

**NOTES ON MEETING BETWEEN PMC AND
UDF/COSATU DELEGATION
6th May, 1989**

MDM: MM, TM, AE

ANC: SG, TG, JJ, CH, TM, RM, JN, PR

Meeting was convened to discuss progress in the efforts to resolve conflict in Natal.

A. Briefing by MDM delegation:

1. After the Lusaka meeting, the proposed convenors were approached and they started process of consulting Inkatha. However, faced with the public and negative response from GB, they are not prepared to take the bold step of calling for a Peace Conference. They also made the error, in approaching Inkatha, to hint at the fact that the proposals being put forward were canvassed among ANC, UDF and COSATU.

2. GB's response was that he had been presented with a fait accompli, and he has come down heavily on the convenors and Archbishop Hurley in particular. Since the exchange started, the train of events has, briefly, been as follows:

2.1. GB replied to Hurley's letter, in which he questions why he was not consulted from the beginning; who the originators were and who decided on the composition of the Committee of Convenors. He then sets out his own "peace initiative". However, he insists on a quadripartite meeting of Presidents and senior leaders of ANC, UDF, COSATU and Inkatha as the starting point. COSATU and UDF replied in a memo indicating their support for the Hurley initiative, stating that they do have a mandate from their constituency, etc, etc.

2.2. GB complains to COSATU after the COSATU(JN) press conference detailing police collusion with Inkatha. Calls for an end to "smear campaigns".

2.3. GB writes to Hurley indicating that Inkatha's position would be taken by the CC meeting late April.

2.4. After whole initiative had been taken to the press by GB, COSATU/UDF hold joint press conference indicating that the "GB initiative" does not differ in substance from positions of the UDF/COSATU, and indicating preparedness to meet Inkatha.

2.5. The Inkatha CC meeting resolutions affirm GB's positions: complaints about consultation, and puts forward quadripartite meeting of Presidents and senior leaders as basic condition and first step. GB also dismisses Convenors as "outsiders" and says he does not need "go-between" to arrange for such a meeting.

2.3. Also note that:

* After putting forward his initiative, GB approached the UK Embassy who in turn approached Kagiso Trust to urge the latter to fund the GB Peace Initiative.

* Indirectly messages being sent to COSATU/UDF via US Embassy indicating that some forces within Inkatha do not want the peace initiative in general to be scuttled.

3. Organisationally the MDM has made some progress. Joint Working Group(UDF/COSATU) functional.

3.1. The various areas could be characterised as follows:

* Where progress has been made in reviving structures eg Greater Pietermaritzburg Valley.

* Areas where there is fierce fighting and where Inkatha, with the support of the SAP, is making headway eg Isithebe, Mandini, Mpopomeni.

* Areas where contact has been made with youth and other structures but not yet stabilised eg Shongweni (between PmB and Pinetown).

* Areas where defectors from MDM have formed gangster/vigilante groups and are on the rampage against the MDM eg some areas around Durban and Inanda.

3.2. The Complaints Adjudication Board (Inkatha/COSATU) has been somewhat functional. But each time a complainant rears his/her head, they are attacked by the death squads. Recent case of Duma who had incriminating evidence against Thulani Ngcobo(a warlord) but was shot after giving evidence - most probably by the warlord himself. Thus COSATU decided to suspend of the Board.

4. After examining developments, COSATU/UDF held consultation last Wednesday, and reached the following conclusions:

4.1. That GB is posturing and is not serious about peace process. Thus need for them to also go public and expose him by taking the initiative and making concrete proposals.

4.2. To call a press conference Monday (8th May) and reply to Inkatha, and call for a meeting of Inkatha, UDF and COSATU to look into how to harmonise the peace initiatives.

4.3. Feel there is no need for the quadripartite meeting of Presidents et al. This to be used by GB as demonstration of credibility and power.

4.4. Should not allow GB to side-step the Convenors and other forces such as the Chambers of Industries and Commerce, churches, newspaper editors, NAFCOC, individuals in the DP. The peace process needs their support and participation.

4.5. During the course of the week to canvass the forces referred

to in 4.3 above and explain position of UDF/COSATU.

4.6. Also to pay special attention to chiefs. In addition to those like Maphumulo who have taken a stand, other chiefs need the "space" within which they can do so without suffering wrath of GB and his war-lords. The peace initiative will provide such.

4.7. Step up international campaigning. ANC needs to take this up to reinforce their work with embassies inside the country.

4.8. To organise more workshops to educate own members. This to also involve Coloured and Indian communities where a start has already been made.

4.9. To step up COSATU/UDF propaganda drive.

4.10. To step up mobilisation for funding.

Need movement input and also ensure synchronisation of follow-up.

5. In response to questions, the cdes elaborated on the following:

5.1. The response of the MDM constituency has been positive in the main. However, this is achieved as a result of political work within the ranks. COSATU/UDF have to constantly explain that discussions under way are not peace talks, but preparations for a peace conference.

5.2. Hurley and other convenors have been largely inactive since GB responded publicly. They have however indicated that their doors will always be open to assist if so required.

5.3. There have been local peace initiatives, but GB always finds ways of scuttling them, eg in Roger Sishi's area.

B. Discussion and decisions:

1. The discussion noted the following:

1.1. GB has always tried to portray MDM as proxies of the ANC. The insistence on the quadripartite meeting on his part is an attempt to promote this stance, as well as to claim that movement has finally acknowledged him as a power. We cannot approve of a "blackmail summit".

1.2. GB's attempt to break out of isolation is part of a bigger package involving the British government and other imperialist forces.

1.3. As movement, we have spelt out our position on "patriotic participation", but the current conjecture relates to the particular issue of ending the internecine strife in Natal.

Notwithstanding, whatever decision we take re: meeting with Inkatha should be informed with our previous negative experiences.

1.4. We have to be clear about the exact role that the ANC can and should play. In the final analysis, the leadership role of the movement must come out clearly, and steps we take should not create an impression that the quadripartite meeting - if it takes place - is an encounter among equals.

2. The meeting then agreed:

2.1. The movement supports the positions taken by the UDF/COSATU to call for a meeting with Inkatha and to go public. (Refer A 4.1. to 4.10. above)

2.2. If GB insists on the quadripartite meeting, the MDM to put forward the real logistical problems that would arise: MDM leaders restricted and not able to travel, etc, etc. Also to state that MDM not opposed to quadripartite but that even this would require the meeting between Inkatha and UDF/COSATU, first and foremost, to consider this and all other proposals relating to the peace initiative.

2.3. That the movement will issue a press statement by next Wednesday to state its position on all the above, and dovetail with UDF/COSATU publicity drive: The statement to be issued after Tuesday NWC/PMC meeting which will deal solely with this issue. The MDM delegation proposed that, among others, the following ideas should be incorporated in the statement:

- * Put the background to the conflict in perspective
- * Aim, above everything else, to push GB to the internal meeting with the MDM - leave him with no alternative but being completely and finally discredited
- * That the movement prepared to play a role, but this to be defined (at the public level) jointly by COSATU, UDF and Inkatha, and that the quadripartite as proposed by GB - if it takes place - would be a result of progress in the peace process inside, not the starting point to this process
- * Emphasise that all other forces: churches, business groups, etc have a role to play in the peace process

2.4. That the MDM and the movement should issue massive supportive propaganda on this question.

2.5. ANC to launch/intensify international campaign on this issue.

2.6. The movement needs to censure the British government for intervening on behalf of GB re: Kagiso Trust funding.

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