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It has not, however, given any clear indication of what it envisages as possibilities for Blacks in self-governing areas like KwaZulu which refuses to take independence.

Thus, while some acceptance of the Buthelezi Commission has occurred in respect of planning and economic development, and a more broadly sympathetic attitude to its political recommendations is emerging in a very general sense at central Government level, there are considerable impediments in the way of a gradual and constructive implementation of the political findings of the Commission.

In recent statements to the Press, Chief Buthelezi has been quoted as saying that the decision to replace the provincial council systems with a new second-tier government (regional service councils) to be staffed by officials appointed by President P W Botha was "... another blow to the process of bringing about change through negotiation and non-violent means..."

"What hope is there for the future if the South African Government hurtles into the politics of obscurity, leaping from one expedient to another in desperate attempts to make the new constitution work?" he said.

In another statement he added it was "imperative" that the authorities in Natal and KwaZulu should be closely involved in formulating policy such as the Draft Bill on regional service councils announced by the central Government.

Commenting about the nature of representation on the proposed regional service councils, Chief Buthelezi said:

"If this is in any way weighted to favour one group over the other, it will unavoidably lead to a speedy collapse of the effectiveness of the structure and will, in fact, militate against the willingness of KwaZulu to participate in it..."

Clearly the task assigned to the Buthelezi Commission — that of promoting a peaceful sharing of power in the region within the context of a wider South Africa — is far from over.

The Buthelezi Commission, however, has provided the evidence which shows that this task is vital.

It has also provided a model of workable power-sharing which most responsible people in the region can accept. In these respects it has built the foundations for the task which lies ahead.

The process of establishing a government in KwaZulu Natal

The Buthelezi Commission envisaged that a government for KwaZulu/Natal could be established in four steps.

Each successive step represented an increase in the degree of co-operation between areas and peoples. Each step would be used to prepare the next step.

It was vital, the Commission reported, that the entire process should not be prolonged indefinitely — hence it felt it advisable to specify that each step be completed within one year.

In brief the report stated:

1. The first step consists of the closest possible consultation between the existing executive and legislative bodies of Natal and KwaZulu.
2. The second step entails the establishment of a single executive consisting of representatives of the KwaZulu Cabinet and the Natal Provincial Council or, alternatively, an amalgamation of the two executives into a single executive responsible to both of the legislatures. At this step, it is also of vital importance to include one or more elected Asian representatives in the joint executive, and also, but perhaps less urgently, a representative of the smaller minorities.
3. The next step would be the transition to a common multi-cultural executive and legislature for part of the area of KwaZulu/Natal. The most appropriate area for this is the Durban metropolitan area. The DMA government should be set up accordingly to consociational principles. In particular, it should include a power-sharing executive composed of sizeable political or cultural groups.
4. The final step would be to bring the entire area of KwaZulu/Natal under single government. The consociational proposal as set out represents one possibility. An alternative is the Lombard Plan. Probably its main weakness is that it maintains KwaZulu as a separate unit in an arrangement of three units that would also have a joint executive and legislature. Hence it fails to respond to the need for a full integration of KwaZulu/Natal.

In effecting a choice between options, there are definite considerations that need to be stressed, namely:

- A KwaZulu/Natal region should not entail independence from the Republic as such.
- An autonomous KwaZulu/Natal should constitutionally always form part of the broader South African context and therefore, appropriate forms of representation and participation in the central government are to be maintained as vital linkages.
- An autonomous KwaZulu/Natal would require a new dispensation as far as the fiscal inter-relationship between that unit and the central government is concerned.

The Commission stressed in its report that its recommendations represented only a consociational proposal and that many other consociational arrangements were possible. It emphasised:

The drafting of a consociational constitution should not be the function of an outside "expert" but should properly be performed in a negotiating process by the representatives of the people involved.

The only firm general recommendations of the Commission were that these negotiations be guided by the principles of power-sharing, group autonomy, proportionality and minority veto.

| | Hanf 1977 Tvl/Natal % | Quail Commission Tvl. 1979 % | Buthelezi Commission 1981 Tvl/Natal % % | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|----|
| "Life in general" | | | | |
| "Very happy"/"Just happy" | 22 | 10 | 6 | 8 |
| "Unhappy"/"Angry and impatient" | 57 | 72 | 79 | 78 |

Trendline results obtained from a scale of socio-political satisfaction/dissatisfaction, standardised by Theodor Hanf of the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute in West Germany, and applied to the Buthelezi Commission study.

Black South Africans — what they feel

The Buthelezi Commission revealed significant evidence of an increase in expressed political discontent and anger — which is now present among between seven and eight out of ten Black South Africans.

Actual militancy and an attitude of confrontation appears in between three and four out of ten Black South Africans.

In a section entitled "Political consciousness among Black South Africans," the Commission reported on detailed attitude surveys which were carried out.

The report indicated that most Black South Africans in all the regions surveyed expected moves towards equality with Whites as opposed simply to improvement in their circumstances.

Trendline results obtained from a scale of socio-political satisfaction/dissatisfaction, standardised by Theodor Hanf, et.al. of the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute in West Germany, applied in the Buthelezi Commission study, provided the noteworthy comparisons in the table above.

A view expressed among 45 to 55 percent of people across groups is that African National Congress (ANC) insurgents would receive sympathy and co-operation from *most or very many* Black South Africans; a view which extends to rural areas of KwaZulu.

In addition the overwhelming majority of Black respondents spontaneously predicted violence or adult social unrest on a large scale if meaningful policy reform did not occur in the near future.

Seven out of ten respondent, for example, predicted mass strikes if people were called upon to act by a credible leader.

Chief M.G. Buthelezi and Inkatha received clear majority support in all regions of Natal and KwaZulu and also have a substantial degree of support on the Witwatersrand.

The report went on:

There are four interconnected but nevertheless distinctive types of *dissident* consciousness among Black South Africans surveyed. Firstly, as indicated, there are groups which are ideologically conservative, relatively apolitical, but which have high levels of discontent with material circumstances, amenities and opportunities.

Secondly, there is a large formation of political consciousness which involves more than a sense of discontent or deprivation but which is characterised by a sense of relative deprivation.

A much sharper political consciousness is present among these people.

They want at least equality of opportunity and participation in decisions affecting their lives. They are not necessarily radical or militant in out-

look, however. A typical non-youthful Inkatha supporter would approximate to this type of consciousness. This consciousness is also coloured by African Nationalism and a concern with Black solidarity.

A third type of consciousness is tending towards an urban lower-middle and middle-class radicalism. This type of consciousness is not as wide-spread as the second type identified but nevertheless predominant among better-educated younger adults on the Witwatersrand and substantial among the groups in Natal and KwaZulu.

It involves a strong verbal allegiance to both the ideal of Black consciousness and the aims of the ANC in exile.

There is among this group a questioning of South Africa's institutions with quite a considerable flavour of socialism or African communalism. This group tends to have fairly high lifestyle aspirations and could not be called genuinely proletarian in outlook.

A fourth broad type is what one might describe as militant. It is probably among this group that one would find the most serious commitment to the current strategies of the ANC in exile.

This type is not necessarily associated with high education; in fact considerable hard core militancy is found

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