

Legislation, Registration, Emasculation

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In January 1980, the 14 unions affiliated to the Federation of South African Trade Unions applied for registration under the newly amended Industrial Conciliation Act. In one sense it is not surprising that they did so - the demand for statutory recognition has been the main demand of the African trade union movement¹ since its inception in the early 1920s, and the amended Act does accord African unions statutory recognition. But it is surprising that the decision of these unions to apply for registration was accompanied by so little debate and discussion. It is particularly surprising when one reflects on the criticisms which have been levelled at the Wiehahn-inspired legislation, not least by FOSATU itself, and the clear statements by Ministers that a principal intention of the legislation is to subject African trade unions to state control.

The only substantial statement of position on the question of registration came from the Western Province General Workers Union which argued against unions applying for registration under present conditions (see the Union's memorandum in SALB 5(4) November 1979). The reasons which inspired the FOSATU's decision to make an application for registration (in the particular form in which they did) have not been similarly publicly expressed. One can only deduce FOSATU's motivations from its actions, press statements and from the actions of its affiliates.

The intention of this article is to take this unengaged debate over registration a step further than the General Workers Union memorandum and to suggest broader reasons why the correct strategy for independent unions is to stay out of the fold of the registered unions. This will present an opportunity to delineate the divergent organisations approaches inherent in the alternatives of registration and non-registration.

African Trade Unions and the State

The position in which African trade unions found themselves after the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act, came into force is unprecedented in their history. They have never before been offered the option of gaining legal recognition. Indeed, one could argue that legal recognition was never seriously a policy possibility for the state until the mid-1970s. However, there have been important changes in the state's relationship to African trade

unions over the last 40 years. The Wiehahn legislation is the most recent of these changes which bear a brief summary.

African unions were at their strongest from the late 1930s until just after the Second World War. Although they were not recognised under any law and none of the various schemes for non-statutory recognition proposed by the Departments of Labour and Native Affairs, were put into effect, unions were given *de facto* recognition by government departments, local authorities and many employers.² The Cape Town Stevedoring and Dockworkers Union, with a large African membership, was even party to an Industrial Council. Union membership grew considerably as more Africans were drawn into the thriving war-time industry. By 1945, CNETU had a membership of almost 160 000 on the Witwatersrand. The growth of unions, accompanied as it was by strikes and other forms of industrial unrest, prompted the state to consider recognising African trade unions and subjecting them to some sort of control. Throughout the 1940s, there were continual discussions on how African unions should be dealt with. The unions, supported by the South African Trade and Labour Council (SATLC), demanded that the definition of employee in the Industrial Conciliation Act be amended to include all workers. Industry also voiced some support for such a step. However, the draft bill stopped far short of this. It provided for a separate recognition for African trade unions which denied the right to strike (already withheld under War Measure 145) and provided no guarantee that unions would gain membership of Industrial Councils. Mixed unions and unregistered unions were to be prohibited. The bill was widely rejected by African labour and political organisations as well as by the TLC and some sections of industry. It was never brought before parliament.

When the Nationalist government came to power in 1948, it appointed a Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Legislation (the Botha Commission). The Commission reported in 1951 and unanimously recommended recognition of African trade unions. Like the 1947 bill, it proposed a separate recognition for African unions. It also proposed a limited right to strike.

The line of action finally chosen by the state tended in a new direction - away from measures to contain the African union movement and towards a policy of suppressing the movement without actually prohibiting it. The reasons for the decision by the state to change its relationship to the African trade unions in this particular way are complex and have to be seen in the context of the changing conditions of class struggle which emerged in the 1950s. Lewis argues that the state could not afford to give any encouragement to the organisation of African workers as this would strengthen the base of the

ANC which was embarking on a new phase of disciplined and co-ordinated political action.³ This highlighted the danger that African unions would tend to turn to politics and threaten industrial strikes in support of political demands.

The attack on the African unions was part of a wider attack launched by the state against the dominated classes and their organisations. The African trade union movement was to be de-politicised and weakened by the enforced removal of militant leaders by means of the Suppression of Communism Act and by the outlawing of all strikes under the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act. Works Committees were introduced to provide a substitute for trade unions. The latter could still exist but had no special rights in law. As this period of more directed struggles progressed the African union movement became drawn into the political struggles of the dominated classes to an increasing degree. Most African trade unions joined SACTU, which was formed in 1955 and soon became closely associated with the Congress movement. In the following decade, the bannings of organisations, police intimidation and the banning, banishment and detention of individuals brought the African union movement to the point of collapse. The movement had virtually no effective existence in the 1960s, but emerged once more in the early 1970s. The strikes in Durban in 1973 and the reconstruction of an African trade union movement in the following years elicited no major change in state policy. Amendments to the labour laws in 1974 and 1977, introduced the Liaison Committee as a new alternative to trade unions. This new effort to make trade unions redundant was eagerly adopted by a more labour-relations conscious management.

A change in state policy towards African unions was heralded by the appointment of the Wiehahn Commission in 1977. The legislation following the Wiehahn Commission represents a fundamental shift in the attitude of the state to the manner in which industrial conflict should be contained. As in the early 1950s, when the state last restructured its relationship to African trade unions, the action takes place against the background of spontaneous struggles of the dominated classes, semi-organised/led by the black petty bourgeoisie. Just as the state was then anxious to prevent the ANC leading a strong trade union movement, it is now frightened that the radical petty bourgeoisie might succeed in influencing working class action through the trade unions. But material conditions are very different from the 1950s. The huge growth of the South African economy during the 1960s, the expansion of monopoly capital, changes in the labour process, the need for large quantities of black skilled and semi-skilled labour have necessitated a more tolerant attitude to worker organisation on the part of both business

and government. In addition, international pressures through foreign governments, overseas labour organisations and multi-nationals have inclined the state towards adopting a form of labour control which is more 'internationally acceptable'.

In 1953 the unions had no choice but to reject the Native Labour Act which attempted to deny them any role in labour relations. The state's strong action against the unions was made possible by their inability to effectively oppose the new system. Works Committees may not have operated, but the trade unions and the political movements were not able to challenge their existence as the only legally recognised avenue for African worker grievances. Today, the unions are given a choice. They are offered the possibility of legal recognition and participation in the structures of the Industrial Conciliation Act. This offer is, however, tied to certain conditions, which reflect a new state initiative to crush progressive tendencies in the trade union movement. Again, today there exists a greater potential for the African trade union movement to oppose the 'new dispensation' - at the very least it has powerful international links which could be harnessed. But the tendency so far has been for African trade unions to take actions calculated more to support the state's initiative than to undermine it.

The decision of the African trade unions over registration must obviously take account of the motives of the state in proffering legal recognition. The aim of the state is to foster the growth of 'responsible' bureaucratised African trade unions, ideally with a membership of more-skilled workers. These will slot into the Works Council/Industrial Council system alongside the older registered unions. The state offers recognition on its own terms. It wants to exercise a strict and limiting control over all aspects of the operation of African unions which favour the emergence of a strong independent trade union movement.

It is, of course, a matter for debate whether the legislation enacted will necessarily be suited to this purpose. It might be argued that unions could take advantage of the way in which the law is drafted to circumvent its intention. There are two points to be made here. Firstly, the present legislation provides no basis for such debate. More legislation is scheduled for 1980, after the second report of the Wiehahn Commission, and the first report was unambiguous in recommending measures to afford a registered democratic union no margin for principled existence. Secondly, as we will discuss below, there are tendencies within some of the unions which make a principled existence - even without additional controls - most unlikely.

Union Reactions to the New Act

The reactions of parallel unions to the legislation have been predictable. Even before the state's decision to permit migrants and 'commuters' to belong to registered African unions by exemption, the parallels had indicated that they would seek registration. TUCSA, which had always refused to embark on any real campaign to organise African workers, suddenly began to encourage its affiliates to form parallel African unions to take advantage of the new dispensation. (See Cooper/Enser in this issue).

Unions belonging to the Consultative Committee of Black Trade Unions, have not taken a united stand on registration. Several of the unions are considering registration while expressing reservations about the continued ban on foreign members and provisional registration.^{3a}

The Western Province General Workers Union, the Food and Canning Workers Union and the African Food and Canning Union took a firm stand against the Report of the Wiehahn Commission at the outset. The General Workers Union argued that 'two non-negotiable principles - the right of workers to join unions of their choice, and control by workers over every aspect of their unions' activities are threatened both by the majority recommendation of the Wiehahn Commission and by the legislation.⁴ The Union states that independent unions can only avoid compromising these principles by refusing to register. The WPGWU, the FCWU and the AFCWU have passed a resolution not to consider registration until the laws on provisional registration and the ban on racially mixed unions are lifted and they are given a clear assurance 'that none of the new controls proposed by the Wiehahn Commission will be introduced into the law'.

FOSATU's response to Wiehahn was not at all clear cut. It welcomed the initial report but severely criticised the government response to it. It seemed to see a great difference between the recommendations of the Commission and the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act. This difference was pictured as being over the Commission's proposal that all black workers be permitted to belong to registered unions and the legislation's exclusion of contract workers. When this aspect of the law was changed by ministerial decree FOSATU still declared its dissatisfaction with the racial restrictions on union membership, the wide powers of the minister, the Registrar, the Industrial Courts and the NMC and the provisions for provisional registration. Nevertheless, FOSATU affiliates decided that they would apply together for registration on condition that their unions were exempt from certain aspects of the law of which they disapproved (racial bars, provisional regis-

tration, no right of appeal to the courts over the Industrial Courts, the possibility that the Minister might split up existing unions).

FOSATU has made it clear that it is applying for registration reluctantly. It, in fact, pleads that it is compelled to register by the 'unprincipled' actions of the parallel unions and their progenitors.⁵ Paradoxically, the 'unprincipled actions' complained of seem to consist of applying for registration when so many substantial shortcomings remain in the legislation. FOSATU believes that registration (subject to its conditions, is a necessary defence against the parallel unions. It is hard to see how such a position can be maintained. FOSATU seems to fear that if unions stay unregistered, the bosses will refuse to meet with them as they have in the past for this reason. Parallel unions will step into the breach with stop orders and seats on the Industrial Council, thus bypassing the representative union. FOSATU believes that the most important advantage of registration is that it will remove one excuse the bosses use to refuse recognition. But this is hardly the most important excuse. Strength of organisation will always be the determinant of whether a democratic union is recognised. The question is whether unions will be able to maintain a truly democratic structure under the controls imposed by registration. FOSATU is aware of the disadvantages of incorporation into the industrial legislation system and apparently does not intend to enter Industrial Councils. But the bosses are just as likely to refuse to talk to a union which does not join the Industrial Council, as they are to reject an unregistered union.⁶

At this point we must, however, ask what FOSATU sees as being the main difference between its unions and the parallels. It is surely the fact that parallel unions are inclined towards the bosses and the interests of members of the parent union and gain adherence through stop orders and benefit funds, whereas independent unions command the support of the workers directly. But registration, and the attendant controls and procedures of the Industrial Conciliation Act will tend to undermine worker control and democracy. Registration will tend to strip independent unions of the factors which distinguish them from the parallel unions. The only defence against parallel unions is democratic organisation and a reliance on the organised strength of the workers. If unions look to registration, or a closed shop agreement, or a benefit fund, or membership of an Industrial Council for their existence, they will become indistinguishable from the bureaucratised welfare institutions which commonly pass for trade unions in South Africa.

Wiehahn and the Weakness of African Trade Unions

Before examining the implications of independent unions, registering or not registering, we need to ask why the state is seeking a change in its relationship with the African trade union movement. There is, of course, no single reason, but the strength of the African union movement is commonly held to be a very important factor.⁷ Webster and Bonner⁸ comment that 'Between them **these unions** have fostered a sense of working-class power which has presented the South African state with a serious problem'. (my emphasis) FOSATU states: 'There is no doubt that it is the years of struggle by the workers **and the representative organisations** that have led to the changes in the legislation'⁹ (my emphasis) But is this view justified? Is the state really concerned about the African union movement as it exists today- with less than 100 000 members, many of whom belong to tame parallel unions? It is rather the case that the organised strength of the working class has not been a major factor behind the new system. The most striking feature about the African trade union movement, and most particularly in the most important industrial areas of the country, is its weakness. its weakness both in terms of numbers and strength of organisation. The militant struggles of the dominated classes since 1973 have in each case been characterised by spontaneity. Leadership of these struggles has not been taken up by 'the workers and their representative organisations', but by the black petty bourgeoisie.

The new Industrial Conciliation Act must be seen in the first instance as a part of the state's response to the broader struggles of the popular classes. The state is in the process of conceding a place in the state apparatus to a section of the black population - it is moving away from the rigid racially exclusive form of state which has characterised South Africa up till now. The section of the black population which the state is trying to co-opt into support for the form of state is narrowly defined to include the black petty-bourgeoisie and certain strata of skilled workers. The recent concessions (reflected in the reports of both the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions) - the house ownership schemes, community councils, municipal status for black townships, etc. - **are aimed at precisely these groups**. The new approach being taken by the state is rooted in an effort to change its relationship with the black petty bourgeoisie (specifically the urban black petty bourgeoisie), not, at this stage, to change its relationship with the working class. If the state's new approach is to succeed, it is important that it **forestall** the development of a democratic trade union movement which is either controlled democratically by the working class or led by radical elements of the petty-bourgeoisie. It is the task of the Wiehahn legislation to do this.

The legislation, in this context, performs two central functions. Firstly, it is framed and calculated to encourage the organisation of skilled black workers and to exclude the organisation of unskilled migrant workers. It will also attack the informal job reservation which currently hinders the upward movement of the top ranks of black workers and supervisors. All the 'positive' aspects of the legislation are intended to benefit only this section of the working class. The legislation aims to divide the working class.

Secondly, the legislation seeks to entrench reformist political practices in the African trade union movement. It attempts to draw them into an industrial relations system which pre-disposes unions to become bureaucratic and hence allows a petty bourgeois leadership to remove control over the union's affairs from the working class. The act of registration alone will not transform a democratic union in this manner, but the web of controls and regulations encouraging the making of major decisions by the leadership as opposed to the workers, encouraging the use of law as opposed to organisation as the first weapon of the union, surely will.

In two recent cases, FOSATU affiliates have taken actions which tend to align these unions with the intention of the state in the above two respects: In the first instance, Mr. Ike van der Watt, general secretary of the S.A. Boilermakers' Society revealed that FOSATU metal unions had agreed not to oppose the formation of a new parallel union by the Society on condition that 'it only recruits black workers in skilled jobs'.¹⁰ Since SEIFSA removed job reservation clauses from the Industrial Council agreement in 1978, skilled African workers have been employed in engineering plants. This has meant that the Boilermakers Society no longer has 100% membership of all craftsmen which weakens its position in bargaining.¹¹ Van der Watt wants to incorporate the skilled African workers in a parallel union to rectify this state of affairs. He has been quoted as describing the Industrial Conciliation Act as 'South Africa's finest legislation' and as regarding trade unions as strong 'if they can control their membership'.¹² The attractions of this decision to the MAWU leadership are clear. Its metal unions will doubtless stand a better chance of being registered after engaging in this type of alliance with a 'responsible' registered union. Also, the FOSATU metal unions will, in this case, not have to confront the difficulties inherent in both skilled and unskilled workers being members of one union. However, this step is in direct contradiction to FOSATU's stated aim of establishing 'broadly based industrial unions ... so as to escape the fragmented, craft based divisions that characterise the weak registered trade union movement'.¹³ More importantly, a stance like this splits the African working class exactly on the lines envisaged by the state.

Secondly, there is the example of the FOSATU-affiliated United Auto Workers Union in the continuing struggles in Port Elizabeth. The black workers at the Ford Struandale plant went on strike in protest against the forced resignation of Thozamile Botha, a Ford employee who was head of the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation. (PEBCO) As a result of this action, Botha was re-employed. In the first three weeks of November, there were three more strikes/walk-outs, in protest against the attitudes of white workers at the plant as well as other conditions in the factory. Ford eventually dismissed 700 workers, the entire African work-force at the Cortina plant. The UAW, although unregistered, is recognised by Ford as the mouthpiece of the workers - it claims membership of more than half the workers at the plant. Nevertheless, the Union clearly had no hand in the organisation of the walk-outs and had no power to terminate them.¹⁴ Several press reports have suggested that the workers turned to PEBCO to lead them, because the Union was not doing enough for them.¹⁵ After the workers were fired, a PEBCO organised committee asked to negotiate with Ford for their re-instatement. Ford agreed, but insisted that the UAW be present. However, the UAW refused to co-operate with the committee as 'this would implicate the union in the unrest'.¹⁶ The Union stated that it would only ask Ford to re-employ those workers who were union members. The Sunday Tribune reported that: 'Mr. George Manase, national organiser of the UAW, said yesterday that the Union regarded this week's strike as political and its move to have union members re-employed was to keep politics out of the factory'.¹⁷

This is exactly the stance which the state wishes to encourage in African trade unions. These unions should steer clear of politics, resist all pressures to add their organisational strength to the political struggles led by the radical petty bourgeoisie. One should not gauge FOSATU's attitude to these questions from the actions of the UAW alone, but the UAW is an important member of FOSATU, with a membership of well over 10 000 spread all over South Africa and these statements have gone unrepudiated. This attitude to politics seems to command support within FOSATU as a whole.

There are good reasons why African workers organisations should exercise care in defining their relationship to bodies such as PEBCO. If a union is to represent the class interests of its members, it must be democratically controlled by the workers and not subordinated to the needs of other classes. But this is not to say it must avoid any form of alliance with organisations dominated by other classes. This is particularly true when working class organisation is weak and the working class is incapable of leading the struggles of the dominated classes itself. But one suspects that FOSATU's reason for being unwilling to associate itself with bodies like PEBCO is rather its fear

that such alliances will meet with the disapproval of the state. In the first issue of *Isisebenzi*, the FOSATU newsletter, workers are pointedly reminded that SACTU (pictured as FOSATU's most immediate predecessor) 'was forced out of existence and into exile because of its close links with political organisations'.¹⁸

FOSATU's ban on politics is not a neutral stance. To see this, we have only to contrast its attitude to compromises with reactionary white petty bourgeois unions like the Boilermakers Society with its attitude to alliances with black mass-based movements. The attitude of the metal unions affiliated to FOSATU sanctions the operation of a parallel union which aims to get acceptance through its ability to control its members. On the other hand, FOSATU seeks to distance itself from PEBCO, even when workers are raising PEBCO demands in the factory itself. A willingness to compromise with the state and white workers, but not with black political movements which command the support of the majority of a union's membership still further follows the designs of the Wiehahn Commission.

Registration not only associates unions with the state's intentions to divide the working class and instill in their organisations reformist political practices, it gives active support to these intentions. In so doing, registration will serve to range unions against the spontaneous struggles of the popular classes. The issue at stake here is who should control the organisations of the working class: (1) the working class itself through democratic organisation and through maintaining its independence from the black petty bourgeoisie, (2) the black petty bourgeoisie through subordinating worker organisations to its political organisations, or (3) the petty bourgeoisie and the state through the industrial relations system.

Registration and Legalism

The question which remains to be answered is why have many independent unions decided to apply for registration. Can a mode of operating be read into these unions' actions which makes their application for registration no surprise? Or is it just an 'error of judgment' which will doubtless be set to rights through a withdrawal of the registration requests as soon as the full intention of the state is revealed after the next Wiehahn report?

It is appropriate here to note the implications of the tradition of 'legalism' in which FOSATU affiliates and other unions have placed themselves. The registered trade union movement in South Africa (see deClercq in this edition) has throughout its history, placed an extreme reliance on the rights which

unions and workers have had under the law. This applies not only to accepting the law as setting the limits to these rights, but more particularly to using legal procedures (and the associated means of petitions, deputations and press campaigns) to secure the enforcement of these rights. Basic employment conditions have been set on the one hand by the Factories, Workmens Compensation and UIF Acts and on the other by the operation of the Industrial Conciliation and Wage Acts. Applications for and representations to Wage Boards and Arbitration Boards or participation in Industrial Councils and Conciliation Boards have long been the major means by which unions have sought to gain improvements for their members. Unions have regarded it very important that minimum wages and conditions be enshrined in law because this allows the enforcement of these standards by force of law.

In practice, the unions came to rely only on the law for the enforcement of these minima and consequently neglected to ensure that the organisation of the workers was strong. There is no need for a close relationship between officials and the rank and file when the formal structures of the Industrial Conciliation and Wage Acts are the main tools of the union. An official's time is better spent preparing submissions and memoranda than in building strong democratic organisation. Legal actions under the legislation can extend also to cases against the Minister and Registrar of Trade Unions over refusals to register a trade union, amend registration certificates or gazette Wage Board recommendations or Industrial agreements.

The point I wish to make is that registered unions are not, and have generally never been, firmly based on anything which could meaningfully be termed the organised strength of the workers. Isolated demands have been won through sudden displays of militant worker solidarity, but the unions have not organised in such a manner as to make worker unity the main and constant base of their strength. In general, workers are brought together only sporadically for banner waving meetings to show support for wage or other demands to be put before one of the councils or boards. Strikes are infused with spontaneity and are often used by unions merely to force to the attention of the Department of Labour or the Industrial Council, that a 'dispute' exists and that a suitable board should be appointed as soon as possible. The base of these unions is not the organised workers. They owe their existence and success rather to the legal supports of the industrial legislation.

The unregistered unions, having much less recourse to law, have had to rely to some extent on the organised strength of the workers for their successes. But frequently they have used the excuse of inferior legal rights, in particular the lack of legally-sanctioned collective bargaining structures, to

explain the failure of unions to be an effective means of winning further victories. It is true that the limits to legalism placed on them by their unregistered status make the law alone an unsatisfactory means for advancing their members' interests. But this has not caused most unions to organise strongly. They have merely sought alternative bases for a legalistic strategy. Such bases have been found either in parallelism or in overseas pressures on foreign firms and 'Codes of Conduct'. Union recognition has been sought on the basis of registered union patronage or on the goodwill of multinationals rather than through the organised strength of the workers. The united action on the basis of which many unions won their first demands was seldom successfully transformed into a strong organisation to take the struggle forward. Organisation lapsed as union leaders succumbed to the temptation of legalism and international pressures.

The mounting number of legal actions sponsored by unions indicates not merely greater activity, but also a tendency to prefer legal approaches to problems when an organisational approach is more apposite. One needs only to look at the Labour Law Bulletin to see the number of organisational questions which are treated legalistically.

Unregistered unions have been unsuccessful in weaving strength from the law, international pressure and the enlightenment of big business. Some see the root cause of their failure to advance their members interests in the refusal of management to meet with them and negotiate legally binding agreements. They look to registration to correct the situation. Incorporation under the new Industrial Conciliation Act will indeed offer the law new prospects to prove itself a sound and effective weapon of the unions. Quite apart from legally negotiated agreements, one can envisage battlefields of new legal cases for the FOSATU unions a challenge of the Registrar's refusal to register them over paper parallel unions, court applications to procure the extension of their registration certificates (new occupations and new areas), urgent interdicts against the admission of employer-built parallels into Industrial Councils.

For the last three years, unions have complained that the bosses would not recognise them because they were waiting for Wiehahn. Now the bosses are waiting for unions to register. Why have they given such short shrift to unions? *The short answer is because they are not strongly organised. Are the unions hoping that registration will remove the need for basic organisation?*

Registration and the widened possibilities for legalism contained within it

will further tend to bureaucratised unions, will further remove the union from the control of the workers. The first sign of this will be the clutching after paper members to spread before the Registrar of Trade Unions. Given the relatively small proportion of African members currently organised, paper membership will be the only means of quickly gaining the level of representivity required for registration. The insidious effects of the South African industrial relations system are not enshrined in the operation of Industrial Councils but in the tradition of legalism and anti-organisation which it has nurtured. The embryonic organisation of the Independent trade unions can only be protected off the rack of registration.

Footnotes

1. Most 'African' trade unions do not restrict their membership racially but I use 'African' trade unions in preference to 'Black' or 'independent' or 'unregistered' trade union for obvious reasons. 'Independent' trade union is a generic term for those African unions which are not associated with a registered union, which are not parallel unions.
2. See Central Archives file ARB 1103 'Memorandum on the Recognition of Native Trade Unions' 17.11.1943.
3. See Lewis, D 'The South African State and African Trade Unions: 1947-1953' (undated mimeo c. 1976)
- 3a. **Financial Mail** 2.11.1979.
4. See Memorandum SALB 5[4] 1979.
5. 'Joint Statement on the Amended Industrial Conciliation Act issued by FOSATU (representing 14 affiliates)...' (undated mimeo c. Oct/Nov 1979).
6. cf. statement by SEIFSA **Financial Mail**, 30.11.1979.
7. The other main factors are usually given as the failure of Works and Liaison Committees to avert industrial conflict and international pressure.
8. **SALB**, 5(2), 1979, page 6.
9. 'Joint Statement....' *op cit.*
10. **Rand Daily Mail** 11.12.1979.
11. Interview with Mr. Ike van der Watt, **SALB** 5(3) Oct 1979, page 94.
12. *Ibid.*, page 96.
13. 'Joint Statement...' *op cit.*
14. **Sunday Tribune** 18.11.1979; **Financial Mail** 9.11.1979, 23.11.1979.
15. **Sunday Post**, Nov 1979; **Rand Daily Mail** 11.1.1980; **Financial Mail** 23.11.1979.
16. **Financial Mail** 30.11.1979.
17. 25.11.1979. Manase 'also accused Mr. Thosamile Botha, leader of PEBCO... of trying to undermine the union'.
18. **Isisebenzi**, July 1979.