

TANZANIA —

THE QUIET REVOLUTION


by Kenneth Ingham

(Typed from a tape recording of the last of six lectures given at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg in August and September 1973 by Professor Ingham, professor of History at Bristol University.)

My theme this evening has a rather pastoral character—the Quiet Revolution in Tanzania.

Now I know that Tanzania provokes rather strong feelings in South Africa, so that if I sound somewhat euphoric in what I have to say it's partly in order to redress the balance, partly because it's my last lecture and I'm leaving tomorrow, partly because I believe what I'm saying.

However, if any one had asked in 1953 which of the three mainland territories of East Africa was likely to be the last to gain independence, he would likely have been told that the question was purely academic, that independence was so remote anyway, that there was no point in asking the question, but if he persisted I think the experts would have replied unanimously, "Of course Tanganyika". Why would Tanganyika be the last? Primarily for economic reasons. Tanganyika is a large country, about three-quarters of the size of the Republic of South along with South-West Africa, roughly the same size as, perhaps a little smaller than, Nigeria, but with a very much smaller population, 13 or 14 million people, and very, very few resources indeed. Take the quantity of minerals. In 1940 Dr. Williamson, against all predictions, discovered some very workable diamonds in Tshenyanga, but against the competition of De Beers and other powerful companies, this meant that he could make a reasonable profit, but provided very little wealth for the country. There is a certain amount of coal in the South-East of Tanzania, but coal in Tanzania isn't exactly a big sell; so that minerals are pretty thin. Agriculturally, too, the country doesn't offer a great deal. The biggest earner is sisal, which isn't exactly a big money-spinner either. The country isn't particularly wealthy nor is it very obvious that it is likely to be any wealthier in the future. Moreover, its population, too, is rather oddly placed. The population of Tanzania is scattered around Lake Victoria, particularly around Mount Kilimanjaro, and along the coast line which is fairly well populated, with other groups scattered in the North. If Cecil Rhodes had stood in Dar es Salaam and pointed westwards and said, "Your hinterland lies there", you'd have had a long way to go to find it! And this has its disadvantages and also its advantages. I'll deal with the advantages on the political side later. It means that the population is singularly scattered and communications



Prof. Ingham (Photo J. Alferts)

are difficult. Much of the central portion, if not actually desert, is extremely arid, and nothing will grow where you expect it to grow.

The history of Tanganyika militated against a great deal of advancement and development. It first of all became, in the late 19th century, a German Dependency, and then after the first World War it became a British Mandate, but it had suffered very heavily in the War. The first Governor

after this war decided he would let things simmer for a while before he started to get things moving again, which I think was probably a very reasonable attitude, but it didn't mean that development was swift. Then in the later 1920's there was quite a step forward under the dynamic government of Sir Donald Cameron, and then almost immediately the world depression at the beginning of the 1930's struck a severe blow to any prospect of expansion at that particular time. This led to caution in the 1930's, and then the second World War, and after that we were in the modern era and independence was being bandied around in the various countries of Africa, but Tanganyika was scarcely in the running—hadn't even been brought to the starting point.

As a result of the poverty of the country many requisites of independence were missing. Education had scarcely developed, partly because of the history of the country. The Germans had done quite a lot for education before the first World War broke out. After the war they were required to leave, missionaries and all, so that in the 1920's and 1930's there was quite a slow recovery in the educational scene. Although a foundation was being laid around the country for elementary education with Government assistance, it hadn't spread very far when the second World War came. Subsequently, when we move into the area of University education, Tanganyika was so poor it could scarcely afford to send students to Makerere College in Uganda, which acted as the central University for students in the whole of the East African territory. (Just briefly, so far as Makerere is concerned, in the 1950's each of three main territories, Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika, had a quota which they were to fill. The remaining places were filled partly from Zanzibar, a few from Northern Rhodesia as it then was, and a very few from Nyasaland as it then was, and the remainder of the places were filled by any of the three main territories which could afford to send qualified students.) Whether Tanganyika had qualified students or not, it couldn't afford to send them, so even in this area it fell well behind the standards which had been achieved by Uganda and Kenya at that time. Secondary education was very sparse. There was an excellent Government Secondary School at Tabora right in the middle of Tanganyika, and there were two mission schools, one Roman Catholic and one Protestant, near Dar es Salaam, but the output of these schools was remarkably small. When independence came there was one university graduate. This was a very serious situation.

These are some of the problems which faced Tanganyika in the 1950's, and this explains why, even though at that time there was a state of emergency in Kenya due to Mau Mau, and great tension in Uganda with the recent deposition and exile of the Kabaka of Buganda, nevertheless, the experts still would have guessed that either Kenya or Uganda would achieve independence far ahead of Tanganyika. And yet, Tanganyika achieved independence in 1961, Uganda in 1962 and Kenya in 1963.

Now how did that come about? I think this is where the beginnings of the quiet revolution are to be found. Tanganyika, in the early 1950's, was just about as a-

political as any country could be. As the second World War was drawing to a close some of the administrative officers in Tanganyika got together and said, "When the troops return from India and Burma"—where many of them had been serving with the 11th East African Division—"they're bound to take a much greater interest in local affairs than they did in the past, and if we're going to avoid discontent and possibly even conflict, we've got to make provision for these people when they do return". And so a scheme was worked out on a local government level, on the basis of which returning soldiers in particular would have an opportunity of playing a much fuller part in decision-making and in the execution of policy than they had before. But, contrary to all expectations, when the soldiers came back, rather like civilian soldiers in any circumstances, all they wanted to do was get home, forget the war and anything outside their own village. They disappeared into the undergrowth, more or less, and that was that!

Political silence was as intense as ever. There was no real problem from that point of view. Indeed, the problem was to arouse interest in the political scene. The Governor at that time, that vigorous gentleman, Sir Edward, (later Lord) Twining, hadn't a great deal of time for politics and thought that economics would provide the answer—that is, if there had been any economics to provide an answer with, which unfortunately there weren't—and he remained in opposition to the bitter end, and bitter, I think indeed, it was. However, though he thought that politics weren't as urgent as economics, nevertheless, he did attempt to encourage a greater interest among, certainly, the more educated African, in the political scene. Sir Donald Cameron had, to some extent, laid the very, very simple foundations. He had urged the African civil servants, most of them very low-grade clerical officers, to form the Tanganyika African Association, and this Association operated more as a sort of Old Boys' Society of Tabora Government School than as any particularly vigorous political group. In any case, the members were so scattered over the whole country that it was only in Dar es Salaam and in Tabora that there was any sign of action on the part of the Association, and really the members only met to discuss Shakespeare's plays or something of that sort, in a half-hearted fashion, rather than independence tomorrow. So this was a rather stagnant scene, a rather idyllic scene in the eyes of many local administrators in Tanganyika in the early 1950's.


The change really came for two reasons, I think, both important because they both intermeshed, providing an internal and an external impetus to change. The external impetus came with the conversion of the Mandate into the Trusteeship which succeeded the second World War. The old Mandatory system had been an excellent system for the retention, the preservation and indeed the encouragement of the status quo. It was rather like **1066 and All That**, you remember, when Magna Carta, among other things, specified that barons would be tried by other barons—who would understand! The criticism of the operation of the Mandate was made by experienced colonial administrators, who had faced all the problems and who were deeply sympathetic to the efforts of their successors. Change was

not unlikely, but with the coming of the Trusteeship Council and the conversion of Tanganyika's relationship with Britain into one of Trusteeship, the new factors began to play their part. The new countries were beginning to make themselves heard very, very vigorously in the United Nations, turning the spotlight on to what was going on in the new Trust Territories. They also had visiting Commissions which came every few years to these territories and looked at what was going on and criticised most vigorously what they felt to be wrong. It could well be that the visiting Commissions were not particularly experienced in colonial administration, and they may have been unsympathetic at times to the problems which the colonial administrators faced. Certainly they urged a more immediate interest in political affairs among the African population and they demanded that the administering power did something to encourage that sort of interest among the African people. This was a stimulus which not only hit Tanganyika but also had repercussions on the world scene in the meeting of the Trusteeship Council in the United Nations. I don't know that this necessarily stirred opinion in Britain, I think possibly, if anything, it stirred resentment of the interference of inexpert speakers on the subject; but nevertheless, it kept things boiling.

But much more important, I think, was the arrival on the scene, from education in Scotland, of Julius Nyerere. Now, he is so very much the key figure, and one can't begin to understand him, I think, unless one is prepared to recognise that he is a thoroughly good man, almost painfully good—and I use that adverb rather as C.S. Lewis would, in the sense that sheer goodness is painful to people who are not quite so good. By that I don't want to say that he is a good man in any political sense at all. Indeed, it could well be that to some extent there is a political naivety about him. I think this arises out of a deep simplicity in the man.

Again, by simplicity I would not suggest stupidity; I mean the simplicity which sees only what he believes to be the good and true. This can be a very dangerous thing in a statesman, I can assure you, but certainly it must be appreciated before one even begins to understand his impact upon his own people and his success in the country. Because his impact upon the people was, and still is, quite astonishing. But it is not the impact of a demagogue who stands with his medals on his chest and lots of braid on his hat and recently-promoted shoulder signs, like that other gentleman whom we could think of without straining too hard. He dresses simply, he speaks simply in language which ordinary people can understand and believe in. They don't see him as someone apart from themselves, they see him as one of themselves, in a sense translated into something almost ethereal as well. It is a strange combination of utter realism, utter contact between the people and the man, and a remoteness that is not one of distance so much as one of inflation of their own feelings to a much higher level.

When Nyerere came back, he didn't of course immediately have this effect upon the people, he wasn't particularly well known. What he did was to turn to this rather moribund afternoon-tea Tanganyika African Association and convert it into the beginnings of a political party. He called it the Tanganyika African National Union. He began to instruct



President Julius Nyerere

and then use the members to instruct others over a wide area. To demonstrate the importance to them of being political beings not in order to create a revolution in the sense of simply overthrowing, by force if need be, the colonial powers, but to make of themselves full men, not partial men who are content simply to get on with the daily things of life; but to look at their fellows next door, and beyond in the neighbouring tribes, and beyond even as far away as Dar es Salaam. Now this was a very difficult thing to achieve for people who lived such remote and separated lives as most of the people of Tanganyika did, and again, stressing the separation of the population's scattered character this was a particularly important job; but he made out of T.A.N.U. an organisation which got in touch and kept in touch with the people as a whole.

In some ways the delay in the development of education in Tanganyika to this extent helped, because it meant that there wasn't really an elite in the West African sense. The educated people, few as they were, were still closely linked to their families. They were not congregated in Dar es Salaam carrying on businesses of their own and already half-Westernised. They were recent products of Makerere College or Tabora Government School, many of them living either in their home towns or in some rural centre, acting as clerks or lesser officials in very close touch constantly with

the people. They had not pulled away from them. This, I think, is tremendously important. Again, one can perhaps decry the use of the indirect rule system, particularly the rather exotic form introduced into Tanganyika by Sir Donald Cameron, who more or less said, "If you can't find a traditional Chief, make one!" Nevertheless, this has helped in that it has emphasised the continuing traditions of local government. And when, superimposed upon this, came the development of the T.A.N.U. political party, there was no sharp division between politics as a centre and local government, which had occurred so very much in other areas where the British had emphasised the indirect system of government, and where there was a division between the elite and the Chiefs, the elite whom the British were rather wary of, and the Chiefs, who were good chaps, whom they could rely on. This wasn't so marked in Tanganyika as it had been elsewhere. This, I think, helped. Then again, if I may refer to the geographical distribution, this too helped, for in so many other countries the capital has been fairly central—for example, Nairobi, in the vicinity of the powerful, numerous, articulate, relatively well-educated Kikuyu people or again in Uganda, Entebbe and Kampala, with all about the powerful, wealthy, well-educated, articulate and well-organised Buganda, all round the capital and a power in themselves, something which provided a central element, pushing the rest of the country away, saying "We are what counts". This was the problem in Mau Mau to some extent. The Kikuyu were rather isolated from the rest of the country. It was a serious problem in Uganda where the Buganda always regarded themselves as a natural elite, and the rest as something to be controlled by them. Not an easy situation for a newly independent political power; but in Tanganyika the situation was different. Dar es Salaam, the capital, was right on the edge, and no big population centred round about it. The peoples of the coast, although linked together in their Swahili civilisations, were not a powerful tribal unit in the traditional sense at all. The big areas of population were some distance away and not easily connected with Dar es Salaam itself. The main population groups were well removed from the centre of affairs. They didn't present a permanent cloud enveloping the capital and weighing down the body. They were scattered at a considerable distance and because of this, I think, Tanganyika never had the political pressure of the heated, over-tense atmosphere in the capital which so many other countries suffered from, rather than gained from.

Dar es Salaam remains a remarkably cosmopolitan city with no strong political views. On the other hand, the very fact that Nyerere apparently began to organise successfully a political interest through the agency of T.A.N.U. made Sir Edward Twining rather wary. Twining was prepared to see politics develop rather slowly and under his control. He didn't like to think of it moving quickly outside his power and becoming, as it appeared to him, very much an African thing, because Twining still believed that a great deal would be gained in Tanganyika if it could emerge as a multi-racial country. By multi-racial he did not mean that white people and brown people would live happily side by side with the black people in the country, or even that white people and brown people would have equal votes and equal rights with black people, but rather that the white race and the brown race and the black race

should be all equal irrespective of the fact that the black people of the country number something like 98%, with a handful of brown people and scarcely a fingerful of white. This was his aim, and his aim was based upon the fact that the wealth and the expertise were properly shared equally, even although the population was not equal.

Since the white people had contributed greatly to the development of the country (not perhaps anything like as much as they had in Kenya, but nevertheless, to a considerable extent), since the Indians too, in their way, had made a remarkable commercial contribution to the country, and, consequently, since relations, so far as one could see, had been happy and satisfactory between the three races, there was a lot to be said, so Twining argued, for his concept of a multi-racial state. Indeed, seeing the development of T.A.N.U., he even went so far as to create his own political party to counter the activities of T.A.N.U., the United Tanganyika Party, whose membership rose, perhaps, to twenty at any given time, and that was about all. The idea was that the United Tanganyika Party should pursue this multi-racial aim along the lines which Twining adumbrated.

But this didn't quite work out like that. Partly due to pressures in the United Nations, but I think very much more due to the fact, which I indicated as far as the Kenya situation is concerned, that Britain herself was moving towards independence, it was determined and decided that in 1958 and 1959 elections should take place to an enlarged Legislative Council, the basis of elections being that of a highly qualitative franchise, but not a racial one. This would be a total non-communable franchise, a common roll, but one where each voter must vote for three people, one white, one brown, one black; and those three people from this particular constituency along with three from nine other constituencies, would form a grand total of thirty in the Legislative Council, where they would be outnumbered by one or two on the Government side, but nevertheless would have a much larger voice in discussing, if not determining policy, than anyone from the Legislative Council had previously had—other than Government servants, of course.

There was a certain amount of discontent at the slow progress that was being made, but it does seem that there wasn't intense pressure for more rapid progress. I think, if anything, the criticisms of T.A.N.U. were levelled against this compulsory qualitative franchise, and their having to vote for three people whether they liked it or not, rather than against the number of members of the Legislative Council, or indeed, the composition of the Legislative Council itself. Had even Julius Nyerere been asked in 1957 how soon Tanganyika was likely to get or should get independence, I think he might have said, "In ten years we should, but we are likely to in about 15 years." I doubt whether he would have been more optimistic than that. But I think a number of events took place in 1958 which completely changed the pattern of development. First of all, Sir Edward Twining left the country. This I think was important, because Twining, as I said, had been a great power for economic development but he did not accept the pressures from the political group which was increasingly enveloping the country. He was replaced by that remarkable man, Sir Richard

Turnbull, a man who adopted a protective camouflage so brilliantly wherever he went that his presence was rarely to be found, only in the excellence with which things developed subsequently. For example, as Provincial Commissioner in Northern Kenya he had been the wonderful father of his family, the benevolent paternalist; subsequently, as Chief Secretary in Kenya, he had been a powerful fighter, a rather ruthless organiser, a brilliant planner in the campaign against Mau Mau. A very odd appointment it might seem, for the quiet and peaceful Tanganyika, moving gently forward to some ultimate goal of independence away beyond the horizons of human thought. But lo! when Sir Richard Turnbull arrived in Tanganyika he immediately became the reforming Governor, the man who was going to push Tanganyika forward as fast as it could advance. Indeed, he summoned Julius Nyerere to see him at a time when he was being tried for making a statement which the British Authorities didn't entirely approve of, and he said to Nyerere, "There are two people who can make this country work, you and I. If we work together it will work well. If we don't work together it will pull apart. What do you think?" Nyerere said, "We'll work together." Now this was the simplicity of the man, the honesty of the man, on Nyerere's part. Here he met someone whose whole tradition had been authoritarian and yet who frankly came to him and said they were going to work together. Nyerere accepted this absolutely and went back—I was told this by a close friend of Nyerere's—he came back to the friend and said, "Things are going to be all right. This man we can trust." And indeed he could. And Turnbull was a great friend of Nyerere's and has remained so to this day.

Now this was a very, very important thing. It meant there was a man as Governor, sympathetic to Nyerere's political aims. Whether he could help him fulfil those political aims depended a lot upon Nyerere himself. Could Nyerere produce the goods? If he couldn't, of course, all Turnbull's benevolent attention would have been wasted. But that Nyerere could produce the goods was proved astonishingly in the elections in 1958 and 1959, for every single candidate who was elected had T.A.N.U. backing. Not a single person was elected who didn't, which put an entirely different complexion on things. If Europeans could stand with T.A.N.U. backing and be elected, and if Indians could stand with T.A.N.U. backing and be elected, then really, T.A.N.U. was a force in the land and could not be ignored; and I think as a result of this close integration of action, and indeed of sentiment, between Sir Richard Turnbull and Julius Nyerere, the British Government was well disposed towards development and sent Sir Richard Ramage in 1959, not to report on the possibilities of independence in 1970 or in 1975, but to suggest the next stage towards the achievement of responsible government, at once if this were possible. And Sir Richard Ramage, himself a very experienced civil servant, and certainly not to be carried away by wild excesses of emotion, reported that in his view, responsible government could be given at once, and it could be along these lines: 71 seats in the Legislature, of which 50 would be elected on an adult suffrage with a common roll, and there should be 11 places for which only Europeans could stand and 10 for Asians. This was acceptable to T.A.N.U., which was not racial in its views, and acceptable to the British Government. An election did take place in 1959.

Of the 71 seats, 58 were unopposed. The remaining seats were won by T.A.N.U. candidates, with one exception—one Independent. An astonishing feat! The United Tanganyika Party just fizzled away and was forgotten in no time at all.

Now this was quite remarkable, and I think it was remarkable in the eyes of the British Government: it was such a smooth operation. There had been virtually no turmoil involved in bringing about this election, and yet T.A.N.U. had swept into power in quite an astonishing way, and Nyerere became at this stage, not Prime Minister, but Chief Minister, so that when McLeod became Colonial Secretary, a McLeod who was committed to independence as soon as was feasible for all the territories in tropical Africa, he had discussions with Nyerere, the Governor and various other officials in the country, and decided that Tanganyika should achieve self-government early in 1961 and independence later in the year. The speed of this was quite astonishing and is only explained, I think, by the apparent quietness and smoothness of the various steps which had so far been taken. There wasn't a tremendous surge of feeling, and yet there was a powerful ground swell of feeling, which was carrying the country forward. I think this was entirely due to the organisation which Nyerere was able to infuse into T.A.N.U. and which T.A.N.U. in its turn, had been able to spread throughout the whole country.

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Now the story sounds, so far, too good to be true, and I suppose, really it was, because after all it's one thing to move towards independence, but to achieve it with the responsibilities it imposes is a very, very different thing indeed; and here, of course, was Nyerere's problem. With self-government first and with independence on hand, he became Prime Minister of a country which really, had only one political party. It is true there was a People's Democratic Party, which appears briefly on the scene, but I've only ever heard of one person being a member of it. There were, presumably, more. It was certainly not significant. Anyhow, he was in power, but what did this power amount to? It amounted to a handful of really well-educated people. A very small handful of people with any experience of responsibility at that level at all, but even worse, there was a big gap below, where the next level of people should have been—and these were seriously lacking. Nyerere made it clear that he must rely as long as possible on British civil servants staying on doing their jobs. He didn't want them to get out too quickly because he saw what an appalling vacuum this would create; but, while Nyerere had had unanimous support throughout the country up to the point of the election, of course, again, once independence had been achieved, there were inevitably those who wanted something quickly for themselves, and there were those who were violently opposed to his keeping on any Britons in the Civil Service, because this was blocking the promotion of Africans. They were foolish enough to think that they could fill these places easily and immediately, and Nyerere had considerable trouble with just this type of criticism. Again, there were those who expected they would be able to feather their own nests very quickly when

they had a job which had formerly been handled by British personnel. Again, Nyerere was opposed to this, but it wasn't easy to contain the situation, so that when he resigned from the Prime Ministership there were a lot of people who thought he had lost his grip, that he wasn't really able to keep a firm control of these dissident elements in his own party: it was easy enough for him while they were in opposition; now that they were in power the situation was more difficult. In fact, I think, they were wrong. What Nyerere did was to resign the office of Prime Minister because he realised that the important thing was to make sure that the machinery of the country was effective, and the only machinery that was operating on an African basis was T.A.N.U. It is true that the administrative machinery of the colonial situation still remained and that Africans were moving into this machinery; but it was not a living machine, it was simply an inanimate object, and the only thing which had fire and life in it was the political party. He spent the early months of 1962 re-organising the political party, giving it life, so that the country should feel that even in its remotest parts it was in touch, through a clearly defined chain of personnel, with the centre. There should be no separation of the small elite at the top from the rest. He even saw to it that there were appointed Regional Commissioners, who were really like Junior Ministers, whose job it was to convey policy to the people and to convey the people's response to the policy-makers. There should be no isolation of the top group from the rest of the country. From his own point of view, he made a particular point of getting around the country, seeing it and being in touch with it constantly, dressed simply, so that he could make easy contact, so that the people would not feel rebuffed by the magnificence of his appearance. He kept in constant touch with them and then he re-asserted himself in his position as Prime Minister, having got the party machine moving.

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All right, again one might argue, this is all very sound and praiseworthy within his own country; but outside his country he was already making a mark which some might regard as unfavourable. To begin with, at the very moment of achieving independence he said he did not wish to belong to a Commonwealth which had in it South Africa, as long as South Africa continued its apartheid policy. An abrupt, brash statement made by the leader of a tiny, new state, which had only achieved independence, literally, yesterday. It is quite understandable that there should be reaction against this, but again I think, whether one agrees with what he says or not, the explanation rests on what I said earlier about the man, his absolute absorption in his own principles. He could not credibly be a free man himself and yet accept what he believed to be the subjection of other African people, particularly when they constituted a majority. This concerned him deeply. He had to make this statement; and let it be said that, in saying this, had South Africa remained in the Commonwealth, he would have taken Tanganyika out. He wasn't saying, "I will say this, but I won't accept the consequences." He would have accepted the consequences (and they would have been serious) of withdrawal from the Commonwealth at this stage. Political naivety, you might argue. Perhaps it is, but it stems from such a burning honesty that he felt he must say this. However,

he was saved from the consequences of this statement by South Africa's own withdrawal from the Commonwealth at that particular moment. But again subsequently, he was to adopt an exactly similar line with regard to Rhodesia and UDI, when he broke off diplomatic relations with Britain, greatly to the detriment of economic affairs in Tanganyika, because he believed Britain should have taken firm action.

Now this, I think, is an indication of the nature of the man, that he is prepared to accept the consequences, and yet, there is a weakness at the same time. There is a weakness of complete faith in other people. This was first revealed, I believe, early in 1964, when there was a mutiny in the very small Tanganyikan Army. Nyerere didn't want an Army in any case. He is reported to have said when he attended Nigeria's independence celebrations, and saw all the people marching past, that he didn't really see himself as a general because he didn't really see the Tanganyikan Army fighting anyone. He later added in a Press conversation that Tanganyika couldn't fight Russia, she couldn't fight Britain, she couldn't fight America, so what was the point in having an Army? She didn't propose to fight Kenya or Uganda—of course, she didn't know about Amin in those days! —why, therefore, have an Army? Would it not be better to get rid of it? I think that he was wishing he had done so early in 1964, because the Army mutinied for two reasons. Firstly, for higher pay, and also because he had not got rid of the British officers, because he believed the Army was not ready to do so. At that stage Nyerere disappeared for forty-eight hours. No one quite knows why he disappeared at that time, but my own view is that he disappeared because he just couldn't accept that this horror had happened. He did not believe that Tanganyikan people could behave in this terribly wrong-headed fashion. I believe it's not a question of physical cowardice, but of sheer sensitivity which hurt him to think that Tanganyikan people should act in this way. He re-emerged of course, and invited the British Marines to come ashore to straighten things out. He did so, I think not so much from a sense of humility, but almost of self-hate that he had had to resort to force to deal with the situation in the country. He quickly asked Nigerian, or at least African troops, to come and take the place of the British, again because he thought it was right and proper that if there must be force used, at least black people should use it against their own people. It was an unhappy situation, but I think this is an indication of the weakness of the man, a weakness stemming from what might be termed human goodness.

Again, I think his attitude towards other forms of external relations reflects something of the same sort of naivety, and yet again, I don't believe this is true stupidity. Almost immediately after achieving independence he began to enter into commercial and economic relations with the Eastern powers, more particularly China. One might argue that having been on such good terms with Britain and the West, having created for himself and his Government an excellent reputation for moderation, wasn't it really asking for trouble to go hob-nobbing with China, of all powers? Again, his explanation was fairly straightforward. He particularly wished Tanganyika to be non-aligned outside the African continent; therefore, to be

non-aligned he must move somewhat away from the West—not deliberately towards the East, but away from the West, which of course brought him towards the East, willy-nilly. Secondly, he recognised Tanganyika's very weak economic position; therefore he must get aid. But again, he did not wish to have this aid all from the same quarter, because this, willy-nilly, would lead him to some sort of dependence upon that particular area. This might affect his political thinking, and indeed the country's freedom. So he looked to China for assistance. Of course, China very gladly gave it, for what motives it is hard to say; but it looks as if he's rather playing into the hands of different powers. Again, over Zanzibar—here was another problem. Off-shore, there was a small island where suddenly there was a revolution. Particularly China and East Germany intervened and gave it support, and it looked as if there was a prospect of a constant source of trouble just off-shore. So what does Nyerere do? Not build up armaments against it, not align himself more powerfully with the West, so that in case of conflict he would have strong friends to defy this recalcitrant area on the coast; instead he embraced it, clasped it to him. Zanzibar is a tremendous embarrassment to him as he has practically no control over its administration, but at least he avoided armed conflict. Here is another instance of his integrity. Refugees who had been plotting against the ruler of Zanzibar were arrested in Tanzania and Nyerere handed them back to Zanzibar. They were immediately executed, which was a great shock to Nyerere. Since then he has not handed such refugees back but has himself imprisoned them on the mainland. This action of taking Zanzibar under his wing seems to have worked: it keeps the matter internal and prevents intervention by Eastern and Western powers.

It must be emphasised that the situation in Tanzania can only be understood if one realises the total support Nyerere enjoys from virtually the whole population. He had, when Tanganyika achieved independence, announced as the slogan of the country "Uhuru Nakazi", an astonishing thing to say—Freedom and Work. You've actually got to work for it now that you've got it. There aren't many people who would have the nerve to stand up and say that. They'd probably say, "Now that we're free, let's sit back and rest and enjoy all the fruits of the colonial past". But he didn't. In the Arusha Declaration he formulated in greater detail this philosophy. He urged upon his country that it must depend upon itself. It would have to look outside for some help, but above all it should produce its own wealth if it could, and rely upon its own resources—and its own resources, as he very bluntly pointed out, were not mineral wealth, not even agricultural wealth: they were just work and manpower. If everyone pulled his weight, then, he said, there wouldn't be the millenium—only a slight improvement. That is what he was offering, just a slight improvement if you work hard. Again, an astonishing line to adopt, but he took it because he believed that this was the only thing to do if the country was to be truly independent, in other words, if people were to say "I rely on myself, I do not go cap-in-hand to anybody else". Again, an impossibility to achieve in this absolute form. Tanganyika was getting aid, at least until 1967 when aid was stopped after Tanganyika broke off diplomatic relations over UDI—had been getting considerable aid from Britain; also from West Germany. She had got

aid from China, she had got aid from East Germany. From every quarter she was receiving some aid. But the main source of Tanganyika's wealth was coming from her own citizens. One mustn't over-praise the situation. After all, nothing could have happened without these loans, without the expertise of other countries too. But nevertheless, the emphasis he placed was on self-help.

But the next problem, of course, was that of UDI and its effect upon Zambia. Out of this sprang the idea of the Tanzam Railway. I don't see that Tanzania is going to get a great deal out of this. And here again, one may say that this is political naivety. Here is an idealistic proposal to build a railway to Zambia so that Zambia should not be dependent upon the Southern powers for the export of her copper—and, above all, to get the Chinese to come and do it! Again, I think that Nyerere's idea was that the Chinese perhaps, in a sense, would tie fewer strings to Tanganyika by undertaking this job, than would the powerful industrial nations of the West. He believed that an association with a country still struggling to establish itself, although on a much larger scale than Tanzania, was a healthier relationship than being linked up with, say, West Germany, the United States, or even the old stand-by Britain. Anyway, Britain wasn't standing so closely by since UDI! . . . Will it work? Is it possible to keep the railway as a sort of separated strip, from which political ideas will not spread to the rest of the country? It seems to be working. One doesn't know for certain, but Nyerere has stated that it will work. He believes that it must, because he makes it clear that he is not committed to any particular policy. This is where African Socialism creeps in, because African Socialism, which is in many ways feared by some of the capitalist states, is not the socialism of alliance with Communism; it is a mutual responsibility, a traditional tribal attitude. Everybody is responsible for everybody else in the country. This is really what is meant by African Socialism—helped by the expertise of the West, helped by the money of the West and East and the Chinese labourers along the railway, the Chinese technicians and so on. But one doesn't know whether it will really work. One simply, as far as the Tanganyikans are concerned, must take Nyerere's word for it and go on as if it will work until something goes wrong.

As far as the future is concerned, it's very hard to say what will happen. But again, Nyerere's concern about Southern Africa is potentially a source of weakness. It may be a source of strength in winning over the allegiance of the other African territories, but the fact that he has provided in Tanzania a launching-pad for guerilla activities against Mocambique and so on, may or may not be of value to him in the long run. Is it a good thing? I'm not sure myself; I don't really know about this. I'm doubtful about the effectiveness in the long run, as opposed to the short run of guerilla activities. But Nyerere deeply believes that he must provide this help if the people need it. These are the people he thinks are fighting the fight which he did not have to wage because independence came so easily to him. But he must help those who think they must help themselves. Right or wrong—I don't know! But it is a dangerous commitment. Again, it is an act of faith on his part that it is the right thing to do.



TANZANIA

As for the future, one can offer no very clearcut prophecy. Again, this depends a lot on Nyerere's presence. At the same time, although he does undoubtedly fall into the realm of charismatic leader, nevertheless I think he has attempted, as far as possible, to build up a sense of unity in the country, not simply focused on himself, but upon Tanzania. Now this, I think, is the revolution he has achieved—a pride in Tanzania. If he had gone to the interior in the days I have spoken of in 1953, and asked the people there, "What is Tanganyika?" very few people would have known anything about it. If you had said, "Do you feel strongly there should be self-government in Tanganyika?" people would have wondered what on earth you were talking about. What he has managed to do is to make people conscious of Tanganyika. And oddly enough, they are proud of it. I say "oddly" because, by the criteria

of the European nations, I think Tanzania is a deeply backward country. But there has not been a pulling away of the wealthy elite from the rest. There may have been a levelling down; there has also been to some extent, a levelling up from the bottom—not very high. No great hopes have been raised, but there is a gradual improvement to be seen for the majority of the people. For some, rather a falling away—people who haven't done too well at the top. Nyerere isn't very keen, for example, on Ministers having lots of directorships, or even earning extra money from boarding houses or anything like that. He likes to think of his Ministers as salaried men serving their country. Perhaps unduly idealistic when people are all too keen to earn a little bit on the side, as they undoubtedly are. It is not a perfect country, any more than any other country. These have been his aims and these are the difficulties that he is bound to face. One difficulty is that the powerful people of the country are those for whom self-interest is likely to prevail, if he's not careful.

The insurance against this, I think, for the future, is the involvement which he has been able to create for the country in the affairs of the country. There has not grown up a political professional class which is thought by the majority of the people to be separate from them. They all belong to T.A.N.U., and the machine looks upward and outward to the centre and is concerned about what's going on. Again, an over-simplification. Probably the peasant working in his field knows nothing of the intricacies of the T.A.N.U. policy, or the working of the Cabinet system in the Central Government. But he is concerned, and he feels that he is part of the system. This, I think, is a hope. Whether it is a stable hope or not is hard to say. Whether or not, if Nyerere moved from the scene, things would collapse, one can't forecast. As long as he's there, however, he manages to keep this incredible hold over his people. This is a hold which is not one simply of awe or respect, although both are there; I think it is a very profound affection for the man. A man who could happily argue that he has a one-party state, not because he is a doctrinaire one-party man, not even perhaps because this is the African system, but because there is no opposition. There is no point in creating one if there isn't one! When he was asked, "What on earth do we do, trying to pursue the Westminster system of having the Government on the left and the Opposition on the right, or vice versa?" he said "Oh! we'll have A to K on the right and M to Z on the left!" He can take that reasonably light-heartedly. He can do that simply because he believes that things are working the way he would like to see them working.

Tanganyika is not a wealthy country, as I have already suggested. If Sir Edward Twining couldn't find wealth, I'm pretty sure Julius Nyerere can't. But at least he has got what Twining tried, by different means, to achieve but didn't succeed in achieving—the backing of 99.99 recurring percent of the population! □