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MINUTES OF A MEETING BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICAN AND ANGOLAN DELEGATIONS : ILHA DO SAL , 23 FEBRUARY 1983

The Meeting was attended by the following persons:

South African Delegation

Mr J van Dalsen	Director-General: Foreign Affairs and Information
Dr B G Fourie	South African Ambassador, Washington
Mr C Bekker	National Intelligence Service
Lt Genl. A J van Deventer	Office of the Prime Minister
Dr J Roux	Secretary : Department of the Prime Minister
Brig C J van Tonder	S A Defence Force
Mr D Steward	Department of Foreign Affairs and Information
Mr P R Dietrichsen	Department of Foreign Affairs and Information
Mr Jose dos Santos	National Intelligence Service - Interpreter.

Angolan Delegation

Mr Venancio de Moura	Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mr Franca Van-Dunen	Angolan Ambassador, Lisbon
Mr Carlos Fernandes	Secretary attached to the Presidency responsible for Foreign Affairs
Major Jose Maria	Secretary attached to the Presidency responsible for Military Matters
Mr Texeria de la Cruz	Africa Division, Angolan Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mrs Luisa Filipe	Interpreter, Secretary

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MINISTER MOURA opened the meeting by welcoming the South African delegates. He stated that Angola had thought after the previous discussions (7 December 1982) that the climate for the solution of the South West Africa/Namibia question was right because of the formulation of certain proposals and counter-proposals based on the principle of the sovereignty of states. They therefore thought it strange that the delegation from South Africa was not at ministerial level and wondered whether it meant a lessening of interest or something else. Nevertheless, the substance was more important than the form. The previous talks had taken place in a climate of frankness and he hoped it would be the same during the current meeting in order to allow the meeting to advance in formulating practical details. What was to be achieved depended largely on political will.

Mr VAN DALSEN made the opening South African statement by referring to the letter which had been addressed to the Cape Verdean Minister of Foreign Affairs by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information, Mr R F Botha, in which the reason for the change in the level of his delegation had been explained. Peace on the South West Africa/Namibian border was still a prime objective of the South African Government (SAG) which was the reason for the first round of talks at Ministerial level on 7 December 1982. Further talks to work out certain details concerning the proposals accepted by both sides in December 1982 were to be held and it was for that reason that Minister R F Botha had addressed a letter to his Cape Verdean counterpart on 2 February 1983 proposing a meeting to which South Africa planned to send a delegation headed by three Ministers. Arrangements were already afoot when the SAG learned certain facts which made it impossible for the planned delegation to proceed to Cape Verde. The Cape Verdean Minister of Foreign Affairs was advised of this on 18 February 1983 by letter. In this regard the SAG considered mutual restraint an implicit requirement under present circumstances. Although it was not formally required, South African forces had exercised maximum restraint - to the detriment of their own position. Nothing was initiated from South Africa's side which could jeopardise the delicate process of negotiations. However, South Africa had received incontrovertible evidence that Angola did not see the matter in the same way, since the lull in South African Defence Force (SADF) activities had been used to strengthen Angolan military positions and to escalate SWAPO terrorist activities against the population of South West Africa. There was evidence that Angola was planning to take advantage of the proposals to launch operations which were to disturb the balance. The SAG concluded that Angola was using the process of negotiation as a smokescreen for SWAPO activities. Mr VAN DALSEN then continued to give examples of SWAPO actions aimed at the population, infrastructure and leaders of South West Africa as well as a list of incidents which had occurred in the ten days preceding the meeting. Mention was also made of the fact that the offensive was considered the largest and most determined ever executed. It was inconceivable to the SAG that the offensive could have been launched without the knowledge and co-operation of the Angolan Government. The

restraint shown by the SADF was to the detriment of its own position which was noticeable in SWAPO activities in which there had been a marked increase over the period preceding December 1982. Since Angola had stated that it was able to control SWAPO, it seemed to the SAG that Angola had chosen not to control SWAPO over a critical period. In addition, there were disturbing signs of redeployment and reinforcement of Cuban and FAPLA forces in Southern Angola while FAPLA was co-operating with SWAPO in the Kunene province. The SAG saw these as signs of an offensive to come.

In the light of these developments, it was not unreasonable to conclude that since the previous talks, there was no intent to control SWAPO. The lack of Angolan restraint had resulted in escalation of hostilities and an absence of progress. The SAG was keenly interested in peace but could not continue with the process until the Angolan Government was prepared on its own behalf and that of SWAPO to reciprocate the military restraint shown by South Africa until the time of the talks. All sides needed to show restraint. In the light, therefore, of the escalation, the SAG wanted absolute clarity before any further discussions or any proposals could be made. The SAG also wanted an assurance from Angola that it was not only interested in a short-term solution but in lasting long-term peace which included the departure of the Cubans. The Delegation was prepared to recommend to the SAG the need for further talks at Ministerial level, but Angolan restraint would have to be exercised in practice.

(A copy of a non-paper which outlines South Africa's position was then handed to Vice-Minister Moura - page 6 of Annexure A). (The above introductory statement is also reflected in Annexure A).

MINISTER MOURA responded by saying that if he had understood the South African position correctly, too many guarantees were required from Angola on SWAPO and on Angolan matters. Secondly, Angola also needed the Cubans.

AMBASSADOR FOURIE interjected that a lasting peace could only be achieved by the departure of the Cubans. It had to be placed on record to avoid any misunderstanding and the SAG wanted this to be conveyed to Angola. The idea was not to discuss guarantees or the type of restraint during the current meeting since it would have to be done during a future meeting of Ministers.

MINISTER MOURA thanked the Ambassador for the explanation and continued to say that his delegation had taken note of the objective analysis given by the South African delegation as well as information on the level of SADF activities.

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AMBASSADOR FOURIE pointed out that, after the previous talks, Minister R F Botha had gone on South African television to give an encouraging message to the country at the risk of his own credibility. If Ministers had attended the present meeting, he would have come under fire from the public for having misread the position on the ground, especially if SWAPO continued its activities while the Ministers were on Sal island.

MINISTER MOURA indicated that he understood the position. The Angolan Government had expected a meeting at the previous level in order to advance practical terms which could be formally substantiated in a document. Such a document would serve as an instrument of pressure on SWAPO. The question was what practical value the talks had for Angola as far as SWAPO was concerned. What was true was that since the last talks, a spirit of violence was prevailing in the border area. Serious infrastructural damage had been inflicted at a dam in Lomaum. Civilians were suffering and the damage was hampering the economy. The sabotage could only have been perpetrated by highly skilled explosives experts and not by the puppets. South Africa's political will was appreciated but the action in question had taken place since the previous talks. These actions would take place while South Africa occupied the Kunene province. There still was the possibility of a cessation of hostilities if the political will existed. Concrete proposals on latitudes and dates of implementation had to be made. It had been impossible to implement the 7 December 1982 proposals on 1 February 1983 but the same will existed to determine new dates. A formal undertaking in writing to serve as an instrument of pressure on SWAPO was needed in order to pass to a higher phase, politically, of the implementation of a ceasefire agreement. They were keen to advance practical terms which would be used to influence SWAPO. Influencing of SWAPO was a delicate matter. The Organisation and the South West Africa/Namibia problem were not creations of Angola. The problem was an international and UN matter. South Africa and Angola shared a border of more than 1000 Km and the situation called for the creation of the right conditions and a written instrument as explained. The situation embarrassed Angola since they could not control the movements of SWAPO in an area controlled by the SADF. Angola was ready to assume its responsibility but the right situation needed to be created. South Africans and Angolans were all Africans and the problems had to be solved in an African manner. But time was not in the two countries' favour. Political will was necessary to establish confidence and move forward.

AMBASSADOR FOURIE commented that the delegation would like to establish what the Angolan views on the long-term issues were. Was permanent peace the aim? Various elements had to be considered, such as when a cessation of hostilities could be expected.

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MINISTER MOURA interjected that the right situation would be created when South African forces withdrew and the area concerned could be occupied by Angolan forces. Another point was that a compromise from South Africa's side could be used to put pressure on SWAPO. Further, since it had been impossible to implement the proposals on the scheduled dates, Angola would like to propose new dates for implementation. As a fourth point, Angola maintained the proposal concerning the line at 15°30'South for all forces. Angola had no intention of being an aggressor and accusations that Angola was establishing bases with aggressive aims, were not true. It had to be remembered that South Africa was in possession of long-range heavy guns.

To facilitate implementation of steps, mutual trust was needed and an instrument had to be deposited - it would be a positive step. It was also to be remembered that SWAPO was a liberation movement supported by the international community.

AMBASSADOR FOURIE mentioned that South Africa had expressed its willingness to address the long-term problem. Of the matters mentioned by Minister Moura, the major one was a short-term problem. It was necessary to look at the long-term questions.

Mr VAN DALSEN added that the question of a climate of confidence had been mentioned and both parties were in agreement. However, the incidents mentioned in his opening statement had upset the SAG and under those circumstances no climate of confidence was possible. Notwithstanding the situation, South Africa was still prepared to continue the negotiating process. Ambassador Fourie had explained the position of Minister R F Botha. The meeting could not discuss the substance of the matter, but had made a proposal which might contribute to the creation of the right climate for broader negotiations. Reciprocal restraint was, however, a precondition for that climate.

MINISTER MOURA said that he wished to make certain comments. Angola had not changed its position since 7 December 1982 and he wished to reiterate that Angola was still in a position to influence SWAPO. It was not true that Angola was making preparations for a big-scale operation - its only purpose was to defend itself against aggression by South Africa and bandits operating from South West Africa/Namibia.

Mr FERNANDES added that he would like to make certain comments which could contribute to an understanding. SWAPO was a liberation movement recognized by the international community.

The solution of the region's problems depended on the implementation of resolution 435 because in order to control SWAPO, a ceasefire agreement between South Africa and Angola would have to be reached followed by a cessation of hostilities, possibly within 30 days. The SAG had to understand that Angola needed an instrument engaging the two governments - a sign to the international community of the common will to implement resolution 435. It would also be a moral force to create the right conditions for South Africa and SWAPO.

AMBASSADOR FOURIE responded that two aspects had become clear. Firstly that Angola regarded control of SWAPO without an agreement as impossible and secondly that resolution 435 could be implemented 30 days after agreement had been reached. He would, however, like to avoid misunderstanding. Implementation of resolution 435 presented serious difficulties and it would not be productive to believe in a make-believe situation. As Mr Van Dalsen had said, the delegation had a limited mission. He wanted to say that the political will in South Africa continued to exist after the December 1982 talks.

Mr VAN DALSEN added that South Africa wished to hold discussions at Ministerial level. But things got out of hand. South Africa could only proceed at Ministerial level if the things which got out of hand since 7 December 1982 could be brought under control. Despite the Angolan delegation's accusations, the SADF had practised admirable restraint. Others had however taken advantage and if there were to be further negotiations Angola would have to look at the situation closely. His delegation could not go any further at the time.

AMBASSADOR VAN-DUNEN then mentioned that he would like to clarify certain matters. Mutual trust had been mentioned and it was in fact important. However, Angola had part of its territory occupied and therefore had more reason for mistrust. Their delegation was trying to make certain points, i.e. the need for a cessation of hostilities and for the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola followed by the creation of a climate of confidence. Conditions for the control of SWAPO in Angola would then have been created. It was to be added that Angola did not control all of its territory and consequently did not know of all activities. The Ambassador then also referred to the sabotage of a dam in Angola which, because of the expertise thought necessary, could not have been an act of somebody without the required skills. Nevertheless, he added, accusations and counter-accusations would not contribute to the solution of the South West Africa/Namibia question.

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Mr VAN DALSEN then wanted to know from the Ambassador whether he thought the dam had been damaged by the SADF or not.

AMBASSADOR VAN-DUNEN replied that he could not say but that the puppets did not possess the technical capacity to place the explosive devices in strategic locations. He also thought that that type of incident created mistrust.

Mr VAN DALSEN then summarised what he had said before, i.e. that the delegation had not been authorised to discuss matters such as the withdrawal of South African troops since those matters would be dealt with as part of the broader negotiations to be held at Ministerial level. He reiterated the need for restraint by forces in Angola.

Dr ROUX asked if two matters could be clarified. Firstly, with reference to Angola's statement during the December 1982 talks to the effect that Angola could control SWAPO, he would like to know whether, since Angola had said earlier during the current meeting that it was not aware of SWAPO's activities, Angola thought it could control SWAPO if a new agreement was reached. Secondly, with reference to Mr Van Dalsen's statement on South Africa's interest in a long-term solution, whether the delegation could express their views on the matter.

MINISTER MOURA replied that since Angola did not have full sovereignty over the southern part of the country, all aspects of SWAPO's military actions did not come to the Angolan Government's notice. If South Africa occupied the area, how could Angola control the area? When South Africa withdrew, control would be possible. At the present time, due to the lack of the instrument already discussed, control was not possible. Once Angola had de jure control, the situation would be different. The SADF had at the time more control than Angola. (The Minister may have meant de facto control).

AMBASSADOR FOURIE pointed out that the build-up of forces mentioned earlier had taken place in an area controlled by Angola. South Africa was aware of that but, in terms of the policy of restraint, had not acted. It was Angola's assistance to SWAPO which caused mistrust.

MINISTER MOURA then asked where the build-up had taken place.

BRIGADIER VAN TONDER responded that it had taken place in areas where brigades were stationed such as Lubango. Members of SWAPO crossed areas where FAPLA/Cuban forces were stationed on their way to South West Africa. He asked how 600 to 850 terrorists could pass through the area without the knowledge of Angolan forces. In addition, South Africa was aware of

new and additional equipment delivered to that area. SWAPO had received sophisticated sniper rifles for planned acts of violence such as assassinations. Angola had to be aware of these movements.

MAJOR J MARIA responded that as a member of FAPLA, he had not been to the Kunene Province since 1981 while South Africans had free access. Angola had proposed 15°30' South as a withdrawal line which in fact established a new border in a way.

MINISTER MOURA said that he would like to conclude with certain remarks. He hoped that the South African delegates had listened carefully to the Angolan positions. He maintained that resolution 435 would create peace in the region. Cessation of hostilities was necessary and perhaps it was also necessary to look at the mechanism on the ground.

Mr VAN DALSEN replied that the South African delegation had drawn attention to the broader issues and that, as he saw it, the Angolan delegation was unable to give a clear reply. A complete reply was not expected but he hoped that some reaction would be forthcoming in the near future to enable progress desired by both parties.

MINISTER MOURA said that he had given some answers, e.g. on the Cubans, and that the proceedings would be reviewed. As Ambassador Van Dunen had said, it was a search for trust. The question was: who was occupying whose territory? South Africa was in South West Africa: Pretoria could not impose withdrawal of the Cubans on Angola. Minister R F Botha had said that the Cuban question was to be discussed between Angola and the USA as in the past. If Angola's proposal concerning the 15°30' South parallel was accepted, SWAPO and Cuban forces could possibly be moved. The sooner the implementation of these points could be finalised the better - if not, Angola would have difficulties in exercising control.

AMBASSADOR FOURIE reiterated that South Africa did not want to discuss the Cuban question. The discussion dovetailed in with the wider issue dealt with by the USA. Reference to the Cubans during the current discussions was a delicate reference, since it was a matter of paramount importance.

Mr VAN DALSEN thanked the Angolan delegation for its contribution and repeated that, after reporting to the two Governments, the Angolan side should indicate how the parties could proceed to mutual restraint.

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On a suggestion by MINISTER MOURA, Mr VAN DALSEN and AMBASSADOR FOURIE agreed that future talks could also be held in Sal but that direct telephone and telex contact should also be considered as referred to by Minister R F Botha on 7 December 1982. MINISTER MOURA added that another meeting place should not be disregarded. The Minister then also referred to Minister R F Botha's remarks about the status of African visitors to Pretoria.

The Meeting, which had commenced at 15h30, ended at 18h00. Mr van Dalsen and Ambassador Fourie then had informal discussions with Lt Col Manuel Rodrigues, Minister of the Interior, and Col Antonio Franca, Vice Minister of Defence who were also on Sal Island.