

Black Viewpoint No. 4

# TRANSKEI INDEPENDENCE

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# Foreword

Today, the South African public, and all people concerned in the whole of Southern Africa, as well as the world over, are pensively waiting for 26 October 1976. This date is expected to be of significant importance in the development of bantustans in South Africa. The first experimental bantustan, the Transkei, will celebrate that day as 'Independence Day'. It is expected to be a great day of reward for the government officials who have had sleepless nights, working very hard in the past year, especially planning and carrying out constitutional, diplomatic and physical preparations for the big day.

The constitutional status of the Transkei has been the cause of much debate between Pretoria and Umtata, resulting in a lot of publicised controversy. The first question that was expected to face the maturing bantustan as a sovereign state was that of its relations with the rest of the international community. In the past six months, the two main figures in the Transkei leadership, the Matanzima brothers, Chiefs Kaizer and George, have been flying around all over the Western world, drumming up diplomatic and economic support for the territory. In the meantime, the South African Government has been training a special team of selected diplomatic cadets, who are to continue with the task of seeking recognition abroad.

At home, heavy face-lifting physical projects like road-building, construction of mammoth hotels, new huge administrative offices, new cabinet residences to accomodate the expected extended cabinet, a brand new international airport, an army headquarters and barracks, a R1,6 million presidential palace with a sliding roof and of course, border posts on the Northern and Southern borders of Umzimkhulu and Kei rivers, respectively, were being undertaken. Recruitment of Transkeian males for the army started in the second half of 1975, and already every morning one can hear the army horn blowing to wake up the Transkei troops sleeping about ten kilometres west of the capital, Umtata.

The Transkei is the geographical unit of South Africa which lies on the south east coast of the country between the two rivers of Umzimkhulu in the north and Kei in the south, the Indian Ocean in the east and the Drakensberg mountain range in the west. It is bordered by the Natal

Province and Lesotho, as well as the Cape Province, of which it has always been part until self-government. It covers a surface area of about 4,5 million hectares.

Although the Transkei is scheduled to become independent as from 26 October as part of a purposeful plan by the ruling Nationalist Party, the administration of the territory under the various laws for 'native administration' in the past has been the policy of all white South African rulers. This was the case with all the other 'native reserves'. However, the recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission, which was composed of a good number of influential Nationalists, made a strong case for separate development to be implemented fully. Although the government had intended (in the words of Dr H. F. Verwoerd in 1957) to let "this tree of separate development grow slowly", the tumultuous period of the beginning of the 1960's, resulting from the challenge to white power by African nationalism, forced Dr Verwoerd, who had become Prime Minister as from September 1958, to say in March 1961, that "in the light of the pressure being exerted on South Africa", the Government would have to allow the development of "separate Bantu states, possibly even to the point of full independence".

The Transkei became the first one of the reserves to be offered self-government, in 1963. It may be noted of course, that it had the advantage, over other reserves, of being a more continuous piece of land, as opposed to the others which had numerous pieces. There was therefore no need for initial consolidation before the experiment was initiated. The other feature of the Transkei which had made the Government uncomfortable about the territory were the troublesome disturbances which lasted from the beginning of 1960 to early in 1961, mainly in the region of Eastern Pondoland.

Most of these acts of violence illustrated opposition to unpopular chiefs and headmen, and to unpopular soil conservation schemes, increased taxation and other official policies. They took the form of stoning of white motorists, as well as destruction of households belonging to, and the killing of, Africans who were regarded as government collaborators. Violence was also reported in Thembuland, and during this time, government collaborators, including some chiefs, had to be protected by Police troops. On 30 November, 1960, Proclamation R400 was declared, providing for detention without trial and without recourse to law for any suffering or inconvenience experienced, a ban on all meetings, without official permits, of ten persons or more. It introduced powers to prohibit free movement in or out of any area. Any tribal chief authorised by the Minister of Bantu Administration could order any African to move with members of his household, with livestock and movable property from a place within the area of jurisdiction of such a chief, to any other place specified by such chief, permanently or for a specified period. He could order the demolition of any hut or

dwelling owned by such an African, without incurring liability for compensation.

These regulations are still in force in the Transkei today. Large numbers of people opposed to pro-government chiefs were made to take refuge in the hills, mountains and caves, where they apparently maintained some form of disciplined communities, with organised communication with the outside world. Most of the trouble was in Eastern Pondoland, the area under Paramount Chief Botha Sigcau, father of Transkei Interior Minister, Stella Sigcau. Paramount Chief Sigcau, whose home was at the time under police guard in the face of threats on his life, is believed to be the man to become the first president of the Transkei Republic.

These events are believed to have contributed to the Verwoerd Government's acceleration of the Transkei experiment. On 23 January, 1962, Dr Verwoerd announced an accelerated timetable of development in the Transkei. In 1963, the Transkei Constitution Act was passed, giving the Transkei self-government through the Transkei Legislative Assembly (TLA) of four paramount chiefs, sixty additional chiefs and forty-five elected members; with a six men cabinet headed by a chief minister. The TLA and its cabinet was given power over agriculture and forestry, roads and works, education for Africans living in the territory, internal affairs, justice and finance.

In terms of the constitution, Transkeian citizenship would be open to Africans only, excluding the Coloureds and Whites living permanently in the territory. Citizenship would be open to Africans born in the Transkei, as well as those domiciled there for at least five years; as well as any other Africans in South Africa, speaking a dialect of Cape Nguni even if they were not born in the Transkei, or had never been to the territory, provided that they were not citizens of any other bantustan. In addition, citizens would include those Sotho speaking Africans anywhere in the Republic, who had descended from a Sotho speaking tribe living in the Transkei. As a result of these provisions Transkeian politicians would campaign for votes in the metropolitan areas of the Republic of South Africa.

After the first Transkei general elections which took place on 20 November, 1963, there emerged two contestants for the position of Chief Minister, Paramount Chief Victor Poto and Chief Kaizer Matanzima. Chief Matanzima had been working closely with the South African Government in the previous few years. He had been the chairman of the Recess Committee which prepared the first draft of the Transkeian Constitution and he had also presided over the special session of the Transkei Territorial Authority which approved the Transkei Constitution Act in December, 1962. His counterpart, Paramount Chief Victor Poto had also been a full participant in government institutions in the Transkei, as he had been paramount chief from as early as 1918. He had been a member of the Native Representative

Council. The Republican Government, however, was known to prefer Matanzima.

On 6 December, the Chief Minister of the Transkei was elected; and Chief Matanzima, who had greater support among the ex-officer TLA members—the chiefs, won the contest. He later occupied the official residence which was built across the Umtata river to the east of the capital, with tight security measures and regular twenty-four hour guard at the gate. Chief Matanzima has remained one of the few bantustan leaders who live under constant guard. Subsequent to this, in January 1964, the loser, Paramount Chief Poto, organised his group into some structure, and by February, the Democratic Party was launched formally, with Poto as its leader, to oppose the Transkei Government. Soon after, Chief Minister Matanzima announced the formation of the ruling party which was called the Transkei National Independence Party. Prior to the formation of these parties, in August 1963, an attempt had been made to found an Eastern Pondoland People's Party. Whatever the effect of this party could have been, no one can say because the party did not last.

On the day of nominations of candidates for the general election, 2 October 1963, eight officials of this party were nominated for Gaukeni, the Eastern Pondoland district which had sustained heavy political stress as a result of the disturbances. Shortly after that, the party's secretary, Mr M. S. Mdingi, was detained by the South African Police and kept right through the election campaign. That incident and further harassment of the party supporters led to the collapse of the party.

At the end of 1973, after a decade in office, the Chief Minister Kaizer Matanzima, who had since been made a paramount chief, announced that the Transkei would be independent within six years. The following year, 1974, another announcement brought independence to 1976. In that same year, Paramount Chief Matanzima along with two other Blacks, Dr M. B. Naidoo and Mr D. Ulster, accompanied the South African delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations. Besides other reasons which were put forward for the Blacks to be included in the South African team, Matanzima was particularly chosen to improve his international experience in view of independence. It was in 1974 also, that the University of Fort Hare (one of the five universities established along tribal and ethnic lines for Blacks in South Africa) awarded Chief Kaizer an honorary doctorate of law, to mark his contribution to the governmental advancement of the Xhosa speaking people.

The year 1975 saw a heightened pace in the preparations for independence. By the middle of the year, the rumblings of the independence drums were quite close, and preparations for celebrations in all the Transkei towns, as well as in other parts of the country, were going ahead. Meanwhile a number of significant developments had

taken place on the political front. Firstly, the Democratic Party leadership had fallen into the hands of Chief Poto's right-hand man, Mr Knowledge Guzana, an elected member from the Dalindyebo region and the only practising attorney in the Assembly, following the Chief's resignation from the position in 1966 as a result of old age and ill-health. Over the years since the party's position as opposition has become much weaker. In 1974, a dissident faction, based mainly in the Thembuland division, developed under the leadership of thirty-year old Hector Bongani Ncokazi. A completely new man in Transkei politics, Ncokazi soon came to be known for his strong language in attacking both the Transkeian and the Republican Governments, as well as the traditional Guzana Democratic Party leadership. He got hold of the total Democratic Party leadership when Guzana was deposed at the 1975 conference of the party in December. A brother-in-law of Chief George Matanzima, Ncokazi won on a ticket of total opposition to the Matanzima independence moves. Guzana had also expressed opposition to independence, however the party supporters, who voted for Ncokazi, felt that he was not doing enough. Mr Guzana had, despite his opposition to independence, participated in the Recess Committee that prepared proposals for the draft independence constitution.

Ncokazi's first message as new Democratic Party leader was a call for a referendum in the Transkei to test the opinion of the people on the independence issue. Chief Kaizer Matanzima, dismissing Ncokazi as a howler, refused to recognise his leadership of the opposition. He declared that he would continue to regard Mr Guzana as opposition leader, whereupon Guzana formed a new party called the New Democratic Party. Ncokazi himself was not a member of the TLA, which he generally regarded as a "frustrating circus". A number of sitting members of the Assembly followed Guzana, a few defected to Matanzima including Paramount Chief Tutor Ndamase, son of the now late founder of the Democratic Party, Paramount Chief Victor Poto.

Only a couple of members remained with Ncokazi, although however he was believed to have considerable support outside the Assembly. Over the first six months of 1976, he made various efforts to spread the anti-independence gospel inside and outside the territory. He is believed to have even considered court action against independence.

In June, a number of Transkeians were arrested by the South African security police in Umtata, under Proclamation R400. It was believed that their arrests were connected with the reported departure from the country of over a hundred people, believed to have gone to Tanzania for military training. On 25 and 26 July about five key Democratic Party members, including two TLA members and two executive members, were detained by the security police under the provisions of Proclamation R400 of 1960. Reacting to the arrests in a statement, Ncokazi said that he saw the move as an attempt to exclude

the Democratic Party from the Transkei Legislative Assembly, and well as to obliterate "effective opposition to (Matanzima's) policies."

The following day, 27 July, he was himself detained under Proclamation R400. History could be said to be repeating itself if the cases of Ncokazi and that of Mdingi of the Eastern Pondoland People's Party could be compared; except for the difference that Ncokazi's party might still survive harassment, because of its long standing. There were reports that Ncokazi would have changed his attitude and stood for Democratic Party nomination for the 29 September pre-independence elections. In a statement following the detentions, the Black People's Convention said: "In the past the Vorster regime has made repeated statements inviting Blacks to oppose its policies 'within the ambit of the law', i.e. through apartheid structures like Bantustans. Today our people are being shown the true nature of the problem facing the black man in South Africa. Recently, no less than six leading members of the Transkei Democratic Party including its leader, Mr H. B. Ncokazi, have been thrown into prison for impertinence of constitutionally opposing the unbearable political robbery and illegal dispossession that cannot be justified morally or otherwise, i.e. the granting of independence to the Transkei. There seems to be no room for conformist opposition to this country's gangsterism by a government which, along with its most trusted lackeys—the Matanzima's can be so ruthless even on the eve of their own independence. Any sane thinking person can see that Matanzima is not alone behind the detentions, but is instructed and backed by Pretoria." Black People's Convention had always opposed any form of participation in these institutions regarding it as perpetuation of the apartheid system it so loathed. It called on all who were participating in these institutions to "immediately and unconditionally withdraw in the name of the Black man's dignity and our love for nationhood". This has always been the Black People's Convention's attitude towards working within the framework of the separate development policy.

Urged by the importance of black opinion on issues of such delicate nature which affect the black community, the Communications Department of the Black Community Programmes Ltd. decided to publish this booklet. For this publication, various black people with different ideological perspectives were asked to prepare papers on Transkei independence airing their views on the topic. It is regretted that some of these people, viz. Mr Hector Bongani Ncokazi and Mr Kenneth Hlaku Rachidi, were detained under the country's security laws.



that a choice would have to be made by white South Africa between two ultimate poles, namely that of complete integration and that of separation, with regard to 'the two main racial groups' (Europeans and Africans). It recommended the strengthening of the latter choice. It called for full scale development of the native reserves. According to its calculations the Commission envisaged the attainment of a total population of ten million people in the reserves by 1979-84. Of this number, it was estimated that eight million would be dependent for their existence on activities within the reserves, and two million on activities in the white sector.

"If the Bantu areas are not developed, the European sector will probably have to accommodate a Bantu population of about seventeen million at the close of this century", said the Commission. It therefore recommended the consolidation of the reserves into homelands on the basis of 'the principal ethnic groups.'

The report concluded: "The choice is clear, either the *challenge* must be accepted, or, the inevitable *consequences* of the integration of the Bantu and European population groups into a common society, must be endured."

This message, together with the recommendation that the reserves must be developed into political sects according to tribal affiliations, heralded the introduction of the Bantustans, which were advanced versions of the original territorial authorities. The first one, which was set up as an experiment in 1963 was the Transkei.

The pattern of composition of the Transkei Legislative Assembly, which was subsequently followed in the establishment of other Bantustans, portrayed the role of tribal chiefs as trustees of government policy. In the Legislative Assembly there was a majority of sixty-four chiefs and a minority of forty-five elected members. Paramount chiefs retained their seats indefinitely, whilst the other chiefs, according to the 1967 amendment to the Act, were elected by the chiefs themselves, to retain their seats for the duration of the Legislative Assembly, a period of five years. Because of the fact that they are on the state pay-roll the chiefs have always enjoyed the trust of the Government. It was as a result of this that they were always put in the fore-front when it came to ensuring the success of government institutions established for Africans. It shall be remembered that this came out clearly in the composition of the Native Representative Council, whose members were elected by electoral colleges composed of chiefs, headmen and members of district councils and location advisory boards. This pattern will apparently be changed when the government policy reaches its logical conclusion on the attaining of independence by Bantustans. The draft constitution of the proposed independent Republic of the Transkei allows for a Parliament of seventy-five chiefs and seventy-five elected members with no majority of elected members.

Today there are eight fully functional Bantustans in the country,

Professor Njisane believes that the creation of an independent Transkei adds to the growth of the Third World "rather than remain and calcify in the present stalemate of rhetoric which still leaves us where we are—under the domination of a white oligarchy."

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*"Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else shall be added unto you." Dr Nkwame Nkrumah Osadyefo of Ghana.*

ON 26 OCTOBER 1976, the Republic of Transkei will emerge and its independence flag will be hoisted into the freedom breeze of Africa to symbolise its sovereignty as a new state. At midnight on 25 October the Republic of South Africa will divest itself of all authority, powers, and functions over the Transkei, hitherto invested in the State President of South Africa, and the Transkei will assume complete control of all its state departments including Foreign Affairs and Defence.

The motto of the Transkei is *Imbumba Yamanyama* (Unity is strength) and the national anthem *Nkosi Sikelel' i-Afrika* (God Bless Africa). Four million voices will add their Pan African voices to autonomous Africa, never again to submit to apartheid, separate development, or white racism. In the process they will be joined by those Whites who opt for Transkeian citizenship which will be nonracial.

Racial minority rule in Southern Africa has been so resilient and its proponents so recalcitrant that efforts by the international community, in support of liberation movements demanding decolonisation, have hitherto been blatantly defied as interference, and occasional reprimand by friendly Western states has been persistently resisted. Occasionally one reads about the 'policy of extended frontiers' which sought to bolster the rest of Southern African white minority governments, a policy which was reminiscent of the now defunct Moseleyite Movement which perceived Southern Africa as the last bastion of white supremacy and civilisation in Africa. It is encouraging to realise that through the undying love of freedom on the part of Blacks in Africa, through the initiative of dedicated Africans in South Africa and outside, and through the modest endeavours of the people of the Transkei since its annexation and before, a portion of South Africa will enter a period of peak experiences, moments of highest happiness and fulfilment which only self-actualised individuals, exercising self-determination, can attain. This experience is impossible in a captive or occupied territory. This is the reality as we perceive it in the Transkei and which motivates the vast majority of those who seek the kingdom of politics.

This is more the beginning, therefore, of a new era rather than the end of an old one. It is a new phase in an unfolding drama involving large masses of Blacks in the whole of the southern sub-continent. In October 1976 the Transkei will assert the brotherhood of man, human dignity, and self-determination, and commit itself unequivocally to these inalienable rights and principles.

### **Out of Dehumanising Tutelage—Citizen and Non-citizen**

To depict vividly how we, as Africans, perceived our status and position in a South Africa riddled with pervasive and relentless colour racism, let us borrow *J. S. Mill's* characterisation of a parallel experience (*Principles of Political Economy, 1848*) and for European workers of the time substitute Africans or, in what was popular South African parlance, 'natives':—

" . . . the lot of the 'Africans in South Africa' in all things that affect them collectively, should be regulated *for* them, *not by* them, (*emphasis mine*) they should not be required or encouraged to think for themselves, or give to their destiny. It is the duty of the ruling white society to think for them and to take on the responsibility of their lot, as the commanders and officers of army take that of the soldiers composing it. This function they should prepare themselves to perform conscientiously, and their whole demeanour should impress the natives with a reliance on it in order that, while yielding . . . to the rules prescribed for them, they may resign themselves . . . and repose under the shadow of their protectors . . . The European should be *in loco parentis* to the natives guiding and restraining them like children. Of spontaneous action on their part, there should be no need. They should be called on for nothing but to do their day's work and to be moral and religious. Their morality and religion should be provided for them by their superiors who 'should' see them properly taught it, and should do all that is necessary to insure their being, in return for labour and attachment, properly fed, clothed, housed, spiritually edified, and innocently amused . . . "

It is not surprising therefore that before Union in 1910, instead of consulting the Africans, a writer from England reported something to this effect: "So far as the natives are concerned give them enough pap to eat and sufficient hymns to sing, they will be content." This is the psychosocial environment out of which the Transkei seeks to emancipate itself. It is against this form of dehumanising tutelage that Blacks will continue to struggle resolutely. We have been called one thing, and then another without any compunction nor any serious inclination on the part of the power entrepreneurs of white society to take into account what we think or say we are. This fact of historical experience is common, to a greater or lesser degree, to all subordinate peoples.

Therefore with independence in the Transkei, we are girding ourselves for the task of making our contribution to the reshaping of South Africa, participating with dignity to offer our own definition of the situation. We wish to inject our own definition and conception of man by re-emphasising our value of humaneness (ubuntu, which means humaneness), judged by which apartheid and separate development are alien ideologies. Indeed, the decisions that face us now revolve around resuscitating those possible values which will reinforce self-determination and set in motion the cycle which will activate self-actualisation.

Until recently South Africa defined herself as a white man's country', and Whites legislated themselves into Europeans and therefore defined themselves out of Africa. Observe the following definition of the African out of South Africa:

"After careful consideration and consultation with the Native Affairs Department, your Commission have unanimously come to the conclusion, and recommend, that it should be a recognised principle of government that Natives—men, women, and children—should only be permitted within municipal areas in so far and for so long as their presence is demanded by the white population." (*Departmental Committee Report, 1935, par. 267*).

One might exclaim like Malcom X: "Yet anyone whoever came out of Europe, 'any blue-eyed thing', becomes a citizen of South Africa the moment he lands there."

As Blacks we lament the arrogance of power which defines the aboriginal populations as mere chattels, readily transferable to any white kith and kin. Examine the Lusaka Manifesto definition of African: it defines the South African Whites as belonging to Africa, it acknowledges their presence as a *fait accompli*; but it also leaves no doubt about its opposition to the 'camel's ingratitude' (*Aesop's Fables*) of defining the African hosts out of their homes. Behind the facade of our distorted history which cries out for reinterpretation, lurks the spectre of the Berlin Conference which defined Africa,—the whole continent,—as 'no man's land' in which Europeans could stake their claims. As we stand at the crossroads today, as we take a perfunctory glance at history and its spooky remnants, a new vision is taking shape, a picture of the potentialities of African energies and African destiny. All this enjoins us to go ahead with the conviction that in spite of setbacks we are morally in the right. It is our moral duty to be free as individuals and as Blacks collectively.

### **Self-Determination: The Political Kingdom**

"We can choose our future. We believe we can reconcile the need to learn a living with the desire to work at what we believe—justice, peace and environment balance . . . ." (*Creating the Future* by Beitz and Washburn, 1974).

The Transkei has opted for independence or self-determination as a duty. It is the responsibility of everyone to be free, free to pursue life, happiness and liberty. To attain this goal the Transkei has opted for a non-racial state with equality for all. Nkrumah, that great pundit of self-determination, once remarked that it is not only the right to govern ourselves that we should seek, but also the right even to mis-govern ourselves, for " 'tis better to roign in hell than to serve in heaven" (*Milton*) The dependency syndrome described by Mill is a condition under which no one should remain a day longer than one is coerced to do so.

The future is not some place to which we are going; on the contrary, it should be a place which we are creating. The paths to it are not found or charted, but made, and the process of making them "changes both the makers and the destination." (*John Schaar* in *Creating the Future*, cf. with Gellner's paradigm of change referred to later). Self-determination is a *sine qua non* to the pursuit of the fundamental rights of man, the dignity and worth of the human person,—man and woman— young and old, and nations large and small.

To become politically effective and credible, and to be economically viable in the pursuit of our national goals which are people-oriented, we must be free to enter international forums. We want to reactivate our history in order to enkindle our consciousness or self-awareness and thus build an authentic African personality concerned more with the people than with alien ideologies. Self-determination is one condition in which we can unleash our energies and save our most precious asset and resource in Africa, for Africa and the world, 'the human potential', in a benign and fertile climate.

The racial policies of South Africa, racial classification, the primacy of white interests in the distribution of power, wealth and position, are the gravest challenge to Africa and the world, and we cannot allow their adventitious roots to grow on African soil. Dr W. E. B. Du Bois perceptively declared (1903): "The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour line—the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea." (*The Souls of Black Folk*).

## **The Stalemate and Decision-making Power**

The people of the Transkei share common concern, that we can no longer linger ambivalently where we are while the situation deteriorates towards a holocaust that will spew chaos. We are convinced that the independence of the Transkei will create an atmosphere in which we can re-examine the South African problem at a round table conference of equals, black, white, young and old, South Africans all, committed to 'mutual co-existence and survival'. The vast population of South Africa has set itself radically against simplistic negation and nihilistic rhetorical opposition characterised by repetitive recital of the ills of our

The papers that make up this book are in fact, papers that were given at Koinonia. I wish to take the opportunity at this stage, to very much thank these fellow countrymen who saw the need for their views to be aired, believing of course, that their views are to a greater or lesser extent, representative of the thinking of sections of black South Africans who make up the groupings of views referred to earlier on. I wish to thank with much feeling, all the people that took the trouble to attend the symposium and promote the discussions to the levels that they reached.

I hope that the views given in this book will be good enough food for thought, to clarify the curious minds of scholars and to give the necessary information to those who are keen to follow black political activities in South Africa.

**Thoko Mbanjwa**  
*Editor*

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1973, a forgotten man, unlamented. In 1974 a firm demand for independence was debated in the Transkeian Legislative Assembly and the motion passed by an overwhelming majority. It is interesting that the TNIP's clamour for independence gained such momentum that today even the Opposition can hardly hold its support intact. The issue which seems to create cleavage within the ranks of the Opposition is a fine distinction some make between two major points of discord: opposition to the separate development policy, and opposition to independence from the rest of the white South African hegemony. "No people ever rejected self-determination", explained a top-ranking Opposition member. The more resilient of the Opposition doubt the economic viability of the Transkei when contrasted with that of the Republic.

The argument runs something like this: we are abandoning the riches of the Republic of South Africa, our birthright. "We have no mineral deposits", others complain. Others say the Transkei independence is tantamount to abandoning those Africans who remain demeaned by pass-carrying and apartheid. The historical sketch given above demonstrates, however, that the people of the Transkei have had an existence which predates apartheid or separate development, and that it is not the brain-child of the National Party. Nor was it created by the present policy, but that the people of the Transkei confronted their problem realistically over many years, and, in the light of their historical experiences, albeit myopic or even parochial, decided against being fifth grade citizens or remaining the untouchables of a rich state, or servants in a palace. What we lose in money or the right to live in locations and a vicarious citizenship, is worthwhile as a price for the redemption of damaged, thwarted personalities. It is infinitely better to be a citizen of some country than none at all.

Ernest Gellner (*Thought and Social Change*, 1964) gives a paradigm of social change which should give us faith in ourselves as a people:

"The rapidity of change is not merely an external matter . . . a bewildering succession of different landscapes; it is a more inward process and fundamental thing. It is rather a consequence of the fact that the rules of the game are constantly undergoing transformation; the framework, which in stable contexts is taken for granted, is itself something which is at stake within the game it is supposed to govern."

He goes on to compare it with a knockout tournament in which the first round is played as soccer, the second round as rugby, and the third and final round as ice hockey. "The outcome of each round modifies the game itself; not only the identity of the game, but also that of the participants, and the issues have changed."

However nostalgic the Whites may be about maintaining the traditional Black-White relations, or about preserving white supremacy as separate development or under any other name, the political independence of the Transkei marks the beginning of the end of racist



institutions in Southern Africa. If the Whites regard South Africa as their permanent home, and I have no doubt they do, South Africa cannot be any less ours, but rather more. But if they insist on establishing a European purity island, then it is to be expected that this will unify Africa irretrievably against such arrogance.

The first phase will involve the Republic in a series of continuing negotiations with the independent Transkei, as equals. We may bog down for a time in definitions and re-definitions, that is, building new contracts through which we can communicate and build the new negotiated order toward coexistence. Whites have made a start by re-defining themselves away from seeing themselves as Europeans, although I wonder if they do not require changes in the laws also to do so. This also involves a re-examination of the Lusaka Manifesto.

The re-examination of old white policies and the introduction of alternative modes of interracial behaviour and relationship hitherto considered sacrilegious by law and convention, and the knowledge that they exist will make their viability easier to accept.

Among other developments will be the discovery that no one is so wise and altruistic as to arrogate to oneself the right to determine the destiny of twenty million Blacks who are voiceless. For if South Africa is to become a democracy some day, we had better start now building the ideological foundation. We might also point out that whatever the performance of other African states, so long as it is not based on the Western brand of racism, it is infinitely more readily tolerable to the rest of the world and especially to Africa. Elections, revolutions, coups d'etat, and just the dreary passage of time can do away with other forms of tyranny, but racial attributes cannot be changed.

This phase is crucial for establishing bridges and for developing mechanisms for handling and routinising dialogue.

Given domestic tranquility we have a unique opportunity. The pertinent question today is: What shall be done with the Whites? It has never been more important than today, to know what the Africans or Blacks are thinking, and what they are building up, for what future.

We shall have either succeeded together or suffered together. If that holocaust comes, then no one will have won. Today no one wins who wins under such circumstances, in the same way that Germany and Japan, losers in the last world war, are today industrial giants.

### **Viability—Capabilities for Independence**

Reference has already been made directly or indirectly to some of the issues raised under this consideration. Perhaps the most unbelievable reaction to Transkei's approaching independence has been the suggestion that we should barricade ourselves in what we perceive as our confinement. This has led to that kind of hubris which attacks the

integrity of leaders like Dr Matanzima or the intelligence of the people of the Transkei. Unless, of course, there is no substance to the allegation that racism breeds misery and starvation and stultifies our human potentials, then we may all enter the game of apolitical demagoguery which defines the future in messianic and millennial terms of the 'impossible dream'. We are willing to face even the stark possibility of survival and painful growth of the Third World rather than remain and calcify in the present stalemate of rhetoric which still leaves us where we are—under the domination of a white oligarchy.

Political viability is, therefore, our least worry. The Transkei has made its first decade of legislative experience with confidence and it will continue to draw in more talent as the years go on. The Transkei has made its first round as well as could be expected with the present strictures of not being completely free. If all this can be achieved with a minimum of repression and violence and in an atmosphere of enthusiastic participation, it will accomplish a great deal more within a comparatively short time. This is a *sine qua non* for economic viability.

Economic viability, it seems to us, must follow from the emancipation of so many captive minds salvaged from frustration. Motivations are what we can pose as serious problematic areas. This is a country whose labour has been drained by outside industries. Experts have assured us that we utilise only five percent of the country's agricultural potential and we know it is a rich country for all forms of agriculture. Our mineral deposits may not be gold mines, but intensive prospecting may yet surprise us.

In short, the Transkei is neither the smallest nor the poorest of countries in Africa and the world. Like all the rest of the world it will depend on developing its resources and on interdependent projects with the rest of the world. So far the agricultural section has established huge irrigation projects, diversified crops in order to encourage cash crops such as tea, coffee, nuts, phormium tenax, etc., and is stepping up afforestation.

The two industrial growth points, Butterworth and Umtata, have set up industrial ventures which are increasing the number of Transkeians getting jobs at home. All in all it can be said that the Transkei is ceasing to be a labour reservoir whose infrastructure is neglected.

Comparison or contrast with other Third World countries will not aid our case very much, nor does it improve the perspective to any considerable degree, because each case has its own peculiarities. Added to our circumstances in the Transkei is that, unavoidably we are situated in the same cultural zone, historical union, monetary zone, customs union, and regional zone with mephitic race-riddled South Africa of whose policies we have been the vociferous victims. This is no more our fault than the fact that we were born black and beautiful. We never chose our colonisers or oppressors, any more than we chose our parents

(*Dr Matanzima*). Economically people will continue the human stream of mobility in and out of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Malawi, etc. This is true of Britain and Ireland, Mexico and the US. As for the so-called subsidies from South Africa, they are as predictable and natural as the continuing Commonwealth and Franco-phone meetings in Paris. There is logic in our regarding these subsidies as reparation for the services we rendered as former 'natives'. The simple fact is that Transkei will not be any worse off than half the Third World.

The level of education, even at this stage, gives much hope for the future. It is not sufficiently diversified to keep a self-sufficient country going. Our purpose is not to dote over our deficiencies but to devise solutions. Given the co-operation of committed citizens and a dedicated civil service we have a good chance to be free and confident.

Contemporary history will record that there was a time when it became necessary for the world to live with two Koreas, two Chinas, two Irelands, two Vietnams, or two Germanys. It will also recall the time India was much larger than it is today, when Pakistan included Bangladesh, and when there was Ruanda-Urundi and the Central African Federation. Zambia and Malawi dissolved the Federation when it became clear to them that it served white hegemony. Today these two countries are playing a vital role in dismantling white racism in Rhodesia.

The independence of Tunisia and Morocco was condemned because Algeria, defined French by the French, was still in the grips of white rule. But it was their independence that hastened the end of French rule in Algeria. They gave Algerians a power base from which to negotiate.

So does the freedom of Southern Ireland in the search for the solution of the continuing strife in Northern Ireland. The political gyrations in the United States, apart from producing Liberia, have given us some of the most intriguing forms of political complexity. Today they have Black caucuses in Congress, in Psychiatry, Psychology, etc., and separatist movements such as the Republic of New Africa. All these point to the importance of self-determination.

We reiterate that the independence of the Transkei will emancipate new energies and that it will change not only Transkeians but also the rest of Southern Africa. The name of the game has to change, and in doing so also the rules of the game will change.

## Hector Bongani Ncokazi

Mr Hector Bongani Ncokazi was actively involved in Transkei politics. He became the leader of the reformist group of the Democratic Party led by Mr Knowledge Guzana. The so-called rebel group of Mr Ncokazi was dissatisfied with the leadership of Mr Guzana, especially after he had participated in the pre-independence constitutional recess committee. At the annual congress of the Democratic Party held in December 1975, Ncokazi and most of his followers were elected to replace Mr Guzana and his group. This replacement of Mr Guzana resulted in a split within the Democratic Party when Guzana formed his New Democratic Party in which he won a leadership status. Despite Mr Ncokazi's key position in the Democratic Party, Chief Matanzima still insisted on recognizing Mr Guzana as the leader of the opposition in the Transkei Legislative.

Mr Ncokazi lost his job as a clerk for a firm in Idutywa, the Bam Brothers, apparently because of his active involvement in the Transkei opposition politics, especially in campaigns against independence. Subsequently, he was detained under Proclamation R400 functioning exclusively in the Transkei.

Bongani Ncokazi was adamant in his call for a referendum to test the feelings of the Transkeians on the issue of independence, with the belief that most Transkeians would vote against independence. He campaigned as far widely as in the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), calling for African States not to recognise the Transkei as an independent state. He had also called on the Transkei people to heed his warning by boycotting the independence. Mr Ncokazi, although he was participating in these institutions, declared his opposition to the whole system of homelands.

Tracing the history of the Transkei, Mr Ncokazi says in his paper that the policy of Divide and Rule, propagated by Cecil Rhodes, gave birth to the Bantustanisation of the Transkei. He lists resistance and public protests demonstrated by Transkeians notably during the 1960's, when Transkei was given Self-Government. He also mentions the Emergency Regulations under Proclamation R400 which were passed to suppress the insistent protest. Mr Ncokazi furthermore criticises the part played by traditional chiefs "towards driving the people of the Transkei to the quagmire in which they find themselves today".

On the basis of the above facts, Mr Ncokezi cites reasons for complete refusal of independence *inter alia* the retention of the Suppression of Communism Act, Terrorism Act, Immorality Act and Proclamation R400.

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LIKE ALL THE OTHER BANTUSTANS the Transkei originates from the 'Divide and Rule' policy of Cecil Rhodes. The Glen Grey Act of 1894 brought about the United Transkeian Territories General Council (UTTGC). In 1952 the Bantu Authorities Act was passed and in 1957 the UTTGC became the Transkeian Territorial Authority (TTA). It was inaugurated by the then Minister of Native Affairs, Dr H. F. Verwoerd. The people of the Transkei protested against this and as a result some from the Dalindyebo Region were deported to Soekmekaar in the Transvaal and to Qachasnek in Lesotho. In Western Pondoland many people died at the hands of the South African Police because they refused to be fenced in against their will and passionately resented some activities of the chiefs who were being used by the Government through the application of the Bantu Authorities Act. It was because of the strong and relentless protests of the people that the Emergency Regulations under Proclamation R400 were passed.

The Transkeian Territorial Authority was, to the people, the symbol of oppression and the chiefs were regarded as stooges that collaborated with the Government against their political interests. When the present Chief Minister was made Chairman of the Transkeian Territorial Authority the people decided to take up cudgels against him. They believed, and rightly too, that he was out to serve the Government that had been oppressing them for many years in the past. This was the time when all the black people of South Africa united against this man because he was not prepared to capitulate to the forces that were berating Separate Development. As a result of this, many people who were on their way to the Transkei to show their protest against Self-Government, were brutally massacred by the police at Queenstown Railway Station. This incident, of December 1962, occurred because the people were convinced that this man was being used by the Government to further the aims and objects of Separate Development, namely Self-Government of the Transkei. By 1960 the banners of African nationalism, behind which the people had rallied from 1912, had fallen.

*Oh what a fall, what a fall was there my country;  
Then I and you all of us fell down,  
Whilst bloody treason flourished over us:*

Yet even in 1962 the people were still inflexibly determined to be free from the nagging tentacles of racist white power. One thing that

became apparent at this stage was that the people did not hate the chiefs, as such, more than they hated the pernicious ideology that was depriving them of their birthright in their own country. One prominent Paramount Chief led a big demonstration down the streets of Umtata, which was made up of people who were singing anti-self-government songs. Nevertheless the Transkei Constitution Act was passed despite strong protests which left many people widows and orphans. The year 1964 saw the Transkei becoming a Self-Governing territory with a Legislative Assembly of sixty-four chiefs and forty-five elected representatives. According to some members of the Legislative Assembly of that time, the opposition leader won the majority when the Chief Minister was elected by secret ballot, as a result of which Matanzima's followers asked for an adjournment before the counting of ballot papers. This resulted in the dramatic fifty-four to forty-nine defeat for the opposition leader with five spoilt papers.

According to the Transkei Constitution, all motions and bills going through the Transkei Legislative Assembly must be approved and signed by the State President. All the motions that are not palatable to the Republican Government are always opposed by the ruling party in this Assembly. The opposition party moved motions like 'granting of amnesty to political prisoners and exiles' which were rejected by the ruling party on the grounds that those prisoners and exiles were saboteurs and communists. Down the years a clarion call has been made by the Opposition for the total repeal of Proclamation R400. The ruling party has been adamant that those regulations would never be repealed because they protected chiefs and headmen against 'so-called' agitators. The interesting part about this is that only those chiefs who support the Government need this protection and they are the ones who also have government paid guards to look after their homes.

From 1964 to 1965 this Legislative Assembly has been nothing but a glorified Bunga, which popular Paramount Chief Sabatha Dalindyebo once called a 'baboon's parliament'. It was there to serve the purpose of window-dressing the domination of South Africa by white racists. To prove that this Legislative Assembly was a sterile body, a motion to abolish reference books was passed unanimously by this same Assembly in 1969 but up to now all the people of the Transkei are still carrying reference books. Apparently this motion was vetoed by the man in charge of this Assembly who is the South African State President. A serious and dedicated freedom warrior will never sit on those green, revolving chairs of the Transkei Legislative Assembly without being the victim of frustration.

It is important to note the big contribution of the chiefs towards driving the people of the Transkei to the quagmire in which they find

## The Role of Fabians and Liberals

It is important to note that the role of the above in bringing about these Bantustans is quite magnificent by virtue of belonging to the oppressing, ruling class. They are erroneously taken by many to be champions of the black cause whereas they have social economic interest lying in the ruling class. *Through their most powerful news media they have built Bantustan personalities, and thereby shifted the public attention from the Mandelas, Tambos and Sobukwes to these Bantustan leaders who have been approved by the Government.* They have even prevailed on some, to sign declarations of faith in order to cadge up votes for their political parties. They invite these leaders to cocktail parties and also to address their academic meetings. They also cajoled the Government created leaders to accept the fact that these Bantustans have reached the point of no return and that they are irreversible. The now commonly used term of "Homeland" to describe these Bantustans was coined by these amicable-do-gooders. Note what one self proclaimed liberal said in one of his editorials in his paper about the impending Transkei Independence. "Chief Matanzima is pragmatically right, the practical benefits to the Transkei are indisputable. Costly buildings are going up. Pretoria is pumping more money into the territory than it would have done. Chief Matanzima can claim credit for these attainments." (*Daily Dispatch*: 4.10.75)

Even Cecil Rhodes and Verwoerd would not express these sentiments in favour of the Transkei so eloquently. Of course this is now clear that the prime responsibility of these liberals is to condition the oppressed to oppression. In South Africa they build these Bantustan personalities to create the false mental attitude of acceptance of the status quo by the dispossessed masses of South Africa.

## Bantustan Leaders

These are the people who have tacitly and expressly accepted the balkanisation of South Africa into Bantustans by:—

1. Enjoying all the benefits that accrue in the position they hold in these Bantustan Governments and Parliaments.
2. Accepting discriminatory budgets drawn by the white Government to further their nefarious political schemes. (*N.B. all the members of these parliaments are included regardless of which side of the political spectrum they stand because they all constitute these parliaments.*)

These are the people who have decided willingly to put themselves at the service of the Government against the interests of the people. I say willingly purposely because there is no law in South Africa that forces the people to be members of these Parliaments. **To put it bluntly, these people have committed a serious crime against black humanity by operating a toy telephone, a Juggernaut that is**

ation by white managers in these concerns. The misery, grief and frustrations that are evident in these centres are caused by the Transkei Bantustan leader assuring the western industrialists that he will allow no trade unions in the Transkei, and that strikes will be prohibited. This he terms 'a healthy atmosphere for the industrialists'. Besides the exploitation of the workers, the traders and shop-managers who are employed by the XDC are ruthlessly treated and are subjected to unfair conditions when they borrow money from it.

Many jobless people are hard hit by the sky-rocketing prices of food commodities. The majority of the Transkei able-bodied men are in the mines and in other commercial concerns of South Africa. In other words by their sweat and toil they are building modern South Africa. After Independence the Transkei will not adopt socialism in order to cater for the needs of the people, but rather will she continue with the capitalist system that has already shown many signs of decadence in many countries of Africa. In short, under the Transkei Republic the people will suffer more hardships and repressions than they had suffered under the South African Republic.

On the basis of the above facts, I submit therefore, that until the people—by an open referendum—decide otherwise we shall assert, justifiably too, that the Transkei people are against Independence because:—

- (i) Their forefathers and brothers died during the two World Wars defending South Africa against foreign invaders. As a result of that, their relatives are orphans and some are widows because their fathers and husbands died in the wars. They want to be compensated by the granting of full human rights to all their brothers in an undivided South Africa;
- (ii) The people of the Transkei who are so shabbily and callously ill-treated by the South African socio-political system are the self-same people, who have built the South African economy which the government boasts of abroad. They have suffered most as a result of the mine disasters that have riddled this country in the past. They now want the fruits of their labours and compensation, by the granting of human rights, for their sufferings;
- (iii) They want to fight hand in hand with their black brothers for their total liberation from the thralldom of white domination and top-doggism in South Africa;
- (iv) They feel that with the retention of the Suppression of Communism Act, Terrorism Act, Immorality Act and Proclamation R400 they will live in the shadows of death and detention without trial under the charge of Transkei rulers who are morally dead, and they will be subjected to humiliation and ridicule among their fellow South Africans;



- (v) They feel that this independence is being imposed upon them by white racists in pursuit of a policy that has been reducing them to cringing beggars in their own country;
- (vi) They feel that only educated people will benefit from this independence. The ordinary masses who are in the lowest strata of society will continue living below the margin of subsistence;
- (vii) They feel that this will be pseudo-independence because the constitution has been drafted by the Republican Government; and even during self-government they will be governed by the Republican Government through the instrument of the seconded officers;
- (viii) They also feel, and most of the civil servants agree with them, that in government service, promotion does not depend on merit. Instead, only the blue-eyed boys of the seconded officers and loyal supporters and sympathisers of the ruling party are given preference, and they feel things will be worse after independence;
- (ix) They feel that the election machinery has always been geared to favour the ruling party, the whole system being undemocratic in that:
  - (a) Polling officers are government servants;
  - (b) Senior polling officers are senior officers of the government;
  - (c) Chief polling officers are magistrates who are white seconded officials;
  - (d) The chief electoral officer is a seconded officer in the Department of Interior. His word is final, for example, in the Engcobo by-election in 1975, the urban areas' votes were not included. This was ascertained by the candidates themselves who were present when counting took place. They were aware of what they had got from local votes, but to their amazement, only local results were announced, and nothing was said of urban votes. On enquiring from the Chief Electoral Officer the candidates did not get satisfaction. The procedure is that, after counting all the votes for the candidates the Magistrate sends the total figures to the Chief Electoral Officer who is in the Department of Interior in Umtata. The latter adds all the votes from the urban areas to these figures, thereby getting the total votes for each candidate;
- (x) They feel this independence is a 'Matanzima affair' because often only the Matanzima brothers are called to Pretoria behind every body else's backs to iron out certain constitutional differences with the Republican Government.

## Gatsha Mangosuthu Buthelezi

Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, an ex-Fort Hare student, was expelled from the University during the boycott of a Governor-General. He was then a member of the ANC Youth League. Chief Buthelezi proceeded to Natal University where he completed his Bachelor of Arts degree.

After having worked at the Department of Native Affairs, Chief Buthelezi was persuaded to become the tribal chief of the Buthelezi tribe. When Kwa-Zulu was declared a Territorial Authority in 1970 he was put at the head of this territorial authority until he was chosen as the Chief Executive Councillor of the Kwa-Zulu Homeland in 1972 when the territory was given self-rule. Chief Buthelezi had played the prominent role in the resuscitation of the Zulu cultural movement called Inkatha ka-Zulu (which name was later changed to Inkatha ye-Sizwe) in 1975. This movement, with a predominant following in the Kwa-Zulu homeland, is geared towards uniting all Blacks in a liberation movement. It nevertheless uses the Kwa-Zulu Legislative Assembly as the platform from which, as he says, "to spread its gospel of articulating the position of Blacks in the country, to formulate resolutions and to seek answers to their questions towards the liberation of a black man in the country". The Inkatha constitution is centred around Zuluism but all other black groups are welcome to affiliate. Provisions in the Kwa-Zulu Legislative Assembly are made that no member can be elected into the Assembly unless he is a member of Inkatha and also a Zulu. The former statement gives priority to Inkatha members while the latter renders a tribalistic tinge hence subscribing to the separate development.

However, Chief Buthelezi has always publicly attacked the apartheid policy of the South African Government which resulted in the establishment of the independence in homeland which he regarded as the balkanization of South Africa. Chief Buthelezi's homeland had consistently refused to have general elections conducted in his area until all Zulus had been issued with citizenship cards and not reference books, and the territory was consolidated. However, it has been recently reported by the Commissioner-General of the Zulus, that by next February Kwa-Zulu would become self-governing and elections would be held before the end of 1977, which statement was refuted by Chief Gatsha.

Kwa-Zulu rejects independence until the territory is consolidated into a whole, not the ten separate pieces. Chief Gatsha asked (*Rand Daily Mail* 28 December 1975) "Is independence worth the price of cutting ourselves off from all main resources of our country?" In his paper which follows, Chief Buthelezi attacks the formation of the homelands "Reserves" which he says, "were remnants of an ethnic framework of administration which existed before our people were annihilated through the barrel of the gun." He adds that these Reserves were however insufficient for habitation by all Africans and yet authorities passed the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act which dispossessed Africans of most of their land. It is on the basis of this insufficient land quota that Chief Buthelezi rejects independence. He refers back to the 1974 Summit meeting by all Homeland leaders where they resolved to deal with black problems en bloc and not as Zulus, Sothos, Tswanas, etc, and the subsequent negotiations by Chief Matanzima with the South African Government for an independence of the Transkei surprised them all.

Chief Buthelezi submits that he is in favour of a federation of all these homelands into a "Multi-national State of South Africa." He justifies his involvement in Separate Development saying that he would have been involved in the leadership whether there was Separate Development or not.

Concluding his paper Chief Gatsha says, "It is not a condemnation of my brothers in the Transkei who are in the leadership for me to state that I view the eminent independence of the Transkei with mixed feeling and gloomy foreboding for black liberation in general."

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THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT of the Transkei and the machinery that has made this possible cannot just be dismissed for ideological reasons. The Transkei, as much as the other so-called Homeland areas, was by-passed by development in order to promote the migratory labour system, so that our people could be pawns in their economic strangulation and exploitation.

The truth of the matter is that the 'Reserves' (for that's what Homelands are) were remnants of an ethnic framework of administration which existed before our people were annihilated through the barrel of the gun.

We all know that the former foes, viz: the Boers and Britons, decided to seal a political marriage of convenience and formed the Union of South Africa. We were not participants in this historic political marriage of convenience between the former enemies. One would not have quarrelled with that had Africans not been drawn into this

Union willy-nilly without any consultation whatsoever. They were drawn into it just as animals in the game reserves are in it without participating in making any decision.

The intentions of the oppressors were soon quite clear when they decided to pass the Native Land Act of 1913, which put a legal seal on the dispossession of the African people. The 1936 Native Trust and Land Act consolidated that dispossession. The only silver lining was an admission by the powers-that-be that the 'Reserves' were not adequate for the African population groups, and as an admission of this, a quota of land was promised to be added to the Reserves as they existed at the time. It is the measure of white greed that after 40 years this quota of land has not been fully delivered to the African population.

The Nationalist Government has for the last 28 years been telling the world that they want 'Apartheid', a consequence of which would be the setting up of separate states for the African people on ethnic lines. The contradiction comes with reluctance to release more land to Africans beyond the 1936 quota. This has been imposed on Africans despite the fact that Africans had in 1912 decided in Bloemfontein to form the African National Congress. This meant that Africans had, after their rejection from the all-white 'Nation', decided to pursue one common destiny as Africans. This was not a pretence that there were no longer Africans who are Sotho-speaking, Tswana-speaking, Xhosa-speaking, Venda-speaking, Zulu-speaking or Shangaan-speaking. But these ethnic divisions ceased to be barriers in the pursuance of one common brotherhood and the Ubuntu or Botho ideal, which all African groups accept as their philosophy. Our African brothers in Zambia, perhaps for want of a better English term, call this philosophy 'Humanism'.

The implication of this unity was that there was one common black struggle for liberation. This was articulated by black leadership in organisations such as the African National Congress, the Non-European Unity Movement, and later on by the Pan-African Congress. I will not go into the history of how these organizations waged the struggle for all Blacks until they were all banned.

The Nationalist Government likes to pretend to the world that Africans prefer being Zulus or Xhosas, etc, than being Africans. This is part of their propaganda in promoting their imposed policies. Thus the ruse that has unfortunately succeeded, that those of us who, because we are left without any choice, still operate within the structures created by their policies 'accept the system'. Some of us have been in the hereditary traditional leadership of our people at local level long before the concept of 'Homelands' ever saw the light of day. The failure to recognize this fact makes many people bundle all of us together as people who 'accept the system', when this is far from being true of all of us. There was always indigenous local government in our society, for example the Bunga system in the Transkei and the Monarchy

in KwaZulu. The Bunga-system never took root in kwaZulu and other Reserves, but there was still some local form of government even in these areas, based on the system of chieftainship, which is an African institution, a fact now masked by the extent to which the colonial imperialists have used the institution over many decades for their own ends.

After the mopping up operations following Sharpeville in 1960 there was a complete lull in African political activity. Ironically African politics was revived through this system of 'Homelands' which Africans have never really accepted although we are involved in it willy-nilly.

We all thought that 1973 marked a watershed when leaders from all these areas called 'Homelands' met at Umtata in September and repeated their commitment to the 1912 Bloemfontein ideal. These areas were acceptable at most as units of one multi-National Federal State of South Africa. At that time it seemed possible that 'Homelands' could be used as bases for moving towards black unity than as bases to promote black disunity. Even on that historic day the leaders who met at Umtata, were concerned about rumours of the looming Transkeian Independence. They questioned the Chief Minister of the Transkei, who denied that this was in the offing at all, to the relief of his colleagues.

At Umtata, the leaders had stressed that black oppression had nothing to do with being Xhosa, Sotho, Tswana, Venda, Shangaan, Pedi or Zulu. They decided in future to request, not separate meetings with the Prime Minister, but one conference where they would all deal with black problems, not on an ethnic basis. The first such meeting was held on the 6 March 1974.

It was however, not very long after this, when we read newspaper reports about joint meetings between the Prime Minister and the Chief Minister of the Transkei on the independence of the Transkei, and joint communiques were issued by the Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, and the Chief Minister of the Transkei, Paramount Chief Matanzima. In November 1974 there was a meeting of leaders which was held at the Holiday Inn in Johannesburg. At this meeting, Paramount Chief Matanzima was questioned by his colleagues on what was reported of these contacts in the light of his denial at Umtata in November 1973. The Chief Minister stated that his people wanted independence. When asked whether he would get confirmation of the people's support for independence through a referendum, he said that he would not use a referendum to gauge the people's feelings. Instead, he stated that he would find out the feelings of his people through regional authorities, tribal authorities, associations of teachers, ministers, lawyers' etc. When asked: What if 80 per cent of these bodies rejected independence? The Paramount Chief said curtly: "That would be a matter for the Transkei". No one could pursue the matter after that. The person who was more angry than all of us about the Chief Minister of the Transkei's failure to take us into his confidence, was the Chief Minister of

Bophuthatswana, Chief L. M. Mangope. It seems ironical, that he has himself without taking anyone of us into his confidence decided to negotiate for an independent Bophuthatswana.

I cannot say more than that the imminent 'independence' of these areas is cause for great agony in the hearts of many an African patriot. One must not give the impression that our brothers are not great patriots in their own rights. But if we look back at the Bloemfontein commitment in 1912 and the whole struggle I have referred to up to the Umtata Conference in September 1973, there is every reason for such agony.

One does not want to adopt a judgemental stance as to what this independence will mean; it would be impolitic to do so at this point in time. But one can describe the pain of watching the glee in Nationalist circles, emanating from the feeling that they can now get away easily by saying that they are sincere about their policies, which to say the least are aimed at robbing black people of their birthright as South Africans. They are meant to make us foreigners in our only Homeland, which is South Africa. They are meant to rob us of any share in the wealth which black people have helped to produce over generations. This policy is meant to hoard 87 per cent of South Africa for about 20 per cent of the population. This policy is meant to fob off 13 per cent of the land to about 80 per cent of the population. The inequity and injustice of it stares one in the face to such an extent that one wonders what coming generations will think of this whole operation.

When African leaders reached consensus on the federal formula, it seemed at the time that all accepted that South Africa must always exist and remain as one country; that at most the former ethnic territories or as they later became, the 'Reserves' could, if properly consolidated, be units of one multi-National State of South Africa. This was a compromise solution, and the only way of avoiding the deliberate balkanisation of South Africa.

At present the finance from the South African Parliament which makes up our budgets, goes to make up as much as 80 per cent of the entire budget of some of these governments, the balance of the budget coming from African sources through taxes, etc. One wonders to what extent the independence that the Nationalists offer, is authentic 'independence', if they look as if they will hold the purse strings of a 'country', and hold it to ransom if they so desire. This is one of the things that worry me, quite apart from the principle of the white minority imposing this formula on the black majority, unilaterally.

These areas need intensive economic development, and the development that has taken place in the Transkei, for example, is a plausible development. In fact I think it is most responsible for those of us who live with our people in these areas, not to abandon them. Although the policy of Apartheid is abhorrent to us as to any other African, it must be realised that some of us who are involved in the leadership here would

have been so involved whether there was Separate Development or not. In other words whilst it might be true of some of the leaders who have emerged from the implementation of these policies that they were a creation of these policies, it is far from being true of all of us. For example few people would appreciate, in the fog of controversy, that is generated by this subject, that I was involved in the traditional leadership of the Zulus, at both tribal and at the level of the entire Zulu people for 16 years, some of which were years of resistance against the system, until it was made mandatory. Maybe I have digressed here, but these are just reminders, for many of the people who pontificate simplistically, were still too young to appreciate that.

They would not know for example that as members of the African National Congress Youth League at Fort Hare we were organised by our Chairman, Mr. Mangaliso Sobukwe, to go to Alice to pay our respects to the present Chief Minister of the Transkei, who was on his way to Grahamstown, to receive his law medal. They would not know that amongst the people who persuaded me, for example to take up my traditional hereditary Chieftanship were leaders such as Walter Sisulu, Chief A. J. Luthuli, Nelson Mandela and Joe Matthews. Involvement in 'Homelands policies' is a consequence of that hereditary leadership. I am not by doing so, defending Separate Development as such.

My last point is that the destiny of black people is one. By accepting the federal proposal, I thought we were salvaging what remained of that commitment to this view. It seems difficult to entrust our brothers and sisters to the wiles of men who have oppressed us for so long, in return for 'independence'. Let us look at certain statistics. The population growth in these areas is more than 3 per cent, and the number of Africans who need jobs has been estimated in the whole of South Africa at 120,000 this year alone. It is further estimated that 60,000 workers will be absorbed through normal growth in the South African economy. Another 60,000 will have to be supplied with job opportunities in these so-called Homeland areas, each year.

One wonders that if 'independence' becomes a fact, to what extent we can ensure that our people will not continue to be exploited as at present as 'guest workers' in 'white South Africa'. Must they be their *chateaux ad infinitum*? If we deny this, to what extent do they treat citizens of the former High Commission-Territories, Mozambique and Malawi, differently from those of us who are in the Republic? These are questions that bother me a lot. Are these the prices Africans are prepared to pay for 'independence'?

In the past, when Africans needed houses at those townships we control, we in kwaZulu gave instructions that our brothers be not discriminated against for reasons of ethnic affliction. How does one continue to do this, once they become passport-holding foreigners? Just recently, we have exchanged correspondence with the Chief Minister of the Transkei, because some mischievous Port Natal Bantu

Administration Board officials, have tried to create some ill-feeling between us. Every school child will know that I have no control over who is allowed to seek employment in the Port Natal area or elsewhere, under influx control regulations, and yet these officials are spreading propaganda that Transkeians can no longer be taken, and that I or the kwaZulu Government forbade it. This is of course a blatant lie. To what extent will they exploit such untruths when the Transkeians become foreigners?

I have said that I do not wish to pass judgement on this issue, but I have attempted to voice my worries and misgivings. It is not a condemnation of my brothers in the Transkei who are in the leadership, for me to state that I view the imminent independence of the Transkei with mixed feelings and gloomy forebodings for black liberation in general.



## Justice T. Mabandla

Chief Justice Mabandla is the former Chief Minister of the Ciskei homeland and the leader of the Ciskei National Party (Imbokotho Emnyama) who was deposed in the 1973 elections by a commoner (now a chief) Lennox L. Sebe of the Ciskei National Independence Party. He stays in Alice and is the Chief of the Amabele tribe in the Victoria East division.

He has been the chief propagator of the policy of the Ciskei National Party (CNP) that of non-racialism. Chief Mabandla gives a brief outline of his Party's policy as an introduction to his paper on Transkei independence. The basic premise from which Chief Mabandla bases his argument is "Transkei independence is a product of this fragmentation." He attributes the homeland independence political philosophy to "the wisdom of the National Party." He quotes statements made by various white people which motivated for the birth of the separate development where Whites said, "We shall not allow a situation to develop in this country where Whites will be swamped by black masses."

Chief Mabandla's paper bears the form of questions and answers which centre mainly around the authenticity of an independent Transkei, its future and possible international recognition.

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AS LEADER of the Ciskei National Party (Imbokotho Emnyama), the official opposition party in the Ciskei Legislative Assembly, it is by now public knowledge in political circles that I subscribe to a policy of non-racialism, which is contrary to the policy of the National Party of the Republic of South Africa. My policy, therefore, envisages a South Africa which is a single state, a South Africa of a single nation, wherein colour, tribal and racial considerations do not enter into the constitution and the statutes of the country. My policy stipulates equality for all the citizens of South Africa. The Nationalists, on the other hand, are committed to a policy of multi-nationalism, by which South Africa shall be fragmented into:

- (i) A single republic of all the 'Whites' while in fact they belong to many national origins;
- (ii) A number of independent Bantustans each inhabited by 'citizens' of that particular ethnic group, e.g. Zulus, Tswanas, Sothos, etc.

Transkei Independence is a product of this fragmentation.

While there is no common ground between my policy and that of the Nationalist Government, I shall endeavour to deal with the subject of this paper as objectively as it is humanly possible.

I shall present my views in the form of question and reply.

(a) Is Transkei Independence in line with official Nationalist policy of separate development or is it the intention of official Nationalist policy that Bantustans shall become independent sovereign states? Admittedly separatism between White and Black has been the way of life in South Africa for centuries, regardless of which political party was in power. The white Parliamentary sessions have always been confronted with the 'Native Problem'. But Homeland Independence as a political philosophy, found its way into South African Parliament through the wisdom of the National Party.

It is significant to observe that this policy was declared at a time when African states in the North were gaining freedom from British or French colonialism one after the other; at a time when the echo of 'uhuru' was producing chills down the spine of every white minority group enjoying power over black masses; at a time when the famous 'winds of change' speech caused genuine fear among the Whites of South Africa. This was at the time when the utterances and actions of the PAC and the ANC of those days were becoming more and more purposeful and effective by the day.

In this political climate the writing was on the wall for the Whites in South Africa, and urgent thinking was called for. From Government benches in Parliament, at National Party rallies and congresses right across the country, came forth such statements: "We shall not allow a situation to develop in this country where Whites will be swamped by black masses. We shall protect the prosperity of this country by all the means at our disposal; we shall not allow communistic tendencies to destroy all we have accumulated over the years", etc., etc. Out came the policy of Separate Development. In the light of this exposition, would it be unreasonable to come to the conclusion that the policy of Transkei Independence was couched in a moment of panic; that it was devised for expediency? It was rushed in to bargain for time. It would therefore be grossly naive to believe that the intention of official Nationalist policy has ever been that the Transkei should graduate to full independence. I wonder if it was not a slip of the tongue when the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr M. C. Botha, said that the independence of Bantu Homelands should not be viewed in the context of independence in international terms. (It will be remembered that this

was said just after the Homeland leaders' meeting in Johannesburg had decided not to accept independence before a satisfactory consolidation plan). I re-iterate that Transkei Independence is not in line with official policy.

(b) Supposing the answer to (a) was 'yes', what obstacles must make the implementation of Transkei Independence difficult? Entirely for the sake of argument I must accept that it is genuine Nationalist policy that Transkei Independence shall be a reality. I must also assume that this will be independence within the context of international politics. Independence over a specified area of land and sea, and within a well defined air space. At this point in time such independence for the Transkei has major obstacles.

The Transkei has been part of South Africa for too long to be easily extricated. The national road system and other roads, the air routes, the railway system, the postal and telephonic system, the state security organisation and innumerable other facets are too interwoven to be subdivided within a century. Every so often the Chief Minister of the Transkei, Chief K. D. Matanzima, has expressed the submission that the Transkei is inseparable from the Republic of South Africa and that whatever befalls the Republic must have a bearing on the Transkei. The solution in compact association of such dimensions will be for the two independent states to have entrenched in their respective constitutions formal treaties, binding them together in all sorts of ways. My view is that there will be so many of these treaties that Transkei Independence in the concept of international politics will not be acceptable. Another major obstacle to Transkei Independence is that there appears to be no means of self-sufficiency in the Transkei. Economically the Transkei has hardly any resources to be viable. Many of the fanatics of Bantustan politics have tended to gloss over this drawback by saying that economic viability is no pre-requisite for independence. "Lesotho and many other independent African states are heavily dependent on other countries". I shall not enter this line of baby talk. What independent state can hope to depend on finding employment for over threequarters of its able-bodied men in another state? This is most ludicrous.

(c) What are the potential dangers of a Transkei Independence? And what is the likely reaction of the Nationalist Government to such dangers?

Once again, for the sake of argument, I must assume that Transkei Independence was originally intended to be achieved. What next? I want to base my reply to this question on recent events in Angola and also on the desire of a future independent Transkei to gain international recognition.

In Angola some domestic squabble between the MPLA on the one hand and the FNLA and UNITA on the other, developed into magnitudes beyond all predictions. Consequently real communism reached the doorstep of South Africa. Russia and Cuba came to

the rescue of the MPLA, and it is common assumption that Russia is itching to gain a foothold into South West Africa and ultimately into South Africa. Would it be unrealistic to imagine some domestic squabble between an independent Transkei and its opposition? Naturally one of the two will call on South Africa for military assistance. It is just as natural that the other will invite an 'unfriendly' country for help, which could be China, Uganda or even Russia.

It gives me ulcers to imagine a situation like this. I see nothing far-fetched in this piece of geometry.

Intellect-wise, Mr B. J. Vorster is too well equipped to lose sight of this potential danger, with the Broederbond and the BOSS giving him advice. I bet there will be no Transkei Independence. What Whites would want "all we have accumulated over centuries to be destroyed by communists overnight"?

Surely an independent Transkei will not be happy to be isolated. They will do all in their power to gain international recognition. Who wouldn't? Yet it has come loud and clear that the UNO will not give recognition to independent Bantustans. The British Government has said it too. Who would expect an independent Transkei to sit back and do nothing about this deep-freeze position?

What would they do?

Again I must base my prognostications on the situation in Angola. Once South Africa got involved, to whatever extent, the Western powers, the United States of America in particular, became shy to be associated with South Africa in the Angola war. Who would guarantee that an independent Transkei will not be shy to be associated with South Africa when the Transkei desperately wants international recognition? Yes, almost every other day, Chief Matanzima tells the world that the Transkei and the Republic of South Africa will always be on friendly terms, will always be interdependent. Will he say the same when faced with the realities of independence? I wonder in the light of such possibilities, if the authors of independent "Bantu Homelands" are not bound to revise their ideas about Transkei Independence. What the outcome of the dilemma facing the Nationalists will be is very difficult to predict.

(d) Should Transkei Independence become a reality, will it last?

I make bold to say that Transkei Independence will not last long or will collapse even if the Nationalists are honest and sincere about its implementation. Why?

- (i) All the white opposition parties in South Africa are against the policy of Separate Development as defined by the National Party. (What each one feels would be right. 'Native' policy is not relevant to the point at issue.) That the two opposition parties in Parliament have expressed support for the Bill geared to push the Transkei over the last bridge to independence, is a political gimmick on a subject that is somewhat sticky at its present

phase. (They have come to realise that the matter has got out of hand. "Transkei Independence is a foregone matter, it would be wise to be on friendly terms with the Transkei.")

- (ii) Many of the Nationalists are against certain aspects of Homeland independence, and yet these add up to the logical conclusion of the entire policy. For this reason the Government now and again has had to be very cautious, and it has had to give in to the cry of its supporters. There is abundant evidence of this on the question of land consolidation, and more will be heard on the subject of Transkeian citizens within the Republic. In short, even among the Nationalists' fold there is no unanimity on the wholesome implementation of Homeland independence.
- (iii) The OAU, the UNO, the friendly and unfriendly states the world over are opposed to Transkei Independence. The most favourable attitude may be from a few friendly states who are only sceptical.
- (iv) Within the Transkei itself the issue is not that decisive: Opposition policy has no accommodation for Homeland independence. Chief Matanzima is also not convincing on this subject. His declared stand has been "you must take what you get, and use it to get what you want". The most significant point is that Chief Matanzima wants a non-racial Independent Transkei, and this is diametrically opposed to Homeland independence as envisaged by the Nationalist Government, which happens to be the donor of Transkei Independence.
- (v) The most deadly aspect of my argument is the fact that Transkeian public opinion on Transkei Independence has not been tested; it still remains an unknown factor. Firstly, the idea of Homeland independence was presented to the Blacks at a time when black political organisations of the day were banned, when their leaders were being arrested or silenced in one way or another. This trend had to instil fear among those inclined to oppose the Government. Secondly, throughout all phases of self government in the Transkei the restrictive Proclamation R400 has been in operation. This may have had the effect to mute an eloquent opposition to the wishes of Government. It is my firm belief that silent or suppressed opposition is potentially more dangerous than all that is heard and known. Further, opposition cannot be suppressed indefinitely.

I am not aware of any bit of evidence to indicate that all of the ruling party really knows what Transkei Independence is all about. I can come to no other conclusion but that Transkei Independence will not last, if by some miracle it does take off.

- (e) Has any good come out of the Nationalist Government's policy

of Transkei Independence? One may ask, can any bit of good come out of a bad whole? My answer is an emphatic yes. Before I attempt to answer this last question I must make it clear that all I have said so far is a direct pointer to one conclusion that the whole exercise of Separate Development or the independence of the Bantustans is but a passing phase, it constitutes a transitional stage in the political history of South Africa. I shall deal with this question within the context of this belief.

- (i) Once the political organisations of the '50s had been banned and the leaders silenced, an awkward vacuum was created. White South Africa and the world would no more be told what the Black wanted and what they did not want. The policy of Transkei Independence has provided a sound-box out of which African opinion could still be heard without the risk of arrest or banning. Some of the utterances of the likes of K. Guzana, L. L. Mgudlwa, Ncokezi, etc, would have landed them into house-arrest outside of Homeland politics. Then a by-product of this has been the invaluable education it has given to black masses in the Transkei. There is today better political awareness even in the most remote rural surroundings than could have been achieved without any sort of a political platform. This in my view, provides good ground for any future political dispensation in South Africa when Bantustan politics are no more. In the context of my argument I must say at this point that I am emphatically opposed to the idea of non-participation in Homeland politics. Without an audience, and without a massive following of the black masses, black aspirations are grossly stunted.
- (ii) While the Nationalists are pushing ahead preparing the citizens of the territory for Transkei Independence, Blacks in the Transkei have found themselves in political and administrative control of Whites. We have today Blacks who are conversant with the terminology of Parliament and with rules of procedure therein; we have today black civil servants at the highest strata of administration and judiciary; millions of our people today have an idea of the course followed in a general election. Such achievements may be devoid of drama and may not be very spectacular, yet they are of tremendous value in introducing our people into generally accepted concepts of politics and administration.
- (iii) Decentralisation of administration has resulted in a faster development of black areas. A Transkei Department of Finance, of Interior, of Education, of Works, of Justice, etc, had to do much better than Pretoria in full control of black interests all over South Africa and South West Africa. I am not in the least suggesting that the position is satisfactory. What cannot be disputed with any justification is that a budget of the Transkei allocated to seven departments is more effective than sums of

money given to a Bantu Affairs Commissioner in charge of all black administration and development within the district of his jurisdiction, or to a Regional Director responsible for all educational affairs in the whole Province. One may feel inclined to say that these 'good' things are minor in the light of broader political aspirations of the black man in South Africa. I say not so. Nothing can be minor as to be useless to the Blacks who have been rendered dwarfs in all that matters in South Africa. In this period of a political vacuum, my submission is that these good things are of great value, as they constitute a very necessary infra-structure for a future South Africa of a single nation.

Lastly I must point out that the Nationalist Government also derives benefit from the situation created by Homeland politics.

- (i) It is tremendous relief to the real Minister in Pretoria when the masses of Blacks will direct their complaints against a Homeland 'Minister', e.g. when teachers' salaries are delayed by as much as six or eight months; when examination results will not be known until a week or a few days before the schools reopen; when there is a shortage of classroom accommodation; when some opposition party supporter has been issued with banishment orders; when there is decrease in the disability grant without due notice; when there is no free education for the children, etc., etc.
- (ii) It is welcome relief to Pretoria when a black 'Leader' can tell the world "you must not interfere in the domestic affairs of our peaceful South Africa"; or "Blacks in South Africa are much better off compared with Blacks in some poverty-stricken African states", or "the world will see how we achieve independence without a drop of blood", or "in the event of trouble, our Homeland will fight side by side with the Republic", or "foreign industrialists are invited to South Africa". It makes a world of difference and it may create a certain amount of confusion when the Blacks themselves make such utterances to the world audiences, often a hostile or sceptical audience.

Whilst saying all I have said I am not unmindful of all the activities which point to the official declaration of Transkei Independence in October 1976. The world is looking forward with mixed feelings to the fulfilment of this controversial philosophy. Yes, the day will come and go. Let us wait and see.

## Hlaku Kenneth Rachidi

Hlaku Rachidi completed his schooling at Sekitla High School in Hammanskraal. He was then admitted to the University of Fort Hare to study for a Bachelor of Commerce degree, which he could not complete in the wake of the 1968 strike. He then enrolled with the University of South Africa to proceed with his B.Comm. and by that time he was actively involved in the University Christian Movement.

Mr Rachidi was one of the spearheads of the Black People's Convention in 1971 and 1972. He played an active role in 1974 during the post-Frelimo period after almost all the Black People's Convention leaders were arrested. Mr Rachidi resuscitated the Black People's Convention in his capacity as the Secretary-General. He worked hard through thick and thin until the BPC National Conference in King William's Town in December 1975, where he was unanimously voted into the position of President. As the President, Mr Rachidi worked conscientiously and with conviction until 13 July 1976 when he was detained under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act.

In his paper Mr Rachidi propagates the Black People's Convention attitude, not only to Transkei independence, but its mother—apartheid which gave birth to separatism. He therefore "condemned the imposition of this unwanted independence, which tended to show a complete disregard of the opinion of the black people in this country".

He strongly condemns any participation in the politics of entrimism which he defined as "participation by a non-ruling class or an oppressed community in inferior political institutions set up to whet their political appetite . . . whilst keeping them away from meaningful seats of political and economic power, within a defined country or social and political order." Mr Rachidi enumerates ways in which architects of Bantustans attempt to prove to the world the authenticity and success of their policy. Mr Rachidi echoes a call to all Blacks in the country to unite in the struggle for "National liberation of Azania".

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IN THE WAKE OF the announcement of the impending Transkei independence, several reactions came from various quarters of the South



African population, many of which—moderate Blacks, moderate Whites, homeland leaders, other white political parties and organised black political groups like the Black People's Convention (BPC)—outrightly condemned the imposition of this unwanted independence, which tended to show a complete disregard of the opinion of the black people in this country.

At a conference of the BPC in King William's Town in December 1975, many grim-faced delegates considered the matter in a debate marked with strong signs of anger, frustration, a feeling of being insulted, and a determination to right what was being made wrong. The resolution adopted there read as follows:

'That this Congress noting:

—the sudden proposed independence of the Transkei in October 1976;

—that this is a cunning manoeuvre by the racist regime of Vorster to give National and International credibility to the abhorrent policy of apartheid, precisely at a time when the process of liberation has shown itself to be inevitable in Africa, and also at a time when the subcontinent has dramatically changed in favour of the struggle for National liberation;

—that the so-called independence is nothing but yet another manoeuvre, to 'legalise' the alienation of the people of the Transkei from the rest of Azania, which is their motherland, so as to give the denial of their rights in Azania a legal and constitutional backing;

—that as the Transkei is preparing for the so called Independence, it is virtually in a state of emergency through laws like Proclamation R400 and the Second Bantu Laws Amendment Act, such that only those movements and individuals who operate within the framework of the abhorred policy of apartheid, are allowed to influence public opinion vis-a-vis the so-called independence;

and further noting

—that Azania is one unitary and indivisible country, Transkei included; that the illegitimate Vorster regime has no right whether moral, constitutional or otherwise of fragmenting the territory of Azania into the so-called homelands;

—that people like Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima and Knowledge Guzana, and all those who participate in the leadership of these so-called homelands, are nothing more than Vorster's prefects and cannot therefore claim to be the authentic voice of the oppressed majority; therefore resolves

—to reject unequivocally the proposed independence of the Transkei;

—to pledge ourselves to working harder towards the solidarity of all people of Azania towards the liberation of **One Indivisible Azania**;

—to inform the world of the black people's attitude towards the so called independence of the Transkei;

—to communicate the contents of this resolution to all parties concerned viz 'Transkei government', the Republic of South Africa and the mass media.

This resolution was clearly indicative of a growing mood amongst black people in South Africa, a mood showing complete signs of impatience with the whole pattern of white domination and arrogance with which, through its apartheid policy, it had begun to so completely control the lives and destinies of individuals and whole communities in South Africa. This rape of people's rights, lives and destinies by a tiny but powerful minority, had been going on for a long time and was now culminating in issues like the independence of the Transkei. The mood was indicative of the fact that black people felt angry, outraged, incensed and insulted at the white arrogance manifested in the claim that all this was being done for them. They were angry at the balkanisation of their country by a reckless minority, who felt so committed to the preservation of 'white' interests as to be completely unaffected by the overwhelming voice, saying 'No.' They were angry at the audacity of white politicians who were clumsily riding rough shod over people's feelings.

Black and white alike. They were outraged by the insensitivity of the minority leadership to the logic of history, as revealed in events all over Southern Africa—Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia. They were incensed at their own powerlessness to stop this process of madness before it is too late, and before it leads to an ugly situation, that constitutes danger to life, limb and property. Finally they felt insulted at the participation in this morass, by sellout tribal 'leaders' who were masquerading under the name of 'homeland leaders', but are in fact nothing more than Vorster's tribal prefects set up by him to make the system work.

The general background to the creation of the Transkei type independence for the so-called homelands was sketched in a Commission report, presented to the same conference. Dealing with the ultimate purpose of these institutions, the Commission stated: "The government created platforms are created for the express purpose of diverting the energy of black people from the true struggle for National liberation to racialist, tribalist and generally divisive political pursuits, which at best keep the real and true goal of total liberation away from the immediate sight and attention of black people and at worst serve to bolster the white racist regime of those who created them . . . . Their creation is aimed at hoodwinking the international community into accepting the racist policy of the white regime, as a sincere programme designed in the interests of the black people. Any participation in these platforms by Blacks can only give credibility to this fraudulence, to the detriment of the black people. They are designed such that those black people who participate in them are the ones who soil their hands by doing the dirty work designed and planned by white racists."

The granting of independence to the Transkei, I would submit, must then be seen as the final stage in the setting for politics of entrism. Entrism is defined as participation by a non-ruling class or an oppressed community in inferior political institutions set up to whet their political appetite, and satisfy their individual vain ambitions, whilst keeping them away from meaningful seats of political and economic power, within a defined country or social and political order. The hallmarks of such politics are that the said inferior political institutions are normally the creation of an essentially oligarchical type of regime, such as we have in the white minority regime in South Africa. These inferior political institutions normally have ill-defined powers, and are steeped in powerlessness whilst showing attractive features such as freedom of speech and guaranteed personal security to those who participate in them. As usual the so-called leadership of these inferior political institutions is given a lot of publicity through the mass media, thus making it apparent that there is reason for their existence.

What is never fully exposed is that with any system of this nature, the oligarchy usually clamps down on authentic expression of the aspirations of the non-ruling class, or oppressed majority by any organised platform other than the inferior political institutions referred to. The purpose is obvious—it is to show up participation in the inferior political institutions as an attractive alternative. Once one allows himself to indulge in politics of entrism, one begins to sink further into the political quagmire. An entrism politician can only proceed along a prescribed path, no matter what right sounding noises he makes in the process. An entrism politician can only oil the machinery meant for his own oppression, no matter what claims he makes to commitment to a broader goal of liberation. An entrism politician can only perpetually flourish in a position subordinate to that of his powerful masters no matter what claims he makes to personal charisma and following.

The South African Government knows its methods best and in designing the inferior political institutions, it places the entrism politician in a position of weakness and within a machinery which can only operate with his cooperation. The ambitious entrism politician can only function within the broad margins allowed him by the oppressor. In the process, the entrism politician can score a lot of personal marks, but on the whole his major function is to sanctify the design of the oppressor before internal and external audiences. Thus in the end he makes the system work and gives international credibility to the nefarious political programmes of the oligarchy. We submit that Paramount Chief Kaizer Daliwonga Matanzima alias 'Chief Minister of the Transkei' and his whole gang of tribal leaders are nothing but entrism politicians.

What then is the specific significance of the Transkei Independence? In the end Transkei Independence cannot be separated from the whole Bantustan policy of the white minority regime. It is a policy born out of fear. The white man is afraid to share, and share completely with a black

man who is heavily in the majority. What is there to be shared? First and foremost, if the two must share alike they have to participate in the same political process which, if allowed to go to its logical conclusion, will inevitably show that the black man is in the majority. Second, and this is most fundamental, the political process cannot be divorced from the economy of the country. Any participation by Blacks in an unrestricted way in the economy of the country, can only result in breaking the stranglehold that a very small white minority is having on the wealth of the country. This would then result in a complete redistribution of the wealth of the country, thereby destroying the very reason for the existence of the oligarchy. Thirdly, through a history of years of propaganda on the need to preserve the purity of the white race, social classes have begun to creep in based on the artificial criterion of colour of the skin, and many Whites are committed to the preservation of this class distinction because of entrenched racial bigotry.

It is then this refusal to share with Blacks which is at the heart of the Bantustan philosophy. Blacks must be pushed off and made so-called citizens of dummy states all around South Africa, to reduce their claim in broader metropolitan South Africa. One notices immediately that this is a sophisticated version of the same 'Native Reserves' created during the Smuts era. The so-called dummy black states now envisaged will have no elaborate industrial infrastructure calculated to give jobs to the millions of Blacks who are supposedly their citizens. Neither are they seriously meant to have this by their white creators because the white man has decided, that although he certainly does not want the black man's vote in the broader metropolitan South Africa, he certainly wants the black man's labour to man the white man's factories, to build for him, to sweep his streets, to make his garden and to care for his babies. Thus migratory labour will eventually be at the heart of the entire relationship between the so-called dummy states and the broader metropolitan South Africa.

It can therefore be seen that in carrying out this type of policy the white minority regime is killing many birds with one stone. In the first instance it is showing the world that Blacks are not completely denied political rights, but instead they are being helped to have their own states set up where they can exercise their own political power. This serves to answer longstanding criticisms levelled at South Africa by the international community to the effect that South Africa is denying its black population the right to participate in the political process. In the second instance, the white minority has made sure that Blacks themselves can lay no claim to any political role in metropolitan South Africa. Evidence for this comes from the twist in the debate over citizenship in the future independent Transkei. All Xhosas and Sothos who have had any form of link with the Transkei are to be compelled to become citizens, whether they like it or not.

It is thus clear now that all these Bantustans are going to follow the same pattern on the citizenship issue and, will be used as dumping grounds for the unwanted black vote. Lastly the Bantustans will serve as convenient labour reservoirs without the other complicating factors arising out of having to recognise the permanence of black labour in metropolitan South Africa. Strange enough this excludes Whites and Coloureds of Transkei origin. There have been varied reactions to the impending independence of the Transkei, throughout the world and also internally. The Organisation of African Unity in its recent summit meeting in Mauritius decided unanimously not to recognise the so-called Transkei state and to recommend to governments throughout the world to react similarly. It is also clear that Western Governments in Washington, London, Bonn, Paris, Brussels, etc. are unlikely to recognise the Transkei, and will allow themselves to be influenced by the OAU and by the banned South African movements—ANC and PAC—which have observer status at the United Nations. Needless to say, none of the Eastern countries are ever likely to recognise the independence of the Transkei. If the Transkei is recognised at all by anybody outside South Africa, it is likely to be by reactionary governments like Rhodesia whose time is running out anyway.

Back at home the two opposition white parties are on record as not having gone along completely with the Nationalists on the Transkei independence issue. The Progressive Reform Party has rejected it outright, whilst the United Party is reportedly characteristically ambivalent on the issue. Other entrust Bantustan politicians on the black side, recognising the criticism to be heaped upon all of them, have rejected the independence question as a sellout on their united stand against independence taken in Umtata in 1973. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi expressed regret that their Transkei brother's decision to go it alone, had broken the black solidarity forged in 1973 at the Umtata meeting, whilst Collins Ramusi of Lebowa bluntly accused the Transkei leader of having betrayed his fellow homeland leaders. In the Transkei itself, Mr Hector Ncokazi, extra-parliamentary leader of the Democratic Party, has also rejected independence, claiming that Matanzima has no mandate from the people to accept this step. He has called for a referendum in the Transkei on the issue, so that the wishes of the people in the Transkei can be reflected.

In all this, the main issue is being missed by those who call for the Transkeian referendum. Transkei is part and parcel of Azania. The territorial integrity of Azania cannot and must not be violated to satisfy mere whims of a minority regime. Land is an important factor, and if any referendum has to be taken at all on whether Transkei should go it alone or not, such a referendum would have to take into account the feelings of all the people of Azania. A minority regime cannot confer authority on a small section of the community to secede, just as Cape Town may not be allowed to declare herself a colony of Germany. When the Transkei

does attain independence, the white minority regime together with the collaborator, Matanzima, shall have committed an unpardonable historical sin of illegally alienating part of our land. Any claims therefore of need for a sectional referendum in the Transkei begs the question. This truth must finally dawn in the minds of the white minority politicians and Matanzima, even as they prepare for their fake independence.

As the international opinion hardens against the Transkei independence, both the System and its collaborators have heightened their propaganda pace, in an attempt to buy favourable reaction to the fake independence. The Minister of Information in the South African Cabinet announced in Parliament that about R1 million would be spent in advertising the independence of the Transkei. In the meantime Dr Eschel Rhoodie, Secretary for the Department, announced more elaborate plans to set the machinery at work and this included a replay of a film comparing the Transkei to other independent states which are already members of the United Nations. Naturally the focal point of all this propaganda would be Western countries.

the collaborators are, of course, also involved in the process. Transkei 'Cabinet Ministers', George Matanzima and Miss Stella Sigcau, have also been globe-trotting in a belated attempt to sell the coming independence to the world. There is no doubt what so ever that luke-warm as the reception of these collaborators may have been, a need yet exists for the world to know that the black people in South Africa completely reject the Bantustan policy and categorically state that any attempt by outside powers to make it work will be seen as calculated political sabotage.

In the wake of the world reaction against the coming independence, Matanzima and Vorster are engaging in political tactics to confuse the situation a bit. They have feigned a quarrel over the citizenship issue with Matanzima taking a 'principled' stand on the matter, and Vorster refusing to withdraw at all from his conservative stand. Matanzima wants the Transkei to determine who the citizens shall be, and Vorster claims the issue is cut and dried. Knowing the magic of the word 'non-racialism' in South Africa, Matanzima claims that Transkei shall be a non-racial state. To crown it all, Matanzima boasts that several South African laws meant for the preservation of white domination are going to be repealed on independence. Some of these are:

the Land Act of 1913, the Urban Areas Act of 1913, the Native Councils Act of 1920, the Colour Bar Act, the Native Representative, Trust and Land Act of 1935, the Urban Areas Consolidated Act of 1945, the Bantu Education Act of 1953, the Job Reservation Act and the Industrial Conciliation Act.

We submit that on all these points Kaiser Matanzima is both deceived and is himself deceiving. In the first instance the so-called citizenship question that Matanzima is now making an issue of was long foreshadowed in the Transkei Constitution Act of 1963. Matanzima has

always known this and has himself conducted several campaigns amongst 'citizens' in Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Johannesburg, some of which points are more than 1 000 kilometres away from the nearest Transkei 'border'. That he is now complaining about the citizenship clause is a mere play on words calculated to show him in a better 'fighting' light. There is no real quarrel with Vorster on this issue. In the second instance the so-called claim that Transkei would be 'non-racial' is made nonsense by the fact that the Vorster regime regards all Whites and Coloureds in the Transkei automatically as South African citizens and with subtle threats discourages any of them from taking up Transkeian citizenship. We also know that the Mixed Marriages Act and the Immorality Act which proscribe inter-marriages and sex across the colour line will be enshrined in the Transkei constitution. What kind of non-racial society is this?

Thirdly all the various so-called 'race' laws to be repealed in the Transkei are either obsolete or redundant because they have served their purpose. The Land Acts no longer apply because land has already been apportioned, the Urban Areas Act is irrelevant in a situation where 'Bantus' alone live, the Bantu Education Act has not been applying for quite a while because of the existence of the Transkei Education. There is no need for the Job Reservation Act because no real competition can be offered by the Transkei infant industry; lastly, the Industrial Conciliation Act, which makes provision for trade unions, worker-management bargaining and legalised strikes, is not wanted in the Transkei by Vorster and Matanzima.

No, we refuse to be deceived by Matanzima. He is nothing but a collaborator. This is why he will not remove from the Transkei statute books, the really significant oppressive laws like the Suppression of Communism Act, the Terrorism Act and of course the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act and the Immorality Act. The Transkei will remain a bantustan, governed distantly by Vorster through the person of Matanzima. Already, so-called draft treaties have been concluded, and are ready to be signed on independence day guaranteeing non-aggression between the two 'countries', solution of problems through negotiation, refusal by each 'country' to have its territory used as a base for attacks against the other, non-alliance with any country at war with the other country, etc. This is the kind of 'independence' that Vorster wants for black people. This is the kind of independence Matanzima has accepted for his people. No sane black man would give any mandate to a leader negotiating on these terms. Hence Matanzima's mandate has been obtained from chiefs who are paid officials of the Nationalist Government. To make the so-called independence, Matanzima really needs Proclamation R400, Suppression of Communism Act, the Terrorism Act and background support from the South African Police and Army.

The architects of the grand apartheid schemes called bantustans must take note of the fact that the Blacks are not deceived. There may

be those Blacks who participate in these schemes for personal gain, and there may be many Blacks who look on silently as the rape of our land continues. In the ultimate analysis all these people have a political soul. Their quest for true humanity and meaningful political participation cannot be satisfied by mere gimmicks. They have had a long patience but ultimately even this must be severely dented. They are not unaware of the changing fortunes in Southern Africa, and they know that in any struggle for liberation from colonial and neo-colonial forces, the aspirations of the legitimate majority must surely be positively realised. The military might of the minority regime and their tight security laws cannot succeed for ever in suppressing the will of the people, numerous prisons and concentration camps will not silence the authentic voice of the majority.

The granting of false independence for the Transkei and for that matter to any other bantustan, is highly a temporal solution to the problems of Azania. It is a futile exercise at a high price in terms of money, manpower, heightened resentment and wasted years in the necessary programme of building proper race relations. Black people want a say in the running of the whole country—their motherland Azania. They reject being camped in arid fragmented pieces of the land comprising 13% of the land whilst 87% is occupied by a minority of the population. Blacks will be satisfied by having a united Azania where every citizen has a right and opportunity to participate in the decision making. Independence of homelands is not for us, but a design against us by the ruling Nationalist Party.