
INKATHA & ANC EXTERNAL MISSION ON CROSSROADS

By: DR. W.Z. CONCO, Deputy President, Natal Provincial ANC (Banned)

Member of the National Executive Committee of the (Banned) Constitutional African National Congress.

Chairman, Board of Trustees of the Lutuli Memorial Foundation, Member of Inkatha — writes from London.

There are several reasons why some of us who actively participated and were elected leaders in the African National Congress before it was banned in 1960, should make a statement in order to avoid confusing the people who were not there and who could easily be misled because the organization talked about is banned and proscribed in South Africa.

In the first place, the ANC External Mission Attack on Inkatha is an open attack on a whole region, not just on an individual. Though I don't have the full statement of attack by the **Acting Secretary General** of the African National Congress and the subsequent statement given in a press conference in Lusaka by the President General of the African National Congress, Mr. O.R. Tambo, I will make comments from whatever press reports one has. Should there be any misquotations in a delicate statement of this nature, it will be because these have been allowed or have been circulated to the general public, before one receives an official one, if at all.

In second place, the region attacked was perhaps the strongest ANC region at the time of the ban in 1960. No wonder Natal was the host of two national conferences in succession in 1958 and 1959. In the third place, this is a constituency which produced more than any other constituency, most of the leading presidents of the African National Congress since its formation in 1912. This is

the region which produced the **first president general** and it is the region which produced the **last president general** of the African National Congress in the name of The Honourable Chief A.J. Lutuli, whose untimely death shocked all of us and the world at large. **Fourthly**, as provided in the constitution of the African National Congress, Mr. O.R. Tambo becomes the president general of the whole organization, including the External Mission in succession to the late President General A.J. Lutuli. The same constitutional arrangement was made in the provinces and I become the President of Natal Provincial African National Congress succeeding the late Chief A.J. Lutuli, who was Provincial President of Natal, and I was his deputy. It would be unusual if I, as president of a region, would not make a statement on an issue which is such a critical crisis in the whole liberation movement, let alone in the future of the unity of our forces inside and outside South Africa, with a common goal to end racial discrimination and to enable the majority of the people of South Africa (Africans) to emancipate themselves from the shackles of oppression by the present South African racist regime.

The very foundation of the African National Congress is African unity. This is the foundation, and these also are the principles, on which Inkatha has built itself into a formidable mass organization with popular support as had never

before been seen in Natal and in other parts of South Africa where it was received with open arms. Drawing a distinction between two political organizations, Inkatha and ANC, helps to avoid confusion. Let us be clear that we are here dealing with two separate organizations. Inkatha, formed five years ago, in a land or country where a political vacuum existed. The tremendous support Inkatha received primarily in Natal is no surprise to me. It will be recalled that at the time of banning of the African National Congress in 1960, Natal was the strongest region which was able to host two successive conferences of the African National Congress. Never before has a province witnessed such a resurgence in spirit, a dedication to a cause, as happened in the late '50's to the date of the banning of the African National Congress.

Perhaps the shock of the ban may have made people think that all has come to an end and there could be no organization coming forth. We now know that that spirit of dedication, that spirit of resurgence, and unity to fight for the cause never ended, it had only to be tapped. In this constituency, it was tapped when the president died and his funeral, to the greatest surprise of the South African authorities, was a show piece that the spirit of Lutuli wasn't dead, and it was at this critical moment that Mntwana Chief M.G. Buthelezi came to the forefront to deliver the main speech to commemorate the

departed leader. There was no announcement of who the next president would be. The second occasion, as you all remember, was the unveiling of the Lutuli Memorial Foundation tombstone in 1972, and the call to the unveiling was made by Mntwana Chief M.G. Buthelezi. I personally wrote to the African National Congress External Mission Headquarters to give the name of the president general and his deputy, which could at least be announced on this great occasion to prevent a vacuum of leadership. I may add at this juncture, that to my greatest surprise, some of the top officials of the African National Congress External Mission were opposed to the organization of the unveiling. Not only that, but they also opposed the launching of the Lutuli Memorial Foundation itself.

It was only after the occasion of the unveiling, which revealed further, the undying spirit of dedication revealing itself in the appearance of the old uniforms of the African National Congress, the flying of the flag, singing of the freedom songs, and the march of the volunteers. I very well remember in London when we had a meeting of commemoration when everyone, at least for that moment, felt he was part of the demonstration revealed in Grootvlei in 1972, twelve years after the banning of the African National Congress and five years after the death of its leader.

In summary, what I would like to emphasize is that the spirit of freedom which has permeated to the people and which became part of their commitment, could never be erased by any State laws, however bitter they may be. Instead the masses of the people move into a higher order of courage which the late Chief Lutuli called "COURAGE RISING WITH DANGER", the greater the danger, the greater the courage. It was this courage of this constituency mainly, together with the good will from other provinces of people who attended both ceremonies which reinforced and in effect, launched the Lutuli Memorial Foundation in spite of character assassinations which circulated in

External Mission quarters and even at times, directed at the late Chief Lutuli himself. These are things which are ugly to reveal. **These are things which are worth revealing. If we don't reveal them we shall be on a bandwagon of brethren and sistren who will find themselves on day being devoured and killed by their own people, long before they face the formidable enemy.**

INKATHA AND THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AS SEPARATE ORGANIZATIONS TO FORGE UNITY

It becomes necessary at this stage to point out quite clearly what Inkatha is in relation to the African National Congress as a whole. The ANC (Constitutional ANC) is a banned organization in South Africa. It cannot hold meetings nor can it organize its branches. Its constitution therefore was made inoperative on South African soil by an Act of the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa in 1960. But the disappearance of the physical presence of the African National Congress did not mean that the principles enshrined in the hearts of the people were also banned. On the contrary, the ban came at a time when the Province (again the constituency being singled out and attacked) was the very live wire of the ANC. Inkatha, in my interpretation, arose at a time when people needed a leader. Despite representation, it was difficult for the External Mission to announce who succeeds the president general and this took nearly ten years to announce or to refer to Mr. O.R. Tambo as the President General of the African National Congress. May I put this on record that when I left Swaziland in 1969, with my family, **not under the auspices of the African National Congress, but at my own expense**, it was Mntwana Chief M.G. Buthelezi and others who requested me to report as follows to the External Mission:-

1. That it is the general feeling of my former ANC officials and leaders that there should be no delay in the announcement of

the president general and deputy president general.

2. That we who are in South Africa felt we were subject to correction, that **Nelson Mandela though in Robben Island, should be made president general** and if the deputy president in consultation the executive so desire, and in fact takes his rightful position that he becomes the President General and then Nelson becomes the deputy.
3. **I lobbied in the only N/EC Meeting I have attended in 1971.** And I had to leave early. Later O.R. told me that decided that Nelson **should not be given any burdens as the authorities were giving him a lot of trouble.**
4. That the External Mission must not jeopardize the position of people like Chief Buthelezi by sending **people who have been trained overseas in broad daylight to go and enlist his support for the underground organization as they had done in 1969.** This in fact nearly got Chief Buthelezi into a lot of trouble. **In retrospect**, it is to be wondered whether that was in fact the intention to have him locked up. I would hate to think that any dedicated South African leader would have such morbid ideas. This was long before Inkatha was formed. I am saying this in retrospect because up to this day I just cannot see how a national organization selects a region and attacks it.

To continue, Inkatha and the African National Congress have no executive relationship whatsoever. The African National Congress is not the boss of Inkatha nor is Inkatha the boss of the ANC. This applies to the External Mission of the ANC in relation to the External Mission of Inkatha if it had existed.

ATTACH ON CHIEF BUTHELEZI IS MEANT TO ATTACK THE WHOLE REGION OF NATAL AND ZULULAND

No amount of explanation for those of us who are leaders in this

region could be given using a distinction between an individual and the organization he leads, let alone using this argument in a place like Natal where Chief Buthelezi is more than one thing. He is certainly more than an individual. **To call him an ordinary individual is in fact to the people he leads, one of the greatest insults.** But to add the insult to injury, to threaten assassination of Chief Buthelezi is beyond my imagination. What is he? What does he mean to the region? How does he come to be the leader of Inkatha? How does he come to be a symbol of Zulu unity? These are the questions which I will leave to those who have made an unprecedented threat to a man of this calibre in one of the most dynamic constituencies which is the very strength of the African National Congress. I must also point out that an attack comes before the wounds inflicted on our brave heroes as Isandlwane and Ulundi in 1879, the Anglo/Zulu war, have not yet healed. It was in that great war of resistance that Chief Buthelezi's great grandfather Ndunankulu, then Commander-in-Chief of the Zulu army was the last example perhaps of the best organized armies ever to face the enemy in Southern Africa. After the defeat of the Zulu armies the English hoisted and engraved the following words at Ulundi after the victory "this is the last battle for the occupation of the whole African Continent, the defeat of the Zulu power is the end of all black resistance. Africa is now open for occupation". Indeed, three years later the Berlin Conference (1883) came into being! "The Scramble for Africa" came — separated by only a few decades before the "Scramble for Slaves".

This statement, of course, does not represent the historical truth. The truth briefly stated is that there were many wars of resistance far greater than the Zulu war. There were **ten Xhosa wars** and there were **six Basutho wars**, and the Zulu war was merely a culmination of a resistance which took place, cost more lives in perhaps the Cape, in Basutholand

(Lesotho) than in Zululand. The drama of the Zulu war is the extermination of the British Army at Isandlwana at the peak of the empire, to the greatest shock of the whole world. They were completely out-manoeuvred by the tactics of King Shaka, the Zulu military genius. To the people of this region the Anglo-Zulu war is never regarded as being more than what their brothers indicate.

At this period in time, one would have expected a message from the President of the African National Congress to the people of South Africa to rally together and prepare themselves for the armed struggle that is to come and commemorate and remember the heroes, not only of the Zulu war, but all those who fell in defending their land in one hundred years of wars, (nearly 20 wars). This was not the time to select a region and attack it leaving the others, especially the Cape and the Transvaal untouched. This is not the time to attack Chief Buthelezi and his people in forming Inkatha at a time when Inkatha has opposed, in no uncertain terms, the independence of Kwazulu as a State outside of South Africa. **As a matter of fact, the President General and the Acting Secretary General, in terms of the South African law, obtaining in their constituencies in the Transkei and the Ciskei, are not South African citizens.** In South Africa today the citizens of the Republic of South Africa are white, Asians, and COLOUREDS, and all those **Africans registered under KwaZulu Government.** This is the constituency which said "no" to independence from South Africa. In other words, it was under the leadership of Chief Buthelezi, as President of Inkatha that KwaZulu Government categorically rejected the whole idea of being separated from South Africa. it is strange and paradoxical that the leader of an External Mission of a national organization like the African National Congress should launch his attack on the leader of an organization which has made such a stand which even the African National Congress never made during the days when the

Regional Bantu authorities were being promulgated. It is also strange that the region of the Cape Province which includes the Transkei and the Ciskei are spared in the attack of the President General and the Secretary General who come from these constituencies and they go and see fault in a constituency which has resisted to lead people down the drain of pseudo-independence which is meaningless. It is indeed also puzzling that the other regions or the other five or four regional authorities who opted for independence are also left untouched and the External Mission vents its venom on Natal. I cannot help but be puzzled by these attacks. But the limit is that these other regions were persuaded by the South African Government to create a fund to fight "Freedom Fighters". But under the leadership of Chief Buthelezi, Natal rejected being dragged to create a buffer for the South African Government.

CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS EXTERNAL MISSION AND INKATHA IN LONDON 1979: WERE THEY A JUDAS KISS"

The consultative talks in London were in the spirit, as I understood them, of co-ordination, co-operation, and knowing what happens in South Africa in relation to the External Mission. They were carried not as anybody bossing anybody. If, on the other hand consultations were genuine, as I have no reason to think that they were not, they showed maturity on both organizations and starting to tackle the problem of relations in a country where the enemy forges divisions in the true style of divide and rule. I am also puzzled by the denials following these talks when the two executives, at great expense, met in consultation to iron out differences and to avoid mud slinging at each other. It later transpired, in External Mission quarters, that the consultations were not official. Then we start wondering whether official means the presence of the other groups, whites, Asians, and COLOURED members of the

African National Congress in exile. This of course, could not be the meaning of official in the constitutional sense of the African National Congress as a whole. It is, and remains, an African organisation. **The External Mission could never, and has no power to change the ANC constitution.** One would therefore regard these as consultations between organisations from South Africa entrusted in the liberation of South Africa by majority African people who are the vanguard of the liberation struggle.

What the consultations in London were not are the following:-

1. They were not a matter of going hat in hand on behalf of the Inkatha leaders to the ANC External Mission.
2. They were not a plea for recognition nor were they meant as a way of getting "a native influx control pass" to get funds from donors overseas.
3. They were not meant to have a whole executive of Inkatha come to London to seek any permission nor any recognition by the African National Congress but they were a brotherly approach, a consultation, a discussion of Africans concerned with the liberation of South Africa, their common home.

Finally, all these notions were dispelled in my presence by our leader, Dr. M.G. Buthelezi, in an interview with the B.B.C. just before they left for South Africa which I was honoured to attend. It was there that I heard the B.B.C. using the phrase "**ANC indiscriminately**" to mean the External Mission and at the same time to mean the whole African National Congress Constitutional. It was there that I pointed out that this is creating a lot of confusion in the divide and rule policy. This arose **when they were insisting that Chief Buthelezi come overseas to seek permission and gain recognition of the powerful African National Congress External Mission.** It was there that I pointed out quite clearly that the question of permission from the

ANC was mischievous because the External Mission represents the people of South Africa in the name of the African National Congress. Therefore, the External Mission will report back to the ANC Conference constituted by branches of the African people in South Africa. The same BBC referred to the ANC in the early 1970's as "**The White-Led South African National Congress.**"

THE POLITICAL MEANING OF THE ATTACK BY THE ANC EXTERNAL MISSION ON INKATHA — AN INTERNAL ORGANISATION

As I have already indicated these two organizations have no executive relationship in the sense that one would give instructions to the other. They are in par as they both claim to represent a certain quota of the African people of South Africa. Inkatha is operative within the country and it was formed under completely different conditions than in which the African National Congress was operative. Its constitution had to be made in order to be a viable and existing organization in terms of the laws of South Africa as they exist today. Incidentally, it is no different from the constitution of the African National Congress. The principles enshrined in the Inkatha Constitution are exactly the same as those appearing in the African National Congress Constitution. This is confirmed in the resolutions of the Central Committee of Inkatha where they are pledged to support the principles of the founding fathers of the African National Congress. They are pledged to observe these without deviation and with the President General Dr. Buthelezi leading them. **If Inkatha National Movement with over 750,000 staunch fully paid members elect their leaders, then those are the leaders of the 750,000 strong organization.** This is irrespective of whether the African National Congress External Mission, nor for that matter, the African National Congress Constitution likes the leader or likes the organization or not. **This is irrespective of whether the organization Inkatha is right or wrong in the eyes of the ANC or**

in the eyes of the world. The decision to elect leaders remains a sovereign right of the African people in South Africa. The decision to decide on an External Mission also remains with organized opinion of Africans in South Africa. They can decide to have another External Mission without ever denouncing the African National Congress. As a matter of fact, it is well-known that the so-called Bantustan — leaders have never at any time gone out of their way to attack the ANC. Similarly, Inkatha leader, President Dr Buthelezi has always referred to the African National Congress leadership as people who are his colleagues with whom he grew up, with whom he shared common beliefs. He has however, made it very clear that their methods are not the methods of his organization. Here we may add another confusing issue which some mischief makers try to make Inkatha different from the African National Congress. **This is the issue of the tactics of violence and non-violence.** I will comment on this briefly.

NON-VIOLENCE AND VIOLENCE ARE MERE TACTICS NOT POLICY

The African National Congress, while operative in South Africa was an open organization, always maintained, rightly so too, that it was a non-violent organization. That the tactic of non-violence applied and therefore it warned its members never to be provoked to a violent confrontation with the authorities. This was extremely difficult especially at the time when the government was forging the Bantu authorities. Violence erupted in Pondoland, in Zululand, in Sekhuniland, in Zeerust, when the people resisted in no uncertain terms the encroachment of a system of government they abhorred in the Bantu Authorities and fencing of their Land. **In the African National Congress those days when all leaders were in South Africa, no one had the courage to announce arm struggle. Not a single leader could ever stand and address a crowd or a big conference of the**

South African National Congress to tell them that they were committed to an arms struggle. This would mean his immediate arrest, charged with years of imprisonment; if he escaped being shot by police.

It is very unfair for those people who managed to leave South Africa, becoming members of the External Mission, to shout that the people must be violent when they have escaped and are in safety. How do we expect those who are facing the vicious attacks of the State to do what we could not do even at the time when the South African State was not fortified. Let me return to our terms of reference enshrined in the Constitution. The policy of the African National Congress is:-

1. To unite the African people.
2. To forge the struggle of their liberation and the liberation of all South Africans of all colours.

The policy of the African National Congress as I understand it is not to unite the other racial groups with the ANC at the expense of African unity. This does not exist in our constitution. Yes, as reasonable men and leaders, we never had, or regarded the other groups as inferiors or lesser people than we are. We welcome their support if they come in an organized manner. The constitution of the African National Congress only admits Africans and not the other racial groups. To call it racist is one of those cheap naive approaches and an insult to African unity. It is the racist regime which drove us apart from decision making in South Africa. It is the racist regime which uses the white vote as its base to maintain discrimination in our land. It is not our making. During its operation in South Africa, the African National Congress was non-violent and the program of action of 1949 stipulated quite clearly that the organization would adhere to non-violent means as far as possible. This did not mean that it would be non-violent at all times. This was fully explained by the later President General that he believed and would follow the non-violent policy (tactic of prose-

cuting the struggle as approved by his predecessors.) But when the time came and the organization was gagged, it became obvious that it could not remain quiet and it then adopted a tactic in its External Mission of training African freedom fighters to engage the racist regime in an armed struggle. Since this could not be organized within the country, the External Mission was left with this mandate — organize for an armed struggle which will eventually wrestle power from the ruling racist government. This was the external meaning of Umkhonto-wesizwe, the military wing of the African National Congress in External Mission. This meant, of course, that the trained Umkhonto-wesizwe guerillas would fight on South African soil and in so doing will get the co-operation of the South African masses who will reinforce their ranks to continue and intensify the armed struggle in South Africa as a whole. This did not mean that other means of struggle, other non-violent means, were ruled out. No organization could ever rely entirely on armed struggle, not based on numerous non-violent tactics actualized by the people in the regime, terrorized by the gorrilas when it is not time to attack or when it is suicidal to attack. This is the meaning of organized approach utilizing all the forces at our disposal. If Inkatha says it is non-violent today in its tactics or logistics, it does not mean that they are pacifists. As matter of fact, and as a historical fact, the people of the region of Natal have never been pacifists however great the challenge may be, they face it with one resolve in battle and out of battle. To achieve this they need unity instilled in them nearly one hundred and fifty years ago, and which is still prevailing in this region, and which requires refueling, organization, and improvement of the local conditions.

In summary, the tactics used to prosecute a struggle are many including violence and non-violence. As many ways as we can muster, wherever we are directively to the struggle, these are to be

used. The main emphasis in the propagation of the spirit of liberation is grass roots constituency Politics! It is a political struggle of which "armed struggle" is merely a part, a means to an end to express a political union and conviction.

DOCTRINES OF IMPOSSIBILITIES AND DOCTRINES OF ENGINEERING THE SOUTH AFRICAN REVOLUTION

Finally, I think I must make a final remark on the approach to the South African revolution as a whole. I will draw examples from personal impressions and conclusions I came to when I came overseas, **not as an ANC functionary, not as a member of the External Mission**, but on my own and at our own expenses with my family. Because of this I have the right to record the impressions and feelings, however wrong they may have been, which passed through my mind now, following this attack. In 1978, I was invited to a symposium by the University of Toronto, where there was a discussion on "The Future of the South African Revolution." Representatives in the panel were Professor Paul, myself, and a South African who is a professor in the University of Toronto. The discussion centered around the way to protest police action in South Africa in 1976. It also highlighted the other disturbing news of various serious action being taken by the students revolting against an unfair educational system. The first question that was discussed was "why is it that Natal did not come out in full force", as Soweto and others had done?" My comment on this was that we must remember that oppression is felt differently at different times by different people so that we must not expect at all times to get uniform action taking part in the whole of South Africa at all times. I pointed to the historical facts that in 1973 it was Natal which came out as the province or region which organized a very effective strike action to which the South African Government referred to in Parliament. It became so effective that in fact it was

threatening the very life economy of other parts of South Africa or the whole province. In this strike, the leaders used all the available manpower and they reported their strike action to Mntwana Chief M.G. Buthelezi who in turn would have to report to the King. In other words, they did not want the government to outflank them and organizing scab labour from the rural areas to take their place. This was effectively prevented because in Natal the urban areas and rural areas are nearly one of the same and have the same spirit prevailing. **There was no distinction and in this province there is no distinction between what other provinces or areas call urban Africans and rural Africans. In this region, the leader is Chief Buthelezi and there is no other. In this region, in order to be able to talk to the African people all leaders would have to go and get permission to address an African gathering.** In this region, this is a military safety valve engrained in generations as a procedure for any man who wants to address a gathering amongst the Zulus. In this symposium, I pointed out all these facts including the fact that when Natal was the only province which organized a strike, we should give it its credit. **Where we should commend this action and should try and develop leadership from the action. We cannot rely on anger and anger alone. I fully agree with the President of Inkatha that the days of using anger to fill the press of the West with news about South Africa spilling African blood are gone and if that is done it is highly irresponsible. Our peoples' blood is too precious to be spilled to raise token donations, which are just "pea-nuts".**

FIRST ATTACK ON CHIEF BUTHELEZI MADE IN JOE SLOVO'S BOOK IN SYMPOSIUM:

It was in this symposium that for the first time I heard an attack directed at Chief Buthelezi read by Professor Paul at the University of Toronto. The attack went along these lines:

That the reason the revolution did

not spread or did not take off from Soweto, to spread all over the country was that there were people or leaders like **Chief Buthelezi who was created by the South African Government as a native elitist middle-class to obstruct the march of the revolution.** It was at that meeting that I made a categorical statement and I opposed Joe Slovo's contention and pointed out that his analysis was very naive, superficial, and that moreover, **Slovo was no leader of the African people of South Africa.** I pointed out: Why should our intelligence be dishonoured or insulted by people who were not our leaders, who write books, and attack a leader of a region of the African people? I indicated, as I have already said, that Joe Slovo is no leader of the African people and he is no leader of the African National Congress either. If I was wrong, I am subject to correction. There was a lot of consternation amongst the Professors (white) in the University of Toronto when I expressed this view. I really meant it, it was not an insult to Joe Slovo with whom I have worked in South Africa and who is a very fine man and a dedicated leader of his people. But to put into a book, writing about the African Revolution, an untruth and to take stereotypes of chiefs as "regions of the South African Government", chiefs as leaders of the Bantustans is nonsensical, superficial, and naive way of looking at the South African Revolution and at the Africans and their way of organization. I pointed out at that Symposium that Chief Buthelezi would be exactly in the same position whether there were Bantustans or whether there were no Bantustans, that his ancestors occupied the position he occupies now as Commander In Chief of the Zulu Army which is banned and proscribed, as Prime Minister to the King which is not recognized because he is an African and perhaps the leading man respected by no less a man like the late Chief A.J. Lutuli.

IS THE ATTACK ON INKATHA PRESIDENT A REPETITION OF HIS MASTER'S VOICE

It is rather revealing that in 1980 the Acting Secretary General of the African National Congress External Mission, NZO, should at last launch an attack on Chief Buthelezi calling him a Muzorewa and calling him all sorts of names in the same vain as Joe Slovo's book. **Is it possible that the Acting Secretary General (Morogoro) is translating the political view expressed in Joe Slovo's book into political reality? It is possible too, that the saintly writings of Joe Slovo are the "official" leading credo of the African National Congress.** This is one of the biggest puzzles which the External Mission will have to answer sometime. **If this is the case then the credibility of the External Mission of the African National Congress representing African opinion is gone.** If this is the case then Inkatha has a right to adopt a method they think is better to the point of completely disassociating themselves from the External Mission, not from the African National Congress necessarily. Incidentally, the ANC has often been referred to as the "white-lead" African National Congress of South Africa.

FINAL REMARK IN NAIVE VIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REVOLUTION

I will summarize the political view built on stereotypes: The Chiefs as Bantustan leader, the rural African are called Bantustans. What is very surprising is that the connotation Bantustan is only used to Africans and does not refer to the other racial groups. Here are some of the views which make the External Mission an organization orbiting and losing touch with the people. Here are some of the views, which in my opinion, are based on stereotypes of South Africa in 1950. This is the era of anti-movements.

1. Anti-pass Campaign
 2. Anti-Apartheid Movement
 3. Anti-Group Areas
 4. Anti-Removal Campaign
 5. Anti-Bantu Education Campaign
1. There is only one way and one

way only to fight the liberation struggle. That is the way of the arm struggle.

2. There is one organization which is on the vanguard of the liberation movement, that is the African National Congress. This of course is not true. There are other liberation movements, however poorly organized they might be, they are still representing the people of South Africa and the African National Congress has no monopoly.
3. There is one method and one method only to fight the revolution, that is the arm struggle. This is easily said outside South Africa than inside. No one leader, even amongst the most militant in the External Mission, ever attacked these words within South Africa.
4. There is one class and one class only to fight and win the struggle that is workers inside South Africa.
5. The "doctrine of impossibilities" that Chiefs could never be part of the struggle because they are Bantustan leaders.

Finally, I will make remarks to endorse the resolution of the Inkatha committee. These are drafted without bitterness where the External Mission is referred to as our brothers. There is no hostility but calculated determination to prosecute the struggle the way we see it. I endorse your resolution "to pursue our own

wisdom that has brought so much promise to so many people in such a short space of time. We reaffirm our acceptance of the principle which guides us and the leadership of Inkatha which the custodian of those principles". This is said in awareness of the Attacks by our brothers in exile meaning the External Mission of the ANC.

It is interesting that you comment in resolution three on the increasing number of attacks by the top hierarchy of the African National Congress in exile, the South African Communist Party, the so called freedom radio, that it is now necessary to prepare Inkatha for the greater responsibility which it must have to oppose these unholy alliances and political opportunism. My observation about the views expressed in Joe Slovo's book perhaps confirm this resolution that we are here dealing with an External Mission with two bosses. The boss of the communist party of South Africa and the boss of the African National Congress, the African people. Surely, the boss of the communist party could never be the boss of the African people. This we will reject categorically and stands rejected at all times. We need no **comissar — bosses** in the same way as we need no **commissioner generals**. Unfortunately, we will be attacked from both sides, on the left, and on the right. This is indeed a tough battle for Inkatha, another challenge of the constituency as a region. I endorse your feeling that when it

comes to the push, Natal will be used as a spring board to forge for the liberation movement and will get all those brothers from other provinces to use us as a **spring board of their grievances when they lack leadership**. This is not said in a spirit of ousting any organization. It is said in a spirit of duty and it is a tough job for an organization in a small region like Natal to take all these responsibilities on its shoulders.

If this is what fate has ordained for us, we have no way but to take that choice. it is indeed tough. It means suffering; it means tears and rivers of them and it may even mean bloodshed! We need a new **unity to instill hope to our African brothers in South Africa** to make this unity grow into a greater one. But in so long a political struggle, **we need more than slogan — unity and promises of what we will do on the day of freedom**. What we need to do **INTENSIVE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF CONSTITUENCIES**.

Finally, the rise of Inkatha is a challenge to the ANC External Mission's leadership and credibility. The spirit of liberation is not in a name even as great as that of ANC. At this point in time **they have become Inkatha. They became ANC twenty years ago**. In the years to come they will **become something else. Blocking people's becoming** is counter-revolutionary because it stresses **'BEING WHAT BECAME YEARS AGO'**.

ZULULAND COUNCIL OF CHURCHES RESPONDS TO ABRECSA INCIDENT

This statement was issued by Bishop L.B. Zulu, Bishop L.E. Dlamini and Bishop M.D. Biyase on January this year 1984.

Events which led to the sudden change of venue of the ABRECSA conference last November, and the statements and reports that flowed from that incident, are a matter of great concern to us as local church leaders. The fact that

the group so affected never reported the incident to the Anglican Bishop of Zululand (to whose church the Kwanzimela centre belongs) or in anyway communicated their troubles, adds to our concern.

With regard to the presence of Dr. D.R.B. Madide to welcome the delegates to the conference, we feel it necessary to point out that this is a standard form of courtesy with the Honourable Chief M.G. Buthelezi. When the Right Reve-