



1718 Hendrik Verwoerd Building
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Tel

7 June 1982

SECRET

Dear Al

Thank you for your letter of 21 May 1982 and for your observations on the meeting of Contact Group Foreign Ministers held in Luxembourg on 17 May 1982. I appreciate the candour of your approach at the meeting and am encouraged by your assessment that the session made a positive contribution to your Southern African policy.

You will recall that in my letter of 20 January 1982, I expanded at some length on our concerns regarding the future of Southern Africa. I know that you share these concerns and we are heartened by the steadfastness which characterizes your approach to the Soviet threat to our region. We cannot afford to allow Soviet expansionism to proceed unchecked, neither in Africa nor anywhere else. We cannot allow further Soviet successes. This will erode and destroy the fabric of society and civilization as we know it.

By now you will have received our communication of 2 June 1982 in which we addressed the question of the voting method and timing for electing the Constituent Assembly in South West Africa/Namibia. Our decision to proceed on this basis was not taken lightly. We have concluded that the process to independence for South West Africa/Namibia must now proceed without interruption. In terms of the envisaged schedule, elections for a Constituent Assembly in South West Africa/Namibia will be held over three or four days beginning on Tuesday 15 March 1983.

We do not have another choice. Apart from the growing danger of Soviet encroachment, political developments in the Southern African context compel us to advance within the framework of a firm schedule. The confusion and uncertainty regarding the Territory's future is now taking its toll. Southern Africa can no longer tolerate this.

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South West Africa/Namibia is an easy target for those who are bent on exploiting these conditions of growing uncertainty. Any vacillation with regard to timing will be used to undermine the power base of the South African Government. We have already informed some of the political leaders in the Territory of our decision and have warned them that they will have to start preparing themselves for elections on the dates in question.

As you know South Africa has consistently aimed at securing an internationally acceptable solution for South West Africa/Namibia and therefore our choice would be for United Nations involvement, SWAPO participation and the Cubans out of Angola. But if this could not be achieved the only alternative would be to proceed without the presence of the United Nations, without SWAPO participation and with the Cubans still ensconced in Angola.

These are the only alternatives. The second alternative will of course mean that international recognition will elude the newly elected Constituent Assembly but, from our perspective, it will not exclude various possibilities which might be capable of achievement through negotiation over the medium and long term by those who are then the decision makers in the Territory.

Quite frankly it has become imperative that South Africa no longer be directly linked with the constitutional process in South West Africa/Namibia or with negotiations on an internationally acceptable solution. Their leaders must as soon as possible carry that responsibility themselves and take their decisions on their own. The exchanges of views between us leads me to believe that you will appreciate and understand our position.

With kind regards

Yours sincerely



R F BOTHA

May 21, 1982

Dear Pik,

I want to give you my personal account of the very important Contact Group foreign ministers meeting which took place in Luxembourg on May 17. In sum, we consider the session to be a major positive contribution to our southern Africa policy.

With the meetings the previous week between Brand Fourie and Chet Crocker in Geneva and the CG Africa directors in Paris, the groundwork had been well prepared for our discussions in Luxembourg. Accordingly, I made it clear to my colleagues that now is the time to move on both Namibia and Angola. Stressing the importance we attach to South Africa's proposal for accelerated progress on Namibia, I emphasized that a window of opportunity for achieving a settlement had been opened and we must move now to take advantage of that fact.

On Angola, I stressed that Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola simultaneous with the departure of South African forces from Namibia is essential. In other words, the Namibia and Angola tracks are now converging and, if the Angola train does not run on schedule, the Namibia train will not run at all. It is no secret to you that, in the past, some of my CG colleagues have been less than enthusiastic about the Angola aspect of our approach to southern Africa. However, in this session, it was clear that they now concur that an Angola solution is a prime item on the Contact Group's agenda. Accordingly, we did some useful spadework on what all of the members of the Contact Group can do--collectively and individually--to bring about the desired results in Angola. We will continue working on that aspect of the problem over the next few weeks. Similarly, on Namibia we now have complete proposals on both UNTAG and impartiality.

His Excellency

Roelof F. Botha,

Minister of Foreign Affairs

and Information of the

Republic of South Africa,

Cape Town.

Let me add a few words on our Phase One imbroglio. I am fully aware of the fact that South Africa accepted the Contact Group's proposed constitutional principles on January 26 without reservation, and that the subsequent behavior of the Front Line States and SWAPO vis-a-vis the electoral system aspect of those proposals has been less than fully helpful. As you are aware, when this problem arose in January, our colleagues in the Contact Group wanted us to go back to you to offer an either proportional representation or single member constituency choice. We resisted that advice and put together an elaborate four-month effort to bring the Africans around on this point. We were unfortunately not successful. I personally believe we should not expend further time and resources in that effort because they are dug in in an unreasonable manner on this point.

Together, we are going to have to solve that problem and we will need your thoughts on how to do that. I believe there are various ways that can be done which will not jeopardize your interests or complicate our ambitious joint agenda. As you will appreciate, it is essential that we capitalize politically on the current moment. In particular, I need to maintain maximum commitment and effort from my colleagues in the Contact Group to accomplish the agenda. The electoral system problem must be considered in that context.

On these issues, as on the other issues to be dealt with, it is clear that our two governments must continue to work together closely. In doing so, we will be fully cognizant of the security concerns you expressed to me in your January 20 letter. We believe that the consultation which took place on a number of these questions recently in Geneva should be continued in the future.

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

SECRET



of South Africa

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INFORMATION

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18 February 1982

The Honourable Alexander M Haig Jr
Secretary of State
WASHINGTON, D C

Dear Al.

The role of Dr Savimbi as a stabilising force in a volatile region of Africa is recognised by both of us as an important element in our efforts to secure a peaceful settlement in South West Africa/Namibia. His stature as a military and political leader is growing. The restraining influence of his successes on Cuban activities is undeniable. He returned from his Washington visit with renewed resolve to continue the struggle against Soviet subjugation of his country. It is encouraging to us that you received Dr Savimbi thereby making it possible for an African voice committed against Soviet expansionism to be heard in your country.

It was with appreciation that I received impressions of the visit and an assessment of the discussions through your Chargé d'Affaires on 6 January 1982. Comment on the visit and its significance has been reflected not only in your own press, but also in the South African and Western European media. It is clear that the impact of the visit is also being felt elsewhere. This is a positive development.

A few days ago, I had another personal meeting with Dr Savimbi. What he told me reaffirmed earlier beliefs that our primary objectives could be secured through astute strategy and a visible manifestation of firm control over events on the ground. Dr Savimbi conveyed to me his perspective of the prospects for a negotiated settlement in South West Africa/Namibia.

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In reviewing his impressions of his visit a somewhat discordant note was struck involving a certain occurrence in Washington D C. He confided to me that a briefing by a senior State Department official prior to his meeting with Dr Crocker had baffled him. According to Dr Savimbi that official suggested to him that it would advance United States' interests if he could

- commit himself publicly to the reopening of the Benguela railway line;
- publicly request the United States officially to recognise the Luanda government;
- publicly advocate a continued Cuban presence in Luanda and Cabinda after withdrawal from other areas.

Although not explicitly stated, the impression was gained that the United States might respond favourably to such sentiments, thus enhancing the prospects of successful dialogue. As a result of this conversation you may wish to remove any uncertainties which linger on in his mind and which may make him susceptible to adverse perceptions of the intentions of some individuals in your Department.

As regards his reported views on SWAPO's present status and future disposition, he categorically rejected any suggestion that he had held the notion that SWAPO, if ever placed in a position of authority, would shed Soviet influence. On the contrary, he considers SWAPO's leadership irredeemably subservient to control by Moscow. Dr Savimbi recounted his surprise that the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee could dispute the ingrained Soviet-orientation of SWAPO. Apparently Senator Percy's view was derived from his acquaintanceship with a number of young college students in Illinois who, while said to be SWAPO members, impressed the Senator with their attitude of independence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. What startled Dr Savimbi, even more, was the Senator's neglect in not recognizing the fundamental distinction between rank and file membership and the leadership hierarchy who in view of an institutionalised dependence upon and indebtedness to Moscow are avowed loyalists of Soviet philosophy. They would, in Dr Savimbi's opinion, remain so. He added by way of a question: "How can anyone believe that UNITA could profit from a SWAPO victory in Namibia?".

Dr Savimbi was uncompromisingly committed to a total Cuban withdrawal. He was insistent upon resolving the political, economic and social instability through free elections. He remained adamantly opposed to attempts to co-opt him into the present Angola government system under the guise of reconciliation. He believed that he would be liquidated within a week should he ever acquiesce in such a proposal. Without free elections, reconciliation with the present leadership

in Angola to him meant certain liquidation. This belief was reinforced by the fate which befell a former Neto loyalist and MPLA minister of health, Mendes de Carvalho, whose misfortune it was to contemplate some form of rapprochement with Dr Savimbi.

On UNITA's position as a legitimate nationalist force with broadening popular support Dr Savimbi is outspokenly confident. UNITA's effectiveness in imposing a stalemate situation against the combined military efforts of Cuban and MPLA troops constitutes a credible factor in the South West African/SWAPO equation. Dr Savimbi's claim to be recognised as an important party in any plan for a settlement of the wider conflict is certainly gaining currency. It is encouraging to know that you agree that the reality of the Savimbi factor cannot be excised from future calculations.

In the privacy of our encounter, free from any need for pretence, Dr Savimbi expressed profound admiration for the firmness projected in your foreign policy leadership. He returned with renewed faith that the Reagan Administration would find it possible to stem the tide of Soviet expansionism in Africa.

Al, there is another matter which we should now address. I am referring to the desire expressed to me by moderate Black African leaders for their role in the deliberations on South West Africa/Namibia to be recognized. It is a development which introduces a new prospect of broadening African support for the present initiative. Its proponents are the Francophone leaders whose strong opposition to communism and Soviet domination is an important and natural asset for Western strategic interests. In reporting these desires to your Charge d'Affaires I explained that these leaders were looking for a signal on the part of the West, a clear gesture that will be seen to confer a measure of recognition of their views. Their reasoning is that the concept of moderation needs support and respectability in Africa. Their ability to constitute a credible alternative to radicalism is affected by the public perception of the international stature of these moderate leaders. They feel offended at not being consulted. I do not believe that the moderate Black African leaders presume to displace the so-called Frontline States in the negotiations. Is it not possible to assign them a role by offering them some form of consultative status? The investment might prove rewarding. Dr Savimbi, without knowing my own views on this matter, urged me to ask you seriously to essay such a course.

Might I in conclusion say that I am heartened by your initial reaction to the issues raised in my letter of 20 January 1982. I have asked Brand Fourie also to discuss these and related issues with Chet Crocker when they meet on the South West Africa/Namibia question next week.

Warmest regards,

Pik

R F BOTHA



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20 January 1982

The Honourable Alexander M Haig
Secretary of State
WASHINGTON D C

Dear Al

Thank you for your letter of 9 January 1982 and for reviewing with me some perspectives of the objectives in the South West Africa/Namibia negotiations and the significance of their attainment under the auspices of Western initiatives. The candour in articulating your views and the realism in your assessment of the implications of failure for Western strategic interests are appreciated by the South African Government. Frank exchanges strengthen the framework of confidence and trust underlying our mutual dedication to a resolution of this very complex issue in a way which would not endanger our vital interests.

Recognising the gravity of a situation which threatens to frustrate a peaceful settlement, I want to assure you that the South African Government fully endorses your own Government's sentiments on the importance of inspiring confidence in the ability of the West to exercise effective control over world affairs. This is important also to a solution in South West Africa/Namibia. In an effort to be helpful in attaining this objective I want to raise with you today an aspect of fundamental importance in the negotiating process over which concensus has not yet been reached. It is presented in the same spirit of candour and sincerity that has thus far characterised our communications with one another. What would be your Government's response if SWAPO were to gain control over the Territory followed by the imposition of a Soviet presence on South Africa's doorstep?

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In a matter of crucial importance for the security of South Africa on which our very survival depends, we have no choice but to consider all the consequences of the alternatives. I am cognisant of your argument that our worst fears need not materialise and that our current efforts are specifically geared to avoiding this spectre. The question is whether it is still possible to outflank the Soviets through the Western initiative. However, sad as it may seem, protestations carry in themselves the element of self-defeat. Protests and warnings if repeated over a period of time tend to lose their impact. We have experienced this, so have the moderates in Zimbabwe and so have the Afghans and the Poles. They have paid the price and it is feared that in similar fashion it will be exacted from us, thus creating the prospect of the Soviet Union gaining another spectacular success.

I earnestly appeal to you, as a political and military strategist, to recognise the depth and dimension of concern that this matter poses for us. It is understandable that the status of the United States of America as a global power may in your case induce a different perspective of events, their significance and possible implications. Your reasoning, briefly, is that failure to reach a settlement would escalate the conflict and intensify world reaction. The demand for punitive action against South Africa would become so strong and emotional that the United States Government would be unable to stave it off, even if it preferred to intervene. The Soviet Union, perceiving this political paralysis, would adroitly exploit the circumstances and establish control over South West Africa/Namibia, possibly by force, directly or indirectly, and in concert with a vindictive majority in the United Nations thirsting for action. Fearing the political and strategic implications of the suggested course of events, your Government would desire to avoid such an outcome.

However, consider South Africa's dilemma if SWAPO were to gain control: whether it is achieved by electoral ploy or through violence and intimidation, the outcome would inevitably be the same - the Red Flag in Windhoek with the South African enclave of

Walvis Bay under direct threat of seizure. It would leave South Africa no option but to respond - with incalculable consequences. Where would this put the United States and how would this affect the strategic interests of the United States?

With Soviet influence firmly entrenched in South West Africa/Namibia, Botswana will be next. That will leave a continental belt 2 000 miles wide in Soviet hands, from the Atlantic to the Indian ocean. Thus an isolated South Africa would be left to confront this enormous alliance of power under circumstances where the country is already shackled by an arms embargo, financial restrictions, denial of import/export bank facilities and limitations on commercial access to certain fields of technology. Above all there is the tendency amongst Western states to ostracise South Africa in a way not even applied against those who are a mortal threat to them. It leaves a bitter taste especially when you consider the history of the punitive action, the vindictiveness in mobilising it against my Government and the selective morality to justify it. Al, you must tell me whether you have thought this through. There is too much at stake for both our countries to take the leap without exploring the width of the jump or knowing the landing area.

I realise that in your assessments the removal of the Cubans from Angola, securing an appropriate role for Dr Savimbi coupled with national reconciliation in Angola and the prevention of other hostile forces from entering the area, are important factors in your strategy for coping with Soviet expansionism. For South Africa it is important to see how this works out in practice.

Having said this I want to assure you that the South African Government remains committed to seeking, in cooperation with the United States Government, an internationally acceptable solution of the South West Africa/Namibia issue. I can, therefore, inform you that the South African Government has today decided, though with considerable apprehension and real anguish, to agree to the revised constitutional proposals handed to us by the representatives of the Five on 17 December 1981.

I want you to know that the provisions for the protection of minorities in the revised constitutional principles have been received without enthusiasm. Viewed against what was reasonably expected, the political price for the South African Government for its willingness to accept Phase I with its inadequacies has become much dearer and downright unpalatable. This was explained to Dr Crocker in London.

The formal response which we intend to convey to the Five is formulated below:

"The South African Government, following consultations with the internal parties of South West Africa/Namibia, is prepared to agree to the constitutional principles on the understanding that a fund be established before implementation to meet the broad economic development needs of an independent South West Africa/Namibia in order to ensure the success of a Namibia settlement of which the constitutional principles are an integral part."

I know that you will understand that comparable developments in neighbouring Zimbabwe where political outrages and economic disruption occur with unflinching frequency are increasing already existing restiveness in South Africa and South West Africa/Namibia. And in far away Poland, Soviet aggression threatens to destroy every sign of independence.

Our people notice these developments and they are influenced by them. They witness what can happen when Soviet encroachment is not met before it takes root. They ask questions, Al. And we, my Government, must provide the answers. I need not remind you that the already precarious position of the internal parties continues to be eroded inter alia by unabated United Nations bias in favour of SWAPO. Can my Government seriously be expected to convince the internal parties of the impartiality of the Secretary General when he himself publicly proclaims his predilection for SWAPO? While we have already agreed that this matter should be resolved during Phase II it is in the interim

*See
attached
for final
wording*

poisoning the atmosphere. From this general atmosphere of uncertainty and disillusionment emanates the cumulative effect of the political cost confronting the South African Government. The strain on political accountability may yet overtake events. Ever had the feeling of being on the right track going in the wrong direction?

The picture which confronts us is gloomy. Yet we firmly believe that the United States of America and South Africa can continue their cooperation in a spirit of trust especially also in view of what will and may happen after a settlement in South West Africa/Namibia has been reached. Bearing this in mind I think we should strive to widen and strengthen the basis of personal contact and direct knowledge of each other. This apart from other possible beneficial results may assist us in avoiding the collapse of this initiative. The prospect of a personal meeting between your President and my Prime Minister is gaining validity in my estimation as a venture to resolve the South West Africa/Namibia issue and to discuss other related issues of fundamental importance to both of us. I fully realize that if such a meeting were to take place without achieving results it may be disastrous for both of us. It would therefore be necessary that extensive spadework and preparatory clearings should precede such a meeting. Please consider it and let me know your reaction.

On a more personal note: we have a rough idea of the burden of responsibilities that you carry also on behalf of the free nations. You have not asked for it but have willingly shouldered that burden. We have admiration for President Reagan's courageous leadership in world affairs in the face of enormous adversity and we respect and appreciate your own vital contribution. In the turbulent times of today I can visualise how often solitude and loneliness surround you while history records what you are doing in the interest of all mankind. It seems so little but what I want to convey to you is our appreciation of the honour and dignity that you and your President have restored to the relationship with my country.

With kind regards

Yours sincerely



R F BOTHA

RESPONSE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO THE REVISED CONSTITUTIONAL
PROPOSALS OF PHASE I (RECEIVED ON 17 DECEMBER 1981) HANDED TO
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WESTERN FIVE IN CAPE TOWN ON 26 JANUARY 1982

The South African Government, following consultations with the internal parties of South West Africa/Namibia, is prepared to agree to the constitutional principles.

The South African Government, however, attaches the greatest importance to substantial financial assistance being provided to meet the broad economic development needs of an independent South West Africa/Namibia in order to ensure the success of a South West Africa/Namibia settlement of which the constitutional principles are an integral part. This would be essential to create the atmosphere required for a successful solution. Further discussions will be devoted to this aspect.

Mr. Eksteen,

January 9, 1982

Dear Pik:

As we complete Phase One and begin Phase Two of the Namibia negotiation, I think it might be useful to review briefly what we are attempting to accomplish in our joint effort. I think it is especially useful to do so, not only because of where we are in time, but because the negotiation is necessarily complex and detailed. It is also taking place within a sensitive global context. Thus, it is vital that we avoid becoming transfixed by minutiae and periodically recall the overall objectives we are together attempting to accomplish.

The key motivation on our part has been our firm belief that in southern Africa, as in other important strategic regions of the world, we must seek to control and guide the course of events. For too long, in my view, the West has stood back and, either through a lack of will or imagination, allowed things to happen to us, which we should not have permitted. I have in mind in particular the unfortunate events in Angola in 1975-76. Too often we have allowed our enemies to control events and to benefit accordingly. That is a situation we must avoid, whether in Poland today or southern Africa tomorrow.

Events in Poland have presented to the West a major challenge to our interests and to the cause of freedom. Under President Reagan's leadership, the United States has assumed the leadership role among its Western allies in crafting a response to the Polish Government and to the Soviet Union. I have asked Chet Crocker to brief Brand Fourie thoroughly on those developments during their London meetings.

His Excellency

Roelof F. Botha,

Minister of Foreign Affairs

and Information of the

Republic of South Africa,

Pretoria.

In southern Africa, I believe that the Namibia negotiation -- as we together understand it -- is playing a key role in our effort to take control of events in the region. It provides the West with essential leverage to improve our relative strategic position in the region and to establish a track record of success. On the first point, we are making it clear to all that the Cuban forces must leave Angola in conjunction with a Namibian settlement. On the second point, if we can produce results which lead to peaceful progress in the region, we will be looked to on other related items on the regional agenda. Our two countries' close cooperation is essential to this endeavor, as I believe our work together in Phase I has demonstrated.

If we fail, either concerning Namibia or Angola, then we can be assured that we will relinquish our initiative in the region and our control over events. If that were to happen, we would run the severe risk of falling back in disorder into a sterile defensive posture which our opponents will surely attempt to take advantage of.

As we take the significant step of completing Phase I and moving to joint consideration of Phase II issues, I recall our meeting of last May which launched us together on this joint venture. I believe that we can take some satisfaction at what we have achieved so far, and in the spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding that has developed between our two countries as we have proceeded. I look forward to working with you on the crucial matters which we face in the days ahead.

Sincerely,



Alexander M. Haig, Jr.