But how, in good conscience, can we agree that no one was to blame for his death? The blame for Dr Aggett's death must, in my view, be allocated to, and apportioned between, a number of persons and agencies. First and foremost, it must be laid at the door of the legislation which permits detention without trial in solitary confinement Despite the findings of the Rabie Commission, there is more than enough evidence, both in South Africa and elsewhere, to show that abuse of the detention without trial power is virtually inevitable. But legislation nas no independent existence of its own. It is an expression of the values which prevail in the society which brings it into existence. So the blame must go also to the persons who enacted the Terrorism Act and its successor, the Internal Security Act of 1982, and who permit such 'indescribably wicked' legislation to continue in existence. It must fall heavily too upon the members of the security police and upon the members of the South African executive, both past and present, who hold or held in their hands the rudder of the South African ship of state. Lastly, and most of all, it must fall upon the ordinary fun-loving, sun-loving, honest-to-God white South African, who, surrounded by poverty and suffering, enjoys one of the highest living standards in the world and by an extraordinary feat of wilful blindness, does not, will not, see what indescribable abominations are being executed in his name and for his alleged benefit. □

SOUTH AFRICA THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS

The Steyn Commission's interpretation of social and political reality.

by Ralph Lawrence

Mr P.W. Botha throughout his period of office as Prime Minister of South Africa's Nationalist Government has sought to project the image of the reformist, a politician well aware of the dynamics of social and political processes, yet at the same time a pragmatist, sensitive to the constraints on public-policy making at any juncture. To this end advice on many significant areas of public policy has been requested. The President's Council was initiated to provide advice on constitutional proposals; the Human Sciences Research Council has, at the Government's behest, carried out studies of sport and education; and commissions of inquiry have reported on labour, employment, security, and the mass media. In this article I examine the work of two Commissions of Inquiry, both headed by Justice Steyn and both dealing with the press, to ascertain not the specific policies they recommend but the intellectual foundations of their analyses, their ideological outlook. We can then determine whether those who actually make public policy are receiving at least some source of advice which encourages them to think differently and promotes a climate of change in society which is reflected in the public policies eventually adopted.

The first so-called Steyn Commission was set up to investigate the relation between the mass media and the state on matters of security.[1] This Report appeared in early 1980. The second Commission carried this task a stage further by being given very generous terms of reference, to judge '. . . whether the conduct of, and the handling of matters by, the mass media meet the needs and interests of the South African community and the demands of the times, and, if not, how they can be improved.'[2] These findings were made puboic in early 1982.[3]

First of all, a preliminary note on my selection of the Steyn Commissioners's efforts for the type of analysis I propose. Both Commissions concluded that their respective terms of reference necessitated a full factual and 'scientific' examination of the context in which the mass media operated; namely, South African society. A large part of these Reports deal with this aspect, clearly revealing an ideological perspective and attendant general public policy prescriptions. Unless indicated to the contrary, I present a composite analysis of the two Reports, for although the second Commission was entirely independent of the first, and not bound by its findings, in practice the work of the bodies proved to be complementary. The later Steyn Commission was substantially in agreement with the views of its predecessor, going so far as attempting to rebut its critics.

I have chosen to restrict myself here to three areas of the Steyn Reports: the social fabric and the political order; democracy; the state, and the relation between the individual and the state. These are two other topics, which for reasons of space I have omitted - the theory of the 'total onslaught' and the appropriate response, a 'national strategy'. The total onslaught comprises the ideological and material forces, within and without South Africa, directed against the present system of rule. The national strategy is the ideological and material riposte, dictating the substance, pace and timing of changes in public policy. The total onslaught, in particular, pervades the Reports, providing the background to and complementing the interpretation of social and political reality I now begin to discuss.

The Social Failure and the Political Order

Does South African society constitute a community, in the sense of a population residing in a given territory, sharing common interests and unified by as well as owing allegiance to the same political authority? The latter Steyn Commission put forward the following argument. To begin with the status of whites in South Africa has to be considered. Can they be regarded justifiably as indigeneous people of South Africa? 'The Afrikaner is unquestionably a true child of Africa' whose only home is South Africa.[4] Afrikaners were once a settler community but they became a nation with its own language, identity and culture - the Cape-Dutch and Boer-Republican cultures.[5] English-speaking South Africans, however, are only in the process of becoming an African people as they interact with Afrikaners and 'other Peoples', thus differentiating them from English-speakers elsewhere.

South Africa is ethnically diverse; it is composed of a number of peoples, each of whom is determined to retain its own ethnic and cultural diversity. This is a well-established fact.[6]

As such each people in this plural community of nations has a different fundamental outlook or perception of reality from that of other peoples. This is manifest in how a people views its past, its present circumstances and its future. On this basis different approaches to social, economic and political demands are inevitable. [7] Apart from cultural cleavages South Africa's population also experiences different levels of economic development: 'This is indeed a land of extremes, where the First World and the Third World co-exist, but do not easily co-operate or harmonise - not even the components of the First World amongst themselves or those of the Third World.'[8]

Given all these various types of diversity it would seem unlikely that South Africans have the common needs and interests which are necessary conditions for any community. The second Steyn Commission, however, found a number of grounds for deciding that South Africa is actually a community, characterised by 'unity in diversity' - as symbolised by the design of the national flag.[9]

For a start, human beings in general share certain fundamental but essential needs and interests; namely, food, clothing and shelter, as well as order and stability, the minimum prerequisites for harmonious social relations.[10] A population sharing these material interests develops a degree of coherence and acquires a sense of identity; it becomes a community. White and Black South Africans have shown very clearly by their attitudes and behaviour that they do have some common needs and interests - order, peace, economic prosperity and political freedom.[11] Thus a South African community exists. Readily identifiable ethnic groups can be part of a community: the Commission supports this by drawing attention to three examples - the European Economic Community, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

A sense of community is evident when its members are willing to co-operate with one another. They collaborate in the pursuance of common objectives and each is aware of the other's worth in so doing. This, too, the Commission held is an acknowledged fact in South Africa. The case of the Boer War is cited. Some English-speakers assisted the Boers in their struggle, as did Blacks who were described in the Report as 'battle-attendants. — Agterryers. [12] More recently Black and White Africans together with Namibians have been '... facing the common foe in South West Africa and other operational theatres and rear areas in defence of Common ideals and of a common sub-continental homeland ...' [13]

But this general point can be put even more strongly. The peoples of South Africa — as the Commission refers to them — do not merely co-operate in the furtherance of common needs and interests ; they share a common destiny of which they are increasingly conscious. This is the true import, it would appear, of the Commission's phrase 'unity in diversity'. People who are concerned to maintain their identity nevertheless act in concert with people of different ethnic groups because their destiny is a common one. Put another way, this is the explanation for 'aggressive South African heterogeneity'; the inherent urge of a community to determine its own destiny according to its own designs.[14] What are the political implications of this view?

South Africa is recognised by the international community to be that territory and population which fall under the jurisdiction of the political rulers in the central government in Pretoria. This is the South African state, which does not

accord with the Steyn Commissioners' view of political reality. Instead, the second Steyn Report regards the same territory as the 'Inner Core' or South African community, composing the Republic of South Africa and the 'independent states' of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and

Ciskei, as well as, it would appear, 'South West Africa'.[15] It is acknowledged that all ethnic groups have equal rights to self-determination. There is no demand to eradicate ethnicity; in fact, quite the reverse. 'In political terms, at least in respect of customary and habitual life-style, there appears to be no demand for integration. The response to the question whether each population group should or should not live according to its own customs and habits was strongly in favour of the maintenance of own life-style ...'[16]

There are three main shades of opinion in South African politics, the Report says. One is that Marxist rule should be established by revolutionary means. Secondly, what one might term the liberal view, namely, that majority rule should replace minority rule, with the transition coming about peacefully. Thirdly, the conservative or pragmatic approach; in this category there is the Nationalist government, the White opposition political parties and leaders of other population groups who participate in the operation of the current political institutions.[17] The Steyn Commissions favour the pragmatic school.

Political reality determines the appropriate style of rule. In the South African community, this means co-operation between Whites and Blacks: '... there are too many Whites (who are also too determined) in South Africa for the Blacks to be able to "chase them into the sea", and too many Blacks (who are likewise too determined) in South Africa for the Whites to subjugate and keep subject by force.'[18] If either Whites or Blacks exclude each other from public policy decision-making, political and economic disaster will follow, creating a vacuum which a foreign power may fill.[19]

On grounds of pragmatism, then, White and Black political leaders should collaborate. This was put into practice at the end of the 1960s when the democratic rulers of the day concluded that the South African community's future should not be settled by armed conflict. Negotiations commenced then and have accelerated over the past decade, with the mode of deliberation constantly being adapted to changing circumstances. The benefit of '... this interaction is having a yeast-like effect on the Inner Core's body politic,

causing a beneficent and dynamic fermentation of thought and the generation of new, realistic and positive perceptions, attitudes and relationships at all levels . . .'20 Despite sharp differences of opinion between South Africa's political élite the process of consultation has made them acutely aware of their interdependence and their common needs and interests: co-operation helps to foster a sense of community.

All in all South Africa's situation is somewhat paradoxical. Stability is provided by effective political rule and a 'basically sound' economy. Yet the community is simultaneously in a state of flux because of its undergoing legal, social and political change. 21

What range of acceptable public policy alternatives is implied by this perception of society and politics? Two features stand out. First, any public policy-makers must take as axiomatic that the main cleavage in South African society is ethnic - this must be maintained. Second, the South African community has certain common needs and interests, the most important of which is to accommodate by negotiation Black and White political aspirations in 'a constellation of states'. 22 This evolutionary process is well-established allowing South Africans to seek solutions to problems in their own 'idiom', without interference from imported ideologies like liberalism or Marxism. The 'Inner Core' is thus dynamic; moreover it is a dynamism with particular qualities — a 'developing democracy'.

Both Steyn Commissions conclude that South Africa is a 'developing and plural democracy' in which the various nations or ethnic groups are subject to a republican form of government: 'Within South Africa and South-West Africa there are at present dynamic forces at work within our midst aimed at the development of the internal order into a multiracial symbiosis modelled on the fundamental values, conduct and world-view of the true religiously-orientated and democratically inclined civilization.' 23 What are the characteristics of democracy in South Africa? There is, the Reports conclude, basic freedom of speech and Press with criticism of the state tolerated within the confines of the law. The judiciary is free from political control; all individuals are equal before the law. Despite state influence the capitalist economy is mainly unfettered. Church and state operate independently, with freedom of religion guaranteed. The 'peoples defence force', security and police forces are apolitical, symbols of national verity and integrity,' . . . the protectors of the life and limb, hearth and home and general security interests of the citizens'.24

Although South Africa is a developing democracy it is not an orthodox liberal democracy with equal political rights for all and a popularly elected legislature and executive. This is an ideal which is not necessarily appropriate for every society in all phases of its development. 25 Liberal democracy only flourishes in homogeneous, rather small societies, without substantial urbanisation, industrialisation and a high rate of population growth. In any case, even the supposed democracies are subject to stress and instability. Britain is suffering militant trade unions, civil disorder and Irish Republican Army terrorism; the United States has wilted under Black Power and persistent racial inequality; democracy is unsuccessful in the European Economic Community. The ideal democracies are not so ideal after all.26

In any event the Westminster system of government cannot be expected to function troublefree in Africa since it is a cultural transplant bound to be rejected by its recipient society.

It would certainly fail in South Africa, given its ethnic diversity, a fast-growing population, a large landmass, industrialisation and urbanisation, which are the very circumstances preventing liberal democracy from taking root. Its initiation would divide society not unite it, for although South Africa is a community, a corporate sense of identity among the people is still lacking; there is a differentiation rather than uniformity. 27 At least a decade must pass before a sense of common destiny can be fully established. 28

In a liberal democracy the opinion of the majority expressed at the polls decides who will form the government. The second Steyn Commission believed that it is not quite so easy to determine what constitutes a majority in a heterogeneous society like South Africa:

> Within the totality of that Community of Peoples each such distinct National or Ethnic Component is a minority as against the rest; but within a particular Nation or group the members thereof usually perceive "the will of the majority" to be that of the majority within their own group, and they cannot usually be expected to defer or bow to the will of some majority on the "outside". 29

For a variety of reasons, then, liberal democracy is undesirable and dangerous to implement in South Africa. But this is not to say that the present South African political dispensation is undemocratic. What makes it a democracy is the fact that leaders of all population groups are able to have some influence on government decision-making. Blacks thus exercise considerable indirect political power even though they are unrepresented in the central legislature. The greater the degree of consultation between Whites and Blacks, the more expansive the democracy - and South Africa's democracy is undoubtedly expanding. Therefore, to regard the country '. . . as an oppressive, racist-inspired White regime suppressing the Black majority and depriving them of their human dignity . . . is fallacious thinking, which in addition ignores the present internal South African dynamism.' 30

Democracy

Democracy is a mode of political rule. We must now consider the Steyn Commissions' understanding of political rule itself, particularly their conception of the state and the relation between the individual and the state.

Individuals are fallible by nature, requiring aid to prevent them from succumbing to their foibles and all manner of dangers. 31 Without society man deteriorates, his mental powers recede. The survival of the individual, his welfare and happiness is only possible in a social context. Society makes self-fulfilment possible. Man is inescapably a social being. 32 However, the social fabric alone cannot sustain order and stability. Man's unrelenting efforts to dominate man must be tempered.

> Put in its most basic form, the quest for power, the struggle to achieve command, maintain, consolidate and exercise power, whether with just or unjust intentions, is one of the fundamental driving forces in man. This power struggle is as old as man. It appears in the individual, the institutional or corporate level, within the community, between political parties, in industry and commerce, between states, in brief, everywhere. 33

The role of the South African state is instrumental. In other words it has no intrinsic qualities beyond the functions it

serves which is to provide for the needs of society. Society cannot do without the state, yet without society there would be no rationale for the state at all. [34] The state is an artifice devised by society to attempt to remedy its shortcomings, to bring about orderly social relations. In the 1980 Steyn Report the state is defined as '. . . a political system, constituted into an organisational unity by its citizens, a particular territory and a system of law which renders legal a particular way in which power is discharged. Within its territory the state enjoys the highest measure of sovereignty.' [35] A state possesses 'inalienable rights' established and guaranteed by law. Against this orderly background individuals and institutions can pursue their goals. Because of the indispensability of the state to society any attempts to replace it with a stateless or anarchic society must be resisted and no such tendencies should be given any encouragement. [36] The internal object of the state is to maintain law and order; externally, its role is to protect its citizens. [37] These ends are attained by government which acts in the national interest. Government is the set of institutions through which state power is exercised. In a democratic system political rulers owe their office to the members of society. [38]

The State and the Individual.

This brings us to the relationship between the state and the individual. In Western liberal democracy political activity is evaluated in the final resort by the advantages or disadvantages conferred on individuals. However, the situation is different in South Africa since the community takes precedence over the individual. This is basic to both Afrikaner and African political thought: '. . . Afrikaner political thinking . . . takes as its fundamental tenets the political freedom and differential development, of Peoples, or ethno-cultural Communities, rather than that of the individual as a deculturalised and non-ethnic base component of a politically and racially undifferentiated Body Politic.' [39] Once again, the Steyn Commission asserts, this demonstrates how foreign ideologies are inappropriate and impractical in the South African context. [40]

A similar fallacy, so the Reports say, distorts the notion of an individual's rights. Rights and duties are correlative; every right entails a duty. [43] What this implies emerges clearly in a passage in the first Report dealing with military conscription. The argument runs as follows. Because Whites enjoy political rights they have '. . . corresponding civic duties in defence of the system that accords them such rights.' [44] The electorate determines at the polls whether a cause should be defended or not. That is what decide the existence of a 'just war'. Thereafter the individual is obliged to accept the majority opinion and it is illegal to refuse to abide by it. 'Should an individual, because of personal moral conviction, not be able to accept as just the cause that the people have accepted as just,

he may exercise his right of withdrawing from the community.' [45] (This is a highly circumscribed 'right' for reasons which will soon become obvious.)

There are not inalienable or absolute individual rights, that is, general and universal rights which are not **conferred** on individuals by the state, but **possessed** independently of the state. The Steyn Commissions adopted a positivist approach. All rights are to be found in common and statute law. [46] Rights and obligations are regulated by the legal system. Three comments at this stage. First, if all rights are created by the state, then it is the opinion of the judiciary or decision of the executive which will decide whether an individual does have the right of withdrawal from the community. Secondly, if rights are solely legal artefacts does an individual have only legal obligations — that is, no moral obligations if they have no legal standing? Thirdly, rights may be curtailed or withheld by executive action. Hence there is no natural justice; justice is what the law says it is and that is variable. Or as the Commissioners put it: 'law must always be just, but justice must be determined according to the requirement concerned.' [47]

The relationship between the rights and duties of individuals is emphasised, particularly in the earlier Report, because it was felt that rights are continually stressed, but little is ever said about duties, especially an individual's obligation to his country and community. [48] Since 1945, says the Report, the trend has been for the individual to take precedence over society which has led to constant attacks on social, political and legal authority. The 'Western public has . . . been continuously fed on a "rights-rich, duties-poor diet" of legal and socio-political philosophies which markedly weaken the social fabric, especially in the ranks of the young.' [49]

Human Rights

Human rights present a problem, as the second Steyn Commission, on the basis of their sources, was unable to find widely shared agreement on what these rights actually are. But whatever they are, they exist in a social context and are part of social relationships, including those that bind members to groups, and groups to groups. [50] The importance of human rights, then, must be assessed against the background of the circumstances of a society. [51]

When a society is in the throes of crisis, as South Africa is, bearing the brunt of a total onslaught, the security of the state overrides the rights of individuals. In the Commission's words, 'the current and anticipated threat is so serious that the "Supreme Right" of the State must prevail and its defensibility and survival interest must take precedence over the lesser interest of the individual and the group.' [52] The argument for this is identical to that for the justification of political rule. The state serves the individual; measures which protect the state are beneficial to him. Consequently, curtailing an individual's rights is done in his interest. Thus security legislation which restricts rights to legal redress is introduced for the sake of the community, to counter the dangers it faces. The 'abnormal demands of the times' are the cause of these measures. But who decides when the state is imperilled? The state itself. [53] And is it the state which is at risk — or the government which, of course, is an entirely different matter? At one point the 1980 Steyn Commission suggests that the press' right to public information may be limited if the government is in trouble. The passage reads, '. . . where government anticipates risk to its survival, (the press) may be precluded from the disclosing of less sensitive information relating to security and defence matters.' [54]

Two noteworthy features emerged in this section on the state and the individual. One is the stress yet again on the community and the corresponding irrelevance of Western doctrine on individual rights and the state. This in a way is surprising, or at least inconsistent, since the justification for political rule, described earlier, is the classical liberal view whereby formal political institutions and practices are only legitimate in so far as they satisfy the basic requirements of individuals.

And, one might add, although the Steyn Commisssioners constantly inveigh against the perniciousness of alien political ideas, their own stance is hardly free of such influence.

Summary

Finally, the intellectual foundations of the Steyn Reports represented in the preceding analysis can be summarised and organised into the following set of propositions:

1. Man is not innately good.

    i. One of man's fallibilities is the desire for power

    ii. Individuals have in common certain basic needs — food, clothing, shelter, order and peace.

2. South African society is heterogeneous.

    i. The main cleavage is ethno-cultural due to a desire for national identity.

    ii. South Africa is a community with common needs and interests — order, security, prosperity, freedom.

    iii. The community is the fundamental social unit.

    iv. A common destiny is developing based on a sense of community and a growing awareness of a shared threat to and hopes for the present social and political order.

3. Unique situations demand unique-solutions.

    i. South African society is unique; it is being subjected to unique pressures.

    ii. South African solutions must be sought for South African problems.

    iii. Foreign ideologies are inherently unworkable in South Africa.

4. The state makes possible stable and fulfilling social relations.

    i. Instrumental; the state serves the individual.

    ii. Rights and duties are correlative.

    iii. Positivism; rights are established by the state.

    iv. Natural rights are a standard, not a requirement.

    v. The security of the state takes precedence over the rights of individuals for their benefit.

    vi. The state itself decides what is in the public interest.

For there to be consistency between such an ideological stance and public policies pursued by the state an acceptable political dispensation in South Africa must conform to these prescriptions:

1. Unity in diversity.

    i. Ethno-cultural groups have a right to self-determination.

    ii. Ethno-cultural groups have equal rights.

2. Political dispensation.

    i. Ethno-cultural groups seek a political order in which group identity will be maintained.

    ii. The South African community is a constellation of states.

3. Political development.

    i. Co-operation is the widely shared style among South Africa's political leaders.

    ii. Black leaders participate to an ever-increasing degree in the policy decision-making of central government.

4. Democracy.

    i. South Africa is a developing and plural democracy.

    ii. Democratisation is the degree of influence on policy decision-making.

    iii. Liberal democracy is an ideal which is practically unrealisable in South Africa.

There is not a single aspect of the ieological basis of the Steyn Commissions' work which suggests any major deviation from the views and policies enunciated by South Africa's current political establishment. Far from being a creative and imaginative source of advice the Steyn Reports attempt to legiti-mise and foster the spirit of cautious reforms and tentative, inherently conservative, political change practised by the Nationalist Government. It is ironic that these independent Commissions of Inquiry, free from political party and governmental representation, should offer in their Reports such a splendid illustration of the contemporary **apartheid** mind at work.

References

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(1) The terms of reference were published in Republic of South Africa **Government Gazette**, No. 6776, 14 December 1979; No. 6821, January 1980. The report itself appeared as Republic of South Africa, **Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Reporting of Security Matters Regarding the South African Defence Force and South African Police**, RP52/1980, Pretoria, Government Printer. (Henceforth referred to as S1.) — (2) Government Gazette, No. 7106, 27 June 1980. (3) Republic of South Africa, **Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media**, RP89/1981, Pretoria, Government Printer. (Subsequently referred to as S2.) For an excellent review of this work, see André du Toit, 'The Steyn Commission and the Theory of the Total Onslaught', **South African Outlook**, April 1982, pp 51-54. — (4) S1, p4; S2, p965. — (5) S2, p181. — (6) S2, p180. — (7) S2, p177. — (8) S1, p74; S2, pp175, 800, 887, 1131. — (9) S2, pp1130-1131. — (10) S2, p177. — (11) S2, p175. — (12) S2, pp180, 1138. — (13) S2, p178. And: 'An even more striking demonstration of that capacity to join hands and to bridge a seemingly unbridgeable psychological, cultural and political gulf and to co-operate in the realisation of a joint Ideal is to be found at the foot of the Women's Memorial at Bloemfontein, a Monument representing the sacred essence of Afrikanerdom. Of the five persons there buried three came from English-speaking homes, and one, Emily Hobhouse, never mastered the Afrikaans language.' S2, p177. — (14) S2, p178. — (15) S1, p45; S2, p177. — (16) S2, p184. — (17) S2, p923. — (18) S1, p55. White right-wing terrorism is a response to the Goverment's '. . . policy of adaptation to changing circumstances and of dynamic and realistc development of the South African Community.' S2, p170. — (19) S2, p720. — (20) S2, p721. (21) S2, p185, Cf. also pp178-179. — (22) S2, pp184-185. — (23) S S2, p185. — (24) S1, p25. — (25) S1, p7. — (26) S2, p182. — (27) S2, pp197-198. — (28) S2, p201. — (29) S1, p25. — (30) S2, pp198-199. — (31) S1, p36. — (32) S1, p17; S2, p721. — (33) S1, p17; S2, pp 262-263. — (34) S2, p880. — (35) S2, p282. — (36) S1, p90. — (37) S1, pp91-92. — (38) S1, p90. — (39) S1, p92. 'Government and its institution are primarily responsible for the monitoring, planning and stability-ensuing process . . . To create and maintain a stable climate a government must not only be fair and just, but must be perceived to be fair, just and responsible, to have the will to act effectively and to be credible in the eyes of the community it serves.' S2, pp897-898. — (40) S2, pp655-656. — (41) Ibid. Note, too, this general ad-mònition: 'As in all human affairs, matters pertaining to South Africa are more often than not markedly different from what they seem to be at first glance or through doctrinal spectacles designed elsewhere for use in other surroundings; and caution is, therefore, necessary when attempting to scout the South African landscape through such glasses lest one stumbles and falls over some undetected obstacle.' S1, p279. — (42) '. . . an orderly compliance with civic duties is a necessary corollary to the enjoyment of civic rights.' S1, p64. Presumably, then, the reverse is equally true — a duty is only owed when a right is conferred? Thus on this view if one has no political rights one incurs no political obligations. — (43) S1, p63. — (44) ibid. — (45) S1, pp9, 17-18, 41. — (46) S1, p18. Natural justice can only be a standard: '. . . in our opinion, "the Natural Law Tradition" of our law is a precious heritage which must at all costs be preserved and constantly used as a "golden metawand" or instrument wherewith to . . . measure the quality of existing or contemplated laws and procedures, and also as a guiding star in our journey towards a more fully developed socio-legal dispensation.' S2, pp202-203. — (47) S1, p23. — (48) S2, p262. — (49) 'The reciprocal gravitational pulls of the solar system of the individual and his cluster of rights and the Galaxy of Society, constitute the right-duty relationship between the single person and the group that constitutes the web of relationship which is of the essence of human existence.' S2, p263. — (50) S2, p288. — (51) S1, p144. Elsewhere, 'Salus republicae suprema lex' is quoted — the security of the state is the supreme law. See S1, pp16-19. — (52) 'The commission emphasizes that only the State is able to determine what is dangerous to the State and what is in the interests of State security . . .' Mr F. le Roux (N.P. Brakpan) speaking in the House of Assembly on 28 April 1980. Republic of South Africa, **House of Assembly Debates**, Vol 86, Col. 4963. — (53) S1, p153. □