

Were the secret budgets of the state apparatuses used by De Klerk's opponents within the NP to fight his strategic direction? It is alleged this opposition is backed by the Barend du Plessis and Magnus Malan faction.

Thus, by the time of the Inkathagate scandal De Klerk had to act decisively. De Klerk used the scandal to neutralise those seeking to undermine his strategy. He responded with an approach which, whilst not securing him a political victory, prevented total public humiliation for him and his party.

His response showed his understanding of the inherent fragility of the NP with its different provincial parties, leadership styles, and political traditions. His post-Inkathagate moves were echoed how he handled the departure of PW Botha: firm but respectful. He did not engage in that sport beloved by newly elected NP leaders – the ousting and humiliation of their political opponents. Instead of displacing his adver-

saries onto the extr-parliamentary terrain he tried to retrain their loyalty within the confines of the NP.

His moves meant the sidelining of Malan and Vlok, the transfer of the National Intelligence Service to the lowly portfolio of the Deputy Minister of Finance and the detachment of Armscor from its historical relationship with the SADF.

SMALL FACTIONS

Malan and Vlok could not be expelled into the extra-parliamentary wilderness where their actions could not be contained. By retaining them in the cabinet De Klerk was preventing the coalescing of small factions which these ministers already possessed within the party.

Malan's demotion displayed De Klerk's faith that "professional" and constitutionally motivated factions within the SADF would not oppose his actions. He was trying to out-manoeuvre the Military Intelligence/Special

Forces axis through the winning of these more "verligte" SADF factions.

Roelf Meyer's appointment as the young and "yuppish" Minister of Defence indicated the seriousness with which DE Klerk intended incorporating the SADF into his programme of political transformation.

The manner in which De Klerk carried out the reshuffle showed he wanted to ensure the primacy of civilian control over the NP. He informed Vlok and Malan of his decision the day before the weekly meeting of the State Security Council. He was not going to negotiate with the security establishment about that.

These moves have meant that De Klerk can add civilianised Defence and Law and Order ministries to his existing power base. This base includes: the bulk of the rank and file of the NP; the Cabinet; the Broederbond; most of the executive members of the state bureaucracy; Afrikaner intelligentsia; large sectors of big business; and certain factions within the security establishment (particularly the army and the navy).

ARMSCOR

The removal of Armscor from the SADF entailed halving the Special Defence Account. Its transfer to a civilian ministry situated its operations within the orbit of the private sector and its traditional forms of accountability.

De Klerk is astute enough to recognise that he cannot proceed with his programme without the ANC and other major political parties. But like all other elements of the ruling bloc he prefers to negotiate with a weakened ANC. Therefore, the differences among the various factions within the NP are about form, detail and not essence: the extent to which they can use violence to achieve this purpose. ♦

Why De Klerk did the shuffle?

A MAYIBUYE correspondent offers an opinion about De Klerk's cabinet shuffles in the wake of the Inkathagate scandal.