

SECRET

MEETING BETWEEN LT-COL A M RODRIGUES ("KITO"), MINISTER  
OF THE INTERIOR OF ANGOLA, AND SOUTH AFRICAN  
REPRESENTATIVES : LUSAKA : 7 JULY 1984

---

Present:

South Africa:

Lt-Genl P W van der Westhuizen  
Chief of Staff Intelligence  
Mr D W Steward  
Department of Foreign Affairs

Angola:

Lt-Col A M Rodrigues  
Minister of the Interior  
Ambassador Andre Miranda  
Angolan Ambassador to Lusaka  
Miss Louisa Filipe  
Interpreter

LT-COL RODRIGUES asked whether he could see the proposed statement which Minister R F Botha had promised to give him.

GENL VAN DER WESTHUIZEN handed him the statement and said that there had been a slight misunderstanding. He and Mr Steward had been prepared to come to Lusaka on Thursday or Friday. At that time they had not been aware of Minister Rodrigues's programme. They had been told that they could convey the text of the proposed statement via Zambia, but this was not what had been agreed between Ministers Botha and Rodrigues. The text of the statement had been approved by the South African Government. It could now be discussed together with other matters relating to the security situation in the border area.

SECRET

2

LT-COL RODRIGUES, after reading the statement said that in the beginning he had been under the impression that the wording of the South African and SWAPO declarations would be similar. He asked whether this was the South African position, and whether its statement would correspond the statement which SWAPO would make?

GENL VAN DER WESTHUIZEN replied that this was correct.

LT-COL RODRIGUES said that he understood that the declaration would be sent to the Secretary-General and would lead to conditions for the implementation of Resolution 435.

GENL VAN DER WESTHUIZEN replied that he did not understand that there were such preconditions related to the statement. South Africa had understood that independent statements would be made by South Africa and SWAPO which would create the right ambiance for the peaceful resolution of the South West Africa question. However, implementation of Resolution 435 was never a precondition for the issuing of the statement. South Africa's position was that Cuban forces should withdraw from Angola before Resolution 435 could be implemented. Minister Botha had not made Cuban withdrawal a precondition for SWAPO's statement on a cessation of hostilities.

LT-COL RODRIGUES said that this was a new element since he had met with Minister Botha. He had sent instructions to the JMC after his meeting with Minister Botha. During his talks with Minister Botha he had discussed practical aspects relating to the JMC and Calueque. He had been in

SECRET

3

Gaberone the whole week and had not yet had an opportunity to report back to his Government in detail on the talks. However, Nujoma was now in Luanda and he would discuss the South African statement with him immediately.

GENL VAN DER WESTHUIZEN said that President Dos Santos had mentioned that Angola had a problem in controlling SWAPO because SWAPO was not involved in the peace process. It was hoped that the proposed statements would help to involve SWAPO and would thereby overcome this problem. Hopefully, Angola would now be able to convince SWAPO to exercise restraint.

LT-COL RODRIGUES confirmed that this was the situation. He would be returning to Angola the next day. Only then would he be able to report on his talks with Minister Botha the previous week, although President Dos Santos was aware of the proposed statement and was waiting to see the text. He said that if there was an urgent message which the Angolans wished to convey to South Africa in this regard it could be channelled through the JMC. He would send a messenger to Ongiva and would request South Africa to do the same, should the need arise.

GENL VAN DER WESTHUIZEN said that he would also like to discuss the details of how and when the proposed statements would be issued - for example, the time and the date that the cessation of hostilities would take effect. It would also be necessary to establish how these undertakings would be carried out in practice. However, these questions could be resolved after the Angolans had spoken to SWAPO.

SECRET

4

MR STEWARD asked whether Minister Rodrigues felt that the proposed South African statement would enable Angola to control SWAPO.

LT-COL RODRIGUES replied that he would have to discuss the statement with Nujoma. Only then would he be able to answer this question.

GENL VAN DER WESTHUIZEN said that he would like to discuss the situation at the JMC. It seemed that the working relationship had improved since Minister Rodrigues and Minister Botha had met on 2 July.

LT-COL RODRIGUES replied that he had not yet received any reports from the JMC but this information indicated that the Angolan component on the JMC had received his instructions.

GENL VAN DER WESTHUIZEN said that South Africa planned to send Genl Geldenhuys to the JMC on 11 July. It would be appreciated if the Angolans could send Lt-Col Monteiro and Lt-Col Sequiero for high-level discussions on ways and means of solving the problems which confronted the JMC.

MR STEWARD said that South Africa wished to conclude the disengagement of its forces from southern Angola in accordance with the Lusaka Agreement as soon as possible. It was hoped that the high-level meeting on 11 July would facilitate this process. Within the framework of the understanding reached between Ministers Rodrigues and Botha on 2 July 1984 it would be necessary to ensure that violations of the Lusaka Agreement would be limited to an

SECRET

5

absolute minimum. This should help both sides to conclude their undertakings in terms of the Lusaka Agreement in a satisfactory fashion. Pursuant to the discussions of 2 July it would also be necessary to reach agreement as soon as possible on the form which the security arrangements along the border would take after the JMC had completed its mandate. In this regard it would be very useful if military experts from both sides would be able to discuss this question as soon as possible.

LT-COL RODRIGUES said that he would do his best.

GENL VAN DER WESTHUIZEN pointed out that once the JMC had finished its task and if it was decided to establish some or other security agency - such as a Peace-keeping Commission - it would be necessary to think about the role which the United States might play in any such process.

MR STEWARD added that South Africa did not have any strong feelings on this question, one way or the other. However, the United States had been involved in the Lusaka talks in February and there was an understanding that they might be able to play some role once the JMC had reached the border. The question was what role they would play in any future security agency.

LT-COL RODRIGUES replied that this matter had been discussed previously and there was already a decision to the effect that the United States could participate in the JMC, once it has reached the border and provided that it continued to function for 30 days. This period would be a continuation of the disengagement process. It would help

SECRET

6

to control SWAPO and would prepare the way for Resolution 435.

GENL VAN DER WESTHUIZEN asked what arrangements could be made for the period after the initial 30 days at the border.

LT-COL RODRIGUES replied that Angola would like to arrange for its military experts work in that direction. Once the JMC reached the border it would continue to function for 30 days. The Lusaka Agreement would continue to be in force. The question was what instrument there would be to maintain peace after the 30-day period. South Africa had proposed that a similar arrangement should continue - under a different name. The United States could continue to participate in such an arrangement provided it was convenient to both sides and provided both sides agreed. However, Angola could not commit itself on this second stage because the situation would be different then.

MR STEWARD asked at what stage military talks could take place to work out the details for the proposed successor to the JMC. Would such talks take place before or after the JMC had moved to the border?

GENL VAN DER WESTHUIZEN said that he could see no reason why such talks should not take place now.

LT-COL RODRIGUES replied that he agreed. By the time the JMC reached the border they might not have enough time.

SECRET

7

MR STEWARD recalled that during the meeting of 25 June 1984 President Dos Santos had indicated that Angola required an instrument with which to control SWAPO. South Africa had now provided Angola with two such instruments. Firstly, there was the statement on the cessation of hostilities and secondly South Africa had indicated that SWAPO could hold talks with the Administrator-General on any question affecting the political future of South West Africa. Hopefully, these two instruments would enable Angola to control SWAPO.

LT-COL RODRIGUES said that it had been agreed that Angola would send experts to hold talks on the Ruacana/Calueque scheme on 13 July. They would fly to Ongiva and from there South Africa would be responsible for their transportation to Ruacana for the talks.

GENL VAN DER WESTHUIZEN suggested that the final arrangements for the meeting could be made during the proposed high-level JMC meeting on 11 July.

LT-COL RODRIGUES said that he hoped the latest talks between South Africa and Angola would lead to a new situation. However, he was worried about South Africa's perception of the Cubans and its insistence that there could be no implementation of Resolution 435 until they had withdrawn from Angola. This was something which concerned him very much. It was a strange element and it would yet create problems. Although there had been progress, it had been relative progress. It could make a contribution but both sides would have to continue their attempts to find a break through. Angola's position remained the same.



SECRET

8

Because Genl Van der Westhuizen and Mr Steward had decided to come to Lusaka that day he had left Gaborone immediately and had flown to Lusaka via Harare. He had once again conveyed his position to South Africa and believed that it was important that this process should continue. There were many South African negotiators, but on the Angolan side he was the only one. Nevertheless, he had not agreed with Phiri's idea that Zambia should convey the South African statement to him. He had decided that it was better that he should receive it himself. He had wanted the statement today so that he could get down to business with Nujoma the next day or the day following that.

GENL VAN DER WESTHUIZEN said that he hoped both sides would soon find a solution to their problems.

84070901k15