

Historical Perspectives and the Effects of Uprootal.

Section I.

Introduction.

While I am aware that the aims of the Interdivisional Committee on Resettlements are to collect, exchange and spread information on the extent of the resettlements and their effects on the people so uprooted; to elicit responses from churches in the process of collecting, exchanging and spreading this information and to stimulate and support local initiatives in self-help projects in keeping with the Resolution of the SACC National Conference of July 1979, I wish to point out that it is not migrations, population shifts and resettlements as such that have drawn the attention of the churches, for these migrations are as old as recorded history. I wish to argue that it is the extent to which these migrations and resettlements have occurred in peace time South Africa and the way these practices have become entrenched in the South African way of life as well as the resultant widespread suffering that has followed in the wake of these shifts. The South African way of life has entrenched in the running of its economy the use of migrant labour. This entrenchment is part of the grant scheme which started way back in our history and is being executed to implement the apartheid policy. At the practical level the policy does not only entail the temporary migrations in the form of labour but also the permanent population shifts which on the one hand cause uprootal of large numbers of people and on the other resettlement of the same people in difficult and different circumstances that are, however, quite convenient for the functioning of the scheme as a whole.

The purpose of this talk is to highlight a few historical perspectives in an attempt to clarify the ideological feeder base for this scheme; I will therefore give a brief historical review of migrations of the period just before the Lifaqane, proceed to the Lifaqane era and its aftermath. An attempt will be made to interpret the Great Trek as a unique form of migration but no doubt related in many ways to the population shifts of its time.

A sketchy review of the effects of the 1913 Natives Land Act and the subsequent related legislation will be given. Then finally the present removals and resettlement as part of the consummation sophisticated racial domination by the White ruling classes. The conclusion gives an account of the effects of resettlement.

Section II.

For the period before the Lifaqane and way back into the period prior to the appearance of the white man in Southern Africa, the history remains unwritten. Our knowledge of the societies that inhabited the whole sub-continent is therefore not only scanty but highly fragmented and speculative since it is salvaged more from archeological and anthropological finds. What is clear though is that most of Southern Africa as early as the fourteenth century and before was dotted with settlements of people who had become not only pastoralists but cultivators of the soil. These were, however, small-scale communities and probably closely-knit and minute political units under chieftancies which depended on hunting, warfaring and subsistence mixed agriculture for their survival. The major causes for movement were probably intertribal warfare, uninhabitable areas especially those infested with (by) disease-bearing insects, the quest for better livelihood with far away relatives in times after diseases had taken a great toll on the kinsmen and also perhaps the inhospitable weather with unreliable rainfalls and intermittent droughts which are typical of the rest of Southern Africa. One can therefore not talk of any real great scale movements of people except that which was inherent:

Churches Misc.

to the societies themselves that were typical of the area at that point in time. Again the technological development of these societies then were at a fairly low level to entail any great loss in material possessions that had to be moved. Except for the uprootal which I speculate could have been fairly painful since most of these societies depended on nature for their medicine and health care, I presume most of the communities did not really move unless they had to. Evidence of some of the permanency we can still find in the nature of the ruins such as Zimbabwe and similar settlements in parts of Vendaland. Then came the Lifaqane.

The Lifaqane no doubt constitutes the only period, close to our own era, which has seen peoples migration comparable to none in recorded Southern Africa history. The period too has not been fully documented. This lack of written material alone makes our knowledge of the era quite inadequate and therefore difficult for us to draw any authentic conclusions regarding the actual causes of this fascinating period. Still more to be said when comparison is made between the Lifaqane and our own era is that the former was a wartime. Ours is a peace time. Theoretically peace times are periods of stability. It is perhaps important though to say only regimes which for ideological reasons find it necessary to displace their citizens, have done so in peacetime in the name of tightening their security for the good of their citizens. I hope in our discussion of this talk you should be able to assess how far this view carries when applied to our own situation in South Africa today. Without making any pretensions to expertise in handling this subject, I just briefly wish to refer in passing to one or two current theories deployed by contemporary historians to explain the Lifaqane. I hope this should help us to see the difference in the mass migrations that followed in the wake of this epoch in comparison to ours.

One argument goes: With the expansion of the Cape Colony from the south there occurred land pressure to the South of Zululand whose expansion direction was southbound. The other goes that there was competition for the control of the European Trade in Ivory, ostrich feathers and hides and skins with Delagoa Bay by the Nguni chiefdoms who were settled in the northern parts of the present day Natal. This rivalry for the trade and trade route culminated into tensions that developed into real conflicts among the existing chiefdoms, in time the conflicts led to real structural changes. In the wake of these structural changes the process of true political fragmentation set in only to fall vulnerable to use by chiefdoms that had standing armies like that of Zwide and Dingiswayo to the north and south of Mfolozi river respectively. The sum total of all these developments was general warfare in which small chiefdoms were destroyed and their survivors were absorbed by their more powerful neighbours. Amongst the Zulus men such as Shaka emerged, with completely revolutionized military organization that soon proved to have no match in the battle field.

While this military revolution was taking place in Natal and the subsequent warfare lead to general turmoil and mass migrations within Natal itself and later over the Drakensburg into the Transorangia plateau, peace and quiet reigned supreme on the Highveld among the Sotho chiefdoms. They had their own petty disputes and tribal wars and kept on raiding one another's cattle without threatening the stability of the area. This was, however, not to last for long as the Lifaqane sent out its break away defectors as well as downright victims who brought along not only their misery, but also their warfare discipline, tactics and weaponry that were by far superior to those of their hosts.

The most notable of Shaka's defectors was Mzilikazi.

Accounts of the Lifaqane ravages are briefly given in a book by Leonard Thompson entitled: Survival in two worlds: Moshoeshe of Lesotho 1786-1870 or Omer-Cooper's The Zulu Aftermath. In fact for the Sotho speaking tribes of the highveld the Lifaqane meant the time of trouble in which for several years the Sotho tribes competed with the Nguni invaders and with one another for diminishing supplies of grain and cattle. The outcome of these wars were that many people were rendered homeless and got subjected to life of hunger, deprivation and extreme human suffering.

About this suffering Thompson has this to say,

"Demoralized survivors wandered around singly or in small groups, contriving to live on game and veld plants. Thousands had fled: some to the north, where they caused further devastations in the Modern Transvaal; others in to Maloti and Drakensberg mountains; others to the South-west where they obtained a footing in Griqua Chiefdoms of Andries Waterboer and Adam Kok, or took service with White farmers in the Cape Colony, or crossed the mountains and joined the Southern Nguni chiefdoms, thousands more had died by spear, from starvation and even from cannibalism, which was the ultimate proof that a society had disintegrated and its moral norms had collapsed".

Writing about Moshoeshe's role in the Lifaqane aftermath Thompson says.

"Thus Moshoeshe inspired a moral as well as a material regeneration among the people whom Lifaqane had disrupted, scattered and ultimately deposited in new combinations in Southern Lesotho. Wherever his authority extended, however, tenuously, life became a little more secure and civility a little more pronounced".

In a remark demonstrating the devastations of the Lifaqane on the political economic as well as the ideological structure, Thompson says.

"A radical social and economic change had taken place in Sesotho society. The Lifaqane had drastically increased the proportion of propertyless men and promoted the concentration of wealth - and hence of clients - in the hands of a few successful men, among whom Moshoeshe was prominent".

There is no doubt that the impact of Lifaqane especially in the way it destroyed the current social order of the time through warfare and mass migration was frightful.

The importance of the Lifaqane to us therefore lies less in it as an era of warfaring and destruction than in the impact of its mass migrations and the general aftermath of it as a dynamic of social change. To me our present day mass removals of people are more important as a social dynamic that has been set in motion to act as a motor for the society that is being envisaged by the dominant classes.

The next significant mass migration of people in South Africa which is "great" in its own way is the "Great Trek" itself. The Great Trek judged at phase value one can think that it was similar to the Lifaqane migrations. I will argue it was similar to the Lifaqane in only one respect viz, that it was a mass migration that was moving away from a hated ruler - the British.

And this ruler was in no way real warfaring. In fact the Trekkers had found it intolerable to remain resident in a society whose ideology they did not believe in. They peacefully moved out of this society with all their possessions it was possible to take along and went to the North well-armed and even more determined in their search for new lands. I conceded some of Shaka's defectors were similar to the Trekkers. But the majority of the Lifaqane victims were refugees in the true sense of the word.

No sooner had the interior of South African seen the Lifaqane devastations and the war ravages than a fresh wave of another kind of refugee - the Trekkers arriving from the South.

Section III.

The Great Trek - which numerically was by no means a very large human migration is significant to the history of migration and resettlement in Southern Africa in one way. The Great Trek took place at a crucial moment in the South African history. This was just the decade following the Lifaqane warfaring and great displacement of the majority if not practically all the Black societies settled in Southern Africa. There were vast tracts of deserted land which once upon a time were occupied by the Shona, Nguni and Sotho tribes across the breadth and length of the sub-continent. Evidence to corroborate this view is today held in all Southern African objective historical accounts. The argument in fact goes as were it not for the Lifaqane the Great Trek could never have been as great as it was often thought. The depopulation of the most fertile land in the interior of South Africa appears to have been the major basis if not the major reason for the Trekkers to be able to satisfy their expansionist drive the way they did. This drive was, however, never left to mature as it had marred a very vital social dynamic of change that had been set in motion a decade before. That dynamic which started as inter-tribal warfaring but ended up a social change dynamic destined to remake the ethnic fabric of the present Southern African societies. With the Lifaqane ravages many communities had taken refuge in the mountains and ragged terrain to make it impossible for the enemies to make follow-up attacks. The epitome of this tactical defence practice is none other than that of Moshoeshoe of Thaba Bosiu. Surely these should have been savage uprootals which were, of course, what every wartime period means. Taking into account what communities these were, it is difficult to comprehend how they in fact survived. It is quite clear they waited for peace to come and gradually migrated back to the lands that were once their home, only to find the Trekkers had moved in during their sojourn into the mountains - hence the fighting that culminated in the present day political boundaries. The boer wars against the tribes that resisted their occupation of the interior of South Africa contributed their fair share to the migrations that did follow in their wake. Not only did boer commandoes attack the villages and strongholds of most chiefdoms that stood in their way and take their women and young folk captive and subsequently indentured labour, they also encountered native chiefs who actually held their own against these settlers, albeit at a high cost. The Pedi's of the North in fact deployed strong contingencies of migrant labourers to the Cap Colony or Lesotho to work for the guns which they badly needed for the defence of their country. This did not continue for long as discoveries of diamonds and gold brought new developments in the area - developments that potentially laid a firm basis of the society that was in the offing. These developments are none other than the actual meaningful capital penetration of the societies that were essentially feudalist if not peasant in orientation.

Section IV.

Prior to the discoveries of diamonds (1867) and gold (1872) the British rule was practically restricted to the old Cape Colony and a small portion to Natal. It was infact the discovery of these two precious minerals that drew them more to the North and into the Interior of South Africa. First to Kimberly, a move which was preceded by the annexation of Griqualand West and later to Johannesburg starting with the annexation of the Transvaal in 1877. From this date until the inception of the Union of South Africa in 1910, South Africa had entered a new era which was principally dominated by one single factor which is known to most analysts of the South African social formation but never fully used. This was Capital Penetration of the South African budding economy.

For our purposes today I wish to argue that this factor - Capital Penetration of the South African social formation - is one single important element that has exercised great influence on the type of human migrations that ever occurred in this country. Our present ethnic structure in the population tells a lot about this. The Malayas had to come to work for the Dutch East Indian Company which was a merchant company itself that ran the Cape Colony for the Dutch, hence the Cape Coloured. The Indians came to Natal to work on the Sugar Plantations while the Chinese on the Gold Mines. So did many other ethnic groups from almost all the European countries come to Johannesburg and to many of our cities to work. Last but not least the blacks left their peasant strongholds wither forcibly or voluntarily to work on the mines. These migrations continued even with colonial boundaries defined. The Malawians, the Zimbabwens, the Mozambicans, the Zambians, the Basutos all came to work on the mines and other capitalist enterprises like plantations and continue to do so even up to this day.

Perhaps I should say in addition to capital, labour is another very important factor that has influenced the patterns of migrations in this country. What is very curious about labour and very important for most analysts is the way it has been expropriated from the people and also what patters of migrations have resulted from the constraints that were devised for its control. e.g. poll tax and the compound system.

Capital and labour are therefore one important union which for years up to the present moment have decided the fate of all people settled on this sub-continent. Elsewhere in the talk I have made mention of as one of the causes of the Lifaqane the strife by some Nguni Chieftaincies to the North of Natal, to control the trade route between the interior of Southern Africa and Delagoa Bay. And also as the other cause; the land question - If this did say anything to you at that time it must be that already in the 18th century in our unrecorded history there were traces of the influence of what is purely capital penetration of our societies. This was merchant capital i.e. another form of capital which usually paves the way for its twin brother, industrial capital. In South Africa it is important to note the impact of merchant capital so that one must be in good stead to explain its role in the history of capital accumulation in the whole social formation. Before I go on to explain what this has to do with peoples' migrations and removals - resettlements of the present day South Africa, let me refer briefly to the South African war 1899-1902)

For our purposes the South African war is 'important only to the extent that it displaced people who had just resettled after the boer wars and the natives who were settled on the Transorangia Plateau and as far afield as the Northern Transvaal. Apart from the thousands of Native 'labourers' who joined the war on both sides especially on the British side, there are areas of the Northern Orange Free State and Southern and Western Transvaal that were razed with fire while the inhabitants were herded into the concentration camps.

In a recent research working paper T. Matsetela writing on the life of his informant Mrs. E. Pooe who experienced the South African war removals of natives in the OFS has this to say:

"Mrs. Pooe's life at this point in time (1899-1902) was interrupted by the South African War - "die Driejaar Oorlog" as she calls it. She says they had heard for some time that there was war coming. Then one evening some black 'Spijoene' arrived in their village at Thalle ahead of the 'laager'. They heard some shooting during the night and the following day the 'laager' (military convoy) appeared.

The 'Spijoene' (British Soldiers) drove all their cattle into the laager, caught their fowls and pigs and instructed her father to inspan his horsecart so that they could all join the laager. The soldiers then set their huts and corn on fire. The laager took them in somewhere near Heilbron and moved to the northwest to a point of koppies and finally stopped at Vredefort.

Mrs. Pooe's experiences in the camp entailed the struggle for survival on a day-to-day basis but in very different and difficult circumstances; for her life in the camp amounted to a foretaste of urbanization - "the location life" as she calls it. She refers to the hardships surrounding the receiving of rations of maize mealie meal, beans, meat, the difficulty in getting firewood they needed for ordinary household cooking or just open fires for the icy, highveld winters; the introduction of coal as fuel, the temporary disappearance of sorghum porridge and certain food items and the living of a type of life where ordinary social institutions like normal family life, marriage, etc were disrupted."

It is clear that Mrs. Pooe's life tells a complete story that needs no qualification. It is perhaps fitting to state that this was all done in the name of capital interests. The British had reason to protect their interests on the 'reed'. South Africa had already turned the top world gold producer at that time and if Britain were to close her eyes to the revolt of the two Boer Republics that wanted their independence the conflict would attract attention from any other capable colonial power to come to the Republics' rescue and annex the Transvaal or/and the OFS.

It is also unfortunate to say that these very people who had lost their homes and possessions during the S.A. war ten years later were again on the move with the passage of the Natives' Land Act of 1913 whose provisions were particularly aimed at the destruction of the successful share croppers and peasant farmers of the North Orange Free State who had recreated their lives appreciably in the aftermath of the South African War. These men and women it was said were standing in the way of capitalization of agriculture in that country. So they had to give way - hence the Soi-Plaatje's 'exodus of the evicted'. One extract from this voluminous book: Native life in South Africa before and since the European war and the Boer rebellion. encapsulates the whole mood and spirit of the

legislation at least from the Black man's view point.

"Awaking on Friday morning, June 20, 1913 the South African Native found himself, not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his birth. The 4 500 000 black South Africans are domiciled as follows: One and three quarter millions in Locations and Reserves, over half a million within municipalities or in urban areas, and nearly a million as squatters on farmers owned by Europeans. The remainder are employed either on the public roads or railway lines, or as servants by European farmers, qualifying, i.e. by hard work and saving, to start farming on their own account, a squatter in South African i.e. a native who owns some livestock and, having no land of his own, hires a farm or grazing and ploughing rights from a land owner, to raise grain for his own use and feed his livestock. Hence these squatters are hit very hard by an Act which passed both Houses of Parliament during the session of 1913, received the signature of the Governor General on June 16, was gazetted on June 19, and forthwith came into operation."

In fact the Natives' Land Act of 1913 is by far the most important piece of legislation on the S.A. statute books on which the basis of the South African land apportionment rests. Not only that but also the basis of all the subsequent legislation that has to do with control of the natives' movements in the country. In short the foundations of apartheid policy were effectively laid in the passage of this act.

A closer look at Plaatje's quotations helps one to identify the pariah's of that time who have counterparts up to this day. The difference it makes is only that the scene is different and the circumstances changed. It is rightly so because it is indeed a long way since 1913. South Africa of 1913 was a budding capitalist society which had the majority of its people engaged in peasant farming. The only industry was mining.

Today South African economy has anchored itself in the capitalist world as a powerful element. Rating it on white standards far above many countries in the Western world itself. In spite of this development the majority of its people, the blacks, are still living below the poverty datum line.

Drawing lines of comparison one can still identify squatters in South Africa today. They are not only squatters displaced in farming but also in the industry. While the squatters of 1913 were intrinsically peasant in outlook the squatters of 1980 are less peasant. I cannot venture to say they are urban. Both however, are victims of the process of capitalization. Today's squatters are people who in the past 15 years have been deliberately displaced from the land and were forced to come and work in the South African industry which was actually booming. With the boom, being today part of the good old days, we have realities to face - realities of recession in which unemployment is the order of the day. What complicates the issue with our case - because recession is world-wide in the capitalist world - are the discriminative employment practices which this country has embarked and the sticking to it as the standard for their industrial code. The discrimination has even been developed to sophisticated levels. The division of the labour force is not only black and white. The black sector is urban and rural (farm labour excluded) with those in urban areas enjoying more rights than the rural migrants. The rural labour is also in two sectors. Those who carry the passport - independent homelands and those who carry the pass - the latter supposedly also having

more rights than those carrying the passport.

Section V.

Up to now I have dwelt on what you might call the history of migration in Southern Africa. I have mixed migrations that have taken place as a result of war and also migrations that took place or occurred in peacetime.

In this last part of my talk I wish to discuss what patterns migrations in our present day South Africa have taken. I wish to discuss briefly the effects of removals and resettlement with special reference to the Rhodesian 'protected villages', I also wish to refer to removals and resettlements in Mozambique and finally wish to discuss the concept 'internal refugees'.

While this seminar is sitting, politicians and administrators of Zimbabwe are grabbling with a very thorny problem. The problem of sorting out whom of the refugees from Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia are the citizens of Zimbabwe and therefore genuine refugees. Most of these young people were victims of social upheaval which in this case is war. In our country in peacetime our government has also been able to generate its own refugees. Perhaps when I say this you immediately think of our thousands of young men and women who have left the country in the early 1960's and the purges of post Soweto Riots of 1976.

It is indeed true to call these last mentioned genuine political refugees. I refer to what one might call politico-economic internal refugees. These are the people who are within the National borders of South Africa (including the Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda). These are all the black people of South Africa but particularly those in Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda. By declaring every black in South Africa to be a citizen of one of the homelands or to ask whether they were born there or ever lived there is in fact treacherous. It has, however, happened and this is what we are faced with today. And it is one reality I have chosen to start with because unless the South African government had given itself the right to deprive the majority of its citizens of their citizenship - by an act of parliament it would not dare do what it is doing with its shunting of people across the breadth and length of the country. In fact a candid examination of the mechanism of this device - the device of getting apartheid to work - is more in the economy than true politics. I have decided to call internal refugees - politico-economic because I have incessantly found it difficult to separate what I may call political from the economic. By defining the homelands boundaries the South African government has given itself an effective leverage whereby to control and at the same time fully entrench migrant labour which is so basic to all South African industrial functioning. By migrant labour arrangements we all understand that men and women have to spend all their life in one area while in fact they will never qualify to be permanent citizens of that area. In this case it is 'White South Africa' I have in mind.

In fact places like Albert Street and many other places like it in all the cities and towns of our country let alone the labour bureaux in the homelands themselves are border posts where the issue of internal refugees is actualized by the law enforcing agencies in the country.

Another pattern which migration has taken is that of forced removals and resettlements which started way back in the 1950's continued right into the 1980's. In our period no less than 3 million people have been moved. The plight of these areas and their peoples I hope are treated elsewhere in the seminar.

I would at this stage wish to refer to the resettlement themselves (in fact people argue that using the word resettlement is misleadingly using a comforting word. They say the actual process is that of uprooting and immiseration) especially to the people either migrant labourers or the women and children who stay at home.

In fact while very many people, much more than 3 million have been resettled both in the urban and rural areas, the areas that deserve to be fully documented are the resettled rural villages which are in existence for some years already. It is my contention that many of these villages have not only lost their viability as compact peasant settlements, they have turned morbid and many are in fact deteriorating. The question is now why the decline?

Section VI.

What we should consider is that people who are removed or are forced to move from one area to another should of necessity react to the removal with unwillingness. In fact usually they resist. Rightly so, because firstly they might have not chosen to move and secondly because forced removal like uprooting is painful. For indeed settled people, especially peasants, like plants or animals - but of course differently - grow roots and in their own way relate to their environment. It is normally in such an ecosystem that they develop their particular subcultures or culturally rich politics, social structures or networks which are not doubt quite enriching to their daily life. In the event of forced removal and the inevitable migration these installations are destroyed. In short, migration whether temporary or permanent has been discovered to harbour a number of stress-producing elements for the lives of the participants. Kjellström (in a personal communication) as cited by Levi and Anderson has the following to say about the effects of migration.

"Decreased possibilities of earning a living in a certain area can lead to stress. The resultant situation obliges the individual to decide whether or not to migrate and the decision-making process may likewise involve stress. The result of such a decision may be either migration, which might produce stress, or a decision to stay, which again can be stress-producing. Arrival in the new environment can mean exposure to adoptional demands, which may provoke stress. Accordingly, the stressors in connection with migration, particularly when this is involuntary can involve (a) lack of maintenance because of lack of job (b) insecurity in connection with the decision-making process (c) demands to enter a new job with or without previous training (d) departure from an environment to which one was accustomed (e) adaptation to a new environment and new social contacts etc. Those remaining in what is often an increasingly ruralized area face a continuous decline in population and/or a change in its composition. This may mean living with an increasing proportion of elderly people, being exposed to shortage of job opportunities, and to decay in municipal economy, resulting in gradual deterioration of public and private services.

Further, and most important, in response to migration, the traditional extended family tends to dissolve. The migrants to the great urban conglomerations are for the most part young men who have to adopt swiftly to city life, for which they often are unequipped. They maintain some contact with their families in the rural areas for a time, but the influence of the patriarchal head, the tribal chief or senior members of the family may decline, and there may be no other factor controlling conduct to take its place. Thus, values and patterns of behaviour may be threatened"

In another study by Murphy (1965) it has been discovered that there is some relationship between migration and mental health. Three areas concerning these interrelationships are

Certain mental disorders incite their victims to migrate;
The process of migration creates mental strain which, in turn precipitates mental disorders in susceptible individuals;

There is a non-essential association between migration and certain other predisposing or precipitating factors, such as age, social class, and culture conflict.

While Kjellström and Murphy seem to be referring to migrant labourers in the South African context it is important to note two things. First, the fact that migrant labour in South Africa is so entrenched that for most rural blacks it has been a way of life for generations. Secondly, because migrants, most migrants are subjected to migration rigours at two levels i.e. from home to a place of employment as well as from one area to another or even getting resettled in an area where they have lived for generations under the betterment schemes policy. One point I wish to make is that all forms of migration are stress-producing. In the case of forced removals the stress-producing elements are even more devastating.

In another study by two researchers of the (WHO) World Health Organisation: Zwingman and Pfister-Amende 1973. Uprooting and After, it has been discovered that such stresses as those resulting from uprooting of people from one area to another can cause so much shock in the people so uprooted as to amount to a partial or total mental stroke. It is quite obvious that in such a state the lives of individuals and that of the community that has been forcibly removed do not only become morbid but absolutely vulnerable and imperilled.

The effects of removal, resettlement and migration are deeper than affecting people at the individual level. In fact, the health of any community is tied up with its capacity to produce food for itself on the one hand and to cope up with the disease environment on the other. What is known of most resettled areas is that there is a great amount of land alienation and in the wake of this has developed a complex disease environment which in turn is related to the changed way of life - where viable peasantry has been replaced by impoverished rural proletariats. There is an environment of people whose way of life has been eroded while they themselves got displaced.

Conclusion.

One point I wish to make in conclusion is that throughout this talk I have been continuously involved in a fierce debate within myself. The subject was: How qualified am I to write on this subject. An even earlier question did haunt me and this was, who am I to talk on the historical and ideological perspectives of migrations and resettlements in South Africa. I couldn't find a good answer to my question. So I had to put up with the best I could lay my hands on viz that I am a citizen of South Africa and therefore it is my responsibility to do so before everyone else can. In other words my analytical framework is more that of a citizen than an expert. I have minced facts with emotions, realities with myths, hypotheses with proven theories, history with suppositions, findings with wishes. I have however, not lied to you, if I did, that was highly unintended. The talk is therefore not given as a research master piece about the problem in question, it is intended instead to excite you to some thinking. Many of the ideas I have toyed with are quite controversial. I can only be too happy to see your discussion adding to the dimension of our understanding of this controversial debate.

Central to my talk I have put the concept migration and what follows in its wake. It should be evident to most of you throughout the talk that I have argued that white migration is as old as our recorded history, it differs considerably in nature and motivation. In other words migration today whether forced or voluntary, whether temporary or permanent differs in its impact to the life of the community in which it occurs. It is obvious from talk that the level of migration during or before the Lifaqane could have been great in its own rights. But in terms of numbers and the level of socio-economic development of our communities today and above all the atmosphere of peace and quite cannot compare with the type of human removal that has occurred in the present era.

I have attempted in similar vein to answer the question why human removals and resettlements on such a scale in peace time? Here too, I am afraid, there is no ready made answer. The only conclusion I could come to was that the present day migration can be related to the ideological, political and economic strategies that the present government is deploying to ensure its stay in power. The strategies are effective at two levels. Firstly, removals ensure a systematic progression of material impoverishment and displacement of the migrants. Secondly, removals are a psychological device whereby the displaced are not only left vulnerable to 'morbidity and mortality' but also, in situations where they reckon against odds to recreate their lives.

It is therefore evident that the real effects of migration in all its facets are never fully appreciated. What often captures the attention of the public eye (e.g. Newspapers) are some removals. There have been some preliminary impulsive studies of some resettled areas that have been revisited. What is actually lacking is a comprehensive research effort to unveil the extent to which this phenomenon has affected the health of our present day black societies and to protect on the strength of those facts what serious implications we are likely to face in the future as a result.

Assuming that South Africa will not always be what it is in the years ahead and that the potential of armed guerilla insurgents are likely to intensify on our borders in the coming years it is horrifying for me to think how people in planned villages, resettled areas and locations will feel like in such a situation.

- 12 -

Perhaps our best lesson has nothing to do with Malaya or Vietnam but more with our immediate neighbours to the North and North East i.e. Zimbabwe and Mozambique.

Mt. T. Matsetela

21 February, 1960.