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SUMMARY MINUTES OF A MEETING BETWEEN A DELEGATION FROM THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, AN ANGOLAN/CUBAN DELEGATION, AND
A DELEGATION FROM THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS MEDIATOR
ON THE QUESTION OF SWA/NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA

CAIRO, 24 - 25 JUNE 1988

SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION

- Minister R F Botha (Leader of the Delegation)
- Minister M A de M Malan
- General J J Geldenhuys
- Dr L D Barnard
- Mr N P van Heerden
- Mr G R W Babb
- Mr J H A Beukes
- Ambassador P G J Koornhof
- Maj. Gen. C J van Tonder
- Mr D W Auret
- Mr L H Evans
- Brig. G N Opperman
- Brig. J W Sonnekus
- Mr J Boshoff
- Mr A Barnard
- Mr A Jaquet
- Mr J Sunde
- Mr J Kilian
- Mr P J Botha
- Mr R F Desmarais

ANGOLAN/CUBAN DELEGATION

- Mr Afonso Van-Dunem Mbinda - Minister of External Relations
- Mr Antonio Dos Santos Franca Ndalú - Vice Minister of
Defence and FAPLA Chief of General Staff
- Mr Franca Van-Dunem - Minister of Justice
- Mr Venancio de Moura - Vice Minister of External Relations
- Mr Antonio Pitra Neto - Director of the Department of the
Central Committee of the MPLA Labour Party for State
and Judicial Organs
- Mr A M V de Almeida - Ambassador to Egypt
- Mr Antonio Jose Maria - Secretary of the President for
Defence and Security Affairs
- Mr Eliseo de Figueredo - Ambassador to Great Britain
- Mr Luis de Almeida - Ambassador to France
- Mr D. de Castro - Ambassador to Cuba
- Mr Joao Batista - Ambassador to Portugal

CONFIDENTIAL

2

Mr Jorge Risquet Valdes - Member of the Politburo of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba
Division General Ulises Rosales del Toro - Chief of the
General staff of the Ministry of the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Cuba
Mr Carlos Aldana Escalante - Member of the Secretariat of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba
Mr Rodolfo Puente Ferro - Vice Chief of the General
Department of Foreign Relations of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba
Mr Jose Arbesu Fraga - Vice Chief of the Department of
America at the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of Cuba
H.E. Mr Giraldo Mazola Collazo - Vice-Minister of Foreign
Affairs

USA DELEGATION

Dr Chester Crocker - Assistant Secretary of State
Ambassador H Cohen - National Security Council, The White
House
Ambassador F Wisner - US Ambassador to Egypt
Ambassador E Perkins - USA Ambassador to South Africa
Mr J Woods
Mr R Cabelly
Mr L Napier
Mr M Bellamy
Mr M McKinley

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Dr Crocker opened the meeting at 14h30 and welcomed the delegations. He thanked the Egyptian Government for hosting the meeting and for providing the necessary facilities. In London it had been agreed that there should be an African venue for the next round of talks and Egypt had made this possible. The US had received many offers from African and other countries to host the talks. Dr Crocker commented on the world-wide interest in the talks and the fact that the settlement process had been discussed at the most senior levels during the recent Moscow summit and Economic Summit meeting of the G7 in Toronto. Dr Crocker also mentioned that the Soviet Union had sent a senior representative to Cairo to follow the talks.

Dr Crocker said that the time now had come for hard decisions. He proposed that nobody should engage in recriminations over the delays in organising this meeting. A key issue he said, was whether it would be possible to recapture the spirit of the London meeting and deal with the issues involved. The US would continue to play its facilitating role and it believed that September 1988 was still a feasible date for winding up problems related to the settlement process, if the political will to do so existed. Americans were not involved in this conflict and it was not American lives and resources that were being wasted. The parties to the conflict should seriously consider whether it was in their best interest for it to continue.

Dr Crocker proposed a total press black-out during the conference, as had been the case in London. The US had drawn up an agenda which he hoped the two sides would agree to. He said that after the Angolan/Cuban proposal of March South Africa had presented its counter-proposals and that the Angola/Cuban delegation had now formulated further proposals. He invited Foreign Minister Botha to start the discussions.

Minister Botha thanked Dr Crocker for his role and that of the US in making arrangements for the meeting. He went on to express the South African delegation's sincere appreciation to the Government of Egypt for agreeing to host the meeting and for the arrangements it had made. It was an honour and a pleasure to meet on Egyptian soil, which was also African soil. Minister Botha then introduced the South African delegation.

Minister Botha said that the meeting did not take place in a vacuum. In the view of the South African Government the nature and purpose of the meeting should be viewed against the background of the problems facing the African continent. A conflict situation in a part of Africa had to be dealt with. All except the Cubans were born and would die in Africa. South Africa could divorce itself neither from Africa nor from the realities of the situation. Often parties talked to each other through the international media but he said that in his 12 years as Foreign Minister he could not recall that this approach had solved any problems, specifically not in political areas.

Minister Botha said that he was concerned about problems such as the two million foreigners in South Africa who had come from South Africa's neighbouring countries. Ten

million other people were fed by these two million and the Minister asked who would feed them were South Africa to return them to their home countries. The Minister said that he could discuss other serious problems such as AIDS and how Africa would be destroyed unless technological advancement and economic progress was achieved. There was no hope for the continent unless conflict in Africa could be stopped. The South African Government sincerely believed that Africa stood no chance of maintaining its standards in comparison to Europe because of such things as high population growth, adverse climatic conditions, disease and poverty. The Minister said that under war conditions, Africa was doomed, and referred to statistics he had brought with him to support his views.

Minister Botha said that he would not raise the Brazzaville fiasco but rather would move forward in a constructive spirit. He said that the real issue before the meeting was foreign troop withdrawal from Angola and the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435/78 (UNSCR 435/78). The South African counter-proposals had been submitted to the Angolans and he would wish to learn the Angolan reaction to them.

Minister Mbinda thanked the US delegation and in particular Dr Crocker for their efforts to find a venue to continue the process started in London. He thanked the Egyptian Government for hosting the conference and went on to say that solidarity in relieving oppression in Southern Africa was the reason why Angola had accepted the Cairo venue. Fostering the independence of Namibia on the basis of UNSCR 435/78 which would restore peace to the region, had also been an important consideration. Having presented the Angolan delegation Minister Mbinda said discussions could start.

Dr Crocker asked Minister Botha whether he had any further comments at that stage.

Minister Botha said he had no comments but was interested to hear the Angolan views.

Minister Mbinda said that he wished to analyse the document South Africa had submitted to Angola.

Minister Mbinda said that to start with, the title of the document contradicted paragraph 5 in which the South African Government claimed it was prepared to explore a peaceful settlement of the conflict. At a later stage the

CONFIDENTIAL

5

document stated that a detailed discussion of the matter was only possible after Angola had accepted the proposals.

Minister Mbinda then said that para **2(c)** did not reflect reality. The South African Government said it did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of Angola, but the events of the past 13 years indicated the contrary. South Africa had caused great human suffering, many deaths and economic destabilisation. He estimated Angola's material losses during this period at US dollars 12 billion. In terms of ethics and international law, the South African Government should indemnify Angola for these losses and this point should be discussed at the present meeting in Cairo.

In 1975 South African troops had travelled over 850 kms into Angola to try and prevent independence. Since independence, South African troops had bombarded, sabotaged and destroyed many installations in Angola. He listed some examples and proceeded to attack UNITA and South Africa's support for that organisation. Minister Mbinda referred to the statement made in December 1987 by General Geldenhuys to the effect that South African troops were withdrawing from Angola under operational conditions. Since then and during January, February and March of 1988 South Africa, in violation of UNSC Resolution 602 had continued to attack targets, specifically Cuito Cuanavale. Minister Mbinda also referred to the visit State President Botha had made to the area and said that this was a violation of international law.

Paragraph **2(e)** was unacceptable to Angola because SWAPO was recognised by the UN, the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement as the sole, authentic representative of the Namibian people. The South African Government could not ask the Angolan Government to take measures against SWAPO because the Angolan Government was not involved in the conflict between SWAPO and South Africa.

Minister Mbinda said that in London South Africa had said it had accepted UNSCR 435/78 but subsequently Ministers Botha and Malan had said it needed alteration. Because of this Angola could not accept that South Africa was sincere. Angola felt that the only changes needed to UNSCR 435/78 were those arising out of South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia.

Paragraph **2(g)**, referring to the timetable for Cuban troop withdrawal was unacceptable to Angola. Cuban troops would

remain in the country because South Africa continued to destroy Angolan territory. Never once in 13 years had Cuban troops crossed the border to Namibia and when UNSCR 435/78 was adopted in 1978, the Cubans had already been there for 3 years. The troops that should leave were the aggressor troops of South Africa. The Angolan and Cuban movement to the south was a response to the unprecedented escalation of its forces in Angola by South Africa.

To show its honest approach to the negotiations, Angola and Cuba had agreed to the total, but gradual withdrawal of Cuban troops. This was in contrast to the illegal occupation of parts of Angola by South African troops. Minister Mbinda then referred to South African military activity in the south of Angola since November 1987. Angola demanded that South African troops withdraw from the south of Angola and this point was not negotiable.

Minister Mbinda alleged that more South African troops were currently being introduced into the south of Angola. He said Angola would not compromise on its sovereignty. South Africa was hostile to the Front Line States and the only way to bring peace to Southern Africa was to eliminate the apartheid regime.

Angola also objected to South African attempts to control the disposition of Angolan nationals.

Minister Mbinda said that Angola could not accept proposals that constituted interference in its internal affairs and therefore these proposals were totally unacceptable. He said that Angola had come to Cairo with a constructive and open mind in search of the best solution based on UNSCR 435/78. The Angolan/Cuban delegation considered the best solution to the conflict in Namibia to be an agreement constituted under UN supervision. Angola had already submitted proposals to the US and now had a further document to submit.

Angola did not consider that the South African proposals could advance the process and neither could they be considered as counter-proposals to the Angolan proposal discussed in London. In London South Africa had rejected quadripartite proposals because SWAPO could not be considered as a sovereign state. Angola now proposed a tripartite agreement between Angola, Cuba and South Africa to implement UNSCR 435/78 and bring peace to the region. Minister Mbinda reiterated Angola's willingness to move forward if this was reciprocated so as to advance on a realistic basis.

CONFIDENTIAL

7

Senhor Risquet agreed with the general points made by Minister Mbisa - Cuba and Angola had come to Cairo with a unified voice. He said arrogant pressure by South Africa was totally unacceptable. South Africa said one thing in London about UNSCR 435/78 but had then changed its mind. In Brazzaville the South African envoys had referred to the situation near Calueque as if they had certain rights in Angola. In all frankness, after studying the South African document, Cuba had wondered whether it would be worthwhile coming to Cairo. He said the South African proposals were a tasteless joke and totally unrealistic. Despite this, Cuba had agreed to participate in the meeting and did not want to be accused of any responsibility for a breakdown in the negotiations. He claimed that the South African position was not sustainable in the light of conditions on the ground. The settlement process was not advanced by South Africa's actions. Cuba rejected South Africa's proposals but wished to reiterate its readiness to continue its efforts for peace. Cuban goals were the independence of Namibia, respect for the sovereignty of Angola, and peace in the region. International guarantees were necessary if Cuban troop withdrawal was to take place. South Africa would not get around a conference table that which it failed to achieve on the battlefield.

Mr Risquet said that UNITA was supported by South Africa in order to destabilize and defeat the MPLA, which represented a gross interference in the affairs of Angola. Cessation of South African support for UNITA was a sine qua non for peace in Angola. Peace in Angola would come the moment this aid to UNITA stopped. In its proposals South Africa was interfering with Angola's internal affairs - the proposal to start National Reconciliation within 6 weeks was totally unacceptable. Cuba and Angola had not interfered in internal South African matters. In reality apartheid was the cause of all problems in Southern Africa. According to the UN apartheid was a crime against humanity.

The question of the number of Cuban troops in Angola had nothing to do with South Africa. By asking about Cubans married to Angolans South Africa was trying to extend apartheid beyond its borders. Black Cubans were descendants of Angolan slaves. There was no truth in the contentions that Cuba was not trying to seek peace. In the last 12 months the largest escalation of South African troops in Angola since 1975 had taken place. Mr Risquet also referred to the visit to the operational area by

President Botha and Minister Botha. He said that South African troops had gone to Cuito Cuanavale to surround and annihilate FAPLA forces, but thanks to reinforcements by the internationalist Cuban troops, that has failed - the myth of South Africa's invincibility had forever been destroyed.

Snr Risquet reiterated the unacceptability of the South African proposals, but said Cuba was still ready and willing to negotiate. Cuba had now submitted a ten point document for a possible agreement. There were five elements in their approach to obtain a peaceful solution:

- (1) Implementation of UNSCR 435/78 without any change.
- (2) A Tripartite Accord between Cuba, Angola and South Africa.
- (3) An accord between Cuba and Angola on troop withdrawal.
- (4) An accord between Cuba and Angola to monitor troop withdrawal through in situ UN verification.
- (5) The UN Security Council to be the guarantor of the agreement.

Dr Crocker then asked Minister Botha for his comments.

Minister Botha started by saying that it was not the same Angolan delegation that he had met in Brazzaville. He said that countries and governments had reasons for their behaviour. He thought that the South African delegation had come to discuss serious proposals. This had not happened. He had not heard any counter-proposals to that which South Africa had submitted. Instead, additional items had been introduced. The Minister said that he would need hours to talk about the wrongs in Angola and Cuba. He mentioned a lack of press and religious freedom and asked when last there had been elections in those countries. He referred to the Alvor Agreement and asked what had happened to that Agreement. Minister Botha referred to ANC camps in Angola and said that not only did South Africa know where these camps were but that it was known that people in these camps were being trained to kill South Africans. Minister Botha said that the four white ANC terrorists recently arrested had inter alia been instructed to kill members of his delegation. Minister Botha reiterated his offer made in Brazzaville for Angola to send whoever it liked to interview these four white terrorists in the presence of international jurists if necessary. Minister Botha said he knew and could say a great deal about damage done by the ANC and SWAPO in South Africa and SWA/Namibia. If Angola wanted to submit a claim for damage, South Africa could and

CONFIDENTIAL

9

would submit a far higher claim since the South African property that had been destroyed by ANC and SWAPO actions was far more valuable.

Minister Botha said he no longer replied to emotive terms such as those which had been used by Angola and Cuba. South Africa had come to Cairo to discuss peace but instead was confronted with all sorts of evasive actions and statements. He asked what had happened since London and Brazzaville. The acceptance of Brazzaville as the venue for the next round of talks had been done with the agreement of the Congolese authorities and in full view of the international media. He could not understand why Angola had wittingly broken that agreement. After the London meeting the South African Government had been told that Angola was serious about Cuban troop withdrawal. The statements he had now heard created the impression that this was not at all the case.

Minister Botha said that South Africa would not be provoked by the rhetoric and abusive statements. After London and in Brazzaville, South Africa had been invited to submit counter-proposals. These were South African proposals, not Angolan ones. Angola had not been asked to agree to them in advance. They were supposed to be discussed, not dismissed out of hand. In Brazzaville there had been neither arrogance nor ideological attacks, in continuation of the spirit of London. The parties owed it to themselves to pursue that spirit. Today new questions had been introduced. Minister Botha said he was prepared to discuss South Africa's internal matters but then the internal matters of Angola and Cuba must also be discussed. He said he was ready to discuss South African history but wished to reiterate that the South African Government was against racial discrimination and was working to remove it. He referred to a statement that he had made in 1974 whilst Ambassador to the UN, in which he had said that discrimination based on colour was indefensible. Much progress had been made in South Africa since then. South Africa had in its time fought the hardest anti-colonial war. South Africa could point to 100 000 black taxi owners in the country, to 45 000 black hawkers in South Africa with a higher standard of living than people in Angola or Cuba, and the fact that more blacks in South Africa owned motor cars than Soviets did in the USSR. Minister Botha also referred to health services in South Africa which were recognised as being of the best in the world and the recent operation to separate a pair of black Siamese twins.

CONFIDENTIAL

10

Minister Botha said that he had shrugged off the language of the Angolans and Cubans. If they wanted to debate basic human rights then it could be done with independent judges or international experts as referees to compare Cuba with South Africa. He then invited all delegates to visit South Africa as his guests with guarantees of safe conduct to judge for themselves what the real situation was. Minister Botha referred to the freedom of action of political leaders like Chief Buthelezi, asking how many Cubans had taken their government to court. He then cited the example of a court case instituted by Chief Buthelezi which the South African Government had lost, also on appeal to the highest court in the land.

Minister Botha said mention had been made of another document that the South African delegation had not seen. He proposed an adjournment to study this document. His reaction would not contain the same language that had been used against South African proposals by Angola and Cuba.

Dr Crocker said that he would give whatever time was necessary for this study.

The meeting adjourned at 16h35.

SECOND SESSION : 25 JUNE 1988

Dr Crocker announced that the US would prepare a draft press statement and circulate it timeously. During the day the US would be thinking about a future work programme and about suggestions on how to proceed, assuming there was a basis on which to do so. He then invited Minister Botha to open the discussions.

Minister Botha raised the question of the press black-out. He said that if one delegation could talk to the press then others could also do so. In the Egyptian Mail an Angolan delegate had given a full account of what had happened the previous day. A similar report had appeared in the French edition of the paper.

Minister Mbinda said this was not the first time that this had happened. He said it always happened when important matters were discussed. What had happened in Cairo had also happened in London when all parties had agreed to a press black-out. Angola was always the victim of this lie. He wanted to assure Dr Crocker that no Angolan delegate had a mandate to talk to the press. If the press had a source of information it did not come from the Angolan side. Angola took its responsibilities seriously and was not the source of this information. His delegation had obeyed the rules laid down by Dr Crocker.

Dr Crocker said this was an important restatement of principle by both sides, to avoid any press contact.

Minister Botha said his delegation had studied the Angolan document entitled "Principles to be Contained in a Possible Accord". It contained important elements with which the South African Government could associate itself. He wished to propose some wording changes which could be summarised in the following way:

- a) South Africa objected to paragraph 10 unless the damages suffered by South Africa and South West Africa/Namibia were also added. Otherwise the paragraph had to be deleted.
- b) As regards paragraph 5 South Africa would like to know what security guarantees the Angolan delegation wanted to see - particularly in regard to Namibia, because South Africa could not see what guarantees

were required. If agreement was reached it should be assumed that the concerns which the Angolan government harboured would fall away. Language which indicated in advance a lack of confidence in the agreement had to be avoided. South Africa therefore proposed deletion of this paragraph.

- c) The word "Principle" in the title was a good word to use.
- d) South Africa could, broadly speaking, associate itself with objectives outlined in paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9. The substance of these paragraphs was acceptable to South Africa.
- e) As regards paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Angolan document South Africa suggested adding some ideas that were of great importance to it.

To summarise, South Africa found in this document a number of principles acceptable to it. South Africa had taken the Angolan document and, using it as a basis, had produced what could be called a joint drafting document - "Joint" because South Africa had taken as much of the Angolan document as possible. Now it was a document containing ideas from both sides. Obviously Angola would now wish to make some comment, but South Africa had endeavoured not to include any extravagant or objectionable elements in its document.

Dr Crocker summarised the position. South Africa had studied the two Angolan documents which had been submitted, had taken the shorter one and had produced a new draft. The US had then given this document to the Angolans. South Africa now sought comment from Angola. Dr Crocker asked if the Angolans wanted more time to study it or if they were ready to comment.

Minister Mbinda said that the Angolan/Cuban delegation had only learnt that morning about the South African point of view in reply to their 10 point document. He wished to propose a careful study of the South African proposals, but wanted to know what the comment of the South African Government was regarding the proposed tripartite agreement - was it a basis for discussion or not? Apart from this Angola wanted more time to consider the latest South African ideas and comments.

THIRD SESSION : 25 JUNE 1988

Dr Crocker asked the Heads of Delegations for their comments.

Minister Mbinda began by expressing appreciation for the realistic approach of the South African Delegation. He regarded this as a positive step. Only by means of serious dialogue could peace and security be achieved in South Western Africa. Although the Angolan/Cuban delegation had not had enough time to fully study the South African proposals he would make a few comments.

The Angolan/Cuban delegation felt that the South African document contained certain principles that were acceptable to them. Nevertheless there were also some ideas that they felt did not merit consideration. In paragraph 2, parallelism and the term Southern Africa used throughout, were not acceptable. The phrase South Western Africa, that is Angola and Namibia, was preferable.

Minister Mbinda said the Angola/Cuban delegation had taken note of South Africa's objections to some of the 10 points in its document. At the negotiating table there were some points of agreement but also several essential issues over which there was not agreement. There was a long way to go and much work still needed to be done. The Angola/Cuban delegation now proposed that both documents be accepted as working documents of the Conference. He also wanted to propose a four-party working group, at expert level, to draft a single document which would bring the principles into global agreement. This way the spirit of London could be restored and UNSCR 435/78 implemented. Minister Mbinda hoped that the experts would be duly and sufficiently empowered to discuss the substance of the principles and he proposed that time be given to give time for this process. He had confidence that the outcome of this would not compromise the negotiations.

Dr Crocker asked for clarification of the time frame proposed.

Minister Mbinda said that his joint delegation felt that the plenary should not break into groups, but that within a time-table of say 10 to 15 days, experts should meet and review ways and means of consolidating the two sets of proposals.

Minister Botha said that the meeting had reached a very delicate stage and in view of the serious considerations involved, requested a short break to consult his delegation.

(The meeting reconvened after a short adjournment)

Minister Botha said that after listening to the Angolan proposal his delegation had decided that in general it was acceptable to them. Perhaps within the remaining time available it might be possible to clarify some of the implications involved in this proposal. As he understood his Angolan colleague, it would not appear practical for the meeting to reach consensus on the two documents. The South African delegation agreed with that reality. In the words of the Angolan Foreign Minister "let us give time to give time". This did not however mean wasting time.

Minister Botha summarised by saying that the important issue was to consolidate the two documents to the satisfaction of the governments represented at the table. That endeavour would be made by a group of experts to be nominated by the Governments concerned. South Africa would nominate the same delegation that had been present at London. The other governments naturally had the right to nominate its own delegations. The task of the working group would be to try and reach agreement on marrying the two documents.

Dr Crocker asked for comments from the Angolan delegation on the question of time and venue for the group meeting.

Minister Mbinda said that the South African delegation had correctly interpreted his statements. There was not time during the present meeting to consolidate the documents. He proposed that the meeting take place within two weeks, i.e. within the first ten days of July. Because of the constructive spirit obtained in London Minister Mbinda proposed that the next meeting be held in London again.

Minister Botha thanked the Angolan Minister but suggested an informal meeting of the heads of delegation to resolve the issue of the venue.

(The meeting adjourned to enable this discussion to take place)

Dr Crocker reported that it had been agreed that the next meeting of experts would take place during the week starting 11 July 1988 and that, subject to confirmation, the meeting would be held in the USA. He said that the US delegation would finalise the press statement for distribution.

Minister Mbinda expressed agreement and satisfaction.

Minister Botha associated himself with the Angolan statements.

The meeting adjourned at 17h30.

FOURTH (FINAL) SESSION : 25 JUNE 1988

Dr Crocker asked whether the delegations agreed with the draft of the final press communique which had been distributed.

Minister Van Dunem apologised for the absence of Minister Mbinda but said he was empowered to comment. The Angola/Cuban delegation had no objections either to the form or the substance of the communique.

Minister Botha said he had read the communique and agreed with it. He thanked Dr Crocker and the US Government for their efforts. He also thanked the Angolan/Cuban delegations for their participation and said that there was no substitute for personal discussions and getting to know each other as human beings. Minister Botha said he left Cairo with hope and expressed his appreciation to the Egyptian Government for assisting in so many ways.

Dr Crocker urged the delegates to the next meeting to arrive in America on the evening of 10 July to start work the next day. The USA would advise as soon as possible what facilities would be made available. Dr Crocker recommended that no more than 6 experts be sent per delegation.

Minister Van Dunem agreed with all the suggestions made. He asked whether the limitation of 6 was for the joint

CONFIDENTIAL

17

Angolan/Cuban delegation or per country. He associated himself with Minister Botha's words and expressed his appreciation to Dr Crocker and thanked the people and Government of Egypt for their hospitality and for providing the venue.

Dr Crocker associated himself with the word of appreciation to the Government of Egypt. The number of experts for the next meeting would be 6 per country. He shared the sense of hope for the future meetings and noted that there was much substantive work to do.

The meeting closed at 10h37.

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