

minority. We must either support both views or reject both views if we are to be consistent. Most liberals will reject both.

(3) *We must abstain from force.* When there was a Liberal Party this was its express view, and the impatient members who broke their Party rule were expelled from the Party. We cannot make the best of both worlds. If we wish to convince by argument we cannot threaten force. It is against the interests of our cause to do so. We may indeed understand and respect those who feel otherwise, who are often brave men even if mistaken ones; but we must be firm on this attitude of non-violence ourselves.

(4) *We must not advise force.* I cannot myself admire those who remaining in safety themselves, encourage others to use the dangerous methods of force. Here as throughout we must have clear and honest minds and not be led away by any adolescent desires to be above all in the avante-

garde. Liberals, like the Whigs of the Cambridge poet's epigram,

"Admit no force but argument."

### THE FORCE OF ARGUMENT

But everything which leads us to oppose physical force combines to place on our shoulders the inescapable duty to *speak out courageously*, and protest against the regime maintained by force in our own country. This is not treason, it is the highest patriotism. That the actions of the Government and the Security Police make it dangerous is undoubtedly true. *We are called, as South Africans who love their country, to face those dangers. Non-violence does not mean apathy, dumb acquiescence or fear. Let us remember and apply the words of the old hymn:*

"Where duty calls or danger, Be never wanting there."

# SOUTH AFRICA'S EXPANSION POLICY

by Robert Molteno

(The last in a series of three articles)

The danger to the developing countries of close trade ties with South Africa only becomes fully manifest when it is realised that South Africa's goal is not just trade, but the creation of a huge free trade area and Customs Union in Central and East Africa.

In recent years her balance of payments has been dramatically deteriorating. In the first half of the 1960's — 1960 to 1964, the average annual trade gap was R242 million.<sup>1</sup> In the second half of the 1960's — 1965 to 1969, this gap widened to an annual average of R535 million. Figures for the early months of 1970 indicate a further deterioration. The average monthly adverse trade balance rose from R31.3 million in 1968 to R51.1 million in 1969 and to R92.2 million in January 1970. The only factor which saved her from crisis was the huge and growing export of gold. In 1960, gold valued at R530 million was exported. This figure rose to R811 million in 1969. But gold production has reached its peak. 1969 output was only 0.5% greater than 1968. In the face of rising costs and the absence of any major new ore-bodies, it is expected that gold production will begin to fall from the mid 1970's<sup>2</sup> The consequences for South Africa's balance of payments are likely to be



Four international boundaries meet at one point. South Africa claimed that a point did not constitute an area, and that Botswana could not establish a road and ferry link through to.

serious. Mr. Harry Oppenheimer, leading mineowner and industrialist, stated in November 1969 that the replacement of gold as a generator of foreign exchange was the main economic problem facing the country.<sup>3</sup> And the 1968 — 1973 Economic Development Plan has called for a 41% increase in merchandise exports.<sup>4</sup> Yet agricultural exports cannot possibly compensate for the gap caused by falling gold production. Indeed agriculture has failed to maintain its share either of the Gross National Product or of exports.

This means that the increasing balance of payments deficit can only be remedied by a huge increase in exports of manufactured goods. But this South Africa has found very hard to achieve. Distance, higher unit costs and technological lag have all prevented her manufactured goods from penetrating the major markets of Europe and North America. In the first six months of 1969, only

4% of South African exports to Britain were manufactured goods – excluding unprocessed copper and diamond exports.<sup>5</sup> This contrasts starkly with the fact that, in 1967, 87.5% of South African exports to Zambia were manufactured goods.<sup>6</sup> South Africa's natural market is Africa. But even here, for political and economic reasons, she is often unable to compete successfully with other industrialised nations. The solution for her would be to include a large number of African states in a protected market – i.e. a Free Trade area dominated by herself.

## ADVANTAGE TO SOUTH AFRICA

The advantages to South Africa of a Free Trade area are easily demonstrated. In the existing Customs Union area of South Africa, South West Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland – South Africa in 1964 supplied 89% of their imports and had a favourable balance of trade with them of R67 million.<sup>7</sup> With the former states of the Central African Federation, (Rhodesia, Zambia and Malawi), which are not linked to South Africa in a free trade area – South Africa only supplied 23% of their import requirements; and in the same year only 8% of Mozambique and Angola's imports. If these states were included in her free trade zone and she were able to dominate their market to the same extent that she dominates her present "partners", she would, on 1964 figures, increase her exports by R476 million a year – or almost the size of the average annual trade deficit she was running in the second half of the 1960's.

**Both Government and businessmen are aware of the huge advantages to South Africa of a wider free trade area. The result has been a growing clamour for the South African Government to initiate a Common Market of Southern Africa – to include countries as far afield as Zambia and even Congo (Kinshasa). Dr. Verwoerd was the first minister to enunciate the idea as early as 1963. He has been followed by the Minister of Economic Affairs, Jan Haak, who in 1965 opened a Conference on "A Common Market in Africa – a marketing concept." He advocated that links, similar to those existing between South Africa and her Reserves and the High Commission Territories, be extended to other African states i.e. "a customs union, and almost free flow of capital, a monetary unit, and a substantial flow of labour."<sup>8</sup>**

Since then, a senior diplomat, Eschel Rhoadie, has written a book, "The Third Africa" (1967), elaborating the idea. In 1969, the University of Pretoria commissioned a special study on the feasibility of the project.<sup>9</sup> And in May 1970, a conference was held at Victoria Falls in Rhodesia to explore the possibilities more fully.

## PERPETUATES BACKWARDNESS

While the benefits to South Africa would be enormous, the results for African states would be disastrous. It is an axiom of economic theory that a free trade area perpetuates the backwardness of the underdeveloped regions included in it. Even the pro-Government journal, *Newscheck* (30/5/1969) admitted: "A customs union is economically justifiable only among states whose productive patterns are fairly competitive before union and which have the possibility of becoming more complementary after integration.

"Also a precondition of the success of a common market is that its members should be at roughly the same level of economic development. Neither of these crucial pre-conditions exists in Southern Africa. In fact, almost the exact opposite prevails." Underdeveloped areas are unable to industrialise because they lack the markets, infrastructure, and ancillary services which would attract industry. And South Africa, in her relations with her existing Customs Union partners, has not taken any measures to correct this tendency whereby they are lagging further and further behind her economically. In these circumstances, for an African state, which is underdeveloped, to join South Africa's projected Common Market would spell perpetual poverty. It is noteworthy that both Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies have shown a marked lack of enthusiasm for the idea.

**It is for this reason that South Africa's goal of a huge Free Trade area is quite consistent with her other goal of keeping Africa's manufactured exports out of her home market. For the creation of a Common Market in the Southern third of the Continent would halt any further industrialisation of states outside South Africa, but in the Market. South African industries would therefore not be threatened significantly with undercutting from lower cost producers in the Market since few would already exist, and fewer still would come into existence in the future. The main result would merely be South African industries gaining easier access to a larger market.**

History also has shown the danger of free trade areas to underdeveloped nations. The United States and the old Dominions were only able to industrialise once they ended free trade with Britain and erected protective tariff barriers. South Africa's own economic development policy has for decades been based on the same technique.

Even the internal economic history of South Africa shows the tendency of industry to locate itself only in developed areas. Most of her industry is in the Southern Transvaal where the goldmines originally created favourable conditions. The coastal industrial areas of Cape Town and Port Elizabeth are finding their growth rates much lower than the Southern Transvaal. As for the rural areas – white as well as black – they are devoid of industry. Only stringent government measures – financial carrots as well as administrative sticks – have forced a few reluctant industrialists to locate their factories in the Border areas on the fringes of African "Reserves" – i.e. away from existing concentrations of industry.

## DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES

The disastrous consequences of Free Trade for weaker partners (and any African state joining would be a weaker partner) is most conclusively shown by the economic history of Southern Africa as a whole. The High Commission Territories have been bound to South Africa by a common Customs Union for sixty years. And the result has been the complete absence of any factories in Lesotho, Botswana and even Swaziland. Botswana is well aware of further unfavourable consequences to herself of the Customs Union. In 1966, President Khama pointed out that his country was not represented on the South African Reserve Bank and could not therefore influence monetary policy which affected it. The revenue from the Customs Union was not related to Botswana's economic growth. The cost of living in Botswana was inflated without any compensating

advantages by the high duties South Africa imposes on imports to protect her industry.<sup>10</sup>

Another instance of the adverse consequences of free trade is Southern Rhodesia which only began to industrialise after the Second World War when the formation of the Central African Federation gave her both an external tariff wall against South Africa and protected access to the large markets of Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Nyasaland (now Malawi). Zambia herself, situated for ten years in the free trade area of the C.A.F., suffered a total lack of industrialisation until she broke out of the C.A.F., in 1964. Since then her manufacturing sector has grown at the very high annual rate of 30%.<sup>11</sup>

## EXPLOITIVE INTENTIONS

The exploitive intentions behind South Africa's Free Trade plans have been most crudely sketched by the pro-Government journal, *Africa South* (February 1968 – page 4); "Our economic and political objectives in Southern Africa are to harness all natural and human resources from the Table Mountain (in Cape Town) to the border of the Congo River . . . Countries like Rhodesia, Malawi, Portuguese East Africa, will be amicably persuaded (sic) to adopt the Rand as their currency . . . There is already a Resources Planning Council for Southern Africa which has to investigate and advise all countries in Southern Africa to avoid duplication of certain industries, which duplication could lead to extravagance and unnecessary competition between countries. (A euphemism for hurting South African industrialists' profits). Member countries of the Common Market could complement one another. For example, the Republic of South Africa could manufacture machinery, chemicals, and electrical appliances – while the Transkei could produce jute, Swaziland sugar, Botswana beef, and Lesotho water."

## THE POLITICAL PRICE

We have examined in detail the pros and cons of African states becoming involved in various kinds of economic relationship with South Africa. Leaving aside the moral and ideological costs involved, our analysis has shown that it is by no means self-evident that it is economically to the advantage of African states to enter these relationships. All sorts of costs are involved more or less obvious, short run and long run.

**But there remains one more question to be asked. What are the consequences for the independence and full freedom of action of those African states who enter into close and dependent relations with South Africa?**

South Africa is thrusting out into Africa for a number of reasons. She needs markets for her manufactured goods. She wants to export capital. She requires buffer zones on her borders which will deny transit to guerillas. How extensive South Africa wishes these buffer zones to be was made clear by the Minister of Police in October 1968 when he argued that she must win the good will of Black states *to the South of the Equator* so that they could act as buffers against pressure from the North.<sup>12</sup> She needs diplomatic ties and other manifestations of friendship by African states to show the West that it too can afford politically to relax its pressure on South Africa. The blatantly opportunistic and self-interested nature of South Africa's "outward-looking" policy in

Africa was revealed by Foreign Minister Dr. Hilgard Muller, in 1968. "As the West becomes aware of our fruitful co-operation with other African states, their attitude towards us improves. I believe that it will happen to an increasing degree because we must simply accept that our relations with the rest of the world are largely determined by our relations with the African states."<sup>13</sup>

## AMENABLE

Her strategy of expansion is based on building and perpetuating a series of links which will make African states dependent on her and so amenable to her will. These mechanisms of dependence should be noted. She has openly proclaimed, utilised, and intensified the geographical dependence of the three former High Commission Territories. Thus President's Nixon's decision early in 1970 to aid them in reducing their dependence on the Republic was greeted with dismay by Nationalist Party commentators. "It is an illusion that sees Botswana's and even Lesotho's love for South Africa as anything more than cupboard love". The new American Policy "could be interpreted by these states as a green light to lessen . . . their ties with South Africa." "It will raise them to a position where they too will be able to join Africa's militancy against us."<sup>14</sup> It followed that, when a little later Botswana tried to end this dependence by using American aid to build a road and improved ferry link with Zambia, South Africa suddenly claimed that Botswana and Zambia did not have a common border.<sup>15</sup> The political intentions behind South Africa's trade thrust into Africa were made clear by *Newscheck* (28/2/1969) – "To longstanding business activity has come official benediction and a political parallel in the form of the Government's outward policy. That South African business should become more active in neighbouring black-states; and not only in Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies, is an implicit part of the policy". The tourist trade is another device to create dependence.

More sinister methods of creating client states in the continent include her military support for the eventually abortive Katanga Secession in 1960/61 and the Biafran Secession in 1969.<sup>16</sup> South Africa has also sought – under the guise of technical aid – to second White Civil Servants to key administrative positions in African states. This process has gone furthest in Lesotho where the Chief Justice, Chief Electoral Officer, head of the radio, chief Legal Adviser, Manager of the Lesotho National Development Corporation, and several advisers are all White South Africans. The process is being repeated elsewhere. The chairman of the Swaziland Public Service Commission is now a South African Civil Servant, as is the head of Malawi's Information Services.

## KEY QUESTION

The key question which every African state must answer is how South Africa will utilise this dependence to limit their freedom of action when it is in her interests to do so? Although the policy is only just beginning, there are already some answers to this question. In 1963 South Africa pressured the former High Commission Territories into delaying opening their radio stations until they had guaranteed not to broadcast material hostile to South Africa nor to beam broadcasts towards her.<sup>17</sup> She has since 1963 forced aeroplanes flying from one of these states (inevitably across her territory) to land in South Africa and submit to search.<sup>18</sup>

She dictates to Lesotho which Basuto citizens may leave their country to visit the outside world and which may return home.<sup>19</sup> She has refused to allow several Basuto students to return. She has successfully demanded that Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland prevent South African refugees from engaging in any political activity against South Africa.

Botswana has even been pressured into using her own police to capture (and gao!) freedom fighters found traversing her territory. This has happened on several occasions since 1967. All these states and Malawi have had to fashion their foreign policies according to South African wishes. They have all condemned the liberation movements. Malawi, for example, refused in 1969 to vote for increasing either moral or material support for the liberation movements.<sup>20</sup> They are not even able to vote against South Africa at the United Nations. They either abstain or absent themselves. Dr. Banda has often condemned the West's decision not to sell arms to South Africa, and stated that neither force, threats, sanctions nor condemnation were of any use. He personally preferred to look at the positive action taken by the white minorities<sup>21</sup> Malawi in 1970 was forced to cede South Africa rights for the South African Air Force to use the new international airport at Lilongwe as a military base.<sup>22</sup>

#### INTERFERENCE IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

South Africa has tried to interfere in domestic affairs of African states as well. As early as 1965, she set up a R½ Million fund to support sympathetic elements in other states. The use to which these funds, voted annually, are put has never been disclosed. Her attempt in 1969 to put paid to any hopes of industrialisation in the former High Commission Territories is another example of interference. So is her assistance – financial and the transport – to Chief Jonathan's Police Mobile Unit in suppressing popular opposition to his coup after he had lost a General Election early in 1970. As Dr. Verwoerd had stated, "it is in our interest to see that the people in these three territories have a sober outlook . . . It is important that we give our friendship to such parties in these territories, especially when, as now, they are also the ruling parties."<sup>23</sup> Also in 1970, South Africa sought to pressure Botswana into abandoning her intention of breaking out of her dependence on the White South by building a road and ferry link with Zambia.

Finally, South Africa has repeatedly shown herself ready to violate the sovereignty of African States. South African military planes have over-flown Zambia and Tanzania.<sup>24</sup> A South African helicopter had landed in Zambia near Sesheke. Another subsequently hovered over President Kaunda as he officially opened the new Sesheke hospital and drowned his speech. South African Police have crossed into Zambia. And in 1969, the S.A.P. followed a suspected stockthief into Lesotho and shot him dead. Indeed, in April 1970, Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, stated that South African troops would disregard the sovereignty of Black states if it was in her military interests to do so. And the chairman of the Nationalist Party's Foreign Affairs caucus in Parliament, Dr. Paul Van der Merwe, stated in March 1970 that South Africa was considering Israeli-type raids into Zambia to destroy alleged guerilla camps.<sup>25</sup> The rationale behind such threats was clearly spelled out by the South African monthly, Africa South: "Surely, it would be very unwise to wait until the Communist terrorists are in the

Transvaal before beginning to counter-attack. So boosting the regimes of Malawi, Zambia, Angola, and Mozambique is a wise counter-offensive if we are to carry the battle into enemy territory."<sup>26</sup>

#### RUTHLESS

These examples show that South Africa is quite ruthless in encroaching on the sovereignty of African states. She is prepared to exploit their dependence on her in a variety of ways when it is in her interests to do so. Her frequent reiterations that she believes in the principles of equality, mutual respect, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states are flatly contradicted by her actions. Mr. Vorster himself has outlined South Africa's ambitions: "We are of Africa, we understand Africa, and nothing is going to prevent us from becoming the leaders of Africa in every field."<sup>27</sup>

It is this situation which provides the most important argument against African states being beguiled by apparent short run gains into entering economic or other relationships with South Africa. Because of the disparity in size and power between them and the Republic, such relationships inevitably mean dependence. And dependence in turn spells incalculable and adverse consequences for the African states involved.

#### CONCLUSION

Economic disengagement from South Africa is not only a moral policy. Not only does it hold some hope of changing South Africa through pressure. Above all, it is the only policy which is in the interests of the African states themselves. The alleged advantages of economic links are outweighed by a host of corresponding economic and other costs.

Finally, Black Africa can never be secure so long as the Southern part of the Continent – embracing nearly 40 million people and nearly one and three quarter million square miles – is in the thrall of White Supremacist regimes. For the foundation principles of these states are a contradiction of the African Revolution: racism versus nonracism; the inferiority of Africans versus the equality of all men; White minority rule versus Black majority rule. Geographically adjacent states, built on mutually exclusive principles, always clash – as Cuba and the U.S.A., West Berlin and East Germany, North and South Vietnam have shown. Each system, to protect itself, must seek to extend its principles to the neighbouring system. This is one reason why Africa wants to liberate Southern Africa. It is also why South Africa is so vigorously launching a counter-offensive to extend its power over neighbouring Black-ruled parts of the Continent. The dangers of this counter-offensive by "White Power" to Africa are incalculable. They provide the most cogent reason why African states cannot rest peacefully until White minority rule is ended. And this necessity in turn points up why it is dangerous for African states to enter any relations with South Africa which the latter can then exploit to her advantage, but to Africa's cost.

#### FOOTNOTES :

1. Computed from *H. Houghton* – The South African Economy (O.U.P. Cape Town – 1967).

2. This is based on the Johannesburg Chamber of Mines 1966 forecast (*The Economist* – 29/6/1968). Since then, the introduction of a fluctuating free market gold price and rising industrial demand for gold, have led to the possibility that South Africa's gold earnings may not fall

significantly in the 1970's. (Newscheck – 20/3/1970). There is no evidence yet to indicate which prediction is likely to be the most accurate.

3. A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa – 1969 – page 88.

4. South African Financial Gazette – 21/2/1969.

5. Overseas Trade Accounts of the U.K. – June 1969 (HMSO-June 1969).

6. Annual Statement of External Trade 1967 (C.S.O. Lusaka 1968).

7. Data from Dr. G. Leistner's "Table of Interarea Trade for 1964". in Tegnikon – March 1967 – page 22. This is the most recent data available.

8. Africa Diary 1965 – page 2295.

9. "The concept of Economic co-operation in Southern Africa". (University of Pretoria 1969).

10. A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa – 1966 – page 120.

11. This is at current prices 1964 to 1967. Calculated from the Economic Report – 1969 (Government Printer – Lusaka – 1970) page 160.

12. A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa – 1968 – page 64.

13. March 1970.

14. Die Beeld – 5/4/1970.

15. The Observer – 12/4/1970.

16. Sunday Telegraph (London) – 30/11/1969.

17. A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa – 1963 – page 281.

18. A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1963 – page 61.

19. A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa – 1965 – page 78.

20. A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1969 – page 78 ff.

21. Africa Research Bulletin – Political Social and Cultural Series – 100 c – 1968.

22. Die Beeld 29/3/1970.

23. The Star (Johannesburg) – 1/10/1965.

24. Africa Confidential – 15/3/1968.

25. Die Beeld 29/3/1970. This is only a reiteration of previous statements by the Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, – for example in April 1968 – The Star – 6/4/1968.

26. Africa South – November 1968.

27. Newscheck – 8/11/1968.

# CHURCHES AND CHANGE

by Jeremy Hurley.

**The churches in South Africa have great potential as agents for change but at the moment they show little signs of realising this potential. I am going to discuss ways in which I think the Churches may be got off their backsides and actually become the force for good that they were intended to be, and what will happen if they don't. I will talk about the English churches mainly, and more particularly the Catholic Church.**

The Catholic Church is run by the hierarchy of bishops, archbishops and a cardinal. Official policy is determined by them, and they speak on behalf of all Catholics in South Africa (by a God given, and not a democratic right). The hierarchy (with one or two exceptions) is white, male and intellectual. Yet it "represents" a people that is 80% Black, over 50% female and largely uneducated. The hierarchy is without exception well enough off to live in large houses in often select suburbs. Yet it represents a people that is largely living below the poverty datum line. The hierarchy have one and all condemned the grant given by the WCC to the Freedom Fighters in Africa for their humanitarian needs, because, they say, a Christian cannot support violence. Yet this same hierarchy has never once urged those of its people liable for Military Service to be Conscientious Objectors, in the name of the same Christ.

## CONTRASTS

I want to enlarge on these contrasts, and the hypocrisies implicit in them, and also to include in them the majority of us Whites who profess to be Christians.

**1) The Church hierarchy reflects the racialistic beliefs of its people in the make up of the hierarchy, as I have already said. It is however, the peoples' racialism that I am going to focus on. This racialism is found in Church-goers, where the Blacks are expected to sit at the back of the church and receive Communion after their White**

**'madams'. It is found in everyday life when Blacks are called every name under the sun by church-goers, if they happen to offend the Whites. It is found when a Black servant is not allowed to have visitors to her room (if she is living in), because "we don't want any skelms around scaring the children". It is found when a woman is not allowed to have her family living with her in the town, and when she can go home on holiday only once a year. It is found when men are transported from the Homelands to the cities to work, because there is not nearly enough work in the Transkei or Zululand, and yet are not allowed to take their families and buy land to live on. All these things are allowed by White Christians and not only allowed but actually supported by them as well.**

Many Christians vote for the Nationalist Party and subsequently support the policy of 80% of the people being squashed into less than 20% of the land. More English speaking Christians vote United Party, and support a policy that has entrenched in it the idea of the inferiority of the Blacks en masse – "not capable of being Members of Parliament, and will only have representatives". A few Christians vote Progressive Party and support a system in which Christ would not have the vote, because he did not have the required high standard of our Western education, and was not interested in making more money than he needed to live on. Do we never remember, and why are we so