

STATE OF ORGANISATION AND THE WAY FORWARD

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper is an attempt at identifying and also gives possible answers to some of our burning problems, at this critical stage of our struggle for National Liberation.

My starting point is that our objective is to destroy and eliminate racial domination and fascist tyranny in our country, and logically our main aim must be directed towards that specific goal.

An observation that has been made in the last few years is that our energies have been, and continue to be surped by issues - however directly related to our struggle - which draw our attention away from the most important task; the intensification of the armed struggle. A debate is taking place at the moment based on the nature of this intensification, especially in relation to our policy position on the seizure of power.

2. OUR MILITARY STRATEGY: ADVANCING PEOPLE'S WAR

In a recent paper presented to the Political Education Workshop, comrade Ronnie Kasrils argues very convincingly that we do not have a clear policy towards Armed Seizure of Power. This he further illustrates by saying that "differences of approach exist between the military and political organs of the Movement"; he goes further and says that "we appear to be agreeing in meetings but differ in practice". One could ask why is it so? The answer is provided in the same document when he says "in fact there are extremely few policy positions of either the A.N.C. or S.A.C.P. on how power is to be seized. And that is central to the problem".

I believe that this is an honest appraisal by a revolutionary, seeking to find answers to our problems. I wish to agree with a view expressed in the paper when it says that this problem "is not simply a problem of the High Command of Umkhonto We Sizwe, but for our entire movement. Anything that relates to the fundamental strategy - the seizure of power through the force of arms - is a fundamental question for all of us, and that includes the leadership and activists of our Mass Democratic Movement at home as well as various sectors of our movement abroad, whether military or political".

The situation being as it is at the moment, it becomes very important

for us to note that the popularity and attention we are presently enjoying, both at home and internationally - be it from our friends or foes - is largely due to the combined success of our armed struggle and mass political action. A success which has altered the balance of political forces in our favour. A lot of potential exists in tilting this balance in the military field to our favour, but very little is done in that area. What we really need to do is engage the enemy in military activities which will seriously dent them, and put us in a much more favourable position.

We should on the other hand admit that, the enormous potential which exists within our ranks and among the struggling masses of our people at home, remains largely untapped. This assertion is demonstrated by enormous sacrifices our people are prepared to make against all odds. In many cases when our people make these sacrifices, they look forward to Umkhonto We Sizwe to come to their rescue. It is very unfortunate to note that the best we have done in most cases, has been to issue statements of support and encouragement to them.

The most recent example of our inability, is that of the three days stay-away, when millions of our people heeded to the call by COSATU. It was largely expected that MK would mount operations in support of this stay-away. But our absence was very disappointing except for one or two sabotage operations on the railway line in Soweto alone. We need to do more in defence of our working and struggling people.

The upsurge of our people in the last 3-4 years, has demonstrated to us the need to root Umkhonto We Sizwe in the masses. This potentially revolutionary situation has resulted in the enemy declaring a State of Emergency, which has become a permanent feature in our situation. The result of the existence of these objective conditions triggered a debate within our ranks on the establishment of organs of people's power, more especially organs of our People's Army. This healthy debate was necessitated by the fact that conditions demanded of us, to advance our strategy to meet the requirements of the escalation in the fighting spirit of our people. Our people's determination to fight the enemy's continued and increased repression, had reached a potentially insurrectionary peak, which demanded to be exploited by arming the masses for a bitter fight in the People's War.

3. LIMITING INFILTRATION

I believe that most of our problems emanate from the fact that we were not able to make significant advances in the armed struggle.

We were not able to take advantage of the situation to the fullest in order to meet the ever increasing challenges. In the meantime, the enemy has taken advantage of that situation and infiltrated a lot of its agents into our ranks. For the moment the situation demands of us to pause a moment and take stock of ourselves.

One of the solutions to this problem of infiltration, lies in the establishment of P.M.C. structures at home. These structures then become the ones which recommend cadres for recruitment into our fighting ranks. This approach would limit the problem of relying on those people who are able leave the country and join us in exile, and thus become new voluntary recruits. Another advantage of having our own commanding structures at home is that, those cadres who are recruited and trained at home do not have a problem of legality while operating underground as elements of our people's army.

By doing this, we shall have greatly reduced the numbers of those people leaving the country without being called and the possibilities of an easy infiltration by agents into our ranks. This approach will also help root our army in the masses. To do this, demands of us very bold efforts, we shall have to do more than just talk about and agree on these matters. We shall have to do everything in our powers to ensure that this strategy succeeds and the armed struggle does indeed escalate.

What are the implications of this strategic approach? This simply means that we must ensure that everyone of our leading cadres is given specific tasks to perform in ensuring the implementation of our program. We need not soft peddle on those that are not performing their tasks as demanded by the program, everyone must be given a reasonable time frame within which to report back. We have to understand that in order to achieve maximum results, a lot of sacrifice is demanded from all of us and there should be no compromise with those that are dragging us behind.

4. RESOLUTENESS, CRITICISM AND THE PROGRAM OF ACTION

Earlier on I mentioned that elements of a revolutionary situation have emerged at home and that they continue to mature. The implication of this situation plus the extend of enemy repression is that, hundreds of activists are thrown into illegal and semi-legal existence, but still manage to operate and survive. This is the situation throughout the length and breadth of our country, a reality we cannot simply ignore. How therefore is it not possible for us to infiltrate hundreds

of our armed combatants to merge with these people and multiply among them?

My contention at the moment is that we lack the political will and the revolutionary resoluteness to ensure the success of our revolution and the war of liberation. We have an organisation, but we lack the decisiveness and will to gear it forward; and this problem may cost us very dearly in the end.

The time has long come for us to seriously and honestly address ourselves to this problem. This needs a very critical and analytical approach without any fear or favour, but a very frank stock taking of the prevailing situation in the leading circles of our movement. We have definitely not given ourselves enough time to attend to internal matters. We must make a critical review of ourselves and draw a clear program of action, which will guide us; this done to avoid degenerating to levels where petty squabbles and sectarianism become the order of the day. To quote comrade Ronnie Kasrils again, he says in his paper "we need a clear vision of how power may be seized if we are to sort out our organisational problems and structures, as well as motivate our cadres".

If the movement had a program of action, directed towards the seizure of power, most of the petty problems and troubles could have been eliminated. This could have been so because everyone in the movement plus the FMC could have been judged on the basis of his/her adherence to and implementation of this program. This I believe would develop positive attitudes like criticism and self-criticism which has been largely destroyed in the movement.

What do I mean here? I mean that every structure of the movement would have a program of action based on the national program. That each structure/department would then be judged on the basis of how much have they done towards the fulfilment of that area of work assigned them. A program of this nature has to be divided into several terms like short, medium and long term. basis. This means that the N.E.C. draws a national all embracing program of action out of the annual January 8 Statement., and that each and every structure of the movement is given that section of the program that needs to be implemented by them. These structures/departments work out their plan on how to fulfil this responsibility in time. This I believe will unleash a vigorous and professional era of emulations and purposefulness in our ranks.

The implications of that approach would be to subordinate every member of the Alliance to the program of the leadership of this Alliance. The leadership of the movement should be able to meet at least once a month, while the PNC secretariat meets on a weekly basis. Very honest criticism must be made against anyone that is lacking in the implementation or does not attend meetings. There must be no excuse why a comrade can't attend meetings. There can be no task beyond that of strengthening the internal and thus shortening our days in bondage under fascist domination.

5. DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION

As soon as we are able to do this, it will extend the level of democratic participation in the movement as a whole. In each and every structure, comrades will be expected to discuss, debate, analyse and implement their section of work. All this work must be directed towards the intensification of the armed and political struggle. The leadership of this movement will be expected to check on the progress and problems structures are having in the implementation of the program. For this the leadership must be available and give itself time to attend to these problems.

We definitely need to do this, because at times it seems that we have entrusted the task of waging this war to a handful of comrades who can't make any headway. Let us make it our business to all worry and play an active part in the advancement of our struggle. This task is simply too much for a few 'specialists'.

We must move away from this tendency and get our cadres involved in this struggle. The problem is that if we fail to do that, we will end up like some factory which has its owners and employees. Unfortunately this tendency seems to be existing in some areas of our work in the movement. Some of our cadres do not feel as part of this process and are simply serving the interests of the head of department or some individual, who has all the answers and only in whom the program of the structure is known.

This practice is very destructive and results in disillusionment and demoralisation of some of the best cadres we have. While we do this, it is important to guard against extending this democracy to levels where it begins to threaten our security. But this argument must not be used to hide the fear of the extension of this health practice. Why I am saying this is because, in the past we have hidden behind

this argument while the struggle was suffering, while at time we avoided attending to burning issues by taking cover in this argument. The tendency became that an ordinary cadres started to believe that the leadership had all the answers even when we could have gained from our membership.

6. NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SEIZURE OF POWER

I believe that the urgency with which a clear and unambiguous policy on how power is to be seized, cannot be over-emphased. This I say because at the moment there harshed, at times open debates on the question of negotiations. This is so because some elements who may be agents, wish to make our people at home and in exile believe that the movement has chosen this option.

While we need not suppress such debates, our position as a movement must be made very clear, not only in declarations and statements; but more than anywhere else in action. I think that one result of this failure is that, some of our friends are beginning to question our commitment to armed struggle and even the wisdom of having chosen that path, when we cannot make any tangible advances on it.

One other issue at hand were the membership is kept in the dark is that of the Post Apartheid South Africa project. A lot is said by our people on this project to a point that at the moment PASA is receiving a very cold reception and at times hostile one from the membership.

While I believe that it is very important that a debate and discussion be encouraged on the kind of a liberated South Africa we want, I am convinced that however good the intentions were of this project, it is going to take some time before the membership, especially those in the army to accept it totally. This I say because already very suspicious conclusions have been made about it. This situation seems to be similar even at home, I therefore wish to appeal for openness in matters of this nature to avoid unnecessary problems.

7. BUILDING A REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

In the final analysis, we need to pay more attention to the building up of the internal struggle in a more concerted way. This effort I believe will erase some of these suspicions, which in essence questions the credibility of our leadership or elements in the leadership.

We must use the fighting potential of our people to advance our armed and political struggle. We have so far had a lot of commitments made by our people, that they are prepared and ready to participate in the escalation of this struggle. I am thinking of people like the Mabuza delegation from Kangwane, Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa, National union of Mineworkers, SAYCO etc. etc. All these delegations have committed themselves in helping and taking part in advancing the struggle, especially the armed struggle, we cannot afford to fail them. One may add that we have it in our power, but we seem to be hesitant. WHY?

I wish to stress that we must engage our energies in achieving this goal. Let us subordinate all other interests to ensuring the success of this goal of the seizure of power. We need to direct all our projects and efforts towards a war footing. I wish to emphasize this because the situation is developing at such a rate that the enemy might decide to play negotiations with us. It is therefore going to be important that when the enemy does come to doing that, we must be at an advantage, with the balance of forces completely in our favour. This can only be ensured if our armed struggle has reached a very high level and we have an army ready and capable of seizing power. I am sure we cannot fail once we start, but at the moment we have not even started.

One of the most important factors we need to address ourselves to, is building a regular army in preparation for any eventuality. We should do that so that when the time comes for us to consolidate the gains of our revolution, we should not be found wanting. We have a lot of cadres who are not being considered for guerilla activities, and I believe that it is only right to consider them for such a task.

I believe that it would be very important for the movement to make a thorough study of the paper drawn by comrade Ronnie Kasrils, entitled "Politics and the Armed Struggle: The Revolutionary Army". This exercise done with a view of calling an extended meeting of the N.E.C. to work out policy positions and a workable program of action to advance the armed struggle.

One of the policy matters which I propose to be examined, is our position on the psychological fear imposed on us of "soft targets". I wish to submit that in so far as the enemy is concerned, there are no such things as soft targets. Everytime they crossed the borders to massacre people, and even our own people at home including children,

they did so with impunity. This was done and continues to be done without regard to the arguments of soft-targets. This indiscriminate policy has resulted in the loss of hundreds of innocent lives in the whole of Southern Africa. At the moment they are in Angola and Namibia, someone must teach them a lesson and I am sure we can do that.

I believe that its about time that we extended this war to the white areas. We must destroy their police and military barracks, their bars and clubs, this includes their personnel(not only when they are on duty in uniforms) but even when they are of duty. These are indeed legitimate targets, and they include the homes of military and police personnel in the white areas. This will force the enemy to pull out of Angola in defence of their homes, property and families.

8. CADRE POLICY AND OUR STRUCTURES

The next point I believe needs to be looked into is the question of structures and our personnel. To some extent I am convinced that we have just too many structures; and that everytime a problem arises, we turn to creating more structures as a solution. Undoubtedly the movement has grown tremendously, but it does not seem like we were ready for this growth in both numbers and responsibility. This organisation can do with a simple structure which is uncomplicated, without resorting to crisis management tactics.

The result of creating more and more structures is that we have in effect created little empires for some people, and our structures have become too elaborate and cumbersome, resulting in inefficient bureaucracies. This is bad for a revolutionary movement. We definitely need to get rid of this practice, because among other things it is going to breed sectarianism and reactionary practices which will just draw us back.

What I think we need is a structure that is very simple but effective, whose personnel is selected on the basis of a standardised criteria. This means that our cadres will have to be trained and properly selected to take up different responsibilities on the basis of merit. One must admit that there is a lot of potential which is untapped in the movement. We further need a cadre policy which will enable us to have some control and accountability in our ranks. This will further make it possible for us to know our cadres better.

This kind of practice will further make it possible for us to have enough cadres to take up different responsibilities, and avoid a

a situation which currently exists were we complain about the lack of manpower when in fact we have literally thousands of cadres doing very little or nothing.

This kind of approach will help us to select some of these cadres to understudy us, at a time when we have no spare time to train individual cadres, at all levels to gain from our individual and collective experiences.

Another solution to this lies in constant consultations with our people at home. The leadership of the Mass Democratic Movement needs to be drawn more and more into the debates in the movement. This practice done in recognition of their leadership role and with a purpose of drawing them closer to help us find solutions to some of the problems facing us. This we need to do because at the moment we can no longer claim the monopoly of the leadership of this revolution, rather we have a special role to play in the broad leadership of our people's struggle for liberation.

I believe that our specialised role in exile in this struggle, is that of a re-inforcing nature; to reach-out to areas which our people at home cannot as a result of the special position they occupy in the struggle. This also applies to the leadership role played by our comrades in prison, who have played and continue to play, that role which none of us could possibly play - however unfortunate their situation may be - but the reality is that they also form part of this three tier leadership in our struggle for national democracy.

Once we are able to recognise these different parts of our leadership, I believe that we will be able to understand very clearly, the role we in exile are supposed to play in this struggle. Central to all our tasks, is that of building a Revolutionary Army, which is capable of merging with our people in all their struggle. This army that will be able to lead and defend our people in battles against the enemy forces. We should remember that when we left the country, we were charged with the task of creating conditions for the training of our cadres and sending them back home. The second task of mobilising the international community has since been re-inforced by the ability of our people to travel. This task can no longer be that central as to take so much of our time outside.

9. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I wish to suggest that we look back and examine ourselves in retrospect, this done in order to examine if we have the political

will to really carry this struggle further. This political will which has the resoluteness and decisiveness demanded of those who are leading a revolutionary movement, rather than a football club or social democratic organisation.

I am making this submission, because even after conference in 1985 had instructed us to move from conference venue to victory, we seem to be reluctant to implement the resolutions adopted then. Take the resolution of sending senior cadres to the forward areas and getting other senior cadres deployed at HQ to take charge of PMC responsibility. I am afraid to say it but, the reality seems to be the opposite seems to be happening. It is important that we engage our middle layer leadership in most of our international engagements, so that we attend more to the problems of the seizure of power. We should only travel when it is absolutely necessary, and this done out of our own choice and not determined by those inviting us. These invitations seem to be dictating who must come to attend their meetings or conferences, and this kind of situation cannot be allowed to continue unchecked.


My final submission is that while elements of a revolutionary situation exist at home, and continue to mature; the absence of a subjective factor is very glaring. Our organisational inability to match these challenges, puts to question the credibility of the whole liberation alliance and its ability to lead the masses.

It is this state of organisational preparedness that I am convinced we need to address ourselves to and very frankly and urgently. This process must be undertaken without any fear of favour, and done in such a way that it is an honest and critical appraisal of the state which we are in organisationally. All done to correct all the flaws existing and put us back on the track towards making us a dynamic force for the liberation of our people.

Cde Ronnie Kasrils contribution was clear at the political seminar - unfortunately the public he addressed was seemingly not a correct one for the topic and not a correct place - we will have to address the audience that can swiftly respond and work harder for the realisation of the demands of the struggle to gain people's power using also effective arm struggle and M/K as a nucleus and or model of our people's army indeed..The M/K should increase the volume and fighting capacity now without delay!

Presented to **ANC** by John Pule Motshabi

11/6/88
Lusaka
Zambia

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "John P. Motshabi". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the typed name.