

LIBERAL OPINION



PARTITION

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. . . OR DEATH!

When Dr. Verwoerd opened the Nationalist Party's Natal Provincial Congress in Durban last year, he offered White South Africa his two alternatives for the future—partition or death. He went on to make it quite clear that by partition he did not mean a clean division of South Africa into Black and White, but the implementation of his own apartheid policy. However, whatever Dr. Verwoerd's view of what constitutes "partition" may be, there are a number of people who are looking to it as the ultimate saviour of the White man and there are a number of overseas journals of repute which have been canvassing this "solution" to the intractable problem which South Africa presents to the world.

It is probable that White South African protagonists of partition see in it the only hope of saving some part of South Africa as a White man's preserve. They see the continent pressing down upon them, they know that the pressure will grow, they fear to lose everything, and so they prepare to give something. They know that what apartheid offers will never relieve the

pressure from the North and so they seek to offer something better, a division of the country. They see a Black state and a White state growing up in friendship and prosperity next to one another. It is a pretty picture, but is there any substance to it?

"WHITE" THEORISTS

All partition plans so far put forward have been based on a division of South Africa thought desirable by **White** theorists. The lines are carefully drawn so that the Witwatersrand and the Free State Goldfields and the industrial areas of the Eastern and Western Cape fall into White South Africa and only Durban, of the major centres, is thrown to Black South Africa as a sop. It should be clearly understood right now that this kind of division is no answer to anything. If partition ever comes to South Africa, it will only come because White South Africans have been forced to it by a major crisis, either internal or external. It will come at a time when White South Africa feels forced to make concessions. In such a crisis it is highly unlikely that Black South Africa would accept a division which left the vast bulk of the country's wealth in White hands. It is much more likely that the White portion of a partitioned South Africa would consist of no more of her area and wealth than the White percentage of the population entitled to it.

SECURITY ?

Partition is presumably intended to bring security to White South Africa and to placate Africa and a hostile world. But what will the policy of the new White state be? Is it intended to be anything else but apartheid and White domination? Surely the only merit in partition, for those who want it, comes from the realisation that it will not be possible to have apartheid in the whole of South Africa and therefore one must retreat and have it where one can? It will be surprising if the new White state of the partitionists does not have the same

apparatus for the preservation of White "civilisation" as the old—no mixed marriages, no mixed sport, more job reservation, more Group Areas—all the laws which Africa regards as a blot on the continent and an affront to African dignity. Is there any reason to think that the laws will seem less obnoxious because the area to which they apply has been reduced?

If partition is going to be real, there is going to have to be a vast uprooting of people. Hundreds and hundreds of thousands of people are going to have to move. Where have mass removals produced anything but misery and suffering? South Africa herself spent thirty years unsuccessfully trying to move her Indian people back to India! What possible prospect is there of moving the White population of Natal and the Witwatersrand and the Free State and the Transvaal? Or the vast numbers of Africans now living in the Cape? Make no mistake, this is what true partition would require.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

The economic problems presented by partition are staggering. Where is the Johannesburg financier and the mine magnate going to find a new outlet for his talents? What is the mealie-farmer going to do without his farm, or the miner without his mine to dig? How are all these people to be absorbed into an economy based on the Western Cape, the Karroo and the Orange River? It is an inevitable consequence of any true partition of South Africa that there will be an overall drop in the standard of living everywhere and a particularly sharp fall in the agricultural productivity of Black South Africa and in the industrial prosperity of White South Africa—for Black South Africa will need White farming skill and White South Africa will need Black industrial skill and markets.

It may be argued that it will not be necessary to uproot vast numbers of people, that

most people will just stay where they are. If they do the minority problems become enormous—each White person in Black South Africa and each Black person in White South Africa a potential fuse to set off an international incident. White South Africa would be even less secure than she feels today.

HOW LONG WOULD IT LAST ?

Supposing in a moment of crisis, South Africa were to accept partition as her solution? How long would it last? Would White South Africa really be able to exist, each person taking in his neighbour's washing? For that is what it would come to. At the very best White South Africa would be a small corner of the African continent without any of the mineral and agricultural resources which at present make her rich. She would be an overgrown Group Area. It is highly unlikely that she would be more acceptable to the people of Africa because she was smaller than before. As long as her political philosophy rested on the same racial assumptions as those on which apartheid rests, she would be anathema to the whole continent. Pressure on her might be eased while partition was effected but it would be put on again as soon as the new state showed the slightest manifestation of White arrogance. Then White South Africa would be less able to resist. Her economic position would have been enormously weakened and her military position would not be much improved. She would have a shorter frontier to defend but more people to defend it against—including many new recruits who really knew what apartheid meant.

TEMPORARY PALLIATIVE

Partition should be seen now for what it is, an attempt at a moment of final crisis to preserve one small area of White domination at the bottom of Africa. It should be realised that partition means the bulk of the present Republic being absorbed into a Black state, and it should be recognised that it means a vast up-

rooting and removing of people and a general decline in living standards for all South Africans, Black and White. Most important of all, it should be realised that it can be no more than a temporary palliative, for, in the end, no state in Africa which is based on policies of White supremacy has any chance of surviving—however small it is.

In the end White people living on this continent will have to learn to live as individual members of the African community, not as members of a special group. It is time they started to learn that lesson, instead of being led up the garden path by partition theorists. The ordinary people of the Transkei have emphatically rejected racialism and come down on the side of race co-operation. What better guarantee for their future could White South Africans want than that? It is time they showed themselves brave enough to accept the hand of race co-operation, on a basis of equality, which African people have been holding out to them for so long.

THE TRANSKEI ELECTION

South Africa's English-language Press habitually interprets all national issues according to their meaning for White South Africans. Thus, when the Transkei's general election was held on 20th November, 1963, the newspapers had boiled down the extremely complicated issues at stake into a simple contest between "the multiracialist Chief Victor Poto" and "pro-apartheid Chief Kaizer Matanzima". It was made to seem that the Transkei's 880,000 Bantustan voters were going to the polls to vote simply for or against the right of White people to live and work in the Transkei as before.

The Press did, of course, by this means

effectively bring the Transkei election to the notice of White South Africa and to that of Black South Africa—which has to read White South Africa's newspapers or go largely newsless. Thus, when "multiracialist Poto" soundly defeated "pro-apartheid Matanzima" at the polls, the result was interpreted as a victory for integration over segregation, and celebrated or mourned accordingly, despite the later absurdity of Chief Kaizer's election to the Chief Ministership by the vote of the state-paid chiefs.

It was indeed a great victory for integration but it is equally true that this was only one of a host of issues with which the mass of Transkei voters were concerned. Without openly-organized political parties, with non-committal manifestos, with only the most guarded and moderate speeches made at meetings held by candidates known to oppose apartheid, it was hardly possible to assess the issues which were before the electorate. But though, in the unique "emergency" circumstances of the elections, observers often did not know in advance the interest of one candidate or another, the voters somehow did, and, in spite of the overshadowing Proclamation 400, in spite of a vastly complicated electoral system based on huge constituencies and multiple lists of candidates, a pattern of the popular will began to emerge as the results were announced.

REJECTION OF WHITE GOVERNMENT RULE

Transkeians were voting for a variety of things, of which the clearest was the acceptance or rejection of time-honoured White Government rule. When the Fingoes elected four anti-apartheid members, they reversed a trend going back to 1835 when, after fleeing from Shaka's wars, these remnants of Zulu tribes united under British protection and took up their place beside the White man, producing that Victorian stereotype, the "loyal" Fingo. Fingoland—around Butterworth and Nqamakwe—was always the first region to

implement Government policy, always the most subservient, the source of a never-ending supply of functionaries to operate new forms of White rule. Among the defeated Fingo candidates on November 20th, was Mr. Cecil W. Monakali, who deputised regularly for Chief Kaizer Matanzima in the now dissolved Transkeian Territorial Authority. The Fingoes resolutely defeated the pro-Government men, the "old guard" who had sat on Government bodies for many years, and replaced them with men such as Mr. Silberbauer Zokwe, a detainee for four months in Nqamakwe gaol during the Pondoland Emergency of 1960, and Dr. P. H. Bala, a medical practitioner of Butterworth, whose entry into local politics only a year or two back, made him an object of constant Security Police attention. The Fingoes may even not have been unduly concerned over the Poto-Matanzima struggle. Both held successful meetings in the area. Their concern was to make a sign that said "Enough!", and after 128 years adherence to "the Government" in its ever-changing, but ever White, forms, they were finally ready to give their support to men whom they knew were opposed to the status quo in South Africa.

THE CONSTITUENCIES

In neighbouring Gcalekaland, a possible five out of seven candidates were anti-Government men; Paramount Chief Sabata's ticket-of-seven in Tembuland proper (Dalindyebo Region) overwhelmed their thirteen opponents. Seven of these, linked together in support of Chief Matanzima, seemingly affluent and appearing to enjoy unseen help, all lost their deposits. In Nyanda and Emboland all except one of the victors were said to be supporters of Chief Poto of Nyanda or his ally Chief Sandy Majeke of the amaBhele in Emboland. In Maluti almost every candidate, and 3 out of 4 of the successful ones, were pro-Poto; in Qaukeni, only one of the eight men returned was a known Matanzima man and he came a very bad last. It is said that he only got in because he shared his surname with a success-

ful pro-Poto man and a number of people voted for him by mistake!

Success for the Government, which had expected Bantustan triumphs everywhere, came only on the southern and northern borders of the Transkei. In Chief Matanzima's Emigrant Tembuland his own four nominees came home, amidst grave rumours of coercive measures and polling irregularities. Umzimkulu returned two Matanzima men.

THE NEW MEN

In many places the "old guard" went out, but what was as significant was the calibre of their successors. A few were uncommitted seeming advocates of simple bread-and-butter policies. But most were men known to have stood up in opposition to Government policy, some of whom had been banished at some time or had been detained in the Transkei's gaols under the Emergency Laws. **What happened in fact was that the Transkei's voters chose, wherever they safely could, the representatives of the modern world, of progress, of the new Africa, of democracy rather than traditionalism, of African freedom in the whole republic rather than of Bantustan isolation.** Like the Fingoes, they looked at the conditions of their lives and said "Enough!"

This must sound painfully obvious to those used to politics in conditions of freedom, but it must be remembered that the Transkei has no experience of such conditions. A massive change has taken place in the area, where so short a time ago, opposition to the Government was openly voiced or even inwardly felt only by an uppercrust of intellectuals, many of them now exiled or otherwise removed from Transkei politics, and by some peasant victims of harshly enforced land schemes.

THE ROOTS OF CHANGE

The Nationalist Government's Bantu Authorities forced commitment on Transkeians, as did its other repressive laws on the rest of the

country. Extremely important in the canalising of this new commitment have been the activities of those colourfully described by B. A. D. Minister de Wet Nel as "wolves who sow hate and suspicion with the purpose of getting you into their clutches" and "jackals coming from all directions". These "jackals and wolves" are the Transkei's own political thinkers and doers. The outstanding early leadership of those chiefs and commoners who, often in loneliness, risked and suffered gaol, banishment and almost intolerable official pressure, and the national political organisations, amongst whom the Liberal Party has played a major part, and who have helped the Transkei to take up the struggle against an oppression in whose success it seemed destined to play a key part.

To all who have worked in this cause, the General Election, for all their condemnation of its motive, arrangements and circumstances, has meant a great step towards the achievement of their aims. The African people of the Transkei have found a voice, and whatever the Government's efforts to silence it may be, this voice can rally all who want democracy in South Africa, at a time when so much of their work seems to lie in ruins. In the Transkei itself the opposition party that has emerged may give the lead to a non-violent, even constitutional, movement against South Africa's unequal and unjust society, for which half a million votes have given a clear mandate.

BANNING

The two documents reproduced below are a "streamlined" version of a banning order under the Suppression of Communism (sic) Act. There is a third document, not reproduced, which requires the victim of a banning order to report regularly to a police station.

An increasing number of people are being shackled with orders similar to this one. Some of the people banned are prominent Liberals—one is a Catholic. The document demonstrates what a heavy price many people have had to pay for opposition to apartheid. To illustrate the extent of the price, we have introduced explanatory notes at various points in the banning order. These notes show how cruel is the punishment which the Minister may impose by arbitrary action upon his political enemies.

Both the documents which are reproduced refer to **furthering the achievement of the objects of Communism**. In this regard the opinion of the Minister as to what constitutes such activity is virtually unchallengeable. Cases decided in the South African courts show that the Minister's opinion will be accepted by the courts, unless it can be proved that he did not direct his mind to the question at all or, if he did, that he was actuated by malice. Needless to say, it is impossible to prove either to the satisfaction of the courts. It follows that the Minister's word on whether a person is furthering the aims of Communism is law.

FIRST ORDER

To

NOTICE IN TERMS OF PARAGRAPH (α) OF SUB-SECTION (1) OF SECTION **TEN** OF THE SUPPRESSION OF COMMUNISM ACT 1950 (ACT No. 44 OF 1950).

WHEREAS I, BALTHAZAR JOHANNES VORSTER, Minister of Justice of the Republic of South Africa, am satisfied that you are engaged in activities which are furthering or may further the achievement of the objects of Communism, I hereby, in terms of paragraph

(α) of sub-section (1) of section **ten** of the Suppression of Communism Act, 1950 (Act No. 44 of 1950), prohibit you for a period commencing on the date on which this notice is delivered or tendered to you and expiring on the 20th day of November, 1968, from—

- (a) absenting yourself from the magisterial district of _____;
- (b) being within—
 - (i) any location, native hostel or native village as defined in the Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, 1945 (Act No. 25 of 1945), except the _____ Location;

[These include all the main residential areas for Africans outside the Reserves.]

- (ii) any native compound;
- (iii) the premises of any factory as defined in the Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act, 1941 (Act No. 22 of 1941);
- (iv) any place which constitutes the premises on which any publication as defined in section **one** of the said Suppression of Communism Act, 1950, is prepared, compiled, printed or published;

[Publication is defined as "any newspaper, magazine, pamphlet, book, hand-bill or poster."]

- (v) any place which constitutes the premises of any organisation contemplated in Government Notice No. R.2130 of the 28th December, 1962, and any place which constitutes premises on which the premises of any such organisation are situate;

[The organisations referred to include a wide range of political and semi-political bodies.]

- (vi) any place or area which constitutes the premises on which any public or private university, university college, college, school or other educational institution is situate;

[Under this clause, it would be a criminal offence for a banned person to go to the school where his own children are being educated. A student who is banned would require special permission to attend his school, college or university. Many African churches are used as schools and this clause would prevent a banned person from attending such a church.]

- (vii) any area set apart under any law for the occupation of Coloured or Asiatic persons;

[Designed to break down all inter-racial contacts.]

- (viii) any harbour as defined in section **one** of the Railways and Harbours Control and Management (Consolidation) Act, 1957 (Act No. 70 of 1957);

- (c) communicating in any manner whatsoever with any person whose name appears on any list in the custody of the officer referred to in section **eight** of the said Suppression of Communism Act, 1950, or in respect of whom any prohibition under the said Suppression of Communism Act, 1950, or the Riotous Assemblies Act, 1956 (Act No. 17 of 1956), is in force;

[This prevents the person to whom the order is addressed from communicating with other banned persons or persons named as Communists under the Act. When a husband and wife are both banned, a special dispensation has to be made so that they may lawfully communicate with each other.]

- (d) performing any of the following acts, that is to say—

- (i) preparing, compiling, printing, publishing or disseminating in any manner whatsoever any publication as defined in section **one** of the said Suppression of Communism Act, 1950;

- (ii) participating or assisting in any manner whatsoever in the preparation, compilation, printing, publication or dissemination of any publication as so defined;

- (iii) contributing, preparing or compiling in any manner whatsoever any matter for publication in any publication as so defined;

- (iv) assisting in any manner whatsoever in the preparation or compilation of any matter for publication as so defined;

[These provisions (i) — (iv) effectively prevent a "banned" person from exercising any influence through the written word.]

- (v) giving any educational instruction in any manner or form to any person other than a person of whom you are a parent.

Given under my hand at Pretoria on this 6th day of November, 1962.

B. J. VORSTER,

Minister of Justice.

Note:

The Magistrate, ———, has in terms of section 10 (1) (a) of Act No. 44 of 1950 been empowered to authorise exceptions to the prohibitions contained in this notice.

SECOND ORDER

To

NOTICE IN TERMS OF SUB-SECTION (1) OF SECTION **NINE** OF THE SUPPRESSION OF COMMUNISM ACT, 1950 (ACT No. 44 of 1950).

WHEREAS I, BALTHAZAR JOHANNES VORSTER, Minister of Justice of the Republic of South Africa, am satisfied that you are engaged in activities which are furthering or are calculated to further the achievement of any of the objects of communism, I hereby, in terms of sub-section (1) of section **nine** of the Suppression of Communism Act, 1950 (Act No. 44 of 1950), prohibit you for a period commencing on the date on which this notice is delivered or tendered to you and expiring on the 20th day of November, 1968, from attending within the Republic of South Africa or the territory of South-West Africa—

- (1) any gathering as contemplated in paragraph (a) of the said sub-section:

[Gathering means "any gathering, concourse, or procession, in, through or along any place of any number of persons having . . . a common purpose, whether such purpose be lawful or unlawful."]

or

- (2) any gathering as contemplated in paragraph (b) of the said sub-section

[not being such a gathering as is contemplated in the said paragraph (a)] of the nature, class or kind set out below—

- (i) any social gathering, that is to say, any gathering at which the persons present also have social intercourse with one another;

[A parent prohibited from attending social gatherings cannot, if seems, attend his own child's birthday party.]

- (ii) any political gathering, that is to say, any gathering at which any form of State or any principle or policy of the Government of a State is propagated, defended, attacked, criticised or discussed;
- (iii) any gathering of pupils or students assembled for the purpose of being instructed, trained or addressed by you.

Given under my hand at Pretoria on this 6th day of November, 1963.

B. J. VORSTER,

Minister of Justice.

Note :

The Magistrate, ———, has in terms of section 9 (1) of the abovementioned Act been empowered to authorise exceptions to the prohibitions contained in this notice.