

the land apportionment policy — in all these we have, I believe, a background from which it was not easy for Rhodesia to deviate in after years. A certain pattern was created. The economy of the country was "geared to the interests of the whites" (to use the term of Colin Leys in his "European Politics in Southern Rhodesia"). Such a gearing took place in the first ten years of the life of the country, and in after years it was as impossible for an unmeshing to take place. Any effort to impose a more liberal government or policy on the country in the later years was to be doomed to failure.

In 1923 Company rule at long last gave way to settler rule. By that year there had been some 33 years of Company rule, 33 years in which white control became entrenched, and the Colonial Office was quite unable to extend the privileges of the non-whites. Nineteen twenty-three is an important year, for the transition was to Responsible Government, full Responsible Government. The fact that a country in which the whites had been ruling for only 33 years was so early given Responsible Government meant that the whites were able to dig themselves in more and more, to establish legislation copied from that of the powerful southern neighbour, and to bind the economy to the interests of the whites.

And so what happened in the 1950's, after another 30 years had passed, was doomed to failure. In 1953 the experiment of the Federation took place. What an absurdity, what an abnormality! — to link two preponderantly black states, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, with Southern Rhodesia with her self-government and her South African philosophy. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were still under Colonial Office rule, Southern Rhodesia had self-government with a white government. The historian of the future will probably see the Federation as some sore or parasite visited on the political body of Central Africa. Historically and logically, Southern Rhodesia was not in the camp of states to the north of the Zambesi River; historically and logically is was in the camp of the Union of South Africa. The years after 1953 revealed the absurdity of this federation; how right Dr. Banda was when he used the phrase he liked so much: "this stupid federation".

It is during the last ten years that Rhodesia has been drifting back to the path that logic and history prepared for her: in other words, she has been moving closer and closer to the path that South Africa has in her blindness selected.

#### AFRICAN NATIONALISM

What the federal experiment led to was the rise of African nationalism, which ran its expected course in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. But Southern Rho-

desia was utterly unprepared for it, and whatever her hopes for partnership might have been, they certainly did not include moves towards majority rule. So the frustrated Africans proceeded to agitate; the African National Congress unleashed violence that culminated in the riots of January and February 1959.

The move towards this sort of thing had a profound effect on political thinking in Southern Rhodesia, in the later 1950's. Mr. Garfield Todd and his United Rhodesia Party were defeated in the elections of 1958. They were, in fact, eliminated, and all ultra-liberals were removed from the Southern Rhodesian Parliament after that election. The moderates were left: the Federal Party with 17 seats and the Dominion Party with 13. Whitehead became the Prime Minister of a country in which the opposition to African advancement was growing deeper and deeper with every passing month. He was forced more and more to the right, and in 1961 he introduced security laws which were admittedly repressive.

The early 1960's revealed the situation more clearly. Southern Rhodesia clearly had no place in the Federation. White rule was more and more entrenching itself in Southern Rhodesia. The fear of being engulfed by Africans made the white men move against African advancement. In the elections of 1962 the Rhodesian Front won and Winston Field became Prime Minister. The Federation broke up in October 1963, and the Rhodesia of U.D.I. was born. Rhodesia, more and more, was looking to her neighbour in the south. The harsh philosophy of apartheid and separate development were the natural political ideas for her to embrace. The chickens of her history were coming home to roost in 1965; and they found their perch in a pen made of South African granite. Whatever forces eventually overthrow the discriminatory policies of the Republic, those forces will have to operate against Rhodesia as well.

---

## ON LEAVING SOUTH AFRICA

by Dr. Peter Royle

[Editor's note: Comments on this further provocative article by Dr. Royle are invited. Since he is now in Canada, however, it may not be easy for him to answer them immediately.]

THE HIGHROAD TO VIRTUE AND WISDOM is not to practise what you preach, but to preach what you practise to see whether its maxim is capable of being

elevated into a universal law: if it isn't, you can be sure that, however much you may be justified by considerations of what it is reasonable to expect of fallible mortals ("Anybody in my position would have done the same"), what you are doing is wrong.

How would this apply to people like myself who leave South Africa partly for political reasons? There seems to be a lot of fog obscuring this issue, with Liberals who leave and Liberals who stay pointing self-righteous fingers at one another through the murk; and although this propensity to mutual recrimination is perhaps bound to be one of the characteristics of a party combining the universalist preoccupations of the moralist with a belief in the value of diversity, it is not exactly conducive to practical effectiveness.

The first consideration to be discounted is that of the amount of courage required to leave or to stay. For most active Liberals it obviously needs more courage to stay than to leave. But this is not strictly relevant to the issue: it no doubt also took courage to fight in the Nazi army. The only possible "liberal" ground for disapproving of people who leave (or alternatively people who stay) would be that their conduct is weakening the cause of Liberalism; and this is not true of either group — or, insofar as it is, it is not their leaving or staying that is weakening it, but what they do or don't do subsequently.

It should be quite clear that the cause cannot be other than strengthened by the international lobbying carried on by émigré Liberals whose activities would have run the risk of being arbitrarily curtailed had they stayed in South Africa; and it should be equally clear that there is still indispensable work for Liberals in the Republic. In the same way as our society demands that some people should mine and others teach, so anyone committed to the Liberal cause should find it eminently desirable that some Liberals should stay and others leave. South Africa does not exist in a vacuum, and its problems will not be solved by its inhabitants alone any more than are those of any other country; and it is necessary, therefore, that there should be an organised body of Liberals informing and working on external opinion.

### HAPHAZARD

All this should be so obvious that it doesn't need saying. But unfortunately there are many Liberals who leave the country convinced that those who are staying

behind are achieving nothing, but are, on the contrary, if they are not banned, merely lending a façade of democracy to the present régime while, if they are white, continuing to enjoy its benefits. And, on the other side, many Liberals committed to staying seem to regard those who leave, unless they can show they have good "private" reasons, as guilty of a dereliction of duty, or, if they continue with their political activities, as no longer competent to act.

And there are yet other Liberals, who probably form the majority, who regard the whole thing as an individual matter and therefore refuse to judge. And as long as this remains the case, so long will the exodus of Liberals continue to be a haphazard affair, determined often by considerations which have nothing to do with politics whatsoever; and so long will the Liberal Party remain a collection of individuals, whose commitment to the cause will always be felt to clash at some point with other equally serious moral commitments.

This brings me to the main point of my argument. For Liberals' commitment to Liberalism to be, as it should be, total, the Party must first of all transform itself into a totality capable of legislating on behalf of its members in the light of its needs and their circumstances. This means not that we must order people to do this or that, which, as opponents of totalitarianism, we clearly cannot countenance, but that we should develop more efficient, and above all more universal, organs of co-ordination, so that we should be in a position to guide our members, and so that nobody need ever feel that in the event of a move his services could no longer be used.

### ABDICATE RESPONSIBILITY

Similarly, at the moment it is not really possible for individual Liberals to decide whether Liberals in their particular circumstances would be doing the right thing for the cause to leave the country or not. Yet to decide without any reference to politics at all is to abdicate responsibility in an area of immense moral importance; and to leave or stay for political reasons can, until the Party has become conscious of its requirements, only be a private act of little more than abstract significance and little practical value.

Unless both leavers and stayers realise they need one another, the Party's political effectiveness will be drastically reduced. In my own case, for example, I feel pretty sure I can be of more use outside the

country than in; but I also feel sure that, barring new developments in the Liberal Party, the only effective organisation I shall be able to belong to will be one more radical than it. And this is a pity.

While, therefore, it is true that the decision to leave or stay is an individual matter, this does not mean that

Liberals are beyond the judgment of their fellows. Moreover, any group that is at all serious in the pursuit of its ends will exert pressures, moral or legal, on its members. But an informed judgment will be possible only when the Party has fully recognised the legitimacy of emigration, defined its international aims more clearly as a result, and established efficient international organs of co-ordination.

## Stop Press . . .

### THE DEATH OF DOCTOR VERWOERD

THE PARTY records its horror and dismay at the murder of the Prime Minister, and expresses its sympathy with his family and friends.

All through his public life Dr. Verwoerd was associated with — and indeed helped to create — policies which we believe are harsh, unjust and wrong. The Liberal Party has always opposed these policies, and will continue to do so.

Nevertheless, we believe that in his private life the Prime Minister was a man of kindness, virtue and integrity; and it is this personal Hendrik Verwoerd that the murder has destroyed. Although while he lived he was almost the symbol of Apartheid, in his death he was only himself, and Apartheid remains unscathed.

We reaffirm our condemnation of all such acts of violence, which attack and destroy only what is good and valuable. Not only do they fail to remedy existing evils, but they create others new and worse.

### BANS LIFTED

IN the past fortnight the following members of the Party have had their bans wholly or partly lifted:—

Terence Beard, Norman Bromberger, Elliott Mngadi, Mike Ndlovu, Chris Shabalala, Selby Msimang, Hamington Majija, Enoch Mnguni.

Just as no reason was given for the bans, no reason has been given for lifting them. Our bewilderment is exceeded only by our pleasure and relief on behalf of these members. There are still many others, however, whose release is essential in the interests of elementary justice.

THE EDITOR.