

is greater than it has ever been. It is therefore no time for those of us who have a real sense of patriotic duty to withdraw from our position.

COURAGE AND HOPE

The Liberal Party is therefore not going to be dissolved. We are going to continue with courage and hope. Our main task is obviously education, but we are not going to close the door to contesting Parliamentary elections the minute we are in a position to do so. We know deep in our hearts that we are not using or desirous of using subversive methods or sabotage, as we also know that our colleagues who have been banned stood four-square for constitutional and peaceful methods. If we are banned, let it be, as it will be, a tyrannical act of government. Let it not be due to anything in our own conduct which could conceivably render banning justified.

We must meet and discuss new techniques. They will obviously have to do with methods of educating public opinion. It may be that we shall have to concentrate on liberal doctrines and principles and less on the Liberal Party as such. We have a real obligation laid upon us to get across to our fellow citizens the principles for which we stand. We believe them to be just, we also believe them to be in the best political interests of South Africa from the long term point of view. Let us take heart of grace, determined to keep our subscriptions paid up and our activities greater than ever before. Let us also be flexible enough to seek new methods and new ways of making our influence felt.

This is our position in the year 1966, at the lowest ebb of our fortunes. It might help us to remember the words of Marshal Foch in a similar time of darkness: "My centre is crumbling, my left wing is beginning to retreat, my right wing is out-flanked. I advance."

EDGAR BROOKES.

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U.D.I.

Since Mr. Smith declared his illegal independence on November 11th the Rhodesian situation has changed almost daily, and it may be quite different on the day when this article is read to what it was on the day it was written.

As the New Year started there was a feeling in the air that what had gone before was no more than preliminary skirmishing, backed up by a slow and largely invisible build-up of Mr. Wilson's economic weapons. Sanctions had not yet had an opportunity to make themselves really felt and Mr. Smith's supporters were able to ignore the future, drown their uneasy fears about it in the Christmas spirit and put off until tomorrow thoughts which did not bear thinking today.

1966 is that tomorrow and, whatever other uncertainties it may hold, there is one thing about it which is quite certain. Before the year is out Mr. Smith will either be toppled or be very near to doing so, or he will have survived and Western influence in Africa will have suffered a set-back from which it may never recover. And not only the West. Non-racialism in Africa, too, will have been driven desperately on the defensive. The Lagos Prime Ministers' conference had wisely given Mr. Wilson time in which to make his sanctions policy work, but if it has not worked by July, anything can happen.

SOUTH AFRICAN REACTIONS

South African political reactions to UDI have been more than interesting. Dr. Verwoerd continues to be extremely cautious and probably deliberately confusing. Sir de Villiers Graaff is all for Smith. No doubt he hopes that white South Africa's obvious emotional involvement with its Rhodesian "kith and kin", and the fact that only he has come out in open support of them, will bring him votes and seats in the General Election. We think he will be disappointed. The Progressives have adopted a line that "this is no affair of ours and we must keep out of it or we may get caught up in the backwash". It is rumoured that they are gravely split over UDI, many of their supporters wanting all-out support of Mr. Smith as, clearly, do many of Dr. Verwoerd's.

The Liberal Party has no problem about Mr. Smith. The sooner he collapses the better. As Alan Paton said in his public statement when UDI was announced, one of the inevitable consequences of Mr. Smith's illegal seizure of power would be a steady drift towards an authoritarian state on the South African model. White Rhodesia would daily become more like white South Africa. And so it has been. Mr. Smith had enough arbitrary powers to frighten most people long before November 11th. He added to them by declaring a state of emergency and proceeding to imprison some of his more outspoken opponents without trial. He has set out to keep Rhodesians as ignorant as possible of what is building up against them by imposing a censorship far more rigid than anything South Africa has yet experienced. None of this was unexpected. What has been interesting is the ease with which the Smith Government has slipped into the attitudes and clichés of every other dictatorship. It has put on the mantle of injured innocence and set about blaming everyone else for all that its own actions have precipitated. One is reminded of Hitler and the Czechs and the Poles, who stood out so provocatively against German aspirations, that he had no course left but to attack them. Mr. Smith is no Hitler, but he has certainly learnt some lessons from him, and it is worth reminding ourselves that it was Mr. Smith and nobody else who declared independence and that he did so with full knowledge of the consequences. It is also worth reminding ourselves that he had no need at all to do so. Looked at from the most cynical point of view he could probably have stalled on the extension of African rights in Rhodesia for years without anyone being sufficiently provoked to do anything effective about it.

RESENTMENT

However, Smith chose UDI, and he must now face the consequences. If he did not know that by UDI he would affront every single thinking African on the continent, and build up a resentment that would not be stilled until he was brought down, then he was very badly informed. The truth of the matter is that, since UDI, Mr. Smith has no long term future in Africa at all. If he survives sanctions he may last awhile, but at what cost? He need not think that Mao Tse Tung will leave him in peace. Sooner or later, if sanctions fail, Rhodesia's border with Zambia will be-

come a guerilla frontier . . . and the guerillas will have Chinese training, they will have Chinese weapons, and they will have Chinese ideas. And Mr. Smith will be able to do very little about them, for if he dares try to take counter-measures across the Zambian border he will have the whole world about his ears.

The prospect, if sanctions fail, is that the whole of Black Africa will have been driven right out of the Western orbit and into the Chinese and hopes for the development of fully non-racial communities in Africa will have suffered gravely. For China does not hesitate to punt the racial line, and why should she hesitate to do so when Mr. Smith will have prepared such fruitful ground for her? On the other hand, if sanctions work, the West will have won a considerable victory and its prestige in the uncommitted world will rise dramatically. For it will have shown that it is prepared to act with vigour and determination against its own "kith and kin" when they attempt to consolidate white racial supremacy over an unwilling majority.

NON-RACIAL RHODESIA

The Liberal Party hopes that the sanctions campaign works and works soon. For if Mr. Smith is brought down without serious bloodshed in Rhodesia it may well be that his crazy seizure of power will have done exactly the opposite of what he hoped for and have laid a broader and more solid basis for a future non-racial Rhodesia than seemed possible before UDI. For UDI has succeeded in aligning a large part of the upper echelons of the Rhodesian "Establishment" against the Government. The Governor's dignified stand, the clear identification of the Chief Justice with him, the known fact that all the other Judges oppose Smith and the reported unhappiness of business and professional leaders—all these hold out hope for the future. For although these people may not be in line with the African Nationalists, they are at least a good deal closer to them than they used to be, and the Nationalists themselves may well have been impressed by the refusal of the leading white citizens to strike any bargains with Smith.

The Lagos Conference has been followed by plans for increased sanctions against Rhodesia and by rumours that these will be accompanied by peace proposals from Mr. Wilson. Is it too much to hope that out of

these will be built a political bridge which will lead peacefully from the present white-supremacist rule to a fully representative, non-racial government?

AFRICAN NATIONALISM DEBATE

REPLY BY PETER ROYLE TO DR. BROOKES' LETTERS IN "LIBERAL OPINION", MAY, 1965, AND AUGUST, 1965

In a healthy democracy there must be vigorous debate. In the course of the following article I shall therefore put my case as sharply as I can. But I wish it to be understood that I intend no rancour, and that my respect for Dr. Brookes withstands the disagreement I shall express with his views.

Dr. Brookes seems to think that my article on nationalism might be a plea for support for the African counterpart of Afrikaner nationalism. How he can believe this, in the light of what I wrote, I find it difficult to understand; and the criticism implied in his request that I define my terms I cannot accept. By "African nationalists" I meant those who are commonly known, both by themselves and by others, as African nationalists. It is as if I were to say: "Christianity is responsible for the Inquisition", and someone were to retort: "But that was not Christianity: Christianity is a religion of brotherhood and love. You must define your terms."

Furthermore, to state that my use of the term "African nationalism" is incorrect is beside the point. It is no doubt incorrect (it is certainly undiplomatic) to use the term "Western bloc" to cover nations such as Japan and Malaysia, but the point is that it is done. And nobody, to my knowledge, allows himself to be confused by it, or sees in it any proof of confusion on the part of those who use the term in this way. In any case, it was partly to **clear up** the confusion caused by the use of the term "nationalist" to describe African freedom movements that I wrote the article to which Dr. Brookes takes exception.

LEAST BAD POLICY

However, this discussion is not a mere war of words. Dr. Brookes seems to believe that if African nationalists are likely to do things which are strictly incompatible with the principles of the Liberal Party, then they should not be supported by Liberals. Now, I do not deny that they **are** likely to do such things. It is quite conceivable, for example, that in this country as in Tanzania, the group that attains power may want to set up a one-party State. But before throwing up our hands in horror, let us concede that in certain circumstances this may be the least bad policy that could be pursued, and that absolute liberalism is often simply impracticable. If, for example, there were strong grounds for believing that one-man-one-vote would lead to the election of a Hitler, it would be stupid and immoral to object to the establishment of a benevolent dictatorship, even though such a régime could not be said to fulfil all the requirements of liberalism. But because liberalism may be impracticable, even immoral, this does not mean that liberals should cease to be liberals, or that they should cease to take part in any form of political activity: it means simply that it is their duty to collaborate with the party that is the least likely to abuse its power when in office and that offers the best prospect of the ultimate triumph of liberalism. The question we must ask, therefore, is not: Does African nationalism conflict at any point with liberalism? It is: Granted that it will conflict with liberalism, should we not nevertheless collaborate with it on the grounds that failure to do so will lead to the perpetuation of something worse and the certain rejection of all liberal ideals on the part of African nationalists?

ABSTRACT MORALISM

Dr. Brookes's approach to this question seems to me to be one of abstract moralism. It is not enough to preach virtue in the hope that one day it will triumph. History is made by men, and to be politically effective one must make an effort to understand them, especially when one disagrees with them.

His attitude to the party's franchise policy is odd. "If [African domination] is what we are asked to approve, what answer have we to the critics of 'one man, one vote' who argue that our policy means the domination of