

TRANSLATION

PERSONAL NOTES OF THE CONVERSATION WITH HIS EXCELLENCY  
PRESIDENT JOSE EDUARDO DOS SANTOS ON 23 SEPTEMBER 1988 TO BE  
CONVEYED DIRECTLY TO HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT PIETER W BOTHA

1. Answer to the question presented by President P W Botha  
of the Republic of South Africa

- I have guaranteed that the Cubans will not interfere in the implementation of 435. They will not pose a threat.
- The Cubans are not preparing any offensive whatsoever against Unita and are not taking part in any operation against Unita (only Angolans).
- The Cubans only defend themselves against external actions. They are in a defensive position. (Of course they react should they be attacked.)
- Only FAPLA fights against Unita. All on-going operations are led by FAPLA. No Cubans are involved.
- I have guaranteed that Angola will fulfil what has been agreed in the "Geneva Accord"; item 6. (prohibits any action by the Cubans in the South-east of Angola). I have guaranteed that this Accord will be observed.
- If necessary: Angola (and Cuba) can give additional guarantees in the next meeting to be held in Brazzaville (commencing 26 September 1988).

- Angola is interested in the implementation of 435 and therefore, it will make every effort to ensure the correct fulfilment of 435 (additional guarantees can be given in the Brazzaville meeting).
- If the RSA wishes that item 6 of the Geneva Accord (secret) be made public, Angola will agree to do so.
- I acknowledge that I have guaranteed that the Cuban troops will not take part in offensive actions once the South African troops have withdrawn from Angola. The South African troops have already withdrawn, therefore the Accord is being observed.
- Arising from this Geneva Accord, item 6 (secret), (between Angola, the RSA and Cuba), the Cubans are, in addition, prevented from carrying out any action in Jamba and Mavingo (area which is geographically well determined in the Accord).
- In conclusion, President José Eduardo dos Santos guarantees the following:
  - (a) That the Cubans are not preparing nor will they participate in any offensive operation against Unita.
  - (b) The Cubans are in a passive and defensive position and will not constitute a threat nor will they influence the implementation of resolution 435.

- (c) If necessary additional guarantees will be given.

2. President José Eduardo dos Santos has found it necessary to clarify the following points:

(a) With regard to the ANC and Unita camps:

- i) Angola is prepared to close down the ANC camps, despite the difficulties, but in counter-balance it would like to see South Africa closing the UNITA camps (this matter was discussed with Dr Barnard to whom the difficulties were made clear, and the need for counter-balance; it was also raised with the leader of the South African delegation during the negotiations).
- ii) Angola believes that the Accord of Principles signed in New York, by the three parties which in its paragraphs (e) and (g) recommend "non interference in the internal affairs of each state" and "non use of the territory to promote war or violence" against other states, should be observed. These principles were duly accepted by Angola and President dos Santos has guaranteed their implementation.
- iii) Regarding this matter it was suggested that perhaps a formal agreement is not necessary. A protocol through an exchange of letters would be sufficient once there is a firm will to implement it.

iv) It is not understandable that only one of the parties observes the agreed principles while there are other parties who do not.

(b) As far as the question of Cuban troops is concerned

i) The principle of the total and complete withdrawal of the Cuban troops has been agreed and accepted.

ii) A calendar which guarantees the total and complete withdrawal of the Cuban troops was presented.

iii) The problem relates to the period for withdrawal.

iv) Peace having been established and for other reasons, no further threat of any kind would exist nor tolerated. The withdrawal process will take place as has been pre-established and agreed.

v) This is a problem relating exclusively to the sovereignty to Angola and Cuba. Neither the USSR nor the USA should dictate how the withdrawal process will take place.

vi) Angola (and Cuba) have undertaken to move the Cuban troops as already proposed (parallel 16th, parallel 13th and the commencement of the withdrawal process from Angola) from the beginning of the implementation of 435.

vii) There will be UN troops in Namibia. After 3 months of the beginning of SR435 implementation the bulk of the Cuban troops will already have withdrawn to the North of parallel 16th. (Part of the process of total withdrawal of Cuban troops.)

(c) On national security of Angola

- i) This is the crucial problem for Angola.
- ii) Angola regards itself as being under threat by South Africa which in the past occupied parts of the Angolan territory. To Angola this is actually a real threat taking into account the very recent events.
- iii) Therefore, Angola cannot foresee Cuban withdrawal in the very short term. There has to be an assurance that there will not be external interference including logistic support to Unita. In this area, neither the USA nor the RSA have presented any guarantees or promise of such a guarantee.
- iv) The independence of Namibia will by itself constitute a guarantee for security of Angola. In this regard, the implementation of 435 will be a very important signal.
- v) The withdrawal of the South African troops from Angola is a very positive factor. A good signal.

- vi) It is necessary to build up confidence based on real facts that take place on the field. It takes some time.
- vii) Angola is ready to make some significant moves but it also wants to see reciprocal and significant steps taken by the other countries. This mechanism builds up confidence. On the other hand, demands by any one of the parties creates an atmosphere of no-confidence. For instance, it is not fair to demand a reduction on the deadline of the withdrawal of the Cuban troops without at the same time giving a satisfactory guarantee for the national security of Angola.
- viii) For internal sovereignty reasons, FAPLA (not Cubans) will operate throughout the national territory of Angola. This is equally being done by Unita. (This issue is not a matter for discussion).

(d) On Unita and Angola

- i) Portugal has already recognised that the initial agreement is no longer valid. Such an agreement no longer exists. In practice, it was denounced by all parties. FNLA was the first to abandon the government. Unita was the second. In practice it denounced the original agreement. Portugal was the third, in September. Only MPLA remained in the Government. Portugal recognised this Government.

- ii) With the lapsing of the initial accord the MPLA Government was recognised by the OAU as well as internationally. It is a legitimate Government (Unita is not recognised internationally, it does not have legitimacy).
  - iii) Therefore, there is a need to find new bases on which to solve the problem. The basis should be an African one, an African solution based on the Charter of the OAU.
  - iv) It is necessary to solve the problem of the Angolans who are within Unita. They already have a State and a Government. There are already several analogous experiences in Africa which can inspire the solution of the Angolan situation.
  - v) President Mobutu agrees with Angola which is endeavouring to apply the same formulas which he used adapted to the Angolan reality.
- (e) On the guarantees, President José Eduardo dos Santos thinks that:
- i) Understandings already exist which were achieved during the negotiations, that must be valued and implemented.
  - ii) The "Tripartite Accord" (draft) (Angola, RSA and Cuba) already discussed and signed in Geneva states:

- Item 4: "Angola and Cuba shall implement the bilateral agreement on the move to the North and the total withdrawal in phases of the Cuban troops from the Angolan territory, signed on the day of the signature of this, as well as the measures in coordination with the Security Council of the UNO for the monitoring "in situ" of the withdrawal process.
  
  - Item 5: According to the obligations of the UNO Charter the parties shall refrain from threatening or using force and guarantee that their territories are not used whatsoever by any state, organization or person to launch acts of war, violent aggressions against the territorial integrity, the inviolability of frontiers or the independence of any state of South-Western Africa.
- ii) What is lacking is an agreement on the calendar for withdrawal, in order to set out the date for the signature in New York, and the mechanism of verification on the ground.
- iv) President José Eduardo dos Santos conveys a firm will to:
- Reduce the present tension and build up an atmosphere of peace, stability and cooperation.



- Contribute as best as he can so that the meeting of Brazzaville achieves success.

Maputo, 24th September 1988