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CONFIDENTIAL

PRESENT SITUATION OF RENAMO IN MOZAMBIQUE

INTRODUCTION

1. As the flow of open information from Mozambique is controlled by the government, it is difficult to establish the degree of support which RENAMO enjoys within Mozambique. In particular, members of the Ndau tribe in Central-Mozambique support RENAMO. RENAMO takes great efforts to avoid tribal favouritism in their recruitment of fighters and supporters. Recruiting takes place on a voluntary basis mostly among former FAM members and local civilians in areas controlled by RENAMO. RENAMO'S freedom of movement extends over 85% of the Mozambican countryside, which would not have been possible had RENAMO not had the support of the local population, whether under duress, intimidation or through voluntary co-operation.

NUMERICAL STRENGTH

2. RENAMO'S numerical strength cannot be determined with certainty. In 1986 Dhlakama told a correspondent of the Washington Times that RENAMO had 22 000 armed fighters and 4 500 un-armed recruits. The number of RENAMO members outside Mozambique is unknown.

COMMAND STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION

3. RENAMO'S political and military command was re-structured during its "National Congress" in June 1989 which for the first time was held inside Mozambique and during which a new National Council and Executive were nominated. Dhlakama was unanimously re-elected as president and new foreign representatives were appointed.
4. RENAMO has an organised military command structure, composed of "officers" representative of every province. Provincial and area command structures which are to a great extent autonomous, have clearly defined functions. This structure performs well in directing and co-ordinating RENAMO'S operations. Notwithstanding the negative allegations in the Minter and Gersony reports, these reports confirm a similarity of modus operandi in all the provinces.

5. In respect of operations, control rests with a regional command structure which includes intelligence and logistics officers as well as administrative, personnel and health officers. Each RENAMO unit also has a paramedic officer at its disposal while other members have special responsibilities such as sabotage, training, communications and health.
6. As regards intelligence and logistics, RENAMO appears to be well organised. Information and food are obtained from the local population whilst they are being politicised by various means. The effectiveness of the latter action is difficult to ascertain because of the low literacy rate of the Mozambican people.

OPERATIONS

7. Notwithstanding certain difficulties, such as a lack of logistical and medical equipment, RENAMO maintains the intensity of its activities in all ten provinces of Mozambique. RENAMO is quite aggressive and eight out of every ten contacts which take place, are initiated by RENAMO. The organisation concentrates its operations in the central provinces, the Beira Corridor and southern Mozambique where Maputo is constantly being threatened. RENAMO regularly launches ambushes on transport routes and sabotage the rail, pipeline, powerline and road infrastructure in Mozambique. They also frequently raid FRELIMO structures, shops and hospitals in rural settlements as well as FAM and ZNA bases, mainly to obtain supplies.

FOREIGN SUPPORT

8. It is regularly alleged that the RSA, and more specifically the SADF, continues to provide aid for RENAMO. Most sources, however, agree that RENAMO is self-sufficient as far as arms, ammunition and military equipment are concerned. RENAMO has developed into a guerrilla movement in the true sense of the word, mainly making use of armament and food supplies captured from FAM and the ZNA. RENAMO launches an average of 35 attacks on FAM/ZNA bases per month.
9. The aid which RENAMO receives from other sources is supplementary to the above mentioned logistics. Moral and logistical support is received from FAM dissidents and the local population, sympathetic Portuguese speaking people outside the country, conservative American organisations and individuals, some Arab and African countries and other organisations and individuals which support RENAMO'S struggle. In August 1989 Saudi-Arabia

donated financial assistance worth R1,5 million to RENAMO, with the aim of supporting the Islamic church in RENAMO controlled areas and to provide scholarships to some RENAMO members.

10. Due to FRELIMO'S effective international propaganda campaign against RENAMO, the organisation has been unsuccessful in obtaining foreign recognition. It maintains offices in the USA, Britain, Italy, Canada, Portugal, USA, West-Germany and some African countries.

NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

11. FRELIMO is under constant internal pressure from the population at large, churches and members of FAM, to end the civil war in Mozambique. This resulted in the publication of a 12-point plan in July 1989 which contains FRELIMO'S proposals for a settlement. In the document the use of force and intimidation is condemned. FRELIMO in its proposal, guarantees freedom of religion, speech and association. FRELIMO proposes that all members of RENAMO be reintegrated within the Mozambican society in its present form. The underlying message of the 12-point plan is that FRELIMO is only prepared to accommodate RENAMO within a "democratised" one party system under FRELIMO.
12. Talks between RENAMO and Mozambican church leaders sponsored by FRELIMO, took place in Nairobi, Kenya, on 7 August 1989 and again on 28 August 1989. During the talks FRELIMO'S 12-point plan was discussed. After the talks RENAMO published a 16-point plan containing their proposals. The RENAMO document states that RENAMO stands for national reconciliation followed by constitutional changes to create a free Mozambique. RENAMO also proposes a total withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Mozambique. On 4 September 1989 RENAMO narrowed its proposals down to the creation of a preliminary coalition government and the election of a national assembly to draw up a new constitution.
13. The talks in Kenya merely highlighted the known standpoints of FRELIMO and RENAMO. It is unlikely that the conflict will be resolved on the basis of either FRELIMO'S reintegration idea or RENAMO'S demand for a totally democratic system. Factors such as the constant pressure on FRELIMO, the role of Mugabe in the Mozambican conflict and the negotiations, FAM'S depleted morale and RENAMO'S poor international image, could create a conjuncture of circumstances in which one or both parties could make concessions.

CONCLUSION

14. RENAMO clearly has the military upperhand against FRELIMO, although the possibility of a military victory for RENAMO seems remote. It appears therefore, that the war could drag on indecisively until an agreement between FRELIMO and RENAMO is reached through negotiation.

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