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SUMMARY NOTES OF MEETINGS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND ANGOLA :
PARIS, 28 AND 29 NOVEMBER 1981

PRESENT:

SOUTH AFRICA:

DR B G FOURIE
AMBASSADOR R A DU PLOOY
LIEUT-GENL J J GELDENHUYS
BRIG C J VAN TONDER
MR J A EKSTEEN
MR E A LOUBSER
MR D W AURET

ANGOLA:

MR VENANCIO SILVA MOURA
Vice Minister of Foreign Relations

AMBASSADOR LUIS JOSE DE ALMEIDA
Ambassador to France

LT.-COL ROBERTO RAMOS MONTEIRO
Ministry of Defence

MAJOR JOSE MARIA
Secretary of the Presidency for Military
Affairs

MRS LOUISA FILIPE
Interpreter (Ministry of Defence)

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MEETING ON 28 NOVEMBER 1981

Mr Moura said that he was pleased to again meet with a delegation from South Africa. The Angolan pleasure at this meeting taking place would be increased if, at the end of the meeting, something positive had been achieved. He thought that where there was life, there was hope. As far as Angola was concerned, their approach was always positive and they expected positive results, be it political or economic, through dialogue. Angola was ready for dialogue irrespective of differences which might exist. The question which had to be asked was why the two sides were meeting and where they were going. The objective of the meeting had thus to be identified. Angola felt that it was always necessary to listen to the South African point of view with the aim of reaching the fundamental objective. This objective was a continuing dialogue which could lead to some sort of understanding. He introduced his delegation and said that they were willing to listen to South Africa, especially with regard to fundamental matters which South Africa wished to bring to Angola's attention. He hoped that some positive points could be found. When Angola was prepared to have dialogue with South Africa, irrespective of the difference which existed between the two countries, progress could be made and one could move forward.

Dr Fourie introduced the South African delegation and said that he wanted to take up the question of why the two sides were here and where they were going. While it might sound somewhat remote in the context of the meeting today, it was necessary to briefly describe South Africa's philosophy. South Africa wanted to see a prosperous Southern Africa, utilizing its resources to the benefit of all its peoples. That did not mean that we had to agree politically, but if the people of Southern Africa wished to see reasonable prosperity, it could only be achieved if countries were prepared to co-operate in this limited field. Dialogue was required. Problems were created because of lack of information. Sometimes disinformation was actively encouraged and this should be overcome.

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The media was only interested in sensational matters which would create problems and not in constructive aspects such as co-operation in the economic field. Perhaps the Angolan side could indicate some agenda items for discussion.

Mr Moura thanked Dr Fourie for his introduction and said that since South Africa had requested the meeting, he wanted to say that Angola's interest in bilateral talks was to find answers to the problems which existed. Angola had not prepared a specific agenda. Some questions could be raised without losing sight of the fundamental objectives. These were peace and co-operation in the region, despite political differences. Up to now, the main concern of Angola was a search for peace. The military members of the South African delegation could confirm this. The question of aggression on Angolan soil was a factor and prevented Angola from working for economic development, which it wished to do. Without peace on the border, it was not possible to achieve economic development. Angola had never embarked on a policy of attacking any country and its agreement to meet and have dialogue with South Africa was proof of its seriousness of purpose to achieve this. Angola was concerned about the situation on its border and for respect for internationally demarcated borders, which Angola scrupulously respected. This had consistently been Angola's position and its armed forces had been instructed never to cross internationally recognised borders. This was not so said in the case of South Africa. Perhaps this problem could be analysed and discussed. On the question of Namibia, Angola was aware of the South African position concerning Security Council Resolution 435, which, according to South Africa, it had accepted. Implementation of that Resolution had not been possible up to now and thus the question for independence for Namibia was also a matter for discussion. The question could be asked whether South Africa was ready to accept independence for Namibia, taking into account existing juridical documents. It would also be interesting to learn whether South Africa accepted the principle of phases leading to independence for the Territory. In other words, the question was how one could proceed to achieve independence for Namibia, which both Angola and South Africa were trying to obtain. South Africa was still occupying Namibia - a territory which it had colonised. Could South Africa tell the international community that it accepted the principle

of independence for Namibia? South Africa was combatting SWAPO in Namibia and because of this war situation, was forced to divert some of its resources to defend the Territory. Angola was not one of the primary parties negotiating for Namibian independence. The two main parties to the conflict were South Africa on the one hand and SWAPO on the other. The question was who was fighting whom - Angola believed it was SWAPO and South Africa. Through this war innocent people were being involved and Angola was being subjected to aggression.

Dr Fourie emphasised that it was not South Africa who was fighting SWAPO. South Africa had on task in South West Africa i.e. to defend the people living in the Territory until such time as they had an opportunity of freely exercising their right to selfdetermination. South Africa had irrevocably accepted, in principle, independence for Namibia. The question of colonizing the Territory did not arise since South Africa had traditionally been anti-colonialist. It was wrong to say that it was South Africa who was engaging SWAPO, since there were a substantial number of South West Africans who were serving in the Territorial Force. It was necessary, however, to get to the practical realities of the border situation. At previous meetings it had been emphasized that South Africa had no purpose in Angola and did not require anything from that country. The difficulty was, and this had been stressed all along, that as long as SWAPO fought a war from Angola, that country invariably became part of the conflict.

When one looked at a settlement in South West Africa one had to know what the intentions of the various parties were. The Five had visited Luanda and good progress had been made on Phase I, leading to a situation where it was hoped that one could proceed to Phase II. As far as Phase II was concerned, SWAPO would become an important factor. SWAPO had often said that they wanted to step up the war and South Africa had hoped that Angola could clarify certain things as far as this was concerned. Recently there had been a report of a statement attributed to the Secretary-General of SWAPO, Mr Moses Garoeb, in Salisbury. While South Africa did not agree with all he had said - in

fact, we strongly disagreed with some aspects - he had stated certain things which led South Africa to believe that some interesting possibilities existed. South Africa had hoped that Angola could inform it whether this statement was true. However, Mr Garoeb had subsequently made a statement in Luanda in which he had refuted what he had been reported as saying in Salisbury and had inter alia stated that SWAPO, as a matter of policy, was committed to the liberation of South Africa under the leadership of the ANC. When we say the first statement we found it interesting and thought you could shed light on it. The second statement made in Luanda and broadcasted by Radio Luanda, however, changed the picture. Dr Fourie read several excerpts from the second statement to illustrate his point. Regarding the settlement proposal, it had to be made clear that if these were SWAPO's intentions, the South African Government would not accept them in a position which would bring them closer to our own border. The question of SWAPO's position during the election period also had to be addressed. As we understood it, there were a substantial number of SWAPO personnel in Angola and during Phase II, one of the questions which had to be addressed, was what steps could be taken to prevent further infiltration across the border. The only obstacle which nullified a peaceful border situation was the presence in and use by SWAPO of Angolan territory as a base for operations across the border. Perhaps Angola had given some thought to this and could indicate how it thought that this difficulty could be overcome.

Mr Moura said that he appreciated the concern expressed on these various points and that he would try to answer the questions. He wanted to make clear that he was not here as a spokesman for SWAPO. This did not mean that South Africa should not raise its concerns regarding SWAPO. As he had indicated earlier, dialogue was desirable but one had to be clear regarding one's objective. That did not mean that one should not meet as often as possible in order to achieve the objective, which was peace and border security. Angola had stated its principles and its desire for peace in the region. If the political will in

bilateral discussions was absent, and there was a lack of co-operation, it would not be because of unwillingness on the part of Angola. At one of our earlier meetings we had discussed technical delegations and exchanges between the two countries. A few days later however, the military were clashing in the southern region of Angola. That did not help our efforts. We have taken note of your concern regarding SWAPO. We are not SWAPO spokesmen, we are only taking part in the discussions. If we have to accept this, why not continue talking, why not also include talks with SWAPO? This could make some contribution. We don't think that we could achieve complete peace, but in our opinion direct dialogue is important. We must not use the press and third parties which indicates that we are perhaps not serious. Direct dialogue is important. That is why we are here. Direct dialogue with SWAPO, such as in Geneva, in which the parties directly involved, the Front Line States and the Five, could lead us to further progress. As far as Angola is concerned, we shall do everything to help the parties concerned to get together. But the correct conditions must be created beforehand. If there is still fighting there is no sense in talking. For parties to accept Resolution 435, some minimal conditions must be created and one of the most important is to cease hostilities. This would also be part of 435. Once military hostility is over, and minimum conditions established, all parties could be involved in the process. Angola, because we are not involved in Namibia, is only involved because of aggression. Angola accepts any government which arises from the envisaged election. But if the right conditions are established, the various parts can be put together. Angola never interferes in the internal affairs of any country and will not interfere in the process emerging from election. It is up to South Africa to see to what extent you can sit down and talk to SWAPO. As a Front Line State, we support liberation movements, because we want to see decolonialization. We have always done everything in our power to work for peace, without forgetting that the liberation of the continent is the main aim. South Africa is part of the African continent. Regarding the constitutional principles, the Angolan position was included in the reply of the Front Line States which was handed to the Five on 17 November 1981. In these counterproposals, the Front Line States included the constitutional principles presented by the Five. There were some

amendments, but they were not important. What the Front Line States got from the Five, was a document which contained some important elements which would lead to a further phase. You said that South Africa was not fighting SWAPO. Angola is also not fighting, but Angola is the one who suffers aggression. Only SWAPO can talk about this, since Angola is not a spokesman for SWAPO. Our efforts leading to a conference, such as in Geneva, are aimed at achieving Namibian independence, development in the region, and economic relations between states. In these meetings many questions could fruitfully be discussed. We think that once hostilities cease, we should have further talks. This will have to be done seriously.

Dr Fourie stated that two aspects had to be put in their right perspective namely Mr Moura's reference to "aggression" and South Africa's attacks on Angola after we had had meetings. There would always be a cause and an effect. SWAPO persistently violated the border and continued to commit aggression against the people of South West Africa. That invariably led to South West African forces crossing the border to pursue SWAPO. The people of South West Africa were suffering from aggression which was being committed against them by SWAPO. Mr Moura had made interesting remarks on the reply by the Front Line States in response to the Contact Group's constitutional principles. South Africa had seen reports on that reply and the Five mentioned it but South Africa had not yet seen the text. South Africa understood the Five to say that they were looking at ways and means to see how they could accommodate the comments they had received. In that process they would also consider the comments made by the South African Government and by the internal parties of South West Africa. As far as security was concerned, Mr Moura's reference to a minimum condition in order to have peace was noted. South Africa was co-operating fully in the new initiative led by the United States and it did not want to side-step it. If it worked, then there would be a solution and success. If it did not, then it would be a difficult matter. The suggestion of a meeting should not be rejected and it might be necessary in future to come back to this idea. Dr Fourie asked whether he understood Mr Moura correctly

that at this time he would like to see how an end could be made to hostilities and enquired whether he had any ideas on how to do and accomplish that in practice.

Mr Moura mentioned that Dr Fourie would recall that when the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 was accepted amongst the Front Line States and together with the Secretary-General of the United Nations it was seen that some previous matters were included in that process in the spirit of finding a solution of the Namibian problem. Account was also taken of the proposal by the late President Neto and the Secretary-General to make practical proposals on the establishment of the DMZ and for a cease-fire. A cease-fire was essential. A solution had to be sought between Angola and Namibia and between Namibia and South Africa. There was also the possibility of a direct meeting between South Africa and SWAPO and a direct meeting between South Africa and Angola in order to get the necessary cease-fire. When it was stated that South Africa was waiting for proposals by the Five then the question arose as to why we were meeting here. Would this meeting bring co-operation in respect of the initiative of the Five or would it work the other way around. The Parties concerned would have to take into account the efforts of the international community in which the Front Line States and the Five were involved and it would not be set aside. If that reality was not accepted, then the reality of this meeting should also not be accepted.

Dr Fourie stressed that a meeting such as this one was also helping the Five. Any matter South Africa and Angola could clear up between them, would be welcomed by the Five. The success of the cease-fire could only be measured by its results. The question was, however, how could UNTAG ensure the cease-fire on a 1 500 km border? The factual situation would have to be observed by South Africa and Angola on their respective sides. It was in this connection that all should remember the expression: "the proof of the pudding is in the eating thereof". Dr Fourie indicated that he would like to consult with his colleagues on the question of the cease-fire and that it could be discussed again the next day.

Mr Moura referred to what Dr Fourie had said regarding the reply by the Front Line States and that South Africa had not yet seen it. If it was a request from South Africa, he could consider it. If it was a matter of information, then the respective Ambassadors could arrange to exchange that information.

Dr Fourie explained that he was only saying that he could not comment on the reply of the Front Line States because we had not seen it.

Mr Moura agreed that the respective colleagues should be consulted on a cease-fire and that it could be discussed later. He wanted to reaffirm Angola's stand on the main objective whenever and wherever a meeting was held and it must be kept in mind that South Africa had asked for this meeting. The main objective must always be peace and stability on the border and how to obtain results satisfactory to all. Then there was the matter of prisoners which had been discussed indirectly and he would like to discuss here the question of Angolan prisoners.

Dr Fourie stated that the ICRC had been involved in the following matters:

- a) Individuals captured who were Angolan citizens.
- b) The remains of three Russians killed in Angola.
- c) The Russian prisoner Petretsov.
- d) Van der Mescht who was captured by SWAPO inside South West Africa on 19 February 1978 and then taken by SWAPO across the border into Angola.

How the Angolan citizens could be returned, could be discussed. He did not want to suggest an exchange of Van der Mescht but Angola could perhaps see whether Van der Mescht could also be included without calling it an exchange. Background had already been given to Angola and the practical aspects of these cases could be discussed. Regarding the Soviet remains, South Africa had indicated that with their return the remains of Lance Corporal Spies should also be returned. The ICRC had made a suggestion that all the remains would be sent to Geneva but that

was not a practical proposal and it would perhaps be better to have such an exchange in a nearby capital or on the border. Dr Fourie enquired how Mr Moura felt, in principle, about these various ideas.

Mr Moura indicated that the practical aspects should perhaps be left for another stage. He then referred to the question of Soviet civilian pilots to be handed over through Zaïre. Then there were also the cases of Angolan pilots and Angolan citizens taken from Angola and brought to Namibia during South Africa's aggression of July 1980. Then there were also 79 Angolan soldiers being detained according to the ICRC at Mariental and at Grootfontein. One of them was in hospital. Angola was waiting that they be brought back to N'Giva where they had been captured. Then there was the case of two Soviet pilots.

Dr Fourie mentioned that the ICRC had received permission to interview the Angolan prisoners. Regarding the Soviet pilots, South Africa had told the Russians in New York that South Africa did not have any knowledge of any Soviet pilots being held on South African or South West African territory.

Mr Moura enquired about the Angolan pilots in an Antonov aircraft which had been forced to land in Namibia.

Genl Geldenhuys stated that South Africa did not know of any forced landing of an Angolan aircraft. There was once a case of a light aircraft which ran out of fuel and was allowed to return to Angola.

Mr Moura concluded by saying that the main issues had now been identified and could be discussed at the next meeting on 29 November.

MEETING ON 29 NOVEMBER 1981

Mr Moura said that he would like to commence the final meeting of the present series with the hope of achieving positive results. He hoped this would not be the last meeting between Angola and South Africa and that those which followed would lead to concrete results. Angola wanted to see progress and hoped that confidence between the two countries could be established.

Dr Fourie said that one could perhaps move quickly at this meeting and establish what could be achieved in terms of concrete results. He agreed this would be the last meeting on this occasion but said that South Africa looked forward to further meetings in future. One question which might be discussed fruitfully was the question of returning prisoners on both sides. South Africa had no problem in principle in returning the persons which it held. Could Angola give South Africa an indication in principle regarding Van der Mescht. It was important that a decision on how this matter should be handled be taken. The ICRC had given Angola a list of the individuals they had seen and it might be useful if South Africa could be given a copy in order to check the names and make certain that these people were in fact held in custody. South Africa could reply by telex and a date and venue could then be decided. It might also be useful to have an ICRC representative present when the persons were returned but that was a decision which would be left to Angola.

Mr Moura indicated that Angola did have a list of people being held by South Africa and in order to start the operation - he did not want to call it an exchange - Angola would submit the list to South Africa. Angola would then await South Africa's confirmation, including proposals as to timing and venue. Regarding the venue, he wished to state that most of the Angolans were from the Cunene area and he did not think it worthwhile to return them to different areas. Angola would want them to be returned to their places of origin. The question of the date and presence of an ICRC representative could also be further discussed.

He could not now already make proposals in this regard but Angola would take a decision at a later stage. He thought it would be preferable to maintain direct contact because this could also lead to and increase mutual trust. It would also be better to continue the contact at a high-ranking level.

Dr Fourie said that he was not sure that all the Angolans came from the same region and this was something that would have to be established. From a practical point of view it might be better to arrange a specific venue where the return on both sides could take place but South Africa would make specific proposals to Angola in this regard. He wanted to add that South Africa also did not view this as an exchange. Moreover, if there were any young people who had been forcibly removed from South West Africa to Angola, it would be appreciated if they could be returned on a humanitarian basis.

Mr Moura said that when he referred to a place or origin, he wanted to stress that it meant the area where they had been taken from. Virtually all the people were military personnel who had been taken from Cunene.

Dr Fourie said that South Africa would make practical proposals in view of the situation on the ground. Since the Red Cross had been involved in this matter for some time now, they might take it amiss if they were now summarily pushed aside.

Mr Moura referred to the question of Van der Mescht and said that he wanted to point out that he was in SWAPO custody. Since Angola was a sovereign state, it could use its good offices to see to what extent conditions could be created to facilitate handing him over. Angola needed time to contact SWAPO and would inform South Africa directly of the result. He thought that it might also be practical for South Africa and SWAPO to meet since such a meeting could advance the creation of confidence.

Dr Fourie said that South Africa saw the Van der Mescht-case as a question of him having been removed from South West Africa by SWAPO. Angola was a sovereign state and South Africa assumed that it would

indicate to SWAPO that Angola wished to have Van der Mescht released. It was a peculiar guest who would not accede to the request of the host country. As far as meetings with SWAPO were concerned the South African point of view was very clear: SWAPO was a party together with several other parties inside South West Africa and South Africa in no sense accorded SWAPO a status which was not accorded to any of the others. Throughout the negotiations South Africa had insisted on partiality and equal treatment for all the parties. Reverting to the question of Van der Mescht it should be mentioned that the ICRC representative had seen Van der Mescht in Luanda on 9 November.

Mr Moura said that regarding the question of Van der Mescht Angola would put its good offices at South Africa's disposal and relay more concrete information at a later stage. Up to now everything possible had been done to facilitate visits to him by the Red Cross. He would also transmit further information in this regard at a later stage. Angola was going to inform SWAPO of its wish that Van der Mescht be liberated and the results would be communicated to South Africa through normal channels. Angola understood the South African point of view that there was no special status for SWAPO or any of the other parties but he wanted to stress that Angola should not be considered to be a spokesman for SWAPO although it had a certain relationship with that Organisation. As a consequence of the events in the border area, a war situation against SWAPO by South Africa existed and similarly this war would be fought by SWAPO against South Africa. As a sovereign state, Angola could find ways to improve the climate and eliminate aggression. When South Africa said that it defended the people of Namibia, it did not create a climate of trust by bombing Angolan towns and destroying Angola's infra-structure. At issue was the question of contact between South Africa and Angola but a climate of trust did not exist. He would have liked to invite South Africa to meet with him in the Cunene province but the continuing war precluded this. Angola would always be ready to talk and hold discussions with South Africa without losing sight of the main objective. The matter of handing over of prisoners on both sides as well as the remains of those who had died had been thoroughly discussed. He wanted also to

raise the question of the Angolan pilot and crew of an AN26 plane which had been shot down in Namibia.

Dr Fourie enquired whether this was a Soviet or Angolan aircraft.

Mr Moura said that both the aircraft and its crew were Angolan and that they had been forced to land in Namibia. He would like to discuss the possibility of a hand-over also of this regard. Another matter which should be discussed was the question of the captured Soviet national and the remains of the four Soviet officers who had recently been killed in Angola.

Dr Fourie pointed out that the Soviet national who was being held was a technician and not a pilot.

Mr Moura agreed and said that we should be clear who we were talking about.

Dr Fourie explained that as far as the other two were concerned the Soviets had raised this question with us through our Mission in New York. South Africa had replied that the aircraft had not landed in South West Africa, that South Africa had nothing to do with this matter and that we had given the Soviet Union an assurance that the persons concerned were neither in South West Africa nor South Africa. We had no knowledge at all of this matter.

Mr Moura said that regarding the remains of the two South Africans who were killed in Angola, he had expressed Angola's desire to hand over these remains. The preservation of the remains was difficult but we could also discuss how the hand-over could best be achieved.

Dr Fourie said that we could be in touch also as far as timing and venue in this regard was concerned.

Mr Moura agreed and said that he concluded from the discussion that there was a mutual desire to conclude this matter and that the practicalities would be subject to further direct contact either by telex or through the respective Ambassadors in Paris.

Dr Fourie thought that either channel could be used. In the case of the present meetings the arrangements considered through the Embassies had worked well.

Mr Moura indicated the question of Angolan prisoners was important as far as the creation of mutual trust was concerned. It was important also to understand why Angola had tried to keep contact with South Africa secret. At present there was not a peaceful situation in existence between the two countries. There was also a lack of confidence on both sides. It would therefore be difficult to justify Angolan contact with South Africa to the people in the regions involved. They were victims of aggression and bombings and would not understand why these meetings had to take place. The result was that South Africa and Angola had to meet in secret.

Dr Fourie thought that the best way of building trust and confidence would be to proceed gradually. The problems which Angola had raised was equally applicable to the South West African side and therefore it was necessary for us to meet quietly.

Mr Moura indicated that he thought that all the matters had been fully discussed and that the possibility of removing the obstacle to establishing a climate of peace, i.e. the war situation, had also been addressed. Unless this was a desire on both sides, there would be no meaningful discussion. The fighting would continue. It would then simply be war. The military officials on both sides, who understood this, could examine the possibilities which existed for ending the war. He thought that soldiers generally were also good diplomats and that it was preferable to talk rather than fight.

Dr Fourie said that South Africa agreed that the best way to solve problems was through discussion and that matters should rather be settled through direct talks than by fighting it out. One would have to look at practical possibilities. At the core of the present situation was the position of SWAPO. One could not, however, proceed unless the

question of trust was satisfactorily addressed and in this regard Angola would have to seriously consider what it could do about SWAPO. As far as the present talks were concerned, the first step in the process of creating trust would be to put what had been agreed to in operation. There should also be movement as fast as possible on the settlement proposal. When we went into Phase II, the Angolan Government both as a Front Line State and as a host country to SWAPO, would have to play its part if present efforts were to be brought to fruition.

Mr Moura said that Angola wanted to find ways to establish mutual trust and confidence. He wanted to state that distrust could come about in various ways. On the one hand there were the statements by Garoeb which South Africa considered to be contrary to the achievement of this goal. On the other hand statements were also made by South African military officials, which did not help matters. At the last meeting, Genl Malan had said that South Africa would not again go into Angola but three days later the country was subjected to another attack. Genl Malan had recently again indicated that South Africa would continue with attacks against Angola. It was possible that the objectives which both sides desired could be achieved, but only if concrete efforts by both parties were made.

Dr Fourie said that Genl Malan had not said that he would not attack Angola, but had indicated that we would continue to follow SWAPO whenever they crossed the border into South West Africa. Neither South Africa nor the South African Defence Force had any quarrel with Angola - SWAPO was the problem. In addition, the media often exaggerated the situation and Radio Luanda did not make for good listening.

Mr Moura said that the Angolan press, which arose out of the Angolan people, only related the reality of the bombing of Cahama, N'Giva, Xangongo, etc. SWAPO was not in evidence in these places, which has been completely destroyed. It was a reality that the Angolan military, and not SWAPO, were present at those locations. Moreover, FAPLA did not operate on the Namibian side of the border.

Dr Fourie noted that SWAPO frequently operated in Angolan uniforms. As a matter of fact, SWAPO had been found to carry a number of uniforms, including FAPLA uniforms and civilian clothes, which they switched as they moved from one area to another.

Mr Moura said that as far as the handing over of Angolan citizens were concerned, he wished also to raise the problem of Angolan teachers who had been taken to Namibia. Angola had handed over a list containing their names in Geneva.

Dr Fourie enquired as to what exactly was meant. South Africa knew of some Angolans who had voluntarily moved across the river and who were living in South West Africa. They moved freely across the border. Was Mr Moura referring to them? South Africa was not aware of any list of names which had been submitted to it at Geneva and perhaps it would be possible to obtain a copy.

Mr Moura indicated that he would submit another list but according to his officials the list had in fact been handed to South Africa at Geneva and the matter had also been discussed at Angola/South African in London. In this regard he should mentioned the name of Martinez Kalanga - a teacher - who had been taken to Namibia or South Africa in June 1980. South Africa should please consider this aspect.

Dr Fourie requested that the full names and supposed dates on which the people had been taken away, be submitted.

Mr Moura agreed and raised the question of a political commissar and a brigade commander who had also been captured by South African forces.

Dr Fourie indicated that he recalled this matter and that we would again have a look at it.

Mr Moura said that what remained was for South Africa to withdraw all its war material from the border area.

Dr Fourie said that South Africa would gladly do that as soon as Angola got rid of SWAPO.

Mr Moura indicated that he did not mean South African withdrawal from South West Africa but only from Angolan territory. Not a week went by without bombings, reconnaissance, etc, taking place in Angola, as the military would be able to confirm. On 18 November 1981 in Chivemba, two elements of the Angolan militia were taken as a result of operations of a AML IM90 armoured vehicle which was carrying out reconnaissance. On 19 November there was movement by two Puma helicopters in the Humbe area and a group of 20-25 men had been dropped there. Of these a few were White, some were Black, and some were Coloured. On 21 November four helicopters had passed Shiolo and there had been explosions in the Humbe area, which was a municipality approximately 100 kms from the border in the Cunene province. There were still South African troops at Humbe. Also on 21 November another Puma helicopter dropped troops in the Chipa area approximately 50-55 kms from the border. These observations were mentioned for information of South Africa, but they also reflected the reality on the ground. This was not a dramatisation but a very real situation which had been observed by Angola. Not a week went by without some sort of activity of the South African Defence Force in Angola.

Dr Fourie stressed that SWAPO was the root cause of the situation on the border and that their continual border violations were aggressive acts. SWAPO also continually laid landmines, However, contact with Angola had to continue and we would return to South Africa and see how matters could be improved.

Mr Moura thanked Dr Fourie for the climate of cordiality which always characterised the discussions. The situation on the ground was, however, not good. Each time a meeting took place, it was followed by increased aggression and the question of where the two sides were going and what the aims of the meetings were arose at each occasion. The objectives should be to secure peace, to safeguard the population and to create the prospect of mutual co-operation on both sides despite differing

ideologies. Angola's external policy was based on internationally accepted norms. Another matter which has been briefly touched upon was the establishment of a cease-fire as a basis for future co-operation. Angola had not received any information from South Africa in this regard and would like to obtain concrete proposals in order to establish such a cease-fire. Another matter which had been taken note of is the question of handing over of people who had been detained on both sides but this would be subject to later confirmation. All these matters should lead to co-operation and mutual respect and it was hoped that at our meetings the respective Ambassadors would be better informed on matters which had to be discussed. It might be possible for an agenda to be decided upon before the meetings took place. As far as future venues were concerned this would depend on the desire of both parties but Angola would set no conditions in this regard.

Dr Fourie indicated that South Africa also had no specific views on a venue and that purely practical considerations would dictate where we would meet.