

ISSUES ON WHICH OFFICIALS OF SOUTH AFRICA WERE BRIEFED BY OFFICIALS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AT THE LATTER'S REQUEST, AT MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON D C ON 1 AND 2 FEBRUARY 1982, FOLLOWING THE MEETING OF THE CONTACT GROUP IN BONN ON 25 AND 26 JANUARY 1982

BACKGROUND TO THIS "FRESH APPROACH" TO UNTAG

PRESENT:

U.S.A.

DR C CROCKER
MR N PLATT
MR L WALKER
MR R FRAZURE

S.A.

AMBASSADOR D B SOLE
MR J A EKSTEEN

A. PHASE I AND RESPONSES RECEIVED BY THE CONTACT GROUP

Dr Crocker made it clear that with the response of the Front Line States (FLS) and SWAPO the ball was now in the court of the FLS and SWAPO and of the Contact Group. The Five intended to present a demarche to the FLS and to SWAPO soon. The FLS and SWAPO apparently assumed that the 50/50 arrangement in respect of the composition of the Constituent Assembly was the ideal position for South Africa and that South Africa had initiated it. The Contact Group would make it clear to them that the latter was not the case, and that South Africa, after considerable effort, had accepted the constitutional principles. After stating those facts the Contact Group would enquire from them whether they thought it wise for the Contact Group to go back to South Africa with all the consequences that might follow from such a step. At present the Contact Group was not sure whether the response of the FLS and SWAPO was the result of genuine or intentional misunderstanding. The Contact Group was, however, preparing to clarify any misunderstanding which might still exist. The other points in the response, other than the one relating to the Constituent Assembly's composition, required only minor clarifications.

B. SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE (FUND)

Dr Crocker stressed that that aspect of South Africa's response was

extensively discussed in Bonn and would continuously be discussed. The individual members of the Contact Group made known the legal position in their respective countries for providing such assistance.

C. BACKGROUND TO THIS "FRESH APPROACH" TO UNTAG

Dr Crocker explained that the Contact Group had spent most of its time in Bonn on matters relating to UNTAG. It was emphasized that the regional security issues which Phase II should address, should be considered so that the Angolan track of the American strategy could be set in motion and Security Council resolution 435 could start working. The question which should be addressed, was how to relate the reduction in fighting to the Angolan track and to South African Defence Force reductions. In Bonn South Africa's position, as had been explained to the United States in London, was taken into account. The United States was taking that position of South Africa very seriously and at face value. The new approach would go beyond what had happened in the past - the stage had now been reached where it should be forgotten "who shot John". The Contact Group concurred in the new approach and agreed that the United States should pursue its elements with South Africa. Confidentiality was, however, of the utmost importance and the outside should not know that that was happening nor of its details. Once progress was made it could be taken further.

According to Dr Crocker UNTAG was only going to make sense when it was contributing something. It should not be a price to be extracted from South Africa and UNTAG should not be directed at South Africa. He put it as follows: "UNTAG must not be a burden for South Africa". The elements of the new approach should meet the requirements of the present initiative and must permit the reasonable implementation of the broad objectives of Security Council resolution 435 and also address the current situation as it related to cross border incursions and to Southern Angola. The dimensions of the fresh approach could only be established once it had been determined what could be negotiated. Its presentation

should be credible and must take into account the psychological needs of the African States and of the United Nations - even if it was for cosmetic purposes only. The same strategy as in the case of Phase I should now be followed too, namely first bilateral discussions between South Africa and the United States of America to determine what would be workable and then the United States' approach to the Contact Group to refine what had been discussed before a presentation to all the parties. That was the only way to approach this and make it to work. It was imperative that with this new approach all sides should display flexibility. Obviously requests would have to be made for changes in past positions and naturally the United Nations and the Africans would see that as an imposition.

D. NEW ELEMENTS OF THIS "FRESH APPROACH"

Dr Crocker emphasized that it was essential to state that Security Council resolution 435 still existed and that that be said to all parties. The functions of UNTAG listed in that resolution would exist until all parties agreed to de-emphasize one or more of them and to pursue those then through other means. For the time-being the functions listed should be kept until de-emphasized. South Africa's position on border surveillance was heard "loud and clear" in London. Another solution would have to be found for that particular listed function.

No figure for UNTAG numbers existed. That figure should be derived from what was planned and be tied to functions. The Contact Group and the United States regarded South Africa's figure of 1 000 as being grabbed "out of thin air" and considered it not to be a credible figure because it was not based on any serious study of UNTAG functions. It was not saleable. The Contact Group was adamant in Bonn that, as the plan stood present time, all UNTAG functions remained valid, but if those functions were to be restructured and de-emphasized then less troops could be required and could there be flexibility on numbers. The position of the

Contact Group was simple and blunt: "We won't even try to sell that figure - not to our own Governments, not to the U.N. professionals and not to the Africans". The United States was also informed by the other members of the Contact Group in Bonn that some form of U.N. military presence in the border area was imperative in the form of a security force in order to provide an essential psychological deterrent. It was also the view of the United States Government that the Africans would not buy that figure because of the psychology attached to the higher figure of 7 500. The United Nations could not and would not take a figure of 1 000 - they could not even justify it to their own military professions. The "upper most limit" in respect of UNTAG numbers should be kept and for symbolic reasons it should be stated that nothing had changed. All the numbers could perhaps not be deployed and could be kept in countries of origin. The feasibility of this would however, have to be explored with the United Nations after it had been explored first with South Africa. In the judgement of the USA it would not be possible to do away with a sizable military presence, not only because it would be seen as a psychological deterrent to a renewal of hostilities, but also because the UN itself would insist on a certain minimum for self-protection in terms of UNTAG's responsibilities to its people. It was doubtful whether in the end that figure of 1 000 was in South Africa's interest when functions were to be related to numbers. A basic outline for UNTAG functions and how they would relate to the new approach was therefore necessary. The United States had taken the South African point of view about visibility of numbers and that the numbers should be brought down.

Another point which South Africa had made in London was noted, namely South Africa's preference to SWAPO bases being monitored in Angola and in Zambia. There might be merit in exploring that further while leaving out precisely what should be done but exploring the possibility of monitoring assembly points/ camps at certain spots in Angola and in Zambia. The United States was not wedded to the idea that that monitoring must be performed by UNTAG.

Minister, Mr Paulo Jorge, in Paris last month and how that related to the new approach of the USA. In working out this part of its new approach, the United States took into account the larger security aspects. The point of the South African Government on visible peace was well taken. The USA had stressed to Angola the need for such peace and that it was necessary to have a period of such peace before implementation of Security Council resolution 435, and, at minimum, a cease-fire which would require a SWAPO pull back to a line to be determined. They insisted with the Angolans that the security aspects required first of all

- 1) SWAPO pull-backs,
- 2) Cuban pull-backs, and
- 3) MPLA/UNITA reconciliation.

Cuban withdrawal was necessary during Phase III and a credible plan to effect that was required from the Angolan Government within a reasonable period - otherwise the United States would draw their own and appropriate conclusions.

It was explained to the Angolans that the pre-implementation cease-fire would include the following and would come into operation in return for South Africa's decision to cease cross border operations on a given day - the start of the pre-implementation cease-fire:

- i) SWAPO/FAPLA pull-back, north of the 16th parallel. That was north of Dr Savimbi's traditional area. South Africa would have an input in determining that line. The 16th parallel was a reasonable one to the USA because it existed at the moment as a result of South Africa's actions south of it and Angola's acceptance would be recognition of a de facto situation. Mr Walker explained that they only raised a SWAPO pull-back but that Mr Jorge in responding to the American remarks added FAPLA of his own volition. The USA accepted that without any comment and intended to keep it in - hence the formal reference to SWAPO/FAPLA pull-back.

ii) Cuban pull-back which could illustratively include one or a combination of the following:

- to a line north of the Benguela Railroad. It would be difficult to relate this pull back to SWA/Angola but it was important in reinforcing Dr Savimbi's position;
- to a line north of Lubango's air defence line. This would also have an effect on national reconciliation in Angola. It was, however, important that no other forces take over that air defence system;
- to a line north of where SWAPO camps would be located after their pull back and to ensure Cuban disengagement from SWAPO bases. Preferably this should apply to FAPLA forces as well. This third possibility although related to the pre-implementation cease-fire, had not yet been discussed with the Angolans.

Mr Walker declared that the USA had not yet come to any agreement with anybody on these elements of and options in such a pre-implementation cease-fire. At this moment all the points were illustrative and put on the table for discussion with the objective of arriving at a credible plan. Once the United States had received an indication from South Africa that the latter saw merit in this pre-implementation cease-fire, it could approach the Angolans with a view to making formal proposals. The overall objective of the United States was, however, to establish as early as possible movement on the ground in respect of Cuban withdrawal.

According to Mr Walker Mr Jorge, while remarking that the pre-implementation cease-fire was necessary - it was a key element; and SWAPO would be amenable - enquired how Angola could, however, expect or demand SWAPO to pull-back if South Africa was not committed to such a cease-fire. The United States explained to the Angolans that, in return

for the various pull-backs, South Africa would have to agree to and observe the cease-fire. No reference was made to any pull-back by or withdrawal of South African forces. That was not connected to pull-backs to be effected in Angola by SWAPO/FAPLA and Cuban forces.

On Cuban pull-back Mr Jorge, while assuming that the cease-fire would be established, remarked that that pull-back would be no problem and would be Angola's contribution. The United States would like to determine what that could mean and would contribute. Accordingly, they would like to hear South Africa's views on that. They were reasoning that the Cuban military emplacement in Angola had no military influence on South West Africa. That influence was more political. In a political sense the United States was, therefore, interested in establishing the earliest possible momentum on that pull-back. The ultimate Cuban withdrawal, as discussed with South Africa, was again stressed to the Angolans and that it must take place during Phase III. It was important to realize that if the United States could effect that pull-back then it would become politically clear that a link between South West Africa and Cuban withdrawal existed.

Mr Walker also discussed and referred to Dr Savimbi's position under each of these two sets of pull-backs. He felt that if the Angolans could be moved on the ground they would have to face the question of Dr Savimbi. In working out these pull-backs and in presenting them the United States was eager to open the "window to national reconciliation" in Angola. To the degree that the Angolans can be brought to talk seriously on Cuban withdrawal, the question of moves towards such reconciliation became that much more feasible. At present there was no possibility of moving towards reconciliation unless there was linkage with Cuban withdrawal.

The United States was, therefore, arranging things so that the position of Dr Savimbi would have to come up - sooner or later. They definitely preferred that it be sooner. The USA felt that such a pull-back by SWAPO/FAPLA to the 16th parallel would have the additional advantage

of strengthening Dr Savimbi's position, but that the Angolans would not raise UNITA now in the discussions on SWAPO/FAPLA pull backs or to a line north of the Benquela Railroad. If, on the other hand, they were to raise it, the United States was ready to respond immediately by saying: "Let us discuss UNITA". They would thus grab the invitation by the Angolans to discuss UNITA. (Mr Walker referred to Dr Savimbi's recent visit to Washington during which the latter reiterated his position, viz. that a political solution must be found. The United States shared his overall political view and agreed that he must have a place in Angola and that he was an important part in the equation. Dr Savimbi agreed that the United States could not be a broker in the national reconciliation, but that it should help to create an environment to expedite it.) According to Mr Walker Dr Savimbi was prepared, in an effort to move towards that reconciliation, to stop attacking the Benquela Railroad for 6 months. In an atmosphere which was also to be improved through other actions, Dr Savimbi and others could move towards that goal.

Mr Walker explained that the element of verifications of the pull-backs from the agreed areas in Southern Angola would still have to be addressed. It would be important to know what SWAPO would be doing in its camps during the cease-fire - whether SWAPO would be peaceful or would use the period for building up its forces. He felt that the parties concerned (Angola, South Africa and Zambia) could work out the details. The monitoring of the pull-backs would not involve UNTAG and several practical ideas could be explored, viz. U-2 flights over the area or a Commission similar to the International Control Commission. The information gathered by those flights would be shared with all the parties as was now being done in respect of the Golan Heights. He did not make any formal proposition on such flights or Commission but he did, however, point out that the establishment of a three or four member Commission with jeeps travelling through a vast area was not practicable. Other problems connected with such a Commission involved its personnel and Angolan sovereignty. He ruled this possibility out. The press could perhaps be involved too and every party could nominate one or two journalists of its preference while knowing that they were not journalists but persons with the

necessary expertise. Another possibility was for nominated persons by either side to act as observers of the operations of the other. Thus, there would be South African nominated observers in Angola and Angolan nominated observers in South West Africa to verify that the arrangements and agreements were being carried out.

F. MISCELLANEOUS

Dr Crocker raised the following:

- a) He was prepared to meet Mr Kosie Pretorius. A date and venue could be worked out once he was informed that such a meeting still ought to take place.
- b) It was necessary to receive as soon as possible from South Africa the "non-document" on UNTAG functions as discussed in London.
- c) South Africa should at the next meeting perhaps give more details of its idea of South African elements attached to UNTAG monitoring teams.
- d) The next bilateral meeting between South Africa and the USA to be held in New York on 16 and 17 February 1982 so that the Contact Group could first approach the Front Line States and SWAPO with a demarché in respect of their response to Phase I and the United States could, following the meeting with South Africa, approach the Angolans with an indication of South Africa's response to the new approach to UNTAG. (It was, however, pointed out to Dr Crocker that even after the next meeting in New York the results would have to be reported to the South African Government and time would be required before any kind of further go-ahead could be discussed or even authorized.)

G. NEXT MEETING

It was subsequently agreed that the next meeting would take place in New York on 22 - 24 February 1982.



J A EKSTEEN
WASHINGTON D C
3 February 1982