


LIBERAL OPINION



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OPENING OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE, JULY 1966

PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

I AM HAPPY to be speaking again from the same platform as Dr. Brookes. We all owe a debt to Dr. Brookes, who assumed the National Chairmanship at a most critical time, and, if I might say so, at a time of life when most men are thinking of shedding old responsibilities rather than assuming new ones. Dr. Brookes has had no easy passage. He assumed the Chairmanship when Peter Brown was banned. Since then the Party has been through many vicissitudes, some of which I can only describe as disasters. One can imagine Dr. Brookes saying of one of these events: "Ladies and gentlemen, this is the greatest calamity that has befallen the Party since I became its National Chairman in 1964." (Laughter.)

Let us remember for a moment these members of the Party who have been banned since the banning of Peter Brown, whose absence on occasions such as these is something never far from our minds, whose courage and whose clear-sightedness are the attributes we need most now.

Harold Head	David Craighead
Walter Hain	Eddie Roux
Dempsey Noel	Samuel Dick
Ann Tobias	John Aitchison
Eric Harber	Chris Shabalala
Joe Tsele	Sam Polotho
David Rathswaffo	Michael Francis
Saul Bastomsky	Enoch Mnguni
Max Thomas	Michael Ndlovu
Selby Msimang	Jean Hill
Barney Zackon	Ken Hill
Alban Thumbrin	Heather Morkill
Fred Prager	Ruth Hayman

Our greetings are sent to them all, and to others, too — Adelaine Hain and the Hain family, Maritz van den Berg, Ann Harris, and Barney Zackon — who have left South Africa.

Banning has by no means been confined to us. The banning of Ian Robertson came as a great shock, partly because he was president of NUSAS, partly because of his age. There were also two bannings of a particularly contemptible kind. Mr. Abe Hurzuk and Mr. Abdul Kay of Cape Town, both members of the committee formed to save District Six, were banned, and one cannot but conclude that this was done to discourage any opposition to this particularly merciless application of the Group Areas Act.

THOROUGHLY BAD

The way in which this law is framed is thoroughly bad. Some of the objects of Communism would be the same as some of the objects of any Government imaginable, including our own. It would appear to me that the Minister of Justice would be able to ban almost any person who took any interest in politics or social welfare. It is because the law is so thoroughly bad that the Courts are prevented from passing any judgement as to whether the Minister was justified or not in the action he had taken. It is a fine situation, is it not, when the law of the land is used to silence the Courts of the land?

The Minister was also of the opinion that it would be detrimental to public policy to disclose his information. Surely the very opposite is true. If this information were of any substance it would do much to lessen the profound public suspicion that Mr. Robertson was banned purely and simply because he was the president of a society that had invited Senator Kennedy to visit South Africa. We are therefore entitled to be sceptical about the Minister's

alleged information — I think one must describe it thus, because it has no legal validity until it has been proved in a court of law.

I think NUSAS deserve both thanks and admiration for the way in which they conducted their protest, which was both dignified and courageous. And these young students deserve to be thanked and admired, too, and especially by people like ourselves, because they showed their sure grasp of those things that are fundamental to the life of any civilised society, at a time, I regret to say, when many older people are beginning to forget them, or should I say, when many older people are beginning to be afraid to remember them?

SENATOR KENNEDY

Our National Chairman has already dealt with the visit of Senator Kennedy, and has likened it to a breath of fresh air from the wider world. This reminds me of that brilliant parable of Reginald Reynolds, who compared South Africa with a room full of people, with all the doors and windows closed, and all the people smoking and drinking and talking. And a stranger from outside opens the door and exclaims: "Phew! What a fug in here." And they shout at him: "How can you know? You've only just come in."

Mr. Con Botha of Natal, in speaking of Senator Kennedy's speeches, showed a pride in things South African which pleased me immensely. For he said, in perhaps not quite these words: "Senator Kennedy uttered a number of cliches, which I have heard Alan Paton, Helen Suzman and Chief Luthuli utter much better." It would have pleased me even more if Mr. Botha had said "our own Alan Paton and our own Helen Suzman and our own Albert Luthuli", but I must admit he didn't say that. And I could say to Mr. Botha: "Look, if you don't like our own South African cliché-makers, why don't you go and live in some other country?" You all know the big difference between Liberalism and Nationalism, don't you? If the Liberal doesn't like Nationalism, then the Liberal should get out of the country. And if the Nationalist doesn't like Liberalism, then the Liberal should get out of the country.

You all know what those cliches were which were uttered by Senator Kennedy. That man, individual man, is the touchstone of value, and

that all society, all organisations, even the State, exist for his well-being and self-realisation. That Government, even by the consent of the people, must be limited in its power to act against the people? That in no civilised society may there be any restriction on the freedom of men to seek education and work and opportunity of any kind?

ENCOURAGEMENT

What an encouragement it has been to us all to hear these principles reaffirmed by a new voice, and not only a new voice but a powerful voice, that may one day be one of the most powerful in the world. Many of us, who in this country are embattled and beleaguered and punished without trial and banned without reason, suddenly felt that we were again part of a wider and freer world, and a safer world, too. You and I well know that the unrest of the wider world is often compared with the peace and order of South Africa, which enjoys a peace very much like the peace of Spain and Portugal.

But nowhere in the world, not even in Spain and Portugal, is the whole aim of government to keep apart for ever the various groups of the race of man, often by methods both cruel and unjust. It is claimed that those are the traditional policies of the country, but, if they had been, two of the most important groups in the country, the Afrikaners and the Coloured people, would never have come into existence at all. It is said that it is God's will that these racial identities should be for ever preserved. How anyone who knows anything at all of the history of man can believe such nonsense is beyond my wit to understand.

What made all these thousands of people, young and old, clamour to hear Kennedy and stretch out their hands to touch him, and wait long hours to hear him? Weren't they hungry to hear again what it has become so dangerous to speak and so dangerous to listen to? Didn't they want some reassurance that the things in which they believed and which some of them were growing afraid to believe, were believed elsewhere, too, by other students, other peoples, other countries of the world?

PRICE TOO HIGH

We often ask ourselves, those of us who have been so bludgeoned and beaten, whether the price hasn't come too high, in terms of careers and happiness and children's happiness, and all the ordinary things that make up a person's life?

This is a question I cannot answer for you. I cannot ask you to choose the hero's lament. I never thought that the river of my life, in its latter stretches, would proceed with such turbulence. One could have expected that it should broaden out into reaches of tranquillity before it entered the sea. Would I have had it otherwise? Well, of course I would have had it otherwise, but not at the price of ceasing to believe what I believe in, or by pretending to cease to believe. Life might have been easier, but it wouldn't have been my life but the life of some other fellow that I had allowed to get the better of me. So, all things said and done, I wouldn't have had it otherwise.

Sometimes we are inclined to judge and condemn white South Africa for its obsession with security and its willingness to make security its supreme value, so preparing the way for the moral corruption that must follow. When we are so tempted, let us remember the tens of thousands who went to hear Kennedy, to hear something of those other values which, at the very least, are as important as security, and indeed are essential to security of another kind. Bludgeoned and beaten as we are, we stand for those same values.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN RHODESIA

An address given to the Durban Branch of the Liberal Party by Dr. Stafford Glass, lecturer in History at the University of Natal.

WE HAVE ALL SEEN in recent years — months even — the swing to the right that has shown itself in the political life of Rhodesia. How does one define a swing to the right? In South African or African politics it is any move or policy that tends to reduce the rights of the black man or to deny him his aspirations; any move or policy that is based on race discrimination, or that

moves in the direction of discrimination. That the Rhodesian Front Party of Ian Smith is moving to the right in this sense is, I think, undoubted. He has no black support beyond what he claims from the Chiefs; in the elections in which his party swept the boards it played on race prejudice with posters such as the one showing white legs and black together (off to school) and captioned "Rhodesia is not ready for this yet." Smith asserted on November 11, 1965, that the time had come to say: "Thus far and no further", a phrase that sums up much of the thinking of white Rhodesia today.

If we accept that Rhodesia is moving to the right, how do we explain it? Of course, one can say: "Oh, because of the rest of black Africa." Such an explanation is too glib, too easy. It may be in some measure part of the explanation. But the historian is not likely to accept it: he will say, let us go back into the past and investigate the background, the early history, and seek there the explanation. That is what I intend to do tonight: to give you some facts about Rhodesia's past, facts which I think explain the success of the "white man boss" mentality today.

FIRST DECADE

I intend to spend most of my time on the first decade of the settlement of what is today Rhodesia. The settlement itself dates from 1890, and there can be no doubt that the foundations laid during the ten years up to 1900 established the pattern of future Rhodesia, and to a great extent made the present trend both logical and inevitable. The matters I wish to deal with concerning the ten years under consideration are the following: the fact that the settlement was the work of a commercial company seeking profits; the fact that it was little more than an outpost of a country, South Africa, that had already established its colour bar; the fact that the African peoples were quelled by force of arms; the fact that the settlers in the mid-'nineties were vastly of Afrikaner stock; the fact that both industry and farming were from the start organised for the benefit of the whites and not of the blacks. These are the things I will deal with — some of them, perhaps all of them — for I believe they explain Rhodesian behaviour of the mid-1960's.

First, then, the **character of the settlement**. It was in September of 1890 that the Pioneer Column hoisted the flag at Salisbury. The members of this column were not merely a bunch of adventurers carving new homes for themselves out of the wilderness: they were the men — the settlers and police — of a new and powerful trading company. The seventeenth century had known its trading companies, like the Dutch East India Company, the E.E.I.C. and the Fr.E.E.C. In the later years of the nineteenth century the idea of chartered companies was revived, in order to colonise Africa.

The Scramble for Africa was really a scramble by trading companies chartered by the governments of

France, Germany and England. France had her interests in the Niger region, Germany in East Africa, and to such places companies sent men to carve out empires for the European nations. Britain wanted to ride off these rivals, but to do it as economically as possible, so she also chartered companies: the Royal Niger Coy. in 1886, the Imperial British East Africa Company in 1888, and in 1889 the company with which we are concerned: the British South Africa Company. The B.S.A. Company was to secure the lands lying to the north of the Limpopo River and to prevent Portuguese expansion into those lands.

PROFITS

The prime object of a trading company is to make profits, and to satisfy the shareholders. The interests of the native tribes with whom the settlers came into contact were not necessarily of any importance. The humanitarian groups in England were well aware of the dangers inherent in the policy of sending out companies to do the work of colonisation: the Aborigines' Protection Society, the Anti-Slavery League, the London Missionary Society set up an outcry against these companies, an outcry which was justified. It is a sad thing that the European has never known how to colonise: they can only exploit, and this is true of all colonising ventures from the time of the Crusades onwards. And when the colonising venture rests with a trading company it is the interests, the commercial interests that are uppermost and the danger of exploitation is all the greater.

The second matter to which I shall now turn is this: that the settlement in Mashonaland **took over the social and economic policies of South Africa**. By 1890, when Mashonaland was opened up, as they say, the various parts of South Africa had already embarked on the colour bar policies that we seem doomed to live with forever. About 100 years ago diamonds were discovered near Kimberley, and this event, as de Kiewiet has said, brought the industrial revolution to South Africa. The miners insisted that life in the towns must be based on the grounds of economic and racial distinction between white and black; there was no place for the natives except as low-paid and unskilled labourers; they had to be herded into locations and compounds; they had to be removed from their families; they had to have passes; there had to be vagrancy laws against them; there had to be reservations of jobs for whites. With the discovery of gold in the mid-'eighties, such policies were applied to the Witwatersrand.

The settlement in Mashonaland was to be a mining one — or so they hoped — and so such rules were inherited by her. The Rhodesia of the future was to copy the legislation of South Africa — many aspects of her colour bar legislation came from the south: she was to ensure that black competition would be controlled, that he would be kept as a labourer, and that the best farming land would be preserved for white occupation.

AFRIKANERS

The third matter is linked with that which I have just been discussing: the **white settlers during the first ten important years were drawn vastly from South Africa, and among these the Afrikaners were well represented.** We often tend to forget the importance of the Afrikaner in Rhodesia: he is today well represented in the population, exercises a powerful sway politically, and is the fellow of his South African counterpart, embracing the religious, social, political and cultural views that the latter holds. As early as 1892 a number of farmers from the O.F.S. trekked to Mashonaland, to be followed during the course of the next three years by other parties from the Transvaal. See S. P. Olivier, "Many Treks Made Rhodesia", on this.

The Afrikaans community established itself mainly in the rural areas to the east and south of Salisbury, and in the old settlements of Melsetter, Chipinga and Enkeldoorn in the south-east of the country. One can discover the Afrikaans population of Rhodesia by looking at the number of adherents of the Dutch Reformed Churches. In 1951 the European members of the Dutch Reformed Churches numbered 13.5 per cent. of the white population. Of the rural white population they formed 24.5 per cent. The electoral system in Rhodesia is kind towards the rural areas, so that the Afrikaner vote to this day enjoys a great significance in Rhodesia.

The fourth matter that I shall turn to is **the policy of the settlers towards the African peoples.** I said earlier that humanitarian parties in England feared that trading companies would not be able to keep the peace with the natives of the occupied lands. They were justified in this fear, as the early history shows. The natives with whom the settlers came into contact were the Mashona: they were supposed to be a cowed and frightened people, crushed beneath the heel of the all-powerful Matabele and their king, Lobengula. However, the whites found it necessary to reduce the Mashona still further. One of the incidents that caused much disgust overseas was that involving **Ngomo**, a petty chief living in a kraal some miles from Salisbury. His kraal was assumed to be guilty of theft from a white man living nearby, and to punish him it was deemed necessary to take a seven-pounder Nordenfeldt Maxim gun, to shell the kraal, and to kill some 23 natives, including Ngomo and his son.

John Moffat wondered what the British Parliament would think of the matter, and he added, "not to mention a much higher tribunal than that". The High Commissioner, Sir Henry Loch, felt that "the punishment inflicted in this case, involving the loss of some 23 lives, appears utterly disproportionate to the original offence, which was the theft of some goods from a Mr. Bennett". There was certainly a body of opinion in the country at the time which objected to such measures. The "Rhodesian Chronicle" on September 17, 1892,

accused the authorities of "bullying the weak", and a few days later, on the 24th, urged officials not to "be quite so ready to start playing at soldiers at the expense of natives whose crime, more often than not, merely arises from ignorance of the law". "Tact and common sense", said this paper, were needed.

MATABELE WAR

The object of all this was, of course, to endeavour to make a useful being of the Mashona, in other words, a servile labourer. It was on the Matabele that the Company turned next. The Matabele War of 1893 would have come anyway, but it came so soon — three years after the establishment of the settlement — because the Company needed the land to exploit. It was hoped that gold would be found there, the gold which had not materialised in Mashonaland. The mere rumour of war was enough to improve the position of the Company, and it was able to raise badly-needed capital on the London Stock Exchange. So Lobengula was defeated; Matabeleland was added to Mashonaland and what is today Rhodesia came into existence.

The fifth and last matter I shall deal with is **the land apportionment policy that followed on the Matabele War.** In Southern Rhodesia the B.S.A. Company had a vast area of land, which it hoped to exploit for the benefit of the Company. The idea was to develop both mining and agricultural activities, for they soon realised that it was futile to pin their hopes on the mineral resources only. So land apportionment came about, which was simply a case of taking the best land for the Europeans. As early as 1894 two Reserves were set aside for the Africans: one was the Gwaai and the other the Shangani. Together they covered some 2½ million acres in extent, and were situated in the low-lying and unhealthy areas of the country. The highlands between Salisbury and Bulawayo were given to the whites. Thus started the pattern that continued to this day: along the railway lines the white areas were demarcated; African reserves were in the more remote situations.

A CERTAIN PATTERN

Well, what can we make of all this? I said at the beginning that it is in the past, in fact in the first ten years of the settlement, that we may find the explanation of present-day attitudes. In the matters that I have raised: in the very foundation of the settlement by a trading company, in the inheritance of social and economic attitudes of South Africa by Rhodesians, in the early policy towards Mashona and Matabele, and in

the land apportionment policy — in all these we have, I believe, a background from which it was not easy for Rhodesia to deviate in after years. A certain pattern was created. The economy of the country was "geared to the interests of the whites" (to use the term of Colin Leys in his "European Politics in Southern Rhodesia"). Such a gearing took place in the first ten years of the life of the country, and in after years it was as impossible for an unmeshing to take place. Any effort to impose a more liberal government or policy on the country in the later years was to be doomed to failure.

In 1923 Company rule at long last gave way to settler rule. By that year there had been some 33 years of Company rule, 33 years in which white control became entrenched, and the Colonial Office was quite unable to extend the privileges of the non-whites. Nineteen twenty-three is an important year, for the transition was to Responsible Government, full Responsible Government. The fact that a country in which the whites had been ruling for only 33 years was so early given Responsible Government meant that the whites were able to dig themselves in more and more, to establish legislation copied from that of the powerful southern neighbour, and to bind the economy to the interests of the whites.

And so what happened in the 1950's, after another 30 years had passed, was doomed to failure. In 1953 the experiment of the Federation took place. What an absurdity, what an abnormality! — to link two preponderantly black states, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, with Southern Rhodesia with her self-government and her South African philosophy. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were still under Colonial Office rule, Southern Rhodesia had self-government with a white government. The historian of the future will probably see the Federation as some sore or parasite visited on the political body of Central Africa. Historically and logically, Southern Rhodesia was not in the camp of states to the north of the Zambesi River; historically and logically is was in the camp of the Union of South Africa. The years after 1953 revealed the absurdity of this federation; how right Dr. Banda was when he used the phrase he liked so much: "this stupid federation".

It is during the last ten years that Rhodesia has been drifting back to the path that logic and history prepared for her: in other words, she has been moving closer and closer to the path that South Africa has in her blindness selected.

AFRICAN NATIONALISM

What the federal experiment led to was the rise of African nationalism, which ran its expected course in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. But Southern Rho-

desia was utterly unprepared for it, and whatever her hopes for partnership might have been, they certainly did not include moves towards majority rule. So the frustrated Africans proceeded to agitate; the African National Congress unleashed violence that culminated in the riots of January and February 1959.

The move towards this sort of thing had a profound effect on political thinking in Southern Rhodesia, in the later 1950's. Mr. Garfield Todd and his United Rhodesia Party were defeated in the elections of 1958. They were, in fact, eliminated, and all ultra-liberals were removed from the Southern Rhodesian Parliament after that election. The moderates were left: the Federal Party with 17 seats and the Dominion Party with 13. Whitehead became the Prime Minister of a country in which the opposition to African advancement was growing deeper and deeper with every passing month. He was forced more and more to the right, and in 1961 he introduced security laws which were admittedly repressive.

The early 1960's revealed the situation more clearly. Southern Rhodesia clearly had no place in the Federation. White rule was more and more entrenching itself in Southern Rhodesia. The fear of being engulfed by Africans made the white men move against African advancement. In the elections of 1962 the Rhodesian Front won and Winston Field became Prime Minister. The Federation broke up in October 1963, and the Rhodesia of U.D.I. was born. Rhodesia, more and more, was looking to her neighbour in the south. The harsh philosophy of apartheid and separate development were the natural political ideas for her to embrace. The chickens of her history were coming home to roost in 1965; and they found their perch in a pen made of South African granite. Whatever forces eventually overthrow the discriminatory policies of the Republic, those forces will have to operate against Rhodesia as well.

ON LEAVING SOUTH AFRICA

by Dr. Peter Royle

[Editor's note: Comments on this further provocative article by Dr. Royle are invited. Since he is now in Canada, however, it may not be easy for him to answer them immediately.]

THE HIGHROAD TO VIRTUE AND WISDOM is not to practise what you preach, but to preach what you practise to see whether its maxim is capable of being

elevated into a universal law: if it isn't, you can be sure that, however much you may be justified by considerations of what it is reasonable to expect of fallible mortals ("Anybody in my position would have done the same"), what you are doing is wrong.

How would this apply to people like myself who leave South Africa partly for political reasons? There seems to be a lot of fog obscuring this issue, with Liberals who leave and Liberals who stay pointing self-righteous fingers at one another through the murk; and although this propensity to mutual recrimination is perhaps bound to be one of the characteristics of a party combining the universalist preoccupations of the moralist with a belief in the value of diversity, it is not exactly conducive to practical effectiveness.

The first consideration to be discounted is that of the amount of courage required to leave or to stay. For most active Liberals it obviously needs more courage to stay than to leave. But this is not strictly relevant to the issue: it no doubt also took courage to fight in the Nazi army. The only possible "liberal" ground for disapproving of people who leave (or alternatively people who stay) would be that their conduct is weakening the cause of Liberalism; and this is not true of either group — or, insofar as it is, it is not their leaving or staying that is weakening it, but what they do or don't do subsequently.

It should be quite clear that the cause cannot be other than strengthened by the international lobbying carried on by émigré Liberals whose activities would have run the risk of being arbitrarily curtailed had they stayed in South Africa; and it should be equally clear that there is still indispensable work for Liberals in the Republic. In the same way as our society demands that some people should mine and others teach, so anyone committed to the Liberal cause should find it eminently desirable that some Liberals should stay and others leave. South Africa does not exist in a vacuum, and its problems will not be solved by its inhabitants alone any more than are those of any other country; and it is necessary, therefore, that there should be an organised body of Liberals informing and working on external opinion.

HAPHAZARD

All this should be so obvious that it doesn't need saying. But unfortunately there are many Liberals who leave the country convinced that those who are staying

behind are achieving nothing, but are, on the contrary, if they are not banned, merely lending a façade of democracy to the present régime while, if they are white, continuing to enjoy its benefits. And, on the other side, many Liberals committed to staying seem to regard those who leave, unless they can show they have good "private" reasons, as guilty of a dereliction of duty, or, if they continue with their political activities, as no longer competent to act.

And there are yet other Liberals, who probably form the majority, who regard the whole thing as an individual matter and therefore refuse to judge. And as long as this remains the case, so long will the exodus of Liberals continue to be a haphazard affair, determined often by considerations which have nothing to do with politics whatsoever; and so long will the Liberal Party remain a collection of individuals, whose commitment to the cause will always be felt to clash at some point with other equally serious moral commitments.

This brings me to the main point of my argument. For Liberals' commitment to Liberalism to be, as it should be, total, the Party must first of all transform itself into a totality capable of legislating on behalf of its members in the light of its needs and their circumstances. This means not that we must order people to do this or that, which, as opponents of totalitarianism, we clearly cannot countenance, but that we should develop more efficient, and above all more universal, organs of co-ordination, so that we should be in a position to guide our members, and so that nobody need ever feel that in the event of a move his services could no longer be used.

ABDICATE RESPONSIBILITY

Similarly, at the moment it is not really possible for individual Liberals to decide whether Liberals in their particular circumstances would be doing the right thing for the cause to leave the country or not. Yet to decide without any reference to politics at all is to abdicate responsibility in an area of immense moral importance; and to leave or stay for political reasons can, until the Party has become conscious of its requirements, only be a private act of little more than abstract significance and little practical value.

Unless both leavers and stayers realise they need one another, the Party's political effectiveness will be drastically reduced. In my own case, for example, I feel pretty sure I can be of more use outside the

country than in; but I also feel sure that, barring new developments in the Liberal Party, the only effective organisation I shall be able to belong to will be one more radical than it. And this is a pity.

While, therefore, it is true that the decision to leave or stay is an individual matter, this does not mean that

Liberals are beyond the judgment of their fellows. Moreover, any group that is at all serious in the pursuit of its ends will exert pressures, moral or legal, on its members. But an informed judgment will be possible only when the Party has fully recognised the legitimacy of emigration, defined its international aims more clearly as a result, and established efficient international organs of co-ordination.

Stop Press . . .

THE DEATH OF DOCTOR VERWOERD

THE PARTY records its horror and dismay at the murder of the Prime Minister, and expresses its sympathy with his family and friends.

All through his public life Dr. Verwoerd was associated with — and indeed helped to create — policies which we believe are harsh, unjust and wrong. The Liberal Party has always opposed these policies, and will continue to do so.

Nevertheless, we believe that in his private life the Prime Minister was a man of kindness, virtue and integrity; and it is this personal Hendrik Verwoerd that the murder has destroyed. Although while he lived he was almost the symbol of Apartheid, in his death he was only himself, and Apartheid remains unscathed.

We reaffirm our condemnation of all such acts of violence, which attack and destroy only what is good and valuable. Not only do they fail to remedy existing evils, but they create others new and worse.

BANS LIFTED

IN the past fortnight the following members of the Party have had their bans wholly or partly lifted:—

Terence Beard, Norman Bromberger, Elliott Mngadi, Mike Ndlovu, Chris Shabalala, Selby Msimang, Hamington Majija, Enoch Mnguni.

Just as no reason was given for the bans, no reason has been given for lifting them. Our bewilderment is exceeded only by our pleasure and relief on behalf of these members. There are still many others, however, whose release is essential in the interests of elementary justice.

THE EDITOR.