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BRIEFING BY MR D SIMPSON, HEAD OF STATE DEPARTMENT'S
SOUTHERN AFRICA DESK, IN LONDON ON 9 DECEMBER 1982

1. Dr C Crocker and Mr Dan Simpson of the United States met Deputy Foreign Minister Il-Ichev and Mr Vladelen Vasev, Head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Third Africa Department (dealing with East and Southern Africa), in Moscow on 7 and 8 December 1982. They also met informally with the Head of the Soviet Africa Institute, Mr Anotoly Gromyko. He is the son of the Soviet Foreign Minister.
2. For his briefing Mr Simpson used as basis the telegram he and Dr Crocker had sent to Secretary of State Shultz to report on their meeting with the Soviets.
3. Mr Simpson explained the context of their talks with the Soviet Union in the following terms: The Soviet Union had suggested in most general terms that it was looking for possible ways of talk to and cooperate with the United States. That suggestion had come up in several diplomatic contacts between the two countries, eg. in recent public statements upon the death of Mr Brezhnev and when Mr Andropov came to power. The United States wanted to see whether these talks might include Southern Africa and whether talks on that subject might be possible. Nothing in which emerged from this meeting suggested that possibility.
4. Mr Simpson categorized their talks as being very much a continuation of the previous meetings which Dr Crocker had had earlier this year with the Soviet Union in New York and also in Geneva. Mr Simpson made it clear once again that the United States was not and would not negotiate with the Soviet Union in respect of Southern Africa, but that it was merely exchanging views and determining postures. Southern Africa was only one of a list of topics that required discussion between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union had not indicated what role they were going to play - not that the United

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States invited them to play any particular role in respect of Southern Africa. The United States told the Soviet Union what it wanted to do and what the United States' intentions were in order to ensure that the Soviet Union would behave more responsibly and so that the Soviet Union could not say that it was not informed about what the United States was doing. In addition the United States wanted to stress to the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union should see that peace in Southern Africa was also in its interest - in other words that Southern Africa could be removed as an area of tension in East-West relations.

5. According to Mr Simpson, the case the Soviet Union presented was that the role of the United States should remain central during the negotiations to find a settlement for the South West Africa question and that the Soviet Union, as a permanent member of the Security Council, had not only the right but also the obligation to ensure the implementation of all resolutions of the United Nations and to see that those resolutions be respected. I remarked that it was ironic - and indeed hypocritical of the Soviet Union - that when the settlement proposal was voted upon and when Resolution 435 was adopted in the Security Council the Soviet Union had abstained on both occasions. It had wanted nothing to do with those resolutions. Now the Soviet Union was the main champion of those resolutions and had taken it upon itself to see to their implementation.

6. Mr Simpson continued by saying that the Soviet Union might perhaps not block Angola from having the Cubans withdraw but they were at least discouraging Angola from taking such a decision. The Soviet Union also contended that Resolution 435 did not give the Contact Group any mandate nor did it specify or refer to Cuban withdrawal. In the eyes of the Soviet Union, the United States was acting unlawfully in respect of Cuban withdrawal and was, therefore, obstructing the implementation of Resolution 435. In other words, the United States was prolonging the unlawful occupation of South West Africa by South Africa. The Americans had told the Soviet Union that the Cubans in Angola were part of the security problem of the area and as such had to be dealt with. Thus whether

Cuban withdrawal was or was not part of Resolution 435 it presented problems of security to South Africa in facing a withdrawal from Namibia. In other words, the Cubans presence was a major factor in the security situation. The Americans had warned the Soviet Union in no uncertain terms to be practical and realistic and to realise that without the Cubans withdrawing from Angola, South Africa would not withdraw from South West Africa.

7. Mr Simpson said that the Soviet Union had gone onto the attack in pointing out that the United States was saying that the latter needed a specific timetable from Angola on Cuban withdrawal and dates for a final withdrawal. They pointed out that as far as solely Namibian issues were concerned basically all points had been agreed upon. Cuban withdrawal had now been focussed upon and was the only missing link in solving the whole issue.

8. Mr Simpson said the United States expected the Soviet Union to make heavy propaganda out of its accusation, namely that it was clear that on Cuban withdrawal the United States was presenting a tough case which amounted to a hardening of its position. The United States response to that was and would be that it had been making that particular point on Cuban withdrawal with the Angolans from the beginning. That propaganda issue would fit into the whole range of United States/Soviet Union relations. The Soviet Union would like to show that the United States was inflexible on this that it was not willing to move on issues and that it wanted to confront the new Andropov Government. The Soviet Union also suggested that the new relationship between South Africa and the United States was an encouragement for South Africa's aggression against Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe. The Americans had denied that and pointed out that the efforts to find a Namibian settlement through negotiations would show to all parties that it would be possible to achieve a peaceful settlement in Southern Africa. The Soviet Union also introduced the point that the Contact Group was split and that nobody agreed with it. This was denied. The Americans stressed that

everyone in the Contact Group was in line and moving towards the same goal. They mentioned the recent prisoner exchange as a case in point to suggest that cooperation on Southern Africa was possible.

9. The Soviet Union also pointed a finger at the United States for not keeping it informed about developments in Southern Africa. The Soviet Union made an issue of their contention that they did not deal behind the backs of the Africans, that they had responsibilities towards SWAPO and the MPLA and that they were not prepared to enter into deals with the United States to the detriment of Africa. The Soviet Union used the public reaction of African leaders to the recent visit of Vice-President Bush to Africa to show that the Africans were not in agreement with the United States on Cuban withdrawal. The Americans explained that in private the Africans were more in favour of Cuban withdrawal than their public utterances indicated.

10. Mr Simpson reiterated that the United States made it clear to the Soviet Union that it was not negotiating with the Soviet Union on Southern Africa but with the parties directly involved, particularly the Angolans. The United States had been negotiating with Angola for more than a year and the United States assumed that Cuban withdrawal would take place and that it would be a true withdrawal. The Soviet Union did not react to the statement that the United States did not intend to negotiate with the Soviet Union on Cuban withdrawal but instead responded by saying that any decision on Cuban withdrawal had to be a sovereign decision for the Angolans and again referred to the February 1982 communique by Angola and Cuba in which it was stated that it would be a matter for Angola and Cuba to decide upon. According to Mr Simpson the Soviet Union clearly wanted to place on record that that decision would be one for Angola even if that was not going to be the case.

11. The United States also wanted to convey to the Soviet Union that if the present situation continued it would be more expensive for the Soviet Union because SWAPO was not going to get into power in Namibia

through violence and the economic situation in Angola was deteriorating rapidly. The United States' position was again made clear, viz., that it sought a parallel withdrawal: Cubans from Angola and South Africans from Namibia. (This was also done to show that their negotiating position vis-à-vis Angola was a reasonable and credible one.) The MPLA position had evolved but not far enough yet because it lacked precision on dates and numbers. The United States informed the Soviet Union that South Africa had exercised military restraint. South Africa through its Foreign Minister had made the general point that peace should be tasted and that a cooling off period could lead perhaps to a more permanent situation which could ensure peace. The Soviet Union had made no comment on the foregoing.

12. According to Mr Simpson, the Americans concluded that if the Soviet Union in the long run wanted to play a role, eg. to co-sponsor an implementation resolution in the Security Council, they obviously had not yet made it clear. The United States did not suggest any role for the Soviet Union. (I pointed out to him that for the Soviet Union to co-sponsor any implementation resolution would mean that it would be prepared to assume financial responsibility for that resolution - that would go against the principle which the Soviet Union had fought for very hard in the United Nations, namely that it would not pay for actions authorized by the Security Council in which it was not directly involved.)

13. Mr Simpson said that the Soviet Union now knew that the United States required a specific timetable from the Angolans and specific numbers in respect of the Cubans. No further meeting was scheduled or discussed with the Soviet Union. He expressed the thought that where the Soviet Union would attack the United States would be on the question of a specific timetable. During private talks at the two dinners they had had together, the Soviet Union spoke of Cuban withdrawal as a possibility at some point during Phase III. They had told the Soviet Union that that was not sufficient. It appeared to them that the Soviet Union did

not reject the concept of withdrawal - it did not say that this was impossible. The United States did not like to grasp at straws but the Soviet Union had not slammed the door. Perhaps their position was positive or possibly they did not have a position. He observed that the Soviet Union perhaps realised that it could lose on the question of Cuban withdrawal. The Soviet Union had not given the United States an inkling as to whether a decision on Cuban withdrawal would be their's or Angola's. They were firmly under the impression that the Soviet Union was not unduly concerned about foreign troops on African soil.

14. The Soviet Union referred to statements by General Malan and the question of the red flag in Windhoek but the Americans pointed out to the Soviet Union that their understanding of those statements was out of context and based solely on press reports. Mr Simpson mentioned that the Soviet Union's knowledge of South Africa's internal affairs was puzzling and that they had no idea as to what was going on.

15. They were still in Moscow when the news of the Angolan/South African meeting became known and they asked the Soviet Union whether they had had any prior knowledge about it. The Soviets had pretended to know of the meeting but when the Americans had asked them who the leader of the Angolan delegation was, Paulo Jorge's name was mentioned!

16. When I asked Mr Simpson whether the United States was contemplating talking to the Cubans in the same manner and fashion as they had done with the Soviet Union, he said no. In explaining their position he said that they were adopted this posture because the State Department's Latin American Bureau was not in favour of any discussions with the Cubans whatsoever.

17. Mr Simpson told me that the meeting with the Angolans which they had expected to take place before Christmas was now being planned for January 1983.



J A EKSTEEN

10 December 1982

PROPOSAL MADE BY SOUTH AFRICA TO ANGOLA, ILHA DO SAL,
7 DECEMBER 1982

The implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 should, in our opinion, be proceeded in two phases, namely

- a) on 1 February 1983 all forces should maintain their respective positions (status quo), and
- b) on 1 April 1983 the following elements of the US proposal for a cease-fire before Implementation (CBI) should be implemented :
 - SWAPO to be withdrawn to positions north of the 14th latitude in Angola.
 - Cubans to be withdrawn to positions north of the Mocamedes Railway line on the understanding that their complete withdrawal will be the subject of bilateral negotiations between Angola and the United States of America.
 - South African and FAPLA forces would not take any advantage of the situation thus created.

An acceptable mechanism should be created to verify and to monitor to the mutual satisfaction of South Africa and Angola the situation created as from 1 February 1983.