

# AN ANALYSIS OF THE CRISIS FACING US ALL

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(This is the title of a pamphlet, circulated by the Secretary General of the Namibia National Front shortly before the recent visit of the Western foreign ministers to South Africa, from which the following extracts are taken. It presents a background to the situation in Namibia quite different to the official version being disseminated by the South African Government and its Namibian supporters at that time. This "official" view is the one most White South Africans accept — some because they like it, others because it is the only one they have heard. The facts and views presented in these extracts will, we hope, help them to understand why the NNF and other organisations felt the only proper response to South African sponsored elections was to boycott them — Editor.)

The following observations can be made after a fact finding mission to the recent session of the Security Council and discussions with foreign ministers of Western governments and with other interested parties.

The governments of the world are united behind the Western proposals and the Waldheim report as the only way to achieve a peaceful internationally recognized solution of the Namibian problem.

The explanation by Dr. Waldheim on objections and reservations raised by South Africa, SWAPO and other interested parties is part and parcel of the Security Council resolution which was accepted by 12 votes to nil.

The aforesaid explanation clarified certain ambiguities and made the whole report more reasonable and conciliatory.

**The following points were made by Dr. Waldheim:**

- (a) The number of 7500 troops suggested for the military wing is the **maximum** suggested estimate and efforts will be made to keep the number as low as possible and to bring in these troops only in stages.

**Consultation** with interested parties, including South Africa as to the composition of the force is conceded to be necessary and in terms of the Western proposals. Such consultations **will** take place.

Consultation however does not mean a **veto** power by South Africa. It must also be noted that the representatives of the D.T.A. submitted a written memorandum to the United Nations in which they did not in the least criticise the proposed number of 7500 troops.

- (b) The **350 civilian policemen** will only have the rôle of monitoring i.e. observing the activities of the S.A. police.

The South African police would in fact be **primarily** responsible for law and order.

- (c) Elections in terms of the Western proposals can take place by **April 1979**, provided no further delays are caused by South Africa.

**South Africa's claim that the Waldheim report is not in accordance with the Western proposals previously accepted by all interested parties, is universally rejected** as totally without substance and a mere pretence to justify South Africa's repudiation of the agreement on the Western proposals. The NNF fully subscribe to this view.

The main objections raised by South Africa are the following:

- (a) **The number of troops required for the military wing and the alleged lack of consultation.**

In the final written Western proposal accepted by all concerned no number is specified but the mechanism required for determining the number and composition is specified and agreed upon. It reads as follows: "In establishing the military wing of UNTAG, the Secretary General will keep in mind functional and logistic requirements. The five governments will support the Secr. Gen's judgment in his discharge of this responsibility. The Secretary General will in the **normal manner** include in his **consultations** all those concerned with the **implementation of the agreement.**"

These provisions are clear.

South Africa's only legitimate complaint could be the lack of proper consultation if that is the case. Even if the Secr. General failed to comply with this requirement before publishing his report, adequate consultation has taken place since and before the formal decision by the Security Council endorsing his recommendations. Even now further consultation as to the number and composition is offered and open to South Africa.

- (b) **The objection that the date of independence will be later than 31st December as stipulated in the Western proposals.**

It must be clear to everybody by now that independence cannot be attained by 31st December 1978.

Even Mr Vorster said in answer to a question at the Press conference where he announced South Africa's rejection that the date will still be decided by the people of Namibia.

In any case the date stipulated in the Western proposals read in context was only a target date which depended upon the date of final acceptance by all concerned including SWAPO and the United Nations Organisation.

Furthermore a period of 7 months was stipulated in the Western proposals as being required as from the date of endorsement by the Security Council for the transition period to independence during which the conditions for fair elections under U.N.O. supervision had to be achieved.

Simple arithmetic therefore leads to the logical conclusion that elections in terms of the Western proposal can only take place in April/May 1979.

(c) **The objection that the suggested 360 police officers is a new element.**

The Western plan accepted by S.A. stipulated inter alia;

"The Special Representative (of the Secr General) shall make arrangements when appropriate for United Nations personnel to accompany the police forces in the discharge of their duties."

The Secr. General has explained in his final submission to the Security Council that this civilian police element will have no executive powers but will only monitor or observe the S.A. police and that the S.A. police would be primarily responsible for law and order as stipulated in the Western proposals accepted by S.A.

Is it not obvious to any reasonable person that experienced police officers would be the only people equipped for the agreed task of observing and/or monitoring the S.A. police?

Or would S.A. and the D.T.A. suggest that the Special Representative should use soldiers?

It is also our view that the true reason for South Africa's decision is that the D.T.A., the favourite of the South African Government, can only be assured of victory in this type of election at this particular time.

In particular, the statements and comment over radio South Africa and spread by some local news media to the effect that SWAPO had rejected the Western proposals are stated to be mere lies and distortions intended to condition South Africans and Namibians for the repudiation of the agreement by S.A.

From now on the argument that SWAPO "N" is afraid to take part in elections and/or that it is not interested in a peaceful solution will hold no water with the international community.

**Both SWAPO "N", SWAPO "D" and the N.N.F. will take part in elections in terms of the Western proposals and Waldheim plan and only such elections will bring international recognition, peace and stability.**

In all the circumstances, it is quite clear that nothing positive will be achieved by persisting with elections now planned for **December 1978**. Such elections **will never** be internationally recognized.

If the Western governments are unable to prevent it, all the gains for Western diplomacy and influence of recent months, will be reversed with grave consequences for South Africa and Namibia, including for the white section of the population.

**The international movement away from recognition of SWAPO as the authentic and only voice of Namibians will break down and be reversed. A SWAPO government in exile may be established and recognized by the United Nations. The support for the violent struggle will grow and violence will escalate dramatically.**

Centrist and moderate political movements will lose influence whilst polarisation will take place between radical left and right.

**Confrontation** between black and white will be revived and will grow.

**The unilateral election now envisaged by South Africa will not contain essentials for fair elections agreed to when both South Africa and SWAPO agreed to the Western proposals** and thus the true will of the people and the true representatives cannot be established by these elections and will not ever be recognized.

Some of these essentials for fair elections contained

in the Western plan are inter alia:—

1. **Every** adult Namibian will be eligible without discrimination to **vote**, to **campaign** and to stand for election."

The **thousands** of political prisoners, detainees, political exiles will now not have the right and/or the means and/or the opportunity to vote, to campaign and to stand for election.

2. "The **Adm. General**, prior to the beginning of the electoral campaign, will repeal **all** remaining discriminatory and restrictive laws, regulations or administrative measures, which might abridge or inhibit that objective."

**This has not and will not be done by the A.G.**

**Radio South Africa** with or without its local Board, is still the main communications media in Namibia and the epitome of discrimination, biased reporting and indoctrination. It combines well **with the monopoly of the Turnhalle-orientated groups over the local press**. Some of this monopoly, e.g. the buying of the Windhoek Advertiser and Allgemeine Zeitung was achieved by foreign money in the hands of foreigners. In addition these D.T.A. mouthpieces even had to import foreign editors to do the job. School halls, town halls and accommodation in hotels and in towns are still in most cases closed to people on basis of race. Those who have no expensive circus tents available, will be at a disadvantage because halls are not made available for multi-racial political meetings.

"The central task will be to make sure that conditions are established which will allow **free and fair elections** and an **impartial** electoral process."

There is **no safety and security** in large parts of the country which makes campaigning difficult if not impossible. **This can only be secured by a ceasefire in terms of the Western proposals.**

The international presence to balance the S.A. army, police and other institutions and to create an atmosphere of confidence freedom and impartiality is and will be absent.

**Can anyone really expect SWAPO to participate in elections supervised by S.A.?**

4. "The key to an internationally accepted transition to independence is free elections for the whole of Namibia with an appropriate United Nations rôle in accordance with resolution 385."

It is obvious that also this essential of the agreed Western proposals will be unattainable should S.A. persist with its unilateral action.

To contend therefore that S.A. still stands by the Western proposals and is acting in the letter and spirit thereof, is an insult to intelligence.

Even if **80%** of the population vote in this election, it will be of little consequence. In many communist and African states, polls of **90 or even 99%** are attained but that does not necessarily mean that it is credible.

The whole governmental machine and institutions and all those aligned with it, are known to the world at large and will not deceive Western governments.

The fact must be faced that there is no alternative to internationally supervised elections. The minimum now required to avoid drastic action and disastrous consequences is to stop all further unilateral steps, to call off the contemplated elections and to proceed in terms of the Western proposals and the Waldheim report endorsed by the Security Council. U.D.I. will go the same way as in Rhodesia. The longer we delay, the more unpleasant and radical the terms will become. □