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secure the implementation of its Bantustan policy has failed. The Bantustan policy will continue to be pursued ; but the Government's authority will depend more and not less upon the use of force. The size and strength of the police and the army are being vastly increased – a measure of the Government's own confidence that its policies can be made acceptable to the African population.

Defence expenditure was quadrupled between 1960–1 and 1963–4, to a figure of £104 million (including the police). By the end of 1964, the Government plans to have 104,000 men in the regular forces, compared with just over 9,000 in 1960. The Permanent Force is reinforced by the Commandos and the Citizen Force, training for which is compulsory for all white youths over 19. In addition there are some 15,000 armed white police, whose disposition is coordinated with the army. Another 15,000 presently constitute the Police Reserve, whose target is 50,000 – with separate units for Coloureds and Indians, but not Africans. Less conventional plans include research into poison gas, chemical bacteriological weaponry, rockets, and nuclear power.

The ingredients of the deadlock should be clear. The South African Government is committed to pursuing the receding hope that 'Separate Development' can provide a real alternative to integration or white supremacy. It arms itself for the day when its position will have to be maintained by sheer force. It cannot be dismissed at the polls while the privileges and prospects of the electorate continue to appear immune from the worst effects of the conflict.

Only a major trauma can break the deadlock. The question is whether it will be produced by violent revolution from within. The tradition of African nationalism in South Africa has been essentially non-violent and non-racial. The movement has always been led by an educated and largely middle-class élite. African nationalism has been inclusive, rather than exclusive : it has never proposed 'driving the white man into the sea'. Its objective has been to secure for the non-whites the right to participate fully in an integrated society.

These remain the objectives. But the choice of weapons has changed over the years. African nationalism naturally grew more militant as persuasive methods met with increased repression rather than a yielding of the white ramparts. It is not surprising

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to find a mood of racialism growing among the rank and file of the nationalist movement. A whole generation of Africans has grown up knowing nothing other than the rule of *apartheid*. They know little of the benefits of a society in which they are met at every turn by the lash of racialism and increasingly violent repression. They have no grounds for hope that non-violent opposition or passive acceptance will alter their circumstances for anything but the worse.

The old weapons having failed, the African leadership has begun to use new ones. The spirit behind this new challenge is revealed in this passage from Mr Nelson Mandela's defence speech at his trial in 1962.

'We have been conditioned by the history of white governments in this country to accept the fact that Africans, when they make their demands strongly and powerfully enough to have some chance of success, will be met by force and terror on the part of the Government. . . . Government violence can do only one thing and that is to breed counter-violence. . . . We have warned repeatedly that the Government, by resorting to violence, will breed in this country counter-violence among the people, till ultimately, if there is no dawning of sanity on the part of the Government, the dispute between the Government and my people will finish up by being settled in violence and by force.'

Thus both sides are now speaking the language of violence. Both urge their supporters that violence cannot be shirked. The seeds of racialism have begun to bear fruit. In such a situation it is vain to hope that the conflict will not produce a race war. The political dynamic inside the country can lead in one direction only.

Neither side can win without active help from outside. The white government hopes to persuade the West that it deserves support to make 'Separate Development' work. The Africans look to the independent African states and to international opinion to sustain them in their struggle. The result is predictable – a race war into which outside powers will inevitably be drawn. The process, if allowed to progress without swift and effective international intervention, could render South Africa a battlefield unfit for habitation by whites or blacks for years to come. But no one can doubt that time is on the side of the Africans.

Power in South Africa

This is the message conveyed in a leading article in the Government-supporting newspaper, *Die Burger* (5 April 1960):

History teaches us what power resides in movements that are imbued with the belief that time is on their side. And time, in superabundance, is behind the black people, who are desirous of capturing political control in Africa.

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Per Haekkerup

Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs

The question of the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa has been on the agenda of the United Nations since 1952. It thus holds the dubious prize of being among the problems in the history of the World Organization that have had to wait longest for solution.

Year after year, the General Assembly has concerned itself with the system of *apartheid* in South Africa and, more and more emphatically, expressed its condemnation of it. But year after year, the Government of South Africa, evidently being more and more confirmed in the belief that stubborn adherence to its policies of *apartheid* is the only means of safeguarding the existence of the white minority, has reacted by reinforcing its racial policies. By its successive violations of fundamental human rights, that Government has demonstrated how slight is the importance it attaches to world opinion. In the long view this attitude will only, so far as I can see, jeopardize the very interests that the South African Government is trying to safeguard.

The growing insistence which we witnessed in the General Assembly in 1962, when a large majority adopted a resolution on far-reaching economic sanctions, did not change the picture. The resolution has had little effect, and the Government of South Africa has even intensified its policies of *apartheid*.

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The Security Council's consideration of the question in August 1963 signified, as it were, the entry upon a new course. The Council, which is the competent U.N. organ for enforcement measures and which, moreover, counts among its members the Powers which alone can ensure the efficacy of such measures, then decided to go beyond mere verbal condemnation, taking certain limited measures against the military potential of South Africa by urging Member States to desist from exporting arms and ammunition of any kind to South Africa.

However welcome and necessary this Security Council resolution was, it seemed doubtful whether it would, in itself, be adequate. Indeed, it was open to question whether implementation by the Security Council of even a consistent policy of sanctions would be strong enough and sufficiently quick in its effects to ensure attainment or enforcement, in peace, of the fundamental change of the South African community which is the first essential for providing decent living conditions for the vast majority of the South African population.

In recent years the peoples of Denmark and the other Nordic countries have watched developments in South Africa with growing concern, anxiety, and resentment.

This public reaction to a problem which, in view of its remoteness and alien character, would hardly have been considered of any concern to us a few decades ago is the best evidence of the feelings of international solidarity and responsibility that have emerged since the Second World War, due not least to the United Nations.

Under impression of the misery of the vast majority of the South African population, and recognizing the risk of serious conflict inherent in this distressful situation, the Danish Government decided, in 1963, to examine the possibility of breaking the vicious circle of *apartheid*. The other Nordic countries shared our grave concern and were equally anxious to find new ways of counteracting these inhuman policies.

In a statement in the General Assembly of the United Nations last autumn I tried to explain our ideas in the following words :

The United Nations has by now dealt with the question of the policies of *apartheid* in South Africa for a good many years. You may know how deep this question has gone to the heart of everybody in

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Denmark. Numerous manifestations of one kind or another bear witness to the intense preoccupation of the Danish people with the question of *apartheid*.

The approach of the United Nations to the question of *apartheid* in South Africa has so far been, and rightly so, that *apartheid* should be abolished as contrary to the principles of the Charter and to human rights. Recently most of us have felt that if persuasion was not sufficient to induce the South African Government to change its policy other means would have to be resorted to. A most important step in this direction was taken by the recent resolution of the Security Council banning exports of arms to South Africa. Other steps will undoubtedly have to follow.

The Danish Government is in agreement with this policy. I repeat: Denmark supports this line of action and feels that it should be pursued and pressure gradually increased. What we desire is not mere words or recommendations of a general nature but measures the effects of which have been carefully studied beforehand and discussed thoroughly with a view to providing sufficient support from Member States. We recognize that the African countries have special interests in this matter, interests which naturally lead them to advocate an unconditional policy of sanctions. This special position also carries special responsibilities. It might be useful to initiate within a small group a dialogue between representatives of these specially interested countries and the major commercial partners of South Africa, which eventually will have to carry the main burden of such a policy of sanctions.

I repeat once again that we think such a policy of pressure necessary and justified. I must, however, ask myself and ask you a question which many members of this Assembly have certainly for some time been asking themselves quietly. That crucial question is this: Is that limited line of action through pressure sufficient in itself to bring about peaceful developments towards a solution of all aspects of the South African question? I am very much afraid that that is not so. I am very much afraid that a policy of sanctions alone – I repeat alone – may well defeat its own ends, aggravate the present state of tension in the area, and bring the possibility of tragic events closer.

Apartheid today causes misery to millions of people. Its abolition will, however, pose other problems. It is the duty of the United Nations to show the way forward in solving these problems in accordance with the basic principles of the Charter. We must face the fact that the great majority of the European population in South Africa wrongly assume that abandonment of white domination means abandonment of their own existence. It is our duty to prove to them that that is not so. It is our duty to demonstrate that there is an alternative to catastrophe and

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that the only road to this alternative goes through the abolition of *apartheid*. It is our duty to give all groups in South Africa hope and confidence that after abolition of those inhuman and abhorrent principles by which the Republic of South Africa is now guided there will be a happy and prosperous future for everybody who has his roots in and wishes to continue his life in South Africa.

In other words: If the approach of the United Nations has so far followed a single line, we feel it has now become necessary for the Assembly to formulate a supplementary policy, to make clear to the world what we should like to take the place of the present set-up: a truly democratic, multi-racial society of free men, with equal rights for all individuals, irrespective of race.

Changing a society so deeply rooted in *apartheid*, and dominated by a minority, into such a free, democratic, multi-racial society may well prove to be a task which cannot be solved by the people of South Africa alone. I feel convinced that in such a process of development the United Nations will have a major role to play if we shall avoid a tragic disaster. We must consider how, if necessary, we can, in a transitional period, contribute to the maintenance of law and order and the protection of life and civil rights of all individuals. We must likewise consider how the United Nations can best assist South Africa in laying the foundation of its new society.

It is in our opinion high time for the Assembly to give thoughts to the positive policy to be pursued in South Africa and to the role which the United Nations should play in coming developments. Careful studies to this end should be initiated now. If not, we may one day be taken by surprise and have reason to regret it.

It was thus Denmark's aim that besides condemning the policies of *apartheid* and bringing pressure to bear on the Government of South Africa the United Nations should consider how it could effectively assist all sections of the South African population in ending, by peaceful means, the present untenable situation, while reassuring the European element that there is an alternative to *apartheid* and that there will be a future for them too in a non-racial South African community with equal rights for all, irrespective of colour and race.

In short, it appeared to us essential to attack the problem on two fronts: on the one hand to make it absolutely clear that the United Nations and the governments and peoples behind the World Organization will not and can not tolerate the continuation of a policy which is based on a dogmatic theory of

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distinction as to human dignity by reason of race or colour; on the other hand to demonstrate with all possible clearness that the United Nations is firmly resolved to give serious attention to the problem and will lend the South African people its best assistance in laying the foundation of a new community.

If, in this perspective, we try to evaluate the results achieved last autumn by the United Nations, it would seem that we have taken a good step forward.

First, the debate of the General Assembly was marked by readiness to discuss constructive ways and means in the approach of the United Nations to the question of *apartheid*. Second, the renewed deliberations of the Security Council and its unanimous resolution reflected the Council's resolve to proceed along the lines adopted last August and, in a wider context, to consider the role of the United Nations. It will be recalled that in its resolution the Security Council called upon Member States to expand and intensify the arms embargo adopted in August. And, what I find particularly important, the Council decided to set up a group of experts to be composed of highly qualified persons and entrusted with the task of examining methods of putting an end to the present situation in Africa through completely peaceful and orderly application of human rights and fundamental freedoms to all inhabitants irrespective of race, colour, or creed. Moreover the group should consider what role the United Nations could play in the attainment of these objectives.

It is not possible to predict at present what influence the international experts may have on future developments. The group was set up for the purpose of providing an organ of so high an international standard that it would be able to express itself freely and independently of divergent political views and with such authority that its integrity would be incontestable. The designations made by the Secretary-General hold out good promise for the work of the group, but the task confronting it will be a difficult one. The group has been asked to report by the middle of May 1964. But if it is to achieve any real success it may be desirable that its mandate be extended. In view of the very nature of the plan, it would be injudicious to anticipate the group's findings.

It is justifiable, I think, to hope that these recent decisions

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may have brought a new element into the debates of the United Nations and that the group of experts will be seen as an attempt to assist, by foresight, in reaching a timely solution of a difficult problem before the misfortunes of South Africa become even more serious and could bring an international conflict within nearer view.

In the task of making the South African Government change its attitude it is essential that the United Nations should have the active support of all its member governments and of all the peoples of the world.

The politics of sanctions: The League and the United Nations

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1

To very many people 'sanctions' means something that somebody tried, or did not really try, to do to Italy about Ethiopia in the 1930s; and failed. Sanctions under the Covenant of the League became applicable in fact both before and after the Italian case: upon Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and of China in 1937, during the Chaco War of 1932-5, and upon the Russian invasion of Finland in 1939 for which the U.S.S.R. was expelled from the League of Nations. But the Italian case remains the most conspicuous and colours current attitudes to the whole problem of sanctions. Historians look back to these events primarily in order to analyse and narrate the course of events. Politicians looking back to them draw comparisons between past experiences and present possibilities and are therefore influenced in their attitudes both directly and, in some instances, by the traces that the past has left in the popular imagination. It is as politicians rather than as historians that we need to revert here to the Italian attack on Ethiopia in 1935.

On 5 December 1934 a skirmish occurred at Wal Wal, a place shown on Italian as well as Ethiopian maps as lying on the Ethiopian side of that country's frontier with Italian Somaliland. It had been apparent for some time that Mussolini wanted to puff Italy up in East Africa and set his country on a level with Britain and France, whose possessions in that part of the world

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were a better advertisement and a better investment than their Italian counterparts. Consequently Wal Wal was at once seen to be a portent and a prelude rather than an incident. Italy was proposing to annex Ethiopia or part of it, and when the attack actually came in October 1935 nobody was surprised. In the ten months after Wal Wal the question was not what would happen but what to do about it.

The determining factors were not African. The League was a European organization in a sense that is not true of the U.N., at any rate since the first phase of its existence. This domination of the League by its principal European members was a feature at least as important on occasions as the more frequently publicized fact that the United States was never, and the U.S.S.R. and Germany were only fleetingly, members. Moreover, in the months after Wal Wal European politics exerted a specially strong pull on international affairs owing to pressures for a united Anglo-French-Italian front against the comparatively new menace of Hitler. Hitler's declaration of German rearmament in March 1935 (like his entry into the Rhineland a year later) intensified the determination of British and French politicians to keep in with Mussolini, who had only recently struck an anti-German attitude on the Brenner at the time of the murder of Dollfuss. The so-called Stresa Front may have been an illusion, but on the British and French sides there was a genuine attempt to form an anti-German alliance with Italy and this attempt entailed a conscious or half-formed resolve not to allow the League to intervene in Africa to the extent of damaging a possible accord between London, Paris and Rome. Mussolini was able to exploit this European situation and lead Britain and France captive, because he wanted only one thing (the conquest of Ethiopia) while they wanted two incompatible things (to protect Ethiopia and the Covenant but, still more, to protect themselves against Hitler).

The position during most of 1935 was that the League would clearly not resolve on sanctions against Italy without an Anglo-French lead; that the British and to a lesser extent the French seemed ready to give this lead if Italy should resort to war; but that (and this was not so clear at the time) Anglo-French support for Ethiopia and the letter of the Covenant was

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circumscribed by Anglo-French *raisons d'état*. Following British and French advice the League refrained from declaring in advance that it would recommend sanctions if the occasion should arise, while during the summer and autumn various attempts were made by London and Paris to find a way of settling the dispute by the time-honoured (if not very honourable) methods of territorial rearrangement. Mussolini used the time given him to perfect his military dispositions and to steal from Ethiopia the role of accuser, compiling a long and vigorous denunciation of Ethiopia for presentation to the Council and the Assembly at their autumn sessions.

The Assembly opened with so firm a speech by the new British Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, that the spirits of the defenders of the Covenant rose very high and even Laval felt constrained to follow suit. Lovers of paradox looking back to this debate from 1964 will note a special plea to Italy not to start a war which would split the world along a colour line; this plea came from the South African representative. While the Assembly was thus occupied, the Council (minus the protagonists) had been examining the facts in the case and early in October it produced a verdict wholly unfavourable to Italy. But a few days earlier the Italian attack was launched.

Thereupon the Council resolved that Italy had resorted to war contrary to the Covenant. Article 16 of the Covenant (to which I shall refer more closely in a moment) was thereby invoked, and in the re-called Assembly every member except Austria, Hungary, Albania and Italy itself accepted this conclusion. It was widely expected that the great majority of members would impose sanctions against Italy, and a committee was established to coordinate the measures to be taken by the several states. The supply of arms to Italy was stopped, and there was little difficulty in arriving at a joint resolve to cancel credits to a state whose credit-worthiness had become doubtful. Commercial sanctions were not so easily dealt with. These were of two kinds: sanctions on imports and sanctions on exports. The pro-sanction members of the League were disposed to cease buying from Italy, but they adopted this attitude with less enthusiasm and less conviction than they had evinced in the case of financial sanctions. It was necessary to argue that the defence of the Covenant

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should override particular commercial interests and to resolve that the countries least affected by such an embargo should devise ways of helping those which were making larger sacrifices.

Then came the question of sanctions on exports. In many fields the pro-sanctions states had sufficient control of the international market to impose effective restrictions by agreement among themselves, but there were a few important cases in which they lacked this control because the United States held the key; in iron, steel, coal, and coke the cooperation of both the United States and Germany was essential. Faced with this situation the representatives in Geneva recommended sanctions on exports in the first category but held their hands in regard to the more lethal second category.

Significantly they failed even to mention one other measure which could have been decisive, the closing of the Suez Canal. It was understood that Britain was firmly opposed to any risk of an Anglo-Italian naval fight in the Mediterranean.

The limitations of the actions taken against Italy were at first obscured by a number of things: satisfaction with the speed and smoothness of the coordinating machinery at Geneva; evidence that the sanctions in fact imposed were having some effect on the Italian economy; private attempts by the United States Government to dissuade oil companies from trading with Italy; and the British general election in November which seemed to strengthen the pro-sanctions Ministers in the British Cabinet. Oil sanctions, possibly with the formal cooperation of the United States Government, were expected before the end of the year. But at this hurdle horses began to refuse.

Laval was now working secretly, skilfully and convincingly for Mussolini, while in Britain the belief was growing that oil sanctions meant war. The result was the Hoare-Laval Plan which, though rejected by Italy and Ethiopia and regarded at Geneva as treason against the League, achieved the purpose of deflecting attention from sanctions (the coordinating committee had adjourned its deliberations at the instigation of France) to the possibilities of a settlement by partition. The pro-sanctionist élan of October and November was replaced by a policy of delays, as Geneva overtly lost ground to London and Paris.

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When Eden, succeeding the sacrificed Hoare, adopted the latter's policy and abandoned his championship of the Covenant, Mussolini's triumph had been assured provided only he could bring the fighting in Ethiopia to a quick finish. This he did, though he had to use gas as well as skill to do so. After Hitler entered the Rhineland on 3 March 1936, Britain and France rushed to make things up with Italy and found it easier to do so on the plea that the war in Ethiopia was as good as over. Earlier in the year Eden had advocated oil sanctions on condition that everybody joined to make them effective, but it was clear that the condition negated the promise and made it an empty one, and Eden himself did not refer to it again. The steam had gone out of sanctions before the end of 1935, though they were not formally abandoned (South Africa and New Zealand alone dissenting) until June 1936. By this time the Italians were in Addis Ababa, the Germans in the Rhineland, the Emperor of Ethiopia in Jerusalem, Britain and France in the slough of despond, and Mussolini in the mood to make the journey from the Stresa Front to the Pact of Steel.

2

Such very concisely was the course of the most celebrated attempt to apply sanctions in modern international politics. Since the attempt was made in the precise context of the provisions of the Covenant of the League, and since those provisions no longer exist but have been replaced by the different provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, it is necessary to examine the relevant parts of both these documents and to compare them. Both say what should, and what may, be done and in what circumstances. But what is said in one is quite different from what is said in the other.

Sanctions is a legal term. It connotes action to be taken in response to a breach of a legal obligation. The Covenant of the League defined the obligation precisely: to attempt to settle any dispute likely to lead to a rupture by one of three specified means, and not to resort to war until three months after the chosen method had proceeded to a conclusion (Article 12). The three methods were arbitration, judicial settlement and an inquiry by the Council itself, and the respective ends (before

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which a resort to war was a breach of the Covenant) were an arbitral award, a judicial decision and a report by the Council. The principal objects of Article 12 were to impose delay, to inculcate a habit of resort to peaceful ways of settling disputes, and to develop effective ways of doing this. The succeeding Articles 13–15 elaborated the notions of judicial settlement by the Permanent Court of International Justice, and inquiry and report by the Council itself. Then came Article 16 which declared that any member resorting to war in breach of Articles 12–15 had committed an act of war against all members of the League, who should thereupon immediately sever all commercial, financial and personal relations between themselves and their citizens on the one hand and the offending member and its citizens on the other. Thus an extensive embargo was to come into operation automatically. In addition the Council of the League was to recommend to members what military, naval and air forces they should contribute to the collective effort to ‘protect the Covenant’.

The comparable provisions of the U.N. Charter are contained in Chapter VII (Articles 39–51). Strictly speaking it is doubtful whether the measures envisaged in these articles ought properly to be called sanctions, and it has been argued that the only true sanctions prescribed by the Charter are expulsion from the organization (Article 6) and loss of voting rights (Article 19). I shall follow the language of Chapter VII and use the word ‘measures’ in place of ‘sanctions’, but this terminological nicety is without importance in the present context.

Article 39 gives the Security Council wide powers of decision which the Council of the League did not have. The Security Council is charged to determine whether there exists a threat to peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. If the Council resolves that any one of these three states of affairs has come to pass, certain consequences follow; if however the Council does not so resolve, then the measures which we are about to discuss may not be taken under the Charter. Everything therefore turns on an initial decision by the Council which is an essential prerequisite to collective action. It would seem that the threat, breach or act of aggression must have international implications, since the measures which the Council may take are expressly

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stated to have as their object the maintenance or restoration of 'international peace'.

If the Security Council determines that there is or has been such a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, it is further required to recommend, or decide upon, measures to rectify the situation. Thus the Security Council is empowered collectively to take decisions and set in motion a train of events, and an affirmative determination by the Security Council under Article 39 may lead to the imposition of binding obligations on all U.N. members (even if these obligations run counter to their own national legislation or constitutions). In the days of the League decisions of this nature rested with individual members, to whom the Council of the League transmitted only recommendations that were not mandatory. Nowadays the Security Council not only takes the decision but may also go on to designate particular U.N. members to take action (Article 48).

The Security Council has therefore a quasi-sovereign authority, but the Council is a composite body which can reach an affirmative conclusion on a substantive question only if more than half its members concur in this conclusion and if none of the five permanent members opposes it (Article 27(3)). Thus the inherent power of the Council is severely limited in practice by the procedural obstacles in the way of a decision to use that power. It is logically possible to conceive a situation in which action would, legally speaking, have been easier under the Covenant, since a member of the League might decide to impose sanctions of its own volition if it deemed that Article 15 had been properly invoked, whereas under the Charter no member may resort to enforcement measures under Chapter VII in the absence of what amounts to a directive to do so under Article 39. Under the Covenant a powerful member could withhold its practical support from sanctions and of course try to persuade others to do the same; under the Charter it may, if it is a permanent member of the Security Council, veto the Council's resolution and so prevent every other member from participating in collective action under Chapter VII.

Consequential action under the Charter is of two kinds: measures not involving the use of force (Article 41) and action by

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air, sea or land forces (Article 42 *et seq.*). Under Article 41 it is once more the Council and not individual members that decides, and having decided what measures ought to be adopted, the Council may call upon members to apply them. The Charter gives examples of possible measures. They include the partial or total interruption of economic relations and of communications (rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio), and the severance of diplomatic relations. The Council remains free to think up and impose any other relevant measures, excluding always the use of force. The Charter recognizes that a U.N. member may run into economic difficulties in its performance of its share in enforcement measures, and it therefore provides (Article 50) that any member – or indeed any non-member which has joined in the collective measures – may go to the Security Council and ask for help with its problems.

The use of force is dealt with at greater length (Articles 42–7). To begin with, the Security Council must come to the conclusion that measures under Article 41 will be, or have proved, inadequate. In that case the Council may take action by air, sea or land in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. Article 42 does not include the previous article's authority to the Council to call on members to do this or that; it has to take action itself and it must therefore be endowed with the means to do so. The framers of the Charter worked out a scheme (Articles 43–7) whereby members would enter into military agreements with the Security Council and provide it with military forces and facilities, but no such agreements have ever been made and after years of discussion the attempt to give effect to this part of the Charter was abandoned in 1948. Consequently Article 42 has been a dead letter and military operations carried out under the authority of the Council have been initiated under the general provisions of Article 39 and have not followed the lines envisaged by Articles 42–7. (Their legality has been challenged.)

The principal differences between the Covenant and the Charter are these. First, the provisions of the Covenant stem from a comparatively precise obligation and its breach – the obligation to postpone a resort to war until certain other methods of settling the dispute in question have been tried. Under the

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Charter the machinery of Chapter VII may be set in motion on three different grounds of which the most precise – an act of aggression – is considerably vaguer than resort to war, and the least precise – a threat to the peace – is not necessarily an act at all but no more than a state of affairs. Secondly, the Covenant made no provision for remedial action until after war had been started, whereas the wider and vaguer language of the Charter admits collective action at an earlier stage. Thirdly, the Covenant did not proscribe war but the Charter goes a long way towards doing so (see Articles 2(3) and (4)). Fourthly, the Covenant assumes that resort to war is a recognizable phenomenon even in the absence (as in 1935) of any declaration of war. The Council of the League was neither asked nor charged to make any pronouncement on this point. Under the Charter, however, the Security Council has to consider the facts and declare whether, as a matter of fact, any of the circumstances envisaged by Article 39 has arisen. In the absence of a similar provision in the Covenant it was open to each League member to conclude, in a doubtful case, whether there had been a resort to war or not, but once the Security Council has pronounced itself under Article 39 no U.N. member may question its conclusion or legitimately abstract itself from the consequences.

3

The application of sanctions in any particular case involves a politico-economic decision within a legal framework. Since national and international affairs are run by politicians with more or less understanding of economics, and not the other way round, the basic element is political will and the basic problem for any proponent of sanctions is how to influence the political will of the states that count most in the matter.

The contribution of economics to the formation of the political will is mainly to restrain rather than impel. Economic hazards operate to bolster a predilection for inaction, whereas the absence of economic objections is not a positive force in favour of action; whereas it is possible for a state to suffer loss by applying sanctions, it hardly ever gains materially by doing so. Both the Covenant and the Charter have recognized this and have

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made provision for softening the injury which a state may bring upon itself by imposing sanctions; it may expect help from its less vulnerable associates. But the expectation is not in practice a firm one and hardly suffices to offset the more prominent fear of discomfort and loss, high prices, unemployment and domestic electoral retribution.

The legal context is important because it determines the starting point of discussion. Where there is a strong legal case against an alleged offender the burden is on those who want to do nothing to make a convincing case for inaction. Where, however, the legal argument is weak, it is up to those pressing for sanctions to argue their associates into voting for them.

South Africa is open to attack on two quite separate grounds. Besides arguing that its internal policies are a threat to international peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter, its adversaries charge it with breaches of the agreement under which it exercises the mandate over South-West Africa (assigned to it by the League after that territory had been taken from Germany by the Treaty of Versailles). If the International Court decides against South Africa on this issue, the legal wrong will be sufficiently established, but the legal consequences are not so clear since neither the Covenant nor the mandate agreement itself prescribes what may be done in such a case.

The attempt to bring South Africa's internal policies within Article 39 and so open the way for international intervention runs up against the imprecision of the language in that article. Is *apartheid* a threat to international peace? There is more evidence of a desire to attack South Africa than of any South African desire to attack anybody outside its borders. And how immediate must the threat be? Is it a threat that is expected to materialize almost at once or a threat that can be shown to be building up even though no breach of the peace may be expected for years? That some time lag was envisaged by the framers of the Charter is proved by their distinction between a breach of the peace, which is presumably an actual present fact, and a threat to the peace, which is not. But how far one is entitled to look into the future is a question that has been left to contention, common sense and pressures.

The argument that South African policies are at present a

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threat to the peace of the future goes something like this. A minority is retaining control by denying elementary civil rights to the majority and by gross and daily invasions of elementary human rights; this minority happens to be a white minority in a black continent, and it is very nearly the only white minority left in a dominating position. This situation, at once anomalous and repulsive, cannot last. In time the Portuguese will be ousted from Angola and Moçambique, Southern Rhodesia will be ringed round by states with black African governments, and vengeance will stand on the borders of South Africa itself. This is prophecy, but it is prophecy at least as plausible as most of the forecasts on which politicians normally have to base their policies. If it is accepted as a reasonable view of what is likely to happen, then politicians cannot escape the strong probability of violence in the next few years. What are they going to do about it? Had they not better intervene now instead of waiting for the situation to get out of hand? If they are to intervene then – given that all attempts at persuasion and remonstrance have been tried and have failed – the line of attack would be internationally concerted measures to cut South Africa's exports and imports, particularly its imports of petrol and lubricating oils, enforced by a naval blockade and accompanied perhaps by a massive refusal of black South Africans to go on working. The object of such an economic campaign would be to prevent armageddon by coercing the South African whites into a dialogue with the South African blacks.

The arguments in favour of such a course are but tenuously legal. It is true that they envisage threats to peace, and that the source of these transgressions lies in the policies of the South African Government. To that extent it is arguable that the circumstances of Article 39 have now arisen and that the culpability lies with the South African Government. But the force of the arguments that I have set out in the preceding paragraph is not that they are legally overwhelming but that they contain a strong appeal to self-interest, for the champions of sanctions are saying that it will be worse for everybody if sanctions are not applied now. There is a choice between waiting for catastrophe and trying to bludgeon into the minds of South Africa's white minority the notion that power can be shared between

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white and black and cannot long be monopolized by the whites.

The issue has to be decided by the Security Council. It comes up in legal guise but it is debated as a question of fact and is voted upon by politicians, and a politician's understanding of complicated legal arguments may be influenced by his view of the future, simply because he is a politician concerned with events and not a lawyer intent upon the interpretation of documents.

Each member of the Security Council is influenced by differing national considerations. Britain has special and prominent defence and economic interests and also wider worries of a more general nature that are not peculiar to itself.

The strategic argument is dying but not dead. Successive Conservative governments have believed that the retention of the use of the naval base at Simonstown is a vital British interest, and although this belief has become more and more tattered under scrutiny, it remains politically potent if only because it lingers on in the mind and speeches of the Prime Minister and a group of influential colleagues. More powerful still are the economic arguments concerning British trade and investment and the supply of gold. These arguments are examined in another paper at greater length, and I wish only to make two points: first, that the investment of about £1,000 million in South Africa and annual trade with it to the value of about £150 million are not far off the totals of British investment and trade with the rest of Africa, so that Britain is now open to material reprisals from black Africa; and secondly that neither figure is very large in relation to total British investment and trade, though they may bulk very large in the affairs of particular persons or concerns (who may be influential).

Gold deserves a special word. It is important because more than two thirds of South African exports of gold are bought by Western countries for the reserves which back their currencies and also (for Britain) because practically all this gold is bought on the London market with consequent benefit to the British balance of payments. Alternatives to gold as a basis for national currencies have long been debated with little result, and it is hardly conceivable that one would be adopted in the crisis atmosphere which would be created by a decision of the South African Government to keep its gold off the London market.

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That Government holds, therefore, a powerful weapon against the West and against Britain in particular so long as the West continues to fail to devise a new monetary system, but at the same time this advantage is offset by the difficulty that South Africa would have in finding at short notice other markets capable of handling gold in large quantities. The impact of gold on the question of sanctions is dealt with more fully in Mr Opie's paper (page 153).

Besides its economic inhibitions the British Government has been influenced by wider considerations which are shared by some other governments. Sanctions are disliked because they are a form of interference in the affairs of other countries and because all such interference is basically suspect in the eyes of an old-established sovereign state. There is a conflict here between two views which both contain a degree of truth: the view that the more interference you allow, the more trouble you are going to have, and the opposite view that unless you sanction more interference, the more you connive at the continuance of malpractices, many of which ought, for safety's sake or righteousness' sake, to be nipped in the bud. This is a form of the contemporary dialogue between nationalism and internationalism. Nationalists, who prefer the sovereign state as the devil we know, regard international action as an extra and last resort, a device not to be extravagantly used because it is new and untried and because it upsets established ways of doing things. Internationalists want to develop joint action urgently in order to remedy the deficiencies of a world order based on the interplay of national expediencies which have in the past led to war at least as often as they have prevented it (some would say, more often). The development of sanctions as a regular part of international politics, accompanied as it must be by an evolution and elaboration of international law in practice, appeals to the internationalist on general grounds just as it scares the nationalist.

Whatever the correct view of the law may be at present, or the balance of political expediency, or the impact of economics, the force of the case against South Africa is massive disapproval. The South African Government has no friends, and the strongest motive force in the campaign against it is moral indignation

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against its odious behaviour. If this campaign succeeds, people will be tempted to say that international intervention occurred in the affairs of a particular state because of dislike of what was going on there. There are a great many states where unsavoury things go on, either because the authorities are too feeble to protect groups of its citizens or because they themselves knock people around. Is international intervention to be permitted and encouraged in all these cases? Given the state of the world, such a prospect is alarming but I cannot see any logical answer to the question except: yes, if Article 39 can be properly invoked. The main reason why the prospect is alarming is that the criteria for such intervention are not defined, with the result that intervention could become widespread, indiscriminate and misplaced. But the remedy is not to refuse to intervene; it is to define the cases in which intervention is to be permitted. Definitions come by prescript and by practice, or, as we should say in domestic affairs, by legislation and by test cases. In international affairs there is little of either and a need for more. Good cases make good law, and the South African case is a good occasion to test the meaning of Article 39 and to define and extend the rule of law in human affairs.

By the close of 1963 the Security Council had twice resolved that the policies of the South African Government were a grave disturbance of international peace. The Council did not use the word 'threat' but substituted for it the word 'disturb' in order to avoid the precise formulation of Article 39. This alteration was insisted upon by the British and United States governments which were unwilling to resort to enforcement measures under Chapter VII but felt no longer able to oppose recognition and condemnation of the facts of the case. In consequence the Security Council, virtually at the behest of these two members (whose concurrence is essential for effective sanctions and which both possess the veto), got itself into the position of acknowledging a threat to peace but evading the consequences of its own resolution by calling it something else. There is therefore a conflict between the facts which set the law of the Charter in motion and the political will of states which have the power to implement it. For the time being this embarrassing discrepancy is being handled by juggling with synonyms.

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Part 1: Background Facts

In considering from a legal standpoint the possible application of sanctions against South Africa, it is essential to begin by getting the record straight. That is what I shall now attempt briefly to do.

Ever since the inception of the United Nations, the Union (now the Republic) of South Africa has been embroiled with that Organization. This involvement has concerned three main issues: (i) The treatment of Indians in South Africa; (ii) The status of South West Africa; and (iii) The question of *apartheid* and race relations in South Africa. I shall consider these issues in turn.

1. The Treatment of Indians in South Africa

On 22 June 1946 the Government of India requested that the question of the treatment of Indians in South Africa be included in the provisional agenda for the second part of the first session of the General Assembly. South Africa objected, arguing that, since the Indians concerned were nationals not of India but of South Africa, the question was a matter 'essentially within the domestic jurisdiction' within the meaning of Article 2(7) of the Charter¹ and should not even be put on the agenda. The United

1. This provision reads as follows: 'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which

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Kingdom, contending that the question was a legal one, suggested that it be referred to the Assembly's legal committee. The Soviet Union, however, said the question was political and should go to the Assembly's political committee. The United States proposed that it be discussed by both committees. Eventually it was decided to refer it to a joint meeting of the two committees. These committees recommended, and the General Assembly adopted, in December 1946, a resolution in which it was stated that 'the treatment of Indians in the Union should be in conformity with the international obligations under the agreements concluded between the two Governments, and the relevant provisions of the Charter.' A South African attempt to persuade the Assembly to ask the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the question whether the Assembly was competent to deal with the Indian complaint was defeated.

This bold assertion of competence by the General Assembly, as well as its refusal to let the Court consider the question, was significant. For South Africa's assertion that the Assembly lacked competence rested on three main grounds: (i) that a country's treatment of its own nationals was a purely domestic affair, within the meaning of Article 2(7); (ii) that no question arose of the violation of any human rights provisions in the Charter because the Charter did not contain any specific obligations in this respect; and (iii) that no international agreements were involved, since the arrangements of 1927 and 1932 relied upon by India were purely intra-Commonwealth transactions and not international agreements proper. All three grounds must be deemed to have been rejected by the General Assembly.

On 23 September 1947 the General Assembly decided to refer the question of the treatment of Indians in South Africa to its First (Political) Committee exclusively, thereby emphasizing that it regarded the question as a political rather than a legal issue. A further resolution was adopted on 14 May 1949, inviting the Governments of South Africa, India, and Pakistan

are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.'

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(which had now become involved) to discuss the problem at a round-table conference, 'taking into consideration the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration of Human Rights'.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights had been adopted by a resolution of the General Assembly on 10 December 1948 by 48 votes to none, with 8 abstentions. Those abstaining included South Africa and the Soviet Union. Most jurists agree that the Declaration, although it has great moral value, is not legally binding. Some jurists, however, consider that it is an authoritative interpretation of the human rights provisions of the Charter by the organ having authority to interpret them, and that as such the Declaration must be regarded as legally binding on Members of the United Nations.

On 2 December 1950 a resolution was adopted in which the General Assembly called upon South Africa to refrain from implementing the Group Areas Act pending negotiations. In the preamble there appeared a reference to *apartheid* which, it was said, 'is necessarily based on doctrines of racial discrimination'.

The question of Indians in South Africa has been discussed since at regular intervals, although in a rather desultory way. On 11 November 1953, for instance, the General Assembly proclaimed that various actions of the South African Government were 'not in keeping with its obligations and responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations'. Recently the particular problem of the Indians in South Africa has tended to be regarded as simply part of the wider issue of race relations in that country as a whole. The record, however, discloses on the part of South Africa a persistent policy of refusing to comply with resolutions of the General Assembly on this question.

2. The Status of South-West Africa

In 1915 the German colony of South-West Africa surrendered to South African forces. Under Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919, Germany renounced all her rights in respect of the territory in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. In accordance with Article 22 of the same Treaty – this article came within that part of the Versailles Treaty known as the

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Covenant of the League of Nations – the territory became a Mandate, South Africa being appointed as the Mandatory. Article 22 stated that since the territory was one of those ‘inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world,’ there should be applied to it ‘the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization’. It was also provided that South-West Africa could be administered as an integral portion of the territory of South Africa, subject to certain safeguards in favour of the indigenous population. These safeguards included an annual report to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. Later, a system was introduced whereby the inhabitants of the territory could submit written petitions to the Permanent Mandates Commission.

The actual Mandate for South-West Africa was adopted by the Council of the League on 17 December 1920. Under Article 2 the Mandatory was entitled to ‘apply the laws of the Union of South Africa to the territory, subject to such local modifications as circumstances may require’: but the Mandatory was also obliged to ‘promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory’. In Article 7 it was provided that ‘if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the Mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice.’

From 1934 onwards South Africa began to urge that South-West Africa be completely merged in the Union. But no decision was taken and the status of the territory remained as it was until the League of Nations was dissolved on 18 April 1946. In November of that year South Africa suggested to the General Assembly of the United Nations that the annexation of the territory by the Union be approved. It was claimed that the European population, through the medium of the South-West Africa Legislative Assembly, had unanimously expressed its wish to be included in the Union, and that a consultation of the natives had shown the majority of them also to be in favour of

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incorporation. But the General Assembly rejected South Africa's proposal and recommended instead that the territory be placed under the international trusteeship system.

As deadlock ensued, the General Assembly asked the International Court to give an advisory opinion. On 11 July 1950 the Court advised: (i) that South Africa remained bound by the obligation of Article 22 of the Covenant and the Mandate; (ii) that, while South Africa could bring South-West Africa within the trusteeship system of the United Nations, she was not legally obliged to do so; and (iii) that South Africa alone could not modify the international status of the territory, the competence to do this resting with the Union and the United Nations jointly. The Court also held that, while South Africa must now submit reports and petitions to the General Assembly, 'the degree of supervision to be exercised by the General Assembly should not . . . exceed that which applied under the Mandates system, and should conform as far as possible to the procedure followed in this respect by the Council of the League of Nations.'¹ The two Commonwealth judges, Sir Arnold (now Lord) McNair (U.K.) and Judge Read (Canada), agreed with this advice except that, in their view, the United Nations was not entitled to exercise any supervisory role over the administration of the Mandate.

In a resolution adopted on 13 December 1950 the General Assembly accepted the Court's opinion. But the attempt to implement it ran into difficulties, partly because the Mandatory did not cooperate and partly because the Charter did not provide for any supervision of the administration of continuing Mandates by the United Nations. It was necessary to ask the Court for two more Advisory Opinions.

In the first of these,² the Court advised that 'the degree of supervision' exercised over South Africa would not 'exceed that which applied under the Mandates System' merely because the new supervising body, the General Assembly, arrived at its decisions by a two-thirds majority, whereas in the case of the former supervising body, the Council of the League, the unanimity rule prevailed. The Court held that in using the ex-

1. *I.C.J. Reports*, 1950, pp. 128, 138.

2. *I.C.J. Reports*, 1955, p. 67.

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pression 'degree of supervision' it had in mind 'the extent of the substantive supervision thus exercised' rather than the voting procedures of the supervising bodies.

The British judge, the late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, agreed with the Court, but for a different reason. His view was that, although the General Assembly could arrive at decisions more easily than the League Council could, the degree of supervision was not exceeded since the General Assembly's resolutions were of a less binding character than the decisions of the League Council. Nevertheless its resolutions were not entirely without legal effect. Members of the United Nations were not obliged to comply with recommendations addressed to them by the General Assembly, but they were bound to give them 'due consideration in good faith'. Moreover, the learned Judge went on: 'An Administering State which consistently sets itself above the solemnly and repeatedly expressed judgement of the Organization, in particular in proportion as that judgement approximates to unanimity, may find that it has overstepped the imperceptible line between impropriety and illegality, between discretion and arbitrariness, between the exercise of the legal right to disregard the recommendation and the abuse of that right, and that it has exposed itself to consequences legitimately following as a legal sanction.'¹

The next Opinion concerned the question whether the Committee on South-West Africa, established by the General Assembly, could grant oral hearings to petitioners on matters relating to South-West Africa. This had never been done in the days of the League and it was again argued that, if this practice were now started, the 'degree of supervision' would exceed that which applied under the Mandates system. The Court, however, held that this would not be so since, although the League Council never had granted oral hearings, it possessed power to grant them.² Again the separate opinion of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht is interesting, formulated as it is on a wider ground. He conceded that in some ways the granting of oral hearings would constitute a degree of supervision exceeding that applied in the past. But, in his view, such excess would be justified by the Mandatory's refusal to cooperate. As he put it: 'If, owing to the attitude of

1. *ibid.*, pp. 115-20.

2. *I.C.J. Reports*, 1956, p. 23.

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the Government of South Africa, the degree of supervision as applied under the Mandates System is in danger of being severely reduced with regard to the principal aspects of its operation, it is fully consistent with the Opinion of the Court of 11 July 1950 that in some respects that supervision should become more stringent provided that it can be said, in reason and in good faith, that the total effect is not such as to increase the degree of supervision as previously obtaining.¹ It seems, therefore, that in the learned Judge's view the legitimacy of the measures taken by the General Assembly to ensure the operation of the Mandate is to some extent affected by the degree of cooperation, or lack of it, forthcoming from the Mandatory. So long as the Mandatory fulfils his obligations, the General Assembly cannot go further than the League Council could. But in proportion as the Mandatory fails to carry out his duties, to that extent the General Assembly may exceed its own powers in order to redress the balance and protect the 'sacred trust of civilization'.

Useful as these three Advisory Opinions were in clarifying legal issues, they suffered from one major defect. They were advisory only. Here I must not be misunderstood. South Africa's obligations under the Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant, whatever these were, remained binding.² What was advisory only was the Court's Opinion on what South Africa's obligations were. A way was therefore sought to obtain from the Court a judgement that would actually be binding on South Africa in terms of Article 59 of the Court's Statute³ and Article 94 of the Charter. The latter provision reads:

1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.

2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgement rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary,

1. *ibid.*, p. 45.

2. Except of course on the South African view, rejected by the Court in 1950, that with the demise of the League of Nations in 1946 the Mandate itself had lapsed.

3. This provides: 'The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.' Although this article is framed negatively, it clearly implies that, in respect of the particular case in question, the decision of the Court has binding force.

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make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgement.

In due course a way was found. On 4 November 1960 Ethiopia and Liberia deposited in the Court Applications in which they asked the Court, *inter alia*, to declare that, in administering South-West Africa, the Government of South Africa had practised *apartheid*; that this was a violation of Article 2 of the Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant; and that the South African Government must cease this practice forthwith. On 21 December 1962, by 8 votes to 7, the Court rejected four Preliminary Objections to its jurisdiction submitted by South Africa.¹ Accordingly, the way is now clear for the Court to give a Judgement on the merits of the case, probably in 1965 or 1966.

It is interesting that the two Commonwealth judges, Sir Percy Spender (Australia) and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (U.K.), were among the minority. They not only upheld all four of South Africa's objections but added a further one of their own to the effect that the issues were not 'such as to be capable of objective legal determination' and that the Court was being asked 'to discharge a task which, in the final analysis, hardly appears to be a judicial one'.² But the other common law judge, Judge Jessup of the United States, citing various cases decided in the Supreme Court of his own country, could see no reason why the International Court 'should be unable to determine whether various laws and regulations promote the "material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants" of the mandated territory'.³

This difference of approach between judges trained in what is basically a common legal tradition is probably due to the wider role assumed by the Supreme Court in the United States as compared with courts in the Commonwealth. It certainly testifies to the complexity of the issues with which the Court is faced in the South-West Africa case.

Two further points need to be mentioned about this case. The first point is that in a resolution adopted on 18 December 1960 the General Assembly *found* that 'the Government of the Union of South Africa has failed and refused to carry out its

1. *I.C.J. Reports*, 1962, p. 319.

2. *ibid.*, pp. 466-7.

3. *ibid.*, p. 429.

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obligations under the Mandate for the Territory of South-West Africa' and *commended* the Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia upon their initiative in submitting the matter to the International Court. The language of this resolution is unfortunate. Even although there is no *sub judice* rule in international proceedings, the General Assembly should not so openly have given the impression that it was prejudging the very questions now being put to the Court. On the other hand, in so far as the Assembly commended the Applicant States for going to the Court, it is, I submit, morally – though not legally – bound to await the outcome of the proceedings before recommending further action in regard to South-West Africa.

The second point is that, in deciding the South-West Africa case, the Court may have to adjudicate upon South Africa's *apartheid* laws in general. The reason is that the first paragraph of Article 2 of the Mandate permits the Mandatory in principle to apply his own laws to the mandated territory. The question the Court will have to decide is the relation between that paragraph and the second paragraph of the same article which requires the Mandatory to 'promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants'. But while any opinion the Court may feel called upon to express on the *apartheid* laws will have great significance, it must be remembered that it will have binding force only in relation to South-West Africa and the Mandate.

3. The Question of Apartheid and Race Relations in South Africa

On 12 September 1952 thirteen Afro-Asian states requested that the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* in that country be placed on the agenda of the seventh session of the General Assembly. This was an important development because it was the first occasion on which it was sought to debate in the Assembly the issue of *apartheid* as such. In the case of the Indians, although they were South African nationals, the interpretation of international, or at least quasi-international, agreements was involved. The international aspect of the South-West African issue could not be gainsaid. Now, however, it was sought to put before the General Assembly what, according to traditional tenets of international law,

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was undeniably a domestic question – namely a country's way of organizing its whole manner of living and the treatment by a State of its own nationals.

Many countries – including the United Kingdom – raised objections based on Article 2(7). The Assembly, however, assumed competence, apparently on two broad grounds. The first was that questions of human rights, affecting the interpretation of certain provisions of the Charter, were involved; and the second was that there might be a threat to peace. As in the case of the Indians, an attempt to ask the Court whether the Assembly was competent or not was unsuccessful.

After the matter had been discussed in its *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, the General Assembly adopted on 5 December 1952 two resolutions. In one of these it established a commission to study the racial situation in South Africa; in the other it declared in general terms that 'in a multi-racial society harmony and respect for human rights and freedoms and the peaceful development of a unified community are best ensured when patterns of legislation and practice are directed towards ensuring equality before the law of all persons regardless of race, creed, or colour, and when economic, social, cultural, and political participation of all racial groups is on a basis of equality'. Without naming South Africa, the Assembly went on to affirm that 'governmental policies of Member States which are not directed towards these goals, but which are designed to perpetuate or increase discrimination, are inconsistent with the pledges of the Members under Article 56 of the Charter'.¹

For the next few years the matter remained on the agenda of successive sessions of the General Assembly. Thus, on 6 December 1955, the Assembly expressed its concern that the Government of South Africa continued to give effect to the policies of *apartheid* and reminded that Government that, in signing the Charter, it had affirmed its faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person. On 30

1. This article provides that 'All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.' One of these purposes is the promotion by the United Nations of 'universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion'.

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January 1957 the General Assembly *deplored* the failure of South Africa to observe its obligations under the Charter. In 1960, following on the Sharpeville riots, the issue was transferred to the Security Council, which on 1 April *recognized* that the situation in South Africa was 'one that has led to international friction and if continued might endanger international peace and security'; *deplored* the policies and actions of the South African Government; and *called upon* that Government to abandon *apartheid*. At the next session a strong resolution was adopted in the General Assembly also.¹ By this time South Africa had become increasingly isolated in the United Nations, and even the United Kingdom delegate, while maintaining his position on Article 2(7), conceded that the *apartheid* situation was so exceptional as to be *sui generis* and as such within the competence of the Assembly.

On 14 December 1960 the General Assembly adopted its famous Declaration on Independence for Colonial Countries and Peoples. No more than the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is this a legally binding instrument, but its political significance is great. In so far as in the Declaration the General Assembly *solemnly proclaims* 'the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end *colonialism* in all its forms and manifestations' it may be thought that the Declaration has no application to South Africa, which after all is not a colony. That would probably be a mistake. For the Declaration states that 'All peoples have the right to self-determination'; that 'inadequacy of political, economic, social, or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence'; that immediate steps should be taken in all territories which have not yet attained independence 'to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations . . .' and 'without any distinction as to race, creed, or colour'; and that 'all States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the present Declaration'.

This Declaration of 1960 is almost certainly intended by its sponsors to apply to the whole of southern Africa as well as of

1. On 13 April 1961.

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course to many other parts of the world. An ominous interpretation of its meaning was given by India when it invoked the Declaration as a justification for its invasion of Goa in December 1961. But the main impact of the Declaration has been to give greater cohesion to the anti-colonial and anti-white campaign in the United Nations. Thus on 6 November 1962 the Assembly, referring to previous action taken both on the treatment of Indians question and on the *apartheid* issue, repeated its censure of the Government of South Africa and requested Member States to take a number of measures, separately or collectively, with a view to making that Government change its policies. These measures included breaking off, or refraining from establishing, diplomatic relations; closing ports to vessels flying the South African flag; the enactment of legislation by States prohibiting their own vessels from entering South African ports; boycotting South African goods; refraining from exporting goods, including all arms and ammunition, to South Africa; and denying landing rights to South African aircraft. The Assembly also established a Special Committee to keep the racial policies of the South African Government under review.

To round off this all too brief account, the Security Council returned to the charge on 7 August 1963 when '*being convinced* that the situation in South Africa is seriously disturbing international peace and security', it adopted a resolution in which it *called upon* the South African Government to abandon *apartheid* and *solemnly called upon* all States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types, and military vehicles to South Africa. A proposal to call for a trade boycott failed, however, to secure the necessary number of votes and was not included in the resolution, which was carried by 9 votes to 0. The United Kingdom and France abstained, the delegate of the former pointing out that, since there was no evidence that South Africa's actions threatened the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the Council should not consider sanctions. On 4 December 1963 the Council adopted a further resolution, this time unanimously. In this the Council *condemned* South Africa's non-compliance with previous resolutions; *solemnly called upon* 'all States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of equipment and materials for the

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manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in South Africa'; *requested* the Secretary-General to establish a group of experts 'to examine methods of resolving the present situation in South Africa through full, peaceful, and orderly application of human rights and fundamental freedoms to all inhabitants of the territory as a whole, regardless of race, colour, or creed'; and *invited* the South African Government to avail itself of the assistance of this group.

The following comments may be made on this resolution, which was proposed by Norway.

(i) In the debate, the delegates of the United Kingdom and France made it clear that their countries would not interfere with the sale or shipment of equipment to be used by South Africa in making and maintaining arms to repel an external attack. The export licensing system of these countries was already said to be based on this distinction, the legal basis for which would appear to be that, whereas the maintenance of *apartheid* by force may endanger international peace, a country is entitled to prepare to defend itself against attack from outside and there is no objection to other countries assisting with those preparations. Curiously enough, these resolutions of the Security Council do not explicitly call for a ban on sales and shipments of arms and military equipment to South Africa by private firms. Presumably the Governments to which these resolutions are addressed are supposed to ban such practices by their subjects as well as to abstain from them themselves. But some clarification is needed since, under the laws of war, although neutral governments are required not to furnish belligerents directly with military supplies they are under no obligation to prevent private persons from doing so.

(ii) The proposal to establish a group of experts to help South Africa in finding a solution to its racial problems is a peculiarly constructive one and is greatly to the credit of the Scandinavian countries who put it forward. Unfortunately, the South African Government rejected this proposal too, although the group, if it had been able to visit South Africa, would have consisted of some particularly distinguished and qualified persons, including Sir Hugh Foot (United Kingdom) and Mrs Alva Myrdal (Sweden).

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Part II: Legal Considerations

Having given what I hope is an objective account of the facts, I must now address myself to certain considerations of law. It will be convenient to do this in the form of a succession of propositions.

(1) Of the three issues discussed above, only the South-West Africa problem has undergone profound *legal* analysis by duly authorized organs, and even there the International Court has not yet considered the merits of the case. The Judgement to be given by the Court in that case will clearly be of the greatest importance. However, until a judgement is rendered, it is never wise to speculate as to what the result will be.

(2) Nor have we any right to assume that, if the judgement goes against South Africa, that country will fail to carry it out. It is true that South Africa's record in the matter of General Assembly resolutions does not inspire confidence in that respect. But in the main there is no legal duty to comply with such resolutions, or even with recommendations of the Security Council when that organ is acting, as it has been so far, under Chapter VI of the Charter. By contrast, when the Court gives a Judgement, there is a duty to comply, under Article 94 of the Charter. Similarly, if the Security Council, acting under Article 39 of the Charter, determines the existence of a 'threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression' and decides that measures must be taken under Chapter VII of the Charter, there is an obligation on the Members to carry out its decisions.¹

(3) Although in general there may be no legal duty to comply with resolutions of the General Assembly or with mere *recommendations* of the Security Council, this is subject to two qualifications:

1. e.g. Article 25: 'The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter', and Article 48(1): 'The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.' Moreover the protection given by the domestic jurisdiction principle, such as it is, 'shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.' This is provided by Article 2(7).

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(a) If a country has a persistent record of non-compliance, the presumption suggested by Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht may come into play. Such a country, the learned Judge suggested, may be no longer exercising its right, but abusing it, and as a result may expose itself to legal sanctions.

(b) If the organs concerned confine themselves to recommending States to carry out existing obligations, and the States to which the recommendations are addressed do not comply, then these States are in breach, not so much of any duty to obey the recommendations of the United Nations organs, as of their fundamental duty to fulfil their obligations in the first place.

(4) It may be as well to deal at this stage with the fundamental objection, consistently put forward by South Africa, that whatever may be the powers of the Security Council, and indeed of the General Assembly as well, all United Nations action with respect to *apartheid* is illegal because this relates to a matter 'essentially within the domestic jurisdiction' of South Africa. As was demonstrated in the Advisory Opinion given by the Court in the case of *Certain Expenses of the United Nations*, and also in some of the opinions of individual judges in that case,¹ it is not exactly easy to deal with root-and-branch objections of this type. Take, for instance, the words of Judge Sir Percy Spender in that case: 'If the General Assembly were to "intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State" within the meaning of Article 2(7) of the Charter, whatever be the meaning given to these words, that intervention would be the entering into a field prohibited to it under the Charter and be beyond the authority of the General Assembly. This would continue to be so, no matter how frequently and consistently the General Assembly had construed its authority to permit it to make intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any States. The majority has no power to extend, alter, or disregard the Charter.' The same Judge repeatedly urged that the actual practice of United Nations organs has no probative value so far as concerns the correct interpretation of the Charter.²

The reason for this unsatisfactory state of affairs is, as the

1. *I.C.J. Reports*, 1962, p. 151.

2. *ibid.*, pp. 195-7.

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Court explained, the fact that 'proposals made during the drafting of the Charter to place the ultimate authority to interpret the Charter in the International Court of Justice were not accepted'. The consequence is, the Court went on, that 'each organ must, *in the first place at least*, determine its own jurisdiction.'¹ The possibility of organs of the United Nations, and even of the Organization as a whole, acting *ultra vires* was therefore clearly accepted by the Court. At the same time, the position was surely correctly stated by the Court when it said: 'When the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such action is not *ultra vires* the Organization.'² What is the correct deduction from all this? Surely it is that when United Nations organs take decisions by the prescribed majorities there is a presumption that they act legally. This presumption is not absolutely irrebuttable, but it is sufficiently strong to ensure that United Nations organs need not tremble to act through fear of exceeding their powers. At the same time a grave responsibility rests on these organs to act with caution, often step by step, and always attempting to carry the maximum number of States with them.

(5) So far as the South-West Africa problem is concerned, there are strong, if not compelling, reasons why no action should be taken until the Judgement of the Court has been given. In so far as the Court in that case may make pronouncements which have a bearing on the *apartheid* issue as a whole, it may be wise similarly to delay action in regard to the whole problem. There is, however, no legal reason why the General Assembly and the Security Council need defer all political action on South African issues if they feel that such issues require urgent political attention.

(6) In what follows as regards sanctions, it must be realized that any decision to apply sanctions against South Africa would be a political decision. All that a lawyer can do is to set out the underlying legal principles and to indicate how the decision to apply sanctions, if such decision were taken on political grounds, could not merely be kept within the law but could also be

1. *ibid.*, p. 168.

2. *ibid.*

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implemented in such a way as best to promote the rule of law.

(7) A sanction has been defined by a leading jurist as a 'threatened evil', the purpose of which is to induce persons to a certain conduct so that those 'whose conduct is to be regulated will, in order to avoid the threatened evil, refrain from the undesired actions, and will perform the desired ones'. The same authority tells us that a sanction is the consequence of a delict; or, to put it the other way round, a delict is the condition of a sanction.¹

(8) Assuming this view of sanctions to be correct, the following are the main sanctions provided for in the Charter.²

(a) *Suspension from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership of the United Nations.* This is provided for in Article 5. The action is taken by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. This sanction is applicable in the case of 'a Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council'. It is therefore a sanction which is supplementary to other action already taken under other headings (e.g. Article 39 and possibly Article 94).

(b) *Expulsion from the United Nations.* This is provided for in Article 6. The action is taken by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. This sanction is applicable in the case of 'a Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter'. By 'Principles' here are probably meant the Principles listed in Article 2. One of these, however, is very general, namely the duty to 'fulfil in good faith' the obligations assumed by Members in accordance with the present Charter.³ Paradoxically, expulsion seems a less drastic penalty than suspension. For an expelled Member may no longer be subject to the duties imposed upon Members. Also an expelled Member may have the rights specifically conferred by the Charter upon

1. Hans Kelsen, *The Principles of International Law*, New York, Rinehart and Co., 1952, pp. 4-7.

2. There is also the sanction provided for in Article 19 - namely loss of vote in the General Assembly if the amount of a Member's arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contribution due from that Member for the preceding two full years. This rather special sanction is not discussed here.

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non-Members, whereas a suspended Member presumably does not enjoy these rights.

(c) *Enforcement action taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII.* As has already been indicated, this action depends upon a determination by the Council that there exists a 'threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression' within the meaning of Article 39. The action taken may take the form of measures decided upon by the Council, or of recommendations. The decisions of the Council are binding upon Members; its recommendations are not.

(d) *Action taken by the Security Council under Article 94.* As has already been explained, where a party fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a Judgement rendered by the International Court, the Security Council may make recommendations, or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the Judgement. Here again the decisions of the Council are binding upon Members; its recommendations are not. There is much uncertainty as to the powers of the Council under Article 94, and as to the relation of these powers to those possessed under Article 39. It seems safe to say, however, that while the Council has considerable power under Article 94 this article does not add significantly to the power the Council already has under Article 39. Moreover, the Council is not obliged to exercise its power either under Article 39 or under Article 94. In other words, the Council is not actually bound to enforce Judgements of the Court, although it may do so if it wishes. Under both Articles 39 and 94 the Council is given a wide discretion to do what it thinks best in the circumstances.

(9) In all these situations, the Security Council arrives at its decisions 'by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members' (Article 27(3)). In other words, the Council's decisions are subject to the famous 'veto' of the Great Powers – although, under a practice which has developed, a decision is deemed validly taken even if a permanent member of the Security Council abstains on the vote.

(10) Under the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution, adopted by the General Assembly on 3 November 1950, it is provided that 'if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the

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permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.'

When the General Assembly steps in and thus exercises what may be called its 'secondary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security',¹ it does so subject to the limitation that it can only make recommendations. Unlike the Security Council it cannot take decisions which the Members must 'accept and carry out' (Article 25). Moreover, the General Assembly only envisages itself recommending the use of armed force 'in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression'. This, however, is of little moment, since the Assembly already has power under Article 14 of the Charter itself to 'recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.'

(11) While all the above measures may be described as sanctions – and therefore the conduct justifying the use of these measures may in each case be described as a delict – certain differences may be noted. Action taken under Article 94 rests on the firm legal basis that the delict, which is the condition of the sanction, consists of a failure to carry out the Judgement of the International Court. Action taken under Article 6 (expulsion) presupposes violation by the guilty party of the Principles of the Charter, although here it falls to the Security Council and the General Assembly, both political organs, to pronounce the verdict of 'guilty'. Action taken under Chapter VII, and the supplementary action taken under Article 5 (suspension) are even more political in that here not merely are the sentencing

1. Article 24 of the Charter confers primary responsibility in this respect upon the Security Council.

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organs solely political, but also the 'guilty' party may, as it were, be sentenced by these organs without having been convicted of any legal wrong. This situation has apparently been accepted by the international community in the belief that, in extreme cases, peace comes before justice. Another way of looking at it is perhaps that, in extremely grave circumstances, the Security Council is empowered under the Charter actually to make new law binding on the Members. If that view is correct, the refractory Member must be deemed to have violated the new law made for it by the Council. It is not surprising therefore that whenever action under Chapter VII is suggested there is a tendency on the part of some Members of the Security Council to hesitate and to seek alternative solutions. This is likely to apply to the South Africa case as much as to any other case. Apart from all other considerations, it stems from the fear of creating precedents.

(12) In these situations, a 'threat to the peace' and a 'breach of the peace' must be judged objectively. Parties are not allowed to say that a 'threat to the peace' exists merely because they disapprove of another State's conduct. Nor, however, is a party allowed to say that no 'threat to the peace' exists merely because the question turns on domestic issues and such threats to international peace as do exist are not his responsibility but are fomented from outside by his critics and opponents.

(13) While the Security Council has sweeping powers, under Chapter VII particularly, in practice it is limited in the exercise of those powers (a) by the veto, and (b) by the fact that it disposes of no force for the purpose of carrying out its decisions. This is because, although Article 43 of the Charter envisaged that all Members of the United Nations would 'undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security', no such agreements have ever been made. Moreover, Article 106 appears to make the power of the Security Council to order 'military sanctions' under Article 42 dependent upon the prior conclusion of the special agreements referred to in Article 43. The failure to conclude these agreements is, however, probably

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no bar to the Council 'recommending' to the Members the use of military force.

(14) In practice, therefore, the possibility of applying 'military sanctions' against South Africa, if such extreme measures were thought to be desirable, would seem to depend upon raising a voluntary international force on the recommendation of the Security Council or the General Assembly. There are models for such a force, both in the Middle East and in the Congo, although in the case of those forces it was not envisaged that they would in fact use force, save in self-defence. The United Nations force in the Congo had in the end to employ a fair amount of force, although hardly on the scale that would have to be contemplated if it were intended to bring South Africa to heel by military means. The nations contributing to such a force might find themselves accused of aggression by South Africa. If that happened, they would have to rely on the defence that they were acting on the recommendation of international organs and that the use of force in such circumstances does not amount to an act of aggression or a breach of the Charter.¹ They might also plead that they were acting in self-defence. Such a plea would indeed be far-fetched, although perhaps not more so than some of the interpretations which have been put on the exercise of this right in the past.²

(15) For these reasons and for a number of others – e.g. the precedent it would create and the difficulty of financing it –

1. A relevant provision would be Article 2(4), which reads: 'All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.' Members of the United Nations contributing to the Force would no doubt argue that their conduct, so far from being 'inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations', was consistent with those Purposes and indeed designed to promote them.

2. Here the relevant provision would be Article 51 of the Charter which reads as follows: 'Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the

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one may conclude that there will be considerable reluctance to employ military measures against South Africa, without at any rate other measures having been tried first. This is as it should be. In any sane system of sanctions, particularly in a nuclear age, one would not expect to have recourse to military means without employing other means first. These other means are suspension (Article 5), expulsion (Article 6), and those enforcement measures under Chapter VII which do not actually require the use of armed force. These are the measures listed in Article 41, namely, 'complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication'. These measures are sometimes referred to as 'economic sanctions', as compared with the 'military sanctions' of Article 42. The contrast between the two types of sanctions should not, however, be exaggerated. In many cases – and South Africa would surely be such a case – the economic sanctions would probably be ineffective unless supported by a blockade. Now, a blockade is in international law a war measure and is therefore rightly included among the 'military sanctions' of Article 42.

(16) The disadvantage of measures like suspension and expulsion is that they are the sort of measures apt to be taken out of a sense of frustration and are unlikely to bring about effective results. There is no indication that the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth has improved the situation – perhaps the reverse is true. Also, such measures offend against the principle of universality which, if not part of the law of the Charter, is certainly part of its spirit. In so far as gestures of this sort have any value, it might be better to forgo the procedures of Articles 5 and 6 and simply to have the General Assembly declare that the credentials of the South African representative at the United Nations are invalid. Another alternative would be to act as the Organization of American States did with regard to Cuba, when, meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay, early in 1962, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.' On this whole question see D. W. Bowett, *Self-Defence in International Law* (1958); I. Brownlie, *International Law and the Use of Force by States* (1963).

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of that Organization adopted a resolution excluding the present government of Cuba from participation in the Inter-American system because of its acceptance of the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

(17) So far as 'economic sanctions' are concerned, Members of the United Nations are free to take such measures against South Africa without waiting for any decision of the Security Council. Some have in fact already done so, in response to the General Assembly's recommendation of 6 November 1962. Members taking such steps should be careful to ensure that they do not violate commercial treaties with South Africa or other international conventions. There is no great difficulty about this: it simply requires taking appropriate legal advice before acting, and possibly some delay. Economic sanctions are, however, unlikely to be effective without a decision by the Security Council, rendering the taking of such measures obligatory for all Members, followed up, if necessary, by a blockade. The authority of the Security Council under Articles 25 and 48, together with the provisions of Articles 2(6) and 103 of the Charter,¹ provide the necessary legal backing for such measures – even to the extent of making them binding on non-members of the United Nations. The difficulty about taking them is likely to be political rather than legal.

1. These provisions read as follows: Article 2(6): 'The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles (i.e. the Principles of the United Nations Charter) so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.'

Article 103: 'In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.'

International action and domestic jurisdiction

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I am in this brief memorandum addressing myself to two points only: (1) Whether South Africa's racial policies are essentially within her own domestic jurisdiction. (2) Under what circumstances can the United Nations take economic or military enforcement action?

1. Domestic Jurisdiction and Article 2(7)

Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter states that

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

South Africa has invoked this clause in all three of the circumstances in which her racial policies have been examined by the United Nations – namely over the treatment of persons of Indian or Pakistani origin; South-West Africa; and the question of *apartheid*. Bearing in mind that what matters are or are not essentially domestic varies through time and depends on the state of international relations, the United Nations has rejected South Africa's claim. The following justifications have been

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offered for the ensuing discussions and resolutions which have been passed :

(i) That 'intervene' in Article 2(7) means solely to employ economic or military sanctions; this can only be done under the conditions laid down in Chapter VII of the Charter, but U.N. action falling short of such measures is perfectly compatible with Article 2(7).

(ii) Neither the question of South-West Africa nor that of *apartheid* (the Indo-Pakistani issue has become merged with the latter question) is essentially within South Africa's jurisdiction. In its Advisory Opinion of 1950 the International Court of Justice has declared that South Africa remains bound by the terms of the obligations of the mandate on South-West Africa. She is also party to an international treaty, namely the United Nations Charter, under which she has incurred specific obligations mentioned in Articles 55 and 56, which are relevant to the policy of *apartheid*. Article 55 (C) states that the United Nations will promote

universal respect for, and observation of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Article 56 provides that

All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

The fact that no specific sanctions are envisaged for a breach of Article 56 (other than the general terms of Article 6, which allows the General Assembly to expel, upon the recommendation of the Security Council, any Member persistently violating the principles of the Charter) in no way lessens the binding nature of South Africa's obligations.

(iii) It is further argued that the repeated practice of organs of the United Nations over a long period of time is to be taken as legal evidence of the proper interpretation of the Charter. This interpretation indicates that placing these questions on the agenda, discussing them and passing exhortatory resolutions does not amount to an 'intervention' within the terms of Article 2(7). This view depends in turn upon the right of United Nations organs to

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assert – at least until a contrary Opinion is given by the International Court – the right to interpret the Charter for the purpose of carrying out their functions. The International Court of Justice has on several occasions indicated that it regards this preliminary interpreting function by U.N. organs as quite proper, and the result of such interpretations (the ‘subsequent practice’ of the U.N.) as of probative value. Evidence may be found in the *ASYLUM CASE*, per Judge Read, *I.C.J. Reports*, 1950, pp. 323–4; in the *CORFU CHANNEL CASE*, *I.C.J. Reports*, 1949, p. 25; in the (second) *ADMISSIONS CASE*, *I.C.J. Reports*, 1950, p. 9; and in the *SOUTH-WEST AFRICA CASE*, *I.C.J. Reports*, 1950, p. 135. The present British judge on the Court, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, has also commented on this point in the *33rd British Yearbook of International Law* (1957), p. 211.

It is true, however, that the new President of the Court, Judge Spender, has asserted, in considerable detail, in the recent case of *CERTAIN EXPENSES OF THE U.N.* (*I.C.J. Reports*, 1962, pp. 182–97) that the actual practice of the United Nations organs has no probative value with regard to the proper interpretation of the Charter. The majority of the International Court none the less appear to approve the principle that there is a presumption, until such time as the Court indicates the contrary on any given dispute, that United Nations organs act legally when they engage in a practice, over a period of years, which is supported by the prescribed majorities.

2. The Circumstances In Which the United Nations Can Take Enforcement Action

The United Nations is now faced with the decision as to whether or not it should do more than discuss, investigate, and pass exhortatory resolutions: in short, whether it should engage upon economic or military sanctions against South Africa.

Whether the application of *apartheid* in South-West Africa is contrary to the mandate and the U.N. Charter is, of course, *sub judice* at the present time, and there is much to be said against enforcement action being mounted before the Court’s Judgement, which will be binding, is handed down.

The Security Council has already recommended that States

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cease the export of arms, or parts which could be assembled as arms, to South Africa. These resolutions were passed on the understanding that they would not constitute obligatory sanctions under Chapter VII, but rather were non-mandatory recommendations under Chapter VI. There none the less exists, as Sir Hersch Lauterpacht has pointed out in another context, an obligation on all U.N. members to endeavour to implement in good faith U.N. resolutions.

(i) States are at liberty to engage upon individual trade boycotts if they wish. Is it proper for the General Assembly to recommend the rupture of economic and diplomatic relations, given that these measures are of the kind envisaged under Article 41, which falls within the Security Council's sphere of authority? There seems no reason why the General Assembly should not recommend Members to do what they may already do individually. Further, the precedent of the Spanish Question in 1946 provides some evidence that the General Assembly has the authority to recommend – though not to order – the severance of at least diplomatic relations if there exists a potential threat to peace. The General Assembly resolution of December 1962 would therefore appear to be legally in order.

(ii) Though South Africa is in breach of Articles 55 and 56, there is no provision that these obligations may be upheld by military or economic sanctions. Only where there exists a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, within the meaning of Article 39, may the Security Council order enforcement action under Article 41 (economic sanctions) or Article 42 (military sanctions). The Security Council is under no compulsion to order sanctions, even if there has been a finding under Article 39, though the *travaux préparatoires* provide some evidence that at least so far as acts of aggression are concerned it should automatically order sanctions. A vote in favour of enforcement action must be passed by a majority including the affirmative votes of the Permanent Members. At this stage, all Members of the United Nations are bound by the provisions of Article 25 (under which they agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council), and the protection of Article 2(7) ceases. Article 5 may also be brought into play.

(iii) We must here examine the contention that, while South

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Africa's policy may be reprehensible and in breach of Article 55, that country has done nothing to justify a finding of a threat to, or breach of, the peace under Article 39; and that any such threat in fact comes from her independent African neighbours. The supporters of this viewpoint thus argue that no enforcement action can legally be ordered against South Africa. If the facts are correct – namely that the threat to peace does not come from South Africa, in spite of her breaches of the Charter – then this argument has considerable strength. Remedies exist in the form of the pressures of public opinion and, in the last resort, expulsion under Article 6, but not through sanctions under Chapter VII. On the other hand, two points may be observed:

(a) Article 41 provides that measures short of armed force may be employed 'to give effect to its (i.e. the Council's) decisions'. Article 42 permits the Security Council to take 'such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security'. In neither Article is it stipulated that the enforcement action *is only to be directed against the particular state* found to have committed a threat to, or breach of, the peace under Article 39.

(b) There may be a stage at which the internal acts of a government become so provocative as to be tantamount to a threat to the peace. The precedent of the Nuremburg Tribunal indicates, for example, that the killing of German Jews in concentration camps was not to be regarded as a matter solely for German concern and jurisdiction. The continued development of the law in this direction since 1946 confirms that, where persons of one racial group are being ill-treated, governments of the same race in adjoining countries have a genuine legal interest. What is less certain, however, is whether this interest is more than an *ex post facto* right of jurisdiction in a Court of Law, or whether it is a valid legal basis for intervention. The case for the latter interpretation is, of course, stronger if the intervention is under the auspices of the United Nations.

(iv) The United Nations may wish, should the International Court find against South Africa in the present case which is now *sub judice*, and should that country fail to carry out the Judgement, to enforce the Court's findings. No presumption is being

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made here either as to the Judgement of the Court or as to South Africa's response: it merely behoves us to examine Article 94(2) of the Charter as a possible legal basis for action by the United Nations. Under that Article,

if any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgement rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgement.

(a) It may be noted that the Security Council is under no legal obligation to act in these circumstances; what action it should take, or whether it should act at all, is discretionary. The wording of Article 94(2) is ambiguous in that it is not clear whether the 'measures to be taken to give effect to its judgement' may include the enforcement measures enunciated in Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. On the other hand, Articles 41 and 42 depend upon a finding, either express or implied, of a threat to the peace or breach of the peace or act of aggression (Article 39). Article 94 does not fall within Chapter VII, and it may be argued that, as sanctions depend upon the existence of a situation under Article 39, any measures taken by the Security Council must necessarily fall short of those provided for by Articles 41 and 42. On the other hand, the very failure to carry out a binding judgement of the Court may, in certain circumstances, cause a threat to the peace, so that Article 39, and thus Articles 41 and 42, legitimately come into play. Further, it may be contended that as Article 94(2) uses the phrase 'may . . . make recommendations or decide upon measures . . .' the Security Council is given the discretionary choice between advocating non-mandatory measures under Chapter VI or deciding upon mandatory measures. A decision in favour of mandatory measures falls within Chapter VII, and thus necessarily would include authority to act under Articles 41 or 42.

(b) Ethiopia and Liberia consider filing with the International Court of Justice a request for a 'provisional measure'. The Court would have to decide upon this application before proceeding to examine the merits of the case on South-West

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Africa. Under Article 41 of the Statute of the Court, it is empowered

to indicate, if it considers the circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.

These 'provisional measures' correspond approximately to an interim injunction in a domestic Court of Law. Ethiopia and Liberia fear that even the partial implementation of the Odendaal Report on Bantustans in South-West Africa would render it virtually impossible, should the final Judgement of the Court find such action illegal under the Mandate, for such policy to be reversed. They may therefore seek an interim order forbidding the implementation of this policy while the issue is *sub judice*. This is not the place to speculate whether the Court is likely to grant the request for 'provisional measures'. Suffice it to say that it remains doubtful, should the order be granted by the Court and disobeyed by South Africa, that U.N. sanctions could legally be mounted on this basis. The only case where an injunction was granted by the Court and not heeded by the party concerned was the ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL CASE, in 1951. The United Kingdom, who was the other party to the proceedings, sought to have passed in the Security Council a resolution condemning the Iranian Government's action. The United Kingdom's request to the Security Council (i) fell short of demanding any enforcement action by that organ and (ii) asserted that the failure of Iran to carry out the interim order constituted a threat to the peace. The Security Council failed to pass such a resolution, largely due to the fact that at that stage it was still uncertain whether the particular dispute was or was not within Iran's domestic jurisdiction. That is to say, an essential difference between that situation and a possible situation in South-West Africa exists, in that in the former no Judgement on the question of jurisdiction had yet been handed down by the Court. The interim request was granted by the Court even though it had not yet decided whether it had jurisdiction to examine the merits of the case. The Court has, of course, already decided in its Judgement of December 1962 that it has jurisdiction to examine the South-West Africa dispute. Article 94 of the Charter refers only to a 'judgement' rendered by

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the Court; it does not mention that the Security Council may make recommendations or take decisions to enforce provisional measures under Article 41 of the Court's Statute.

3. Conclusions

(i) *Apartheid*

If it can be shown that South Africa's racial policies are causing a *bona fide* threat to the peace (and not merely that the threat is coming from her northern neighbours) then the Security Council may *order* economic or military sanctions.

The General Assembly, if there exists either a potential threat to the peace (on the precedent of the Spanish situation of 1946) or an actual threat to the peace, may *recommend* that states sever diplomatic relations and probably also that they voluntarily engage in an economic boycott. The General Assembly can only recommend military sanctions under the Uniting for Peace Resolution if there exists an actual breach of the peace.

As the *apartheid* and South-West Africa issues are so closely related, it is very desirable that no sanctioning recommendations should be passed by either organ until the Court's final Judgement is available.

(ii) *South-West Africa*

Should the International Court hand down a Judgement against South Africa, and should South Africa refuse to comply with the Judgement, then the Security Council may, on a broad reading of Article 94(2), decide upon enforcement action, by means of either economic or military sanctions. Should the Security Council be unable to reach agreement (and a decision under Article 94(2) is subject to the veto), this is *not* a matter which can be dealt with by the General Assembly. The only circumstances in which the Assembly may recommend the setting up of a U.N. Force is where there exists a breach of the peace. It may recommend economic sanctions if there is a threat to the peace. In neither case will its recommendations be mandatory.

Due to the limited powers of the Assembly, and the ambiguous

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wording of Article 94(2), the Security Council would be on the strongest legal grounds if it can show also that there is a *bona fide* threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39.

*

By way of a footnote, the following observations on expulsion may be made:

Article 2(6) provides that 'The Organization shall ensure that states which are not members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security'.

If South Africa were expelled from the United Nations, sanctions could be taken against her still, but the wording and general intentions of the above Article, together with the precedent of action against North Korea, indicates that there would have to exist at least a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. Moreover, South Africa would cease to be bound by the obligations of Articles 55 and 56 on human rights. The human rights element to any sanctioning process would thus be lost, and the U.N. would have to rest on Article 39 alone. The United Nations would, in the opinion of the present writer, undermine its position *vis-à-vis* South Africa, both morally and legally, if that country were expelled.

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Whatever the claims of the South African Government with respect to its sovereign rights and jurisdiction, its policies of *apartheid* and race discrimination have become major issues of international dispute and tension, imperilling good relations between states and peoples everywhere.

These policies have been the subject of United Nations policy and debate for eighteen years. Well over half the countries of the world have broken off relations with South Africa and are enforcing measures of economic and political sanctions against the Republic as a demonstration of their opposition to *apartheid*. In the African continent, both governments and peoples regard the policy of *apartheid*, and the formidable military machine constructed to buttress it, as an insult to their dignity, a persistent provocation, and a direct threat not only to their national independence but to the peace of the whole continent. Their response, which now includes all-round assistance to the opponents of *apartheid* inside South Africa, represents a deep, direct, and far-reaching all-African engagement in the South African question.

South Africa's policies have created widespread uneasiness among people in many parts of the world. There have been mass demonstrations of opposition to *apartheid* in many countries. In Britain and other states a consumer boycott of South

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African products has been in operation, and several public campaigns aimed at influencing official policy towards the South African question are taking place. There have been labour strikes in support of boycotting South African goods. *Apartheid* has become the object of condemnation in almost every important political conference and meeting of public organizations. The world-wide public awareness and abhorrence of *apartheid* add a new dimension to the international character of the South African question.

This paper examines the implications of these developments for world peace and security and of the immediate relevance of collective sanctions against South Africa as a necessary international policy for the maintenance of world peace and good relations between states.

South Africa and the United Nations

The United Nations has been confronted with the South African question since the organization's very inception in 1946. Its two main organs – the General Assembly and the Security Council – have adopted some thirty resolutions dealing with this question, all of which have:

1. declared that South Africa's policies are contrary to its obligations under the provisions of the U.N. Charter;
2. proclaimed that these policies have led to international friction, carrying 'grave international repercussions', which constitute a 'danger to international peace and security'; and
3. urged the South African Government to change its policies, abandon *apartheid*, and initiate measures aimed at bringing about race equality and harmony in South Africa.

The General Assembly has adopted some forty-five resolutions on South Africa's conduct towards the mandated territory of South-West Africa. These condemn the policies and actions of the South African Government and declare that South Africa's gross violations of its obligations as a Mandatory Power towards the United Nations and its suppression of the South-West African people have brought racial tension to that area and undermined the authority of the United Nations with respect to its trusteeship functions under the Charter. All the resolutions

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urge the South African Government to abandon its policy of forcibly extending *apartheid* to South-West Africa and to fulfil its international obligations under the Mandate.

To these repeated U.N. protests and appeals are to be added the regular attempts of the General Assembly and Security Council to create special machinery designed to encourage discussion and negotiation between South Africa and the states offended by South Africa's racial policies.

These attempts, made with consideration of South Africa's prestige and authority, have provided ample opportunity to the South African Government to re-establish its relations with the Governments directly concerned. Between 1946 and 1951 the General Assembly repeatedly called for direct negotiations between the Governments of South Africa and India on the international issues arising out of India's complaint about the treatment of people of Indian origin in South Africa. These were rejected by the South African Government. The U.N. Commission on the Racial Situation in South Africa, set up by the General Assembly in 1952, was refused admission into South Africa; its requests for discussions with the South African Government were rejected. The attempts of Mr Dag Hammarskjöld, the late U.N. Secretary-General, which included direct talks with the South African Prime Minister, to encourage changes in South Africa's policies in accordance with the U.N. Charter proved wholly abortive. In calling for a report from the Secretary-General by 30 October 1963, the Security Council meeting of August last gave sufficient time to the South African Government to reconsider its position and take meaningful steps towards compliance so that additional measures may be avoided. Instead, the South African Government ignored the Security Council. In February 1964, the U.N. Expert Group set up by the Security Council to examine proposals aimed at bringing about a peaceful change in the South African situation was refused admission into South Africa; its approaches for direct contact with the South African Government were rejected.

All these efforts of the United Nations to dissuade South Africa from pursuing its *apartheid* policies and to ensure the upholding of the principles and purposes of the Charter by

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South Africa have met with little or no response from the South African Government. Rather than relax its *apartheid* policies in the interests of peace and good international relations, the South African Government has intensified and extended its doctrine of White supremacy over the whole gamut of non-White life and labour in the country, enacting legislation aimed at suppressing and banning all opposition and resistance to the doctrine within the country. These eighteen years have seen, more than any other period in the country's history, the most far-reaching steps taken ruthlessly to impose and entrench White minority rule and to degrade the status and role of the 13 million non-White people in the economic, social, and political life of the country. This is reflected in the following major pieces of *apartheid* legislation adopted during the period :

1. The Population Registration Act of 1950 and 1952. The law defined and classified the population into racial categories – 'Whites', 'Coloured', 'Natives', and other sub-divisions to cover Asians, etc.

2. Separate Representation of Voters Act, 1951 and 1956. This provided that the Coloured voters in the Cape should be removed from the common roll and placed on a separate roll to elect 4 White representatives.

3. The Group Areas Act of 1950 and 1957, with subsequent amendments. This law extended the powers of the authorities to bring about complete territorial and residential separation according to race over the whole country.

4. The Bantu Authorities Act, 1951 and 1959. This provided for the creation of tribal authorities in certain areas and for the legal consideration of Africans living in urban areas as aliens in South Africa. The 1959 Act abolished the Parliamentary representation of Africans and provided for the appointment of, initially, 5 Commissioners-General to represent the Government. The Transkei Constitution Act of 1963 provides for the election of a Transkeian Assembly with limited powers and under the jurisdiction of the South African Government.

5. The Native Laws Amendment Acts of 1952, 1956, and 1957. These laws introduce controls over the so-called 'influx' of Africans into urban or non-African areas as classified by the

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Group Areas Authority. Under this law any African born in South Africa can visit an urban area for up to seventy-two hours without obtaining a special permit. Stringent conditions for the permanent residence of Africans in urban or 'White' areas are provided for, and the local authorities are given powers to order an African to leave any area if 'it is considered that his presence is detrimental to the maintenance of peace and order'. Under this provision many political workers and trade unionists have been banished to outlying regions.

6. Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, 1953. This legalized and enforced racial segregation practised in public transport, schools, places of entertainment, church, hospitals, clubs, and 'similar institutions'.

7. Native Labour Act of 1953 and the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956. These laws redefined the term 'employee' to exclude Africans; prevented the registration of trade unions having African members; and prohibited strikes by African workers. Mixed trade unions (i.e. containing both White and non-White workers) could no longer be 'registered'. Provision was made for 'job reservation', that is for specified types of work to be reserved for persons of specified racial groups.

8. The Bantu Education Act. The control of African education was transferred to the Ministry of Native Affairs. No schools were to be established without the Minister's permission, and he was given wide powers to make regulations covering levels and standards of African education. The Act of 1959 prohibited the entry of non-Whites to the existing 'mixed' universities, and separate racial universities were created.

The United Nations Special Committee on *Apartheid*, set up by the General Assembly in November 1952 to review South Africa's racial policies, drew the following conclusion:

The *apartheid* policies of the Government of the Republic of South Africa have undermined the economic, cultural, social, and political rights of the majority of the population. They have denied the opportunity for persons of all 'racial' groups to contribute to the development of the country. . . . The present policy, at once inequitable and irrational, has heightened tensions within the country and could only be enforced by a regime of repression.

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That such 'tensions' would arise was already suggested by the October 1953 session of the General Assembly, when, in its resolution on the South African question, it noted that 'it is highly unlikely, and indeed improbable, that the policy of *apartheid* will ever be willingly accepted by the masses subject to discrimination.'

The 'regime of repression' referred to by the Special Committee was largely developed and fashioned in this period of confrontation between the United Nations and South Africa. Several major laws were enacted to suppress the growing movement of opposition and resistance to *apartheid* in the country: the powers of the South African authorities were increased to ban and control the activities of persons, to ban organizations, meetings, publications, and any agitational activities directed against the Government's policies. The Government secured powers to declare states of emergency under which the ordinary processes and the rule of law would be suspended; powers of arbitrary detention and arrest, including house arrest, were acquired; and under the Defence Amendment Act of 1963 the Government's powers were enlarged to include the use of the armed forces to assist the police in the 'prevention and suppression of internal disorder'.

This then is South Africa's record of defiance and opposition to the United Nations. It is a record not only of refusal to comply with its obligations under the Charter and to accede to the repeated requests of the General Assembly and the Security Council, but of acts and omissions by the Republic which have seriously aggravated the international aspects of the country's racial crisis. As the General Assembly of November 1963 noted, the South African Government has denied all avenues for 'peaceful change' in the country and has 'created the grave danger of violent conflict carrying with it considerable international repercussions'.

International Repercussions of South Africa's Policies

The repercussions are already manifest in the more recent decisions of the U.N. General Assembly and in the actions of a large number of states towards South Africa, both in regard to

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their direct relations with that country and in their general international policy.

For the United Nations the long period of persuasion has run its full course. The stage is set for the condemnation of South Africa as an international delinquent: a country which has persistently violated the norms of international behaviour, which threatens disorder in the international community, and which defies the United Nations to the point of undermining its authority and peace-keeping functions. No senior state official has publicly declared, as did the South African Foreign Minister in July last, that 'our main enemy is the United Nations'. And no country has frustrated, more than South Africa has done, the progressive order of change and the widening of the area of human freedom which today stand as essential conditions for the maintenance of international peace and security. This situation has already had a deep impact on the policy of the United Nations; and, as the U.N. Special Committee on Apartheid noted in its report of September 1963, the time has arrived to demonstrate that 'the international community has adequate means to disabuse the Government of South Africa and its supporters of their short-sighted and dangerous calculations'.

This international demonstration first took shape when the General Assembly recommended in its resolution of April and November 1961 that all states take 'separate and collective action', in conformity with the Charter, to bring about an abandonment by the Government of South Africa of its offending policies. The following year, in November 1962, the General Assembly, noting South Africa's total disregard of its obligations under the Charter, now recommended that member states take specific measures, including an arms embargo and a trade boycott against South Africa. In 1963, the Security Council met twice to consider the 'explosive situation' created by South Africa's policies. It recommended an embargo on the supply of arms, equipment, and war materials, and set up the Expert Group to recommend further policies to secure peaceful change in South Africa.

The development of the trade boycott and other forms of sanctions adopted against South Africa by U.N. member states are a measure of the international character of the crisis pre-

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sented by the South African question. By the time that the 1963 session of the General Assembly met, some forty-six countries had informed the Secretary-General that they had fully implemented the General Assembly's resolution of November 1962 and had severed all trade, political, and other relations with the Republic of South Africa and closed their airports, airspace, and seaports to South African aircraft and vessels. A further twenty-one countries, though they did not formally communicate with the Secretary-General, announced that they did not possess or would now sever trade and political relations with South Africa. Some forty-three countries formally pledged themselves to respect the arms embargo recommended by the Security Council.

To these measures must be added the increasing international pressure, led in the main by the newly independent states of Africa, for the exclusion of the South African Republic from all international agencies of the United Nations and other inter-governmental organizations. These pressures have led to South Africa's withdrawal from the International Labour Organization and the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa. South Africa's withdrawal from the latter organization is particularly significant: the Economic Commission for Africa is directly responsible to the Social and Economic Council of the U.N., one of the principal branches of the organization. In virtually every other inter-governmental body, South Africa's membership has become little more than nominal. Earlier, in May 1961, the same considerations had secured the enforced withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth. This movement to isolate and exclude the Government of South Africa from the mainstreams of international life reflects, like the recent decisions of the United Nations, the critical point reached in the world's confrontation with South Africa.

South Africa and the Peace of Africa

The South African question assumes particular importance in the context of Africa, for at least three reasons.

First, the regime of White supremacy and *apartheid* in South Africa is regarded by the rest of Africa as an extreme

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manifestation of colonialism; a centre of counter-revolution and reaction whose aims are seen as the preservation of an order wholly in conflict with and antagonistic to the great changes that have swept the continent in the past decade.

Nobody disputes that these changes have had a profound impact on international relations. Like the changes in Asia after the Second World War, they represent a new element in the international balance of forces working for the strengthening of peace and security and the role of the United Nations. Thus, in the view of the African nations, the continuance of colonialism and racialism in any form constitutes a menace to the peace of the continent and the world. These considerations have now become the foreign policy foundation of all the independent states, furthering their desire to secure and cement all-African unity. The first Conference of the Heads of African States, held at Accra in 1958, declared unequivocally that 'the existence of colonialism in any shape or form is a threat to the security and independence of the African states and the world'. Two years later, at their meeting in Addis Ababa, the Heads of States again expressed the conviction that 'colonialism is one of the factors which provoke friction between peoples and endanger international peace and security'. A similar policy was expressed in the declaration of the 1963 Addis Ababa Conference. In all these declarations the South African regime and its policies are represented as a particularly serious menace to the security of the independent African states and a threat to the further development of African freedom and self-government. This explains the concerted African drive to isolate South Africa internationally, and, as the Nigerian Prime Minister has declared, 'to use all the means at our disposal, especially at the United Nations, to ensure that the last vestiges of racialism and colonialism are wiped off the face of Africa' (*Foreign Affairs*, New York, October 1962).

Secondly, the extreme forms which racialism takes in South Africa are regarded by the African people as standing insults to their dignity and a provocation to their pride and national self-respect. No African government can ignore this, nor the fact that its people are inflamed by South Africa's defiant pursuit of *apartheid*. This agitation has become a source of all-African

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discontent which compels every African state, as a matter of national self-interest, to pursue a direct anti-South African policy.

Thirdly, the South African question has now become considerably more serious and direct for the independent African states as a result of the formidable programme of militarization that South Africa has undertaken in recent years. This programme introduces a new factor into the international character of the South African problem. It not only reinforces the belief that the Government of the Republic is prepared to use the force of arms in order to maintain *apartheid*, but by the very nature of the armaments being acquired, threatens the safety of the independent states of Africa. Reported South African military assistance to the Katanga secessionist regime against United Nations forces in the Congo, with police incursions into the High Commission Territories to kidnap political refugees, and Government pronouncements aimed at the incorporation of the Territories, contribute to the African view of White South Africa as an expansionary power.

The South African arms build-up envisages not only the development of a considerable defence posture. It includes the creation of a force capable of large-scale offensive operations, employing weapons and aircraft of considerable range to bring countries in a wide arc stretching from Ghana to Somalia within its firing power. Some Western countries, particularly Britain, have claimed interests of strategy in South Africa and link these interests with their supply of arms and equipment to the South African Government. In this way the general war danger is being introduced into the continent, greatly adding to the security problems of the independent African states. A new and far-reaching imbalance in armaments and military power has developed in the continent as a result of the South African military build-up. This is a new and serious source of disturbance which exposes the African states to demands for redressing the balance and hence for a diversion of their scarce resources into a costly arms race.

African reactions to what they consider to be South Africa's threats to their national safety and the movement for Africa's liberation have been forthright and sharp. The Third Conference of the Heads of African States, meeting at Addis Ababa in

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June 1963, set up a National Liberation Committee composed of representatives from nine member countries of the newly created Organization of African States. This Committee was given the task of providing assistance to the national organizations and people of all the territories under colonial rule, including South Africa, in their struggle for freedom and national independence. The Addis Ababa meeting called for the immediate implementation of all-African sanctions – in the fields of trade and political relations – against the South African Republic. It further agreed jointly to call for the early convening of the Security Council to consider the South African question. A new and more purposeful policy of securing the exclusion of South Africa from the United Nations and all inter-governmental organizations was proclaimed.

These African reactions portend a conflict with strong racial implications, carrying enormous consequences for world peace. The international dangers of South Africa's *apartheid* policies were noted with ominous foresight by the U.N. General Assembly some ten years ago. In its resolution of December 1954 it declared that 'the policy of *apartheid* constitutes a grave threat to the peaceful relations between ethnic groups in the world.'

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South Africa's policies, both towards the country's non-White population and towards its obligations as a Mandatory Power to the United Nations, have offended good relations between states and the maintenance of world peace and security. The enormity of the offence is suggested by the considerable aggravation of the South African question in four major spheres of international and human relations.

First, the persistence of the South African Government's defiance of the United Nations, despite the latter's generous attempts to provide that Government with opportunities to bring about peaceful changes in the system of race relations in the country, amounts to an abusive and contemptuous disregard for its international obligations under the Charter; it is an attempt to destroy the United Nations as an instrument of peace, and to flout the principles of collective security and peaceful change on

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which the post-war system of international relations is founded. The continuance of such a policy by the Republic of South Africa threatens disorder and, indeed, war.

Secondly, South Africa's policies, supported by a formidable military machine, frustrate and challenge the historic and irreversible movement of liberation and national independence that has been taking place in the African continent. This carries with it the seeds of a most dangerous conflict – a race war, which may spread throughout the world.

Thirdly, South Africa's policies offend and disgust civilized people everywhere. These policies are insulting to the peoples of Africa and incite them to acts which no government can ignore. These policies have provoked public demonstrations in many parts of the world. Public discontent and agitation will continue to grow until international action brings about the conditions for an effective solution of the South African question.

Fourthly, the South African question has contributed to the deterioration of relations between third states. The meeting of Foreign Ministers of the member countries of the Organization of African Unity, held in Lagos recently, decided to recommend to the African member states to withdraw overflight and transit facilities from all aircraft and vessels, irrespective of nationality, which ply between South Africa and countries abroad. And in other ways, the attitude and policies of several Western countries towards the South African question have influenced and disturbed their relations with the emergent nations and peoples of Africa. This is a further source of tension in international relations.

These four aspects of South Africa's delinquency now make imperative the formulation and adoption of an effective and enforceable international policy of sanctions. As noted in this paper, the beginnings of such a policy were contained in the resolution of the U.N. General Assembly of November 1962. This called upon member states to take the following specific measures against the South African Republic :

(a) Breaking off diplomatic relations . . . or refraining from establishing such relations.

(b) Closing their ports to all vessels flying the South African flag.

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(c) Enacting legislation prohibiting their ships from entering South African ports.

(d) Boycotting all South African goods and refraining from exporting goods, including arms and ammunition, to South Africa.

(e) Refusing landing and passage facilities to all aircraft belonging to the Government of South Africa and companies registered under the laws of South Africa.

In 1963, the Security Council recommended an arms embargo against South Africa. The U.N. Trusteeship Committee recommended in 1962 that member states impose an embargo on oil supplies to South Africa. Unfortunately, these recommendations have been disregarded by several important member states, particularly the United Kingdom.

The United Nations has the power to impose mandatory sanctions against a state whose policies and actions present a threat to international peace and security and which persistently violates its obligations under the Charter. Article 41 of the Charter empowers the Security Council to decide on measures, short of the use of armed force, against such a state. These measures include economic sanctions and the severance of diplomatic relations.

The burden of this paper is that South Africa's racial policies have become a direct threat to peace and security in Africa and the world. Eighteen years of defying the United Nations and world opinion is unprecedented and, if allowed to continue, will destroy the confidence of peoples and states in the United Nations and the system of collective security which it administers. The international community has the means to disabuse the Government of South Africa; the employment of such means, in accordance with the U.N. Charter, is now urgently demanded not only to assist in bringing about an end to the tyranny of racial rule within South Africa, but to safeguard peace and reinforce the confidence of the peoples of the world in the effectiveness of the United Nations and its Charter.

The strategic implications of sanctions against South Africa

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Proposals to apply economic sanctions against South Africa may be affected in their attempted realization not only by the more obvious political and economic considerations which influence the attitudes particularly of Britain and the United States. The object of such sanctions requires, in the first instance, to be clearly determined. There are two main alternatives, of which the first, if effective, is by all normal criteria that which is to be preferred: that is to bring pressure to bear on the current regime so drastically to modify its policies that world public opinion is satisfied. The second is to produce, by economic means, such a situation in South Africa that anti-Government elements are able to acquire power and so bring about a revolution in the social order. In other words, the hand of the Verwoerd Government has to be forced to the point either that it accepts, however unwillingly, the transformation of the state to the extent that white supremacy is no longer recognized as the guiding force, or to the point where it loses control. In the latter case a period of chaos of short or long duration would be virtually inevitable and the ultimate consequences would be unpredictable.

The questions whether a Nationalist government would ever make the necessary concessions or, indeed, whether world opinion, in which the views of Afro-Asia are now so important an element, would regard as acceptable any solution which did

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not forthwith transfer power to an African majority are matters for political assessment. This paper assumes that the fundamental decision to bring the necessary pressure to bear on South Africa has been taken and is, therefore, concerned primarily with the problems of enforcing sanctions – that is of applying a blockade; with the capacity of the South African Government to maintain its preparedness, against internal and external threats, in the face of such a blockade; and marginally with the need for some sort of international military intervention to secure law and order if this should become necessary.

Sanctions could be either total or concerned with commodities vital to the country's economy and its defence. Total sanctions are in an important sense easier to apply: a blockade in these circumstances would simply aim at the prohibition of all traffic with South Africa whether by land, sea, or air. A limited procedure would involve search and would, therefore, be more tedious in its application on the various routes of entry into Southern Africa. If there were full cooperation on the part of all the members of the United Nations with the exception of Portugal then the task would be relatively simple from the military point of view, especially if the areas of Portuguese Moçambique and Angola were to be included in the blockade. If they were not then the leakage of supplies whether by land or air would be unlikely to contribute much to the alleviation of growing shortages of commodities like oil and rubber in which the South African economy is most vulnerable, though a loophole, however trivial, could be an embarrassing complication in other ways. The land frontiers with the two Portuguese territories are not conducive to free traffic of large quantities of goods, and the terrain is such that they could not be rapidly developed for this purpose even if it should prove worthwhile.

For the purposes of effectiveness, however, it would be unwise to assume that the acceptance of a policy of sanctions by the huge majority of the membership of the United Nations and the official application of that policy in the ports and on the airfields of all the countries concerned would seal South Africa from the outside world, without the obvious existence of effective precautions. Experience has shown that there are always elements prepared to go to elaborate lengths to disguise the destination of goods and

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to devise complex procedures for their delivery. Ideological differences, for instance, are no obstacle to traffic in arms: it is only the naïve who will have been surprised on such grounds to hear the reports of an alleged arms deal between South Africa and Czechoslovakia in recent times. A plan for economic sanctions to be successful must be accompanied by massive means of enforcement if it is not to be readily disrupted by officially unrecognized groups exploiting the situation for gain or adventure. South Africa has a negligible merchant marine and relatively few transport aircraft of her own and so would inevitably be dependent for supplies on an agglomeration of strange friends.

The Republic has a long coastline of about 1,500 miles and on three sides almost as limitless stretches of ocean as any other country in the world. The possibility of a disguised approach especially from a southerly direction against an unguarded shore is considerable. Thus the denial of African ports would not constitute any barrier to supply. The dependence of South Africa on foreign transport can, however, be clearly demonstrated: such British shipping companies as Union Castle and the Clan Line not only carry virtually all sea passengers and the mail, but a good deal of cargo too. Deprivation of British and American shipping would, therefore, in itself be a heavy blow. Its official continuance would probably make the problems of a U.N. blockading force insuperable. But it is not only in this direction that the cooperation of the Western powers would be virtually essential if such a plan were to succeed.

The fragility of Pan-African military strength has been clearly demonstrated in 1964. The weakness of African armies in terms of morale in relation to the civil fabric of the state has been illustrated not only in ex-British East Africa, but before that in various states of the French-speaking community – Togo, Dahomey, and Congo (Brazzaville). In any case, they are almost entirely infantry in composition: the air arms, except perhaps in the case of Ethiopia and the countries of the Mediterranean littoral, are rudimentary and the navies negligible and inexperienced in the problems of blockade involving relatively long periods of patrol in seemingly empty ocean. The African states possess almost none of the technical paraphernalia such as helicopter carriers and advanced radar which could make a blockade

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in the second half of the twentieth century, in however remote a part of the world, really effective except against submarine smugglers. Even if the practical aid of the relatively militarily minded neutralist Asian regimes like India, Pakistan, and Indonesia were to be enlisted, their own local commitments and the problems of long-range operation would present formidable difficulties. There remain only Russia and China on the one hand and the Western great powers on the other. Apart from the reluctance of the former pair to become entangled in operations far from home, which could involve setbacks risky to prestige, there would not only be hesitation about enlisting their assistance but considerable difficulties in the manner of cooperation and the provision of base and technical facilities within range of the South African coastline.

The political preparedness of Britain and America to execute the wishes of the Afro-Asian group may be debatable: ready acceptance of the implications has been made more difficult to achieve by the disillusionment with 'the wind of change' thesis which has come to a head since the upheavals in East Africa. Nevertheless if the consequence is likely to be Communist exploitation of the situation to the lasting disadvantage of the West, this could prove the decisive factor. It is easy to depreciate – as some strategic thinkers who believe that their view is the only one consonant with the jet age do – the importance to the West of the sea routes round the Cape. Sir John Maud in an article in *The World Today* (January 1964, p. 12), entitled 'British Responsibilities in Southern Africa', put the present position succinctly. 'Britain and her N.A.T.O. partners share with South Africa an interest in the use of sea routes round the Cape – an interest not so much concerned with circumstances of global war as with a situation in which for any reason passage through the Suez Canal might be difficult or impossible.' British retention since 1955, under the terms of the Simonstown Agreement, of control of the communications network in the seas around South Africa and of repair and refuelling facilities at the Cape cannot be regarded as without significance. It is conceivable that in order to retain an element of control, and to forestall Soviet intervention, it might be considered better to go along with Afro-Asian opinion rather than to continue to resist it. Such a decision would be taken with the greatest reluctance, but it might come to be

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recognized as the lesser of two evils, on the grounds of self-interest, as well as a means of preventing the total disintegration of the United Nations.

Thus the fact of Afro-Asian dependence on the great powers for long-range air and sea transport, and for technical development, can be accepted and was, in fact, endorsed by the operation in the Congo, which without the Globemaster aircraft of the United States Air Force would have been hamstrung. Similarly, the use of Anglo-American forces as an instrument of United Nations policy for the ultimate purpose of posing a threat to the industrial economy of South Africa, which would cause panic amongst the English-speaking business community of the country and lead to widespread civil disorder on the part of the non-whites, could become an expedient in international diplomacy; in which case a quick rather than a protracted settlement would be the next essential.

Any action which aimed at the overthrow of the South African regime, but did not provide for some interim administration and the security forces to uphold it, would be gravely lacking in responsibility. It is easy to argue that this should be for the U.N. to provide, but great foresight would be required in planning the composition of the force. By the very nature of events, the white population of South Africa would have become a more or less defenceless minority struggling for survival in the crudest terms. The divided racial loyalties implicit in such a situation, as the incident of the protection of the Austrian field ambulance by African troops in the Congo in January 1961 showed, indicate a balance between white and coloured forces. It might be that the best guarantee of the minority from oppression would be not the exclusion but a strong representation of the major powers who would have made the operation possible. Additionally some provision would have to be made for the reconstitution of the South African police and defence force. Chaos would be only in the interests of the mischievous. A strong holding force would have to be provided until a new national organization could be trained.

These speculations, however valid, imply the success of sanctions. What are the weaknesses of military relevance which a blockade would seek to exploit? Once a country has been denied an outlet for her products – South Africa in 1960 exported goods

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to the value of £724,500,000 out of a net national income of about £2,000,000,000 – the survival of the government organization depends ultimately on its ability to maintain law and order. This in its turn is rooted in the supply of manpower and materials for the purpose. The expansion of South Africa's defence forces since 1956 has made her a formidable military opponent by African standards, though perhaps not so formidable as her propagandists would have us believe. She has a permanent military cadre of about 15,000 men who are the professional experts, the jet pilots, and the training framework for a citizen force five or six times this size. The whole of this force has done recent military training and there are, in addition, the Commandos, a number of which are based on weekend rifle clubs, who total in all about 80,000 men. The aggregate of the white members of the police, permanent and reserve, is between twenty and twenty-five thousand. Of the white population of 3½ million, about a quarter of a million are readily available for formal armed service of one kind or another.

These facts reveal a force expensive to maintain in men, money, and materials, but what matters in the context of a blockade is South Africa's ability to do it from her own resources. Since 1960 she has undertaken extensive renewal and substantial increases in heavy equipment. There have been reports of purchases of German troop carriers, of orders for French Mirage jets, Alouette and Westland Wasp helicopters, Canberra bombers and the Lockheed C-130.B Hercules air transport from the United States. In October 1962 came the controversial order for the 30 Blackburn Buccaneer maritime strike aircraft. According to some quarters the total number of aircraft delivered or in the pipeline is 200 operational machines and 100 helicopters. In October 1963 five nations were reported to be competing to sell elementary jet training planes to the Republic. According to the *Daily Telegraph* air correspondent (24 October 1963), Italian companies were involved in the proposed sale of Macchi 326 and Fiat G.91.T aircraft as elementary and advanced trainers, both of which aircraft are capable of being armed, the former as a ground support machine. At the beginning of 1964 there were reports too of inquiries about the Bloodhound missile, on the grounds that new anti-aircraft equipment was required. The total effect of the actual

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purchases which have been made, and of the establishment of arrangements to manufacture Panhard armoured cars, for instance, under licence, is likely to be to make South Africa self-sufficient for heavy equipment and spares in the immediate future.

Thus the arms boycott, to which forty-three countries had subscribed by October 1963 and to which America and, in a partial fashion, Britain subsequently gave their support, in a sense came too late to be effective. But this is not the whole picture, for according to an official statement by the Commandant-General of the Defence Force, the truth of which there is little reason to doubt, South Africa is capable of manufacturing over 90 kinds of ammunition and some small arms including automatic rifles. Some of these, like the Belgian FN rifle, are manufactured under licence. The foundations of this industry have been gradually built up with the aid of manufacturing firms in the chemical and explosives field since 1955. In all, South Africa on the face of it is a country which now has the basic resources for the maintenance of security and indeed for external defence. She provides her own small arms and has apparently stockpiled sufficient aircraft and vehicles to enable her to give some substance to the claim of certain Ministers to have fortified the state against attack.

It is only when the question of strategic materials is reviewed that South Africa's vulnerability really emerges. Unlike other African countries she is self-sufficient in terms of iron, steel, and coal. Though at present she imports some copper from the Rhodesian-Katangan copper belt, the output of copper ore mined in the Union amounted in 1961 to more than £10 million worth and could well be sufficient in the short run. The key materials are rubber and oil in all its forms. Synthetic and natural rubber is imported from a wide range of sources, especially the United States and Malaya: the domestic production of motor tyres and tubes is in value about five times the figure for those imported ready manufactured. The dangers of dependence on foreign raw materials are significant but could be partially offset by stockpiling, and synthetic manufacture, for which no figures are available.

Oil is imported from the main oil-producing areas and most

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notably from Iran, which provides about £6 million of crude oil annually, as well as about £5 million motor spirit and considerable quantities of paraffin. Oil companies in South Africa hold about two months' supply of motor spirit and three months' diesel fuel: Government stocks for strategic purposes are not known. The weakness here is recognized and action with a tinge of desperation is evident in this field. SASOL, the state-owned plant which produces oil from coal, now yields about 40 million gallons of petrol annually, or around 10 per cent of the country's needs,¹ and makes a minor contribution to the supply of diesel oil, is in the process of development. It is unlikely, however, that in the next fifteen years, even with the considerable expansion of manufacturing capacity which is planned, this source could do more than maintain the present position with regard to oil supply.

The alternative is to look for natural resources. A large proportion of the total area of South-West Africa has now been allocated in concessions to oil-prospecting companies, including a wide strip along the full length of the Angolan border. Though the generosity of the South African Government in its treatment of any company which makes a worthwhile strike is likely to be exceptional, this can be no more for the time being than a long-term palliative. Thus a blockade which concentrated on oil and rubber, and in particular shut off supplies from the Persian Gulf, would have a substantial chance of bringing the South African Government to its knees, because it would within a matter of months restrict internal security patrols and above all reduce the capacity of the security forces to move rapidly to meet an emergency. The effectiveness of such an operation would depend upon its backers. The Republic would almost certainly have the capacity to frustrate it if the only naval forces available were the few frigates, seaward defence boats, and so on which countries like Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal could contribute. Few of the smaller nations have any aircraft at all capable of the long duration flights which are necessary for ocean patrol. It might be that opinion in favour of sanctions would be so strong as to make insignificant the number of vessels available and able to convey the relevant supplies. To run the risk involved in no

1. *Times Review of Industry*, December 1963.

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action, however, would be an invitation to ridicule. The alternative is a relatively full-dress operation which only powers of some military standing could organize on behalf of the United Nations. The immediate military problems of a blockade are clear enough : it is to some extent a question of whether the long-term strategic and immediate political concerns of the major powers of the West are seen to coincide sufficiently to engage them in a project which in all other respects is bound to be deemed unpalatable.

Given such participation the necessary blockade would become a matter of organization. Bases with harbours, preferably with airport facilities close at hand, on both coasts of Africa would be required unless complete carrier task forces were available. Distances are a problem : there are no significant shipping havens, if the Portuguese ports are excluded, within 2,000 miles of the Cape. The airfields of Northern Rhodesia and Katanga are 1,500 miles to the North, and at least 500 miles from the sea. Some surveillance of the main oil ports of the world would be the first means of economizing what could otherwise amount to a vast effort. Whatever the scale of operations it is unlikely that such a blockade could be totally effective, though it might well be successful in producing the result required. The self-sufficient largely agricultural economy of South Africa fifty years ago could have survived in isolation for a long period. The industrialized state of today, in which a substantial proportion of the African population is involved, could not long withstand the shock of shortages. Unemployment would produce disorders with which as the weeks passed the Government would be increasingly unable to cope. At some point the existence of the minority ruling race would be endangered : U.N. troops would need to be nearby to secure the position. A blockade of South Africa would mean at least a major operation short of war, followed by long-term precautions through a force with more clearly defined orders than that in the Congo, in order to prevent as its aftermath another and almost certainly bloodier Algeria.

The strategic situation

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Indigenous Armies

The Republic of South Africa has a full-time army of about 15,000, and she claims to be able to put 250,000 into the field at short notice.

Other armies of importance on the continent are the following:

Southern Rhodesia	3,500
Northern Rhodesia	3,000
Ghana	8,000
Cameroons	3,000
Ethiopia	29,000
Libya	6,000
Guinea	5,000
Somali	4,000
Nigeria	7,000
Algeria	65,000
Egypt	c.100,000
Tunisia	20,000
Morocco	35,000
Kenya	3,000

These figures are approximate: they take no account of paramilitary police and do not reflect differences in equipment and quality of training. They are not, in any case, all that informative, for the ability of a state to mount a military

The strategic situation

expedition is not a function of the size of its army but rather of its internal commitments, its administrative backing, and its transport support. In 1960 about 5–10,000 African troops went to the Congo and this figure may be taken as some index of the ability of the independent African states to mount operations outside their own borders.

Indigenous Air Forces

Various countries have training and communications aircraft, but these have no military applications outside the realm of internal security. The key elements in the military aerial balance of power are long-range reconnaissance and fighter-cum-strike aircraft. Some fighters are piston-engined; the more recent ones are jets. The most reliable indication of the quality of jet fighters is their speed. They may be classified on this basis into the subsonic ones, those that fly just above the speed of sound, which is Mach 1.0, and those which do Mach 2.0 or above.

The Republic of South Africa possesses 16 Mirage III Mach 2.0 strike aircraft. She is getting some more and also about 24 Buccaneer Mk II naval strike aircraft which can do Mach 1.2. The subsonic jet fighters include 32 American Sabres and the 50 British-built Vampires of the auxiliary Citizen Air Force. Eight Shackleton long-range maritime reconnaissance bombers are operational, and 6 Canberra subsonic light jet bombers (B.12 variants) have been ordered for training purposes.

The Egyptians have *c.* 350 warplanes, including 50 MIG-21s, 15 MIG-19s, 80 MIG 17s, 50 MIG 15s, 50 TU-16s, and 75 IL-28s. The MIG series are all jet fighters; the last two representatives are supersonic, and the MIG-21s can, in fact, do Mach 2.0. The Algerians already have 5 MIG-15s and the Moroccans 12 MIG-17s, plus 4 Furies, which are old piston-engined craft. The Tupolev 16s and Ilyushin 28s possessed by the Egyptians are medium and light bombers respectively.

Apart from the Ethiopians, who have 15 Sabres and 30 Swedish Saab-17 fighter bombers, which are now obsolescent, and the Somalis, who have a few old piston-engined F-51 Mustangs of last-war vintage, the only other state in Africa with any warplanes is Southern Rhodesia. She has some 30 Canberra

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bombers and 30 Hunter and Vampire ground attack aircraft.

From this it follows that if the independent African states did not wish to rely on, or were not able to obtain, the full backing of the United Arab Republic, they would have to invest heavily in aerial support before they became able to challenge the Republic of South Africa.

Navies

Egypt leads the continent in this respect. Her 8,000 sailors man 8 destroyers, 6 frigates, 8 corvettes, and 9 submarines. The Republic of South Africa comes second with 3,000 men who maintain 2 destroyers and 8 frigates. Ethiopia keeps 1,000 men in her light coastal forces. Nigeria and Ghana have 1,000 and 500 respectively; the former has 1 frigate on order and the latter 3 escort vessels. No other state has any significant naval vessels.

Gas warfare

Mr L. J. Le Roux, Vice President of the National Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, states that South African scientists are now working on tabun, soman, and sarin. These are poisonous gases first developed by the Nazis, and their effectiveness is terrifying.

Exercising Naval Supervision of South Africa's Foreign Trade with a view to enforcing economic sanctions

There would be little prospect of a naval patrol being effective without the collaboration of the major naval powers. The coastline of the Republic of South Africa is 1,600 miles long and vessels enter South African ports at the average rate of forty a day. The coastline of the Portuguese Overseas Territories, which might be used to smuggle goods in, extends over an extra 1,500 miles, and vessels enter Portuguese controlled ports at an average rate of twenty per day. To work an effective control system it would be necessary to have aircraft-carriers on station to direct other warships towards approaching merchantmen. Four fleet carriers would probably be needed to help maintain a patrol of

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South Africa and seven to help maintain one of South Africa plus the Portuguese Overseas Territories. The United States keeps 26 fleet carriers in service, Britain 4, and France 3. Australia, Canada, India, and the Netherlands have 1 each.

The number of warships needed actually to inspect incoming merchantmen would be of the order of 25 to 50, and provision of these would be well within the capability of several nations.

A point to note is that oil tankers are exceptionally easy to identify. Oil can of course be carried in tins or barrels in ordinary tramp ships, but this mode of transit is neither safe nor convenient.

Economic sanctions and South Africa's trade

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This paper attempts to answer two broad problems. First, how vulnerable is the South African economy to the application of economic sanctions against her in the field of foreign trade by other member countries of the United Nations? A more specific, and perhaps more useful inquiry in this field would be to assess the minimum programme of trade sanctions which would be likely to be effective, in the sense of facing South Africa with the prospect of an economic breakdown unless its government were prepared to change its present policies.

Second, would the application of effective sanctions have serious adverse repercussions for the rest of the world; if so, which countries would be likely to be significantly affected? Here, the possibility must be examined of some form of international compensation for economic loss resulting from the application by certain countries of sanctions against South Africa. The probable effects on the United Kingdom economy are, however, specifically excluded from consideration here, as they form the subject of a separate paper by Mr Worswick.

The Vulnerability of the South African Economy

The effectiveness of any programme of sanctions aimed against a country's foreign trade will depend generally on the degree of

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dependence of its economy on trade with the rest of the world. The relative importance of trade to the gross product varies widely from country to country. The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., at one extreme, depend on foreign trade only marginally, so that even if other countries refused to trade with them the harm to their economies would not be too serious. At the other extreme are small one- or two-crop countries, depending on exports for the greater part of their income. South Africa falls somewhere in the middle of the range (see Table 1). Its dependence on foreign trade is greater than that of the more highly industrialized countries of Western Europe, but is much less than that of the typical primary-producing country in the early phases of industrialization. Exports account for about one quarter of South Africa's gross domestic product, and imports for one fifth. These proportions are large enough for severe damage to be done to the functioning of the South African economy by economic sanctions against the whole of her foreign trade.

The effects of such sanctions on the South African economy can be assessed from an input-output table, which shows the dependence of each sector on imports (in its total input, or purchases)

Table 1: Importance of Foreign Trade in the Economies of Selected Countries at Different Stages of Economic Development, 1961

	Percentage of gross domestic product			Gross domestic product per head (\$ U.S.)
	Imports	Exports	Mean	
Trinidad and Tobago	58	63	60½	645
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland	27	37	32	185
Jamaica	29	24	26	645
South Africa	19	27*	23	415
New Zealand	20	21	20½	1440
Canada	17	17	17	1775
Nigeria	18	13	15½	90†
United Kingdom	15	15	15	1245
Australia	14	15	14½	1380
Japan	10	9	9½	465
United States	3	4	3½	2570

Source: Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1962, United Nations, New York, 1963.

* Including gold; 17 per cent, excluding gold.

† Estimate.

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and on exports (in its total output). Such an input-output table is available for the South African economy for the year 1956-7; the inter-relationships shown for that year are likely to be substantially the same today. Table 2 gives a brief summary of the main totals. It shows that in 1956-7, one half of South Africa's imports consisted of materials for industry, the rest being divided roughly equally between consumer goods and capital equipment. Excluding factor incomes accruing in fixed capital formation, imports accounted for over 30 per cent of capital goods supplies; in addition, of course, home capital goods output had an important import-content in the form of intermediate materials, components, and fuels. Exports of South African produce accounted for over 20 per cent of the total final sales in the economy in 1956-7, compared with one half for consumer purchases and nearly one tenth for public authorities.

The one half of South Africa's imports which consists of materials for industry is shown in greater detail in Table 3. Nearly one quarter of the total consists of materials for the engineering and transport equipment industries (mainly for capital equipment), while food and textiles together took rather more

Table 2: Foreign Trade in the South African Economy, 1956-7

	<i>(Million rands)</i>					
Purchases	Sales	South African Imports	Total	Factor incomes*	Total input	
		industries				
<i>Intermediate output</i>						
South African Industries		1707	580	2287	4097	6384
<i>Final products</i>						
Consumers		2411	255	2666	79	2745
Public authorities		506	11	517	1	518
<i>Gross domestic capital formation:</i>						
Fixed capital		487	221	708	204	912
Stock changes		119	35	154	2	155
Exports		1171	64	1235	6†	1241
Total, final products		4693	587	5280	292	5573
Total output		6400	1167	7567	4389	11957

Source: 'An Input-Output Analysis of the South African Economy, 1956-7', *South African Journal of Economics*, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 1961.

* Including indirect taxes.

† Indirect taxes only.

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than one quarter. Timber, petroleum, chemicals, agriculture, and commerce and transport took most of the rest. Textiles and clothing, forest products, petroleum and coal products, and the engineering industries are, moreover, highly dependent on imports for their supplies of materials: in each, imports account for over 40 per cent of total materials purchases. At the other extreme, it is important to note that the gold mining industry is only marginally dependent on imported materials and components.

On the export side, however, there is heavy dependence on gold, which accounted in 1956-7 for over 40 per cent of total export earnings. Products of agriculture, forestry, and fishing were the next most important group (17 per cent of the total),

Table 3: South African Industries: Consumption of Imports and Exports of Final Products in 1956-7

	Imports in relation to total inputs			Exports in relation to total final sales		
	Imported materials purchased	Total goods purchased	Import proportion	Exports	Total final sales	Export proportion
	(Million rands)	(Million rands)	(Per cent)	(Million rands)	(Million rands)	(Per cent)
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing	37	164	22	195	439	44
Gold-mining	10	143	7	504	505	100
Other mining and quarrying	4	29	15	58	80	73
Food, drink, and tobacco	60	471	13	76	614	12
Textiles and clothing	98	163	60	45	251	18
Forest produce	53	118	45	17	137	12
Chemicals	49	129	38	39	99	40
Petroleum and coal products	21	40	52	5	52	10
Basic metals	17	72	23	28	49	57
Engineering and transport equipment	135	312	43	58	414	14
Other manufacturing	32	134	23	39	157	25
<i>Total manufacturing</i>	<i>464</i>	<i>1439</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>307</i>	<i>1773</i>	<i>17</i>
Public utilities	5	56	9	—	56	—
Other services	61	246	25	106	1180	9
Total	580	2077	28	1171	4033	29

Source: As for Table 2.

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followed by food and textiles (10 per cent together), and engineering, metals, and chemical products (aggregating 11 per cent). Gold is exceptional in so far as it is produced virtually entirely for export. The loss of an export market for gold alone would thus have cut South Africa's exports by an amount not far short of the value of her entire imports of industrial materials, on the basis of the situation in 1956-7. Several other important industries are also heavily dependent on exports: 'other mining and quarrying', which consists largely of diamond mining and uranium, etc. ores, exported almost three quarters of its final sales, basic metals nearly three fifths, and agriculture and chemicals each two fifths.

A similar analysis is not available for a year later than 1956-7, but it is evident from the trade statistics that the structure of South African trade has not changed in essentials since that date. Table 4 shows the main import and export items for a recent year (1961). Imports are heavily weighted by capital goods items, textiles, petroleum, and chemicals; exports by gold, wool, uranium, fruit and vegetables, and diamonds. Economic sanctions would thus result directly in a large proportionate cut in supplies of capital equipment, and would also most probably bring the greater part of South African industry to a standstill for lack of materials and components. The gold-mining industry, which is virtually self-sufficient in materials, could carry on production, but this would be pointless if South Africa could find no buyers for its gold abroad.

Key Commodities

It would be possible to apply sanctions to particular commodities, as an alternative to a general trade embargo. The advantage of a 'selective' type of sanctions would be that, if correctly applied, it would produce a very considerable economic dislocation in the South African economy with a minimum of disturbance of traditional trading channels. It would, moreover, face the South African Government with an urgent alternative of either negotiating with the United Nations (with the possibility of further sanctions in the background) or imposing a complete reshaping of their economy, with an inevitable drastic cut in the standard of living. The fact that the sanctions were limited to a

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Table 4: South Africa's Commodity Pattern of Trade, 1961

(Million Rands, f.o.b.)

	Imports	Exports	Trade balance
<i>Main net imports</i>			
Machinery (non-electric)	157	21	—136
Transport equipment	141	8	—133
Textiles	120	5	—115
Mineral fuels	76	13	— 63
Electrical machinery	65	6	— 59
Chemicals	73	32	— 41
Paper and board	28	4	— 24
Metal manufactures	29	8	— 21
Scientific Instruments, etc.	20	2	— 18
Total of above	709	99	—610
<i>Main net exports</i>			
Gold	—	490	+490
Wool	5	117	+112
Uranium ores	—	79	+ 79
Fruit and vegetables	5	80	+ 75
Diamonds	26	84	+ 58
Maize	—	39	+ 39
Non-ferrous ores and concentrates	2	38	+ 36
Iron and steel	20	41	+ 21
Non-ferrous metals	24	44	+ 20
Total of above	82	1012	+930
<i>Other commodities</i>	214	232	+ 18
Total	1005	1343	+338

Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1961, United Nations, New York, 1963.

small number of commodities, and would still allow South Africa to trade in world markets on a considerable scale, might well encourage an atmosphere in which fruitful negotiations could begin.

Objections to a limited programme of sanctions of this type might be that it would be more burdensome, or more difficult, to police effectively than would a complete embargo on trade with South Africa, and that it is not likely to be as effective. However, a limited programme could be given a time limit within which negotiations should start; if they do not, the full range of sanctions could then be applied.

Such a minimum programme of trade sanctions would consist

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of an embargo on exports to South Africa of capital equipment and petroleum, together with an embargo on purchases of South African gold. The effect on the South African economy of withholding supplies of capital equipment from abroad, including spares for maintenance of existing equipment, has already been indicated.

South Africa is even more dependent on imports for her supplies of petroleum than she is for capital equipment. In recent years, almost all her petroleum has been imported, mainly in refined form, the state-owned SASOL Corporation's output from its oil-from-coal plant being only about $\frac{1}{4}$ million tons a year. Total consumption in 1962 was $3\frac{1}{2}$ million tons, and is growing fairly steadily at 5 per cent a year; at this rate, import requirements by 1970 would amount to over 5 million tons, unless home output is expanded.

Apart from the probability of an extension of output by SASOL, there remains the possibility of a large-scale oil strike within South Africa. Exploration leases have already been issued (mainly to a consortium of U.S., British, French, and West German companies) covering 300,000 square miles in Natal, the Orange Free State, and Cape Province. Exploration is also being pressed forward in South-West Africa. None the less, a dramatic change in South Africa's dependence on imported petroleum is unlikely, at least for the remainder of this decade, during which the South African economy will be vulnerable to an embargo on its foreign petroleum supplies.

Gold is, of course, a special case. Not only do gold exports represent over half of South Africa's merchandise exports, but South Africa is also far and away the largest gold producer in the world. Moreover, her share of world production has steadily increased over the past decade. In 1953, South African production represented 49 per cent of the world total (excluding the Soviet Union), whereas in 1962 the proportion had risen to 69 per cent.

However, it is not likely that even the complete cessation of South Africa's gold sales to the rest of the world would have a serious adverse effect on the world liquidity position. At the end of 1962, the official gold reserves held by all countries outside the Soviet area totalled \$39 billion so that, assuming that about one

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half of the current South African output (\$892 million in 1962) went into monetary reserves, this would represent only just over 1 per cent of the total current stock. There is always the possibility, moreover, that the loss of supplies from the world's largest producer might induce the monetary authorities in the main trading nations to improve the present international monetary arrangements.¹

Trade Diversion

So far, it has been assumed that any programme of trade sanctions operated under the authority of the United Nations would be universal in scope. However, it is only realistic to consider whether, in fact, some member countries of the United Nations would ignore the sanctions order, and continue to trade with South Africa. On their present policies, two countries – Southern Rhodesia and Portugal – appear almost certain to wish to continue to trade with South Africa. The case of Southern Rhodesia is rather exceptional, in view of the present uncertainty concerning her future status and form of government; her position is considered further in the following section.

Portugal – and any other countries following a similar policy – could, however, become an important means of evading the objectives of a trade embargo. This is not because Portugal could supply the capital equipment and other essential imports needed by South Africa from her own production, but rather because the possibility would open up of Portuguese firms buying such equipment and re-shipping it to South Africa either directly, or through Angola or Moçambique. Similarly, South Africa might be able to obtain petroleum and other embargoed goods through these channels.

To prevent any substantial amount of evasion of a general embargo on exports to South Africa, it would thus seem necessary to set up some form of control on exports to countries refusing to comply with the United Nations' trade sanctions. One possibility might be to require importers in such countries to sign a declaration to the effect that the goods which they are buying are not destined for on-shipment, either directly or indirectly, to South

1. This and other possibilities, including the raising of the price of gold, are discussed in some detail in the paper by Mr R. Opie (p. 153).

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Africa. Firms which signed the declarations, but nevertheless re-sold to South Africa, would be placed on an international 'black-list'. Though the policing problems of such a scheme might well be formidable, they would have to be faced if trade sanctions were to be made effective.

South Africa's Trading Partners

South Africa's foreign trade is carried on preponderantly with the main Industrial countries. Nearly three quarters of her total imports come from Britain, the Common Market countries, North America, and Japan; the same countries take two thirds of her exports (see Table 5). Britain occupies rather a special position, partly because of the continuance of traditional trading links from pre-Republic days, and partly because heavy British capital investments in South African industry and commerce involve a fairly intensive two-way trade between the two countries. Because of this, any programme of sanctions could never be effective so long as Britain remained aloof, or restricted sanctions to commodities other than the 'key' items mentioned above. But

Table 3: South Africa's Main Trading Partners in 1962

	Imports		Exports*	
	Value	Percentage of total	Value	Percentage of total
	(Million rands)		(Million rands)	
United Kingdom	310	30.2	242	27.9
United States	169	16.5	78	8.9
Germany, West	103	10.0	43	5.0
Japan	42	4.0	72	8.3
Italy	29	2.8	44	5.1
France	28	2.7	31	3.6
Netherlands	25	2.4	25	2.9
Belgium	14	1.4	38	4.4
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland	29	2.8	85	9.8
Canada	26	2.5	10	1.2
Total, 10 countries	775	75.3	668	77.0

Source: South African trade returns.

* Excluding gold.

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it is also true that an effective system of economic sanctions would have to be supported by *all* the main industrial countries. If, for example, Britain alone applied sanctions, South Africa would replace British capital goods by American, German, French, or Japanese. Effectiveness can be attained only by jointly agreed action.

The position is somewhat different with regard to South Africa's trade with neighbouring countries. These countries account for a relatively small proportion of South Africa's external trade and the application of sanctions here would be unlikely, in itself, to embarrass the South African economy to any great extent. By the beginning of 1964, virtually all the independent countries of Africa had placed an embargo on trade with South Africa, while outside Africa such trade had also been prohibited by India, Malaya, Jamaica, and British Guiana in the British Commonwealth, and by Burma, Kuwait, Iran (except for petroleum), Philippines, Surinam, and Syria, as well as by the Sino-Soviet group.

The former Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had close economic ties with South Africa. In 1962, some 30 per cent of its imports came from the Republic, though the latter took only 6 per cent of its exports (see Table 6). Moçambique and Mauritius were also appreciably dependent for their imports on South Africa, which supplied one eighth of the total imports of each in 1962. As an export market, however, South Africa has never assumed any great importance in general, taking under 4 per cent of exports from Moçambique, and considerably less from other African countries (with the exception of Rhodesia-Nyasaland).

The severance of trade with South Africa could, nevertheless, cause severe difficulties for certain industries, if they were working mainly for the South African market or were depending mainly on the Republic for their supplies of materials. Separate trade figures for the three constituent parts of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland are not available, but in view of the well-known specialization of each it is not difficult to draw the appropriate conclusions from the figures. These show (see Table 7) that, for Northern Rhodesia's main export, copper, South Africa is a very minor market, taking only 5 per cent of the Federation's exports in 1962. For zinc, lead, and tin, however,

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Table 6: Trade of Selected African Countries with South Africa, 1962

	Exports			Imports		
	To South Africa	Total (1) as percentage of (2)	(3)	From South Africa	Total (4) as percentage of (5)	(6)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		(£ m.)			(£ m.)	
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland	13.0	202.6	6.4	42.6	143.0	29.7
Moçambique*	1.2	31.7	3.7	5.7	46.4	12.4
Kenya	1.1	37.9	2.9	3.3	91.3	3.6
Uganda	0.7	37.6	2.0	0.4	14.2	2.7
Tanganyika	0.8	51.2	1.6	0.4	30.1	1.4
Congo (Leopoldville)†	0.1	53.8	0.3	1.7	81.5	2.2
Morocco**	1.5	116.0	1.3	0.0	148.5	0.0
Mauritius††	0.07	4.8	0.15	2.8	22.7	12.3

Source: National trade returns; *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1961*, United Nations, New York, 1963.

* 1961.

† January–September 1962 (annual rates).

** January–November 1962 (annual rates).

†† January–June 1962 (annual rates).

South Africa is the major export outlet, but the quantities are relatively small, and it should not be difficult to switch to other purchasers. Nyasaland's exports are very specialized; in 1953 (the last year before Federation), raw tobacco and tea together accounted for about 85 per cent of her total exports, and the current proportion is probably very similar. Since South Africa took only a negligible quantity of raw tobacco and tea from the Federation, the application of sanctions would not embarrass Nyasaland in this respect.

The position of Southern Rhodesia, as the industrializing member of the Federation, is different from that of her erstwhile partners, since South Africa is at present the only export market of any importance for the manufactured goods produced in Southern Rhodesia. In 1962, exports of apparel, radios and parts, and cigarettes to South Africa amounted to £2.5 millions, and it would not be easy to find new markets if this trade were stopped.

On the import side, all three Federation countries are fairly heavily dependent on South Africa for imports of manufactured goods and foodstuffs. Almost 30 per cent of all machinery and transport equipment by the Federation in 1962 came from South

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Africa, and virtually all the explosives, fuses, and detonators (for the Northern Rhodesian mines) were from the Republic. All these goods should, however, be available from Europe, North America, or other countries, though no doubt at a higher cost. It might be more difficult to replace the fish, grain, fruit, and other foods imported from South Africa, though replacements could probably be made over a good proportion of the range.

Moçambique's main trading partner is Portugal, but South Africa takes a third of her timber exports (which themselves represented under 5 per cent of her total exports in 1962), and one fifth of her oils and fats shipments (see Table 7). Dependence on South Africa for imports of manufactures is not as high as for the Rhodesian Federation.

Of the three former British East African territories, Kenya has the largest volume of trade with South Africa. In 1962, over two fifths of Kenya's exports of soda ash (sodium carbonate) were shipped to South Africa for use in the glass industry there. As already mentioned, this trade has now been banned, and the Kenyan industry is seeking alternative markets in eastern Europe and Japan. On the import side, Kenya can fairly easily replace South African supplies of manufactures, but South African feldspar, which, though a small import in value terms, was important for the Kenyan cement industry, will probably be replaced by higher-cost imports from Canada. Neither Uganda nor Tanganyika, however, is likely to suffer any appreciable loss from the application of sanctions on their trade with South Africa; as Table 7 shows, their trade with the Republic in 1962 was only marginal.

Conclusions

Several main conclusions can reasonably be drawn from this review of the character of South Africa's foreign trade. First, the South African economy is a relatively 'open' one, in the sense that foreign trade plays a major role in economic growth, both by providing growing markets for South African produce and by providing the industrial materials, fuel, and capital equipment on which that growth has fed. Second, the concentration of South African foreign trade on a limited number of industrialized countries implies that no attempt by the United Nations to

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impose sanctions on South Africa could succeed without the full agreement and participation of these countries, among which Britain and the United States are the most important. Third, sanctions limited to a few 'key' commodities (petroleum, capital equipment, and gold) would have severe adverse repercussions on the South African economy without putting that economy under 'siege' conditions. Fourth, some form of 'policing' of trade with countries not conforming with a general United Nations' sanctions scheme would have to be instituted to prevent any substantial evasion by way of trade diversion.

Finally, the countries imposing sanctions would suffer an economic loss, since they would have to switch their trade to less profitable markets, or buy from more expensive sources of supply. Such losses would, however, be marginal for most countries, and there seems little case for proposing a special scheme of compensation from international funds, particularly as

Table 7: Commodity Trade of Selected African Countries with South Africa, 1962

	Exports			Imports		
	To South Africa	(1) as Total	(1) as percentage of (2)	From South Africa	(4) as Total	(4) as percentage of (5)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	(£ m.)			(£ m.)		
<i>Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland</i>						
Copper,						
electrolytic	3.9	85.4	5	Machinery	13.1	36.4
Zinc	1.4	2.4	59	Transport		
Apparel	1.1	1.4	78	equipment	10.4	46.2
Radios and				Explosives,		
parts	0.7	0.7	93	fuses, and		
Cigarettes	0.7	0.7	92	detonators	2.3	2.3
Tobacco, raw	0.6	41.0	2	Other		
Lead	0.5	0.7	75	chemical		
Tin	0.5	0.5	99	products	3.1	10.7
Railway				Other manu-		
sleepers	0.3	0.3	99	factures	5.5	15.5
Asbestos	0.3	7.6	4	Food,		
				beverages,		
				and tobacco	5.2	13.0
				Crude		
				materials	1.3	5.7
				Fuels	1.3	9.8
						14

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<i>Moçambique*</i>							
Timber	0.51	1.46	35	Metal goods	1.22	5.27	23
Animal and vegetable oils and fats	0.18	0.94	19	Petroleum and other mineral products	0.94	3.15	30
Fruit, coffee, etc.	0.18	10.95	2	Machinery	0.68	7.30	9
Sisal and cotton	0.16	11.10	1	Transport equipment	0.67	6.08	11
				Chemical products	0.47	2.96	16
<i>Kenya</i>							
Soda ash	0.54	1.2	44	Chemicals	0.70	6.8	10
Tea	0.20	5.2	4	Machinery and transport equipment	0.32	23.7	1
Coffee	0.19	10.5	2	Other manufactures	1.33	34.3	4
Sisal and pyrethrum	0.12	7.5	2	Food, beverages, and tobacco	0.49	8.6	6
<i>Uganda</i>							
Coffee	0.51	20.1	3	Machinery and transport equipment	0.15	4.5	3
Raw cotton	0.16	8.3	2	Other manufactures	0.19	7.3	3
Tea	0.07	2.0	3				
<i>Tanganyika</i>							
Raw cotton	0.33	7.4	4	Machinery and transport equipment	0.24	7.7	3
Sisal	0.33	15.7	2	Other manufactures	0.14	14.5	1

Source: National trade statistics.

* 1961.

the majority of countries likely to be most affected (relatively to their total trade) have already banned trade with South Africa. If one assumes that Southern Rhodesia and Portugal (together with Moçambique) under their present regimes would not comply with a United Nations request for sanctions, then there would be very few countries indeed for which the imposition of sanctions might involve any appreciable loss. In the absence of an international compensation scheme, such countries might well decide not to invoke sanctions on their trade with South Africa.

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Such a decision, would not however, significantly reduce the effectiveness of a uniformly applied system of sanctions by the main industrial countries under the authority of the United Nations.

Oil sanctions against South Africa

Brian Lapping

of *The Guardian*

with the assistance of a group of Young Fabians

This paper is designed to offer a brief idea of the feasibility of an oil embargo against South Africa, since the withholding of oil is the one action which might be expected to be as damaging as total sanctions. Its conclusions may be summarized:

1. No embargo would be effective without the support of the United States, Britain, and other Western powers.
2. South Africa's present oil stocks would last four to six months, at her present rate of consumption, and could probably be extended.
3. Agriculture in South Africa would be severely affected by an oil embargo; industry much less so.
4. An oil embargo, to have a reasonable expectation of effectiveness, would need to be enforced by a blockade.

The paper begins by examining the use to which oil is put in South Africa, it then reviews likely sources of supply during an embargo, and finally discusses how an embargo might be run. The final section sketches out an international oil-rationing scheme designed to enforce an oil embargo without the use of a military blockade. The complexity and doubtful effectiveness of such a scheme suggest, however, that a blockade would be the only way.

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1. The Use of Oil in South Africa

South Africa is less dependent on oil than most industrialized countries. Of the Republic's fuel consumption, oil provides only about 10 per cent¹ – compared with about 35 per cent in Europe. South Africa's coal reserves seem to be inexhaustible (recently estimated at some 70,000 million tons), and she enjoys the lowest pithead prices in the world.² She is the only country which extracts oil from coal.³ This process, which would be hopelessly uneconomic elsewhere, is just able to pay in South Africa, thanks to a duty on imported natural oil, and exceptionally cheap coal, even by South African standards, which has been made available to the oil-from-coal organization. The average price of coal per ton at the pit-head in South Africa is 12 shillings; at the huge coal-mines owned by the Government's oil-from-coal corporation (SASOL) it is 5 shillings; in England it is 91s. 9d. Nevertheless oil extracted from coal can provide only a small part⁴ even of the 10 per cent of the Republic's fuel need which is met by oil.

Most factories and mines in South Africa are powered by electricity extracted from coal, or by coal itself. The South African railways in 1960 ran 2,669 steam locomotives, 472 electric-driven, and 76 diesel-driven⁵. These latter were mostly used where there is a shortage of water for the steam engines, i.e. in South-West Africa, and for shunting. The railways in 1961 carried 284 million passengers and 76 million tons of freight. It is difficult to assess precisely how much freight and how many passengers were carried by road, but some figures are available and from them a tolerable guess can be made: the Road Motor Services, run by the South African railways, carried 9 million passengers and 2 million tons of goods. Since the motor services possessed 1,505 vehicles, while motor carrier certificates were issued to other operators in respect of 63,916 vehicles, private

1. *Petroleum*, May 1963, p. 197. Shell estimates the figure at 13 per cent.

2. O. P. F. Horwood and J. R. Burrows in *Economic Systems of the Commonwealth*, edited by C. B. Hoover, Duke University Commonwealth Studies Centre, p. 478.

3. Dr P. E. Rousseau, Chairman of the S.A. Coal Oil and Gas Corporation (SASOL) in *Report on the Republic*, January 1963.

4. Under 10 per cent according to the *Financial Times*, 10 October 1963.

5. South African Government yearbook.

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organizations may have carried about 40 passengers and tons of freight for every one carried by the Road Motor Services. In the year to 31 March 1962 the South African Government gave £638,636 in subsidies to operators of bus services for Bantu in towns.

When motor cars and aeroplanes are added to these figures, it appears that rather more than half the transport system is dependent on oil. The railways are narrow-gauge and slow, and fairly extensive internal air services are run, joining Johannesburg and Durban by four flights each way daily, Johannesburg and Capetown by three flights each way daily, and several other centres. On 1 January 1962 there were 675 civil aeroplanes in South Africa, of which 60 were twin-engined and 26 had four engines.

Roughly half the oil consumed in South Africa is in the form of petrol, which is mainly for the propulsion of private cars. These are the normal transport of the white population, and the South African Government is proud of the Republic's high car ownership. When the effects of an oil embargo begin to be felt, the inevitable petrol rationing for motor cars will strike at one of the props of the white South African way of life.

Even more, however, it will strike at agriculture. In 1959 there were 106,000 tractors in use, 45,000 lorries, and 80,000 other vehicles on farms in South Africa. Road transport is the farmer's normal means of contact with the railways, by which he dispatches his products for sale. The white farmers' extensive holdings are substantially mechanized, and here oil is the main source of power, both for production and for transport.

Some diamond mines in South-West Africa and the fishing fleet, which has been a steady source of exports based on canning in recent years, are also dependent on oil. A growing chemical industry has developed following the establishment of oil refineries in South Africa, and would be severely hit if the oil-flow stopped. Motor-car assembly, which has become a large industry in South Africa, would presumably suffer, as would the complete motor-car production plants which are being built by Ford, General Motors, Dyna-Panhard, and the Daihatsu Kogyu Company.¹

1. *New York Times Economic Review of Africa*, 27 January 1964.

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The defence forces are, of course, dependent on oil for mobility.

2. South Africa's Oil Supplies

It seems unlikely that oil deposits will be found in South Africa. Oil explorers have searched in South and South-West Africa intermittently for the past 60 years,¹ finding oil traces but no commercial deposits. Hopeful noises have been made by geologists as recently as November 1962;² some half-dozen organizations are reported to be sinking large sums of money into oil prospecting, especially in South-West Africa, but, according to the Southern Africa *Financial Mail*,³ none of the oil companies with refineries in South Africa has any expeditions under way in the Republic. Several prospecting leases were issued by the S.A. Department of Mines in 1963, and one consortium announced that it would spend £13 million of foreign capital on exploration.⁴

At present the only local oil in South Africa comes from SASOL (S.A. Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation), the organization set up by the Government in 1950 to extract oil and chemicals from coal. According to a recent report in the *Financial Times*,⁵ SASOL for a while produced 15 per cent of South Africa's petrol requirement, but this has since been allowed to fall to 10 per cent, as the Corporation is now concentrating investment of roughly £15 million a year on major chemical projects (for gas, rubber, fertilizers, and polyethylene).

An English oil expert who has made a study of the oil-from-coal process considers that SASOL could easily adjust its equipment at short notice to change the bulk of its output from chemicals to oil. A second SASOL plant could, he says, be set up without difficulty, given 18 months.

1. *Petroleum Press Service*, March 1963.

2. *Oil Indications in S.W.A.*, The South African Mining and Engineering Journal, 29 November 1963.

3. *Oil Industry and the Economy*, 25 January 1963.

4. *Petroleum Press Service*, March 1963.

5. 10 October 1963. That article and Dr P. E. Rousseau's article in *Report on the Republic*, January 1963, are the main sources for information here given about SASOL.

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Since the cost of the existing SASOL plant was about £40m., it may be assumed that the cost of further plant to double its output would be roughly another £40 million. This must be compared with the Republic's 1964-5 defence budget of £105 million, out of a total budget of £506 million, and net annual investment of more than £300 million.¹

According to the expert, even an early decision to refuse to sell the machinery necessary for building further SASOL plants (as part, perhaps, of an arms and war materials embargo) would be ineffective. German and American manufacturers have developed the techniques of production, but if their products were withheld South African engineers could probably build another SASOL plant themselves. They have the first plant to copy, and they are the only source of experience of how this particular type of plant runs. If they had to build it themselves, the expert thought, the job should take a maximum of two years. SASOL's total production (of oil, chemicals, etc.) is about 300,000 tons per annum. South Africa's total oil consumption in 1962 was about 3,500,000 tons. Thus, even if SASOL were able to use its entire productive capacity for oil, it could still supply less than 10 per cent of the Republic's present need. To achieve this, it would have to withdraw chemical intermediates which it supplies to a large number of South African firms. Even if these chemicals could be imported, some industrial dislocation would result.

The £15 million a year which SASOL is now investing to diversify chemical production is not likely to increase its oil production capacity. For the present, therefore, SASOL is not able to remove South Africa's vulnerability to an oil embargo, merely significantly to diminish it. Roughly stated, South Africa's oil needs can be met by coal at a cost of £40 million for the machinery to satisfy every 10 per cent of the present need. This expenditure would have to be regarded as a pure defence cost, since at the moment SASOL does not see economic sense in increasing oil production, and has in fact slightly diminished it.

Apart from SASOL's production, all South Africa's oil comes from overseas, the bulk being imported in crude form

1. *Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics* of the S.A. Reserve Bank, December 1963.

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and refined in the Republic.¹ Of this a small part is refined by another Government undertaking, SATMAR (S.A. Torbanite Mining and Refining Co.). The SATMAR refinery is not comparable in size with the refineries of the major oil companies, as Table 8 shows. But SATMAR could be important in the event of a boycott because it is a South African Government-owned body which employs men who know how to run an oil refinery.

The fact that the Iranian Government was able, in 1951, notwithstanding opposition and withdrawal of personnel by the Iranian Petroleum Company, to operate the Abadan Refinery – even though they could not export, they produced all home needs – suggests that the South African Government should have no difficulty in operating the refineries of the big oil companies, in the event of a boycott. It is the policy of the oil companies to train and employ local personnel in their installations. The problem for the South African Government will be how to get the crude oil to refine.

Table 8: Oil refineries in South Africa and their capacity*

<i>Place</i>	<i>Annual Capacity (tons)</i>	<i>Company</i>
Durban	1,450,000	Mobil
near Durban (Reunion)	3,000,000	Shell and BP (came on stream October 1963)
Capetown	1,250,000	Caltex (due to come on stream 1965)
Boksburg (some 10 miles east of Johannesburg)	100,000	SATMAR
Sasolburg (some 50 miles south of Johannesburg)	300,000 (this figure includes all SASOL products, oils, chemicals, etc.)	SASOL

*Table based on figures in *Petroleum*, May 1963, except for the SASOL figure, which comes from Dr Rousseau's article in *Report on the Republic*.

1. At the time of writing (February 1964) the huge Shell-BP refinery has only just come into operation, and statistics publicly available do not yet indicate the present proportions of crude and refined oil coming into the Republic.

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The refining capacity indicated in Table 8 exceeds the annual need of the South African market (3½m. tons approximately), partly because it includes fuel oils (which are inevitably produced in the refining process, are not wanted – coal being so cheap – and are therefore exported), and partly because oil companies usually build refineries to cater for the expanding future market. (South African oil consumption, growing at about 5 per cent per annum, should exceed 5 million tons by 1970.)

The obvious way of getting crude oil to feed the refineries during an embargo would be to buy it beforehand and store it. This will be done in part by the oil companies, which keep up to three months' normal requirements of refined products¹ in stock in South Africa, in addition to their stocks of crude. Such large stocks may be explained on commercial or political grounds: the large refinery of Shell-BP has only recently come on stream, and oil companies in the Republic have previously been accustomed to waiting for tanker-loads of particular refined products. With a large refinery on the spot, companies would normally make their stocks of refined products smaller. On the other hand, oil companies' stock policies are greatly influenced by government suggestions. The South African Government, after discussion with the oil companies, seems to think that they will give it their full cooperation in resisting an oil boycott.

Additional storage capacity could be built by the government in the form of steel tanks like those used by the oil companies. In England these cost roughly £2,000 for every 1,000 tons' capacity² (storage for 1,000 tons of oil requires 25 tons of steel). The South African steel industry, which is largely state-owned, could probably produce tanks to hold one month's supply of crude oil for roughly £600,000.³

To build tanks capable of holding a year's supply would cost, at this reckoning, £7.2 million, a sum which South Africa could comfortably afford. Her steel industry is probably capable of producing the necessary steel plate. About 75,000 tons would be

1. *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, Government Printer, Pretoria.

2. According to the Council of British Manufacturers of Petroleum Equipment.

3. South African steel is inexpensive, and the price might be even lower.

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required, compared with the Republic's total production of plate in 1962 of 355,000 tons¹ (out of a total production of all types of steel of 2,350,000 ingot tons²). Thus the building of storage tanks to hold a year's oil would require a quarter of the total 1962 production of plate in the Republic. This is less serious for South Africa than it might appear because, with SASOL's production, the oil companies' stocks, and the likelihood of oil getting in through the embargo, the Government will probably not think it necessary to build a full year's storage capacity, and steel could be imported from the Common Market or a number of other areas where there is excess capacity; also it is possible that disused mines can be adapted for storing crude oil (since it has to be refined it does not matter if it gets dirty) if non-porous mines can be found reasonably near to the refineries.

Since there is a glut of oil throughout the world and South Africa would have fairly long notice of a proposed embargo, it seems certain that she could accumulate large stocks. Only an embargo with the clear prospect of outlasting South Africa's stocks would be worth attempting.

Assuming an embargo capable of lasting that long, South Africa's reaction will be to try to keep open a flow of oil. Angola would appear to be the most obvious source. Luanda, her oil-exporting harbour, is only 1,800 miles from Capetown and 3,000 miles from Durban by sea, nearer than any other source of crude oil. Her Portuguese Government is likely to be South Africa's staunchest ally in defending white supremacy, although the political question of whether Portugal would dare support South Africa against an almost united world is an open one.

Angola's oil is being extracted and sold in joint harness by the Portuguese Government and a Belgian oil company, Petrofina,³ which predicts that an output of 1½ million tons will be achieved in 1964, of which ½ million will be used locally and the rest exported. Angola is not likely to increase her output much

1. Information supplied by the British Iron and Steel Federation.

2. *Report on the Republic*. This figure is rising fast.

3. The details of the set-up, to judge from Petrofina's annual report, 1962, are: a marketing company, of which Petrofina owns 56 per cent and, according to the Portuguese commercial counsellor in London, the Province of Angola owns the rest, and an exploration, production, and refining company of which Petrofina owns 45 per cent.

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beyond 1½ million tons per annum from the sources which have so far been discovered. Known reserves at the end of 1963 were 28 million tons, which places Angola on a level with minor oil producers like Austria, the Netherlands, and Bahrein. By comparison, known reserves in Algeria and Libya at the end of 1963 were over 900 million tons each. However, exploration continues, both by Petrofina and by the U.S. company, Gulf.

Thus Angola, with exports of a million tons a year, would appear to be able to supply almost a third¹ of South Africa's oil needs. She seems unlikely to do so. Petrofina, although a Belgian company, has a large distribution chain in the United States (also in Britain) and would be responsive to U.S. Government pressure not to sell to South Africa. Would the Portuguese Government confiscate Petrofina's share of the Angolan oil holdings and herself export to South Africa? This too seems unlikely. Portugal possesses her own refinery at Lisbon, making her to some extent independent of the oil companies, but Angola's exports of a million tons a year would not cover even Portugal's own needs (1.9 million tons in 1962²) let alone those of South Africa (3.5 million tons). Thus if Angola is to supply a significant quantity of oil to South Africa, Portugal will have to supplement her own resources by buying from the oil companies either directly or through independent companies acting as

1. The 'Crude Evaluation Charts' published by the U.S. *Oil and Gas Journal*, 15 April 1963, give the impression that Angolan crude oil is fairly poor in the light fractions South Africa needs most, and rich in gas oil and residual oil. A million tons of Angolan crude, therefore, may provide a lot less than a third of South Africa's requirements. The *Financial Times* of 19 February 1964 carries a brief report that in 1963 Angola could not find markets for her crude exports, and that she would therefore benefit from an oil embargo of South Africa. It seems probable, however, that by the time an embargo is arranged Angola's crude will have found an outlet; in any case it will be necessary for the embargo to be so planned that oil-supply sanctions or some other sanctions against Portugal would follow from her colony's supplying South Africa. A tanker travelling from Luanda to Durban might be able to remain within the 12-mile limit throughout its journey, thus avoiding international waters where a blockading fleet could intercept it.

2. This figure is based on the tables in the *Institute of Petroleum Review*, November 1963, the figures there given in barrels being divided by 7.3 to convert to metric tons.

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intermediaries. She would thus be dependent on the oil companies' which would themselves be under the orders of their governments to assist the embargo.

On the question of oil getting to South Africa from consumer countries, the boycott organizers' task will be made more difficult by the fact that half of South Africa's demand for oil is in the form of petrol to drive internal combustion engines. In Western Europe petrol for internal combustion engines is produced to excess. This is in addition to the present world surplus of crude oil in general: all crude has to be refined, by processes which include heating to draw off products of different boiling points, so that the most volatile, like petrol, rise first, with heavier oils, like diesel oil and paraffin, rising next, and fuel oil being among the later substances remaining.

Fuel oil is a cheap product to burn in industrial furnaces, power stations, etc. and is greatly in demand in Europe. When crude oil is refined, heavy oils of one kind or another will account for 40 per cent or more of the output. But in Europe and Japan the need to supply fuel oil to their customers has driven the oil companies to over-production of petrol and other light oil products. So great is the pressure on them to get rid of these light oils that all the big oil companies now sell petrol in bulk to small independent companies which market it at cut prices, competing with the majors' own retail chains. South Africa during an oil embargo would need more than 1½ million tons a year of petrol, the product which major refiners are today selling even to their competitors. This is an economic situation in which it is difficult to erect barriers: the sellers eager to dispose of their goods to anybody at cut prices; the buyer, in the case of South Africa, probably prepared to pay exceptionally high prices. In such conditions shrewd businessmen – and no one can predict their nationality – rapidly become millionaires. No boycott can expect to seal this type of gap completely, particularly when there are too many oil tankers in the world, dozens laid up and probably available to be bought cheaply.

Some minor sources are likely to supply South Africa during an embargo. A refinery is being set up by Shell and BP¹ at

1. Its owners are 21 per cent Shell, 21 per cent BP, 58 per cent local marketing companies.

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Umtali in Southern Rhodesia, due to be completed late in 1965. Its capacity will be half a million tons a year, and if Southern Rhodesia is still White-ruled by the time of a boycott, oil may be expected to flow south. Shell and BP would try to prevent this, at the request of Western governments, but Umtali is only 250 miles from the northern border of Transvaal, and some oil would certainly get through by road. (The railway line from Bulawayo to South Africa involves a journey through Bechuanaland Protectorate; whether the British Government there would dare stop oil travelling by train is an interesting question.) Similar leakage, probably on a larger scale, should be expected from the refinery at Matola in Moçambique, since this is Portuguese-owned and would not have the presence of the oil companies to restrain its exports to the Republic. However, both these refineries could have their supplies of crude restricted during an embargo.

It is worth considering substitutes for oil to drive vehicles, if only to dismiss them as potentially significant contributions to South Africa's boycott-resistance. Producer-gas was made in Britain during the war, and can be used to drive internal combustion engines if a small coal furnace is carried on a trailer, the producer gas from the furnace being piped into the engine. This method undoubtedly works, and South Africa has plenty of coal; but the cost of trailer, furnace, piping to engine and modifications to carburettors would probably be £200 or more, a sum which motorists are unlikely to spend on a short-term measure, especially as the measure would involve stoking up a fire to get the car going. Some firms using lorries might find this a useful way of keeping them on the road, although it might be seriously uneconomic for what would be looked upon as a short emergency period. Methane from sewage is the second substitute for petrol, which might make a small contribution to relieving the effects of an embargo. Large communities can easily produce methane, and many do it accidentally when treating their sewage to remove its smell. This gas can be compressed, and cylinders of it used to drive vehicles. The compressor is an expensive piece of equipment, but, unlike the producer gas furnace, would continue to be useful after the boycott was over. West Middlesex sewage plant claims

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to be the only one in Britain today running its vehicles on methane from sewage.¹ Its population of 1½ million provides enough sewage gas to save the county council a maximum of £100,000 a year on fuel. This is only £2,000 a week, which would not buy much fuel, but a few of the larger South African towns might try it. Ordinary coal-gas, which could be used to fill cylinders under pressure and thus drive cars, is produced at only five works in South Africa, in addition to S A S O L. Vehicles run on gas cylinders have a limited journey-range, so that this method could be used only in the locality of gas works (i.e. in towns).

3. The Operation of an Oil Embargo

South Africa imported 34 million barrels² of oil in 1962. World exports were 4,998 million barrels.³ More than twenty countries could each significantly diminish the effectiveness of an oil embargo by diverting to South Africa only a small proportion of their present exports. Table 9 shows something of the difficulty. It lists countries whose exports exceeded South Africa's imports in 1962. The countries printed in italic letters may, to judge from their voting at the United Nations, be disinclined at present to assist an oil boycott.

The countries listed in italic letters have been selected by going through the voting list of the Trusteeship Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, which has on one recent

1. *The Journal of the Institute of Sewage Purification*, Part 2, 1945, contains an article, 'The propulsion of vehicles by compressed methane gas, West Middlesex main drainage works', by W. Parker, then chief mechanical and electrical engineer. Costs of the installation in 1942 were: compressor motor, cables, storage cylinders, gas-washing tower, vehicle charging panel, etc. £6,000; cost of converting vehicles to operate on methane, about £100 each.

Dr E. J. Hamlin, City Engineer, Johannesburg, was present at the meeting at which Mr Parker's paper was delivered, and said that a vehicle had been run continuously from 1935 in Johannesburg on sewage gas. His comments lead to the impression that South Africa is well placed to take advantage of the small potential of sewage gas as a substitute for oil.

2. *Institute of Petroleum Review*, November 1963.

3. Divide barrels by 7.3 to convert to metric tons. The import figure varies from the consumption figure for reasons given elsewhere – and because the sources are different.

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Table 9: Significant Oil Exporters, 1962* (figures in thousands of barrels)

1. CRUDE		
<i>Canada</i>	91,580	For comparison South Africa's imports of crude in 1962 were 12,107
<i>Colombia</i>	24,312	
<i>Venezuela</i>	810,485	
<i>Iran</i>	340,748	
<i>Iraq</i>	349,174	
<i>Kuwait</i>	599,630	
<i>Neutral Zone</i>	63,047	
<i>Katar</i>	67,728	
<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	462,609	
<i>Algeria</i>	157,995	
<i>Egypt</i>	19,715	
<i>Libya</i>	65,511	
<i>Nigeria</i>	24,553	
<i>British Borneo</i>	14,195	
<i>Indonesia</i>	92,202	
<i>Sino-Soviet bloc</i>	124,000	
2. REFINED PRODUCTS		
<i>Mexico</i>	11,230	For comparison South Africa's imports of refined products in 1962 were 21,814
<i>United States</i>	59,511	
<i>Dutch Antilles</i>	263,203	
<i>Trinidad</i>	89,824	
<i>Venezuela</i>	291,364	
<i>France</i>	55,400	
<i>West Germany</i>	30,966	
<i>Italy</i>	62,170	
<i>Netherlands</i>	88,166	
<i>United Kingdom</i>	72,316	
<i>Aden</i>	24,571	
<i>Bahrain</i>	76,480	
<i>Iran</i>	82,559	
<i>Kuwait</i>	33,452	
<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	62,507	
<i>Indonesia</i>	36,378	
<i>Malaya and Singapore</i>	29,535	
<i>Sino-Soviet bloc</i>	94,900	

* This table is also based on the *Institute of Petroleum Review*, November 1963.

occasion voted on the subject of oil sanctions. The occasion was a somewhat obscure one: in a lengthy resolution on South-West Africa, which the Committee was preparing for the Assembly, a clause urged all states to 'Refrain from the supply in any manner or form of any petroleum or petroleum products to South

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Africa'. The United States delegate proposed that this clause should be deleted, and had the support of twenty-one other countries – Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The delegates of sixty-seven countries voted for the retention of the clause, and the resolution containing the clause was adopted by the General Assembly in a plenary session on 13 November 1963.¹

There may be 22 good reasons to explain why 22 states which voted against the clause can be expected to support an oil embargo. Indeed, the Iranian delegate said that he voted against the resolution because 10 per cent of Iran's petroleum exports went to South Africa,² and Iran was not prepared to stop these sales so long as South Africa was certain to get the petrol from another source. He added: 'To find a practical and realistic solution, this problem must be dealt with not on the level of one country but on a global scale which would make it an effective and real embargo.' Collective measures, he said, would willingly be accepted by Iran.³ He also said that he thought that the organization of an embargo might be worked out by the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (O P E C). The Venezuelan delegate said that his country agreed with Iran. When the vote was taken he abstained. The U.N. Special Committee on Apartheid has since written to O P E C seeking advice on the operation of an oil embargo.

There may be other exceptions like Iran. Denmark expressed sympathy with the resolution, adding that she thought it was not in the jurisdiction of the General Assembly. But it is reasonable to suppose that the majority of the twenty-two countries which voted against sanctions on that occasion have still to be converted.⁴ They include the parent countries of all the world's

1. United Nations U.K. Information Centre, Special Release SPL/99.

2. He seems to have been exaggerating, to judge from published figures.

3. *Southern Africa*, 1 November 1963.

4. The countries that voted against the deletion and may therefore be assumed to be in favour of an oil boycott are: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussia S.S.R., Cambodia, Camerouns, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Colombia, Congo (Braz.), Congo (Eliz.), Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Ethiopia,

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major oil companies. U.S. companies control 58 per cent of world oil production and British and British-Dutch companies control 16.3 per cent. The U.S.S.R. bloc produces 16.4 per cent of the world's oil,¹ leaving 9.3 per cent shared between the control of France (about 2.5 per cent), Western Germany, Mexico, Brazil, Indonesia, Argentine, Austria, Japan, and some even smaller producers, including Portugal.² The 22 also include most of the world's largest oil consumers, all of which export some surplus products.

The large oil-consuming countries, especially the United States and those in Western Europe, are the ones we need to worry about, and no party with a prospect of power in any of these countries, let alone a government, has yet made an oil embargo against South Africa part of its policy. Unless it is backed by a blockade, an embargo could be rendered ineffective if one Western government decided not to break it, not even to encourage companies to break it, but merely to allow some trifling inefficiencies of administration occasionally to hamper the free movement of the embargo inspectors sent by the United Nations, or regularly, but always accidentally, to fail to stop sales of oil to independent businessmen, for whose subsequent use of the oil the government concerned could not be held responsible. Britain appears to have practised similar duplicity over the U.N. military operation in the Congo without suffering for it. Thus it can be seen that an oil embargo requires the active cooperation of the powerful countries of the West, and probably their military support. Such cooperation will never be obtained by exhortation, but only by convincing the governments

Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kuwait, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Rumania, Ruanda, Senegal, Sierre Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tanganyika, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.A.R., Upper Volta, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

Abstentions were: Argentine, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cyprus, Ecuador, Guatemala, Laos, Lebanon, Mexico, Peru, Taiwan, Trinidad, Tobago, Venezuela.

1. *World Oil Statistics*, published by the British Petroleum Information Bureau, October 1963.

2. *Petroleum Times*, world oil production survey, June 1963.

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concerned that supporting an embargo is in their own national interest.

One way to attempt this would be to apply concerted pressure on oil companies. If the many oil-producing and oil-consuming countries which favour economic sanctions threatened simultaneously to levy some form of charge against any company known to supply South Africa, the big oil companies would stand to lose more by continuing to supply South Africa than by withdrawing from her market. On the other hand, if the big companies gave up the South African market, smaller companies which buy none of their oil from countries imposing the sanctions would be able to supply South Africa without penalty. The present suppliers of South Africa, Shell and BP, Mobil, Caltex, and to a lesser extent Esso and Total, would not wish to lose the South African market to minor competitors, and might therefore be expected to ask their Governments – the U.S., Britain, Holland, and France – to try to stop the sanctioning countries from carrying out their threats. If the sanctioning countries made it clear that they could be stopped only by an undertaking of the governments concerned to support wide economic sanctions against South Africa, the supporters of a boycott might be getting somewhere.

Such pressure would work in this way only if it coincided in timing with the conversion of the U.S. Government to sanctions. If the U.S. Government were strongly opposed to sanctions at a time when a large body of producers and consumers was making threats against the oil companies, it could advise the oil companies concerned to stop supplying South Africa and could encourage some of the large U.S. companies which have no present interests outside the U.S. to fill the gap.

The other ways of attempting to put pressure on the Western governments, including flirting with Communism, trade union pressure, and diplomatic pressure, while all worth examining, do not belong properly in a paper on oil sanctions.

Once the persuasion of the Western powers is accomplished the problem of organizing the embargo will have to be faced. A blockade by ships of war off the South African coast looks like the simplest answer. If the United States and Britain are persuaded to support an embargo, why should they not lend

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ships to enforce it? The answer may be that this could involve them in threatening to sink ships of third parties with whom they have no quarrel. Possibly, if an embargo can be organized without recourse to blockade, the Western powers will be more easily brought to agree with it. In this case, mere diplomatic undertakings will not be enough: countries cannot be relied upon to punish their own citizens who are found to be breaking the embargo. International inspection and sanctions will be needed, and these may be based on an oil-rationing scheme, under which no country is allowed more oil than her previous year's consumption plus a reasonable allowance for growth. A vast team of U.N. inspectors will have to be appointed, performing to some extent the function of Lloyds agents – that is, reporting on movements of ships – as well as advising on individual applications for authority to make bulk purchases of oil, and seeing that the rationing scheme is obeyed. All oil-exporting ports will need surveillance. More important than the inspectorate, however, will be the sanctions machinery. If a U.N. inspector reports to the government of a country that a purchaser of oil who lacks the U.N. rationing authorization is being supplied, and the government takes no action, what follows? Clearly the correct answer is that the country accused shall be given an immediate hearing to inquire whether it supplied South Africa, and, if it is found guilty and is an oil-importing country, it should have its ration reduced. If it is an oil-exporting country, its sales will be curtailed. On the other hand, if it is found that the sales to South Africa were made by an international oil company without the consent of any government, the company will have to face some similar form of sanction. The tribunals looking into such cases will have to be ready to sit at very short notice and reach findings quickly. If this system worked, South Africa could be supplied by a producing country only in the event of an unlikely coincidence – that the supplying country produced just enough oil to satisfy her own needs and South Africa's without having to import or export oil, or in any other way to be dependent on international oil companies.

To prevent independent businessmen from selling oil to South Africa, nations and international oil companies would have to be held responsible for selling only to holders of a U.N. rationing

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permit. To attempt to catch the fly-by-night speculator would involve an impossibly large international police operation. For oil companies or countries which sold oil to an unauthorized person to be effectively sanctioned, companies and countries with the power to effect oil sanctions would have to place this power, for the period of the embargo, in the hands of the U.N. sanctions authority.

Gold

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Diamonds may be a girl's best friend, but most people would settle for gold, any time, any place. Nor is this gold-worship confined to simple-minded peasants or illiterate natives. It is just as much a mark of the most sophisticated Western society-hostess as of the cultivated central banker. For gold is held supreme as the proper backing for a nation's currency. Until recent times, when all self-respecting countries were on the so-called 'gold standard', the money supply consisted either of gold coins, or of tokens – bank or Treasury notes – promising the holder he could get an equal value of gold if he preferred it, simply by presenting his note to the bank which had issued it.

At varying dates between the outbreak of the First World War and that of the Second, this promise was withdrawn in most countries and the idea of a gold 'backing' to the note issue generally abandoned. It still survives in the United States, in that one quarter of the note issue must still be backed by gold, but this is universally regarded (outside, perhaps, some of the Committees of the Senate) as a useless, indeed troublesome, anachronism, and one can anticipate safely that it will be discarded in the near future.

Thus the idea that a currency is respectable at home only if it can be converted into gold at any time has now been abandoned,

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and rightly so. But this is not true thus far, internationally. International convertibility – the power and the right of, say, American holders of sterling, German holders of dollars, and British holders of marks to convert their holdings into any other currency – has been a major aim, often the overriding aim, of international monetary policy since the war.

To achieve this was a slow and difficult business. If a country's currency is to be convertible into gold or another currency on demand, some institution, generally the central bank of that country, must hold a stock of gold or other currencies which it is prepared to sell, at a known price, without limit, against foreign holdings of its own currency. Thus the Exchange Equalization Account, a branch, as it were, of the Bank of England, held £887 million of gold and £62 million of other convertible currencies (mainly U.S. dollars) on 31 December 1963. These are the whole Sterling Area's famous 'gold and dollar reserves', now more properly called 'gold and convertible currency reserves'. These reserves are increased when overseas persons or institutions wish to acquire sterling and pay for it with gold or non-sterling currencies, and are reduced when foreign holders of sterling wish to convert their sterling into other currencies or gold. Convertibility of sterling means precisely that they have this right, at an announced price or rate of exchange. To be ready to meet such demands if and when they arise, the Bank holds a reserve of gold and other currencies.

The United Kingdom is not alone in this. Table 10 (page 155) shows the reserves held by the central banks of the world outside the Soviet Area. The reserves of all non-Soviet countries rose, in the decade 1953–62 from \$53 billion to \$66 billion, or by some 23 per cent. Most of these reserves, although a decreasing proportion of the total, are held in gold – gold reserves rose from \$34 billion by 14 per cent to \$39 billion, but that meant that gold fell from 68 to 65 per cent of total reserves. None the less it is clear that the 'gold-preference' of central bankers is strong.

But although it is strong, it varies greatly from banker to banker, and from time to time. For example, central banks of the Overseas Sterling Area excluding South Africa hold only just over 9 per cent of their reserves in gold. Indeed it is a part of the definition of an O.S.A. country that it is prepared to hold, and

Table 10: Gold and Convertible Currency Reserves* (\$ U.S. billion)

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
<i>All countries</i> †	53	55	56	58	59	60	60	63	65	66
Gold as percentage of total	68	67	67	66	68	67	69	66	66	65
<i>U.S.A.</i>	23.5	23.0	22.8	23.7	24.8	22.5	21.5	19.4	18.8	17.2
Gold as percentage	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Continental Europe</i>	10.2	11.9	13.5	14.0	14.3	17.6	18.2	22.4	25.6	26.7
Gold as percentage	55	54	53	56	59	59	66	63	66	67
<i>Latin America</i>	3.4	3.2	3.2	3.7	3.9	3.2	3.1	3.1	2.8	2.4
Gold as percentage	59	56	62	51	49	53	55	48	54	54
<i>United Kingdom</i>	2.7	3.0	2.4	2.3	2.4	3.1	2.8	3.7	3.3	3.3
Gold as percentage	89	90	92	78	67	90	93	89	70	94
<i>Overseas sterling area</i>	7.8	7.9	7.8	7.6	7.3	6.8	7.5	7.1	7.3	7.6
Gold as percentage	8	9	10	11	10	10	11	11	14	17
<i>Rest of the world</i> †	6.0	6.1	6.5	6.9	6.0	6.6	7.2	7.9	7.7	8.5
Gold as percentage	35	36	35	33	37	36	35	32	36	30

Source: I.M.F. International Financial Statistics.

*Gold, IMF Gold Tranche Positions and Foreign Exchange Holdings.

† Excluding the Soviet area.

does so hold, very nearly all of its reserves in sterling. Hence gold is a mere token in their reserves.

The really gold-hungry countries, as it appears from the Table, are the U.S.A., which holds all of its reserves in gold, and the United Kingdom, with over three quarters in gold. But the U.S. reserves have fallen greatly over this period, while the U.K.'s reserves are, as the whole world knows, small. The real appetite for gold can only be traced in Table 11 (page 156), which shows total gold reserves over the same decade. The most startling feature is the great redistribution of gold holdings – the transatlantic migration of gold from the U.S.A., which lost \$6 billions' worth, to Continental Europe, which gained nearly

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Table 11: Total Gold Reserves* (\$ U.S. billion)

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
<i>All countries*</i>	34.3	35.0	35.4	36.1	37.3	38.0	37.9	38.0	38.9	39.2
<i>U.S.A.</i>	22.1	21.8	21.8	22.1	22.9	20.6	19.5	17.8	16.9	16.1
as percentage of total	64	62	62	61	61	54	51	47	44	41
<i>Continental</i>										
<i>Europe</i>	5.4	6.1	6.9	7.5	8.2	10.1	11.3	13.2	15.1	16.2
as percentage of total	16	17	19	21	22	27	30	35	39	41
<i>Latin America</i>	1.9	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.2
as percentage of total	6	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	3
<i>United</i>										
<i>Kingdom</i>	2.3	2.5	2.0	1.8	1.6	2.8	2.5	2.8	2.3	2.6
as percentage of total	7	7	6	5	4	7	7	7	6	7
<i>Overseas</i>										
<i>sterling area</i>	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.1
as percentage of total	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
<i>Rest of world†</i>	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.2
as percentage of total	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6

Source: I.M.F. International Financial Statistics

* Excluding international institutions, such as the I.M.F.

† Excluding the Soviet area.

\$11 billions. Indeed, Continental Europe absorbed an amount of gold into its central banks' reserves equal to almost all of the U.S.'s loss and the increase in total gold reserves together.

It would take us too far afield to analyse how this came about. Suffice it to say that the competitive power of European exports, and the international generosity of the U.S. in making loans and grants, have together produced a huge and continuing surplus in Europe's balance of payments, and a huge and continuing deficit in that of the U.S. European central bankers have elected to take payment for enough of the surplus in gold to give them now some two fifths of the world's monetary gold.

To analyse why European (and English) central bankers should want to hold such a high proportion of their reserves in gold would require the talents of a psychologist, not to say psychiatrist, as much as those of an economist. After all, reserves held in gold are costly to move about and to insure, but

earn nothing. Reserves held in, say, sterling Treasury Bills or U.S. bank deposits earn interest. Bankers are traditionally supposed to be ever on the search for earning assets, which gold isn't. But they also want assets that are liquid, i.e. convertible into cash on demand without loss. Ideally they would like perfectly liquid, high-interest assets. So would we all. But such assets do not exist. Hence we, and they, must and do compromise, and hold some perfectly liquid assets as a reserve in emergency, while the rest of our assets we distribute across a hierarchy of assets with a hierarchy of interest rates, in order to earn as high an income as possible.

Here we obviously have a reason why central bankers hold so much gold – it is regarded as the supreme internationally liquid asset. If you hold it, you can always sell it to another central banker in exchange for any other currency you may want. But a holding of, say, dollars or sterling may not be convertible *at the present price* when you most want to convert it. After all, every currency in the world has been devalued at some time or another, in some cases often, against other currencies (and hence against gold). Thus if a given currency runs any risk of devaluation, it makes an unsatisfactory reserve currency.

The converse of this danger is, of course, that holdings of gold would command *larger* amounts of a devalued currency after it is devalued. Hence the very danger which might make any given currency suspect – and, *a fortiori*, if it makes all currencies more or less suspect – makes a holding of gold even more attractive. The only circumstances where gold would be less attractive as a liquid asset than, say, Deutschmark is where the DM is itself about to be appreciated. But currencies are seldom appreciated and, even when they are, are seldom followed by many others. Thus, even then, gold is no *worse* an asset than any other currency which is not being appreciated – and, in the world of central bankers as they are, *it* is itself safe from being devalued, since that would require *all*, or all major, currencies to be appreciated.

Here is a very important reason for central bankers to hold gold. Another reason lies in the fact that the main alternative reserves to gold are holdings of sterling, or of U.S. dollars. It is regarded as unwise, and in any case slightly derogatory to the

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status of sterling as a reserve currency, if the reserves held against sterling are another reserve currency. The only other such is the U.S. dollar. Thus the Bank of England holds most of its reserves in gold. Allied to this reasoning, but with a higher proportion of nationalism in it perhaps, European central bankers are not eager to hold much sterling, which they argue is accident-prone, or U.S. dollars, which have been safer than sterling in the past but which have grown increasingly suspect, in the eyes of central bankers anyway, over the last five years or so. Hence there is nothing quite as 'good as gold'.

The Supply of Gold

How much gold is there available at the present time? Table 12 (below) shows the value of production in the non-Soviet world during the last decade. The total value rose by 53 per cent. South Africa's share of that total rose from just under one half to just under 70 per cent, and the rise in her output accounted for more than all the increase in world output. This upsurge of output derives, of course, from a combination of British capital, African labour, and improved technology.

But the amounts available for adding to the international reserves each year differ from the total amount in two directions. Some of the non-Soviet world's output is bought for industrial (and decorative) purposes, while much goes into private hoards. On the other hand, the Soviet Union makes occasional large

Table 12: Gold Production (\$ U.S. million)

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
<i>World output*</i>	848	897	940	980	1019	1051	1127	1178	1215	1298	1350
<i>South Africa</i>	418	463	511	556	596	618	702	748	803	892	950
as percentage of total	49	52	54	57	59	59	62	64	66	69	70
<i>Overseas sterling area</i>	519	569	608	651	696	721	808	853	905	996	1030
<i>South Africa as percentage of O.S.A.</i>	80	81	84	85	86	86	87	88	89	90	92

* Excluding the Soviet area.

sales of her own output in the West, thereby adding to potential supplies. How much do these two factors amount to? Table 13 (below) shows the amount involved in the four main sources and uses of gold since 1953. Sales of Soviet gold have added about one fifth to non-Soviet output in recent years, and one can safely expect this will continue.

On the other hand, much less than half the total annual increase in gold supplies has become available to add to official reserves in recent years. In the last five years, indeed, only 38 per cent of total annual supplies have gone into official reserves. But these years included the great gold scares of 1960 and 1962. If one takes the longer run of the decade from 1953, official reserves secured just over one half of the increase in gold supplies.

Suppose then that sales of South African gold were to be completely halted. What difference would it make to total international reserves? The rate of increase of stocks of newly mined gold would drop from some \$1,300 million to some \$400 million – non-South African output has remained very nearly at this figure for a decade. Such a level of output would be, on recent experience, all swallowed up by private industrial demand.

Indeed there is a danger that the private demand for gold would increase. Some speculators might well reason that this reduction in available supplies makes a rise in the U.S. dollar price of gold marginally more likely. Thus the price of gold in the various markets might rise. In the gold scares of the past three years the central banks, in particular the Federal Reserve and the

Table 13: Sources and Uses of Gold (\$ U.S. millions)

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
<i>Gold</i>										
<i>production*</i>	850	900	940	975	1015	1050	1125	1175	1215	1290
<i>Sales by the U.S.S.R.</i>	75	75	75	150	260	220	300	200	300	200
<i>Total sources</i>	925	975	1015	1125	1275	1270	1425	1375	1515	1490
<i>Increase in Official gold</i>										
<i>Stocks*</i>	420	640	630	495	705	680	750	310	600	335
<i>Other users†</i>	505	335	385	630	570	590	675	1025	915	1115

Source: B.I.S. Annual Reports.

* Excluding the Soviet area.

† Residual.

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Bank of England, have met such sudden attacks by unloading some of their own holdings, in order to steady the price. Hence the amounts of gold already held by central banks might actually fall, in order to meet a flurry of private speculative demand. One cannot guess how long such demand would continue. Speculators are nervous creatures. They might equally argue that the loss of South African gold output brings nearer, not the day when the gold price must be raised, but the day when gold is demonetized internationally, as it already is internally. That would enormously reduce the private demand for gold and reduce the price (on some estimates) to some \$5 an ounce. The South African economy would be virtually destroyed.

Perhaps the most realistic assumption to make is that these two forces would cancel out. What then would happen to the supply of gold available to the world's central banks? Here one must choose between two possibilities. First, South African supplies might be completely halted. Then no net amounts of gold would be added to the present level of reserves.

But official sanctions may not completely halt sales of South African gold. Suppose, then, to take the other extreme, that such sales continue at the same rate as at present, but that sales are diverted from London to the Far and Middle East markets. The hoarding and industrial demands of the East and the West can and will thus be met as before, but somewhat more directly. What supplies still reach London from other sources would then all be available for official reserves. Thus we need to take a view on two things. Would sanctions against South Africa increase the hoarding and speculative demands for gold? And would they succeed in limiting the amount of gold South Africa manages to sell in total anywhere in the world? If the answer is *no*, to both questions, there will be no worsening of the world's liquidity position. The more nearly the answers to these questions are *yes*, the greater is the danger of a worsening liquidity situation.

This would mean that present reserves would have to be used more intensively and new ways of adding to reserves found. Here, a number of points must be made. First, there is no single best ratio of reserves to, say, the total value of world trade, any more than there is one between an individual's holdings of cash and his total income or expenditure. It is a compromise which can (and

does) safely vary. Hence there is no reason here to fear that there will inevitably be inadequate reserves.

Secondly, the loss of South African gold to the outside world may precipitate the long-awaited day when the U.S. Government feels ready, willing, and able to remove the requirement that the domestic note issue be backed by a 25-per-cent holding of gold in Fort Knox. This would release the whole of the U.S. gold reserves for use as genuine international reserves, with at least two beneficial effects. The U.S. Administration (and the rest of the world) would become much less worried by any reduction in the U.S.'s gold reserves. Losses from these reserves since 1957 have already added \$4.5 billion to the reserves of the central banks of the non-Soviet world, or more than one quarter as much again as South African output over that period.

Perhaps more relevantly, the U.S. gold holdings would need to decline by only $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent (of their present level) *per annum* to offset completely the total loss of South African supplies. If the whole of the U.S. reserves were thus freed (as on rational grounds they should be) the U.S. Authorities would very likely not resist a loss of this order, at least for a year or two more.

A second beneficial effect could be that other central banks would be prepared to hold their dollar surpluses in dollar balances, rather than to insist on converting them into gold. In banking terms, the reserve ratio of U.S. foreign-owned dollar deposits could fall, without any cause for concern to the U.S. or other central banks. If that were to happen, the world's supplies of international liquid assets could rise safely and far, on a 'base' of no more gold than is at present held.

But this is nothing new. The whole world's trade and finance was financed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by *sterling* balances based on a trifling holding of gold. And the present dual-centred international finance system is based on sterling- and dollar-balances, themselves 'backed' by much less than 100 per cent of gold. Thus in a sense, there is already not enough gold to go round.

There never has been. 'A modern liner could convey across the Atlantic in a single voyage all the gold which has been dredged or mined in seven thousand years.'¹ Hence ingenious minds have

1. J.M. Keynes, *Essays in Persuasion*, London, Rupert Hart-Davis, p. 182.

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devised ingenious schemes and institutions to supplement the total supply of international liquid reserves. The International Monetary Fund was just such an invention. This permits member countries – 102 all told – to draw out their original gold *tranche* without let or hindrance, and one quarter of their quota each year under certain conditions. These *tranches* amounted in 1962 to no less than \$17 billion. By any standards these drawings amount to a massive addition to international liquidity – as they are meant to.

Next, there are large international balances available in the hands of commercial banks. In 1962, they amounted to a further \$12 billion.

If cutting off the supplies of South African gold were to precipitate an international liquidity crisis – as, in any case, it *would* bring any such crisis that much nearer – there is no lack of proposals for dealing with one – proposals in the names of Triffin, Bernstein, Stamp, Maudling, and Zolotas.

There have, as well, been actual operations carried out which have added to liquidity – the conclusion of the bilateral ‘Swap-agreements’ between the U.S. Federal Reserve and a number of other central banks; and the setting-up of the so-called Basle Club, essentially a way by which Western European central banks can lend each other reserves in times of sudden loss. In addition, the I.M.F.’s facilities have been enlarged by the *Borrowing Scheme*, a plan under which ten industrial countries (the Group of Ten) have undertaken to lend up to \$6 billion to the Fund if called upon to do so.

Hence, one must not go so far as to suggest that there can be no international liquidity problem in the future – but whether there is or not will not be determined by the failure of one year’s, or even a few years’, supply of South African gold. Nor can one argue that the loss of South African gold would necessarily lead to a rational solution to the world’s liquidity problem. But it ought to; and it might.

Gold and the United Kingdom

Although cutting off South African gold need do little damage to the international financial system as a whole, one might none the

less fear that it might damage gravely the United Kingdom, whose international liquidity position is notoriously shaky. Is this likely?

It might be thought, first of all, that South African gold is, in some way, 'more valuable' to the U.K., or easier for it to get, because South Africa is a member of the Sterling Area. And as Table 12 shows, South Africa produces nine tenths of O.S.A. gold output. But this hope – or fear – is an illusion.

The proceeds of all South African exports, in whatever currency, are converted into sterling. Her reserves are held in London. Thus U.K. purchases of South African sherry, and of gold, are paid for in sterling. Her sterling balances rise. But whether they remain higher depends, of course, on whether South Africa has an overall balance of payments surplus or not. If she is in exact balance, her sterling balances remain unchanged, and we have the gold. But suppose South Africa sold us not gold but more, say, oranges which we now import from Spain. We would still earn as much gold, indirectly, as if South Africa had sold it to us direct. For now we would earn the gold in payment for the surplus in our trade with Spain, equal to our reduced purchases of oranges from Spain. Thus there is nothing special, or specially valuable to the U.K., in the fact that South Africa is a member of the Sterling Area, exporting gold to us. This was not true, of course, in the days of inconvertible currencies; but those days are past.

Hence to think of the direct damage to the *U.K.* of 'the loss of South African gold' is misleading. The U.K.'s gold reserves would fall only if the overall balance of payments of the whole Sterling Area with the non-sterling world were to run into deficit as a result of sanctions.¹

But would not the U.K. be uniquely threatened by any decrease in world liquidity? And this, as we have seen, is a likely result of sanctions. Whether the U.K.'s reserves alone are large enough depends on her own balance of payments position (see Mr Worswick's paper, p. 167) and on the likelihood of a world liquidity crisis. This latter, as we have seen, does become very slightly more likely if sanctions are successful.

But there is one avenue whereby the U.K. and some City

1. See the contributions of G. D. N. Worswick (p. 167) and A. Maizels (p. 120) on this broad and complicated issue.

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institutions could be damaged. The other markets – Paris, Zürich, Basel and Geneva, Beirut, and Toronto – handle in all no more than one tenth of the turnover in London. One of the results of this relatively huge turnover is that one can always buy, or sell, any amount in a hurry in London. This derives from two facts. The dealers in London – five firms of bullion brokers – offer very fine margins on transactions. Thus it pays any buyer or seller to try one of the highly competitive London dealers before going elsewhere. As an example, a buyer in Zürich is likely to have to pay two cents a fine ounce above the London price, and in Beirut three cents above the Swiss price; and he can expect to be able to deal in only small amounts in these other markets. Hence London can attract both supply and demand.

Secondly, the Bank of England operates continuously and actively in the London market on behalf of the so-called central bankers' pool. There is thus always a residual demand for any amount of gold on offer – while, if it suits central banking policy, additional supplies from the Bank of England's reserves can be poured into the market.

It is not surprising, therefore, that almost all of South Africa's gold is sold in London. It would be fair to say that the amount involved could not be handled anywhere else *at present*, nor could the South African producers hope to get anything like as good a price.

If, therefore, South African gold were barred from the London market, the London bullion brokers would lose a great slice of their commission income, and the U.K. balance of payments would weaken by the loss of the (foreign) share of those commissions. As essential components of an efficient market, the brokers would no doubt be supported in some way by the Bank of England, particularly if the sanctions seemed likely to be quickly effective.

Gold and the South African Economy

Suppose a total ban on South African gold sales was successful. The loss of income this would impose on South Africa is serious. Gold accounts for some 10–12½ per cent of the Republic's gross national product, and sales of it for some half of her total

exports. A complete stop to such sales would cut her G.N.P. by something like at least one fifth to one quarter fairly quickly (unless the Government or Reserve Bank financed the stockpiling of it), apart from the indirect effects of such a fall in income on the demand for and output of South African capital goods industries.

It might, however, be possible to induce the London market not to handle South African gold, but impossible to prevent other markets doing so. In the short run, no other market could take over London's role half as efficiently. But the skill, the contacts, and the capital resources could no doubt be acquired fairly fast in other markets – if it looked as though London were to be closed for a fair time.

But *could* sanctions on gold be successfully policed? Gold cannot be effectively labelled. Unless *all* the world's gold markets could be closed to South African supplies (and it is unlikely they could be except by force), South African gold could easily be sold on the fringe markets, remelted, restamped, and then quite freely and unidentifiably resold on the main markets. What is more, big profits could be made on such sales, since the main markets continue to offer \$35 an ounce. Thus the minimum agreement necessary, in my view, would be for all central banks to agree to buy gold for some specified period only from other central banks. This would still permit, say, the Reserve Bank of Australia to sell newly mined Australian gold, to add to the world's reserves, while barring South African supplies.

But even this runs into difficulties. Gold is one of the most durable commodities known to man – precisely one of the reasons why it has been so popular as a raw material for money. If it was announced, therefore, that sanctions were to be for a limited period only, this would be as good as a guarantee that anybody who could pick up South African gold at a discount could make a sure-fire profit as soon as the sanctions were lifted, or broke down. This would be a strong temptation – and would make it that much easier for South Africa to sell, somewhere, somehow, all her output at \$35 an ounce less an estimate of storage costs and interest forgone for the likely period of the sanctions.

Thus if South Africa were to press her sales, she could fairly easily hope to succeed, even if at the cost of a lower price than

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now on a smaller quantity than now. This would of course impose *some* loss on her economy and her gold producers but much less than the total loss possible.

A more sensible move, from the South African point of view, might be for the S.A. Reserve Bank to buy all the current output until the emergency passed. The Reserve Bank would then have to finance any import surplus it could run with its sterling balances – unless these were blocked – which currently stand at some \$150 million. When these had been used up (and they would not last long), South Africa might then turn to its I.M.F. drawing rights, which currently permit her to draw \$190 million – unless the I.M.F. too were barred. But then only her gold would be left. It would be very difficult to police the Latin American and Middle and Far Eastern markets which might spring up, or expand, if the European markets were all closed to South Africa. Even so, some real damage would be done to the South African gold producers, in the price which they can get, or in the amounts they can sell, or (more probably) in both.

Conclusion

Thus the conclusions emerge: (a) that a ban on the purchases of South African gold could severely damage the South African economy; (b) that such a ban need do no more than the most trifling damage to the international monetary system (and might just precipitate a much needed series of reforms therein); (c) that, equally, the damage to the U.K. would be small, although the damage to a very small number of City firms could be serious. But the policing problems would be great – gold is in demand anywhere in the world, and many private persons would no doubt be prepared to buy and hold South African gold if it were sold at a discount now, but with the certainty that the ban would soon be lifted. None the less, merely a refusal by the central banks of the Western world to buy South African gold would harm themselves little, but South African gold producers much.

The impact of sanctions on the British economy

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1. Introduction

It is a characteristic of economic relationships that as a rule they involve a gain to the parties concerned in them. *A* has a house to sell, at any price above £3,000. *B* wants to buy a house, but will not spend more than £4,000. If the sale takes place at any price between £3,000 and £4,000 both parties get better terms than, before the sale, they were prepared to accept. Not every economic transaction brings a gain to all parties. In the first place the individual transaction may be but one element of a larger ‘package’ deal: e.g. a firm might take a loss on one transaction, which is necessary for it to secure other contracts on which it makes more than compensating gains. Secondly, the whole notion of gain is tied up with the extent to which the parties are free to enter, or not to enter, a particular contract. Where there is coercion, what may look like a normal economic transaction may have its terms dictated by one side. And it can happen the other way round, namely that one party makes a gift to the other dressed up as an economic transaction.

It seems reasonable to suppose that the great majority of economic transactions between South Africa and Britain involve gains on both sides. Most of them occur between firms rather than between individuals, and this is likely to reduce the influence of non-economic factors, at any rate on the side of sentiment. And while it is true that some firms may exercise monopoly

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power, which can be assumed to secure a greater share of the gain for the monopolist, if it is carried too far the buyer will simply stop buying and go elsewhere. Thus while we speak of *imposing* economic sanctions on South Africa, in fact such economic sanctions will certainly have some unfavourable consequences in the country, or countries, imposing them. It is the object of this paper to indicate the nature of those consequences for the British economy, and to make some estimate of their scale. Countries do not suffer pain, people do. If the British Government joins in a system of economic sanctions on South Africa, the consequential losses will be borne by particular British people and firms. Some may suffer very little, others will lose a lot. In Section 4 of the paper I shall consider means whereby the unevenness of the incidence might be mitigated.

2. South Africa's External Economic Relations

What is the nature, and the scale, of South Africa's economic dealings with other countries and, more especially, with the United Kingdom?

Table 14 sets out the principal items in South Africa's balance of payments in 1961 and 1962.

On current account South Africa is a *net* earner, to the order of £100 million in 1961 and £150 million in 1962. There had been a somewhat smaller balance in previous years, and the first half of 1963 also showed a smaller, but still favourable, balance. Of the current credit items the two big ones are merchandise exports and non-monetary gold, between them accounting for about 90 per cent of the total current earnings. On the debit side merchandise imports, of over £500 million, are rather larger than merchandise exports; investment income payments contributed one seventh of total current debits, and payments to foreigners for freight and insurance were over £30 million a year greater than earnings from this source.

The surplus on current account is matched by a 'capital out-flow' (i.e. acquisition of assets abroad). This also appears to have been normal in recent years (except in 1960). On the capital side in 1961 and 1962 the major item was the building up of reserve bank assets, including monetary gold, which constituted half or

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Table 14: Balance of Payments of South Africa with Rest of World, 1961, 1962

	£ m.			
	Credits		Debits	
	1961	1962	1961	1962
A. Goods and Services,	834.5	882.5	729	735
<i>of which</i>				
1. Merchandise (f.o.b.)	465.5	477	509	523
2. Non-monetary gold	288	316	—	—
3. Freight and insurance	5.5	6	38.5	37
4. Other transportation	14.5	15.5	13.5	14
5. Travel	12	13	19.5	19.5
6. Investment income	17.5	21	104	95.5
7. Government n.i.e.	1	1.5	2	2
8. Other services	30.5	32.5	42.5	44
Net Goods and Services	105.5	147.5	—	—
B. Transfer Payments	28	28.5	32	23.5
C. Capital and Monetary Gold	—	—	92.5	159.5
D. Errors and Omissions	—	6	9	—

Source: I.M.F. Balance of Payments Yearbook Vol. 15. Original figures given in rands. (The rand was introduced as the monetary unit on 14 February 1961, replacing the South African pound at the rate of two rand to one pound. The current exchange rate between the rand and £ sterling is still 2 to 1.)

more of the capital item. In recent years, there has been no 'balance of payments problem' of the kind with which the British are all too familiar.

In the two years 1961 and 1962, 28 per cent of South African exports went to the U.K. and 30 per cent of South African imports came from there. Nearly one half of South African gross expenditure on travel and freight was to the U.K. Nearly 60 per cent of investment income payments were made to the U.K. In both years the entire non-monetary gold export went to the U.K.

3. The Purpose of Sanctions

The primary effect of economic sanctions will be to alter the magnitude of some or all of the items which appear in Table 14. But with what object?

The purpose of economic sanctions may be specific – e.g. to hinder or prevent a country continuing aggressive military operations, by interrupting the supply of materials essential to them.

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Such might be the purpose of oil sanctions. Success would depend on the size of the aggressor's stocks and his ability to secure new supplies from his own territory or from other countries outside the sanctioning group. The ban on the supply to South Africa of those types of arms which could be used for police purposes is specific.

But economic sanctions can also be considered where there is no specific, or limited, aim, but where the purpose is in one way or another to make life so uncomfortable for the government that they would either be willing to change their policies, or so weakened politically as to be forced to give way to others opposed to those policies. Let us look at this from the point of view of the two sides of Table 14. Suppose first that the sanctioning countries simply refuse to buy South African goods and services (while continuing to sell to South Africa – in so far as the goods are paid for in gold, or currencies other than the South African rand). Surely this would cause widespread dislocation: loss of production, underemployment or unemployment in mines, factories, and farms supplying produce for export. A boycott could have these consequences. But the South African Government, if it so wished, could mitigate the effects. Imagine that the Government itself simply purchased all the goods and services which otherwise would have been exported – and just dumped the goods in the ocean. Then, apparently, the boycott would have produced zero effect. And, at first sight, this looks all right since, after all, the South African population never enjoyed those goods and services, precisely because they were exported for the use and enjoyment of foreigners. But the perceptive reader will have noticed that there is one difference. The proceeds of South African exports were used to pay for imports. If these imports are still coming in at the normal rate, the finance must be found elsewhere. If all current earning from export is stopped, then reserves of foreign currencies would have to be drawn upon until they are used up.

Table 14 shows that the inclusion or exclusion of gold in any boycott would make a good deal of difference to South Africa's ability to continue, over a long period, to pay for imports, since gold exports alone were well over half the value of imports of merchandise (inclusive of freight and insurance). It should also

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be noticed that while the suggestion that the Government could buy up the exportables and dump them in the sea would obviate any immediate loss of production and employment, this would not be by any means the optimal counter-action. The South African economy could *consume* the exportables: however low in their own scale of values, they would be worth something in South Africa. Better still, the resources which could be released from producing for export could be directed into producing import-substitutes. In the nature of the case, however, and even in the long run, a policy of 100-per-cent autarky would be likely to leave South Africa with a lower real income than she would have had if foreign trade had continued.

In other words, a boycott by other countries of purchases of South African exports really amounts to an attempt, by indirect means, to curtail South African *imports*, a result of which can first be postponed and then mitigated if the South African Government is smart enough to take the correct counter measures.

Similarly a refusal to *lend* money to South Africa boils down to an indirect means of reducing her imports. This does not mean that a boycott of her exports or lending has no effect. It has precisely the effects we have described. Moreover, the counter-measures, though technically feasible, may be tiresome to undertake, and difficult to operate without some friction. But, in the end, the difference between a (complete) boycott of purchases *from* South Africa and an embargo on sales *to* South Africa is one of timing. If all countries were to refuse to sell goods and services to South Africa the dislocation would be at its height immediately the ban was imposed. In as much as these imports consist of fuel and raw materials for industry, these industries must stop as soon as domestic stocks are run down, and can only be reopened to the extent that alternative (higher cost) sources or substitutes can be found in South African territory. In as much as they consist of machinery and other capital equipment, their loss can be mitigated to the extent that worn-out equipment can be pressed into further service, while new projects might well have to be abandoned for the lack of some essential piece of equipment.

Whereas the effect of a boycott of purchases could be almost zero at first, and gradually increase in intensity, with the ban on exports to South Africa the order of events is different. The

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greatest dislocation is achieved at once, and thereafter the South African Government could take steps to mitigate the effects of the ban, by precisely the same policy of redeploying resources no longer needed for export¹ towards the production of import substitutes. Thus the time sequence is reversed. It should be noted, however, that the *degree* of dislocation achieved immediately by the ban on sales is greater than that brought about ultimately by the boycott (for under the latter it takes time before imports fall to zero, and that time could have been used to launch the mitigating programme). It is obvious that a partial boycott, or a partial ban on sales, observed by some countries but not by others, must reduce the impact of sanctions. In the same way a selective ban on the sales of particular goods, e.g. oil, or machinery, or arms, would have a smaller total effect. There is, however, little of a general nature to be said about partial sanctions until one knows which countries will impose sanctions and which will not, or which items are to be banned. For this reason the question 'What would be the effect of a policy of sanctions upon the British economy?' is ambiguous. The line I propose to adopt in the remainder of this paper is to suppose that there were to come into being a unanimous U.N. policy of a ban on sales to South Africa and that, in consequence, South Africa immediately stopped her export of goods, gold, and services to the rest of the world. This is the case of the *maximum* (as well as most immediate in time) impact on South Africa and the maximum dislocation for the rest of the world. This should give us an outside limit to the damage to be inflicted on the U.K. economy itself.

4. The Effect of Sanctions on the British Economy

What we are supposing is that *all* economic transactions between the U.K. and South Africa will cease. For if we, and other countries, put a complete ban on sales to South Africa, there is really little point in South Africa *exporting* to the rest of the world. She would merely build up financial claims on the rest of the world which cannot be turned into goods so long as the ban persists. If the South African Government thought, nevertheless, that it was to its interests to accumulate unspendable balances,

1. See Section 4.

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then the question of import replacement by the rest of the world will be that much less. In particular, if South Africa continued to export gold to the U.K. and take 'unspendable' sterling in exchange, that would reduce the liquidity problem which the world will otherwise have to face. We shall, however, adopt the 'pessimistic' line in this section. Finally, there would be no point in South Africa borrowing in overseas capital markets, in so far as such loans, if given, could again not be turned into goods for the duration of the sales ban. Let us, then, consider the impact on the British economy, examining in turn the effects of the loss of exports, the loss of imports, and treating the loss of gold imports as a third and separate question.

(a) Exports

The right-hand columns of Table 15 (p. 180) summarize the value of U.K. exports to South Africa in the years 1959-60-61, and the percentage which exports to South Africa in each group contributed of the total U.K. exports of that group.¹ Total exports in these years, of the order of £150 million, constituted between 4 and 4½ per cent of all U.K. exports, and it will be seen at once that the main item concerned is Group D, manufactures. From £150 million of exports valued f.o.b. there should be subtracted a small item to account for internal transport from factory to quayside, and a further item to account for 'pre-manufacturing' inputs, mostly imported materials. The contribution of manufacturing to gross domestic product in 1959-60-61 was, on average, £8 thousand million, of which exports to South Africa would be about one sixtieth or less. Total employment in manufacturing in 1959-60-61 averaged 8¾ million: if the exports to South Africa were a typical sample of all

1. Throughout this section I shall use statistics for these three years. Very detailed figures of trade are published in the four volumes of the *Annual Statement of Trade* prepared by the Commissioners of Customs and Excise. The latest set, published in 1963, contains data only up to the year 1961. Totals for 1962 and 1963 are already accessible; but since the object is to get an idea of orders of magnitude, it seemed better to stick throughout to figures referring to the same set of years. In the event of the Government joining in a U.N. policy of sanctions, the execution of the policy would clearly have to be based on the current data, which are, of course, always accumulating in the Customs and Excise offices.

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manufactures, and if we further suppose that the value added per employee in movement of goods from factory to quayside was of the same order of magnitude as in manufacturing, then the employment corresponding to these exports was about 150,000. This is only an indication of the scale involved. It does not follow that, if sales to South Africa were stopped, unemployment of 150,000 people would immediately occur. For two distinct sets of reasons it is in fact very unlikely to occur. If firms send fewer goods from factory to quay, the road and rail services do not promptly dismiss redundant drivers, etc. They will do so only if (i) the reduction in demand proves permanent and (ii) the structure of manpower in those services permits *pro tanto* cuts in employment. If (see the next section) the lost trade is likely to be replaced sooner or later, then there may be no dismissals at all.

The same is true, perhaps to a lesser extent, in manufacturing itself. It has been widely noted that, especially since 1945, fluctuations in demand and output are accompanied by much smaller fluctuations in employment. In the short run, certainly, firms nowadays do not dismiss workers at once when demand falls. There are several reasons for this, but one of them is that if they think that demand will recover they retain their existing labour force, for they fear that if they dismiss men now they will not be able to hire them back later. How quickly the demand for the particular firms affected will recover depends on whether specific counter-measures are taken.

Besides merchandise exports, in 1961-2 the U.K. sold various services to South Africa as follows:¹

	£ m.	
	1961	1962
1. Freight and insurance	20	15½
2. Other transport	6½	6½
3. Travel	9½	9
4. Government and other services	11½	13½
5. Investment income	62½	56

It is not possible to calculate the employment equivalent of the £40-50 million of service sales represented by items 1 to 4. Take, for example, freight and travel. If we ban sales to South Africa, there will be little point in sending empty ships. It is, however, unlikely that all, or even any, of the ships concerned will have to

1. *I.M.F. Balance of Payments Yearbook.*

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be laid up and their crews disbanded. Some at least will take up other trade, sometimes on somewhat less attractive terms (or why were they on the South Africa run, when more profitable opportunities were available? This argument, however, would not always apply. Some lines continue to run with lower returns than elsewhere – because they take a long view of the gains from providing a *regular service*).

Investment income is a payment for capital services (however they may be regarded, e.g. abstinence, reward for risk taking) and has zero ‘employment’ equivalent. We should not forget, however, that the share- and debenture-holders concerned will lose income of the order of £60 million a year.¹

1. This is a gross figure taken from the I.M.F. *Balance of Payments Yearbook*: the same sources recorded an average investment income flow from U.K. to South Africa of £5 million which might be set off against it. Other sources suggest that the flow of investment income from South Africa was smaller in the years in question. Thus the U.N. *Report on Foreign Investment in the Republic of South Africa* (5 March 1964) gives the figures for the flow of earnings of ‘direct investment’ as £25 million and £28 million respectively. This source quotes no figures for earnings of ‘non-direct investment’ but does give figures for capital showing the value of non-direct capital to be only one third that of direct capital. Thus unless the rate of return on the former were several times higher than on the latter, the total investment income would be less than the £50–60 million quoted from the I.M.F. *Balance of Payments Yearbook*. It has also been argued that to offset the cessation of the flow of investment income from South Africa to the U.K. one could stop the counter-flow of capital from U.K. to South Africa, thereby relieving the balance of payments. But it is by no means clear that in recent years this flow has been large, or even existed. Much depends on how the retention of undistributed profits in South Africa is treated. These profits are formally owned by British shareholders and may therefore be regarded as a ‘capital outflow’ from U.K., but whether such earnings were to continue to be made and retained would have no effect on the balance of payments. The only relief from this source would come if there were net new funds being exported from U.K. to South Africa which could be stopped when sanctions were imposed, and about this there are no data. To indicate the difficulty here, the regional balance of payments tables of the I.M.F. *Balance of Payments Yearbook* include in the balance for U.K./South Africa an item of ‘Errors and omissions’ of £85 million and £89 million in 1961 and 1962, which is larger than any of the individual items we are dealing with. In this article I have kept to the gross I.M.F. figure for investment income as being the largest of any of the recorded estimates, and thus probably giving us the outside limit of the difficulties which imposing sanctions might bring.

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To sum up, the immediate impact on Britain of stopping all sales to South Africa will be a loss of income to owners of capital, and a reduction of income (e.g. through short-time working) for some, and a complete loss of employment for others. But this is not a *permanent* loss. Put the other way round, we can say that the immediate effect of the ban is to release productive resources which become available for alternative uses. Take employment: if, which is reasonable, we postulate a continuation of policies of full employment, workers made unemployed by the ban will, sooner or later, be re-employed elsewhere. An economist might argue that, in the nature of things, the alternative employment will be marginally less productive than the one it replaces. There is something in this: one does not need to argue that the allocation of resources in the contemporary mixed economy is perfect: it is sufficient if, on balance, the transfers are more likely to be towards less than towards more productive employments. But even if this 'permanent' loss were as high as 10 per cent (which is putting it high for such a relatively small shift) it would amount to something of the order of £20 million a year, which, spread over the whole population, is barely perceptible. The important losses are the transitional ones – between the loss of employment in the old occupation and picking it up again in the new one. The same applies to loss of profits from current trading. The loss of income from investment in South Africa is, perhaps, different. For the real resources which generate this income are in South Africa itself – and the purpose of the ban is to choke off economic activity there. The 'abstinence' or 'risk-taking' of British shareholders is not a 'productive factor' which can now be put to alternative use in the U.K. itself.

If the 'transitional' losses of income and employment were distributed evenly over the entire British economy, there would be no need for specific measures. The losses would be evenly distributed and national policy would be confined to raising effective demand quite generally by the appropriate amount. In fact the losses are bound to fall more heavily on some sectors than others, and there is a *prima facie* case for seeking ways of spreading the burden more evenly.

The easiest, technically, is investment income, which on our supposition is to be cut off. The British Government would offer

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to take title of all shares and bonds concerned, and pay compensation, in the form of interest-bearing British government securities. The interest on these securities could be financed during the ban by an increase in the income tax on unearned incomes. If, when the ban is over, the South African investments begin to yield again – the money will flow into the Treasury, and the U.K. taxpayer can be relieved *pro tanto*.

The transitional losses of income and employment from current trading cannot be identified and dealt with so easily. Table 16 (pp. 181-2) shows, for a large number of trade groups, the percentage which exports to South Africa contributed of the total trade of the group concerned in the years 1959–60–61. In quite a number of cases this is 1, 2, or 3 per cent. But in a few cases, e.g. D.17, railway vehicles, exports to South Africa were by no means a negligible proportion of total exports – though of course they would constitute a much smaller proportion of total *production*. One might take the line that where the exports to South Africa constituted less than a certain proportion of total production no special measures need be contemplated. Fluctuations in output of this order occur anyway. For some firms, with over-full order books, the loss of South African trade would mean no interruption of production at all. For others the scale of the loss would not be crippling; and they might be expected to seek new outlets: it should be remembered, though, that on our assumption industries in other countries would be similarly confronted with cut-backs of sales. If one chose some such arbitrary figure as 5 per cent of production, can the affected trades be located? The answer is, in principle, yes. As a first step in this direction the figures of the *Annual Statement of Trade of the United Kingdom* were examined in detail, and every case where exports in the three years 1959–60–61 constituted more than 10 per cent of U.K. total *exports* of the item concerned was recorded. The results of this study can be summarized as follows:

Percentage loss of exports entailed by a ban on sales to South Africa in 1959–60–61

10 – 15		15 – 20		20 – 30		Over 30	
No. of cases	Total value*	No. of cases	Total value*	No. of cases	Total value*	No. of cases	Total value*
158	£29.6m	62	£8.1m	29	£6.8m	23	£6.8m

* Value in 1961.

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The next stage would be to line up the items where the loss of exports was considerable with the Census of Production, to find out the proportionate loss of production. In practice this is very difficult, owing to the lack of exactly corresponding detail in the two statistical sources. Moreover this would only lead us to industries, or sections of industries, affected, whereas what we ultimately want is *firms*. But in any case, in the event of a practical operation of any scheme for compensation for losses the firms affected could be asked to submit returns and thus identify themselves. We can, however, use the export loss figures to get an idea of the scale of the problem. If, in lieu of 5 per cent of production, we chose 10 per cent of *exports* as the cut-off level we would, in 1959–60–61, have found 272 cases which between them had suffered losses at an annual rate of £51.3 million: if we chose 20 per cent of exports as the cut-off level, we would have found 52 cases involving £13.6 millions' worth of business.

How, if at all, could the transitional losses of the affected firms be compensated? Any system of monetary payments would be pretty complicated. Presumably *firms* would have to be paid: but how to ensure that the compensation was properly distributed as between profits, salaries, wages, or compensation for loss of employment? Moreover, what the affected firms need most is alternative markets. An alternative line of approach would be to offer to underdeveloped countries, e.g. independent African states, a total of loans at a rate equal in value to the previous exports to South Africa. Part of these loans, however, would be 'earmarked', i.e. could be spent only on the products of those industries most adversely affected by the South African ban. Such a scheme would go a long way towards overcoming transitional losses and would, at the same time, have a certain political appeal.

(b) Imports

Total U.K. merchandise imports from South Africa (excluding gold), of the order of £100 million in 1959–60–61 (see Table 15, p. 180), constituted between 2 and $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of total imports. Table 16 (p. 181) shows the percentage which imports from South Africa constituted of total imports in various trade groups. Apart from A.6, fruit and vegetables, there are no items where the

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import loss would be as high as 10 per cent. On this side of the picture the main sufferers from the transitional losses will be final consumers. If South African oranges are unobtainable, they must go without or put up with Israeli or Californian ones. A switch of £100 million of imports to alternative sources may put up prices a little – the more so as other countries hitherto importing from South Africa may be substituting at the same time. There will then be some loss, but it will be so widespread as not to call for specific amelioration. There may be a few importing firms which have specialized in South African products – and consequently some assistance might be given to help them enter as buyers in other markets.¹

From the balance of payments point of view it would, of course, be better if British consumers just went without the 2 per cent of imports from South Africa. The combination of loan-financed exports, replacing exports which brought in current earnings, combined with maintaining the value of imports at the old level,

1. The *Annual Statement of Trade* includes no figures for diamonds, but it is possible to collect bits of information from various sources which together suggest that the imposition of sanctions would not bring insuperable difficulties from this quarter. In the first place, while, according to *United Kingdom Balance of Payments, 1963*, U.K. imported diamonds to an average value of £100 millions in the five years 1958–62, in the same five years she exported diamonds to an average value of £92 millions. Since part of the value of exports would have been accounted for by value added in processing some of them in U.K., retained imports of uncut diamonds averaged more than the £8 millions a year difference between the two above figures. But of the retained imports it is only those destined for industrial use which could be a matter of serious concern: doing without new tiaras for a while is something the economy can stand. One might guess that with this scale of entrepot trade, stocks alone might be sufficient for the duration. If they were not, are there alternative sources of supply? According to the *United Nations Yearbook of Statistics* South Africa's share of world production in the years 1959–61 was 22 per cent for gem diamonds and 8 per cent for industrial diamonds. Against this it must be said that 'the great Kimberley-based de Beers company handles the sale of 80 per cent of the total world production of diamonds' (*South Africa Today*, April 1964: it is not stated whether this figure is for gems alone, or includes industrial diamonds). Whether the South African Government could prevent the company selling diamonds produced outside South African territory seems rather doubtful. Half the industrial diamond production, for example, comes from the Congo, and this source would, presumably, be available to the combined United Nations.

Table 15: U.K. Trade with Union of South Africa, 1959-60-61*

	U.K. Imports (£ m.)			U.K. Exports (£ m.)		
	1959	1960	1961	1959	1960	1961
A. Food, beverages, and tobacco	45.4	48.1	54.6	2.8	3.1	2.8
percentage of total						
Class A	3.0	3.1	3.7	1.5	1.6	1.3
B. Basic materials	33.4	37.3	37.9	1.3	1.7	1.6
percentage of total						
Class B	3.6	3.5	3.9	1.0	1.3	1.2
C. Mineral fuels and lubricants	0.1	0.1	0.2	1.0	1.1	0.9
percentage of total						
Class C	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.8	0.8	0.7
D. Manufactured goods	10.2	10.6	10.3	139.7	143.2	137.3
percentage of total						
Class D	1.0	0.7	0.7	5.0	4.8	4.4
E. Miscellaneous	0.2	0.3	0.3	4.1	4.9	4.4
percentage of total						
Class E	1.4	1.4	1.8	5.3	5.0	4.4
TOTAL	89.3	96.4	103.3	148.9	154.0	147.0
percentage of total	2.2	2.1	2.4	4.5	4.3	4.0

*In 1962 and 1963 the share of imports from South Africa in total U.K. imports was 2.3 and 2.4 per cent, and of exports 3.9 and 4.8 per cent.

will worsen the current balance of payments. If all other sanctioning countries do the same, the overall balance with the primary producing countries will worsen. From a world point of view that is no bad thing. We return to this in the concluding section.

(c) Gold

In the years 1959-60-61 U.K. imported, on average, £231 million of gold from South Africa, just under one half of her total gold imports. At first sight it might seem that if this supply were to have been stopped Britain's gold 'reserves' would have fallen or, when they were rising, they would have risen correspondingly less. However, this is not the case. The gold does not flow directly into the reserves, but into the London bullion market. And it can, and did, leave the country again for other destinations: in the same three years the *Annual Statement of Trade* shows average gold exports of £291 million. Of new gold production, some finds

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Table 16: U.K. Trade with South Africa* as percentage of total trade in each group

	Exports			Imports		
	1959	1960	1961	1959	1960	1961
A. 2 Meat and meat preparations	1.7	1.8	1.3	0.2+	0.2+	0.4+
A. 3 Dairy products, eggs, and honey	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.6+	1.0+	3.0+
A. 4 Fish and fish preparations	5.1	5.4	4.9	0.3+	0.6+	1.5+
A. 5 Cereals and cereal preparations	0.6	1.5	0.9	3.1	3.3	2.9
A. 6 Fruit and vegetables	2.8	3.0	4.1	10.9	12.0	11.9
A. 7 Sugar and sugar preparations	0.7	0.7	0.7	7.9	7.4	8.7
A. 8 Coffee, cocoa, tea, and spice	0.8	0.8	1.5	—	—	—
A. 9 Feeding stuff for animals, etc.	0.3	0.3	0.8	3.9	2.9	5.8
A.10 Miscellaneous food preparations	3.5	3.5	2.7	—	—	—
A.11 Beverages	2.0	2.0	1.5	2.9	2.5	3.5
A.12 Tobacco and tobacco manufactures	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.6
B. 1 Hides, skins, and fur skins	—	—	—	4.2+	3.6+	4.4+
B. 2 Oilseeds, oilnuts, and oil kernels	—	—	—	1.8	2.0	2.7
B. 3 Rubber, including synthetic and refined	5.0	3.4	2.4	—	—	—
B. 4 Wood and cork	4.5	2.9	2.7	—	—	—
B. 5 Pulp and waste paper	—	—	—	2.6	2.8	3.5
B. 7 Wool and other animal hair and tops	0.5	0.9	0.9	9.2+	8.2+	8.2+
B. 8 Cotton	—	—	—	0.2	0.2	0.2
B.10 Crude fertilizers and minerals	1.5	1.4	1.1	5.9	6.3	6.5
B.11 Metalliferous ores and scrap	0.8	3.7	2.9	6.5	8.4	8.2
B.12 Miscellaneous animal and vegetable matter	5.3	5.6	4.2	0.5	0.6	0.6
B.13 Animal and vegetable oils, fats, and greases	2.0	2.4	2.4	3.5+	3.0+	6.9+
C. 2 Petroleum and petroleum products	1.0	1.1	0.9	†	†	†
D. 1 Chemicals	4.0	4.1	3.9	1.8	1.5	1.5
D. 2 Leather, leather manufactures, and dressed furs	4.6	4.2	4.2	1.9	2.0	2.0
D. 3 Rubber manufactures	2.1	2.0	2.1	—	—	—
D. 4 Wood and cork manufactures	9.7	8.7	9.7	2.3	2.2	1.9
D. 5 Paper, paperboard, and manufactures	7.8	8.0	7.4	0.1	0.2	0.2

* In nearly all groups figures for exports and imports are given only for South Africa and South-West Africa Territory taken together. In a few cases, marked thus+, the figures refer to South Africa alone. In the three years taken together, *total* exports to South-West Africa Territory were 1 per cent of exports to South Africa and South-West Africa Territory together. The corresponding percentage for imports was 8 per cent.

† Negligible.

Table 16 (continued)

	<i>Exports</i>			<i>Imports</i>		
	1959	1960	1961	1959	1960	1961
D. 6 Wool yarns and woollen and worsted fabrics	3.9	4.2	4.6	—	—	—
D. 7 Cotton yarns and woven fabrics	9.3	9.7	9.4	—	—	—
D. 8 Man-made fibre yarns and woven fabrics	9.4	10.6	9.8	—	—	—
D. 9 Miscellaneous textile manufactures	5.5	5.2	5.2	0.2	0.1	0.2
D.10 Miscellaneous non-metallic mineral manufactures	5.4	5.5	4.4	0.7	0.6	0.7
D.11 Silver, platinum, and jewellery	0.7	0.6	0.5	5.7	4.4	2.1
D.12 Iron and steel	1.9+	2.6+	2.7+	4.2	1.8	4.2
D.13 Non-ferrous base metals	1.2	1.1	1.0	0.9	0.6	0.4
D.14 Manufactures of metals	4.4	4.4	4.3	0.6	0.7	0.8
D.15 Machines other than electric	4.8+	4.8+	4.2+	0.5	0.3	0.2
D.16 Electrical machinery, etc.	8.2	6.6	6.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
D.17 Railway vehicles	24.7	29.4	20.2	—	—	—
D.18 Road vehicles and aircraft	4.3	4.7	4.8	0.2	0.2	0.2
D.19 Ships and boats	8.5	0.3	0.7	—	—	—
D.20 Sanitary, plumbing, heating, and lighting	5.1	4.8	3.6	—	—	—
D.21 Clothing, footwear, travel goods, handbags, etc.	3.8	3.6	3.2	0.1	0.2	0.2
D.22 Scientific instruments, photographic and optical goods, watches, and clocks	4.2	4.1	4.0	0.3	0.4	0.4
D.23 Miscellaneous manufactured articles	5.3	5.5	4.7	0.3	0.3	0.3
E. 1 Postal packages	5.7	5.3	4.8	3.0	3.0	3.9
E. 2 Animals not for food	0.7	0.5	0.6	—	—	—

its way into monetary reserves of different countries, or the International Monetary Fund, and some goes into industrial use and private hoards. There is, in fact, no peculiarly British problem which would arise from the stopping of South African gold exports (except for some possible losses to London bullion dealers, with a smaller quantity to handle); it is essentially a problem of world liquidity in financing international payments. This aspect is fully dealt with in Mr Opie's paper, and we need say no more about it here.

5. Conclusion

Let us now pull the threads together. If imports of goods and services from South Africa are stopped, importers will switch to alternative sources of supply. Apart from transitional losses, this will presumably occasion some loss, in the sense that for a given expenditure of pounds sterling the U.K. will get slightly less value for money than hitherto. As we have already pointed out, inspection of the import figures suggests that in most cases there would be no real difficulty in finding satisfactory alternative supplies. (A possible exception is diamonds, which, unfortunately, do not appear in the *Annual Statement of Trade* at all, and for which there are no figures. They are not easily replaceable, and it may be that the burdens of sanctions might fall rather heavily on people about to buy their first tiara.) Similarly one could argue that exports no longer being sent to South Africa would now be available for sale in other markets. But export markets for manufacturers are not perfectly elastic, and some drop in price might have to be accepted if they were to be sold. Alternatively, if export prices are somewhat inflexible, they might not get sold at all. (It was to overcome this possibility that the suggestion was made of special loans to underdeveloped countries, to enable them to purchase the kind of export hitherto sent to South Africa.) If the U.K. did try to sell the exports elsewhere, any shortfall would open up a gap in the balance of payments on current account. The maximum gap would occur if she did not make the attempt, but instead sent the exports to underdeveloped countries with loans which she financed herself, to the extent of £150 million. There is, moreover, one item which cannot be switched, namely investment income from South Africa, of about £60 million. The loss of this income 'for the duration' also opens a gap in the current balance. Thus if the U.K. went it alone in imposing sanctions, a gap of somewhere between £60 and £210 million would appear in the balance of payments, according as she succeeded in selling exports elsewhere, and according as she decided, for employment reasons, to finance special loans to underdeveloped countries. (If she *were* going it alone, this last would appear to be a gratuitous extravagance, and she would do

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better to get what proceeds she could from selling the 'released' exports.) This gap would have to be closed, but might we not take it as a measure of the 'cost' of sanctions to the British economy? Could we not say that as a maximum Britain would have to forgo (in the form of reduced imports or increased exports) £210 million, i.e. about £4 per head of population? Actually things *could* be worse than this. In recent years, whenever imports have outrun overseas earnings, the British Government has dealt with the problem by holding back the entire economy. Professor E. A. G. Robinson has lately argued that in the years 1958–62 'we diminished the gross national product by about £660 million in order to save imports of about £200 million'.¹ If a similar method were to be pursued in the case of sanctions on South Africa the burden might indeed be heavy, equivalent in the worst case to about 2½ per cent of gross national product. But such an outcome would be doubly unnecessary.

In the first place, if a unilateral correction of the British balance of payments were to be required, deflating the whole economy would be the worst possible way to bring it about. Selective import controls could be used to confine the loss to the same order of magnitude as the original gap which is to be closed. Secondly, other countries which contemplate unilateral sanctions might have similar qualms about the possible outcome for themselves. But if *all* countries join in imposing sanctions it would be in their interest to treat the consequential balance of payments problems as a whole, and the situation would be completely transformed. Take the export of manufactures which have hitherto gone to South Africa. If all the suppliers compete with one another to dispose of these exports in markets which are already occupied, as it were, they might be frustrated. But a special loan to underdeveloped countries could 'create' a market of a size equal to that lost in South Africa. A number of schemes have already been adumbrated, quite apart from the sanctions question, for providing loans to underdeveloped countries, while preserving the liquidity of the industrial countries, e.g. Maxwell Stamp's proposal. Further, in as much as some countries, e.g. the U.K., suffer a worsening of their balance of payments from the loss of investment income which cannot be 'switched', special

1. *Three Banks Review*, December 1963, p.8.

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credits, e.g. from the International Monetary Fund, could be provided so that such countries would not be called on to reduce imports. (In so far as the rest of the world cannot easily expand the supply of goods hitherto coming from South Africa, then *some* reduction of imports will be necessary.) In the context of such a combined operation, the significant losses from sanctions are seen to be the transitional ones which will inevitably arise here and there because the timing of such a diversion of trade cannot be perfect. But the longer run losses from diversion, from the substitution of Californian or Israeli oranges for those who prefer South African, on the one hand, and some re-shuffling of exports on the other, are not likely to be large and will be widely spread. Some persons may lose more than others, and some might even gain. As we saw earlier on, it may be possible to identify those within the British economy who would be most hard hit, and arrange compensation schemes to spread the burden, and as we have just seen a similar spreading could be arranged between nations.

Thus there is no simple answer to the question – what would be the effect of economic sanctions on the U.K. economy itself? If Britain acted unilaterally, and then proceeded to cope with consequential balance of payments problems by the wrong means, the outcome might mean a sacrifice of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of national product. But if an optimal policy were followed, a combined operation of all the nations, the overall loss would be imperceptible, especially in economies which are growing at a reasonable rate. Britain's position with regard to sanctions is a strategic one. On the one hand her trade constitutes about one third of the external trade of South Africa. Thus if Britain stayed out, the effectiveness of sanctions by other countries would be significantly diminished, the more so if Britain allowed her own trade consequentially to increase. On the other hand, if Britain were to go it alone, and were obliged to cope with consequential balance of payments problems single-handed, she might run into rough water. Thus Britain, if she supports sanctions, has a strong case for asking that they should take the form of a combined U.N. operation, in which event the burden would be light.

The impact of sanctions on the United States

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The object of this paper is to examine the probable impact on the American economy of the imposition of sanctions against the Republic of South Africa. I interpret the word sanctions to mean, for the purpose of this analysis, a complete cessation of economic relationships between the United States and the Republic of South Africa. This implies that citizens of the United States will be forbidden to export goods to the Republic of South Africa and to import goods from the Republic of South Africa. It also implies a prohibition against the investment of American capital in South African enterprises. I shall refrain from discussing the morality of imposing sanctions against a country with which the United States is at peace – although I might add, parenthetically, that I have no qualms with respect to this – nor will I be concerned with the political and administrative difficulties which will inevitably arise. I assume, in short, that sanctions are imposed and that they are effectively policed and will concentrate exclusively on the probable effects of these actions on the American economy.

An economic boycott of South Africa will affect the American economy through its impact on American exports, imports, and overseas foreign investments. In the remainder of this paper, I propose to examine the probable impact of sanctions on each of these areas.

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1

The major effect of sanctions in so far as exports are concerned will be on the level of employment in the export and the export-supporting industries. If the United States economy were characterized by an excess demand for goods and services, a reduction in the value of exports need not result in unemployment. For in these circumstances the goods previously exported, or more generally, the factors and resources used to produce these goods, could be diverted to other areas to fill hitherto unsatisfied demand. Where, however, a country is operating at less than full employment level, as has been true in the United States in recent years, it is legitimate to assume that a decline in demand, for whatever reason, will be associated with an initial equivalent decline in the value of production and hence will result in additional unemployment. The significant question, therefore, is concerned with the amount of disemployment which would ensue following the imposition of sanctions against the Republic of South Africa.

A precise answer to this question would require a detailed up-to-date input-output matrix which, unfortunately, is not available. An approximation of the disemployment effects resulting from the imposition of sanctions can be obtained, however, by adapting the results of study undertaken by the United States Department of Labor.¹ It is possible to derive from this study estimates of average output per employee in the major export industries and in the export supporting industries for 1960. If we assume that the output-employee ratios have remained constant between 1960 and 1962 – the latest year for which data are available – and that the marginal output-employee ratios are similar to the average output-employee ratios, we have a basis for approximating the disemployment effects of sanctions. All that is required to achieve this is to apply the estimated output-employee ratios to actual American exports to South Africa.

In 1962, total American exports to the Republic of South

1. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Domestic Employment Attributable to United States Exports*, 1960. Washington. Also see the 1963 Statistical Abstract of the United States, Table 1214.

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Africa amounted to \$222,622,667, or to approximately 1 per cent of American exports by value. A breakdown of American exports by major SITC groups is shown in Table 17.

Table 17: United States Exports to the Republic of South Africa, 1962

<i>SITC</i>	<i>Product</i>	<i>Value of Exports</i>
		\$
00	Animals and Products (edible)	1,940,154
0	Animals and Products (inedible)	2,768,751
1	Vegetable Products (edible)	7,264,207
2	Vegetable Products (inedible)	9,773,828
3	Textile Fibres and Manufactures	35,269,902
4	Wood and Paper	11,776,842
5	Non-metallic minerals	14,688,152
6	Metals and Metal products	7,552,546
7	Machinery and Vehicles	88,099,084
8	Chemicals and related products	29,495,823
9	Miscellaneous manufactures	13,993,378

Source : Bureau of the Census, United States Exports of Domestic and Foreign Merchandise.

Table 18 contains a somewhat more detailed breakdown of American exports to the Republic of South Africa, together with estimates of disemployment effects resulting from the imposition of sanctions. As was already noted these estimates were derived by adapting the results of the Department of Labor's study of domestic employment attributable to United States exports.

It must be emphasized that the disemployment estimates shown in Table 18 are approximate rather than precise. My own feeling is that these estimates somewhat overstate the direct impact on American employment of a cessation of exports to South Africa. It is not probable, for example, that a decline in the level of demand would result in as large a disemployment in agriculture and in services related to trade as the estimates suggest. In many industries, labour, in the short run, is better regarded as an overhead factor rather than a variable factor, and substantial changes in the value of output can occur without appreciable effects on the level of employment. Since, however, I have no rational basis for adjusting these estimates, it is best to leave them as they are and to regard them as upper estimates of the disemployment effects of sanctions.

The disemployment estimates of Table 18 are to be regarded as

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Table 18: Disemployment Effects of Sanctions

Product	Value of Exports to South Africa (in \$ millions)	Disemployment		
		direct	indirect	total
Farm output (a)	13.4	2,800	2,052	4,852
Leather and manufactures	1.6	180	90	270
Rubber and manufactures (b)	7.8	291	291	582
Textile fibres and manufactures (c)	31.1	500	366	866
Paper and allied products (d)	10.3	323	665	988
Petroleum (e)	9.7	133	204	337
Stone, glass, and clay products (f)	1.8	257	390	647
Machinery except electrical (g)	46.8	2325	1090	3415
Electrical machinery (g)	9.0	515	319	834
Transport equipment (g)	32.3	1053	280	1333
Metals and manufactures	7.6	217	666	883
Chemicals	29.5	789	1190	1979
All other goods (h)	20.5		3257	3257
Trade, Transport, and other services (i)			5530	5530
Grand Total				25773

(a) Includes SITC groups 00,1 and part of 3

(b) part of SITC group 2

(c) part of SITC group 3

(d) part of SITC group 4

(e) part of SITC group 5

(f) part of SITC group 5

(g) part of SITC group 7

(h) Includes miscellaneous manufactures (group 9) plus all other manufactured exports not elsewhere specified. The employment estimates for this group were obtained by applying the overall output per employee ratio derived from the Department of Labor study. According to this study, \$1,000,000,000 in exports supported 150,000 jobs.

(i) The employment estimate for this group is equal to 1 per cent of all the jobs in these service industries attributable to total American exports. United States exports to South Africa are approximately equal to 1 per cent of total American exports.

the primary effects of sanctions. In addition to these, there are secondary effects resulting from the operation of the multiplier. Recent studies suggest that the employment multiplier in the United States is between 1.5 and 2. This is to say that an initial (primary) decline in employment of 25,773 will result in a further decline in employment of between 12,886 and 25,773. On the assumption that the employment multiplier is 1.5, therefore,

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unemployment in the United States will increase by 38,660 as a result of the cessation of exports to South Africa. If the multiplier is assumed to be 2 rather than 1.5, total unemployment resulting from the imposition of sanctions will amount to 51,546. The fact that I have not rounded these estimates does not, of course, confer on them any greater degree of precision.

In theory, American employment may decline still further because of the induced reduction in exports to those countries whose foreign exchange receipts are likely to fall because of their imposing sanctions on South Africa. I am unable at the present time, however, to hazard an estimate of the importance of this factor.

2

I should like to turn now to a consideration of the impact of sanctions on the American economy operating through imports. The cessation of imports from the Republic of South Africa can affect the American economy by increasing the cost of goods currently purchased from the Republic or, to the extent that the goods currently imported from South Africa are unavailable from any other source and have no adequate substitutes, by depriving the American economy of vital supplies. It is necessary to examine the pattern of American imports from South Africa to determine how significant each of these effects is likely to be.

In 1962, American imports from the Republic of South Africa amounted to \$256.7 million. A detailed breakdown of these imports together with the value of American imports from all sources is shown in Table 19.

Most, but not all, of the imports the United States derived from the Republic of South Africa can be replaced by domestic production, imports from other sources, or by adequate if not entirely satisfactory substitutes. Ostrich feathers, for example, could be replaced by other kinds of feathers should the need arise, and I am told that Maine lobsters are an adequate substitute for Rock-tail lobsters. By the same token, the United States could readily find alternative sources of supply, or technically satisfactory substitutes, for the cane and beet sugar, the manganese ore, ferromanganese, the tin alloys, the germanium, the antimony, the sardines, and the wool it currently imports

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Table 19: American Imports from South Africa, 1962

	Value of Imports from South Africa (\$ million)	Value of Imports from all sources (\$ million)
Sardines, not in oil	2.2	2.6
Rock-tail lobsters	14.3	38.6
Feathers, crude ostrich	0.4	0.4
Cane or beet sugar	9.1	298.0
Wool, 60's and finer	27.5	79.7
Asbestos, blue crude	2.1	3.6
Asbestos, chrysotile	0.8	1.1
Asbestos, amosite	3.2	3.3
Diamonds, rough	11.3	102.4
Diamonds, cut	4.7	89.2
Diamond dust	8.7	12.1
Industrial diamonds	7.1	31.9
Manganese ore	3.9	62.5
Ferromanganese	1.8	13.3
Uranium ore	97.5	252.3
Tin alloys	1.9	40.5
Antimony	1.1	2.2
Germanium	0.8	1.5
All other	58.3	—

Source: Bureau of the Census.

from South Africa. These substitutes will unquestionably increase the cost of these goods to American producers and consumers, and might in other ways reduce their welfare, but I doubt that the total effect will be very serious. In view of the relatively low value of imports involved, it is highly unlikely that the increase in cost to American consumers and producers resulting from these substitutions will exceed \$25 million.¹ It is not possible to estimate, however, how this increase in cost will affect specific firms and industries.

Potentially more important are those imports which the United States derives from South Africa for which there are no adequate substitutes. How significant is this consideration? To the best of

1. I derived this estimate by assuming that the cost of all imports derived from South Africa, exclusive of uranium, would rise by 15 per cent. Although there is no justification for this or any other assumption, I believe it overstates the increase in the cost of imports. Ultimately, of course, the extent to which the cost of substitutes rises depends upon the relevant elasticities of supply. The only reason for quantifying the probable increase is to emphasize how unimportant it is likely to be in the aggregate.

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my knowledge amosite asbestos is the only commodity currently imported from South Africa which would fall into this category. Amosite asbestos has important applications in the American defence programme as well as in industry. It is found nowhere else in the world but South Africa and, as of now, there are no known commercially satisfactory substitutes for it. There can be no question, therefore, that sanctions imposed over a long period of time could create a potentially serious problem with regard to this commodity. It must be emphasized, however, that even in this case the problem would not arise immediately. As of the end of 1962, the United States Government held 32,000 short tons of amosite in its stockpiles. Since American imports of amosite have averaged 14,000 short tons a year in the most recent past, the current stockpile is capable of meeting requirements for rather more than two years.¹

It is sometimes thought that the United States is critically dependent on South Africa for uranium and diamonds. This, however, is not the case. It is true that the United States derived 14 per cent of her uranium requirements from South Africa in 1962. It should not be overlooked, however, that the current government holdings of uranium are sufficient to meet all foreseeable future needs. In addition, both Canadian and American uranium producers are capable of expanding their output enormously at very short notice. It was in recognition of this that the United States has terminated all procurement contracts with foreign suppliers with the exception of that with South Africa, which is to continue through 1966. It should be noted that the continuance of this contract may make the United States legally responsible for payments even if uranium imports from the Republic should cease.

South Africa's importance as a diamond producer is frequently exaggerated. In 1962, South Africa produced approximately 9 per cent (by carat weight) of the total world output of industrial diamonds and approximately 25 per cent of total world output of gem diamonds. The former Belgian Congo is a much more

1. Until recently, the United States was also heavily dependent on South Africa for Crocidolite asbestos. The recent development of satisfactory substitutes, however, has reduced the importance of this particular type of asbestos.

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important producer of industrial diamonds than South Africa, accounting for 67 per cent of total world output. The points I wish to make are that alternative sources for diamonds do exist and that the imposition of sanctions against South Africa is more likely to create a crisis on the marital front than on the industrial front.¹

The conclusion that emerges is that the cessation of imports from South Africa as a result of the imposition of sanctions is not likely to have an important effect on the American economy. The increase in the cost of goods currently derived from South Africa would be nominal. Aside from amosite asbestos, moreover, the United States is not critically reliant on South Africa for any commodity for which alternative sources of supply are not readily available.²

3

The impact on foreign investments is the third way in which the imposition of sanctions may affect the American economy. At the end of 1961, the value of American investments in South Africa amounted to \$505 million, of which \$302 million was in the form of direct investment. Income from these investments was equal to approximately \$61 million. It is not unreasonable to assume that, faced with sanctions, the Republic of South Africa will retaliate by expropriating all foreign-owned property within its borders. Should this occur, it might appear that American investors would sustain a heavy loss as a result of the imposition of sanctions.

I do not believe this is a very serious threat. Even the most casual study of South Africa's economy suggests that it cannot

1. The growing importance of synthetic diamonds should not be overlooked. These diamonds are rapidly becoming competitive and may within a short time replace natural diamonds for industrial use even in the absence of sanctions.

2. I have not attempted to measure the impact of a cessation of imports from South Africa on American employment. In some cases import substitutions will lead to an increase in employment. In other cases, however, the reduction in imports will induce a decline in domestic employment. I do not believe the net effect of a cessation of imports from South Africa on the level of employment is likely to be significant.

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long survive isolated from the rest of the world. On the assumption that economic sanctions are universally imposed and effectively policed, the South African Government will, sooner or later, have to negotiate to rejoin the world community. One of the conditions the outside world can insist upon before economic relations are restored is that all expropriated investments be returned to their former owners or provision made for adequate compensation. If this is made a requirement for readmission to the world community, the potential loss to foreigners – including Americans – from the initial expropriation of foreign investments is not likely to exceed income from these investments and whatever depreciation and depletion have occurred.

If sanctions are not universally imposed, or are ineffectively policed, the threat to foreign investors is increased. If, for example, some countries are prepared to trade with South Africa, the urgency to restore normal economic relationships will be reduced and the conditions imposed by the boycotting nations may prove unacceptable to the South African Government. In these circumstances, the investors of those countries imposing sanctions may very well lose all or a major part of their South African investments. But should this come to pass, more than the value of foreign investments will have been lost. For what this state of affairs implies is that the imposition of sanctions will have failed to accomplish its major objective: namely, the overthrow of the oppressive South African Government or the abandonment by this Government of its inhumane policies. This is simply another way of saying that the risks involved in imposing sanctions are reduced and the chances of success are increased the more universally they are applied.

4

Although the gold problem is treated extensively in another paper, a few remarks regarding it are in order here. In 1962, world gold output amounted to 50,000,000 troy ounces and was valued at \$1,750,000,000. South Africa accounted for roughly one half of this output. Since a significant proportion of the annual gold output ends up as monetary reserves, a reduction in the outflow of gold from South Africa as a result of the imposition

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of sanctions could have an important effect on world liquidity. Because of the fact that the pound sterling and the dollar are key currencies, the impact of this reduction in world liquidity is likely to fall mainly on the United States and the United Kingdom. Countries which traditionally maintain a fixed proportion of their reserves in gold are likely, in these circumstances, to convert more of their dollars and sterling holdings into gold. The important question, therefore, is whether the threat to international liquidity is sufficiently serious to warrant a reconsideration of the advisability of imposing sanctions.

I do not believe that considerations of international liquidity should play a role in arriving at a decision regarding the advisability of imposing sanctions. I maintain this position not because I minimize the world liquidity problem, but rather because I believe it can be resolved quite simply by a few crucial policy decisions. The abolition of the obsolete requirement that the American monetary authorities hold gold equal in value to 25 per cent of the Federal Reserve System's liabilities is long overdue. The adoption of a modified Triffin Plan would do much to eliminate the shortage of liquidity, as would an increase in the lending powers of the International Monetary Fund. The major point is that the shortage of liquidity is not an insoluble problem and should not be used as a rationalization for not imposing sanctions. In fact, if sanctions against the Republic of South Africa hasten the day when these long overdue reforms are implemented, the world will have derived an unexpected indirect benefit from them.

5

The conclusions that emerge from the preceding analysis can be succinctly summarized. The imposition of sanctions against the Republic of South Africa will, on balance, have a very minor impact on the American economy. The cessation of exports will result in disemployment of 50,000 workers. The cessation of imports from the Republic will not create any serious problems, although the cost of substitutes may rise nominally. The threat that sanctions will result in the loss of foreign investment is more apparent than real, especially if the sanctions are universally

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applied and effectively policed. Finally, the reduction in the gold outflow from the Republic of South Africa should not be a source of difficulty and may even help bring about some long overdue reforms in the international financial mechanism.

Sanctions and the Indian experience

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India was the first country to sever trade relations with South Africa in protest at its racial policies. The decision to impose economic sanctions was taken in principle as early as November 1944, when the Government of South Africa introduced measures (known as the Natal Ordinances) restricting the right of its citizens of Indian origin to occupy and acquire land within its territory. For a time the Governor-General of South Africa withheld his assent to these measures, and this fact – together with considerations arising from the Allied war effort – weighed with the then Government of India not to give immediate effect to its decision. Towards the end of 1945, however, the Government of South Africa announced that fresh legislation would be enacted for carrying out and extending its policy of racial discrimination. All exports to and imports from South Africa were therefore prohibited from July 1946, and this boycott has continued ever since.

There were several factors which seemed then to be in India's favour. India had increased substantially its trade with South Africa in the course of the war. For a time it even ranked as South Africa's third most important source of imports. On the other hand, India's exports to South Africa accounted for only

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about 5½ per cent of its own total exports in 1944–5,¹ and the commodities were of a kind which had a ready market elsewhere. It also possessed a near-monopoly in its main item of export to South Africa, namely jute manufactures. India itself imported very little from South Africa and was not dependent on any of its products to the same extent as South Africa depended on Indian exports of jute manufactures. While India had therefore only the South African market to lose (a small part in any case of its total world market), the boycott seemed likely to cause at least some dislocation to the South African economy.

Though the decision to sever trade relations with South Africa was motivated primarily by considerations of national self-respect and prestige, it was undoubtedly strengthened by the belief that such action could also be effective. The nature of the expectations held at this time will be evident from the views expressed by two leading Indian journals on this question in 1944.

There are reasons to think that South Africans will suffer more than Indians if such measures are taken. The South African trade is mostly in the hands of non-Indians at both ends. Ordinarily the important export from India to South Africa is jute and import from that country wattle bark. While India alone takes a third of South African wattle, South Africa is an insignificant importer of her jute. The paralysing effect of shortage of this material for packing in South Africa will be more widespread than that of wattle in this country. Indigenous substitutes of wattle have been discovered in India, and stoppage of import will no longer seriously dislocate her tanning industry for any considerable length of time. There are always serious difficulties in enforcing economic sanctions, as there are always possibilities of re-export from one or the other of the importing countries. Scrupulous export quotas would have to be enforced. South Africa's dependence on Indian textiles and tea besides jute is much greater at the moment than normally. From the point of view of sheer timeliness, so vital in any form of retaliation, it is only now that India should impose the economic sanctions. It does not involve any considerable strain on her economy, while there are chances of such a measure mobilizing the conscience of the United Nations whose war effort no less than the peace objectives have been jeopardized by the South African measure.²

1. Exports to South Africa account now for a somewhat smaller proportion of the total exports of the United Kingdom, being only 4–4½ per cent of the total in the period 1959–61. See Mr Worswick's paper, page 167.

2. *Eastern Economist*, 10 November 1944.

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In the event of our enforcing economic sanctions, South Africa may possibly look for help to some of the United Nations, as, for instance, the U.S.A. and Argentine in regard to oilseeds, although it is extremely doubtful whether the former will have any exportable surplus. Again, for tea, it may turn to Ceylon. But that is about all. For, in so far as jute bags, cloth, and leather are concerned, India holds the whip hand. In South Africa, it is known, hessian bags are used for packing fertilizers, sugar, flour, cement, salt, etc. while jute sacks are utilized in packing wheat, maize, and other grains. Wool packs from India are used for packing South African wool, which is demonstrably the major industrial industry in the Union. Any embargo on the export of Indian jute manufactures is, therefore, sure completely to deprive the South African industry and agriculture of their basic packing materials, bringing, in its train, considerable paralysis of the Union's economy.¹

That the boycott had an immediate effect on the trade between the two countries will be seen from Table 20, which shows the magnitude and composition of India's trade with South Africa in 1944-5 (the last year of the war) and 1946-7 (the year in which trade was cut).

According to Indian trade statistics, trade between the two countries dwindled further in the following year and was practically negligible after 1948-9.

Between the decision to impose economic sanctions (taken in 1944) and the complete cessation of trade with South Africa, there were, however, two important developments. One was the end of the war, which opened up new sources of supply for South Africa, and the other was the emergence of Pakistan as a separate political unit. According to the terms of the partition of India in 1947, the new Indian Union was the successor government to the old regime, and Pakistan, being an entirely new political entity, was under no legal obligation to abide by the decisions taken earlier by the Government of India. Both these developments weakened India's ability to make the boycott effective.

To judge from South African trade statistics, imports from India continued to arrive for several years. The boycott seemed to have made hardly any difference to supplies from India until 1956.

1. *Commerce*, 10 November 1944.

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Table 20: India's Trade with South Africa, 1944-5, 1946-7 (in Rs. crores)

<i>Exports</i>	<i>1944-5</i>	<i>1946-7</i>
Raw and waste cotton	0.1	0.2
Cotton manufactures	2.8	0.4
Jute, gunny bags	3.8	0.9
Jute, gunny cloth	0.5	0.3
Leather	0.5	0.4
Vegetable oils	0.3	0.1
Paraffin wax	0.7	0.2
Seeds	1.2	0.1
Spices	0.1	0.2
Wool manufactures	0.7	0.2
Others	1.2	0.5
	11.9	3.6
<i>Imports</i>		
Barks for tanning	0.5	0.4
Metals and ores	0.6	0.2
Liquors	0.2	0.1
Precious stones and pearls	0.9	0.2
Others	0.8	0.3
	3.0	1.3

Source: Government of India, Review of the Trade of India. Transactions on government account are not covered by these data. Rs. 1 crore = U.S. \$2.2 million (approx.) or £750,000.

The explanation for this apparent inconsistency between the Indian and South African trade statistics appears to be that (1) a number of countries acted as transit camps for re-export to South Africa of commodities imported from India, and (2) South Africa recorded its imports of these commodities according to the country of their origin. Of such re-routing of trade through third countries there is indirect evidence.

For instance, within the category of jute manufactures, the main requirement of South Africa was for sacking gunny bags.

Table 21: South Africa's Imports from India (in U.S. \$ million)

1948	:	17.5	1953	:	3.3
1949	:	20.2	1954	:	12.0
1950	:	3.0	1955	:	5.4
1951	:	14.2	1956	:	1.6
1952	:	19.7			

Source: United Nations, Direction of International Trade. South African Trade statistics are not directly cited here as they are not readily available in India.

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In 1944-5 (according to Indian trade statistics) India exported directly to South Africa about 44 million sacking gunny bags valued at approximately Rs. 3½ crores; by 1946-7 the number had fallen to 10 million, and by 1947-8 there were no exports at all of these bags to South Africa. However, the number of sacking gunny bags exported to Australia rose sharply over the same period from 63 million in 1944-5 and 54 million in 1945-6, to 106 million in 1947-8. Data on the commodity composition of Australia's exports to South Africa are not available, but according to South African trade statistics the total value of these imports rose sharply from around \$3 million in 1945 and \$8 million in 1946 to over \$14 million in 1948, and then, after averaging about \$9 million between 1949 and 1953, fell back to a relatively low level of \$5 to 6 million in the period 1954-7. It seems not unlikely that the explanation for the bulge in the intervening period is the re-export of sacking gunny bags from Australia to South Africa.

There is similar evidence of a fairly sharp increase during this period in India's exports of commodities, previously shipped directly to South Africa, to other countries of the British Commonwealth neighbouring South Africa such as Kenya, Rhodesia, and Tanganyika. Table 22 shows the increase in the value of cotton and jute manufactures exported from India to Kenya, Zanzibar, and Pemba between 1946-7 and 1951-2.

Table 22: Indian Exports of Cotton and Jute Manufactures to Kenya, Zanzibar, and Pemba (in Rs. crores)

	<i>Cotton manufactures</i>	<i>Jute manufactures</i>
1946-7	2.1	0.5
1947-8	1.6	1.3
1948-9	2.1	0.9
1949-50	3.9	1.4
1950-1	3.5	1.6
1951-2	2.7	4.1

Source: Government of India, Review of the Trade of India.

Hong Kong was probably another source of supply. Indian exports of jute manufactures to Hong Kong rose from Rs. 0.2 crores in 1946-7 to Rs. 1.4 crores in 1948-9 and Rs. 4.4 crores in 1949-50.

From around 1952 a new element emerged with the entry of Pakistan into direct trade with South Africa. The Muslim

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League, which was the political party responsible for the creation of Pakistan, had been an active and enthusiastic supporter of the decision to boycott trade with South Africa in 1946. But (as mentioned earlier) Pakistan had no legal commitment to abide by the decisions taken before 1947, and from the middle of the fifties it took full advantage of this freedom. Table 23 shows the increase in the total value of imports into South Africa from Pakistan, as registered in South African trade statistics.

Table 23: Imports into South Africa from Pakistan, 1951-62 (In U.S. \$ million)

1951	:	—	1958	:	14.7
1952	:	2.7	1959	:	15.3
1953	:	2.3	1960	:	16.7
1954	:	6.8	1961 (Jan.-Sept.)		13.3
1955	:	10.1	1962 (Jan.-Sept.)		20.2
1956	:	11.9			
1957	:	16.7			

Source: United Nations, *Direction of International Trade*.

That the imports from Pakistan registered in South African trade statistics do not represent re-exports from third countries is clear from Pakistan's own trade statistics. According to the *Statistical Bulletin* published by the Government of Pakistan, exports to South Africa amounted to Rs. 9.1 crores between July 1961 and June 1962.

India's trade boycott of South Africa appears to have been thus rendered ineffective, initially by the re-export of products of Indian origin by countries like Australia, Kenya, Southern Rhodesia, and Hong Kong, and later by the breaking of the boycott by Pakistan. It is probable that South Africa had to pay higher prices initially for the imports from India secured through third parties, and suffered in the process some deterioration in its terms of trade, but the loss on this account could not have been very considerable. After Pakistan's entry into direct trade with South Africa even this adverse repercussion is likely to have been corrected. The loss ultimately has been that of India, namely of the South African market in which it had earlier established itself and in which the demand for its products had been continuously growing.

The case for economic sanctions is obviously a political one

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and the factors that determine their success are also in the ultimate analysis of a political character. If all countries decide on severing trade relations with South Africa, and if action is taken more or less simultaneously, the boycott will be certainly effective. Even if all countries are not prepared to be actively involved, the boycott can be made effective provided those who join are numerous and strong enough to prevent others from taking advantage of the situation. But if a small group of countries decide to 'go it alone', it is very unlikely that sanctions can achieve their objective, however large the share of South African trade enjoyed by the sanctioning countries might be now and however vital the requirement of the South African economy for their products. The loss is likely to fall more heavily on them than on the country against which the boycott is imposed. That even countries which have a considerable political stake in appearing to be on the right side of such a boycott find it difficult to resist the temptation is clear from Pakistan's entry into direct trade with South Africa. This is essentially the main lesson of the Indian experience in boycotting South Africa.

Sanctions and the High Commission territories

The dependence of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland on the Republic of South Africa and the effect on them of an International Trade Embargo against the Republic.¹

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The purpose of this paper is to highlight the economic links between the three High Commission Territories and the Republic of South Africa, and to study the effect on the three Protectorates of an economic trade embargo on South Africa. The economic ties of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland with the Republic are so many that it would seem that the closest co-operation with South Africa is essential since in general terms the three Protectorates are geographically and ethnically part of South Africa. However, despite this, all the three High Commission Territories can play a positive and integral part in any economic boycott directed against the Republic. This is assuming, of course, that the United Kingdom, the United Nations Organization, and the African states are committed to help alleviate some of the hardships caused by the severance of ties between the Republic and the High Commission Territories. With this in view, it is essential to look at the problems of the three Protectorates in the context of Africa as a whole. A quick glance at the continent shows that there is only a very small belt in southern Africa which still remains dominated by foreign

1. This paper has benefited from discussion with the Economic Sanctions Group of the Edinburgh branch of the Anti-Apartheid Movement and particularly from the assistance given by Dr B. Meltzer, Mr R. Cooke, and Mr P. Olive.

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powers. However, this gap is narrowing all the time, with Nyasaland (Malawi) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) becoming independent in the near future. This leaves seven countries – Angola, South-West Africa, Bechuanaland, Southern Rhodesia, Moçambique, Swaziland, and Basutoland – as dependent countries. In addition to these, there is, of course, South Africa.

In order to put the three Protectorates into their true perspective, a number of statistics are necessary, and so I propose to give a few introductory remarks on Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland. These will be followed by a more detailed analysis of the economic ties between the Protectorates and the Republic of South Africa, and this by a discussion of the implications of a trade embargo on South Africa and how this will affect the Protectorates.

In area, the three Protectorates are over half the size of the Republic (see Table 24). However, this comparison is rather misleading, since Bechuanaland, the largest of the three Territories, is confined largely to the sparsely populated Kalahari Desert, a region of sand belts, supporting grass and occasional thorn scrub, and inhabited by the aboriginal bushmen. Unlike Basutoland, Bechuanaland is not an enclave within the boundaries of South Africa, for it is bounded on the west by South-West Africa, and in the north by Northern and Southern Rhodesia. Likewise Swaziland, a country slightly smaller than Wales, is bordered by Moçambique in the east. However, for the purpose of this paper, since Portugal is likely to side with South Africa in the event of a United Nations trade embargo on the Republic, it has been assumed that Swaziland, like Basutoland, is engulfed within 'foreign lands'. Basutoland, which is about one and a half times the size of Wales, is contiguous with Natal to the east, Cape Province to the south, and Orange Free State to the north and west. One quarter of its land consists of lowland territory, while in the west the highland terrain rises to a height of over 11,000 feet in the Drakensberg Range. This latter area is sparsely populated.

The total population of the three Protectorates, at the last census in 1956, was 1.35 million, including those people who were temporarily absent from their countries. In contrast, the 1960 census in the Republic of South Africa gave a total population

Table 24: Area and Population of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland, South Africa, and South-West Africa

	Area (sq. m.)	Year of census	population										
			Total	Africans	Asians	Europeans	Other						
Basutoland	11,716	1946	563,854	561,289	274	1,689	602						
		1956	641,674	638,857	247	1,926	644						
		1961*	694,000										
Bechuanaland	222,000	1946	296,310	292,755	94	2,379	1,082						
		1956	320,675	316,578	248	3,173	676						
		1961*	350,000										
Swaziland	6,705	1946	185,215	181,269	6	3,201	739						
		1956	240,511	233,214	n.a.†	5,919	1,378						
		1962*	280,300	270,000	n.a.†	8,040	2,260						
Republic of South Africa	472,359												
Cape	278,465	1946	11,415,025	7,830,559	285,260	2,372,044	928,062						
Natal	33,578							1951	12,671,452	8,560,083	366,664	2,641,689	1,103,016
Transvaal	110,450							1960	16,002,797	10,927,922	477,125	3,088,492	1,509,258
Orange Free State	49,866												
South-West Africa	317,887	1960*	525,064	427,980	n.a.†	73,154	23,930						

* estimated

† not available.

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of 16.00 million, 19.3 per cent of whom were Europeans. The Protectorate with the largest population is Basutoland, which in 1956 had 641,574 persons resident there, and to this must be added 154,782 Africans who were absent at the time of the census. Unlike the other two Protectorates there is no European settlement, and in the census year (1956) only 0.3 per cent of the total were Europeans, most of whom were administrators, missionaries, or short-term residents conducting business or trade. In Swaziland, on the other hand, out of a total population of 240,511 in 1956, 2.5 per cent, or approximately 6,000 were Europeans who owned 45 per cent of the agricultural land. The proportion of Europeans in Bechuanaland was much smaller and in 1956 amounted to only 0.9 per cent of the total population of 320,675. In both Swaziland and Bechuanaland these minorities comprised a high proportion of Afrikaans-speaking Europeans, and in Bechuanaland, where the Europeans owned 2 per cent of the land, the percentage was over half.

The economies of both Bechuanaland and Basutoland are based almost entirely on stock raising and agriculture. In general the form of agriculture is, characteristically, that of a peasant community with small individual land holdings. In both these territories, and particularly in Basutoland, the farmers have a constant struggle against climatic conditions, impoverished soil, and a system of land tenure which permits little development or improvement in either crop production or agricultural method. Likewise in Swaziland, although mining is of increasing importance, the bulk of the population is engaged in subsistence farming. However, recently a number of significant changes have taken place in agriculture because of the Swazis' growing interest in the cultivation of cash crops, under irrigation.

In all three Protectorates maize and sorghum are the most important crops and constitute the staple foods. However, the three territories are not self-sufficient in the production of maize, and local supplies have to be augmented with imports, which nearly all come from the Republic. For example, imports of maize into Bechuanaland have risen from an average of 5 million lb. for the period 1954-7 to 44 million lb. in 1960, or 125 lb. per head per annum. In Basutoland, imports of maize increased from 21 million lb. for the period 1950-3 to 46 million

Table 25: Imports into Bechuanaland, 1950-60

	Annual average									
	1950-3		1954-7		1958		1959		1960	
	<i>m. lb.</i>	<i>£ thousand</i>	<i>m. lb.</i>	<i>£ thousand</i>	<i>m. lb.</i>	<i>£ thousand</i>	<i>m. lb.</i>	<i>£ thousand</i>	<i>m. lb.</i>	<i>£ thousand</i>
TOTAL IMPORTS		1859.64		2575.07		3503.65		3406.56		3282.69
<i>Food</i>		466.11		391.63		552.19		752.88		1100.03
a. Staples	18.86	190.05	9.29	116.87	16.63	176.42	23.62	255.24	53.12	543.63
(i) Sorghum and millet	1.10	12.90	0.02	0.22	0.02	0.15	0.62	4.70	9.51	107.22
(ii) Maize	13.31	123.98	4.95	47.63	0.93	94.37	15.30	156.88	43.61	436.41
(iii) Wheat	4.45	53.20	4.32	69.02	6.68	81.90	7.70	93.70	—	—
b. Protein		n.a.		12.76		10.0		85.3		117.49
(i) Cattle				7.43		5.22		60.26		113.89
(ii) Other livestock				5.33		0.34		20.45		3.60
(iii) Butter				—		4.47		4.55		1.54
c. Other		276.06		262.00		365.75		412.38		437.37
<i>General Merchandise</i>		800.68		1364.66		1765.41		1457.29		1057.87
<i>Vehicles</i>		75.35		255.53		433.05		414.52		556.16
<i>Textiles</i>		515.95		553.30		733.71		746.18		487.90
<i>Fertilizers</i>		1.54		9.96		19.29		35.69		80.71

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Table 25a: Percentage Composition by Value of Imports Into Bechuanaland, 1950-60

	1950-3	1954-7	1958	1959	1960
TOTAL IMPORTS	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Food</i>	25.1	15.2	15.8	22.1	33.5
a. Staples	10.2	4.6	5.0	7.5	16.6
(i) Sorghum and millet	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.1	3.3
(ii) Maize	6.7	1.9	2.7	4.6	13.3
b. Protein	n.a.	0.5	0.3	2.5	3.6
c. Other	14.8	10.2	10.4	12.1	13.3
<i>General Merchandise</i>	43.1	53.0	50.4	42.8	32.2
<i>Vehicles</i>	4.1	9.9	12.4	12.2	16.9
<i>Textiles</i>	27.7	21.5	20.9	21.9	14.9
<i>Fertilizers</i>	0.1	0.4	0.5	1.0	2.5

lb. in 1962, or 67 lb. *per capita*. Wheat is grown fairly widely in Basutoland, but in the other two Protectorates it is grown mostly on European farms, and a certain amount is exported. However, in recent years, the Protectorates have, on balance, been net importers of wheat. Likewise the territories have become increasingly dependent on imports of sorghum to supplement local production. In Bechuanaland and Swaziland a certain number of cash crops are grown, mostly on European farms. In Bechuanaland, cash crops include groundnuts, beans, and pulses, while in Swaziland cotton, tobacco, and rice are grown. With increased use of irrigation for growing crops, agricultural output in Swaziland is expected to increase substantially in the next few years. Sugar, of course, is the most important export crop, accounting for just over 40 per cent of total export earnings in 1962. For marketing purposes, the Swaziland sugar industry is at present integrated with that of South Africa, but it has a separate production quota of 80,000 tons *per annum*.

Both Bechuanaland and Basutoland are dependent to a great extent on stock raising and animal husbandry. This is the dominant source of cash income for the African peasant and farming communities in these two Protectorates. In Bechuanaland, for example, since cattle ranching is the main occupation of the Bechuana people, the key to increased prosperity for the country lies in the expansion of the livestock industry. Nearly all the few industries established in the Protectorate are based on cattle products, while in 1960 91 per cent of all domestic

Table 26: Domestic exports of Bechuanaland, 1950-60

	Annual Average									
	1950-3		1954-7		1958		1959		1960	
	<i>m. lb.</i>	<i>£ thousand</i>	<i>m. lb.</i>	<i>£ thousand</i>	<i>m. lb.</i>	<i>£ thousand</i>	<i>m. lb.</i>	<i>£ thousand</i>	<i>m. lb.</i>	<i>£ thousand</i>
TOTAL EXPORTS		2001.15		2638.50		2586.90		3364.11		2678.64
<i>Agricultural Products</i>		126.90		396.50		239.12		203.48		38.77
a. Sorghum	3.49	34.77	19.53	194.50	8.28	66.20	10.40	78.00	0.05	0.40
b. Beans	3.08	35.81	14.97	131.48	7.28	109.20	3.19	31.00	1.15	11.46
c. Groundnuts	0.00	1.85	0.89	9.21	1.40	32.90	3.32	79.60	0.43	10.15
d. Wheat	0.00	0.04	0.62	7.94	0.02	0.25	0.05	0.59	0.24	3.03
e. Other		54.43		53.37		30.57		14.29		13.78
<i>Animal Products</i>		1803.30		2082.42		2108.14		2955.45		2434.29
a. Butter and butterfat	0.50	65.9	0.65	99.20	0.51	79.0	0.56	68.00	0.29	45.30
b. Cattle (live) (thousand head)	73.11	1391.86	21.30	444.12	7.22	167.08	10.20	204.19	7.87	150.89
c. Cattle (carcase)	—	—	24.39	1105.27	30.46	1473.69	42.21	1980.58	36.02	1577.97
d. Other livestock		98.69		67.23		33.02		29.12		20.18
e. Hides and skins		209.52		193.36		175.76		418.22		105.82
f. Miscellaneous		37.31		173.28		179.63		255.37		534.15
<i>Minerals</i>		43.80		144.04		191.16		198.72		205.59
a. Asbestos	0.49	24.05	2.89	126.51	3.47	139.91	2.24	95.27	3.60	132.26
b. Manganese	—	—	0.13	0.58	10.99	49.39	31.81	92.00	28.40	70.82
c. Other		24.30		17.0	—	2.70		2.50		2.50
<i>Miscellaneous</i>		22.65		15.55		47.7		15.46		—

Table 26a: Percentage Composition by Value of Main Exports, 1950-60

	1950-3	1954-7	1958	1959	1960
TOTAL EXPORTS	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Agricultural Products</i>	6.3	15.0	9.2	6.0	1.4
a. Sorghum	1.7	7.4	2.6	2.3	0.0
b. Beans	1.8	5.0	4.2	0.9	0.4
<i>Animal Products</i>	90.1	78.9	81.5	87.9	90.9
a. Butter and butterfat	3.3	3.8	3.0	2.1	1.7
b. Cattle (live)	69.6	16.8	6.5	6.1	5.6
c. Cattle (carcase)	—	41.9	57.0	58.9	58.9
<i>Minerals</i>	2.4	5.5	7.4	5.6	7.7
a. Asbestos	1.2	4.8	5.4	2.8	4.9

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exports consisted of animal products. The most important single item was cattle carcasses, which in the same year amounted to £1.58 million or 59 per cent of the total export bill. It must be emphasized that the reliance of Bechuanaland to such an extent on animal products means that if in any one year there was a widespread outbreak of foot and mouth disease, and/or a severe drought, exports could be reduced drastically, which would also mean that income from this source would be cut almost entirely. Although in Basutoland the dependence on animal products is not so great, in 1962 the two most important export items, wool and mohair, accounted for 75 per cent of total export earnings. Although much has been done to improve the quality and grading of these products, their value has not increased. Therefore one can conclude from these few sketchy remarks that the economic well-being of the Basuto nation and the Bechuana people, in any particular year, depends largely on climatic conditions, and on the prices fetched by the main export commodities – wool and mohair in the case of Basutoland, and cattle in the case of Bechuanaland. The main markets for these products are, of course, to be found in South Africa.

Unlike the other two High Commission Territories, Swaziland is rich in mineral deposits, particularly asbestos and iron ore, and late in 1960 a copper-nickel-cobalt deposit was located. Asbestos is, at present, the most important mineral exported and in 1962 accounted for some 33 per cent of the territory's total export earnings. The entire output of the Havelock Mine, one of the world's five main producers of asbestos, is exported through Barberton in the Transvaal. The bulk of it goes to the Republic, the United Kingdom, France, and Spain. Mining at the large iron-ore deposit (47 million tons) at Bomvu Ridge (Ngwenya) will start by the end of the year, after the mines have been completed (cost £3–4 million, to be operated by the Swaziland Iron Ore Development Corporation Ltd – a subsidiary set up by the Anglo-American Corporation and Guest, Keen and Nettlefold). The mine's output has been assured by the signing of a £40-million contract for the supply of 12 million tons of ore over a period of ten years to the Yawata and Fuji Steel Companies of Japan. An essential preliminary to the exploitation of these reserves is the completion of a rail link to the coast. It

Table 27: Imports Into Basutoland, 1950-62*

	Annual Average													
	1950-3		1954-7		1958		1959		1960		1961		1962	
	m. lb.	£	m. lb.	£	m. lb.	£	m. lb.	£	m. lb.	£	m. lb.	£	m. lb.	£
	thousand		thousand		thousand		thousand		thousand		thousand		thousand	
TOTAL IMPORTS	2626.71		2940.20		2947.27		2893.94		3142.48		3059.53		3530.37	
<i>Food</i>	307.68		435.36		574.82		725.54		941.99		831.06		1082.89	
a. Staples	30.84	286.46	34.14	337.70	31.01	308.86	38.20	455.13	53.33	594.08	39.20	477.47	45.00	684.28
(i) Wheat	8.01	98.79	7.31	93.55	7.70	98.62	8.80	116.52	8.50	116.04	7.56	107.63	8.43	116.12
(ii) Maize	21.24	170.72	24.68	214.17	22.09	193.12	27.16	314.26	46.26	462.26	30.67	356.28	34.24	534.34
(iii) Sorghum	1.59	16.95	2.35	29.99	1.22	17.12	2.25	24.35	0.58	15.84	0.97	13.57	2.33	33.82
b. Protein	21.22		97.66		265.96		270.41		347.91		353.59		398.61	
(i) Cattle	13.20		65.98		183.65		208.21		273.38		270.16		320.12	
(ii) Other livestock	8.02		31.68		82.31		62.20		74.53		83.43		78.49	
<i>General Merchandise</i> †	2319.03		2504.84		2372.45		2168.40		2200.40		2228.46		2447.48	

*Compiled from returns submitted by traders, and should be regarded as an indication rather than an accurate picture of exports.

† Other foodstuffs are included in General Merchandise.

Table 27a: Percentage Composition by Value of Imports 1950-62

	1950-3	1954-7	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
TOTAL IMPORTS	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Food</i>	11.7	14.8	19.5	25.1	30.0	27.2	30.7
a. Staples	10.9	11.5	10.5	15.7	18.9	15.6	19.4
(i) Wheat	3.8	3.2	3.3	4.0	3.7	3.5	3.3
(ii) Maize	6.5	7.3	6.5	10.9	14.7	11.7	15.1
b. Protein	0.8	3.3	9.0	9.4	11.1	11.6	11.3
<i>General Merchandise</i>	88.3	85.2	80.5	74.9	70.0	72.7	69.3

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is therefore planned to connect the Ridge with Goba, in Moçambique, where a connexion exists to Lourenço Marques, operated by the Moçambique railway authorities.

In contrast to Swaziland, neither Bechuanaland nor Basutoland has any large mineral deposits. Although recent geological surveys have revealed extensive deposits of coal, Bechuanaland has only two minerals, asbestos and manganese, which are mined on a significant scale. However, in 1960, exports of these amounted to £206,000 or 7.7 per cent of total domestic exports. On the other hand, Basutoland has very few exploitable minerals, although a very small amount of diamonds were dug in 1962.

Apart from these mines in Bechuanaland and Basutoland there is very little industry in the two Protectorates. Basutoland, indeed, has only one small brick field and two missionary printing works, which employ a total of about 100 people. In Bechuanaland, however, the list is slightly longer – an abattoir, maize-mill, and soap factory at Lobatsi, and a creamery, hides and skins depot, and bone-meal factory at Francistown. There is therefore comparatively little paid employment, and wage-earners total just under 10,000 in the whole country. In Swaziland, apart from a small number of relatively large industrial units engaged in mining or the processing of local produce for export, little manufacturing development has as yet taken place within the territory and in fact the Swazis have probably benefited very little from the development which has taken place. However, unlike the other two Protectorates, the demand for labour within Swaziland is much greater and this means that there is a reasonably large and stable labour force.

Militating against the growth of light industries in all three Protectorates during recent years have been the inadequacies of the transport systems and of power supplies and, especially, the low level of the purchasing power of the population in each of the Territories. However, while progress is being made to remedy these defects in Swaziland, the greatest deterrent to economic expansion in Bechuanaland is probably the lack of adequate water supplies and, of course, as in Basutoland, the almost non-existent domestic market. Therefore economic development is especially needed in the livestock and agricultural fields. Of all the High Commission Territories, Swaziland, the

Table 28: Exports of Basutoland, 1950-62

	Annual Average													
	1950-3		1954-7		1958		1959		1960		1961		1962	
	m. lb.	£	m. lb.	£	m. lb.	£	m. lb.	£	m. lb.	£	m. lb.	£	m. lb.	£
	thousand		thousand	thousand		thousand			thousand		thousand		thousand	
TOTAL EXPORTS	2092.98		1964.42		1376.90		1649.74		1462.60		1413.52		1641.40	
<i>Agricultural Products</i>	229.16		338.63		303.88		157.13		161.12		97.40		188.20	
a. Wheat	6.11	60.59	13.26	156.92	10.35	137.74	3.67	35.45	7.87	100.00*	5.13	67.00*	4.55	156.02
b. Maize	0.75	4.59	0.02	0.03	0.33	2.98	0.49	5.83	0.09	1.03	0.06	0.93		—
c. Peas and beans	5.07	86.15	10.20	161.02	9.46	139.75	5.18	114.97	2.63	52.52	1.14	25.80	1.48	30.80
d. Sorghum	9.70	77.84	2.16	20.67	2.37	23.43	0.13	0.88	1.17	7.57	0.32	3.70	0.27	1.34
<i>Animal Products</i>	1863.82		1625.79		1073.10		1492.61		1301.50		1316.10		1453.19	
a. Wool and mohair	8.31	1726.00	8.57	1429.00	7.48	831.32	8.31	1202.02	7.97	1060.97	8.62	1168.97	10.04	1236.71
b. Hides and skins		63.91		46.34		56.24		49.48		45.44		34.57		25.59
c. Livestock		66.30		137.30		171.20		230.20		195.10		112.50		190.89
d. Other		7.60		13.20		14.50		11.00		n.a.		n.a.		n.a.

* Estimates

Table 28a: Percentage Composition by Value of Domestic Exports, 1950-62

	1950-3	1954-7	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
TOTAL EXPORTS	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Agricultural Products</i>	10.9	17.2	21.1	9.5	11.0	6.9	11.5
a. Wheat	2.9	8.0	10.0	2.1	6.8	4.7	9.5
b. Peas and beans	4.1	8.2	10.1	7.0	3.6	7.8	1.9
<i>Animal Products</i>	89.1	82.8	77.9	90.5	89.0	93.1	88.5
a. Wool and mohair	82.5	72.7	66.4	72.9	72.5	82.7	75.3

Table 29: Imports into Swaziland, 1958-62*

	in £ thousands				
	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
TOTAL IMPORTS	3172.00	3955.00	4100.00	5219.50	11108.0
<i>Food and Drink, of which</i>	645.28	1079.50	1182.00	1327.00	1135.00
a. Staples	91.07	142.50	266.50	460.00	636.00
b. Sugar	105.21	198.50	69.50	81.00	28.00
c. Livestock	26.85	58.00	41.50	59.50	26.00
<i>Motor Vehicles, spares, petrol, oil,</i>	598.25	848.50	802.50	950.00	1832.50
of which Petrol	101.30	131.50	200.00	375.00	608.50
<i>Timber and Building Materials</i>	214.31	477.00	411.00	646.50	475.50
<i>Other Merchandise, of which</i>	1714.16	1550.00	1704.50	2295.50	7665.00
a. Mining stores	205.62	125.00	171.00	470.00	n.a.
b. Fertilizers	37.61	85.00	220.00	275.00	436.00
c. Tobacco and cigarettes	83.25	93.50	41.50	59.50	223.00
d. Coal	47.04	45.00	140.00	85.00	74.50

Table 29a: Percentage Composition of Imports by Value, 1958-62

	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
TOTAL IMPORTS	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Food and Drink</i>	20.3	27.2	28.8	25.4	10.2
Staples	2.9	3.6	6.5	8.8	5.7
<i>Vehicles, etc.</i>	18.9	21.5	19.6	18.5	16.5
<i>Building Materials, etc.</i>	6.8	12.1	10.0	12.1	4.3
<i>Other Merchandise</i>	54.0	39.2	41.6	44.0	69.0

* The figures given for Swaziland's external trade should be regarded as an indication rather than as an accurate picture of imports and exports.

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smallest of the three, is potentially a viable unit, and the opening of a direct rail link with the coast is of extreme economic importance to it.

The next stage which requires examination is the degree to which Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland are closely linked to the Republic of South Africa.

First, all three Protectorates form a Customs Union with the Republic of South Africa. This means that not only is South African currency legal tender in all three High Commission Territories, but, for purposes of customs regulations and restrictions, Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland are treated as one country with South Africa. As a result of the 1910 Agreement, the Protectorates receive a certain fixed proportion of the Republic's total gross customs and excise revenue: Basutoland receives 0.88575 per cent, Bechuanaland 0.27622 per cent, and Swaziland 0.149 per cent. In addition to this revenue from the South African authorities, each Protectorate levies duties on alcoholic beverages imported from South Africa.

By far the largest source of Government revenue in Basutoland is this customs and excise revenue received from South Africa, and in 1961-2 it amounted to nearly £1 million, or 48.3 per cent of total revenue (30.1 per cent if grants-in-aid are included). Similarly, in Bechuanaland 23 per cent of total revenue is accounted for by customs and excise revenue. On the other hand, in Swaziland, less than 10 per cent of revenue represents customs and excise revenue obtained from the South African authorities. In passing it should be emphasized that, unlike Swaziland, both Basutoland and Bechuanaland are dependent on the United Kingdom for grants-in-aid to balance the Government current account. Ever since 1954-5, the Bechuanaland Government has had a deficit on current account and has become increasingly dependent on the United Kingdom for grants-in-aid. This budgetary aid has been forthcoming, but only after the surplus balances built up during the war years had been exhausted. However, without a marked improvement within the economy there is no prospect that the country's revenues will be sufficient, unaided, to meet its ordinary recurrent expenditure, if the bare minimum of public services are to be continued. In 1960-1, nearly £1 million was needed to balance the account. In Basuto land,

Table 30: Exports of Swaziland, 1950-62

	Annual Averages		1958	1959	1960		1961		1962	
	1950-3	1954-7			m.lb.	£ thous.	m.lb.	£ thous.	m.lb.	£ thous.
TOTAL EXPORTS	2,516.2	3,539.2	3,941.8	4,374.5		6,025.0		6,335.0		7,459.5
<i>Agricultural Products</i>	309.0	710.8	1,213.3	1,730.7		2,590.5		3,037.5		4,258.0
a. Rice	49.0	188.4	225.0	187.0	8.4	162.5	8.0	195.0	7.8	305.0
b. Cotton	85.8	201.1	178.0	298.2	8.4	267.0	10.6	359.5	6.0	206.5
c. Tobacco	35.2	24.5	81.5	87.6	1.0	49.0	0.4	24.0	0.6	34.0
d. Sugar	—	—	54.7	423.0	73.0	1,280.0	117.0	1,843.5	124.0	2,991.0
e. Fruit (fresh and canned)	20.3	83.5	178.7	240.4		191.0		205.5		301.5
f. Timber and timber products	58.3	147.4	470.6	443.5		600.0		329.7		420.0
g. Other	60.5	65.8	24.7	51.0		41.0		80.3		n.a.
<i>Livestock and Animal Products</i>	427.5	488.8	577.9	546.3		611.5		725.5		704.0
a. Cattle	293.3	375.6	333.1	405.1		514.0		633.5		636.5
b. Hides and Skins	82.9	30.5	160.2	39.2		32.5		37.0		35.0
c. Butter	43.2	75.1	74.6	74.0		65.0		55.0		32.5
d. Other	8.1	7.6	10.0	28.1		n.a.		n.a.		n.a.
<i>Minerals</i>	1,779.7	2,339.7	2,150.6	2,097.6		2,823.0		2,572.0		2,497.5
a. Asbestos	1,741.3	2,313.2	2,131.0	2,085.4	64.0	2,787.0	61.6	2,535.0	65.6	2,470.0
b. Other	38.5	26.5	19.6	12.2		36.0		37.0		27.5

Table 30a: Percentage Composition of Exports of Swaziland by Value

	1950-3	1954-7	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
TOTAL EXPORTS	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Agricultural Products</i>	12.3	20.1	30.8	39.5	43.0	47.9	57.1
a. Rice	1.9	5.3	5.7	4.3	2.7	3.1	4.1
b. Sugar	—	—	1.4	9.7	21.2	29.1	40.1
c. Timber	2.3	4.2	11.9	10.1	10.0	5.2	5.6
<i>Livestock and Animal Products</i>	17.0	13.8	14.7	12.5	10.2	11.5	9.4
<i>Minerals</i>	70.7	66.1	54.6	48.0	46.9	40.6	33.5
a. Asbestos	69.2	65.4	54.1	47.6	46.3	40.0	33.1

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too, the United Kingdom has given budgetary aid in recent years, and this amounted to nearly 18 per cent of Government revenue in 1960-1 and to 40 per cent in 1961-2. Therefore, in both these two Protectorates, the Governments are extremely dependent on revenue obtained from outside their countries. In Bechuanaland 53 per cent, and in Basutoland over 70 per cent, in 1960-1, of total Government revenue came from grants-in-aid and from their share of South Africa's gross customs and excise revenue.¹

The second field in which the Protectorates are closely connected with South Africa is related to the above. The Republic provides the principal markets for the sale of domestic exports and the purchase of supplies. Basutoland's small amount of agricultural exports go to South Africa. In fact the marketing of all produce exported from Basutoland, with the exception of some hides and skins, is totally integrated with South Africa. Furthermore, internal marketing in Basutoland itself is dominated by the Republic, since there is no significant crop consumed in the Territory which is not supplemented by imports from South Africa, and in which prices are not conditioned by factors obtaining in the South African markets. Although Swaziland is still closely connected with South Africa, and nearly all imports come from the Republic, at least one third of all domestic exports are sent to countries other than South Africa. The proposed railway line from the Bomvu Ridge, running right across the country and joining up with the Moçambique line, is of great significance because it will give Swaziland direct access to the sea, and the Territory will no longer be dependent on South Africa. Bechuanaland, on the other hand, is not at present so closely linked with the Republic, but even so in 1960 76 per cent of recorded imports originated in South Africa and 53 per cent of domestic exports found markets in the Republic. However, the railway line connecting Bechuanaland with Southern Rhodesia means that there is an alternative route for trade. In conclusion, Swaziland and Basutoland are wholly dependent, at present, on

1. This dependence on external sources for a vast proportion of Government revenue means that all development that does take place must be undertaken with overseas money. Development is confined therefore to schemes financed from the U.K.

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Table 31: U.K. Trade with Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland, 1959-61

	in £ millions		
	1959	1960	1961
<i>Imports into U.K. from Protectorates,</i>	1.45	3.66	3.78
<i>of which</i>			
a. Asbestos	0.85	1.98	1.75
b. Meat preparations	0.37	1.40	1.88
<i>Exports from U.K. to Protectorates</i>	0.48	0.48	0.44

Table 32: Summary of External Trade

	in £ millions					
	Basutoland		Bechuanaland		Swaziland	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
1950-3	2.63	2.09	1.86	2.00	1.80	2.52
1954-7	2.94	1.96	2.58	2.64	2.44	3.54
1958	2.95	1.38	3.50	2.59	3.17	3.94
1959	2.89	1.65	3.41	3.36	3.96	4.37
1960	3.14	1.46	3.28	2.68	4.10	6.03
1961	3.06	1.41			5.22	6.34
1962	3.53	1.64			11.11	7.46

Source: Colonial Reports, H.M.S.O.

imports from South Africa, while Bechuanaland does receive some of her supplies from Southern and Northern Rhodesia. In all cases, the vast majority of domestic exports are destined for markets within South Africa.

The third field in which the Protectorates are dependent on South Africa is that of employment for a large proportion of their labour. In both Bechuanaland and Basutoland, there is little opportunity for earning money at home and, because of the needs of the mining industry in South Africa, increasing numbers of Bechuanas and Basutos seek work in the Republic. Although no reliable figures are available, it would seem that in Bechuanaland between 20 and 25 per cent of the adult male population are temporarily absent from the territory at any one time. Over 90 per cent of this migrant labour finds work in the Republic and, in 1960 alone, 22,000 Bechuanas were recruited for work in the gold mines, while a further 4,000 found employment in other

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fields. In Basutoland this dependence on South Africa for paid employment is even greater and, in 1961, 120,000 Basutos obtained passes allowing them to go to the Republic to seek employment. This is a substantial increase over the figure of 50,000 given for 1950. The majority of the migrants work in the gold mines of the Transvaal and Orange Free State. In both these two Protectorates, agriculture, which is the mainstay of the majority of the Bechuanas and even more of the Basutos, suffers as a result of these movements, for it is the able-bodied men who migrate. In Basutoland, it is estimated that about 50 per cent of the adult male population are absent from the country at any one time. This throws the burden of agriculture on to the children, the women, and the aged; and apart from holding back any progress, and thereby making families even more dependent on the migratory system for cash with which to pay taxes, etc., it has disastrous social effects, shattering homes and depriving children of adequate parental control – to mention just a few. The number of Swazis working in South Africa, though substantial, at about 10,000 at any one time, is not nearly so great as in the other Protectorates. At present, most of the Swazis find employment in South African mines, although about 3,500 work in forestry and agriculture nearer their own home. However, with the possibility of future development in both the industrial and agricultural fields, the number of migratory labourers can be expected to fall. In Basutoland, on the other hand, the Morse Report¹ expresses the view that unless, and until, the forces responsible for the country's poor agriculture are reversed more and more of the Basuto people will be forced to seek work in South Africa, for this is the only alternative to poverty at home.

It must be mentioned in passing that all this migrant labour is, of course, an important source of ready cash to the Basutos and Bechuanas. In Basutoland an estimated £423,000 was sent back to the families of migrant labourers, and £377,000 was received in the form of deferred pay in 1961. Likewise in Bechuanaland the total sent back either as deferred pay or remittances was £356,000 in 1960.

It is not possible to say with any accuracy what proportion of

1. *Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate, and Swaziland: Report of an Economic Survey Mission* (H.M.S.O., 1960).

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the total African labour force in the Republic, estimated at 2.54 million (1951), is actually indigenous. However, there are certain facts which throw some light on the relative part taken by imported labour. In 1946, only 41.25 per cent of the 305,410 African workers employed in the industries represented by the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association had their homes within the Republic. In 1954, the Tomlinson Commission stated that some 650,000 African workers came from beyond the borders of South Africa, while, more recently, out of a total labour force of 432,234 African workers recruited in 1959 by the Chamber of Mines, only 182,561 came from the Republic (the remaining 58 per cent came from territories outside the Republic). An Economic Commission for Africa Report¹ estimates that the sum total of migrant labour amounts to about 500,000, and this would mean that something like 20 per cent of South Africa's African labour force comes from beyond the borders of the Republic.

This practice of importing labour from neighbouring countries means that the domestic South African labour market is flooded with cheap labour, which depresses the market for indigenous labour and condemns the local Africans to low wages. The same E.C.A. Report points out that if there was no imported unskilled labour into South Africa, the correspondingly smaller indigenous labour force would enjoy a strengthened bargaining position and so stimulate a better and more rationalized labour policy. The organization of the two recruiting associations is so vast that in Bechuanaland the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association runs its own airport at Francistown, to which about 100,000 miners a year are flown from various parts of Bechuanaland, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland. From Francistown, they proceed by train to South Africa and are joined en route by local Bechuana recruits. The enormous expense of annually transporting these men up to 4,000 miles is apparently less than the payment of an economic wage within South Africa. It has been said that the wealth of the Reef gold mines lies not in the richness of the strike but in the low costs of production, kept down by the abundance of cheap labour. Moreover, the immobility

1. *Economic and Social Consequences of Racial Discriminatory Practices* (U.N., 1963).

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or, more correctly, the abundance, of African labour on practically fixed low wages limits the competition between the various mining companies. Furthermore, the countries which export labour in large quantities tend to adopt *laissez faire* policies and to ignore problems of economic development within their own countries. At the same time, some of the Governments concerned have concluded agreements with the recruiting countries. For example, by an agreement between South Africa and Portugal, South Africa is entitled to recruit 100,000 Africans a year from Moçambique while, in return, 47 per cent of the traffic to and from the Rand must pass through the port of Lourenço Marques.

Admittedly the High Commission Territories have supplied only a part of the imported labour, but the fact that this labour is near at hand and does not require acclimatizing adds to its value. However, by continuing to allow and even encourage this system of migratory labour, the administrations of the High Commission Territories and therefore the United Kingdom are conniving at the exploitation of South African labour. Furthermore, while this system continues there will be no incentive to find solutions to the problems of under-employment in the respective Territories, and especially in Basutoland and Bechuanaland.

The last field in which the Territories are closely connected and dependent on South Africa is in communications and services. Although it is difficult to obtain information on this topic, it is known that in Swaziland all the road haulage is undertaken by South African railways, while in Bechuanaland the only railway is run jointly by the South African authorities and Rhodesian Railways. Finally, in the fields of banking, posts, and telegraphs the connexions with the Republic seem to be very close indeed.

We can conclude by saying that although South Africa's racial policy has been completely repugnant to the inhabitants of the three Protectorates, the economic ties are extremely strong. While it is obvious that South Africa could do without them, Bechuanaland, and in particular Basutoland, would find it almost impossible to live without the Republic; and if Swaziland had to do so, it would greatly set back that country's advance to viability. Moreover, the Republic is clearly in a position to exercise direct pressure on all three High Commission Terri-

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teries, and it could do so by means which would be entirely within its own competence.

There seem to be seven kinds of action which South Africa could take in the event of an international trade embargo being enforced. First, the Republic could march straight into all three Protectorates; secondly, South Africa could place high duties on all exports entering the Republic from the three Protectorates; thirdly, prohibitive duties could be placed on all goods exported from South Africa to the High Commission territories; fourthly, South Africa could revoke the Customs Agreement of 1910; fifthly, South Africa might prevent migrant labour from finding employment in the Republic; sixthly, it could withdraw its services and stop its important role in communications; and finally it could do nothing at all.

In deciding which course of action South Africa is likely to take in the event of a trade embargo, two assumptions have to be made. First, it is assumed that the economic trade embargo will be directed and supervised by the United Nations; secondly, it is assumed that any action which South Africa might take would be lifted immediately the United Nations trade embargo ceased.

In the light of this, it would seem unlikely that South Africa would march straight into Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland, simply because this would be an act of aggression against the United Kingdom in the first place, and secondly against the United Nations and therefore all the countries supporting a trade boycott of the Republic. On the other hand, all three Protectorates are a centre for subversion against South Africa, and so constitute an acute embarrassment to the Government of the Republic. Moreover, the incorporation of the High Commission Territories into South Africa is the only way that sense can be made of *apartheid*, since it would mean that land allocated to African occupation would increase from 13 per cent to about 50 per cent. Instead of invading the Protectorates South Africa is much more likely to restrict the quotas on domestic exports from the Protectorates or prevent imports from going to the Territories. Decreased quotas, or changes of a similar nature in regulations for the import of cattle products from Bechuanaland and Basutoland, would have a great effect on the people of the High Commission Territories since, in general, this is the

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main source of cash income, besides that obtained from employment in South Africa. However, any export restrictions placed on maize by the South African authorities would have a much more drastic effect since, as has already been shown, the Protectorates are not self-sufficient in this staple crop, and imports of maize in 1960 were 125 lb. *per capita* in Bechuanaland and 67 lb. *per capita* in Basutoland. Although these figures are substantial, yet in none of the Protectorates has there been a policy aimed at self-sufficiency in maize or for that matter in any other staple crop. This means that, in the event of South Africa taking such action, a considerable amount of maize and other items will have to be airlifted into the Protectorates, unless appropriate steps could be taken to store sufficient supplies. Bechuanaland could be fed through Northern Rhodesia; and Swaziland exports rice, and so could substitute rice for maize as the staple food. Basutoland, therefore, constitutes the really serious problem. Of course, it should also be borne in mind that to make such a policy effective the policing of something like 2,368 miles of borders would be entailed (Bechuanaland, 1,800 miles, including South-West Africa; Basutoland, 368 miles; and Swaziland, 200 miles).

South Africa would be unlikely to prevent migrant labour from finding employment within her boundaries, as miners from the Protectorates are highly valued as a labour force and, moreover, the Protectorates are near at hand and the labour from them does not need acclimatizing. Furthermore, with more and more countries to the north becoming independent the net of the recruiting organizations is shrinking. Of course there is a possibility that the migrant labour from the Protectorates in South Africa might be held as hostages. If this ever happened, it would entail direct intervention by the British Government.

The South African Government could easily revoke the 1910 Customs Agreement. As has been shown, revenue from this source is extremely important to the Protectorate Governments. However, in the event of a trade embargo, there would be no imports and therefore no customs and excise revenue either for the Government of the Republic or for the High Commission Territories. The United Kingdom would therefore have to increase its budgetary aid which has been forthcoming in recent years.

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The problems of assessing the magnitude of any action that the Government of South Africa might take in the event of a United Nations trade blockade are immense. The remedies to any such action depend on the length of the United Nations blockade and also on its timing. If, for example, sanctions only lasted, say, two months, and were implemented after the wheat harvest some time in March and during the maize harvest of May and June, then there would be no need to airlift essential foods into the Protectorates. If, on the other hand, the boycott was planned for the hungry season, say, between September and January – or lasted for a year – then additional food would be needed in Bechuanaland and Basutoland in particular.

However, this is looking at the negative side of the problem. Since this trade embargo would be supported by the United Nations, then the three Protectorates would be engaged in an economic blockade of South Africa. This removes the uncertainty of any action which South Africa might take against the Protectorates, and at the same time makes them an integral part of the boycott. Certainly, with the support of all the African States, the United Nations, and the United Kingdom, the Protectorates *can* withstand an economic boycott directed against South Africa. On the other hand, I have been informed that in Basutoland, for example, the Basutos could at the outside be self-sufficient for their daily needs for a period of up to three years. This may be rather a surprising statement, but the plight of the Africans in Basutoland and Bechuanaland is already so difficult that relatively speaking they would not mind tightening their belts a little more. My Basuto informant wholeheartedly believes that the people of the Protectorates would be willing to undergo further hardships in order to bring pressure to bear on the South African Government. On the other hand, the countries supporting a possible United Nations trade embargo on the Republic of South Africa should be prepared, as part of their action, to store adequate supplies or support an airlift of essential foodstuffs into the three High Commission Territories.

Appendix to R. M. Bostock's paper

The question of supplying essential commodities to the inhabitants of the three Protectorates, in the event of an international trade embargo on South Africa, will be examined in this Appendix. Three ways of ensuring adequate supplies of these commodities will be considered – the increase of existing production, stockpiling prior to the embargo, and the airlift of essential goods during the embargo.

The first task, in doing this, is to determine which goods should be classified as 'essential commodities'. It has already been shown that the three territories are dependent on imports of maize primarily, and of other staples, to supplement local production. Also, as local industry is virtually non-existent, they are almost completely dependent on imports of capital equipment, consumer durable goods, fuels, and lubricants. But, it is assumed that for a relatively short-term period food would be the most necessary commodity which would have to be supplied to the Protectorates in the event of a trade embargo on South Africa. Maize is the main staple food in the three Protectorates, and the emphasis of this Appendix will therefore be on the supply of maize to them. However, the need for other items such as petrol, spare parts, medical supplies, etc. (for which the trade returns are completely inadequate, see Tables 25, 27, and 29) should not be overlooked,

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especially if the trade embargo on South Africa were to last for more than a few months.

All three Protectorates are dependent on South Africa for the bulk of their maize imports. The only possible exception to this is Bechuanaland which, in 1960, obtained some 46 per cent of its maize supplies from Rhodesia. This means that – since it has access to both Northern and Southern Rhodesia – it could, in the event of a trade embargo on South Africa, be supplied with maize, and other items, from Northern Rhodesia. Swaziland imported 5,804 tons of maize from South Africa in 1960, but, as its rice exports were substantial, it could, if necessary, be reasonably self-sufficient with rice supplementing maize as the staple food. Basutoland, however, provides a real problem. Not only has it been entirely dependent on South Africa for maize imports in recent years, and for imports of all other main staple crops, but since it is an enclave within South Africa, the entry of staple foods from alternative sources of supply is dependent on South African goodwill. It is essential, therefore, that, in the event of a trade embargo, supplies of maize should reach the territory.

Imports of Maize – 1960

Basutoland	20,652 tons
Bechuanaland	19,643 ..
Swaziland	5,804 ..
	—————
	46,099 ..
	—————

The latest year for which figures from all three territories are available is 1960 and, in that year, total imports of maize into them amounted to 46,000 tons – of which Basutoland accounted for just under 21,000 tons. Although 1960 was a peak year for the import of all staples, because of bad harvests, it is useful to consider it, since it places an upper limit on the amount of maize supplies which would have to reach the Protectorates, and especially Basutoland, in any one year.

Although – as has been made clear – no attempt has yet been made in the Protectorates to reach any degree of self-sufficiency in the production of maize, or of any other food crop for that matter, if sufficient warning were given of the trade embargo a certain amount of stockpiling would be possible. This could be

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done in two ways. First, increased production could be encouraged within the Protectorates and, secondly, surplus stocks of maize from the U.S.A., Argentina, or South Africa could be stored within the Protectorates before the trade embargo began.

The first way of ensuring adequate supplies of maize, by increased production within the territories, would seem to be quite possible in Bechuanaland where, with increased cultivation and improvement in the seed, sufficient maize could be grown to satisfy all local demand. Basutoland however, does not seem to be in such a position, as only 15 per cent of the land can be cultivated¹ and, in this area the soil has been cropped continuously for many decades. Moreover, because of the absence of any sort of fuel, practically all cattle manure is burnt, which means that little organic matter is returned to the land. Therefore, in order to provide sufficient supplies of maize to meet local demand, during a trade embargo, some of the maize surpluses which have accumulated in the main exporting countries would have to be utilized.

End-of-season stocks of maize in exporting countries
(m. tons)

	1959-60	1960-1	1961-2*
U.S.A.	44.7	50.2	41.0
Argentina	0.3	0.1	0.1
South Africa	0.7	0.7	1.1
	—	—	—
	45.7	51.0	42.2
	—	—	—

* Subject to revision

Source: Commonwealth Economic Committee, *Grain Crops*,
H.M.S.O. 1963.

One of the biggest problems connected with using this surplus stock is that of storage, which would have to be undertaken on a fairly large scale if stocks of maize were to be sufficient to last for the duration of an effective trade embargo. There are, of course, many ways of storing maize, but in the circumstances the most attractive method would seem to entail the construction of as many distribution centres throughout the Protectorate as possible.

1. The Morse Report estimates that in 1959 total output of maize and sorghum amounted to 118,714 tons. This would suggest that imports amounted to about 10 per cent of total consumption.

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As supplies of petrol would in all probability be stopped during the embargo period, a considerable problem would arise over distribution if the storage of maize was in a few vast American-style silos. The most practical form of storage, therefore, would seem to be *aluminium crittal bins*.¹ In order to augment local supplies of maize in Basutoland by, say, 25,000 tons for any one year, a total of 625 crittal bins, holding 40 tons each, would have to be installed throughout the country. The cost of one of these bins in the U.K. would be £160, or £4 per ton. This seems to be the cheapest way of storing maize, but to this figure must be added the cost of roofing, flooring, and other ancillary equipment. As all this would have to be imported into Basutoland, no accurate estimates of total cost can be made. However, it can be assumed that the total cost of storing maize would be in the region of £8 to £10 per ton, or between £200,000 and £250,000 per 25,000 tons. The two most important factors in storing maize are that any system used must be both weather- and vermin-proof.

Technically, supplies of maize could come from any of the three countries listed in the above table. The Republic of South Africa has the second largest maize surplus, and this would be more than sufficient for supplying Basutoland with 25,000 tons for stockpiling. If supplies from this source were forthcoming, the problem of obtaining maize would be greatly reduced. However, if this is an unrealistic possibility, supplies could come from either the U.S.A. or Argentina, although this would mean that the transport of maize overland from the South African port of entry to Basutoland would be dependent on South African goodwill. (This would also apply in the case of any other port of entry, as Basutoland is an enclave within the Republic.) If the Republic is not willing to supply maize for stockpiling in Basutoland, then it is unlikely to allow supplies to reach the territory from sources of supply outside the Republic. Furthermore, the import duty of £2.24 per ton of maize (2 shillings per 100 lb.) levied by the South African Government would increase the price of the maize. Despite these problems, the c.i.f. cost of importing maize from

1. An alternative method would be to store maize in large underground silos, similar to those used in Argentina in the 1940s. In 1943 Argentina stored 768,000 tons of grain by this method. This storage system has the advantage that it does not require special equipment.

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Argentina or the U.S.A. would be in the region of £20–5 per ton, to which must be added import duties of £2.24 and storage costs of £8–10 per ton. The total cost per ton, therefore, would probably be between £30 and £40 (£750,000–1,200,000 per 25,000 tons). In passing, it should be noted that this cost is close to the implicit value of maize imports in Basutoland. In 1962, for example, the unit price of a ton of maize was £34.96 (£26.02 in 1961) as compared to a declared export price of £19.05 to countries outside the Customs Union.

There are, therefore, two main problems connected with the stockpiling of maize in Basutoland. First, an adequate system of storage has to be established and, secondly, these stores must be filled. The latter raises the difficulty of transporting maize to Basutoland across South African territory, assuming that supplies from this source are not forthcoming.

The only other way of supplying Basutoland with maize is through an airlift. This would, over the period of a year, entail the use of a great number of aircraft. Sufficient supplies of maize could be made available from East and Central Africa (and Angola); but the airlift of 25,000 tons of maize into Basutoland would involve something like 5,000 trips (using a Beverley, which has a range of 1,850 miles and a payload of 14,000 lb.). Probably the only airfield suitable as a centre for such an airlift would be Lusaka, in Northern Rhodesia, which is some 1,000 miles away from Basutoland.

Thus if an economic boycott of South Africa were to last for as long as a year, the size of any airlift into Basutoland would be very large. Moreover, the longer the time-period involved, the more difficult it is to predict with any certainty the level of essential commodities needed. If stockpiling of maize was possible, small aircraft should be made available for use in a supporting role, to carry medical supplies, spare parts, and even petrol to Basutoland if necessary.

In conclusion, therefore, it is not possible to give any exact estimates as to the size or cost of stockpiling or of airlifting essential commodities into the Protectorates. Obviously, if the trade embargo is to last for a year, then stockpiling *must* be undertaken prior to it; but if the time-period involved is only a few months, and falls over the harvest period, then there will be

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little, if any, need to supply Basutoland, or the other Protectorates, with maize. But, as the first stage of a campaign to introduce economic sanctions against South Africa, the administrations of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland should be strongly encouraged to increase the acreage under maize and other staple crops and to start a certain amount of stockpiling.

Sanctions against South Africa: The impact and the aftermath

J. D. Marvin

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This paper deals very largely with the probable reactions of the human material involved. It therefore cannot avoid being in large part an expression of my own opinion.

It has also been necessary to make certain other assumptions :

1. That a boycott unsupported by force is of use only to sustain the morale of the boycotters and entirely ineffective as a means of exerting pressure on South Africa.

2. That a blockade could be effective, but only if it were backed by strong naval and some air power and had at least the tacit support of all nations that can deploy substantial naval power.

These two assumptions could, I believe, be proved, but it is no part of my assignment to do so.

*

The Tongaat Sugar Company has built for its workers, White, Indian, and Black, a model township – a sort of Bourneville in the lovely setting of the Natal sugar belt. The houses for the Zulus are pleasant four-room cottages comparing favourably with any native housing I have seen in South Africa or elsewhere. They cost about £430 each to build. On the ground of that cost (though the company was paying the money), Government officials turned down the plans. They refused to sanction so high

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a figure for native housing : to the ox his stall and to the native his £200 house.

I told this story to one of the Nationalist intellectuals ; she was very shocked and came back in due course with the official interpretation. It was, of course, perfectly legal to build a house for an African costing more than £200, but those who do such things cannot expect that the cost will be treated as an expense of trading ; you have to pay out of net taxed income. With company tax at its present level, it would thus cost approximately £600 gross to build a £400 house – a substantial fine, which deters most people from the eccentricity of spending too much on a house for an African. To the company's credit, I believe it did not deter Tongaat Sugar.

I mention this incident not to import prejudice, and certainly not as the most flagrant example of racial injustice I can think of, for that it certainly is not. I mention it just to illustrate a state of mind – the mind of men who have no thought of putting the needs and aspirations of their fellow men on a par with their own ; the idea simply sounds absurd to them. It is the mind of men who see nothing horrible in Dr Verwoerd's policy of gradually uprooting half a million black inhabitants of the Western province and packing them off to supposed native homelands where in fact many of them have no roots and where they will find no opportunities.

Remind such people that out of every four South Africans three are black or brown South Africans and they just get angry. They are not, they will insist, brutal to natives, meaning usually that they are not personally brutal to their personal servants.

In practice, the brutalities are obvious enough to convince me reluctantly that, if something is not done about it, the maintenance of peace is in the medium to long run most improbable :

1. *Job reservation:* In no other country is the citizen excluded by law from a wide range of occupations, and therefore in effect from the acquisition of a wide range of skills, just because of his colour.

2. *Wage machinery:* The Black man alone is excluded from direct representation on bodies that fix his wages.

3. *Group areas:* In no other country claiming to adhere to Western civilization is a man forbidden by law from living with

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his wife and vice versa, again by reason of his colour alone.

Probably every age has done things that men in other lands or in another age have regarded as horrible. I do not suppose for a moment that this generation of Englishmen would tolerate the concentration camp structure that their grandfathers used in order to bring the South African war to an end. All the more honour to the few who spoke out then, and the more honour now to those hundreds, indeed thousands, imprisoned with or without trial, or officially silenced, or forced to pick up the threads of their existence far from their homeland.

It would be a great mistake, however, to assume that the general body of those who pursue these policies realize that they are doing wrong. The leadership does, but the general body has come to regard it as normal human conduct.

It would be an equally great mistake to suppose that these attitudes of mind will right themselves in the normal course with the passage of time and the growth of human intercourse alone. The seeds of change, springing largely from the Geyser heresy trial, may be there, but they will take a long time to germinate. Meanwhile, South African history of the past fifteen years is not the history of slow advance for the under-privileged (as in Southern Rhodesia or in certain parts of the U.S.A.), but of the continuous removal of human rights. The distinction is important in guiding us as to how far we ought to go. It is also important in enabling us to weigh the risks of a further conflagration. It is relevant here that there has not over the past fifteen years been a single session of the South African Parliament that has not deprived the Black man of some human right or other.

We must also assume that the Nationalists intend to go further along the same road. The London Embassy is something of a plum in the South African diplomatic service. In giving it to the man who goes on record with an expression of regret that more natives were not killed at Sharpeville, Dr Verwoerd in effect serves notice on the world that he believes he plays a winning hand and means to pursue it.

It must also be made clear that the policy of 'separate development' is completely fraudulent. Its object is not to segregate the development of the non-Whites but to prevent it. A few examples make this abundantly clear. Look first at the vaunted policy of

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fringe industries – an attempt to encourage by fiscal and administrative means the growth of a ring of factories in the White man's land, but close to the African reserves. The sites have been chosen outside the reserves but within a bus ride of them, so that the labour force may travel back to tribal land at night. Therefore job reservation will apply. Had the sites been chosen inside the reserves the doctrine that opportunities there are reserved for Black men would have applied, and it would have been impossible to put job reservation into force. It is an attempt to use Black labour while keeping it to the unskilled manual tasks.

By way of contrast I have seen a letter from a government department in Pretoria refusing industrial development for a particular piece of land on the Reef because the power did not exist to mark the industrial development there either 'all White' or at least 'no Bantu'. The existing job reservation rules make it impossible to reserve particular jobs or proportions employed in a job for Whites; it does not make possible the reservation of whole factories. The letter implies that it is intended to assume that power.

When you consider these two examples of bad faith against the background of the rigging of the Transkei elections held under cover of a localized and bogus state of emergency (which was freely used to prevent the emergence of candidates not acceptable to the Nationalists); when you consider that the result after all the rigging can hardly have given satisfaction to the authorities; and when you consider that the powers of the Transkeian Government are really nothing much greater than those enjoyed by an English county council, you are entitled to conclude that the policy of 'separate development' is not designed to provide development but to hold the lid on a permanently explosive situation.

So much by way of introduction was needed to show why even those of us who approach extreme measures with very great reluctance (and that certainly includes myself) are compelled to admit that the outside world has ample grounds for exerting pressures in order to maintain peace.

Having got that far it would be extremely foolish not to recognize fully the points of great strength that exist in the South African economy.

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Every working day the labour force of the South African mines, mainly Black and mainly paid 6s. to 7s. a day, pulls out of the earth £1m. worth of gold. It is just conceivable that with a sufficient degree of international cooperation the Rand Refinery's hallmark might be made bad delivery on the world's chief gold markets – though I doubt it. The result if that were done would simply be that the vendor (the Reserve Bank) would lose a shilling or so per ounce, representing the cost of having the bars broken up in Hong Kong or Tangier and remelted. Some other recognized refinery would eventually put on its more acceptable hallmark.

Moreover it is worth remembering that gold bars pass regularly down the railway from Pretoria to Lourenço Marques. They are ostensibly family allowances for the Portuguese natives working in the mines, and the Portuguese Government has bargained to receive it in gold bars. (I have never seen any convincing evidence that even the escudo equivalent is actually passed on to the dependents of the mine-workers, but that is not the point.) Moçambique is technically a province of metropolitan Portugal. Whereabouts in Portugal the central bank decides to hold its gold and how long each individual bar has been there are matters that can hardly be investigated, nor can Portugal's (technically internal) traffic between Lourenço Marques and Lisbon.

Rather similar difficulties of control apply to the diamond trade, and taking the two together I am convinced that South Africa has means of payment that we cannot touch, which will see the country through on essentials – not the luxuries – for a period not of months but of years. The human and natural resources are both very strong. The Government will be ruthless in cutting out unnecessary payments.

In practice, in the early stages of blockade the gold production matters less than most people assume for this reason: it is inconceivable that an international body could move into action without prolonged discussion. Everyone, including the South Africans, would see international action coming. During those weeks and months industrial stock building would be in progress and the Reserve Bank would be converting part of its enormous

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gold stock of £260m., partly into raw materials by speeding up imports and partly perhaps also in setting up credits in places where they would be most useful. In practice the central reserve would have been largely invested in the commodities needed for a siege.

Bearing all this in mind it is impossible to attempt any sort of a schedule of how quickly an embargo would bite home. Import control, though now fairly lenient, has not been abolished, and in the ordinary way one would feel that a blockade of three to six months would be producing difficulties for several industries. My expectation, however, would be that enough anticipatory buying would have been done to make the period considerably longer.

Oil, however (dealt with in another paper), is clearly a special case. Apart from drawing on stocks the Republic would be reduced to the 10 per cent of its normal consumption produced locally. We must assume that rationing would be applied immediately, that the private motorist would be a bad sufferer, and if true to pattern the Government would be a good deal kinder in its allocations to agriculture than to industry. Indeed, up-country deliveries both to farmers and to cooperatives where there was no railway would be an immediate problem. The country is consciously geared to a minimum dependence on oil and a maximum dependence on the coal-burning railway system. But of course there are very big areas which the railway system does not touch.

Rationing would be applied at once and immediate inconvenience would follow. In addition to the private motorist himself and the rural dweller, I would expect to list among the early sufferers the motor assemblers and dealers (because people would not go on buying new cars when there was little or no petrol for them), with the hotel and catering trades (and therefore S.A. Breweries as a big hotel-owner). The tyre manufacturers would suffer, and perhaps the growing list of motor component manufacturers. In the last case there is the possibility over a somewhat longer period of switching to some other engineering product that might have become scarce. Agricultural, fishing, and perhaps diamond production would be affected and the

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whole business community (the people live largely in their cars) would be seriously inconvenienced, but not – I would guess – put out of action.

If wheat were included in the blockade, the shortage would quickly become apparent, but again, I would suspect, not crippling. It would probably become necessary to incorporate a proportion of maize in the bread.

Agriculture would of course be inconvenienced and not by the shortage of petrol alone. *Inter alia*, the fertilizer trades depend on a certain (diminishing) proportion of imported raw materials.

I think we ought to assume that mining would be able to avoid any drastic effects of shortage of raw materials, including explosives, by anticipatory buying of the comparatively small quantities of imported raw materials needed, and that by resorting often to second and third best the textile and clothing industries or sufficient units of them would get by for a considerable period. There would be an immediate disappearance of certain quality goods and very gradually the range of shortages would widen.

Within a few weeks – if I am right in thinking that the South African authorities would react by rationing and putting the country on a war footing – there would be a marked but not fatal impact on the business community, on agriculture, and on the way of life of everybody. Quickly shortages of all luxury goods and more gradually of certain engineering products would emerge. Unemployment in the Reef, in the Cape Peninsula, and more particularly in Port Elizabeth area would grow. But I think it would probably be about two years before the country was faced with breakdown.

For the purpose of that guess I am assuming no overt action from the oppressed racial groups within the Republic. I am now too far away to be able to form any worthwhile opinion as to whether or not that would be so. But if the underground were strong enough to oblige the military authorities to consume a fair amount of oil without involving themselves in the kind of uprising that could and would be brutally put down, the effectiveness of blockade could be increased and its period could be shortened.

Now how would the human material react?

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The first point that must be underlined is that by bringing Verwoerd, Vorster, and company to their knees, you will not cure anybody of race hatred. Race prejudice is far too deeply ingrained; it has become a religion. A people that can spend long hours and weeks thinking out how to bring about *apartheid* in the dry cleaners' vat, a community that will segregate congregations in the churches and corpses in cemeteries, is not going to abandon the traditions of its life so easily. It is true, of course, that the moral background of *apartheid* contains the seeds of its own destruction. The Geysers heresy trial deeply shocked more loyal members of the three Dutch Calvinist Churches than most people understand; but to rely on that is to look ahead more years than, probably, we have got.

Rather we must on the short to medium term expect a much closer get-together between the official opposition (United Party) and the Government, both joining together to try to defeat the sanctions. Indeed one sees something of the sort beginning to happen now. I estimate that of the White population a maximum of one in ten (and quite likely a smaller figure) are more or less radical opponents of the Government's racial policies (I refer to the Progressives and smaller groups further Left). In an atmosphere of sanctions the dividing line between opposition and treason would have obviously become even narrower than it now is. The job of true opposition must now be to survive. What the Government would do politically, if faced with blockade, of course I do not know, but I would expect a much longer list of banned persons and of those in prison without charge or trial as soon as external pressures were applied.

Thus backed by what it would represent as being a united nation, the Government would obviously proceed to carry out its threat of making the impact of any sanctions fall as far as possible on the non-Whites. The Black unemployed would be shifted off to their supposed tribal homelands where of course there would be nothing for them to eat, let alone jobs. It is also difficult to see how a large and sudden demand from the Whites for public transport could be met, except by taking it away from the Blacks.

Secondly Dr Verwoerd would almost certainly counter-attack the three British Protectorates – not probably by a

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military invasion, for that would be an act of war which might quickly bring his own regime to an end. He could, however, turn on a counter-blockade against the Protectorates, together with an intensification of his most recent propaganda line – that if only they would accept his racial ideas and welcome advisors South Africa might be prepared to extend some material benefits, including possibly more land, in return for abandoning British protection and accepting his.

We must therefore assume that any blockade imposed on South Africa will fall with at least the same force on Basutoland, which is completely surrounded by South African territory, and with very nearly the same force on Swaziland. Swaziland has a small back door on Moçambique, but it would be necessary to control imports into Moçambique if this exercise were to be made effective. It is difficult to envisage supplying Swaziland through Portuguese territory. The outward traffic naturally would be still more difficult, if it were decided to apply sanctions to exports. Is Turner and Newall in Manchester to be allowed to receive the products of the great Havelock Mine in Swaziland? If not, the mine, the biggest Swazi enterprise, would close. If the answer is yes, then how is that raw asbestos to be distinguished from asbestos coming from the company's South African mines, also coming out through Lourenço Marques? Bechuanaland presents less of a problem, though one envisages plenty of South Africans driving over to fill their tanks if Bechuanaland were not put on oil ration.

There is an additional probability that the South African Government would close down on Protectorate labour seeking work in the Republic. Pressure theoretically can be put on Basutoland by that means. The problem is complicated by the fact that a large number of people living in South Africa are Basuto by race and speech and are therefore Basutos in South African eyes, but are not Basuto nationals by the laws of Basutoland. The Protectorate would presumably refuse to accept them if Dr Verwoerd tried to drive them out of South Africa. I think, however, that the mines would probably be allowed to continue engaging a substantial number of Basutos. These men are about the best quality of labour that the mines get and their labour is good value – too good.

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With the Protectorates one must remember first that they are in customs and currency union with the Republic, secondly that the biggest revenue item in the budget of each of them is its share (on an agreed formula) of South Africa's revenue from import duties, and thirdly that each of them is currently in receipt of grants-in-aid from the British Government, so that the U.K. Treasury in fact covers the budget deficit and holds down local expenditure to keep that deficit small.

It follows, first, that to cut off South Africa's supply of imports would have an adverse effect on the revenues of each of the Protectorates, which would be serious in relation to their tiny budgets; and secondly that if the U.K. Government stepped up the grants-in-aid – as would seem right and proper in the circumstances – the increased payment would in fact accrue to the South African Reserve Bank. Because of currency union, a favourable balance of payments (Swaziland has a favourable balance although its budget needs a grant-in-aid) has exactly the same effect as handing gold bars to the Reserve Bank in Pretoria.

As a personal view I think it nevertheless would be necessary for the U.K. to step up the grants-in-aid in order to absorb unemployment and to absorb on public works labour from the Protectorates which South Africa might be expected to expel. The amounts would be relatively small, and, particularly if you accept my earlier argument that it is little use worrying about South Africa's ability to make payments (because the gold and the diamonds will be used whatever you do about it), the lack of logic in this situation matters less.

Even without that it is foolish not to recognize that the idea of exposing the Protectorates to the pressures of blockade just when, after long neglect, they are beginning to emerge as useful little multi-racial communities is going to be most unpalatable for any British Government that may be in power.

That leaves the final question – the mess that would be left behind and what would be needed to clear it up. Physical damage of an enduring type to the economy I envisage would be small. South Africa's already large and prosperous industry was to a very large extent brought into being by the partial blockades that two World Wars involved.

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Under the stress of improvisation and shortages, new products would have been developed and new industries built up. Therefore, apart from an acute shortage of raw materials and certain other imported products, the end of the blockade would bring no great problems. Such problems as there were could obviously be overcome by bridging finance on a reasonably short-term basis. Once that gap has been closed the further outlook for South African industry would be bright.

Nature designed the southern tip of the African continent, with its harbours, its rich resources, and its abundant supplies of reasonable quality labour, to be the workshop of its own continent. The marvel is that during a period when South Africa's own policies prevented the country from claiming that status with its neighbours industry has nevertheless remained prosperous. It must be supposed that when the political obstacles have been removed South African products will be reasonably easy to sell, as they would be if there were no political factor, for they are competitive in quality and price. The mining industry would not, I imagine, have been much affected; there is the possibility that during the stress of blockade there might be a demand to pick the eyes out of certain gold mines in order to increase production from the same labour force. But there is an obviously close limit to which such a policy could be carried in the fairly short term.

The human problem would be more serious. The struggle would end with a large body of Whites in all the positions of importance determined not to move an inch further than they were forced to go. And there would be no alternative government in sight. The business community would doubtless be divided (as it now is) and could probably be relied upon to produce a fair quota of first-class brains willing to accept the new outlook. In any case those people are there to make money, which they could hardly do while resisting authority.

Doubtless some would leave the country. But broadly the often repeated complaint of White South Africans – that the White man in that country is not an expatriate colonialist and really has nowhere else to go – is true.

The public service, including both civil service and police, would be the really intractable problem. The stronghold of the

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Broederbond (the Nationalist secret anti-British and anti-African society) rules the roost, and I think it is still true that we only suspect who its leading figures really are. Moreover for more than a dozen years the Afrikaner has always been preferred for promotion regardless of ability, until a Nationalist clique of rather indifferent quality holds all the power in the civil service. Heavy stonewalling from these officials is to be expected.

One other difficulty may be foreseen, though it could obviously be dealt with in the terms of any settlement: a very large part of South African industry is in the hands of companies which are the subsidiaries or associates of parents in this country, in America, in Holland, or in other European countries. During the process of a blockade the parent and the subsidiary are going to fall into breach of contract with each other on supplies of goods and technical know-how. That does not matter much while the struggle is in progress: the South African subsidiary will have to do what the South African Government tells it to do and the parent what its own Government tells it. But afterwards I anticipate some difficulty in re-establishing normal relations, especially if the South African Government has sequestered assets belonging to nationals of the blockading countries.

All these difficulties seem to me to add up to the necessity of victory being followed up by the putting-in of an international group of advisers with adequate powers extending over a few years, to see that the terms of any settlement were indeed carried out and to overrule any decisions that run counter to the spirit of the settlement. It might indeed be temporarily necessary to endow these international advisers with actual ministerial portfolios, for many of those whom one would naturally expect to find in alternative government are in prison or in exile, and – let's face it – they are not in full agreement with each other.

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The situation certainly demands strong action, and the exercise you are discussing seems to me just about feasible if the whole world cooperates.

The exercise would have a better chance of success if it were applied to South Africa's imports only, leaving the exports to take care of themselves. The relative ineffectiveness of the boycott

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of South African goods even in countries that profess to have applied one reinforces this view.

Even so, effective blockade would involve numerous breaches not only of established trade patterns but often also of actual contracts. Strenuous opposition from industrialists, in America and in several European countries, must be expected, and the body affectionately known in South Africa as the 'Society for the Perfuming of the Polecat' (the South African Foundation) would gain new adherents. That is not necessarily fatal. But it makes it much more important to start with the assurance of strong and widespread support. To try and to fail would be a major disaster.

Reports of Commissions I and II

Introduction

1. The Commission's terms of reference were to examine the implications, both for the world trade and payments system as a whole, and for individual countries, of a programme of economic sanctions organized collectively against South Africa. The Commission had before it a number of papers submitted in advance and enjoyed the assistance of a number of economic experts. As a result of its deliberations, the Commission has arrived at the conclusions set out in this report.

2. It was agreed that the object of economic sanctions was to produce a sufficient breakdown in the operation of the South African economy to create a situation in which *apartheid* would be brought to an end. It was emphasized that losses accruing to individual countries and firms as a result of the imposition of total economic sanctions were likely to be very small compared with the losses that would accrue if South Africa exploded into a racial war.

3. It was also agreed that it would be essential, in view of their strategic role in relation to trade with South Africa, that the programme of sanctions should have the active participation of the United States and the United Kingdom. But it would also be necessary for the programme to have the backing of all other nations in order to prevent South Africa evading the effects of

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the sanctions imposed by some countries by diverting its trade to others, or by receiving supplies through third countries.

World Trade and Payments

4. It was established in a paper submitted to the Commission¹ that the South African economy was very vulnerable to economic sanctions: of the chemicals consumed in South Africa, for example, the import content was 38 per cent; of the engineering and transport equipment, 43 per cent; of the petroleum and coal products, 52 per cent.

5. The dependence of total world trade on the South African economy, on the other hand, was extremely small, and the effects on world trade of the complete disruption of economic relations between South Africa and the rest of the world would not be serious. Moreover, there is only one commodity (amosite asbestos)² of which South Africa may be a monopoly producer; with this exception, there are thought to be no commodities which could not be supplied from other sources.

6. It was strongly emphasized that an effective programme of sanctions would only be temporary: it would be maintained only until *apartheid* had been abandoned, and this would happen within a very few years, and possibly within a matter of months. It was pointed out that the financial crisis which had hit South Africa at the time of the Sharpeville massacre was an indication of the vulnerability of its economy. When *apartheid* has been abandoned, sanctions will be withdrawn, and trade and payments between South Africa and the rest of the world would be rapidly re-established.

7. It was agreed that world trade and payments would not suffer any serious effects as a result of the cessation of South African gold sales. Although South African gold production accounts for more than 70 per cent of newly mined gold outside the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, and China, it represents a very small annual addition to total international reserves. In view of

1. By Mr Maizels, p. 120.

2. This is used in the U.S. defence programme. At the present time the U.S. Government is estimated to have stocks equivalent to more than two years' requirements.

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the temporary nature of a programme of economic sanctions, the cessation of South African gold sales might accelerate this process. Even under existing arrangements it would be perfectly feasible for the appropriate United Nations agency to make credit available to offset any loss of world liquidity.

8. It was also agreed that there should be no difficulty in making sufficient gold available out of Central Bank reserves to offset any tendency for the gold price to rise as a result of any increase in private hoarding. There was some discussion of the problem of distinguishing newly mined South African gold from other newly mined gold, but it was agreed that a system of identifying South African gold would not be necessary if there was a total blockade on South African imports, since South Africa would not in that case be able to use foreign exchange that accrued from clandestine sales of gold.

9. The question of oil sanctions was also discussed. It was pointed out that although much of industry and the public transport system in South Africa operated on the basis of indigenous coal, agriculture, private transport, and the mobile defence forces were totally dependent on oil, the overwhelming bulk of which was imported. It would not be possible for South Africa to expand the production of oil from coal to a sufficient degree within a short space of time, and although it would be technically feasible for the South African Government to store large quantities of oil this could do no more than delay the very serious effect on the economy of an effective programme of oil sanctions. It was agreed that although oil sanctions would not by themselves be enough, an effectively policed system would play an important role in a programme of total sanctions. It was also agreed that the denial to the South African economy of other key commodities, such as chemicals and machinery, would have very serious effects.

10. The Commission concluded that although total economic sanctions would have a very serious effect on the South African economy, they should not have serious effects on world trade and payments as a whole. Such disturbance as did occur could easily be taken care of by the same kind of international agreement that resulted in a programme of collective sanctions.

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Individual Countries

11. The Commission felt that it was important to look at the individual economies of Britain, the United States, West Germany, and Japan. There was some discussion about the weight that should be given to problems of Britain and the United States. But the detailed consideration of their problems arose not so much from sympathy for their difficulties as from an appreciation of two things: first, that Britain and the United States are the major opponents of sanctions; and second that the arguments about the economic consequences usually go unchallenged. This Conference, and in particular the terms of reference of the Economic Commissions, gave us a valuable opportunity to examine the arguments and to explode the myths.

12. For these discussions, the Commission had the benefit of expert papers on Britain and the United States, and for West Germany and Japan the Commission sought expert advice from the floor.

13. It was accepted that the country most likely to be affected would be Britain. At present British shareholders receive about £60 m. a year in the form of income on South African investment. But this would be only a temporary loss, limited to the period of sanctions. The alternatives of sabotage and civil war would have a more lasting effect on this income.

14. The loss of South African trade would also affect Britain. At present 4½–5 per cent of British exports go to South Africa, and 2–2½ per cent of British imports come from South Africa. The Commission also established that the effect of this on her trade and balance of payments would be marginal. The Commission was satisfied that even on the most pessimistic assumptions these problems could be overcome. In practice the situation is likely to be much less extreme. Provided Britain imposed sanctions as part of an international programme, the readjustment of her trade would be easily achieved. There was discussion of the possibility of a concerted plan for the redirection of trade, and the opening up of new markets, with special emphasis on an increase of exports to the developing world, financed by special loans or grants.

15. The special character of balance of payments problems for

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Britain and the United States arises from both the dollar and the pound being key currencies. The Commission recognized these particular problems but felt that they were manageable by the authorities concerned. Temporary balance-of-payments difficulties could be overcome by special arrangements with international agencies.

16. In the case of the United States the arguments are very similar to those for Britain, but the involvement is much less. American investment in South Africa is still substantially less than British, but nevertheless some \$50–100 m. of investment income would be forgone. Of American exports, only 1 per cent go to South Africa, and American imports from South Africa are small. The extra cost of replacing imports would be negligible, and in view of the positive embarrassment of the major item, uranium, the United States might actually gain.

17. West Germany and Japan were mentioned briefly, a cursory glance suggesting that the effects would be much less than those on Britain. 1.3 per cent of Germany's exports, and less than 0.5 per cent of her imports, and 1.8 per cent of Japan's exports and less than 1 per cent of her imports, are involved.

18. The Commission concluded that for the industrial countries, of which the above four would be the most affected, no vital national issues are at stake and these countries cannot convincingly plead economic disaster as a reason against supporting sanctions.

19. In addition to the effects on national economies, the effects on individual groups were considered. It was agreed that there are two reasons, apart from political considerations, why countries like the United States and Britain are opposed to sanctions. One is the existence of important business groups in these countries having considerable interests in South Africa; the other is the fear that if sanctions were not enforced simultaneously by other competing countries, like Germany, France, and Japan, these business groups would lose through sanctions without the objective of sanctions being achieved. It was felt that the only effective way of overcoming the hesitations on these accounts is to make clear to all business groups in all countries that continuance of trade and business with South Africa would bring them losses far greater than their gains. Many of these business

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groups have larger interests in countries which have already decided to adopt economic sanctions against South Africa than in South Africa itself. Discriminatory action against these companies could be an important and decisive factor in winning the support of their opposing Governments.

Report of Commission III

South Africa today is in a state of crisis. Power is in the hands of the Government, which is ruling without the authority of the people, and which is waging what amounts to war on all those who oppose the policy of *apartheid*. This policy involves for the Africans, Coloureds, and peoples of Indo-Pakistani descent removal from their homes, separation from their families, denial of opportunities for advancement, participation in the Government, and basic human rights. Faced with the growing opposition of the people, the Government has introduced savage laws which fall on all opponents of *apartheid*, black and white. For years the great mass of the people struggled to win equal rights for all, first by normal constitutional means and later by non-violent protest.

Denied all legal methods of struggle and subjected to increasing restrictions on their political actions and on their freedom of movement they have turned as a last resort to violence as their only means of redress. They are faced with a ruthless Government which is able to draw support from its main trading partners. The prospect therefore is increasing violence and bloodshed at a cost which the world cannot contemplate.

Further there is every likelihood of this internal conflict spreading beyond the borders of the Republic. There is an imminent danger that this would involve the rest of the continent of Africa and possibly beyond, and might lead to a global war. In

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these circumstances the Commission is convinced that the world has a duty to intervene in order both to help break the deadlock within South Africa and also to bring about the conditions necessary for social change with the minimum cost in terms of human life and suffering. The only effective means, short of military intervention, is economic sanctions. These must be swift and total. To achieve this it is necessary that all states should cooperate in enforcing such sanctions. The aim of sanctions is to help bring about conditions in which the people of South Africa can establish a non-racial democracy. The constitution of such a democracy must be worked out by the people of South Africa themselves.

The effects of sanctions would fall on all the people of South Africa. Africans are used to privation and are prepared for more. It is they who have repeatedly asked for sanctions because they believe that if the Government is deprived of outside assistance it would be easier for them to achieve their objectives. We believe that the majority of the Indians and Coloureds stand by the Africans in this. It is frequently argued that sanctions would consolidate the whites behind the present South African Government. It is our conviction that total sanctions would have a profound effect on the white minority. They would rapidly be involved in discomfort, inconvenience, and hardships of varying degrees. Further they would be faced with imminent disaster. This would compel many of the more reactionary to re-think their position, and would create conditions in which the more liberal elements would be encouraged to come out more openly against *apartheid*. There were signs of this happening after Sharpeville, and indeed at each crisis under Nationalist rule since the Defiance Campaign, but the cracks were papered over; the crisis was not big enough and there was not sufficient pressure from outside. Furthermore we believe that sanctions will be an encouragement to the people of South Africa in their struggle. It would be unrealistic to suppose that violence can be avoided, but it seems probable that in these circumstances it will be far less than in the prolonged brutal and civil strife which we would otherwise foresee.

The High Commission Territories will also suffer from the imposition of sanctions and indeed it is possible that the South African Government might retaliate against them in various ways.

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We believe that the powers imposing sanctions should accept responsibility for assisting these territories by way of supplies in particular food, medicines, and other essential commodities. Maize for Basutoland is the most important of these items. Steps might well be taken in advance to increase storage capacity and reserves. Specific recommendations are made for this in the expert paper on the High Commission Territories. At the moment the people of these three territories are inevitably involved in the effects of *apartheid*. For this reason we believe that it would be necessary for the powers operating sanctions to consult with the authorities and peoples' organizations of these territories. Should South Africa invade the protectorates – though we consider this extremely unlikely – this would constitute a clear case of aggression and would warrant immediate action by the international community. It is possible that there would be an increase in population in Basutoland resulting from the repatriation of Basutos by South Africa. This too would be a responsibility of the sanction powers. But this, and the making up of the deficit in the customs agreement, would be a very small part of the total cost of the operations of imposing sanctions.

Reports of Commissions IV and V

The Fourth Commission (Legal and Political) and the Fifth Commission (Policing) met together to hear papers and to discuss issues which were considered to be of interest and to fall within the scope of both Commissions.

Some of the experts and the clear majority of the delegates believed that it was impossible to separate discussion on the legal and political aspects of sanctions from discussion on the policing aspects, and vice versa.

It was therefore decided to merge the two Commissions, and joint Commission sessions were held and a joint report produced.

On the policing side, the commission received for its consideration written contributions from W. F. Gutteridge, Hugh Thomas, and Neville Brown, and a statement from Anthony Verrier. But the prevailing sentiment was that the enforcement of sanctions would not provide a problem if such sanctions were ordered and operated by the United Nations with the support of the great powers. The joint Commission accordingly devoted itself to the legal and political aspects of sanctions.

1. The Crisis in South Africa

The Legal and Political Commission of the Conference deliberated at length on the question: Is the South African situation a

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threat to peace, a state of affairs in which the United Nations must be prevailed upon to apply economic sanctions against South Africa?

The Commission has unanimously and without reservation come to the conclusion that the policies of the present South African Government *do* constitute a most serious threat to the peace, and an ever more dangerous one.

Apartheid is a form of government which denies to the vast majority of South Africans the most elementary human rights; it violates the United Nations Charter, the Declaration of Human Rights, and all civilized precepts of government; it flies in the face of international standards and fundamental freedoms.

Apartheid is a form of colonialism which has used race discrimination and armed suppression against its people in order to entrench white minority rule and to prevent the right of national groups – which constitute the majority of the country – to participate in the Government and to determine their own future.

Above all it is vital to note that the *apartheid* system is a tyranny that is especially inflammatory because it is a racial form and this race rule – unique in the world in its brutality and rigidity and official character – is a threat to peace by its very existence.

The minority Government of *apartheid* clings to power by the use of force and violence against the South African people, and recent years have seen bitter offensives launched by a greatly strengthened police state to crush organizations and forces in the country that campaign for human rights and equal opportunities. The South African Government has refused to veer from its path of rule by force; it resolutely refuses to recognize or negotiate with the representatives and leaders of the persecuted majority; it has rejected every opportunity for a peaceful and negotiated solution to the country's problems; and in the present series of political trials, chief among them the Rivonia Trial, it seeks to incarcerate indefinitely or even bring to death the spokesmen of the people who have led them in their fight for equality and fundamental freedoms.

South Africa's racial policies are a continual threat to peace within her own borders.

By its seizure and misrule of South-West Africa, the South

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African Government has persistently and deliberately failed to fulfil its international obligations in the administration of the mandated territory. It has thereby, by flagrant defiance of the United Nations resolutions over the past seventeen years, created a crisis for the international community of nations where the time is long overdue for action to save this territory from South Africa's misrule. Even in the face of the most unanimous condemnation of the world South Africa continues to press forward with the intensification of *apartheid* in this territory as planned by the Odendaal Commission.

South Africa's economic involvement in other territories, notably the Protectorates, the Rhodesias, and the Portuguese colonies of Moçambique and Angola, buttresses colonial race rule in half a dozen countries and threatens the whole of the southern portion of the continent with the consequences of her bellicose race policies.

Above all South Africa's race rule is an ever-present incitement to the rest of Africa, where oppression of the African people on the grounds of race is a cause of the most intense provocation. South Africa is seen by independent Africa to be not only an extreme manifestation of colonialism but also as a centre of aggression and counter-revolution that menaces the principles and practices of the new independent Africa. In the view of the African nations the continuance of colonialism and racialism in this form constitutes a menace to the peace of the continent and the world; and this is a vital factor in the foreign policies of all the independent states, cementing all-African unity and inspiring their determination to act against a force which challenges the very basis of independence for Africa.

This commission finds that within South Africa the Government is arming against its people to maintain *apartheid* and an explosive unrest threatens to develop at any time from isolated acts of sabotage and resistance into prolonged armed conflict that will engulf the whole southern half of the continent. Outside South Africa independent Africa is inflamed not only by the practices of *apartheid* but by the evidence that South Africa's formidable programme of militarization makes the *apartheid* state a belligerent threatening the peace of the continent.

II. South Africa and the United Nations

The increasingly oppressive measures taken by the Government of South Africa against the majority of the population within its control faces an increasing measure of public reprobation throughout the world. This has found expression in the United Nations, especially as the process of decolonization, gathering momentum, has brought into the organization large numbers of African and Asian countries, now actually a majority of the membership of the organization.

The General Assembly, representative of the whole membership of the Organization, has been seized of racial problems in South Africa since its inception and has considered them annually thereafter.

Its resolutions have reflected from year to year the growing detestation with which the great majority of the population of the world regards policies of racial oppression. The appeals of the General Assembly to the Government of South Africa have remained entirely without effect and that Government has continued to intensify all the most objectionable features of its policies.

The South African Government's contention that *apartheid* is a matter essentially within its domestic jurisdiction in the sense of Article 2 (7) of the Charter was for some years accepted not only by the U.S. and the U.K. but by a number of other countries. This position has gradually lost support, however, as it has come to be realized that policies of racial oppression, being fraught with momentous international consequences and dangerous to world peace, cannot possibly be regarded as matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a member nation.

The General Assembly, as is well known, has power only to make recommendations, not mandatory decisions, and the South African Government has relied on this in defending its decisions to ignore the resolutions of the General Assembly.

The Afro-Asian countries which have been carrying on the struggle against *apartheid* at the U.N. for many years succeeded only comparatively recently after the Sharpeville massacre in March 1960 in having the Security Council seized of the matter. A recent Security Council Resolution on this matter (S.3586 of 7 August 1963) states *inter alia*:

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The Security Council

Being convinced that the situation in South Africa is seriously disturbing international peace and security:

1. *Strongly deprecates* the policies of South Africa in its perpetuation of racial discrimination as being inconsistent with the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations and contrary to its obligations as a Member State of the United Nations;

2. *Calls upon* the Government of South Africa to abandon the policies of *apartheid* and discrimination as called for in the previous Security Council resolution of 1 April 1960 and to liberate all persons imprisoned, interned, or subjected to other restrictions for having opposed the policy of *apartheid*;

3. *Solemnly calls* upon all States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types, and military vehicles to South Africa;

4. *Requests* the Security General to keep the situation in South Africa under observation and to report to the Security Council by 30 October 1963.

This Resolution was also disregarded by the Government of South Africa. It may be asked how South Africa is able to disregard a decision of the Security Council which should be mandatory on all member nations. The fact is that South Africa has taken advantage of a weakness in the wording of the resolution – a weakness which is due to the reluctance of three of the permanent members of the Security Council, the U.S., the U.K., and France – to envisage enforcement measures against South Africa.

If the Resolution had defined the situation in South Africa as being a threat to the peace in the words of the Charter then the question of enforcement measures would automatically have arisen in the case of defiance by South Africa of the Security Council's decision. As, on the insistence of the powers named, these key words were not used – being replaced by the rhetorically stronger but effectively weaker form 'seriously disturbing international peace and security' – South Africa has been able to defy this resolution of the U.N., like all the others, with continued impunity. The same is true of the in some senses even stronger resolution (S.4571 of 4 December 1963) passed later in the same year.

This situation is humiliating for the United Nations and damaging to the prospects of a strengthened world order. By

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refusing to recognize the existence of the real and serious threat to world peace which is constituted by the South African situation, the Security Council is allowing this threat to develop to even more dangerous proportions. Responsibility for this situation rests primarily on the Governments of the three countries named and secondly on public opinion in these countries which has not yet been sufficiently awakened to the danger which the South African system of government represents to international peace and security.

III. Impact on African States

South Africa's continued defiance of the United Nations and the apparent powerlessness of the world organization – due mainly to the positions taken up by some of its Members having close relations with the South African regime – has led inevitably to growing frustration and bitterness among countries of Africa and Asia which see *apartheid* as a crystallization of the worst forms of colonialism, and the denial to an African population of the elementary rights of determining their own destiny and maintaining human dignity.

The continuance of this situation without any form of effective international intervention cannot fail, if it continues, to precipitate a grave international crisis. There have now been a series of important statements on this matter reflecting the unanimous opinion of the independent African States, the most recent of these being that of the Conference of African Foreign Ministers held in Lagos on 24 February 1964 which states, in part, as follows :

Noting in particular that inasmuch as the Government of South Africa has disregarded all peaceful efforts to secure the abandonment of the policy of *apartheid*, sanctions of every kind represent the only remaining means of peacefully resolving the explosive situation prevailing in South Africa.

Decides to submit to the next conference of Heads of State the following recommendations :

1. That it should reaffirm that the situation in South Africa represents a serious threat to international peace and security ;
2. That it should condemn the Government of South Africa whose

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policy, which is inconsistent with its political and moral obligations as a State Member of the United Nations, gravely imperils the stability and peace of the African continent and of the world;

3. That it should endorse and promote action by representatives of the Organization of African Unity in international bodies to secure the abandonment of the policy of *apartheid* and that it should welcome this growing support of many States and institutions for African demands in this matter;

4. That it should renew its appeal to all States to apply strictly the economic, diplomatic, political, and military sanctions already decided upon by the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council;

5. That it should address a special appeal to the major trading partners of the Government of South Africa to desist from the encouragement they are giving to *apartheid* through their investments and their trade relations with the Pretoria Government;

6. That it should commend the delegation of Foreign Ministers entrusted by the Addis Ababa Summit Conference with the task of setting forth and defending the African position in the United Nations Security Council and that it should instruct the African group in the United Nations to request the earliest possible action by the Security Council to give effect to its resolutions S.5386 of 7 August 1963 and S.5471 of 4 December 1963 calling for an end to the sham trials of South African nationalists and for the liberation of all persons imprisoned, interned, or subjected to other restrictions for having opposed *apartheid*;

7. That it should decide to take all necessary steps to deny the right of overflight, landing, and docking, and all other facilities, to aircraft and ships coming from or bound for South Africa;

8. That it should instruct the African group in the United Nations to prepare and submit to the next Summit Conference of Independent African States a complete report on the nature and scope of trade relations and private and public investments as between South Africa and other States, and as between African States and these partners of the Government of South Africa.

IV. The Threat to Peace

The legal discussions of the Commission (see Annexe, p. 267) clearly established the fact that in order to get action to apply sanctions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter it would be necessary to establish that the situation in South Africa constituted a threat to the peace as specified under Article 39.

It is clear that where the Security Council has determined the

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existence of a threat to peace, the United Nations has the power under the Charter to intervene by all effective means including, where appropriate, military means. The determination of the existence of a threat to peace is not, in itself, a legal question but a question of fact subject to political assessment.

The Commission is of the opinion that the South African situation does constitute a threat to peace and that the reasons why the Security Council has not recognized it as such are political reasons stemming from the reluctance of certain powers having close relations with South Africa to undertake or support sanctions of any kind.

It is sometimes argued, on behalf of these powers and by others, that the South African situation cannot be considered a threat to the peace within the meaning of the Charter because the danger to international peace arises, exclusively, it is claimed, from the possible intent of African and other adversaries of South Africa's internal policies. In the Commission's view this opinion cannot be sustained. The threat to the peace arises in the first instance from the policies and practices which the South African Government imposes by the threat and use of force on the majority of the population over which it has control. The populations of the other States in Africa know that these policies are directed against Africans as such, although the regime can make them effective only against the population within its borders.

All peoples neighbouring on a State which systematically oppresses people like them and which refuses to negotiate about, or even to discuss, its oppressive policies are bound to resent this situation intensely and, if all other recourse is exhausted, to consider military means.

It would be perverse either to ignore the threat to the peace which this constitutes or to claim that this derives primarily from the policies of the neighbouring countries. The primary threat to the peace is constituted by the South African Government's use of force against the majority of its own population. Secondary threats to the peace come from the massive build-up of South African armed forces, which menaces the independent countries of Africa, and from the angry reaction of the African population within and beyond the borders of South Africa.

If the South African Government can be induced to abandon

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its policies of racial oppression imposed by force then no threat will arise from beyond its borders.

Those who are concerned about this threat to the peace must therefore seek by all effective means to induce the Government of South Africa to abandon these practices.

V. Political Basis for Sanctions

Moral suasion has been tried over many years without any success whatever. The necessity of military action is what we must hope to avoid, giving trial first to all other means showing prospects of success. It should be noted, however, that where a regime is maintained solely by violence – as is the case in South Africa – it would be hard to find historical examples of such a regime being radically changed without force being brought into play at some stage.

In so far, therefore, as any attempt to bring effective pressure to bear on South Africa involves a risk of force being used – and this risk should be frankly noted – the prime responsibility for this situation rests not on those who are attempting to bring about change but on those who are ruling by violence and who seek to protect their status as overlords by the same means.

Intermediary between moral suasion which has failed, and military means which should be used only in the last resort, are a number of sanctions and measures holding varying prospects of success. It is the Commission's considered opinion that all methods in this range holding prospects of even limited success should be tried. A number of such measures are listed in another part of this report and in the reports of other Commissions. The Commission's object in proposing such measures is to bring home to South Africa that world opinion is irrevocably set against its practices, is not prepared to tolerate their continuation, and is ready to use all legitimate means to bring them to an end. This conviction cannot be induced in the Government of South Africa merely by verbal declarations. It can be induced only by concrete action and mounting pressure from inside and outside South Africa. It is hoped that under such pressure, and as future dangers become more clear, the internal situation in South Africa may evolve for the better. Certainly hopes expressed by many in

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the past about the spontaneous development of some kind of liberal force in South Africa have proved to be wholly without foundation. It may, however, be more reasonable to consider the possibility that business interests in South Africa, and associated with South Africa, may come to see the need for political change if it becomes evident that world opinion on this matter is seriously determined and will not be content, as in the past, with lip-service to liberal ideas. Economic and other sanctions constitute, however, the only *peaceful* option available, and it is clear for that reason that they must be given a trial. The sole hope of ending the *apartheid* system in South Africa without the use of force lies in the determined and united application by the world community of effective economic sanctions and political measures associated with such sanctions.

VI. Obstacles to Sanctions

The main obstacle to the implementation of such a policy – the policy of a serious attempt to end the *apartheid* system by peaceful means – lies in the fact that three major powers, permanent members of the Security Council, having in varying degrees associations with South Africa, have shown themselves consistently reluctant to do anything that might disturb the *status quo* in that country. These states are the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and France.

The United Kingdom, because of its economic involvement in South Africa, is unlikely to take the lead in any measures designed to bring about radical change. It is true that a change of government in the United Kingdom might eliminate the more cynical practices of the present British Government, such as continued sale of arms to South Africa in defiance of the Security Council resolution. It is clear, however, from the message of the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Harold Wilson, to this Conference that even a Labour Government would not take a lead in the use of sanctions against South Africa. While, therefore, it is desirable that the efforts of the Anti-Apartheid Movement and others concerned with enlightenment of British public opinion on this question should continue, it would not be realistic to look for a new lead from this quarter. It can, however, reasonably be expected

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that a British Labour Government would not be able to take a less progressive position on this matter than the United States. It would seem, therefore, possible that British support for economic sanctions might be obtained if the position of the United States were to change.

The position of the United States is in many respects the key to the problem of securing international support for the use of economic sanctions. The influence of the United States at the United Nations is such that it is inconceivable that that body could adopt sanctions without not merely the consent but the active support of the United States. It is therefore essential that for the action which ought to follow this conference a special effort should be made to influence American opinion in the right direction. Some specific suggestions regarding this are made in the Recommendations of Commissions IV and V, page 271.

As regards France, which might until recent times have been classified almost automatically as politically sympathetic to the South African regime, it has been suggested to the Commission that recent evolutions of France's foreign policy and France's relations with the French-speaking African states might lead to a radically new approach on France's part to the South African question. The Commission is not in a position to assess exactly what weight should be given to these reports, but it considers that the matter should be carefully explored.

In the Commission's opinion, if the support of these three powers can be obtained for sanctions against South Africa then the United Nations will be certain to determine on such action and will have the necessary power at its disposal to make the programme of applying sanctions respected by the South African regime. Without such support – or at least the support of the United States – no programme of internationally applied total economic sanctions is likely to come into being and therefore, if this support is denied, the situation will continue to drift as it is doing at present towards an explosion of violence.

**Annexe: Summary of Legal Issues discussed in
Commissions IV and V**

The joint Legal and Political and Policing Commissions addressed themselves to the question of the circumstances in which it would be legal for economic sanctions to be taken through the U.N. against South Africa. From the papers of the legal experts and their comments it emerged that there were in fact two quite separate circumstances relevant to South Africa in which the provision of the Charter envisaging such action would be brought into play. The first of these concerned the situation in South-West Africa and the judgement of the International Court, and the second the existence of *apartheid* in South Africa itself. Since these were quite distinct questions it was agreed to discuss them separately.

South-West Africa

After fifteen years of wrangling, the General Assembly is now awaiting the judgement of the International Court of Justice on the contentious proceedings entered against South Africa by Ethiopia and Liberia on the grounds that the practice of *apartheid* in South-West Africa is a violation of the mandate and must be stopped.

The consensus of the legal experts on the Commission seemed to be that the Court was likely some time in 1965 to decide against South Africa on the precise question which had been asked, but was unlikely to go further and make any general condemnation of *apartheid*. If this judgement is handed down and if South Africa refuses to comply, then it is for the U.N. to decide what action it should take. Article 94 of the Charter states that the Security Council may make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgements of the Court. Legal opinion as to exactly what action this permits the Security Council to take seems somewhat mixed, but it was the opinion of at least one of the legal experts on the Commission that the wording did in fact allow the taking of enforcement measures, including economic sanctions as envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter. It was emphasized, however, that action would only be taken to enforce the precise judgement of the Court and not to

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mount a general attack on South Africa. The general feeling of the experts seemed to be that a finding against South Africa in the International Court combined with the measures granted to the U.N. by Article 94 of the Charter gave much the best *legal* case for a positive intervention in South Africa's affairs and that it would be a case which the Western powers which were committed to upholding international law would find hard to answer. It was also pointed out that the legal case for intervention could be much stronger if action were delayed until the final judgement of the Court and not pressed on any interim injunction that might be asked for.

Apartheid

With regard to *apartheid* the position at present is that the General Assembly has recommended that states should take unilaterally extensive economic and diplomatic sanctions and that the Security Council has passed a non-mandatory resolution calling for an arms boycott. The basis of the consideration of this question by the United Nations has been Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter, which bind states to abide by certain general provisions concerned with human rights. To move on from the resolutions already passed would involve a move from Chapter VI of the Charter into Chapter VII. According to the legal experts present, the breach of Articles 55 and 56, however serious, was not sufficient to justify such a move since the Charter did not provide for the taking of enforcement measures by the United Nations to uphold these articles. In order to get action to apply sanctions under Chapter VII it would be necessary to establish in addition that the situation in South Africa constituted at least a threat to the peace as specified under Article 39. For an action under the Uniting for Peace resolution in the General Assembly it was pointed out that it would be necessary to go even further and prove that the actions of South Africa constituted a breach of the peace.

In order to get action in the Security Council it would be necessary for all permanent members to agree that there was a threat to the peace at least to the extent of abstaining rather than using the veto. At present both the United States and Britain had stated clearly that they did not think that the situation at the

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moment in South Africa did constitute a threat to the peace.

The conclusion of the legal discussion was that there were two situations concerning South Africa where it would be legal for the U.N. to take enforcement action:

- (i) if a judgement of the International Court of Justice found against South Africa and South Africa failed to comply with the judgement; and
- (ii) if it could be established that the application of *apartheid* policies in South Africa were so provocative as to constitute a threat to the peace.

The consensus of the Commission was that since the case of South-West Africa was *sub judice* and unlikely to be decided before 1965 the Conference should concentrate on the second point.

Findings and Recommendations of the Commissions

Commissions I and II

1. After detailed consideration, the Commission finds that a policy of total economic sanctions against South Africa is feasible and practical and can be effective. The Commission therefore strongly recommends a policy of *total* economic sanctions against South Africa.

2. The Commission finds that the adverse effects of a policy of collective sanctions on world trade, finance, and the economies of individual countries having significant share in the South African economy would be small and marginal. Even these effects may be mitigated by the adoption of domestic measures by the countries concerned, and by international action.

3. The Commission recommends that the widest possible publicity be given to the fact that such adverse effects as the imposition of sanctions might have on the British and American economies would be marginal, and that arguments that vital economic interests are at stake are highly exaggerated.

4. The Commission recommends that countries imposing sanctions against South Africa consider the appropriateness of adopting a policy of discrimination against firms of any country which deal with and strengthen South Africa economically.

5. The Commission recommends that this report and recommendations be transmitted to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development currently in session in Geneva for

Findings and Recommendations of the Commissions

consideration when formulating their proposals for the promotion of economic development and international trade.

Commission III

The beliefs of this Commission are:

That South Africa is in a crisis which amounts to a state of race war;

That the crisis cannot be resolved except by intervention from outside;

That complete trade sanctions provide the only effective means of intervention short of military intervention;

That the aim of economic sanctions is to remove economic support from *apartheid* so that the people of South Africa can bring about change, with the minimum cost in human suffering, and the present race war be prevented from involving the whole continent and beyond;

That the effect of total sanctions could quickly achieve these aims and that their total effect on the High Commission Territories must be faced but can be considerably lessened.

Commissions IV and V

The Commission recommends an intensive programme of action designed to bring nearer the day of mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa.

1. Activity on a national and international level by all forces united on the need for sanctions to use the machinery of the United Nations to declare that the South African situation constitutes a threat to world peace within the meaning of Article 39, and to invoke the provisions of Chapter VII for mandatory sanctions.

2. Recognizing that mandatory action can only result from a Security Council resolution which would require the support of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council, special pressures are essential to get the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and France to change the direction of their policies on the South African question.

3. The campaign must stress that opposition to *apartheid* and continued trade which bolsters this system are incompatible

Findings and Recommendations of the Commissions

policies; are policies against the trend of world opinion; are contradictory to the long-term interests of those Powers; and a potential source of conflict with the Powers of Africa and Asia. The continued frustration of the wishes of the overwhelming majority of nations and even of mankind could lead to a breakdown of the United Nations, to alignments on a colour basis, and to extreme crisis on a world scale.

4. The sanctions movement can be impelled forward by the most loyal adherence to boycott resolutions of the United Nations and other assemblies, and in all countries where it is not fully observed the most energetic steps should ensure its complete enforcement.

5. Within specific countries appropriate pressures must be devised in this campaign. Examples are:

- (a) In the U.S.A. pressure by the Negro and Civil Rights Movements to influence State Department policy.
- (b) In the former French territories of Africa, pressures on France.
- (c) In the U.K., pressures by Commonwealth countries, particularly in Africa and Asia.
- (d) In the Middle East pressure on the oil-producing countries.

6. Concerted action to blacklist firms that trade with South Africa and thrive on *apartheid* must be planned. Information must be disseminated to show South Africa's trading relations with the rest of the world, and, by contrast, the trading position of Africa and Asia with the rest of the world.

7. There should be launched appeals to Heads of States, to the Trade Union movements of all countries, to the major religions of the world, to youth and student organizations, and to political parties, sensitive to pressure at times of election.

8. Information services to counter the propaganda of the South African Government and the South African Foundation should argue the unanswerable case against *apartheid* and so influence public opinion.

These and other activities call for the establishment of a permanent body to further the movement for economic sanctions and to coordinate activity at an international level.

Resolution accepted by Final Conference Plenary

The Conference charges the Steering Committee of the Conference to convey to all states, all specialized international regional and national bodies and other organizations of public opinion, the resolutions and decisions of the Conference and urge for appropriate and urgent action. It further charges the Steering Committee to impress on the Organization of African Unity the urgent need for setting up permanent machinery to pursue energetically the international application of economic sanctions.

Sanctions against South Africa

