

STATEMENT OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS OF SOUTH AFRICA ON
THE OCCASION OF THE MEETING IN LUSAKA ON APRIL 1ST 1980 OF THE
HEADS OF INDEPENDENT STATES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

The liberation of Zimbabwe.

The great victory of the Patriotic forces in Zimbabwe, the forthcoming installation in office of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe constitute a dramatic and glorious historical event, the climax of a century of resistance to colonialism and fifteen years of bitter civil war. The people of Zimbabwe have demonstrated a high level of political maturity by giving an almost total vote of confidence to the national liberation movement and the guerilla forces which had born the brunt of the civil and military offensive against colonialism, racial discrimination, white minority government and the rebel regime.

As we observed in our statement of March 19th, 1980: "The independence of Zimbabwe has driven yet another nail into the coffin of decaying colonialism and racial oppression. This has further titled and consolidated the balance of forces in Southern Africa in favour of the struggling masses."

The African National Congress (South Africa) wishes to take this opportunity to express, on behalf of our members and people, and indeed on behalf of all the oppressed peoples in Southern Africa our heartfelt gratitude to the Frontline States for their generous and undeviating support given to the Patriotic Front and the people of Zimbabwe in their heroic struggle for national independence and a peoples democracy. That victory would have been infinitely more protracted and difficult were it not for the remarkable demonstration of international solidarity on the part of the Frontline States. Their parties, Governments and peoples have undergone great hardships, lost many lives, suffered much destruction of property at the hands of rebel troops and racist armies which violated their national sovereignty in repeated acts of reckless invasion and disregard of international law.

The final result has been a complete vindication of the display of international solidarity by the Frontline States, a support given without the hope of reward or for any self-interest motive, but only on the basis of principle and high ideals. There are not many periods in history

when it can be said without qualification that right has prevailed over might, that truth has triumphed over untruth. The victory of the people of Zimbabwe should be seen as a triumph not only for themselves but also for the people of the Frontline States and all progressive mankind.

We say all these for genuine reasons of admiration and gratitude to the independent states of Africa. Having won their own battles for freedom, they extended the hand of friendship and provided material aid of incalculable value to other peoples and liberation movements that have yet to achieve independence for themselves. We are convinced that our struggle will also be crowned with success and we too through unity and the invincible determination of our people to be free will one day proclaim a truly independent republic in which democracy based on the principle of adult franchise without discrimination on grounds of race, colour or tribe will prevail. When that great historical moment arrives, our sacrifices and those made on our behalf by friendly states and peoples will also receive their vindication and reward.

White South Africa's response.

It is not to be expected that our enemy, the racist regime of Pretoria and the entire Apartheid camp, should view Zimbabwe's independence under majority rule with any degree of satisfaction. There can be no agreement between the oppressed and the oppressor on such fundamental issues as the right of nations to self-determination, democratic self-government, equality before the law and the abolition of man-made obstacles to development and progress of any section of the population. What we, the oppressed people of South Africa regard as a great victory for our cause is bound to strike fear and dismay among the oppressors.

Even at the time of the Lancaster House Talks and increasingly since then, the racists in South Africa manifested a growing unease at a prospect of a victory for the Patriotic Front. The government press and the mass media communicated this state of alarm in vicious vituperation in familiar terms against so-called "terrorists", "communists" and "the Marxist Mugabe". Threats were uttered. It was said that South Africa will not hesitate to intervene in the event of a breakdown of "law and order" during or after the elections. South African troops were stationed in Zimbabwe as an independent task force or as integrated units within the Rhodesian racist army. South Africa's armoured cars invaded Zimbabwe and were seen along the border of

Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique.

Government propaganda and the mass media created in the white minority a condition bordering on mass hysteria when it was announced that the Patriotic forces and ZANU PF led by Robert Mugabe in particular had achieved a resounding victory at the polls. Against this background and under these conditions P.W. Botha, the racist Prime Minister, announced on March 9th, 1980, that he had decided to call a multiracial national convention to deliberate on matters affecting South Africa. Indeed he explained that the people's victory in Zimbabwe's elections had changed South Africa's strategic situation.

The significant reasons for so-called "multiracial solution" must be seen in the wider context of South Africa's "Total Strategy" and plans for a "constellation of Southern African States".

Total Strategy

This is how the South African Minister of Defence, since 1966, P.W. Botha, the present Prime Minister described his approach in 1977 to the raging conflicts within and around South Africa. His White Paper on Defence for 1977 stated that South Africa was "today involved in a war, whether we wish to accept it or not". Attention was drawn to alleged consequences of the liberation in 1975 of Mozambique and Angola; the "terrorist" activities of SWAPO's PLAN in Namibia, or South Africa's armed aggression "to safeguard her security interest" against Angola; the alleged "intervention in the civil war" by the Soviet Union and Cuba, the "relative proximity of Soviet influence and military aid" in Southern Africa; and the consequent "threat to the Republic of South Africa".

This situation, according to the Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, demands the adoption of a "Total National Strategy" of co-ordinated and interdependent activities in all fields: military, psychological, economic, political, social, technological, diplomatically, ideologically and culturally.

Pretoria has declared an intention "to prevent through Western diplomatic action, the build-up of Marxist influence and military power in neighbouring states". Whereas Western diplomacy is projected as a decisive obstacle to the presence and operations of our political and military action is to be taken by South African army. The White Paper states that the army must be maintained

in the state of preparedness for action within South Africa and also in neighbouring states.

This posture is claimed to be "defensive but prepared". The armed forces are organised to present a "credible deterrent". Much attention has been given to "the study and implementation of counter-insurgency". These pronouncements are similar to the declared aims of other reactionary governments that face the revolutionary situation of their own making. The White Paper conveys the determination of the regime to reject demands for radical change and to resist by force within our country and outside the growing demand for national self-determination, a democratic government and race equality.

The army.

The regime claims that its posture is based on the principles of non-aggression, renunciation of territorial ambitions, peace and co-operation with neighbours. Behind the mask, however, the racist autocracy nurtures the dangerous spirit of aggrandizement, engages in reckless adventurism and pursues hegemonic aims.

South Africa's armed forces have repeatedly violated territorial sovereignty of her neighbours. They invaded neighbouring states and perpetrated aggression against civilians and members of the national liberation movement in Zambia, Botswana, Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In addition to its flagrant acts of aggression, Pretoria engages in subversive activities meant to destabilize countries that accommodate refugees, politicians, militants and freedom fighters. South Africa's acts of violence have given rise to angry protests from the members of the international community. In reply, Pretoria, arrogantly asserts a self-granted right to invade states at its own discretion. That, in effect, was claimed in the White Paper. It declares that South Africa was obliged to intervene on a limited scale in Angola to "safeguard her security interest"; "responded to a call for protection by the workers at the hydro-electric scheme of Rua Cana on the Kunene River, extended its intervention to deflect the events of the Angolan civil war to the north border of South West Africa and to inhibit SWAPO's effort to capitalize on to unstable situation in the Southern region of Angola".

Pretoria therefore, impudently includes independent states within its "security zone". Secondly the regime has in its own opinion established a precedent for armed aggression in defence of foreign investments. This display of naked imperialist aggression is a standing threat to other states in the sub-continent.

South Africa's mailed fist hangs heavily over the entire region. In terms of the amendment to the country's Defence Act, South Africa's armed forces have a legal entitlement to operate anywhere within the republic and also in neighbouring states. The amendment indemnifies the government against actions brought in its domestic courts for damages arising out of raids, "hot pursuits", air bombardment, and invasion by armoured columns into other people's territory. If the regime practices a measure of restraint in its external aggression, it does so only because of deference to international opinion and a fear of invoking reprisals.

Pretoria knows that Apartheid cannot survive without continued large-scale support from the Western powers. It depends on them for financial support, military equipment and political backing against opponents throughout Africa for Apartheid and White domination. The White Paper on Defence acknowledges this dependence. The government's foreign policy, it says, endeavours "to emphasize the strategic importance of the Republic of South Africa, the danger of a Marxist infiltration, and extent of the threat of revolutionary take-over in Southern Africa". The reason given for this emphasis is the necessity to mobilize Western countries against the "build-up of Marxist influence and military power in neighbouring states". These states, according to the White Paper lack ability "to successfully initiate aggression against the Republic of South Africa". Some are said however to have the support of a "super power" with capacity to wage integrated war by both revolutionary and conventional means.

Pretoria has appointed itself to be the custodian of "Western humanitarian values and passionately desires to remain the bastion" of Western-American imperialism. The West is urged to inhibit neighbouring states from developing their defence capabilities. The regime directs its attacks against the wide-range of enemies: the national democratic revolution, progressive African states, neighbouring countries, and socialist countries. In the words of the White Paper, White South Africa's enemies aim at:

- (i) The expansion of Marxism through revolutions in Southern Africa;
- (ii) The overthrow of White regimes;
- (iii) The realization by "militant African blocs" and the "Arab blocs" of the aspirations to destroy "so-called colonialism and racialism" and to establish "Pan-Africanism";

- (iv) An indirect strategy to "unleash revolutionary warfare in Southern Africa" by means of isolation to force South Africa to change its domestic policy in favour of the black population.

In pursuance of "Total National Strategy" the state has increased its military expenditure from R61 million in 1961-62 to R1700 million in 1977-78 constituting 18% of the budget and 5% of the G.N.P. The White Paper proposed to expand the permanent force of nearly 30 000 members from 17% of the total military establishment to a target figure of 30%. The permanent force will also increase its quota of Coloured and Indian members and step-up the recruiting of Africans for a Supporting Service Core established in 1975.

The demand of the "Total National Strategy" has led to the whittling away of civil liberties even for the privileged racist minority. The statutes amending the Defence Act and the Civil Defence Act introduced in 1977 have extended the state war-time powers to existing conditions, defined as, "operating in defence of the republic or for the protection or suppression of internal disorder in the Republic".

The Acts increased the period of compulsory national service from 12 to 24 months; authorises the Defence Minister to proclaim a "State of Disaster" in circumstances arising from the influx of refugees into the republic or any consequences arising out of terrorism as defined in the Terrorism Act, 1967.

The regime's armed forces have grown into a monstrous octopus, spreading its tentacles over the entire society, sucking the economy to feed itself and absorbing an increasing number of White youth, now even Blacks, who are ordered to risk their lives in the defence of White privileged propertied classes and their internal backers. The regime has turned the Apartheid state into its personal property, an instrument of total tyranny, the all powerful manipulator for all people and resources on behalf of the White bourgeoisie, a rapacious capitalism, Western - American industrialists and the agents of imperialism. The nerve centre of this many-headed monster is international finance.

South Africa remains an imperialist and neo-colonialist bridgehead.

The past decade marked an important stage in the national liberation movement as colonial empires toppled and dozens of oppressed peoples rose to political independence.

At the same time there is need to emphasise the danger which imperialism and colonialism still present to the newly liberated nations, and those still under foreign domination. On the African continent, the imperialist powers count on maintaining and strengthening the colonial and racist bloc in the south, with South Africa as the main striking force.

Current events in the south of Africa show that South Africa, having become the richest and most developed country in Africa with the help of the Western monopoly capital, has itself become an imperialist, neo-colonialist force vis-a-vis independent African states.

The most striking aspect of South African political life in the post-war period has been apartheid. The single most recurrent theme of its international relations has been the mobilisation of opposition internationally against apartheid, and the countervailing attempts of successive South African governments to neutralise such opposition.

South African policy towards the rest of the world has mainly consisted in attempts, by various means and varying degrees of urgency, to withstand the pressures for internal change and to reduce at the same time the disabling efforts for South Africa of hostility to apartheid. It has also sought to maintain existing, or to create new, gainful international transactions without white minority rule in South Africa being abandoned. In a sense, then, South African international activity has been a little more than the extension of its internal conflict - a struggle to make the world safe for apartheid. This fundamental linkage between domestic and external politics has nowhere been more evident than in South Africa's relations with the rest of Africa.

Because of their domestic social policies South African governments have been apprehensive of political rights being granted to Africans in the colonies to the north of the Union. They feared such concessions would encourage African nationalists within South Africa itself. They also

expected that the African governments which came into being as a result of such concessions would be hostile to racist-ruled South Africa, all the more so because they would be susceptible to non-Western influences - which were unfriendly to South Africa. Thus South Africa opposed decolonisation until it became clear, in the late 1950s, that the process was irreversible. South Africa, however, continued to support every enclave of colonial and settler influence and control which survived.

Indeed, the general sentiment which pervaded policy-domestic as well as foreign - is Pretoria's consistent antagonism to decolonisation and radical forces it seems to generate. The main aim behind the Africa policies of South Africa is still to create in Africa an ideological and organisational milieu which would be favourable to white minority rule in South Africa itself. Continued imperial rule in Africa had the potentiality of providing just such a context.

At the outset, the Nationalist government had hoped to be able to persuade the imperialist powers to co-operate with South Africa in exercising control over Africa on the basis of white supremacy. Dr Malan had proposed an African Charter based on four points:-

- Protection of the indigenous peoples of Africa against penetration by the peoples of Asia, especially India, which had repeatedly intervened in South Africa over the treatment of the Indian minority;
- European "guidance" of African development, to ensure that Africa remained within the European orbit;
- Total suppression of communist activities (including the call for equality);
- No arming of Africans anywhere.

Position of Domination.

The correspondence between South Africa's internal and external policy was most clearly shown by Malan's statement in 1953, when negotiation over the future of the Protectorates of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland, that the Nationalist government was opposed to suggestions that they be granted their independence. The Union could not, he said, "permit Negro states, Bantu states, to rise within our borders, States which are free and

independent and which can lay down their own policy in every respect."

It was during this same period that Malan repeatedly rejected as a "caricature" of Nationalist policy the notion of separate development which later came to be incorporated in the Bantustan policy.

Strijdom carried on where Malan left off. In 1955, in one of his earliest foreign policy statements, he asserted that South Africa could not by itself, maintain White supremacy in South Africa. There would have to be the greatest possible co-operation between various white communities in Southern Africa if they wanted to ensure their existence in Africa. "That is what we generally mean when we talk about African policy", he said.

During the same debate, when the opposition pointed out that South Africa's apartheid policies stood in the way of any agreement with the West, Mr Blaar Coetzee (then Minister of Community Development) replied: "If we are to give up our position of domination in order to gain the friendship of the West, why do we really want their friendship?" This question still stands at the heart of South African foreign policy. Put as a statement, it makes clear that South Africa requires the friendship of such other states as can assist her to maintain "our position of domination".

The thought that the imperialist states in Africa began to fade as the process of decolonisation was set in motion, followed by the disappearance or diminution of many of the communities of white settlers in colonies "threatened with the grant of independence.

The growth of independent African community resulted in the increasing pressure on South Africa for the abolition of apartheid - through the Organization of African Unity, the United Nations, and international support for the national liberation movements of Southern Africa. Coinciding with this was the upsurge during the fifties and early sixties of the oppressed peoples of South Africa itself - culminating in the Sharpeville and Langa shootings. Ultimately came the inevitable adoption of a revolutionary strategy by the people's organisations as the only answer to the ever-intensified repression of the state. From all these pressures emerged South Africa's new policies of Bantustan or "separate development", coupled with the unfolding of its concomitant, the "outward" policy abroad.

Verwoerd blamed the pressure of forces outside South Africa for the decision of the government to embark on the Bantustan experiment at all. "In the light of the forces to which South Africa is being subjected, there is, however, no doubt as to what must be done in the course of time."

The History of Dialogue.

South Africa today calls for dialogue with Africa - but it is to be dialogue on her own terms. When in 1962 the Prime Minister of Nigeria, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, announced in the Nigerian House of Representatives that not only was he prepared to visit South Africa, if invited, but he was willing to exchange ambassadors with Pretoria, Dr Verwoerd accused him of provocation and said, he was not prepared to allow into the country people whose only aim was "to help turn the government away from its policy." A later more significant approach was made by the independent African States in 1969 in the form of the Lusaka Manifesto.

South Africa was openly being invited to make some gesture, however small, of goodwill towards her own non-White people and the peoples of all Africa. In October 1969, then Foreign Minister, Dr Hilgard Muller, in a passing reference, said there was "a lot" in the manifesto with which white South Africa agreed, but a great deal of the document was "based on misconceptions and failure on the part of its authors to inform themselves of the contents and objectives of South Africa's policies."

In November 1970, in an interview with the London "Sunday Telegraph", then Premier Vorster made it clear that any relationship South Africa entered into with Black African states would be made on the basis that there was no interference with South Africa's domestic policy of apartheid. He was not even prepared to have apartheid on the agenda.

Dialogue is a weapon of the White minority government of South Africa to strengthen apartheid in South Africa, to promote the interest of apartheid South Africa in the rest of Africa, to entrench White domination and neo-colonialism in Africa under the banner of anti-communism.

Apartheid Resistance to Change.

The political mask of Apartheid South African strategy purports to be aimed at winning hearts and minds of the people of South Africa. Having robbed Africans of their natural birthright, the right to national self-determination

and citizenship in their own ancestral land, the regime now seeks to recruit them to fight in protection of White man's life and property. Since African Nationalism, the conception of one, single, all embracing nation is diametrically opposed to the Pretoria schemes of perpetual subordination of Blacks, an attempt has been made to substitute tribal nationalism. This device is incorporated in the "New Total Strategy" under the projected three-tier parliament - Whites, Coloureds and Indians - which applies the familiar divide and rule motto. The aim is to split the Coloured and Indian peoples from the Africans. This is the essence of Botha's proposal to call the multi-racial Convention which is a variation of a scheme put up by his predecessor Vorster in 1977.

In the latest version of this proposal, P.W. Botha has surprised the world with the announcement, on March 9, 1980, that his government had decided to summon a conference representative of all races in our country to "deliberate about matters affecting South Africa". He gave as the reason for this decision the fact that the election victory of President Mugabe's ZANU-PF had changed the strategic situation of South Africa.

Does it mean that Botha and his lieutenants have at last recognised the iniquity of the colonial and racist apartheid and acknowledged the justice of our demand for a united and democratic South Africa? Does this move therefore represent a decision by the white minority regime to relinquish its monopoly of power?

The answer to these questions was of course given by Botha himself. For, in the same speech of March 9th, he re-affirmed his racist government's opposition to the democratic principle of one person one vote. He also pledged to maintain white minority domination, declaring that "the National Party will defend the white man, his political rights, culture, and his right to self-determination."

In other words, the apartheid regime stubbornly refuses to learn the simple lesson, so clearly demonstrated in recent years in Mozambique, Angola and now in Zimbabwe, that it is impossible to keep a people in perpetual servitude.

He knows that in this situation, in order to "defend the white man and his political rights", it is not sufficient to place exclusive reliance on the "brave" police of Sharpeville, Soweto, and Silverton fame, or on the much-vaunted might of the racist army, which has not halted the people's march to victory, notwithstanding that its exploits in Southern Africa during the past decade have already cost this continent more than 30 000 innocent lives in Zimbabwe alone.

The purpose of Botha's proposed conference is to involve the Black people in the total strategy for the defence of White minority interests. We the nation of the oppressed, the exploited source of profit accumulation, the victims of discrimination in ghettos, labour compounds, slums are being called upon to defend the oppressor. We are being called upon to put our stamp of approval on the policy known as Apartheid which the international community condemns as a crime against humanity.

We shall not betray Africa and the progressive world. We shall not betray our heroes and martyrs; the men, women, youth and children who fell in the fight for freedom. We shall not betray the national leaders and captured militants whose release from imprisonment has been, and continues to be the subject of world-wide demands and appeals by people from every walk of life.

The Imperialist Nature of South Africa.

Relations with her neighbours.

It is in the nature of capital that it operates only where it can reap the greatest profits in the shortest possible time. In the Southern African region the logical area of investment and operations for international capital is the Republic of South Africa with its great mineral wealth; its well developed infra-structure; its high industrialisation, its limit less reservoirs of semi-skilled and highly skilled labour and its ruthless state machinery that is used to maintain labour peace and the highest rates of exploitation unhindered by considerations of the rights of workers and the need to divert profits to social amenities for the working people.

It can hardly be expected therefore that in a situation where the RSA's neighbours intergrate their economies with ~~the~~ South Africa, giant investors would be persuaded to change the existing infra-structures in favour of the RSA's neighbours thereby reducing their profit margins to build infra-structures and industrialise the countries neighbouring South Africa. Rather they will want to continue a primary situation whereby all these countries remain suppliers of raw-materials that are processed in the RSA industrial complex.

Coupled with this, the thrust of RSA policy itself has been to ensure a growing dependency by her neighbours on South Africa, to make out of the RSA what President Kaunda has called the 'kingpin' in a Southern African constellation. This policy has not come about as a result of the realisation that South Africa has to live and develop with its neighbours but rather is a continuation of old policies that have at various times being termed differently.

These policies have crystalised in what is now termed Total Strategy and foresee a South African counter-offensive that is directed against her neighbours in the economic, military, diplomatic and cultural fields, combining economic bribery with military aggression, diplomatic offensives with cultural aggression.

To understand this we have to examine the nature and volume of South African investments where these have been undertaken in neighbouring states. A review of these confirms that they have been limited to two major fields: the non-productive sector and the extension of infrastructures that serve the extractive industries.

South African investments are rarely in fields that promote industrialisation, which is not what her neighbours need to reduce dependency and promote development and welfare. South Africa is against industrialisation in the neighbouring states that would compete with her industries as she regards her neighbours as markets for her industrial production and as sources of raw-materials, such as Zambian copper; Swazi iron ore; Zimbabwean coal, gold and chrome; Angolan gold, oil, diamonds and iron ore, Botswana's diamonds, copper and nickel, Mocambican energy and Lesotho's water.

Furthermore South Africa discourages two ways mutually beneficial trade with her neighbours in order to protect her industrial products and improve her balance of payments. As the only industrial economy in Southern Africa she has a favourable balance of trade with her neighbours as opposed to her other export markets and uses protectionist clauses in her trade agreements.

South Africa's overall balance of trade has been deteriorating. In the early sixties her average annual trade gap was £141 million. Between then and now there has been a steady increase of this gap which is only balanced out by the gold boom of the early seventies and the closing of the last decade.

On the other hand the encouragement of South African investments in neighbouring countries carries with it the danger, through the demand for appropriate safeguards as regards taxation, repatriation of profits, guarantees in relation to nationalisation and the position of expatriate (white South African) workers, that the neighbouring states will firstly - be hindered from developing their own industries by having to use South African goods and services, which is presently common practice in bilateral investment and secondly, will be importing South Africa's racial system where white South African workers and experts are on contracts that exclude African apprenticeship whilst importing frictious attitudes into neighbouring countries. Thirdly South African capital in-ports with the accompanying expertise involve economic disadvantages for the countries involved through the high cost of imported white labour - which raises production costs; the strain on the balance of payments through the repatriation of salaries and dividends and the instability caused by a fluctuating manpower situation (expatriate expertise) which at the same time retards the progression of local skilled labour.

Another consideration arising out of dependence on South African export markets for primary goods and minerals is that South Africa herself is self-sufficient in nearly all the minerals she needs. Her climatic conditions make self-sufficient in all essential agricultural products. Dependence on her as an export market carries with it the danger that this market can be closed off to her neighbours without much dislocation for the South African economy itself but with dire consequences for her neighbours. Such a position of dependence also opens her neighbours to political blackmail and infringement of their sovereignty and independence in various ways.

Taking into account that the oppressed majority in South Africa is stepping up its liberation struggle with the support of the OAU member states and progressive sections of the international community it is worth noting that those who formulate policy in South Africa, in considering the survival of the system, recommend that: "If the RSA were to experience real hardships as a result of sanctions however, the country will obviously put the interests of its own people above those of neighbouring countries The half million foreign workers for instance would be sent home the RSA certainly would not share the limited stocks of fuel with neighbouring black states. Production of manufactured goods with a sizable imported content would presumably be cut to suit South Africa's internal needs at the expense of potential users elsewhere in the region."

This economic position of South Africa vis-a-vis her neighbours is reinforced by military, diplomatic and propaganda measures. The regular threats and acts of aggression that emanate from Pretoria are coordinated with these economic measures that are intended eventually to place South Africa in a position of total domination of the region and control of large areas of the African continent.

The aggression perpetrated against neighbouring countries has pointedly sought to cripple them economically, not only to discourage them from supporting the national liberation movement of the African people but also to force them to submit to South African dominance.

South African imperialism, which is a progeny of British imperialism has outgrown its baby shoes, becoming of age and assuming its own dynamic both in conjunction and in competition with other major imperialist powers. The development of monopoly capital as the prime mover in the South African economy is creating a military-industrial complex that needs markets to conquer. With the greater amalgamation of "English", "Afrikaans" and foreign capital, monopoly corporations and the military establishment have created an alliance at the summit of state power and evolved a defensive strategy that is operative through outward expansion. The result has been growing pressure on the South African government to initiate a Common Market of Southern Africa - to include countries as far afield as Zaire. The late Verwoerd was the first to enunciate the idea as far back as 1963 followed by the then Minister of Economic Affairs, Jan Haak, in 1965 when

opening a conference on "A Common Market in Africa - as marketing concept." He advocated links similar to those existing between South Africa and her Reserves (Bantustans) and the former High Commission Territories to be extended to other African countries.

These ideas have since been constantly elaborated. In 1967 by Eschel Rhodie, then a senior diplomat, in his book, "The Third Africa"; in 1969 in a study commissioned by the University of Pretoria on the feasibility of the project; in 1970 by a conference held at Victoria Falls. Since then various South African politicians and industrialists including Vorster, have expounded and explored the idea.

Botha's Constellation comes as a crystallisation of the idea, a coming of maturity in the light of the change in the balance of forces within the South African system itself and in the region.

In 1968 it was crudely stated that "our economic and political objectives in Southern Africa are to harness all natural and human resources from Table Mountain to the border of the Congo River ... Countries like Rhodesia, Malawi, Portuguese East Africa, will be amicably persuaded to adopt the Rand as their currency There is already a Resources Planning Council for Southern Africa which has to investigate and advise all countries in Southern Africa to avoid duplication of certain industries, which duplication could lead to extravagance and unnecessary competition between countries. Member countries of the Common Market could complement one another. For example, the Republic of South Africa could manufacture machinery, chemicals, and electrical appliances - while the Transkei could produce jute, Swaziland sugar, Botswana beef and Lesotho water."

In 1978 it was said with more refinement that: "Firstly South Africa will have to show a greater awareness of post-colonial requirements such as to adopt a greater African posture than at present ... South Africa should continue to show her willingness to seek rapprochement with Africa with a view to cooperation and such approaches should not be made from a position of weakness but from a position of military and economic strength

It is well known that if an association is to be mutually beneficial it has to be entered into on the basis of equality, ensuring that it is complimentary. Association as offered by Botha in a constellation of Southern African states is obviously lopsided. It serves three basic

functions: to create markets for South Africa's manufactured goods and capital exports; to create buffer zones of economically dependent states around her after failing to maintain buffers through the military option; to present an image to the world of a South Africa in the process of progressive evolution which would enhance the chances of hostility against apartheid being reduced or neutralised and facilitating capital exports to South Africa coupled with breaking out of the growing isolation that is being imposed on South Africa for her policies.

These are economic, military and diplomatic considerations serving the interests solely of South Africa.

General Magnus Malan, Chief of the SADF says: "These are those who see only two basic points of views: on the one side war, on the other peace. I do not subscribe to such a simplistic view. There is no such thing as total peace at any given time. A mature or developed state must approach such matters from a basis of complete strategy. This entails a united and collective effort which includes diplomacy, politics, economics, industry, local authorities, the military.

None can plan and go its own way independently. There must be coordination.

It is therefore no accident or conversion on Botha's part that he should propose constellation as foreign policy, convention as internal policy and threats of aggression outwardly with increased repression inwardly.

Towards the people's government.

White South Africa relies on military power and an advanced industrial economy to impose its will on neighbouring countries and other peoples on the continent. The government of independent states in the region recognise that unbalanced development is a threat to political freedom. They have therefore taken collective action to promote self-reliance, social progress and economic independence. Seventeen states signed a Declaration of Intent in March 1978 in which they affirm a commitment" to the principle of establishing a Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African

States as a first and major step towards the creation of an effective common market".

The members of the proposed FTA recognized the "unique situation" of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland which by reasons of history and geography have been integrated into a Customs Union with South Africa. Together with Mozambique they supply migrant workers to the South African economy. The supplier countries agreed at a sub-regional conference in 1978 to harmonise their policies with a view to creating domestic employment opportunities in substitution for the external migration of workers. Southern Africa Labour Commission comprising the supplier states was formed in January 1980 to initiate and co-ordinate projects and improve production capacity and obtain the required material, financial and technical support.

We welcome and pay tribute to the parties, governments and people who have taken a firm stand against South Africa's military and economic power by adopting policies designed to develop their own resources in every sphere of social activity. In this way Africa can demonstrate in practice its utter rejection of the Apartheid system which institutionalises White hegemony over the Black majority.

As we have observed, the regime has no intention of bringing about changes that would enable the majority to determine their own destiny. On the contrary P.W. Botha's strategy is to widen the scope of white power by means of an economic constellation throughout the sub-continent.

Independent Africa has taken action to eliminate the last bastions of colonialism and racism in Southern Africa. The responsibility for putting an end to this detested tyranny which perpetuates the worst features of an obsolete colonialism however rests upon the oppressed people of South Africa, spearheaded by the African National Congress (South Africa) and its revolutionary army. In the words of our President, Comrade Oliver Tambo, "we have a strategy for victory whose indispensable imperative is unity in action, a sustained and ever growing attack and resistance on all fronts, and which requires constant consultations among all our patriotic people at national, regional and local levels, to ensure a co-ordinated offensive for the attainment of agreed strategic and technical goal".

Our conception of our multilateral offensive embraces a military struggle in conjunction with political mobilization and industrial organization. We have demonstrated that our people have the will and the capacity to advance on all three fronts. We enter the last round with complete confidence based on more than three hundred years of resistance to foreign domination, the accumulated experience of three quarters of a century long struggle for national unity and peoples power, and the unqualified support^{of} independent Africa, the socialist world and progressive forces of mankind.