

Angola file

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SUMMARY NOTES OF A MEETING BETWEEN MINISTER SILVINO DA LUZ, FOREIGN MINISTER OF CAPE VERDE AND MESSRS D W AURET AND J MARX OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS : PRAIA, CAPE VERDE, 24 FEBRUARY 1986

Also present: Mr Du Prê, Chef du Cabinet in the Foreign Ministry.

Minister da Luz received Messrs Auret and Marx in his office in the Foreign Ministry in Praia. The meeting, which lasted approximately two and a half hours, was throughout relaxed, informal and friendly. The South African delegation afterwards attended a dinner hosted by the Chef du Cabinet.

MINISTER DA LUZ welcomed his South African visitors and since it was the first time that he had met Messrs Auret and Marx, a brief discussion ensued in which their positions in Foreign Affairs were explained to him. Minister da Luz referred to the message he had received from Minister Botha regarding Captain du Toit and said that it had been passed on to Angola. He had done so by sending his Secretary of State to Luanda to discuss this matter at high level. He wanted to point out that the Angolans had in the meantime made a statement regarding Captain du Toit in which they had indicated that they would be prepared to negotiate his release in return for a number of Cuban and Angolan soldiers. The Angolans had indicated to his Secretary of State that the negotiations regarding this matter could take place either with Cape Verde or the Red Cross acting as intermediaries. He was however convinced, that Angola wished to pursue this matter.

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MR AURET said that he could not foresee any difficulty with such intermediaries but asked whether the Angolans would not be prepared to talk directly to South Africa in this regard.

MINISTER DA LUZ said that the Angolans had not specifically excluded such a possibility in the talks with his Secretary of State. He would take up this matter with the authorities in Luanda during his forthcoming visit to Angola. South Africa could indicate to him whether it found the idea of one of the two intermediaries acceptable.

MR AURET repeated that he could not foresee any problems in this regard but that South Africa would be interested in speaking directly to the Angolans on this matter. He would however like to establish whether there were any Cubans or FAPLA soldiers being held.

MINISTER DA LUZ said that he and his President were leaving for a visit to Angola, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana on Thursday, 27 February 1986. They would be having meetings with the Heads of State and Government in all of these countries and, if they were at that time available, would be meeting with Sam Nujoma in Luanda and Oliver Tambo in Lusaka. He would be grateful for an outline of current developments in South Africa and in the region since he considered it important not only to be informed on events through the media.

MR AURET said that he would be pleased to inform the Minister of the very important developments which had taken place in South Africa recently. It was unfortunate that the media seemed, as a rule, to only stress the negative elements of the situation in South Africa. The positive

aspects, of which there were many, were being ignored almost completely. The result was that the picture which was being presented to the world was a heavily distorted one which inclined almost exclusively towards creating an image of South Africa as an uncaring, unfeeling and violent society. This image might be useful in increasing newspaper circulation and television audiences but it did not serve the best interests of all South Africans or the cause of progress of reform.

The speech by State President Botha on 31 January 1986 had been a major event in the history of South African politics. The State President had made a number of very important announcements in this speech, which could be seen as guidelines for the future. These included:

- the acceptance that South Africa had outgrown the outdated colonial system of paternalism and the outdated concept of apartheid;
- the acceptance of an undivided Republic of South Africa with all its communities having the right of participation in institutions to be negotiated collectively;
- one citizenship for all South Africans, which implied equal treatment and opportunities;
- equality before the law;
- the protection of individuals and groups through the sovereignty of the law;
- the protection of human dignity, life and property regardless of race, colour, creed or religion;
- the participation of all South Africans in government through their elective representatives;
- and,
- a negotiated democratic system of government which can accommodate the legitimate political aspirations of all South African communities.



These matters, the Minister would agree, addressed extremely important aspects of South African life and were a further indication of the earnestness of the South African government in proceeding with its evolutionary political program. It was important also to recognize that this process, which would make participation in government by all South Africans possible, should be achieved peacefully and the government rejected categorically the use of violence to achieve political goals. The State President's speech had been followed up by further announcements amongst which were the scrapping of the pass-system by 1 July this year and the abolition of influx control measures in favour of a system of positive urbanisation. These were important decisions which, no matter how hard South Africa's adversaries tried to downplay them, could not be ignored. They were the realities extant in South Africa today and should be accepted as such. What was necessary, it seemed, was a policy of encouragement on the part of the outside world and not the confrontational approach which now seemed to be the order of the day.

MR AURET proceeded to discuss the situation in South West Africa and indicated that the South African Government stood by its previously stated policy that it would proceed with the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 once agreement had been reached regarding Cuban troop withdrawal. This was the only aspect which still prevented further progress. At the request of the Transitional Government of National Unity in Windhoek, the South African Government had recently also indicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations that a system of proportional representation would be used in elections to

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be held in the territory in future. This was an important decision and again underlined and confirmed the willingness of South Africa to assist in achieving progress in the negotiations surrounding South West Africa. SWAPO was, however, continuing with its policy of violence. It was still killing and abducting the people of whom it claimed to be the only representative. It had again started its annual infiltration into South West Africa and incidents on the border were increasing. South Africa would not stand idly by and simply allow this to continue. South Africa wanted peace in South West Africa. The South West Africans themselves desired peace. They had gone so far as to repeatedly in the past call on SWAPO to lay down its arms and join in the process of nation-building. It was incomprehensible that SWAPO continued with the senseless violence and killings. They should join the other parties inside the territory in finding solutions. Cape Verde, whose leaders were respected, could play an important role in helping to achieve this.

As far as Angola was concerned, South Africa had no desire to interfere in the internal problems of that country. The Angolans had to solve their own problems, hopefully in a peaceful manner. It was however a fact that Angola was still providing SWAPO with sanctuary and that SWAPO carried out its nefarious activities from Angolan soil. South Africa would not allow SWAPO to impose its will on South West Africa through force of arms. There was also concern about the massive arms-buildup which was taking place in Angola. While South Africa did not want to prescribe to other countries what its domestic policies should be, it seemed that no-one in Angola stood to gain anything by a continuation of the civil war which was raging there. Would not a peaceful process which achieved national

reconciliation bring about a more acceptable situation in which attention could be given to the advancement of the economic and social well-being of the Angolan people.

With regard to Mozambique, MR AURET noted that South Africa stood by its commitments under the Nkomati accord. South Africa did not support RENAMO and Foreign Minister Botha had personally gone out of his way to try to ensure that supply routes which seem to exist to allow the flow of arms to RENAMO from countries outside the region, were blocked. It appeared that the RENAMO was still receiving support from countries and individuals outside southern Africa. There appeared to be forces at work which did not want Nkomati to succeed. South Africa's intentions as far as the accord was concerned was clear; it was both in Mozambique's and South Africa's interest that Nkomati succeeded. South Africa would do its part to make this possible. He wanted to say that a number of projects had recently been started in Mozambique and this was a further indication of the positive intentions of South Africa.

MR AURET said that the South African government was extremely concerned by recent landmine incidents which had taken place on the borders with Botswana and Zimbabwe and in which a number of people had been killed. It was regrettable that the ANC used the territories of neighbouring states as access-routes to pursue their violent activities. He did not contend that the governments of the countries concerned were aware of the presence of such persons on their soil, but South Africa strongly felt that these states should do everything in their power to prevent a recurrence. These views had been conveyed to the governments concerned.



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As far as MR MANDELA was concerned, MINISTER DA LUZ was informed of the statement made by PRESIDENT BOTHA in this regard.

MINISTER DA LUZ thanked MR AURET for the exposition which he had given regarding the situation in southern Africa. He had found it useful and was pleased that he was better informed through this conversation. He wanted to pose a number of questions relating to matters which had come up during the discussion thus far and said that he would approach them in the same spirit of frankness with which Mr Auret had talked to him. He wanted to say that seen from the outside, all explanations which South Africa had advanced in regard to its relationship with Mozambique, were treated with great suspicion. The conviction remained, especially in Africa, that South Africa had not been loyal to SAMORA MACHEL. Moreover it was perceived that all openings which SAMORA MACHEL had given South Africa had been used to give him a raw deal. He was saying this in a frank and open spirit since he wanted to convey the seriousness with which the relations between Mozambique and South Africa were viewed. This feeling was a result not only of the material which FRELIMO had found at the RENAMO-base at Gorongosa, but also on the description of events which had been contained in the so-called Vaz diaries. Moreover, because RENAMO remained alive and was intensifying its activities in Mozambique at the present time despite FRELIMO attempts to contain its operations, the idea existed that logistic bases for RENAMO existed either in Malawi or South Africa. MINISTER DA LUZ said that he had heard talk of support for RENAMO emanating from other countries, including the Arabs and other countries further afield. He wanted to say that taking the military, economic and technical capabilities of South Africa into

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account, it was however difficult to believe that RENAMO was not using South African soil to launch its operations without South Africa having knowledge of this. He was convinced that there were certain elements in the South African military who were still supporting RENAMO. It would be a pity if the political capital which South Africa had accrued in Africa were to be further dissipated than it had already been through such a situation. The uneasy relationship between South Africa and Mozambique placed Cape Verde, who suggested that dialogue with Pretoria take place, in a difficult position and was a certain way of undermining the influence which Cape Verde could exercise in this regard. Cape Verde was in favour of direct contact with South Africa without any intermediaries playing a role. MINISTER DA LUZ said that his country wished to continue this policy since he believed that direct contact was the best way to establish a good relationship.

MR AURET indicated that South Africa was naturally interested in direct dialogue with Cape Verde and hoped that the good relationships which had been built up in the past could be continued. As far as Mozambique was concerned, he wanted to say to MINISTER DA LUZ that South Africa had in the past taken very important steps to ensure that no assistance to RENAMO emanated from within the borders of the Republic. In this regard the Minister was aware of the radar installations which had been installed on the South African/Mozambican border and which was used to monitor any possible flights which might take place. Furthermore, there was the recently uncovered ring of forgers in Johannesburg and which, South Africa had reason to believe, were also providing assistance to RENAMO. He wanted to assure Minister da Luz that South Africa was doing everything in its power to carry out its commitments



under the Nkomati accord and would continue to do so in the future. It was not in South Africa's interests that an unstable situation existed in Mozambique. Nor was it in the interest of that country.

MINISTER DA LUZ said that he was pleased that this was the South African attitude since he believed that the best way of convincing a hostile outside world of South Africa's good intentions was through the progressive developments of relations with Mozambique. The development of such relations would project favourably to the outside world and could go a long way in reducing the vast suspicion which at this time existed. MINISTER DA LUZ turned to the question of MR MANDELA and said that it was his impression that should MR MANDELA be released he could play a moderating role in South Africa. He wanted to say that MR MANDELA had originally not been in favour of violence and it was his view that MR MANDELA could not be expected to fulfil the condition of foreswearing violence in order to secure his release. He, DA LUZ, would not have accepted such a condition. The release of MR MANDELA would, according to the Minister, also be a gesture of goodwill to Africa and the outside world.

MR AURET replied that as he had already indicated, President Botha had stated in his speech of 31 January that the release of Captain du Toit, Dr Scharansky and Mr Sakarov could be an important factor in the consideration also of MR NELSON MANDELA'S release. This meant that the original decision regarding the release of MR MANDELA i.e. that he take a decision to enable his release, had now been broadened and the decision no longer only rested with him. MINISTER DA LUZ would be aware that Dr Scharansky had already been released and should

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Mr Sakarov and Captain du Toit also be set free, it was only a question of time before MR MANDELA could also be released.

MINISTER DA LUZ said that he took note of this position and that the situation was now clearer following the explanation he had received. As far as Angola was concerned he wanted to say that it was his impression that there had been backward movement regarding the negotiations between Angola and the United States. He thought that a new and more aggressive spirit was evident on the part of the Americans and there were also other factors which seemed to point to a retrogressive movement. These included the propositions made by the United States to the Angolans during the last meeting which took place in Luanda as well as the military intervention in Angola by South Africa during the course of last year which was seen as an attempt to save UNITA. He wanted to say that people on the "outside" saw a certain logic in the phased withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola. The problem however arose when highly trained troops had to be replaced with people who were essentially underdeveloped and who would require substantial training before their level of operational preparedness could compare with that of the Cubans. This would be very, very difficult. Moreover, there would also be problems should the Cubans withdraw and they are replaced by people who were already trained since the Angolans had difficulties in finding the necessary wherewithal to support such troops.

MR AURET indicated that he had already informed the Minister regarding South Africa's position on Res 435. This policy stood. South Africa was interested in achieving independence for Namibia. The territory was

costing the Republic an enormous amount of money every year, money which could be spent on very important and urgent projects which were required within the Republic itself. There should be no doubt in the mind of MINISTER DA LUZ regarding the seriousness with which South Africa viewed these matters. We were not intransigent, but we were not prepared to simply hand over the territory to a group of people who were intent on forcing their policies onto the people of Southwest-Africa at the point of a gun.

MINISTER DA LUZ indicated that he would welcome any messages from Minister Botha at any time should there be things which South Africa wished to have communicated to some of the neighbouring states with which it did not have direct links. He wanted to refer also to the question of South African Airways and its landing-rights in Cape Verde. There had recently been some manoeuvres, the source of which he was not sure of, to put the question of landing-rights for SAA in Cape Verde on the Agenda of the next meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity. The position of Cape Verde in this regard had not changed and a Cape Verdian delegation which was to travel to the OAU meeting in this regard were under strict instructions to defend the position adopted by Cape Verde. Cape Verde had considered also inviting a mission of the Council of Ministers of the OAU to their country to investigate this matter at first hand. He was not sure of the source of the pressure which had again recently emerged but he would be very grateful if South Africa could provide him with some information regarding its commercial relationships with the rest of Africa. This would enable him to effectively counter any arguments which might in future be advanced as far as SAA landing-rights were concerned. He wanted to repeat that



Cape Verde would try to defend its policy towards South Africa while it would at the same time state that it was against apartheid and racism, that the whole of Africa should be liberated and that it was up to the people of South Africa and the front-line states to say whether they were in favour of or against sanctions against the Republic. This position would be conveyed in the strongest possible terms also to the rest of Africa. Cape Verde had nothing to hide and would continue with the policy it had adopted in regard to South Africa thusfar. MINISTER DA LUZ said that during the visit of Mr Steward in September 1985, he had raised the question of a Soviet National being held by RENAMO. He would be very pleased to receive any information which we might be able to let him have in this connection.

MR AURET indicated that he did not think that this would be possible since South Africa did not maintain any links with RENAMO. He would however go into the matter and see where it stood.

MINISTER DA LUZ thanked Mr Auret for the exposition he had given to him on the various items and asked that his very best regards be conveyed to Minister Botha. He had heard that Angola would be very interested in continuing discussions with South Africa and wanted to know what he could communicate to the Angolans in this regard.

MR AURET said that South Africa was, for its part, prepared to discuss matters directly with Angola at any time. He was sure that Minister Botha would be very interested in meeting Minister Rodrigues (Kito). There was of course the possibility that Minister Rodrigues might like to travel to Cape Town for such a meeting. Such a visit could be held

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in the strictest secrecy and there would be no problems as far as we were concerned. MINISTER DA LUZ would also be most welcome to visit South Africa again.

MINISTER DA LUZ said that while he had indicated that the Angolans were interested in dialogue with South Africa, the visit of Savimbi to Washington recently may have had a negative impact on that inclination. He would however convey to his President that which he had been told and was sure that President Ferreira would speak to President Dos Santos in this regard. He himself would speak to Kito on the possibility of a meeting with Mr Botha.

In conclusion, MINISTER DA LUZ said, he wanted to raise an idea which has been exercising his mind for sometime: the impression he had was that as time passed and no solutions were forthcoming, only one group of countries would benefit from such a position. These were the outside powers which had no real interest in Africa but would exploit the situation to their own advantage. It was his firm opinion that as long as the problems in SWA/N remained, it would become more and more difficult to prevent such outside interference. This was not in his country's interest nor did he think in the interests of South Africa and the southern African region as a whole.

MR AURET said that outside interference in African and especially southern African affairs was also of great concern to South Africa. Everything possible would be done to avoid this and the dialogue which South Africa was able to conduct with its fellow African countries was one way of doing so. African countries faced many problems which could, however, only be solved by themselves. He thanked Minister da Luz for the frank and forthright manner in

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which the discussions had taken place and for the kind reception which the South African delegation had received.