

THE ALFRED AND WINIFRED HOERNLÉ
MEMORIAL LECTURE 1966

“ARE THERE
SOUTH AFRICANS?”

by

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THE ALFRED AND WINIFRED HOERNLÉ MEMORIAL LECTURE

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- 1965 Prof. Gwendolen M. Carter, *Separate Development: The Challenge of the Transkei*

Are There South Africans?

DURING the month of Munich, twenty-eight years ago, Alfred Hoernlé and I got to know each other across a conference table in Australia. When the conference was over, a research task brought me to South Africa. I still retain a vivid memory of the friendship and help which both the Hoernlés gave me throughout the six months of my stay. This evening, I must do my best to deliver a lecture conformable with their standard of scientific and personal integrity. They would have wished me, I think, to lecture upon a South African theme. Yet their knowledge of South Africa possessed a precision and depth which I cannot approach. If they were here this evening, I could tell them nothing about their country that they did not know already. I could only ask them questions. But that, precisely, is our procedure in the academic world: we are all the time asking questions, not to score points against each other but to test our hypotheses; not to establish some case, but to make such progress as we can along the difficult path of knowledge.

The theme of my lecture is expressed in a question: Are there South Africans? You may think this question conspicuously un-academic: indeed, I am bound to confess that a journalist suggested it to me—but what of that? Some journalists possess an eye for the essential which is not invariably the gift of academic persons. The journalist whom I now have in mind is a Natal man, G. H. Calpin, who produced during the second World War a book entitled *There Are No South Africans*. He began by citing the cumbersome language his fellow-countrymen almost always used when they tried to designate themselves as a people: true Afrikaners, good South Africans, English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans or Afrikaners—they seemed incapable of naming themselves without some qualifying adjective or phrase: yet other peoples, such as the British or Germans or French, felt no similar need of adjectival props. Calpin concluded that South Africans were still in doubt and in dispute with each other about

their own identity as a nation—if indeed they were a nation; he saw two nations within the framework of one state.

Only two nations? If Calpin were writing his book today he would have to state his views on the emergent Bantustans. And he would have to face a question which twenty-five years ago did not bother him: Ernest Renan's question, *Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation?* Tonight, I have little time for discussing this question in terms of theory; but I must at least enumerate some elements of nationhood: first, the territory; secondly, the culture; thirdly, the polity; fourthly, the subjective consciousness of nationality—*le plébiscite de tous les jours*, as Renan called it. Among European nations, only the English, French and Spaniards have had the good fortune to possess all those elements of nationhood without having to fight hard for them. Up to the nineteenth century, the Italians and Germans possessed the territorial and cultural elements, but not the political element. Up to the twentieth century that, by and large, was the situation of the Irish.¹ Meanwhile, Jewish national feeling—if 'national' is the right word for it—remained a millennial miracle. The Jews possessed no territory. Linguistically and racially they had become multiform. Yet they remembered Zion. In our own time, they have made Zion the shrine of a Jewish national state.

All this is background. I am trying to spot-light a few concepts which will help me to transmute Calpin's generalised proposition, and my generalised question, into a series of particular questions. In tackling the task, I have found little help from the famous nationalist writers. Mazzini, for example, was not a systematic thinker but an evangelist who took for granted the God-given identity of state and nation and the God-given harmony of national states. He believed that the nations would become a united brotherhood so soon as they could all be sorted out the one from the other. He failed to see how resistant they were to being sorted out. Except in western Europe and a few other favoured regions, the world's nations and potential nations are so mixed up with each other that they cannot all possess their own separate territories and polities. They are compelled

¹ The Irish had almost lost their language, but were none the less insistent upon their separate cultural identity. To them, an Irish national state seemed, among other things, the indispensable instrument of national revival in the cultural sphere.

to look for ways and means of sharing these blessings. For *homo sapiens* as a species, this need is now urgent. Mazzinian fission has become an explosive force in other continents besides Europe. Moreover, it has become coincident in time with nuclear fission. Xenophobic nationalism and the bomb make a dangerous combination.

This last reflection may seem rather off the track of my lecture, but I have wanted to drive home one point: South Africa with her medley of peoples should think twice before committing herself too far to the theory that each nation should have a separate state, or—alternatively—to the theory that nations living in one state should coalesce. The world map shows many examples of the two-nation or multi-national state: Switzerland, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Canada, Soviet Russia—one could easily enlarge the list. In some of these states, most notably Switzerland, the diverse nations lead a stable life together; in others, such as Belgium and Canada, tension seems at present to be on the increase. In any diagnosis of its causes, one would need to examine both the political and the cultural components of nationality. Since Mazzini's day, they have been systematically studied and I ought by rights to spend a little time on them now: for example, I ought to remind you what a slow-growing plant cultural nationality is, until urbanisation and education become its forcing house. But I cannot afford any longer to stay shivering on the brink.

Are there South Africans? I shall put this question in terms successively of law, politics and economics. In doing so, I shall be asking what are the integrative and what the disintegrative elements of South African life. I am aware that these adjectives have acquired emotional and polemical overtones; but I cannot help that. I shall use them as my dictionary prescribes, purely as terms of description. Integration I shall take to mean the combination of elements into a whole; disintegration I shall take to mean the breaking of a whole into fragments or parts.

In law, there *are* South Africans. Your Statute Book confutes Calpin. Act No. 44 of 1949 declares, in effect, that almost every person whom you meet when you walk down the street, whether he be white, black, brown or brindle, is a South African citizen. His passport, if he has one, declares his citizenship to the wide world, no matter what his colour is.

This colour-blind definition of citizenship surprised me at first. A revised definition of nationality, based upon Act No. 40 of 1927, would have served your government's essential purpose: namely, to identify the categories of persons subject to South African jurisdiction. According to juristic theory, the concept of nationality has its roots in the relationship of sovereign and subject: the concept of citizenship, on the other hand, has egalitarian connotations.² On a famous occasion 1,900 years ago, St. Paul made the latter point. Your own Minister of the Interior made it on the 10th June 1949 in his speech on the second reading of the South African Citizenship Bill. 'Citizenship,' he declared, 'not only has duties and responsibilities, but citizenship also consists of a bundle of rights which belong to the proud possessor of South African citizenship. Foremost among those rights is the right of franchise.'³ Somebody might well have interjected: 'Are you including the non-white citizens? If you are, you must give them their bundle of rights. If you are not, you must stop calling them citizens.' To that interjection Dr T. E. Dönges would doubtless have replied that the specific rights of citizenship belong to the *domain réservé* of domestic jurisdiction. In law, that answer would have been correct. In logic, it would have been a *non sequitur* from the statement he had just made about the content of citizenship.

In law, the answer still stands. Although Act No. 48 of 1963 establishes a separate citizenship for the Transkei, Section 7 of the Act makes this citizenship subordinate to South African citizenship. Sub-section (3) reads as follows: 'The Republic shall not regard a citizen of the Transkei as an alien in the Republic

² See Clive Parry, *Nationality and Citizenship Laws of the Commonwealth and of the Republic of Ireland* (London 1957) pp. 3-22. South Africa's Act No. 44 of 1949 was in line with the citizenship legislation of the other Commonwealth Members at that time. It did not, however, contain the common clause, explicitly linking the citizenship of a Commonwealth country with the status of British subject. That link was maintained in practice by other means. cf. *Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg*, Vol. 26 (1963), pp. 44-9: 'A Transkeian Citizen of South African Nationality?', by J.F.H.

³ *House of Assembly Debate, Second Session Tenth Parliament*, col. 7587.

and shall by virtue of his citizenship of a territory forming part of the Republic of South Africa regard him for external purposes in terms of international law as a citizen of the Republic and afford him full protection according to international law.' Transkeians, it is clear, remain just as much South Africans as they ever were.

Nevertheless, the leader of the United Party denounced the Transkeian Constitution Bill as a fatally disintegrative measure. Upon what grounds? So far, upon no good grounds in law. But law follows politics. Can it be true, as the Opposition alleges, that the present political course is disintegrative?

The questions which I shall ask about the integrative or disintegrative trend of politics will have not merely a territorial but also a sociological reference. I shall be trying, so far as I can, to clear my mind first about the politics of colour, secondly about the politics of culture. As a prelude to each inquiry, I shall look quickly at the historical landscape.

For the politics of colour, the Cape's Ordinance No. 50 of 1828 and the Cape franchise of 1853 give a convenient compass-bearing. These measures are integrative in the sense of being colour-blind. Their origins were metropolitan; but recent research has revealed that, for whatever reasons, a low non-racial franchise qualification was favoured by most white inhabitants of the Cape in 1853. For the following eighty-three years, the colour-blind franchise remained a stabilising influence upon the Cape's political life. Leaders in each section of the people—John X. Merriman, F. S. Malan, Abdullah Abdurahman, Davidson Don Jabavu—acclaimed it as a constructive approach to the politics of race. But that is not to say that its principles struck deep root in South African soil. The Voortrekkers repudiated them. So, in a circuitous manner, did English-speaking Natal. So did Lord Milner, Lord Selborne and their expert advisers. So did the white trade unions and the Labour Party. To be sure, most Cape men remained faithful to their principles; but they also

remained steadfast in their resolve never to press those principles to the point of endangering white supremacy.⁴

In consequence of all this, there was never ground for expecting Cape principles to permeate South Africa. The entrenchment of the Cape franchise in the constitution of the Union, although at the time very few Cape men saw it, was the first of a series of rearguard actions. Are there any actions still to be fought in that long campaign?

Or am I asking the wrong question? Military metaphors never quite fit political phenomena. But no more do mathematical metaphors fit them. General Hertzog used to talk about 'solving' the native 'problem'. For example, point 4 of his 1924 election manifesto contained his pledge to produce the solution. Did he produce it? . . . General Smuts believed that no once-for-all solution would ever be found for the innumerable and intolerably complex political, economic and social entanglements of South Africa's diverse races and cultures.

Between the two World Wars the favourite slogan was the one about letting the Natives develop along their own lines. Social anthropology in those days seemed to lend some plausibility to the slogan and General Smuts in South Africa—like Lord Lugard and others in England—made some use of it. However, Smuts outgrew it. Creswell, Madeley and their associates never outgrew it. The naiveté of those Labour stalwarts fascinates me. They asserted over and over again that everything would come right when the blacks were sent back to their own areas. What areas? How many blacks? At what economic cost? They never asked those questions. In consequence, one has to assume that they were bluffing.

The politics of separate territorial development cannot be taken seriously unless and until the politicians start to wrestle with the quantities. General Hertzog played with the quantities in a small way. Twenty years later, Dr. Verwoerd started to wrestle with them. The Tomlinson enquiry of the mid-1950's was a sign that the government meant business. But what kind of business? Areas of Bantu self-government within the unitary South African

⁴ For example, in 1892 James Rose-Innes took the initiative in stiffening the tests for the Cape franchise; in 1930 J. H. Hofmeyr proposed in a Joint Select Committee that Native voters in the Cape should never exceed 10 per cent. of the Provincial electorate.

State? Or areas of sovereign independence outside that state? Which of these two? In an article of March 1959 in *Optima*, the Secretary of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Dr. W. W. M. Eiselen, proclaimed the first objective but repudiated the second. On 20th May 1959, in his speech on the second reading of the Bantu Self-Government Bill, the Prime Minister, Dr. H. F. Verwoerd, repudiated that repudiation. Dr. Eiselen's article, he explained, had been written some months before the government had formulated its new policy. That policy was to promote Bantu self-government all the way to full sovereign independence. The consequence of that would be 'the same kind of situation as exists in Europe'. The Prime Minister did not find that prospect frightening. Common interest, he believed, would hold the separate sovereign states together. Or, if it did not, he would rather have a smaller white state in South Africa capable of fighting for its own survival than a larger state which had already surrendered to Bantu domination.⁵

That statement is definitive. Your government stands committed to the independence of the Bantu 'homelands'. But it does not stand committed to any timetable of independence, or to any programme of ways and means. On 6th March 1963, in his speech on the second reading of the Transkeian Constitution Bill, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. de Wet Nel, managed to say in the same sentence that the Transkei would remain 'for many generations to come', and that it would remain 'always', a part of the Republic of South Africa.⁶ That expectation, as I have discovered during the past five months, is shared by many white South Africans. It expresses or implies the theory of indefinite postponement.

You must forgive my Australian realism. Let me tell you a story of my country. We once had 'our own little Republic'. In 1854, when alluvial gold was running short at Ballarat, the police were hounding the diggers for their licences. The diggers revolted. They set up a flagpole eighty feet high and hoisted their flag, the stars of the Southern Cross on a blue ground. They elected Peter Lalor as 'Commander in Chief of the diggers under arms'. They drilled. They built their legendary Eureka stockade. They

⁵ *House of Assembly Debate*, 19th May 1959, cols. 6214 to 6241.

⁶ *House of Assembly Debate*, 6th March 1963, col. 2240.

were brave men; but inexperienced in war. Before dawn on Sunday the 3rd December 1854, after ten minutes of bloody fighting, their stockade fell to the assault of nearly 400 soldiers and police. A policeman named John King climbed to the top of the flagpole and tore down the flag. But that was not the end of the story. Next year the Colony of Victoria acquired not only a new constitution but also the power to amend that constitution. Responsible government followed almost at once. Victorians took charge of their own police. Peter Lalor, minus one arm, became a Minister of the Crown. In 1900 the new Australian nation adopted without controversy a flag which embodies both the Union Jack and the stars of the Southern Cross.⁷

Today, the Transkeians have their own national flag, not to mention their national anthem. Do they have their own police? At the present time, a police bill is being discussed at Umtata; but Proclamation 400 emanates from Pretoria. Meanwhile, the nominated chiefs, who draw government pay, are holding nearly a 3 to 2 predominance in the Transkeian Legislature. An Australian is bound to notice things like these. It so happens that my government is following in New Guinea more or less the same policy of decolonisation as your government has proclaimed for the Transkei. We in Australia have not, so far as I know, uttered that magic word 'independence'; but when I compare what we are doing with what you are doing in such fields as economic development and education, I feel it a safe bet that the New Guineans will achieve a more substantial independence than the Transkeians will. Of course, I realise the immense differences in the circumstances of our two countries. From one point of view, our task seems easy in comparison with yours. We have only to let slip an adjacent island, but you have to dismember your own body politic, your own soil. From another point of view, you have a flying start over us in the independence race. You have been producing an educated middle class—families like the Jabavus—for more generations than we have been in New Guinea. The Bantu have been in the iron age for more than 1,000 years; but the Papuans are just emerging from the stone age.

⁷ In writing the above paragraph I have been indebted to my colleague Professor K. S. Inglis, a young historian of distinguished achievement who has elected to teach in the new University of New Guinea.

I wonder whether I was not too sardonic just now in my comments on the theory of indefinite postponement. Perhaps it is only a minority of South Africans who fool themselves that way. During his speech of 20th May 1959, Dr. Verwoerd replied as follows to a question thrown at him by Sir de Villiers Graaff:

I say that if it is within the power of the Bantu and if the territories in which he now lives can develop to full independence, it will develop in that way. Neither he nor I will be able to stop it, whether our policy is accepted or whether the policy of the United Party is accepted.

That statement seems realistic. Already we can see black South Africans taking the political initiative. They are proclaiming their own independence timetable. In March 1963 Mr. de Wet Nel said that independence, if ever it came, would not come for generations; but in May 1966 Chief Kaiser Matanzima proclaimed A.D. 2000 as independence year.⁸ He proclaimed it under pressure from Transkeians who are a good deal less patient than he is himself. He has also let it be known that the present territorial definition of the Transkei does not altogether satisfy him. Are we then to expect an irredentist movement? All those hundreds of thousands of Xhosa outside the boundaries! Under the constitution, they are citizens of the Transkei. The Sudeten Germans were never citizens of the Reich. . . . These, I know, are disturbing thoughts; but I have seen some sensational maps of a partitioned South Africa. These maps represent the post-Tomlinson speculations of white South Africans.⁹ Does anybody know the speculations on this subject of black South Africans?

The politics of colour, it seems to me, after their integrative start in the nineteenth century, are now well along the road towards the territorial disintegration of this country. Will you please tell me if I am wrong?

⁸ *Daily Dispatch*, 21st May 1966.

⁹ Mr. Jan de V. Graaff has made the most interesting of these maps. It is based on the concept of a 'demotomic line' and demarcates two areas of majority rule, the one for whites, the other for blacks.

The politics of culture now become my theme. The phrase is not a good one; but it will do no harm provided I tell you what I intend by it. I have nothing to say about the traditional cultures of the Xhosa or the Zulus; I want merely to raise some questions about the two highly self-conscious cultural groups of white people. I could, of course, call each of these groups a nation, as Calpin sometimes does; but that would mean begging my main question: is there or is there not one composite white South African nation?

Indisputably an Afrikaner nation exists. *Afrikanervolkseenheid* is a central theme—some people would say *the* central theme—of the history of this country. After two centuries of acclimatisation to South Africa and of slow, inarticulate growth as a community, Afrikaners leapt forward at one bound to national self-consciousness. It happened round about the 1870's. My choice of the symbolic year, if I had to make a choice, would be 1875, when the Rev. Stephanus Jacobus du Toit of Paarl founded *Die Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners* and its newspaper *Di Patriot*. An Afrikaans grammar followed the next year, an Afrikaans school reader two years later. In the meantime, S. J. du Toit was writing the first history book in Afrikaans, *Die Geskiedenis van Ons Land in die Taal van Ons Volk*. Linguistic self-assertion, Calvinist theology, republican aspiration, the mythology of Slagter's Nek dressed up as history, journalistic propaganda, a programme for the schools—du Toit in his own person embodied all those elements of the Afrikaner cultural resistance movement. It had a close coincidence in time with the Transvaal's political resistance movement. For du Toit, the Transvaal became a magnet. After Majuba, he went north to found Christian National Education.

A generation later, the same battles had to be fought a second time against Lord Milner. Fighting them became a habit. Other countries have had the same experience. In the history of every nationalist movement that I have studied, a time can be identified when the defenders became the aggressors. Has the same thing happened here?

I have been reading recently Professor van Jaarsveld's critical studies of what I shall call the S. J. du Toit period of Afrikaner

nationalism.¹⁰ Professor van Jaarsveld destroys many myths but perpetuates the central myth. At least, that is how I interpret him. He records an Afrikaner monologue. But surely there was a dialogue? Du Toit's voice was not the only one raised among Cape Afrikaners in the 1870's and 1880's. There was a more influential voice. Du Toit founded the Afrikaner Bond; but J. H. Hofmeyr took possession of it.¹¹ Hofmeyr made the Bond his instrument for achieving linguistic and cultural equality between the two sections of the European population. What was more, he made it his instrument for achieving a partnership between the two peoples. That was a broader purpose than any that du Toit envisaged. The confrontation of du Toit and Hofmeyr became a contest between two conceptions of nationhood: on the one side, *Afrikanervolkseenheid*; on the other side, *Suid-Afrikaanse Volkseenheid*.

This contest continued for the next half century and more. Perhaps its most tragic episodes were General Hertzog's exclusion or self-exclusion in 1938 from the Voortrekker celebrations and in 1941 from the Herenigde Nasionale Party. How and why those things happened would be stories worth telling. But my task now is to follow the du Toit-Hofmeyr contest right up to present times. Does the contest still continue? Or has *Afrikanervolkseenheid* delivered its knock-out blow? Does anything survive of the old *Suid-Afrikaanse Volkseenheid*? If not, what future has the English culture in this country?

Nationalist Afrikanerdom, in the far-off days of its cultural resistance movement, built a hard shell around itself. Today it no longer needs that shell; but it still clings to it. For example, it still retains in all essentials the programme of child education which the Rev. S. J. du Toit formulated nearly a century ago. General Hertzog's unforgiveable sin, I sometimes think, was to have made himself the champion of bilingual schools. How many of them still survive in the Transvaal? From the strictly educational point of view they were stimulating to young intelligences.

¹⁰ See especially F. A. van Jaarsveld, *The Awakening of Afrikaner Nationalism 1868-81* (Cape Town 1961).

¹¹ In comparison with Hofmeyr, du Toit lacked steadfastness. He ended his political career after the Jameson Raid in Rhodes's camp.

That truth was demonstrated in the 1930's by dispassionate educational research.¹² Nevertheless, nationalist Afrikanerdom felt the urge to segregate its children from non-Afrikaner influences. The urge found expression in the parliamentary debates of 1943, which I have had occasion to study. I have not had occasion to study the final assault on bilingual education but I can observe its consequence: the erection of a wall which makes it impossible for Afrikaner and English-speaking children even to play together. What separate versions of their country's history the separate sections of children learn, I do not know.¹³ Presumably, they resemble the separate versions which the S.A.B.C. offers to the separate radio audiences. It so happens that I was invited after my arrival here to contribute to the radio programme on General Smuts. Subsequently, I decided to listen both to the English and Afrikaans versions of that programme and of some other programmes in the same series. Because I have an unpractised ear for Afrikaans, I organised a small listening party divided 50-50 between the two language groups. We all found this exercise informative. To mention one example only: the English version of the Botha story was more or less a distillation of Dr. Engelenburg's book. But the Afrikaans version? You will get some idea of what it was like if you can imagine Dr. Goebbels calling a meeting of the best radio actors and the best producers in Germany and telling them, 'Go to it boys! I want a programme on Winston Churchill'.

These phenomena fascinate me.¹⁴ I cannot discuss them this evening at any length; but the programme on Louis Botha comes right into the middle of my present inquiry. Botha did in South Africa what Laurier did in Canada: he created a party which brought the two language groups together. On the premises of *Suid-Afrikaanse Volkseenheid*, that was both a practical and a patriotic thing to do; but on the premises of *Afrikanervolkseenheid* it branded Botha as a *renegaat*, a *volksvreemde Afrikaner*, a traitor to his own people. It is an axiom of *Afrikanervolks-*

¹² A distillation of this research is given in E. G. Malherbe, *The Bilingual School* (Longmans 1946).

¹³ Since writing this sentence I have discovered that Mr. F. E. Auerbach knows something: see his book, *The Power of Prejudice in South African Education* (Cape Town 1965).

¹⁴ There exists already at least one Xhosa version of South African history. When they get their own broadcasting service it will be interesting to listen in to their version of—for example—the Nongause cattle killing of 1856-7. I wonder if the newly-formed South African Historical Association would think it worthwhile to appoint a committee, in even linguistic balance, to report annually upon the use and abuse of history by broadcasters?

eenheid that every true Afrikaner votes nationalist.

That axiom, if it is accepted, produces the Milner situation in reverse. Milner said in 1900 that he would feel satisfied if by 1910 South Africa had three men of British race to every two men of Dutch race. Half a century later, the opposite situation existed. On the Milnerite principle of top-doggery, Afrikaners were now the master race. Not all Afrikaners accepted that principle, but those who did had a clear view of its implications for the English-speaking underdogs. Let me quote a classic statement from *Die Transvaler* of 30th April 1941:

Ons verwerp dus geheel-en-al die opvatting dat alle Suid-Afrikaners saam as een volk gereken moet word: Die Afrikanerdom is vir ons die volk van Suid-Afrika, en die res van die Suid-Afrikaners is, vir sover hulle blank is, of potensiele Afrikaners, of vreemdelinge. . . .¹⁵

For the descendants of the 1820 settlers, this is a harsh choice to have forced on them—either to become Afrikaners or to become aliens on their own soil.

I realise, of course, that Afrikanerdom has meant different things to different people. Onze Jan Hofmeyr defined an Afrikaner simply as a loyal South African and General Hertzog once or twice used or implied the same definition; but it is not the definition of the Afrikaner Broederbond.¹⁶ Consequently, a Grahamstown man may find himself puzzled at having notice served on him to turn himself into an Afrikaner, or else clear out. Does it mean that he has to stop speaking English? I do not think so. The ultimatum is ideological. Grahamstown people can keep the language of Milton, provided they throw overboard Milton's *Areopagitica*, along with *Magna Carta* and all the rest of their foreign *impedimenta*.

Whether or not they are submissive to this ultimatum is a matter for dispassionate investigation. If I were the investigator I should employ an heuristic device which I call Milner's Law. Within six months of his arrival in South Africa, Milner made

¹⁵ I first saw this sentence quoted in M. Roberts and A. E. I. Trollip, *The South African Opposition 1939-45* (London 1947). I then read it in its full context. The writer, Professor L. J. du Plessis, is reputed to have been in 1941 high in the councils of the Afrikaner Broederbond but to have fallen from grace since then. That does not mean that his ideology has fallen from grace.

¹⁶ General Hertzog's views on the Broederbond were put on record in a three-hour speech at Smithfield on 7th November 1935.

a diagnosis of the interplay between the politics of culture and the politics of colour. In reply to a call from Asquith for the restoration of good relations both between Britons and Boers and between whites and blacks, he pointed out that 'object No. 2' was the principal obstacle to the attainment of 'object No. 1'. 'You therefore have this singular situation,' he continued, 'that you might indeed unite Dutch and English by protecting the black man, but you would unite them against yourself and your policy of protection.' In other words, colour is fundamental: not culture.

I see Milner's law conspicuously operative today in the reaction of white South Africans to events in Rhodesia. That disastrous but intelligent proconsul would feel no surprise if he could see the 'I hate Harold' stickers on East London motor cars. He would feel no surprise at South African reactions to the United Nations. He would see his law operative everywhere. Consider, for example, the symbols of nationhood. It is proper that English-speaking South Africans should respect the Republic; but the republican ardour of many ex-Jingos astonishes me, until I remember Calpin's quip about their loving the Union Jack more than anything else in the world, except the Colour Bar. Or consider the arithmetic of elections. It suggests a steady seepage of English-speaking voters to the National Party. How can we account for it? According to Milner's law, these new recruits to Nationalism are voting white. At least, they think they are voting white.

Must we then conclude that the politics of colour, like a gigantic anaconda, are swallowing the politics of culture? The election figures, when you take a second look at them, do not support a conclusion so extreme as that. And even if they did support it, they would not record the end of the debate on values. Majority vote has never decided the fundamental issues which our civilisation has been wrestling with ever since Socrates raised them in Athens and Jesus raised them in Jerusalem.

If I am to fulfil my promise of raising a few economic questions, I shall have to move fast. I therefore propose to pack my questions into two propositions:

1. That the programme for Transkeian independence contains

no adequate economic component.

2. That continuing economic growth in South Africa presupposes continuing economic integration.

These are propositions for debate. They are not assertions but Aunt Sallies. Will you please shoot at them?

To start with, you may reject the premises of my first proposition. They are the premises of 'economic viability'. My country, like yours, has earned its keep. To my way of thinking, a state which has no prospect of earning its keep is only fictionally independent. I am aware that many people nowadays think differently. On the world map of today we see many conspicuously unviable states. Too often, they become vortices of power conflict and nuisances to their own people. Is South Africa creating more of them?

If present trends continue, the Transkei will be an economic cripple when it achieves political independence. In all the Bantu homelands, the conditions of economic progress, according to the Tomlinson Commission, are twofold: an agricultural revolution: an industrial upsurge. To achieve the agricultural revolution—so the Commission argued—it is essential to liquidate communal land use, to reduce by scores of thousands the number of production units, and thereby to raise the level of agricultural productivity per man. This programme involves an immense displacement of persons from the land. The displaced persons will have to find employment in secondary and tertiary industry. To provide this employment, the Bantu homelands will need white capital, skill and business ability. . . . This, I think, is the gist of the Tomlinson doctrine. Whether or not the doctrine is sound is not for me to say; nor is it for me to say whether or not the government had sound economic reasons for rejecting some of its fundamental articles. I simply record the fact that neither the agricultural revolution nor the industrial upsurge is observable in the Transkei. No more has there been any significant economic growth on the Transkeian borders: if you want to see the new border industries, you must go to Natal and the Transvaal. Output per head of the population in the Transkei is falling.¹⁷ If income per head is not falling, the explanation must

¹⁷ Stephen Enke in the *South African Journal of Economics* of March 1962 estimates a declining per capita output for the Bantu areas as a whole.

lie in the remittances received year by year from the 200,000 or more Transkeian migrants who are working and living in far-away places where the Republic's economic life is dynamic. And yet, the whole object of the operation—not only as the Tomlinson Commission saw it, but as the government sees it—is to settle these Transkeian citizens, or as many of them as possible, in their own territorial home.¹⁸

I should like to see the operation proceeding more successfully than it seems to be doing. Nevertheless, too much success might prove awkward. What would be the effect upon the Republic's economic growth if all the expatriate Transkeians and all the other black expatriates—I do not like that word, but it expresses official thought—could be sent back to their Bantu homelands? Ever since the diamond discoveries of a century ago—to go no further back in time—the availability of non-white labour has been an essential condition of white prosperity. You will find the classic exposition of that truth in the *Report of the Economic and Wage Commission*, 1926. The truth remains self-evident. In 1964, employment in the modern exchange economy of the Republic exceeded 5½ millions. Of that total, more than 4½ millions were non-whites. Your most recent Economic Development Programme, starting from the assumption that a growth rate of 5½ per cent. per annum can be sustained throughout the years ahead, estimates that the labour requirement will rise by 1970 to 7 millions. If this requirement is to be met, the proportion of non-whites in the total will need to be higher than it was in 1964. Moreover, a rising proportion of the non-whites will need to be skilled workers. Even now, there is an observable seepage of black labour through your industrial colour bar. Can this mean that South Africa is already making an economic choice which contradicts her political doctrine? Can it mean that she is putting economic growth first, and separate development second?

The Republic's labour-hunger produces demographic consequences. These have many significant facets which I have no time to discuss; but let me remind you of some trends in the geo-

¹⁸ This paragraph is based upon the statistical and economic analysis contained in a recent paper by Mr. Trevor Bell of Rhodes University. I hope that Mr. Bell will prepare his paper for publication and that he will in the meantime tolerate my raid upon it. He has no responsibility for my over-simplifications.

graphical distribution of your African population. At the time of the 1951 census, the distribution was as follows:

<i>In the Bantu Areas</i>	<i>On White Farms</i>	<i>In Urban Areas</i>	<i>Total</i>
3.6m	2.3m	2.6m	8.5m
(=43%)	(=27%)	(=30%)	(=100%)

The Tomlinson Commission produced those figures. What the figures are today nobody knows. Your official statisticians seem almost to believe that demography should be kept in the dark. But perhaps this is an unkind interpretation; perhaps they are just conservative persons, clinging to their old-fashioned classification by magisterial districts. Be this as it may, demographic and economic research still manages to get to the truth in a rough and ready way. *Die verswaring van die Platteland* is proceeding apace. In the regions of industrial growth, the ratio of non-whites to whites is steadily rising.

Against this economic and demographic background, let us look again at citizenship, first as seen from Umtata and secondly as seen from Pretoria. You will recall that all Xhosa persons, excepting the minority which belong to some other jurisdiction, are by law citizens of the Transkei, no matter where their residence is in the Republic. And what now holds good for a Xhosa person—so your government has declared—will some day hold good for every Bantu person in the Republic: according to his ethnic definition, he will possess his rights as a citizen in one or other of the Bantu states. What do those rights add up to? I have had it explained to me that they are just like the rights which a Jew of the dispersion enjoys in the state of Israel. I do not follow that explanation. Jewish persons in Australia have the same rights as all the other Australians. They have votes in Australia. They have no votes in Israel. If they did have votes in Israel, I fail to see what good they could get from them. Tell me, please, what good can an expatriate Xhosa get for himself and for his family by voting in the Transkeian elections? During the past six months, I have been living in an area of Cape Province

where population is growing faster than employment. All around me I see Xhosa in distress. I do not see anything that Umtata can do to help them. Of course, the position may change. Remember those maps. Some of them put the Xhosa who are my neighbours inside a big Xhosa state. If and when that happens, their citizenship will become of some practical use to them.

And now for South African citizenship. According to my reasoning, the citizens of the Republic in the year A.D. 2000 will number 13,223,000. This, I need hardly say, is not a prediction. It is a piece of arithmetic which follows in logic from the following assumptions:

1. That the policy of Bantu independence, as proclaimed by Dr. Verwoerd on 20th May 1959 and re-affirmed on various occasions since then, remains the policy of the Republic.

2. That A.D. 2000 becomes independence year for all the Bantustans, in accordance with the timetable proclaimed for the Transkei by Chief Kaiser Matanzima.

3. That the independent Bantu states, like all other independent states, enact their own citizenship laws.

4. That these laws make the same provisions for expatriate citizenship as the Transkeian Constitution Act now makes.

5. That the trends of differential population growth continue for the next four decades as they are now. These trends give the following figures for A.D. 2000:

<i>Whites</i>	<i>Coloured</i>	<i>Asiatics</i>	<i>Bantu</i>
7,033,000	5,031,000	1,159,000	27,949,000

Now follows the conclusion. The 27,949,000 persons classified as Bantu will be citizens of their own states, not of the Republic. But the Coloured and Asiatics cannot possess states of their own because they do not possess territories of their own. They may or may not be given some share of Dr. Dönges's 'bundle of rights'; but in either event they will remain citizens, or at any rate nationals, of the Republic. So now I can do my addition sum. The whites plus the Coloured plus the Asiatics add up to 13,223,000 Republican citizens or nationals.

Let me say again that I am not making a prediction. From the factual point of view, all my assumptions are questionable. You may think the second one—about the timetable—particu-

larly implausible. The third one would be upset, with most disturbing consequences for the theory of separate development, if the citizenship laws of the new states were to base themselves on the *ius soli* and therefore to exclude from citizenship persons born in the Republic. Nevertheless, the assumptions are permissible in logic. Logical thought is essential if rational men are to understand the significance of the propositions they put forward and of the policies they proclaim.

However the quantites work out in practice, the Republic, if it sticks to its present course of policy, will probably have on its soil many millions of black persons whose citizenship lies elsewhere. These persons will not necessarily be *uitlanders*: the Republic can easily enact a law to give them the same kind of treatment as citizens of Ireland receive in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, I foresee practical difficulties. The Bantu states will almost inevitably show concern with the treatment meted out to their citizens in the southern Transvaal or the border areas. Does this mean that labour relations in the Republic will become international relations?

Naturally, I am not forgetting the realities of power. The power of the Republic is beyond challenge in this part of the world. All the Bantu states together will be a weak bundle. For a long time to come, the Republic need anticipate no trouble in bringing recalcitrants to heel. But in doing so, it will have to invoke the Milnerite doctrine of paramountcy.

Before resigning themselves to that, white people in this country might think it worthwhile to try to untie the economic-demographic-citizenship knots. If they do think it worthwhile, they might well make a start by looking again at the last chapter of Professor Hobart Houghton's book, *The South African Economy*. That chapter suggests some ways and means whereby the realities of citizenship might possibly be brought into accord with the realities of economic growth.

I have no proposals to put before you. I have not even answered my first question. Instead, I have kept on asking questions, without having any of the answers up my sleeve. I have tried to ask my questions dispassionately: but inevitably they stem from my personal experience. I am an Australian. During the past thirty years I have got to know your country a

little, and to love it a great deal. At the risk of appearing arrogant, I now make the assertion that we Australians are using our brains to better purpose than you South Africans are using your brains.

We Australians are living dangerously. Throughout the past year we have had troops in action on two fronts in Asia. Nevertheless we maintain close Asian friendships, particularly but not exclusively with member-states of the Commonwealth. Under the Colombo plan during the past two decades we have given—to our own great profit—substantial economic, technical and educational¹⁹ assistance to half a dozen or more Asian countries. Meanwhile, we have committed ourselves—for reasons which seem to me more compelling than your reasons—to a policy of decolonisation. Let me return to my earlier parallel between New Guinea and the Transkei. My university maintains at Port Moresby a 'New Guinea Research Unit' with an establishment of 10 academic persons. Every year, two or three times that number of my colleagues and their graduate students are making the Research Unit their base for scientific field work. Within the sphere of social research, their investigations spread wide and go deep: every year, we are publishing 30 to 40 learned articles (I do not mention the books and the theses) on problems of linguistics, archaeology, pre-history, demography, geography, social anthropology, economics, political science—no doubt my list remains incomplete. In planning this research, my university is able to count upon a sufficiency of two essential commodities: finance and freedom. Sir Robert Menzies, a conservative statesman whom we call a Liberal, has been the main provider of these commodities. He has not thought, as some of you may have been thinking, that so many academic busy-bodies must be a nuisance. If he had thought so, I for one should not have been surprised: I remain perpetually astonished that anybody should think it worthwhile to pay me for doing the things that I want to do. Nevertheless, not only the Australian government, but also some of the neighbouring governments have been all the time urging us to do more of these things. One of my colleagues, a demographer, is continually being called upon to supervise the censuses of the Pacific Islands. Another colleague, a geographer,

¹⁹ At the present time there are approximately 12 000 Asian students in Australia.

has been called upon to investigate the social, economic and political prospects of the Fijians. This man has also played a major part in planning the radical educational programme for New Guinea to which I referred earlier. And so it goes on. Every year, hard-headed administrators are coming to us and saying: 'Will you please do more of the research and thinking that we need?' Just before I left Australia, the Commonwealth Government made an insistent request to my university to undertake a new venture of legal research.

You, by contrast, have this year one social scientist pursuing part-time field research in the Transkei. If you have more than one, I hope that somebody will give me their names—or his name.

I remember General Smuts telling me in Cape Town twenty-eight years ago that South Africa was a laboratory for the social sciences. Is this the situation today? Or has it been decided by majority vote that South Africa already has all the answers?