

**REPORT OF MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT OF THE ANC, OLIVER TAMBO
AND THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, GEORGE SCHULTZ: STATE DEPARTMENT:
28 JANUARY 1987**

1. President Tambo was accompanied by a delegation of four, these being: Johnny Makatini, Thabo Mbeki, Barbara Masekela and Neo Mnumzana.
2. The Secretary of State was accompanied by a delegation of about eight which included Dr Chester Crocker and his deputy Chas Freeman, a representative of the National Security Council, the State Department spokesman, Charles Redman, U.S. Ambassador to Zambia, Paul Hare and others.
3. The meeting, originally scheduled for 30 minutes, lasted just under an hour.
- 4.0. The Secretary of State said the U.S. Administration is against apartheid and that the sooner that system goes, the better. However, they were against all violence from whichever side it came. They wished to see an open, democratic state with equal opportunities for all to participate in government and in the economy of the country. This should come about through negotiations. While the U.S. Administration has its own ideas, it does not wish to prescribe solutions. This is a task for South Africans. To that end the Pretoria regime should release the political prisoners, unban political parties and involve everybody in negotiations. The U.S. Administration has been talking to other South Africans as it is now talking to the ANC to convey its views about the need for negotiations. It recognised the ANC as an important player in South Africa. He had read the ANC's January 8th statement with interest and noted what it said about a non-racial democracy.
- 4.1. He wanted to make it clear that the U.S. Administration was opposed to violence and viewed the "practice of necklacing" as horrible. He also wished to take up the issue of Soviet influence over the ANC rather than the question of communism. There was rivalry between the USA and the USSR over many issues including nuclear weapons. He knew that the President had met General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. They themselves talk to the Soviet Union. He said that countries under "Soviet domination" had demonstrated an absence of democratic practice and poor economic development. It was fascinating that China and the Soviet Union had now decided on fundamental

economic reform. The South African economy should benefit the region of Southern Africa as a whole. He stated that he was glad to see the President and welcomed the opportunity to meet him. For him the primary purpose of the meeting was to listen to the President.

- 5.0. President Tambo thanked the Secretary of State for taking the initiative to convene the meeting and commended him for resisting pressures to have it cancelled. The peoples of Southern Africa as a whole were interested in the outcome of the meeting.
- 5.1. [The Secretary of State said that it was necessary to stand up for what is right.]
- 5.2. President Tambo proceeded to explain the positions of the ANC on the issue of "violence". He also presented other issues to the Secretary of State. (See Appendix) He described a possible scenario around the issue of the release of political prisoners.
- 5.3. [The Secretary said that the U.S. Administration was in favour of the release of political prisoners and had communicated this view to the Pretoria regime as well as stated it in public.]
- 5.4. [On the issue of expulsion of U.S. correspondents from South Africa, the Secretary said that they always protest at the expulsions. However they would hesitate to get involved in a tit-for-tat situation. They think it is good that there are representatives of the South African regime who are exposed to U.S. views on the question of apartheid and who can report these views to Pretoria.]
- 5.5. [The Secretary was puzzled by the reference of the President to US-SA intelligence cooperation. His staff informed him that this matter was raised in the Anti-Apartheid Act passed by the U.S. Congress. He gave the impression of being unaware that there was such cooperation.]
- 5.6. The Secretary referred to the "negotiating concept" of the EPG and in this context asked if the ANC would be prepared to renounce violence if Botha were to agree to serious negotiations. What would the ANC

do about the rights of the white population?

- 5.7. The President explained that the ANC could not agree to a unilateral cessation of hostilities but that hostilities could end as a result of negotiations during which both sides could agree to end the use of force. In other cases eg. Zimbabwe etc., the cessation of hostilities had never been made a pre-condition for negotiations. Furthermore, the U.S. Administration itself was aware that Pretoria had a long record of breaking commitments it had made eg. Namibia, Angola and Mozambique. We would therefore need strong signals, and not words, to convince us that Pretoria was serious about negotiations.
- 5.8. [The Secretary said he was a little disappointed at this response.]
- 5.9. The President repeated the ANC's views about the kind of democratic society we seek. In this context, we want to see whites treated as South Africans with the same rights as any other citizen. We are against the concept of group rights.
- 5.10. [On the issue of U.S. - Soviet discussions about South Africa, the Secretary said that there had been discussions between the two countries in the past but that they had never identified issues on which they could act together. However they would be meeting General Secretary Gorbachev later in the year and would discuss the matter again.]
- 5.11. [On the question of Angola, the Secretary said that UNITA controls a large part of the country. What was required was that "the MPLA government" should enter into negotiations with UNITA to end the conflict and solve the problems of that country.]
- 5.12. [During the course of the meeting, the Secretary said that at the moment the Pretoria regime was not prepared to listen to anybody from outside. This limited the possibility of the U.S. Administration to influence that regime on any issue.]
- 6.0. Both parties expressed appreciation of the fact that they had met and looked forward to continuing dialogue between the U.S. Administration

and the ANC.

- 6.1. The parties agreed that in statements to the press, it would be better that each side would try its best to let the other explain its own positions as explained during the course of the meeting. They agreed that the meeting had been "serious and substantive".
- 6.2. About 30 minutes after the end of the meeting, the State Department issued its own press release of the meeting as well as still photographs that had been taken by two photographers as President Tambo and Secretary Schultz met and just before the meeting started at 15.30 hrs.
- 6.3. President Tambo spoke briefly to the press outside the State Department at the end of the meeting and later held a press conference after the media had attended the State Department briefing.

ENDS

Incl. Appendix (NOTES FOR THE MEETING.)

APPENDIX

NOTES FOR MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF STATE, MR GEORGE SCHULTZ

1. Express appreciation for initiative taken by Mr Schultz and his resistance of conservative pressures to cancel the meeting.
2. We approach the meeting seriously as does the rest of Southern Africa.
3. We hope it will help to give us a better understanding of the policy of the United States Administration towards Southern Africa as a whole.
4. The Secretary is familiar with the democratic goals of the African National Congress. He is also aware of the ANC strategy to bring about change—mass political struggle, armed struggle and the international isolation of the apartheid regime.
5. Both ANC and the U.S Administration are agreed about the goal of a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa. The question is what action to take to achieve this result.
6. We believe that the policy of constructive engagement has not succeeded to move Botha towards this goal. Instead Pretoria read it as encouragement to dig in.
7. We are also aware that your stated policy is to bring about negotiations. Our view is that Botha is not ready because pressure is still insufficient.
8. Therefore we urge strict implementation of the present set of U.S. sanctions.
9. We urge U.S. support for these sanctions when the matter comes before the Security Council.
10. We urge that U.S. takes the lead and persuade other western countries to follow its example.
11. We urge that U.S. ends intelligence cooperation with South Africa.
12. We urge that U.S. Administration considers expelling South African Government Information Officers each time a U.S. correspondent is expelled from South Africa.

13. To unblock the political process we urge the U.S. Administration to do everything possible to secure the unconditional release of all political prisoners. There is a way of handling Botha's expressed concerns.
14. Our understanding from our visit to the Soviet Union last November is that the Soviets are not seeking to compete with the U.S.A. over the question of South Africa. Perhaps the two powers should discuss between themselves to remove elements of east-west rivalry which complicates our situation unnecessarily.
15. The U.S. should extend meaningful assistance to SADCC.
16. The U.S. should pressurize Pretoria to stop supporting MNR and destabilising Mozambique.
17. It would help the whole process of resolving problems in our region if U.S. established relations with Angola and stopped supporting UNITA.
18. The U.S. should activate its diplomacy with regard to Namibia to seek Pretoria's implementation of United Nation's Resolution 435.