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MEETING OF THE JOINT MONITORING COMMISSION (JMC) :
MUPA : 28 MARCH 1984

1. After a brief introduction by MAJOR XAVIER, the Head of the Angolan Component of the Joint Monitoring Commission, COL KOEN, the acting Head of the South African component, announced that there had been no violations of the Lusaka Agreement during the period since the JMC had moved its headquarters to Mupa. Lt.-Col Monteiro, the Deputy Chief of Staff of FAPLA, said that his government and party wanted peaceful solutions in southern Africa and had been giving special attention to the disengagement process. He suggested that the meeting should consider the following questions:

- a) the mandate of the JMC in terms of the Lusaka Agreement;
- b) the manner in which the Lusaka Agreement was being carried out; and
- c) any other business.

In this regard there were a number of questions which the Angolan side would like to present. LT.-COL MONTEIRO went on to say that the Angolan side accepted the mandate for the JMC which had been prepared in terms of the Lusaka Agreement by South Africa with two exceptions (see annexure A). Firstly, the Angolan side could not accept paragraph 7(c), which had been proposed by South Africa, because it was not consistent

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with the reassertion of Angolan sovereignty. The Angolan side did not feel that it could accept any limitation on the manner in which its forces reoccupied their own territory, particularly in view of UNITA activity in the area in question. He added that Angola could also not accept the last sentence of paragraph 10 which stated that JMC teams could be deployed in the area in question at the behest of either or both of the parties in order to monitor compliance with the Agreement. The Angolan side believed that the Lusaka Agreement made provision only for the despatching of JMC teams to investigate specific allegations of breaches of the Lusaka Agreement and not for general patrols.

2. GENL GELDENHUYS differed with the Angolan interpretation of the Lusaka Agreement with regard to paragraph 10 and quoted from the minutes of the meeting of 16 February 1984 to support his contention. However, he noted that there had been a third party present at that meeting and suggested that the matter be referred to the United States for clarification. With regard to paragraph 7(c) he said that although this had not been part of the Lusaka Agreement, it had been part of the Cape Verde and Fleur du Cap understandings. MR STEWARD added that paragraph 7(c) should also be seen in the context of South Africa's proposal of 15 December 1983 in which the Republic had offered to disengage its forces in Angola on condition that the resulting situation would not be exploited, inter alia, by FAPLA. It was agreed that this question would also be referred to the United States for clarification.

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3. LT.-COL MONTEIRO said that the Angolan side had informed the United States of these two problems via the British Embassy in Luanda a week ago and had expected that the Americans would by this time have been in contact with South Africa.

4. GENL GELDENHUYS then turned to the second item proposed by the Angolans, namely the manner in which the Lusaka Agreement was being carried out in practice. Although he had been able to approve, on his own authority, during the JMC meeting of 19 March 1984, the move from Cuvelai to Mupa, certain problems had arisen which would make this procedure impossible on this occasion. He would have to refer the question of the JMC move to Evale to his Government for a decision. In this regard it was important to note that although the JMC had not detected any violations of the agreement during the past week, this was certainly not an accurate reflection of the whole situation in the area in question based on SADF intelligence. Firstly, there was an alarming presence of SWAPO in the area, particularly in the regions south of Cahama, near Evale and in the central region just north of the border. Secondly, it was clear that the Angolan Government had not used all the means at its disposal to ensure the withdrawal of SWAPO elements from the area in question. It had, for example, not used radio broadcasts, the distribution of pamphlets or aerial loudspeakers to achieve this purpose. It was also clear from information obtained from SWAPO prisoners that they were in radio communication with their

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regional headquarters. In addition, there had been a number of alleged violations which were still being investigated.

5. LT.-COL MONTEIRO replied that South Africa's preoccupations were correct and that the matter would have to be referred to his Government. There would have to be renewed contact between his Government and the President of SWAPO, particularly with regard to SWAPO activities in the triangles which have their apexes at Techamutete and Cassinga. Angola was worried about this situation and agreed that the JMC headquarters move should not take place at this stage. He understood South Africa's preoccupation and emphasised that Angola was totally pledged to the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement. In this regard he added that Angola was worried that little progress had been made with regard to the solution of the problem of Namibia. He felt that a long time had already elapsed but there was still no evidence of a meeting between SWAPO and South Africa. He suggested that staff meetings between Angola and South Africa should take place on a weekly basis within the framework of the JMC.

6. LT.-COL MONTEIRO said that he wished to raise three additional questions on the instruction of his Government:

a) What was the status of Angolan prisoners in South West Africa and South Africa? Angola had made a number of enquiries in this regard but no reply had been received.

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- b) Angola requested the return of the war material which had been captured by South Africa in 1981 and in 1983/84, particularly at Xangogo, Ngiva and Cuvelai.
- c) Angola was particularly concerned about the existence of a third force in the area in question. UNITA had established itself in the area controlled by South Africa and had in addition launched actions against FAPLA in the area from which South Africa had withdrawn. It was clear that the UNITA "puppets" and "bandits" were supported by South Africa. Angola had for example found South African parachutes deep inside its territory, which proved that UNITA was being supplied by South Africa.
7. GENL GELDENHUYS replied that none of these questions were covered by the Lusaka Agreement and could therefore not be dealt with within the JMC framework. He suggested that these questions should be referred to higher authorities. At this point, after an exchange of courtesies, the meeting adjourned.
8. MR STEWARD and GENL GELDENHUYS then called LT.-COL MONTEIRO and LT.-COL SEQUIERO aside for a private discussion. MR STEWARD said that it was clear that the questions which had been raised by LT.-COL MONTEIRO were of importance to both countries and should be discussed directly at a confidential meeting, preferably between Minister R F Botha and Minister

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Rodrigues Kito. LT.-COL MONTEIRO replied that his Government had taken note of the informal approach which had been made to it the previous week through the South African contingent on the JMC in this regard. His Government agreed that such a meeting was necessary and desirable but that it should not be held on the border between South West Africa and Angola. He suggested that South Africa inform the Angolan authorities as soon as possible of the time, venue and agenda of the proposed meeting. He further suggested that this information should be conveyed via the direct telex channel to President Dos Santos which had been proposed to Ambassador Fourie at an earlier stage in the Cape Verde Islands. He confirmed the importance of holding such a meeting in the strictest confidence.

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