

This report focusses on some of the key strategies of repression used since June 12 last year. All the sections deal in some way or another with how the state has been using the Emergency in an attempt to crush organisations & regain control. Some sections indicate the extent to which the state is attempting to set up a counter-revolutionary force in the townships.

It should be noted that this report has some serious limitations:

\*Firstly, it doesn't cover some major areas of repression, such as repression in the rural areas & the crack down on the trade unions.

\*Secondly the amount of information available is very limited because of Emergency conditions. Much of our information is drawn from statements to the Jhb. office of DPSC; & reports from the Transvaal OFS & Northern Cape regions of DESCOM.

\* Thirdly the focus is only on repression, not all aspects of state strategy. So only a narrow part of the JMC strategy is looked at. not the more subtle methods of countering organisation such as township projects, youth trips etc.

Furthermore the report doesn't attempt to cover problems facing detainees , hunger strikes, detention conditions etc.; or the work DESCOMS & DPSCS have been doing during the emergency.

Finally, the focus on the various strategies used by the state to crush the democratic movement doesn't deal with how organisations have coped, or developed counter strategies. That assessment we leave up to organisations themselves.

THE STRATEGY OF MASS DETENTIONS

The analysis reproduced below gives a rough idea of the extent of detentions in the first 10 months of the Emergency.

\*These are official statistics but we don't know if they include those held for 14 days or less.

A few observations can be made about the detention statistics:

\* The vast majority of detentions have taken place in the centres of ungovernability & peoples power (E.Cape & Transvaal )

\* Thousands of rank & file members of organisations, particularly members of street committees, have been detained; unlike the last emergency where a lower proportion of detainees were organisationally connected.

\*The main target of repression has been overwhelmingly UDF affiliates, particularly the civics, youth congresses & student congresses.

\*The mass of trade union members who have been detained have tended to be held for shorter periods. This trend may be changing.

\*A core of leading activists have been held for the entire emergency, or a large part of it.

\* Youth continue to bear the brunt of "security force" action, particularly youth of 15 & upwards. The security forces operate on the basis that all youth of this age are a ' threat to public safety ' & therefore a legitimate target for detention , assault or even shooting. Youth aged 18 & under have consistently been a third or more of detainees.

\* Growing numbers of people opposing bantustan rule have been detained. Over 140 people have been detained in recent weeks in KwaNdebele alone.

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VERY NB : CURRENT SPATE-OF-RELEASES

DPSC HAS BEEN RECEIVING REPORTS THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF CHILDREN & LESS EXPERIENCED ACTIVISTS ARE BEING RELEASED AROUND THE COUNTRY (Krugersdorp, Diepkloof ,Modderbee, E.Cape, Cape Town ).IT IS BELIEVED THE PRISONS ARE BEING CLEARED TO MAKE WAY FOR THOSE TO BE HELD IN A CRACKDOWN BEFORE JUNE 12

REPRESSION IS CO-ORDINATED BY ALL BRANCHES OF THE "SECURITY FORCES"

In general, the statements which formed the basis for this report indicated that all organs of the state repressive machinery are acting in collaboration with one another, employing similar tactics and the same levels of brutality. Most of the people who reported assaults, shootings or arrests identified the presence of SAP, SADF and either municipal or administration police and body guards.

There have been reports, for example, of the SAP detaining a person and a few days later SADF personnel have arrived to detain that person. These reports indicate that in some areas, the police and SADF have been given lists of names of people that they are to arrest. There are also reports of people being detained by municipal police who are then interrogated by the SAP or security police. Ex-detainees have said that SAP, security police and municipal police arrived together to arrest them. In some instances people have been tortured in the presence of the police by army personnel.

The overall pattern is one of indiscriminate violence, aimed at all sections of the community. More than a few people reported being shot while on their way to or from work, school, visiting friends or even going to the cinema. Often these shooting incidents occurred while the person was in the vicinity of a funeral vigil or a scene of unrest. In some instances, the shootings appeared to be based on the notion that everyone in the area is guilty and therefore a legitimate target because they were in the area at that time.

These assaults on the general community range from shooting randomly at funeral vigils to shooting at houses, in school yards and playgrounds to firing teargas into houses. As well as imposing of informal curfews such as stopping people in the streets at night and assaulting them or questioning them as to why they are in the area. There have also been reports of SAP and municipal police stopping vans and cars and assaulting people while trying to find out who the vehicle belongs to.

It would appear that these assaults fall into the pattern of creating a general climate of terror in the townships with the aim of discouraging community support for activists and organisations.

## GENERAL HARASSMENT STRATEGIES

### 1. HARASSMENT OF RELEASED DETAINEES

\* Released activists are repeatedly harassed : they are threatened with redetention if they continue being active in organisation , or if any political activity takes place in their area.

\*In fact large numbers of released activists have been redetained & assaulted, & then often rereleased.

\* Attacks on released activists are becoming increasingly sinister with growing numbers of attempts on their lives & in some cases actual assassinations.

\*The above tactics, together with continued harassment of activists families, are designed to frustrate & intimidate activists. At the same time a lot of pressure is put on activists to inform or join the Greenbeans or SB.

AIMS: to break morale , to spread suspicion & to destroy organisation.  
to stop activists from remaining active after release.

### 2. HARASSMENT IN STREETS

\* The "Security forces" patrol the streets in many areas with lists & photos of activists. Activists are unable to walk in the street in a number of areas because of harassment.

\* In some townships, particularly the smaller areas, 'curfews' have been imposed by greenbeans/kitskonstabels , & those out after curfew are assaulted.

\* The "security forces" patrol many areas at night, trying to find out where street meetings are being held.

\* Whenever a particular mass action is planned , the state goes on the offensive to try & frustrate that action: they put on a massive show of force with hundreds of S.Forces' patrolling the streets ; loudhailers are used to instruct residents to do this or that ; homes & offices of activists are raided; state pamphlets are distributed ; & youth in the street are assaulted.

AIMS: TO regain control over the ungovernable areas;  
TO make it impossible for organisations to operate;  
TO prevent united mass action.

## REPRESSION AGAINST FAMILIES OF ACTIVISTS

A large crackdown was expected for some weeks before the declaration of the National State of Emergency. As a result, many activists escaped the state's net when the crackdown came. It has been estimated that many thousands of activists went into hiding immediately after, and even before the emergency was declared.

The "security forces" who have gone to the homes of activists looking for them have been extremely brutal in their treatment of the families when they discover that the activists are in hiding. This violence against the families seems to be designed to achieve a number of objectives;

- \* to force activists to come home or give themselves up because of future possible violence against their families;
- \* to isolate activists from the support of their families and friends;
- \* to make the community at large scared to have anything to do with activists, or to themselves become active in organisations.

Repression of families of activists has taken a number of forms: taking family members as hostages; assaulting family members; attacking the family's home; threatening that if the family don't turn the activist in, they will take action against the activist or the family.

Most of the activists who are being hounded in this way are engaged in legal, democratic work in mass organisations. Yet their families are being treated with a severity which had previously been reserved for relatives of people working in the ANC and Umkhonto we Sizwe. The state in this emergency is therefore putting those doing legal work on the same footing as those working underground or involved in the armed struggle.

## STRATEGY OF REPRESSION IN SCHOOLS

### \*PATTERN OF REPRESSION:

Since schools opened this year every effort has been made to identify student activists & expel them from schools. This has been done in the following ways;

1. Known student activists were refused readmission when the schools reopened.
2. Many school principals have been collaborating with the police & SADF by giving them lists of students who are politically active. These students are then detained.
3. When the students elect new SRC's the principals also have in some cases handed these lists over to the system.
4. In some areas activists attending school have been harassed by Greenbeans.

\* This offensive against students comes after last year's Emergency regulations (July 14) forcing students to reregister & carry ID cards. Resistance to these measures by students led to the system shifting to the above tactics.

Also the widespread occupation of schools by the "security forces" seems to have been made unnecessary by these tactics, since the school authorities are doing their dirty work.

\* Peoples Education: in January the state introduced regulations which virtually made Peoples Education illegal. At the same time most of the NECC national leadership were detained.

Note: the patterns referred to above are widespread & affect students in both rural & urban areas.

### \* AIM OF REPRESSION IN SCHOOLS

The aim seems to be twofold:

1. TO reverse all the gains students have made in the last few years, by crushing the SRC's & isolating students from their leadership. In addition harassment & torture of ordinary students is designed to break their morale. IN this way the regime hopes to reassert control over the schools.
2. To stop the development of Peoples Education.

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JMC'S & THE RECRUITING OF INFORMERS

Since the Vaal uprisings on September 3 1984, the state's informer network has come under tremendous pressure. Thousands of 'free-lance' informers have been exposed, attacked (and in some instances necklaced), and confessed to spying on their communities. This has apparently made it extremely difficult for the security police to maintain their informer network or to recruit new informers.

Information about the activities of the democratic movement has always been a critical factor in the state's attempts to destroy it. But over the last couple of years it seems as if accurate information gathering has become almost impossible.

So in December 1985, African Confidential (vol 26, no 25) wrote 'over a quarter of the 900-plus deaths since September 1984, have been of blacks accused of collaboration with the authorities. Police confess that their township intelligence has begun to dry up'.

The revelation (Weekly Mail October 3, 1986) that a series of secret committees dominated by the SAP and SADF, are effectively running the country has thrown some light on the crisis of information and how the state is handling it. In line with the 'total strategy' pioneered by the SADF in the late '70s a network of over 500 strategising and action committees with tremendous power and autonomy have been set up from the national level (the State Security Council which is often referred to as the real Cabinet) to the smallest town.

Of particular interest here is that the officials who leaked the details to the Weekly Mail emphasise that of the sub-committees

set up in each area, the ' intelligence committee' is regarded as the most important. According to the SSC officials, 'it is probably the number one committee. They don't worry about intelligence for the whole country, they will worry about their area.....' They work on the basis of detailed information 'precisely who was at what meeting and what was said by whom. They also keep tabs on those regarded as important community figures' (WM October, 3, 1986).

Clearly this system can't work without informers. Information coming into the DPSC office suggests that the state is using the state of emergency in an attempt to reconstruct its informer network. A clear pattern has emerged where the 'security forces' randomly pick youth up off the streets, attempts are made to coerce or bribe them in detention into becoming informers and these attempts are followed up after they are released from detention.

Coercing people to inform

A number of cases have been reported of the police using detention to terrorise people to inform. The idea seems to be that if you scare people sufficiently, they will be prepared to inform. This strategy is often aimed at less experienced and less politicised detainees. The use or threat of violence is sometimes combined with promises of large sums of money, education, and so on.

The attempt to coerce people to inform isn't only designed to get information about the democratic movement and activities in the townships. It is also designed to create divisions by sowing suspicion that detainees have agreed to inform. The state wants people to believe that there is a vast network of informers.

In this way it hopes to undermine the people's confidence in their ability to build strong organisation or wage effective struggle.



The security forces are not only using violent methods in their attempts to recruit informers. Under the guidance of the State Security Council, they are also using more devious methods to trap the youth into agreeing to work with them. This is part of the so-called 'win the hearts and minds of the youth campaign'.

The most notorious example of this approach is the setting up of youth concentration camps. This is only one part of a broader strategy to depoliticise and 're-orientate' youth and ultimately to get them to collaborate.

The 'win the hearts and minds' campaign is carried right into detention cells. Former detainees have described how the younger and inexperienced detainees are isolated from other and subjected to a 'softening up' process. Detainees are split up into three categories. One detainee described this as : category A: the leaders, category B the 'soldiers', members of organisations and street committees, and category C 'ordinary people'.

Category C, the young detainees, often not members of organisation are not allowed to have any contact with the other detainees. This is to isolate them from the political leadership of the other detainees, and in this way to depoliticise their detention experience. This is because the state knows that detention is a 'school' where detainees learn about the democratic movement, the history of the struggle and so on.

The treatment of Category C detainees was radically different from the other categories of detainees. they were given more exercise time, hard supervised exercise and games and were promised a chance to watch videos and play video games. they were also to receive lectures on road safety and family planning.


According to a detainee who was in the female section of Diepkloof, detainees in group C were asked time and again to be informers by the security police. An older detainee in group A was moved to group C after it became apparent that the security police wanted her to be a state witness.

The camps have been used for indoctrination purposes, and as a direct and indirect means of recruit informers. A former inmate of the Rodewal Camp explained to journalists 'they taught us about leadership and also about communists and terrorists. They showed us pictures of the Russian AK 47 guns that the terrorists use and the R1 guns that the republic uses and they taught us that the Republican guns are much more powerful. They taught us to believe that the people who say they make war to save us leave us to die...

Another detainee (a student leader) who was approached to go to the same camp after 3 months in detention refused :  
 'I know about Roedewal. It is a place where they indoctrinate people to make them believe that our progressive organisations and the African National Congress are bad and that we should support the government of the Republic!  
 (Washington Post 13 September 1986)

A couple of former detainees told the DPSC that when they were released from the camp they were told that all their problems were over now, they could live nicely, and they wouldn't have problems with education. They were told that they would get back to them and would be in touch. Although indirect, this was clearly aimed at recruiting these youngsters as informers.

How the Security Forces exert influence: the security network, left, forms a shadow structure alongside the normal state structure, right, plugging in at every level.



POSTSCRIPT MAY 27<sup>TH</sup>

DETAINEES AT MODDERBEE HAVE JUST GONE ON HUNGER STRIKE BECAUSE ATTEMPTS WERE MADE TO RECRUIT THE YOUTH INTO THE GREENBEANS. THEY WERE TOLD THEY WOULD BE RELEASED AFTER TWO WEEKS OF TRAINING.

## ASSAULTS AND TORTURE

There is extensive evidence to show that people are being assaulted while they are under arrest. Generally, the patterns of assault and torture fall into two categories. Firstly, there are assaults, often severe, which occur during the "short" detentions - people arrested for about 48 hours. These assaults seem to be directed mostly at the non-activists in communities. Often, they appear to be aimed at intimidating the person from becoming involved in community activities or in resistance.

Secondly, there are severe assaults on people who are being held for long periods. Often these people, and especially children, are assaulted over a few days, held for a long period and then later charged with public violence. These assaults seem to be aimed at two things. Extracting information regarding community and organisational activities or forcing people to confess to "crimes", generally falsely.

## FORCED CONFESSIONS

Statements given to the DPSC by former detainees indicate that emergency detainees are being made scapegoats for various actions, particularly for attacks on police and BLA officials' houses. Apparently the police have been unable to find the people launching such attacks and are only concerned to produce a "culprit" irrespective of whether that person had anything to do with the attack in question.

This brutal and seemingly pointless exercise probably has two main functions. Firstly, to demonstrate that the police are in control of the situation, that those who commit such acts almost always get caught and punished and to "make an example" of such people. Secondly, the lower ranks of the "security forces" are almost certainly under great pressure from their superiors to produce results, to catch the people responsible, and they are not particularly concerned about the methods used or whether those "confessing" really were involved in the attack, as long as they can please their superiors.

The detainees statements generally have one thing in common - they were subjected to intensive and prolonged torture until they agreed to sign a statement confessing to things they did not do. This of course is not a new detention practice. What is remarkable is that many of the detainees so assaulted are picked randomly off the streets, often because they are young and male. There is thus the assumption that people in a particular age range can be credibly presented as having committed a particular act against the state.

THE SHOCK-TROOPS OF THE COUNTER REVOLUTION.

From December<sup>'86</sup> a wave of vigilante attacks against UDF activists was launched in different parts of the country. This sinister development was an attempt by the regime to shift our people's attention away from it as the main source of violence, and to create division and confusion within our communities. The vigilante phenomenon prominent during the first state of emergency had been remarkably absent during the first six months of the national emergency. That is, until December 1986.

Apartheid vigilantes - Uniformed and Ununiformed

It was in the context of a general intensification of state repression that the vigilante phenomenon re-emerged in December '86/Jan. '87. It is significant that:

- \* Attacks by vigilantes seem to have been more or less simultaneously orchestrated, indicating a high degree of co-ordination and planning. Little significant vigilante activity had taken place for six months, yet numerous attacks were now launched in scattered parts of the country.
- \* Large gangs of well-armed vigilantes, (numbering up to 1500 in one instance) launched attacks often with the blatant non-interference or active assistance of members of the security forces. In many cases township residents captured by the vigilantes found themselves arrested en masse by the police.
- \* The resurgence of vigilante attacks comes in the wake of a major onslaught against the organs of popular democracy in the townships - particularly the street committees which have developed over the last eighteen months. Attacks by vigilantes on street committee members fit in with the co-ordinated offensive to set up hundreds of local state committees to break the growing threat posed to apartheid by these organs of popular democracy. Increasingly the pattern is for apartheid elements to set up their own parallel structures at street level, from which they gather information, launch attacks and so on. The creation of such collaborationist structures coincides with the formation of the military dominated Joint

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Management Centres which are co-ordinated by the State Security Council.

\* The announcement in September 1986 that thousands of kits constabels ("instant cops") would be trained in three weeks gave rise to speculation that they would simply be vigilantes in uniform. Subsequent developments have confirmed these fears: not only have they worked in vigilante style, but many of them have been identified as belonging to vigilante gangs. There is also widespread speculation that both forces are trained by the same masters, and that there is a special camp in the Transvaal for the secret training of uniformed and non-uniformed vigilantes, named Askari. The stated aim of the kits konstabels was to "root out the comrades", exactly the rationale given by the vigilantes for their activities. It seems more than coincidence that the rise to prominence of the kits konstabels has coincided with the re-emergence of vigilantes. In certain areas kits konstabels are also involved in setting up reactionary structures at street level.

\* Despite the blatant collaboration between the vigilantes and formal agencies of the state, there has been an attempt in the recent vigilante attacks to project the vigilantes as "ordinary residents" or "older people fed up with the intimidation by the youth". In one instance, the vigilantes described by state spokesmen as "old men of 60" were in fact youth. By presenting the vigilante squads as a spontaneous phenomenon representing "moderates" in the community, the state hopes to distance itself from the atrocities committed by these death squads, and to cause *divisions* in the communities particularly amongst young and old. This is unlikely to succeed given the flagrant co-operation with the "security forces"; and the fact that the vigilantes often - but not always - come from outside the communities; and not least of all because it is the communities themselves and their leaders which are under attack.