

Mozambique's solidarity with the national liberation struggle in South Africa



By Alda Romão Saúte Saíde

When the xenophobic attacks occurred in South Africa, the greater majority of South Africans felt angry and ashamed. I personally also had those feelings. I had been welcomed in Mozambique; they had given me a job and a home. Some [Mozambicans] died in the bomb attacks that were directed against me. The Mozambicans supported us, they extended to us their love, compassion, understanding, recognition and solidarity in every possible way, and now they were being attacked [in South Africa] because they were foreigners, because they were Mozambican.¹

Introduction

Relations between the people of Mozambique and South Africa reach far back to long ago, when permanent contact was established through social networks because of a sense of affinity. Cordial relations were consistent from pre-colonial times and there were strong trade and social relations until colonial powers penetrated the region. The so-called 'Mfecane', marked this era and left an indelible and similar cultural mosaic throughout the region. In Mozambique, migration mainly from northern KwaZulu Natal gave birth to the state of Gaza, bordered by the Nkomati River to the south; the Zambezi River to the north; the Indian Ocean to the east and the Lebombo and Chimanmani mountain ranges to the west.

The presence of colonialists in Mozambique and South Africa re-shaped the relationship between these two peoples. The arrival of European settlers in South

1 Interview with Albie Sachs, April 2013, regarding the construction of the Matola Memorial, Maputo, South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET) Oral History Project (hereafter SOHP). All interviews, unless otherwise stated, were conducted by the author of this article.

Africa from the mid-seventeenth century and the subsequent agricultural development (wheat, wine, fruit, sugar cane and livestock farming) led to the importation of slaves (until the nineteenth century) from Mozambique, and to a greater extent from Madagascar, continental India and Indonesia; and later to the importation of migrant workers from the current day Gaza and Maputo Provinces. Thus, for the first time, Mozambique, particularly its southern provinces, was becoming an integral part of the economic system in southern Africa. There was also a strengthening of the friendship and solidarity that tied these two countries together.² The discovery of diamonds (1867) in Kimberley and gold (1886) on the Witwatersrand, in Paul Kruger's South African Republic (ZAR), gave new impetus to the migration of Mozambicans. They flocked to the mines to seek work which was better remunerated than any work they could find in the Portuguese colony. Thousands of Mozambicans worked on the construction of the railways and in the South African diamond, gold and coal mines.³ It was as a result of this increase in migration to South Africa and the huge demand for workers in the mining sector, that the Portuguese government, as colonisers, saw the need to regulate the migration into South Africa, and subsequently signed co-operation agreements in the transport and labour sectors, with the South African government.⁴

The consequences of this economic progress, together with political developments in South Africa and the southern African region as a whole, turned South Africa into the political and economic hub of the region, systemically linking officially segregated areas of Botswana, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi, causing these colonies to be economically, and in some cases, politically dependent, on South Africa. At the same time, and quite unintentionally (the colonisers had not planned such a rapprochement) the ties of friendship, solidarity and familiarity between indigenous South Africans, Mozambicans, Zimbabweans and Malawians were strengthened and consolidated, catalysed by their shared experience of exploitation, oppression and racial discrimination.

2 Eduardo Mondlane University (hereafter UEM), Department of History, *História: Manual da 10ª classe* (Maputo: UEM, 1980), 7–8.

3 Ibid. As early as 1899, the mines in South Africa employed 100 000 workers, many of whom came from the areas south of the Zambezi, mainly the Gaza Province and other neighbouring areas. In 1936, there were 300 000 workers on the mines: 60 per cent from Transkei and Ciskei; 25 per cent from Mozambique and 15 per cent from Lesotho. A comparison of the migrant workforce on South African mines reveals that in 1898 Mozambique contributed 60.2 per cent of the workforce, South Africa only 23.4 per cent and Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland 15.9 per cent. In 1918 Mozambique contributed 34.6 per cent of the workforce, South Africa 55.5 per cent and Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland 8.7 per cent. In 1951 Mozambique contributed 34.8 per cent while South Africa contributed 35.3 per cent and Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland together 16.5 per cent. In 1975, at the time of Mozambique's independence, it contributed only 28 per cent of the workforce, while South Africa contributed 32 per cent and the other three countries, 30.4 per cent. See Ibid., 15 and 17.

4 Ibid., 18–19. Various labour-related agreements were signed between South Africa and Portugal. In 1964 an agreement was signed that provided for service agreements for migrant labourers of 12 months, with the possibility of an extension to 18 months, and provided for deferred payment, whereby after the initial 6 months, 60 per cent of the salary payable for the remaining period could be retained by the mining company on behalf of the worker and deposited into a designated bank in Mozambique. The value of the deferred salaries would be exchanged for gold at a fixed gold price in ZAR. However, that price remained the same despite subsequent increases in the gold price on the world market.

The end of World War II and the flourishing of national liberation movements, in particular the revitalisation of the ANC in South Africa gave rise to the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO, in what is now Namibia); the Bechuanaland People's Party (BPP, in Botswana); the Basutoland National Party (BNP, in Lesotho); Imbokodvo (the National Cultural Movement in Swaziland); the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU, in what is now Zimbabwe); the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU); Frente de Libertação de Mozambique (FRELIMO, in Mozambique); the Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (the MPLA, in Angola); and the Malawi Congress Party (MCP in Malawi).⁵ The subsequent solidarity between these liberation organisations forced the colonialist and racist governments in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Portugal (who held political, military and economic power), despite their many political and economic differences, to create a political and military alliance against the national liberation and independence movements in their respective countries. South Africa took the lead and launched a long regional destabilisation process that only came to an end in 1994 when the country was liberated from the grip of apartheid.

The declaration of independence of Mozambique and Angola in 1975 and later Zimbabwe in 1980, in the southern African region, created favourable conditions for liberating South West Africa (Namibia) and South Africa from apartheid. After their independence was proclaimed, Mozambican, Angolan and Zimbabwean peoples reaffirmed their determination to continue supporting the struggle of the Namibian and South African people against the apartheid regime.

Mozambique's economy was integrally linked with that of the colonial powers through the rail/port network and the remittances of migrant workers, and therefore, its challenging of colonialist minority regimes was tantamount to economic suicide. The South African regime felt that the country's 'socio-economic and political stability' was under threat and in response, continued its aggressive destabilisation of the region, particularly Mozambique, by carrying out direct attacks and supporting the Movimento de Resistência Nacional (Mozambican National Resistance) (MNR)⁶ in a war that almost paralysed the country. Despite the signing of the Nkomati Peace Accord between Mozambique and South Africa in 1984, the destabilisation campaigns continued. The aircraft crash in 1986 that took the life of Samora Machel, the first president of Mozambique, was planned by the apartheid regime and demonstrated that the destabilisation of the country continued.

Despite the South African regime's attempts at destabilisation, the peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe, which were collectively integrated to form a united front called the Frontline States, founded in 1979 with Tanzania, Botswana and Zambia, continued to challenge the apartheid regime. They provided not only moral support but also logistical support, transport to and from South Africa,

5 These liberation movements were the ones that led the struggle for decolonisation in their countries, and the first to assume the presidency. The decolonisation process in southern Africa was a complex one in which there were various parties and often a split between factions.

6 Initially it was called the Movimento Nacional de Resistência (MNR). It was organised, financed and equipped by the Southern Rhodesian Intelligence Services, and later by South Africa's SADF.

housing, family, love and entertainment to freedom fighters and South Africans who fled from the atrocities committed by the South African regime. In reaction to the 'Constellation of Southern African States' (CONSAS) proposed by apartheid South Africa (another attempt by the racist regime to exploit its economic hegemony in the region) the Frontline States created the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980. Members of SADCC included Tanzania, Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, and they prevented the integration of any of the Frontline States into CONSAS. The economic crises and destabilisation they suffered – initiated by the South African government in Mozambique and in other Frontline States – by no means overshadow the pride and glory of the eventual liberation of the region, which culminated in the dismantling of the apartheid regime in 1994.

This chapter aims to analyse Mozambique's solidarity with the struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa and has been divided into five sections. The first section covers the period from the 1950s to 1974, and aims to demonstrate how the colonialists, in cahoots with the other minority governments in the southern African region, and despite the global winds of decolonisation, tried by all means to halt the rising power of national liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies, Southern Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. However, their efforts simply strengthened the solidarity, friendship and fraternal ties between the liberation movements, namely FRELIMO, ANC, MPLA, SWAPO and ZAPU/ZANU. It was during this period that the colonial regime was dismantled in both Mozambique and Angola.

The second section covers the period from 1975 to 1980 and describes the first years of Mozambique's independence. It also delves into Mozambique's warm reception of liberation movements from South Africa (ANC) and Southern Rhodesia (ZAPU and ZANU) and the unconditional material, diplomatic and moral support it provided. It was also during this period that Southern Rhodesia attained its independence. In South Africa there was a change in the balance of power, demonstrated by unprecedented mass action on various fronts: armed struggle movements, trade unions, community based organisations, women and youth organisations.

The third section covers the period 1981 to March 1984. At this time Mozambique prepared for economic and social upliftment and intensified its support of the struggle against the apartheid regime. However, this period also represents the regime's most aggressive policy of destabilisation against Mozambique, characterised by direct and indirect assaults against Mozambican economic and social infrastructure and its people, with the loss of lives. It also resulted in the signing of the Nkomati Accord. The fourth section covers the period from March 1984 to 1995, and describes the crisis in the solidarity and brotherly relations between Mozambican and South African people, caused mainly by the Nkomati Accord and tells how these ties were re-established. It also analyses South Africa's non-compliance with the Accord, its continued aggression against Mozambique and the determination of the Mozambican government and people to give unconditional support to the liberation struggle in South Africa, which led to the death of President Samora Machel and his delegation.

The fifth and final section discusses the end of the struggle and the post-1994 era, symbolised by the construction of the Samora Machel monuments in Mbuzini and Matola, and the interpretation centre that pays homage to the solidarity between the people of Mozambique and South Africa. The Matola raid took place on 14 February 1982 and the Mbuzini centre was inaugurated by President Mandela and President Chissano.

From the Pretoria-Salisbury-Lisbon alliance to the dismantling of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique, 1950–1974

Subsequent to World War II and the resurgence of nationalist movements in Africa, colonial regimes in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique organised a political and military front against the national liberation movements in these countries.⁷ Contrary to what happened in other African countries, as well as South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, in the Portuguese colonies the political movements were all founded clandestinely or in exile and from the very beginning they acted in extreme secrecy within the colonies. FRELIMO, founded on 25 June 1962 in Dar es Salaam, was the result of a consensus between the three existing nationalist movements, namely União Democrática Nacional de Mozambique (National Democratic Union of Mozambique) (UDENAMO) founded in 1960 in Salisbury, União Africana de Mozambique Independente (National African Union of Independent Mozambique) (UNAMI) founded in 1961 in Malawi and the Mozambique African National Union (MANU) founded in 1959 in Tanganyika.⁸ However, following the founding of FRELIMO, as well as the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) (MPLA) and Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde) (PAIGC) the massacres, repressions and repeated brutality by the police and armed forces, showed the total intransigence of the Portuguese government. The national movements thus had no option but to organise an armed struggle – it was clearly the only vehicle through which they could attain liberation. The national liberation armed struggle began in

7 Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia's economies were linked and were subordinate to South Africa's capitalism. They provided labour, raw materials and markets for South African products. Other independent countries in the region, especially Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland were very dependent on South Africa and their conservative governments were wary of upsetting relations with South Africa. The political and economic situation in the region made it difficult for South Africa's liberation movements to establish a regional platform from which to operate.

8 For example, on 16 June 1960, thousands of Mozambican patriots gathered at Mueda and demanded that the Portuguese return Mozambique to its people. Although it was a peaceful demonstration, the Portuguese forces reacted violently, firing into the crowd and killing about 500 people. This barbarism was repeated in February 1961 in Xinavane, and in 1963 in Lourenço Marques (now Maputo), Beira and Nacala during a series of strikes that resulted in the death and imprisonment of many of the strikers. See A.P. Muiwane, *Datas e Documentos da História da FRELIM* (Maputo: CIEDIMA-SARL, 2006), 5 and 23; E. Mondlane, *Lutarpor Mozambique* (Maputo: Coleção Nosso Chão, 1995), 97–98.

Mozambique on 25 September 1964.⁹ In British and French colonies political parties existed legally. In South Africa the ANC was a legal political party for a long time until it was banned in 1960, although in Namibia, despite the fact that SWAPO was a legal entity, its members were persecuted and detained by the apartheid regime. In Southern Rhodesia, ZAPU was a legal political party. Within this context, the differences between the colonial systems determined the strategies and tactics that were adopted by the national liberation movements.

The collaboration between the racist colonial regimes against FRELIMO began on 29 March 1964 at the border between Southern Rhodesia and Zambia (Victoria Falls), at the request of the Portuguese secret police (PIDE). The Rhodesian police detained a group of students that had fled Lourenço Marques (Maputo) and were on their way to Tanzania. This group consisted of Armando Emílio Guebuza (now the president of the Republic of Mozambique); Milagre de Jesus Mazuze; Josina Abiatar Muthemba (she later became the wife of Samora Machel); Mariana Isabel Saraiva; Cristina Tembe; Ângelo Azarias Chichava; Amós Estevão Manhanjane; and Simione Chivite. On 10 April 1964, a large group of students accompanied by six children (76 people in all) was detained by the South African police and returned to Lourenço Marques at PIDE's request. These students had escaped from Boane in small groups and had made their way on foot all the way to Swaziland.¹⁰ In 1965, Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa signed a secret agreement on the defence and security of 'white Africa' which provided for the organisation of joint defence operations against nationalist and subversive communist groups.¹¹ Later that year, apartheid regime soldiers participated in military operations in Cabo Delgado and Niassa.¹²

Furthermore, it had been made public that senior officials from the intelligence services of the three regimes met regularly to exchange information and coordinate military operations against the national liberation movements. One of these meetings took place in July 1969 in Lisbon, and was followed by a meeting in October 1971 in Luanda. Agenda items discussed included matters related to the intensification of actions by Namibian guerrillas and the situation along the Rhodesian-Mozambican and Angolan-Zambian borders.¹³ However, armed struggles in the region, especially in the two Portuguese colonies, were taking place hundreds of kilometres away from South African borders.

9 In conformity with Portugal's repressive and anti-nationalist movement policies, Portuguese secret police and intelligence services detained Joel Gunduane, Josséfate Machel, Matias Mboa, Matata Bombarda Tembe, Justino Mucal, André Manjoro, Lameque Michangula, Daniel Mahlayeye and Albino Maheche in December 1964. They were on their way to Lourenço Marques to form the 4th region of the Southern Mozambique's deployment force for national liberation. In December, various people who had had contact with these freedom fighters were also detained, namely Rogério Jauana, Luís Bernardo Honwana, Rodrigues Chale and Abner Sansã o Mutemba. On 4 January 1965 Malangatana Ngwenya, Júlio Sigaúque, Rui Nogar, João Reis, Daniel Magaia and Armando Pedro Muiuane were detained. See Muiuane, *Datas e Documentos da FRELIMO*, xiv.

10 Muiuane, *Datas e Documentos da FRELIMO*, 29–30.

11 UEM, Department of History, *História: Manual da 10a. classe*, 147.

12 Frelimo Party, *Boletim da Célula*, Special Edition, (February 1981), 4.

13 A. Urnov, *África do Sul contra África, 1966–1986* (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1988), 35.

Fascist Portugal was South Africa's closest ally and according to Vorster, was one of the few countries with which South Africa had a 'common understanding'.¹⁴ Based on the principle that good friends come to one another's rescue in times of crisis, Vorster's government sent several battalions of his armed forces to the Cabora Bassa hydro-electrical power station construction site at the end of 1969 and early 1970.¹⁵ South Africa's interest in completing the Cabora Bassa project was its increasing need for water and energy. As for Portugal, its interest was prompted, on the one hand, by the need to increase Mozambique's profitability, and on the other, the reciprocal interest in sustaining good relations with South Africa. Furthermore, the settlement of European communities on the occupied land provided safer and more efficient support to the colonial regimes because they provided an effective means of fighting against the national liberation movements. In addition, the participation of Western monopolies in the project had very important political implications for South Africa and Portugal: the greater their economic participation in the region, the more they would defend the racist colonials.¹⁶ In summary, the conclusion of the Cabora Bassa project (and Cunene in Angola) would turn South Africa into the supplier of the only hydro-electrical power network in southern Africa, which would include Zambia and Tanzania. Energy dependence would create a favourable climate for the subjugation of other economic sectors.

In December 1970, three Portuguese officials in Brussels announced publicly that South Africa was helping Portugal to transport troops to Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau by providing them with air transport. Between 1971 and 1973, Rhodesian and South African soldiers attacked FRELIMO guerrillas in the Tete area on many occasions. In September 1973, they attacked Zumbo in Tete. In Cabo Delgado, in the areas where guerrillas were operative, the South African Air Force devastated the forest with defoliators and other chemical substances.¹⁷ In addition to this, towards the end of 1971, in response to a request from the then president of Malawi, Hastings Banda, South Africa sent four aircraft with weapons and armoured vehicles to patrol the southern borders of Malawi. According to an aide in the police force, 'South Africa cannot stand and watch while a friendly country with a small

14 IDAF, *Southern African Information Service, Political and Social* (London: IDAF, 1967–1972), 146.

15 W. A. Hance, 'Cabora Bassa Hydro Project: Portugal and South Africa', *Africa Report*, 15, 5 (1970), 20–21; 'Editorial Notes: CABORA BOSSA', *The African Communist*, 40 (1970), 13. The idea of a powerful hydro-electric power station on the Zambezi River had been conceived in Lisbon in the 1950s, but its implementation was difficult due to a lack of resources and electricity consumers. The plan only bore fruit in 1966, when it was tabled before the chairman of the South African Industrial Development Corporation (IDC). In July 1968, the contract was given to an international consortium called Zambeze Consórcio Hidroeléctrico (ZAMCO). A pilot project was carried out by South African companies headed by the Anglo-American Corporation. Partners included companies from West Germany, France and Portugal, such as Telefunken, AEG and Siemens. The chairman of Anglo-American became ZAMCO's president. Construction began in 1969 and in 1974 the first phase of the project was almost complete.

16 D. Birmingham, *Frontline Nationalism in Angola and Mozambique* (London: James Currey, 1992), 55; Urnov, *Africa do Sul*, 42–43; Mondlane, *Lutarpor Mozambique*, 82–83; A.F. Isaacman and B.S. Isaacman *Dams, displacement, and the delusion of development: Cahora Bassa and its legacies in Mozambique, 1965–2007* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2013).

17 *Africa Report*, 15, 5 (1970), 2; *The African Communist*, 40 (1970), 13; IDAF, *Southern African Information Service*, 385; *Boletim da Célula*, Special edition (February 1981), 4.

army is at risk of being beaten and invaded by South Africa's enemies'.¹⁸ In fact, this military alliance between Vorster and Banda was aimed against the liberation struggle of the region, especially those in Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia.

The reciprocal arrangement between Portugal and South Africa developed in other areas as well. In 1973, South Africa became the main exporter to Mozambique. South African exports tripled compared to 1966, increasing from 627 million to 2.3 billion escudos.¹⁹ In addition, the South African Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), through the Banco de Fomento Nacional de Lourenço Marques, provided credit and loans to construction projects in Mozambique's economic sectors on condition that 60 per cent of the funds were used to procure South African goods and services. One such loan was the concession of R12.3 million to the Cement Company of Mozambique in 1973. In 1969 Johannesburg Consolidated Mines, was given a monopoly to prospect for all minerals in Tete Province, except oil, iron ore, natural gas and diamonds.²⁰ Labour was another important area in Portuguese-South African co-operation. At the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, approximately 120 000 to 130 000 Mozambicans worked in South Africa, of whom almost 100 000 were miners.²¹

It was within this context of the apartheid regime's onslaught against FRELIMO and its intention to keep Mozambique under Portuguese colonial rule, that friendship ties developed between FRELIMO and the ANC, both exiled liberation movements. The leaders of the movements, Eduardo Mondlane, Marcelino dos Santos and Joaquim Chissano of FRELIMO met Oliver Tambo and other leaders of the ANC. In fact, the links between Marcelino dos Santos and the ANC date back to 1960–1961 when he became secretary-general of the Conference of Nationalist Organisations of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP) and met people like Mzwai Piliso, Johnny Makathini, Yusuf Dadoo and Moses Mabhida.²² The relationship between Marcelino dos Santos and various representatives of the ANC and the ties of friendship between FRELIMO and the ANC also deepened when Marcelino dos Santos married the South African, Pamela Beira in 1968. Pamela remembers visits that Oliver Tambo, Alfred and Regina Nzo, Thabo Mbeki, Ruth Mompati and others, paid to her apartment when she lived with Marcelino dos Santos.²³

Joaquim Chissano first met Oliver Tambo in 1962 at the Afro-Scandinavian conference when the Scandinavians made a presentation on the struggle of the South African people from the ANC's perspective. On that occasion, Chissano took the floor in support of the ANC to say that:

18 IDAF, *Southern Africa Information Service*, 324.

19 *Ibid.*, 615.

20 *Ibid.*, 529–530.

21 *Ibid.*, 635.

22 N. Manghezi, *Amizade Traída e Recuperada: o ANC em Mozambique (1976–1990)* (Maputo: PROMÉDIA, 2007), 40 and 48. Marcelino dos Santos was a founder member of FRELIMO and filled the positions of deputy president of FRELIMO, Minister of Planning, Minister of Sofala Province and Speaker of the People's Assembly during his career.

23 *Ibid.*, 49 and 51.

The ANC cannot be pressurised into precipitating events, it needs to act according to the situation at hand. The same applies to Mozambique. Neither Mozambicans nor South Africans like violence, it is apartheid and the Portuguese colonialists who are violent. We need to pursue peaceful resistance until all possibilities have been exhausted. The conditions required for an armed struggle need to be created with great care, lest we give the impression that the armed struggle is our preferred route, when in fact it is merely an alternative, which only the attitude of the oppressors themselves can push us towards.²⁴

Later, Chissano introduced himself and had a brief conversation with Tambo, who thanked him warmly for his speech. The second meeting occurred towards the end of the 1960s or early seventies when they met in front of FRELIMO's temporary headquarters in Dar es Salaam. Marcelino dos Santos greeted Oliver Tambo and reminded him of their first meeting in 1962. Thereafter, Tambo always addressed Marcelino dos Santos as 'my fellow traveller'.²⁵ Their meeting not only cemented their personal friendship but also strengthened the friendship between the two movements. At the beginning of the 1950s, a branch of the ANC emerged in Mozambique, formed by Mozambican miners working in South Africa. It was not very prominent, and only re-emerged after 25 April 1974, but even then it wasn't very dynamic.²⁶ In point IV of its Liberation Front programme, FRELIMO stated its intention to 'apply a foreign policy based on solidarity and co-operation with all anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist peoples, governments and organisations', which meant that they wished to collaborate concretely with all African peoples who were fighting for their national independence, especially those in Portuguese colonies and in southern Africa.²⁷ It was based on this principle that relations between FRELIMO and ANC military cadres who operated from Tanganyika and were trained in Egypt during the early years, evolved.

Joaquim Chissano recalls that in 1958 a solidarity movement emerged called the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) that brought together the liberation movements from central, eastern and southern Africa. They used to meet in Dar es Salaam and Chissano participated in two meetings. As a result of the alignment of liberation movements, a group was formed called the 'authentic liberation movements'. In contrast to others they were the original and revolutionary movements. The unauthentic movements were those that resulted from splits in original movements. The ANC (South Africa); FRELIMO (Mozambique); SWAPO (South West Africa, now Namibia); MPLA (Angola); PAIGC (Guinea

24 J.A. Chissano, *Vidas, Lugares e Tempos* (Maputo: 2010: 351). Joaquim Chissano was a founder member of FRELIMO. He was head of Security and Foreign Affairs during the struggle, prime minister of the transitional government, minister of Foreign Affairs and president of the Republic of Mozambique.

25 Ibid., 351.

26 S. Vieira, *Participei, por isso Testemunho* (Maputo: Ndjira, 2010), 404. Sérgio Vieira was a FRELIMO member. During his career he was governor of the Bank of Mozambique, Minister of Security, governor of Niassa Province and member of the delegation that negotiated the Nkomati Accord.

27 FRELIMO, Statutes and Programme of Action, cited in Muiwane, *Datas e Documentos da FRELIMO*, 115–116.

Bissau and Cape Verde); and ZAPU (Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe), were the authentic movements. Those labelled as unauthentic movements were SWANU (South West Africa); PAC (South Africa); ZANU (Southern Rhodesia); UPA, that later became the FNLA (Angola); UNITA (Angola); and FLING (Guinea Bissau). It should be noted that later FRELIMO accepted ZANU as an authentic movement due to the seriousness with which it fought for the liberation of Southern Rhodesia.²⁸ This alignment allowed the liberation movements to exchange experiences on liberation struggle strategies and methods, to co-operate with one another and to strengthen their solidarity. Joaquim Chissano recalls that in its advocacy work abroad, especially in Europe, FRELIMO always lobbied not only for the liberation of Mozambique and other Portuguese colonies, but also for an end to apartheid and to Ian Smith's minority regime in Southern Rhodesia. In an interview he explained: 'we told the world that whoever supported our liberation struggle needed to support the struggle against apartheid. We were also in favour of sanctions against apartheid South Africa.'²⁹

Corroborating Joaquim Chissano's account, Mariano Matsinhe recalls that the creation of this group of authentic movements led to FRELIMO and the ANC's participation in OAU meetings, receptions at embassies, international solidarity conferences and in retreats in Dar es Salaam, where they would share and discuss issues relating to the liberation struggle.³⁰ However, it was in Kongwa, the temporary home of many freedom fighters from various countries, that the true ties of friendship and mutual assistance between FRELIMO and the ANC were cemented. This was achieved via monthly cultural activities where they learnt the dances and songs of both countries, participated in sports activities, mainly football, and exchanged life experiences, military strategies and material resources. For example, Lennox Lagu³¹ recalls that it was through this exchange that he began to understand the events in Portuguese colonies and the reasons for FRELIMO's liberation struggle.³²

In 1969, with the re-opening of the Tete front, the ANC sent a group of combatants under Lennox's leadership to do reconnaissance in Tete to see if the cadres could be smuggled to South Africa from there. With support from FRELIMO, the ANC cadres not only did reconnaissance in Tete but were able to observe the manner in which FRELIMO conducted its military operations. On his return to Tanzania, Lennox explained that despite the fact that FRELIMO had created the necessary conditions to support the group, the geographic location of Tete constituted an obstacle for the

28 Interview with Joaquim Chissano, Maleísse, 15 August 2007.

29 Ibid.

30 Interview with Mariano Matsinhe, Maputo, 28 February 2013. He was a member of FRELIMO, and FRELIMO's representative in Zambia. He was also a FRELIMO delegation member in the negotiations on the Lusaka Accord, Minister of Security and resident Minister of Niassa Province.

31 Lennox Lagu was the first chief representative of the ANC in Maputo and is currently a general in the SADF. See also S. M. Ndlovu, 'The ANC in Exile', in SADET, *The Road to Democracy in South Africa, 1960–1970*, 2nd edition (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010), chapter 11.

32 Manghezi, *AmizadeTraída e Recuperada*, 39–40.

ANC because the region was too far from South Africa.³³ It was necessary to wait until FRELIMO had taken the war closer to southern Mozambique.

In 1968, in response to an appeal by the president of FRELIMO, Eduardo Mondlane, political activists who supported the liberation of Mozambique created the Committee for the Freedom of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau (CFMAG) in London. These activists were the journalist, Africanist and historian, Basil Davidson; Advocate, Lord Tony Gifford and journalist, Poly Gaster, who had worked at the Mozambican Institute in Dar es Salaam. The solidarity committee's main task was to carry out awareness campaigns, disseminate information on the liberation struggle in Portuguese colonies, uncover the support that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) states were providing to Portugal, gather more sympathisers and mobilise material resources to send to freedom fighters. It was through its work that the committee established fraternal ties and began to collaborate and support the anti-apartheid movement that had already existed in London for many years. The two organisations often met to exchange and share experiences on the struggle. They also received leaders of the liberation movements, organised meetings for these leaders, as well as arranging solidarity campaigns and funding events. These activities were carried out based on the conviction that the struggle for the liberation of Portuguese colonies, especially Mozambique and Angola, was an integral part of the struggle for the liberation of the entire southern African region. Therefore, the solidarity networks and organisations had to co-ordinate their activities and work together. Alpheus Manghezi said the following when recalling those times:

While exiled in London, Ruth First and I were engaged in various liberation struggle actions led by the ANC, FRELIMO, MPLA and ZAPU. When Portugal launched the N6-Gordio operation, I was a postgraduate student at Uppsala (Sweden). Joaquim Chissano, a senior member of FRELIMO came to Uppsala and, together with a Scandinavian group that was in solidarity with the struggle of the people in Portuguese colonies, we organised various meetings so that he could explain the situation of FRELIMO's struggle as well as that of other movements in general. We also carried out awareness-raising campaigns at the secondary schools and disseminated information on the socio-economic, political and military situations in the southern African region and other Portuguese colonies, and on the reasons why the people were struggling and why the Scandinavians and other Europeans should support their struggle.³⁴

The joint collaboration between these international solidarity networks also deepened the friendship, solidarity and support between FRELIMO and the ANC, as well as with other liberation movements in Portuguese colonies. The Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau concluded its work in 1975, when

33 Ibid., 43–44.

34 Interview with Alpheus Manghezi, Eline, 23 March 2013. Manghezi was a South African scholar, who lived in Maputo and worked as a researcher at the CEA at UEM from 1976 until 1989, when he was transferred by the ANC to Tanzania to head the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College.

these countries attained their independence. It was replaced by the Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau Information Centre (MAGIC), which focused on the socio-economic and political situation in these same countries, as well as mobilising emergency campaigns for Angola which was under military occupation by South Africa. It also served as a recruitment and selection agency for Mozambique, recruiting and examining co-operating experts such as doctors, professors/lecturers, agricultural engineers, economists, lawyers, nurses and others interested in contributing to the reconstruction of the country.³⁵

On 25 April 1974, as a result of the liberation movements' growth and successive victories in Portuguese colonies, for example, PAIGC's victory in Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde and the failure of Operation N6-G6rdio in Mozambique, a coup d'6tat took place in Portugal, putting the military in power and ending Portuguese fascism. Thereafter, Portugal and FRELIMO commenced negotiations, culminating in the signing of the Lusaka Accord on 7 September 1974.

Portugal's defeat and the subsequent decline of the Portuguese empire in the 1970s was a dramatic and significant change in the balance of power in the southern African region. Until then, South Africa had applied a regional strategy that depended on the existence of a number of buffer states to surround it: the Portuguese colony, Angola, and the South African colony, Namibia, to the west; the British colony, Rhodesia, in the centre; and the Portuguese colony, Mozambique, to the east. This policy of creating buffer states allowed apartheid South Africa to push the liberation movements to regions far beyond its borders and to ensure that territories in the region continued to serve South African capitalists, since they could provide cheap labour, markets for South African products and services, such as transport. Thus, South Africa's regional policy aimed to create close alliances with the region's colonialist powers, supplying them with various types of assistance, including military support.

The crumbling of the Portuguese empire undermined the main pillar of South Africa's regional strategy. In the immediate term, it meant the loss of two buffer states, Angola and Mozambique. It also created favourable conditions for the resurgence of liberation struggles in Zimbabwe, which gained independence in 1980, and Namibia (1990). It also influenced the people's struggle within South Africa's borders. After April 1974, the immediate priority of the apartheid regime's Africa policy was to stop this and to prevent freedom fighters from using the favourable conditions to intensify their attacks against the remaining colonial regimes. The defeat of Portuguese colonialism led to the reform of the apartheid regime's regional policy, under the leadership of Vorster. Thus in October 1974, Vorster launched a new policy called 'detente', with the primary objective of uniting southern African states under a 'constellation of independent states' that together would form a powerful bloc and a 'united front against common enemies'. Bribes, secret diplomatic meetings and visits

35 Interview with Poly Gaster, Maputo, 19 July 2013. Gaster was a British journalist and activist for FRELIMO. She was the founder of the Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau, and now lives in Mozambique. Currently she works in the Mathematics Department at the UEM. See also Interview, Alpheus Manghezi, Eline, 23 March 2013; Z. Maharaj, *Dancing to a Different Rhythm: A Memoir* (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2006), 87.

were made to various West African states to establish this new initiative. At the same time, some insignificant 'petty' forms of apartheid were removed. However, South African expenditure on defence doubled from 1974 to 1975, reaching R1 billion.³⁶

With regard to Mozambique, from 25 April 1974, when the coup d'état happened in Portugal, until June 1975, when independence was proclaimed in Mozambique, a debate took place at the nerve centre of the apartheid regime about how to respond to the creation of a FRELIMO government in Mozambique. The apartheid regime initially tried to use local reaction to its advantage. There was a prominent industrialist in Mozambique called Jorge Jardim, who in 1974 established a political movement in opposition to FRELIMO. Mercenaries were recruited with the aim of deploying military units under the leadership of Jorge Jardim and his political group. Some recruitment took place in South Africa and Jardim travelled to South Africa in June and July 1974.³⁷ According to the former director general of the dissolved Department of Information, Eschel Rhoodie, and the then senior military commander and later Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, South Africa was strongly in favour of a military intervention to support the Portuguese settlers in their uprising, which took place unsuccessfully in September 1974, in protest against the signing of the Lusaka Accord. However, at the last minute, Vorster gave instructions to immobilise the equipment and munitions at Komatipoort on their way to Mozambique, because in his opinion there was no credible alternative force in Mozambique that could oppose FRELIMO and serve the apartheid regime's interests. Shortly before Mozambique's independence, Vorster offered to sign a 'non-aggression pact' with the future FRELIMO government. FRELIMO rejected the offer.³⁸

After the disintegration of the Portuguese colonial empire, the political and military importance of South Africa increased, since it was the last bastion of imperialism on the African continent, more particularly in southern Africa. The United States, Great Britain and France's veto of the United Nation's draft resolution aimed at excluding South Africa as member in October 1974 revealed the friendship and interests that these so-called democratic superpowers shared with the apartheid regime. In addition, Western countries voted against the arms embargo on South Africa in the Security Council in June 1975, revealing their intention of supporting South Africa's military power. They also provided important assistance to the apartheid regime in the development and concretisation of South Africa's 'detente' policy that was characterised by the establishment of direct contact between South Africa and Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana. The meetings were preceded by intensive preparations in London and Washington from August 1974 to April 1975.³⁹

However, the South African authorities and their supporters' attempts to distort the meaning of the word detente by shifting the focus from diplomatic relations

36 R. Davies, *South African Strategy towards Mozambique in the post-Nkomati Period: A Critical Analysis of Effects Implications* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1985), 7 and 8; Urnov, *África do Sul*, 111. See also chapter 14 of this volume.

37 Urnov, *África do Sul*, 112–113.

38 Davies, *South African Strategy*, 8.

39 *Africa Report*, 20, 3 (1975), 43; IDAF, *Southern African Information Service*, 806a.

between states to a fight against liberation movements were immediately detected and rejected by the progressive forces on the African continent. In this regard, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the ANC unmasked the racists' manoeuvres. The president of the ANC, Oliver Tambo stated, 'in analysing Vorster's various political, economic and military manoeuvres it is important to note that they emanate from a position of weakness and not of strength. The moment has arrived for us to pursue the enemy in withdrawal and not succumb to his flattery'.⁴⁰ To summarise, the collusion between colonisers and racists in southern Africa could not prevent the development of the national liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies or in Southern Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa itself. The successes of the liberation struggles led by the peoples of Africa were among the primary reasons that led to the demise of fascism in Portugal, as well as the disintegration of the Pretoria-Salisbury-Lisbon alliance and the end of colonialism in Mozambique, Angola, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde and São Tomé e Príncipe.

Thus, South Africa's most important task was not concluded: to destroy the liberation movements and to maintain southern African countries under white colonial domination. On the contrary, the colonialists' alliance strengthened the solidarity and mutual support between the liberation movements, namely FRELIMO, ANC, MPLA, SWAPO and ZAPU/ZANU. The winds of revolution were blowing strongly towards South Africa, that is, the necessary conditions were being created to provide the ANC with a safe rearguard from which to carry out its fight against apartheid.

The struggle continues: From Mozambique's declaration of independence to Zimbabwe's independence, 1975–1980

On your behalf, at midnight tonight, the 25 June 1975, the Central Committee of FRELIMO solemnly declares the total and complete independence of Mozambique and the creation of the People's Republic of Mozambique. The Republic which is thus birthed is the realisation of the aspirations of all Mozambicans... It is the result of the sacrifice made by all nationalist combatants and of all the Mozambican people, and it is the attainment of our victory... Born of the liberation struggle for national independence the People's Republic of Mozambique is in profound solidarity with the national liberation movements and has made international militancy a fundamental principle of its national and foreign policies... Due to its unique responsibility in view of its geographic position, the People's Republic of Mozambique is committed to the struggle for peace in the Indian Ocean [region].⁴¹

40 Statement by O.R. Tambo, acting president of the ANC at the 9th Extraordinary Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Dar es Salaam, 1975, 6, quoted in Urnov, *África do Sul*, 125–126.

41 Extracts from the Declaration of Independence speech by President Samora Moisés Machel at the Machava stadium. See Muiuane, *Datas e Documentos da história da FRELIMO*, 465–469.

Mozambique became independent in 1975, after ten years of fighting against the Portuguese colonial regime. The Lusaka Accord, signed in September 1974, recognised FRELIMO as the only and legitimate movement that could represent the Mozambican people and that should accordingly take power.

The revolutionary ascension to power by FRELIMO opened the way for the establishment of a socialist regime and the transformation of society. Following in the steps of Tanzania and re-affirming the principles established in FRELIMO's Statutes and Programme, the revolutionary government stated in the Independence Declaration that Mozambique was a free country and would serve as safe rear guard for the Zimbabwean and South African liberation movements. FRELIMO made these statements because it was fully conscious of the fact that the peace that Mozambique had attained with independence would be meaningless and ephemeral unless the region as a whole was also free.



Figure 17.1: The President of the People's Republic of Mozambique, Samora Moisés Machel, making his Declaration of Independence speech on 25 June 1975, at the Machaca Stadium in Maputo. Sourced from documents of the Matola Monument and Interpretive Centre

Mozambique's spirit of solidarity with southern Africa's liberation struggle was rooted in the very beginnings of FRELIMO's struggle. Therefore, it was natural that the collaboration between FRELIMO and the ANC would continue after Mozambique's independence. Once it had attained independence, Mozambique joined forces with the other Frontline States to bring peace to Angola, liberation to Zimbabwe and freedom from apartheid to South Africa; besides opposing Idi Amin's Uganda and Tanzania's struggle against his regime. Mozambique contributed troops and weapons to the fighting in Uganda. Thus, Mozambique's struggle for liberation was

perceived as integral to southern Africa's liberation struggle. Independence brought many responsibilities and challenges to Mozambique as it had to face a far more sophisticated power in the form of South Africa. For almost a century, Mozambique and South Africa had maintained economic relations. Mozambicans were employed in South Africa's mining sector and South Africa used the Maputo corridor's rail and port services. Thus, a large percentage of Mozambican revenues were generated through these economic relations and basically, Lourenço Marques, now Maputo, depended on South African foodstuffs and manufactured goods.

Despite this economic dependence, Mozambique bravely reinvigorated the Frontline States, offered its territory as a rear guard to the ANC, the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), thereby demonstrating its commitment towards the regional liberation struggle. Joaquim Chissano explains:

After the Lusaka Accord, FRELIMO had to adopt a strategy of support to the liberation struggle in southern Africa. Conditions were created for Mozambique to serve as a safe rear guard, and after independence we accepted that the ANC should have offices in Mozambique and that its leaders should live amongst us. That is how President Oliver Tambo, and the secretary-general of the SACP, Moses Mabhida, came to have homes in Mozambique. Various other leaders of the struggle, Joe Slovo, Ruth First and Albie Sachs, also resided in Mozambique, although there was no military base as such. Leaders of the armed struggle who were based in Mozambique carried out clandestine operations in South Africa despite the risks that such operations implied for our country. For example, Jacob Zuma was one of them, and there were others... We also made space available where the South Africans could prepare themselves and we allowed them to transit through Mozambique to South Africa carrying weapons and other logistical equipment. Our country served as a clandestine base for South Africa. It is true that the main task at that stage was to intensify the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, so that we could then have a wider base from which to pursue the liberation struggle in South Africa. The idea was to tighten the circle around apartheid... We didn't dare impose sanctions against South Africa because we had many Mozambicans working there. If we had imposed sanctions on South Africa, it would have been tantamount to imposing sanctions on ourselves.⁴²

In corroboration with Joaquim Chissano had said in his interview, Jacinto Veloso stated emphatically:

The solidarity between FRELIMO and the ANC was based on mutual interests and reciprocity. After independence, Mozambique was South

42 Interview, Joaquim Chissano, Maleísse, 15 August 2007; Interview, Joaquim Chissano, Maputo, 2 April 2013.

Africa's enemy and our best ally in that country was the ANC, which could and already was creating problems for the apartheid regime, and we saw it as an ally that could put an end to apartheid. Our support for the ANC was a direct consequence of FRELIMO's political direction. Tactically, having a safe and sure political and military ally within the apartheid system was the best way to weaken the system. With regard to support, the FRELIMO government provided diplomatic support by complying with the international agreements against South Africa. It provided practical support by giving political asylum to the ANC, providing shelter and protection to exiled members etc., and above all by supporting military actions in South Africa, such as sabotage. Through special and secret mechanisms, FRELIMO allowed war material to transit from Mozambique to South Africa. They provided logistical support so that the material could be transported, off-loaded and hidden in South Africa.⁴³

In addition, in his book *Memórias em Voo Rasante* (2006) Jacinto Veloso states: 'Our own security forces provided all the necessary military and infiltration support so that trained men could be infiltrated into South Africa, and sometimes, even though Swaziland.'⁴⁴

Confirming the evidence related by Joaquim Chissano and Jacinto Veloso, Alpheus Manghezi states:

When the South African government complained that FRELIMO had given military bases to the ANC, it wasn't true. We [the ANC] didn't have military bases in Mozambique, but in Angola and Tanzania, yes, we did have military bases. What is true is that Mozambique provided accommodation for a number of our cadres and freedom fighters who were in transit to South Africa. We had homes in Matola, Bairro da Liberdade and Maputo and there were definitely arms caches in some of them. Military training took place in Angola, Tanzania and sometimes Zambia. After their military training, the combatants would travel to Mozambique, and once in Maputo, would be infiltrated into South Africa via Swaziland. The success of the mission would depend on consultations with the leadership and people of the two countries. The ANC used weapons that came from various socialist countries including the USSR, which provided the ANC with support to the value of US\$22 million per year.⁴⁵

Mozambique's unconditional support for the liberation struggle in South Africa, under the leadership of the ANC, did not consist only of diplomatic support, accommodation and logistics. Of no less importance are the many direct and frank statements that the government made in support of the ANC, especially those of the

43 Interview, Jacinto Veloso, Maputo, 28 February 2013.

44 J. Veloso, *Memórias em voo Rasante* (Maputo: António José Correia Paulo, 2006), 129.

45 Interview, Alpheus Manghezi, Eline, 23 March 2013.

then president of the People's Republic of Mozambique, Samora Moisés Machel, such as:

We should also establish relations with South Africa – it is an undeniable fact that we share a border with South Africa... Mozambique will continue to support the liberation struggles... We support the legitimate struggle of the peoples of southern Africa... We condemn racial discrimination and apartheid.⁴⁶

In his address to the diplomatic corps in December 1976 he said:

The anti-populist regime wants to survive by increasing aggression and creating puppet states that can serve as buffers against the liberation movements and as bases from which to launch attacks against genuinely independent African states... But we want to affirm that such manoeuvres will not succeed because even puppet states are inhabited by people and people are never puppets.⁴⁷

Addressing a state banquet in Conakry in June 1976, he expressed similar sentiments:

In the same vein, we will provide all necessary assistance to the ANC-led people's liberation struggle and the South African people's resistance to this inhumane form of racism known as apartheid, so that they can attain complete economic and social emancipation.⁴⁸

At the United Nations in October 1977, President Machel called for the elimination of apartheid, which he described as 'hostile to humanity':

The search for solutions to the problems in southern Africa requires, above all, the elimination of the apartheid regime. The existence of this regime, which is hostile to humanity, creates intolerable tension and is a threat to the people of Africa... The People's Republic of Mozambique is conscious of the special responsibilities that it has as a member of the United Nations, and as a country that is geographically right next door to this last bastion of racism in Africa. The People's Republic of Mozambique will not back down from its international obligations. We will not surrender because of intimidation or blackmail. We will not withdraw in the face of aggression, regardless of how barbaric or cruel it is.⁴⁹

At a state banquet in Beijing in May 1978, Machel reiterated 'that regardless of the circumstances the People's Republic of Mozambique will honour its international obligations to support the people's liberation struggle in southern Africa'.⁵⁰

46 University of Fort Hare (hereafter UFH), ANC Archives, Box 8, Folder 49, File 1–3, Samora Machel's speech to the Central Committee, Inhambane, June 1975.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

President Samora Machel attacked the apartheid regime head on and explained that the South African people's liberation struggle was not intended to replace white racist injustices with black racist injustices, but rather to liberate all South Africans and hence the reason why Mozambique provided unconditional support to the ANC and to all people who loved freedom and peace. At every occasion and in each pronouncement made by the Mozambican government it was clear that the apartheid regime was Mozambique's enemy as well as the enemy of all independent African states, especially those in southern Africa. He made the point that the ANC was recognised as the legitimate representative of the majority of South Africans and was the movement that should lead the liberation struggle in South Africa. He expressed Mozambique's solidarity with the ANC, the people of South Africa and the liberation struggle in southern Africa. As the president often said, 'Mozambique cannot be free, if some parts of the African continent continue under foreign domination, if some parts of humanity remain subjected to domination'.⁵¹ According to Joaquim Chissano, it was as a result of such pronouncements that the apartheid regime imposed economic sanctions against Mozambique. These sanctions took the form of a reduction in the employment of Mozambican mine workers, a cut in miners' remittances and a reduction in the amount of goods transported via the Maputo harbour and the Ressano Garcia, Swaziland and Chicualacuala railway lines. It was indeed a high price for Mozambique to pay for defending the people's rights to independence, freedom and equality in South Africa.⁵²

The Mozambican government also strengthened co-operation with the Soviet Union (USSR) and the Eastern bloc, which created even more suspicion among the apartheid regime and its allies. The support and solidarity between FRELIMO and the ANC extended to the national reconstruction process in Mozambique, especially in the education sector (notably tertiary education). At the time of independence, there was widespread illiteracy in Mozambique (in excess of 90 per cent). Furthermore there were very few teachers, the majority of whom were foreigners and were distributed among the schools according to a discriminatory scheme. The few existing public schools were situated mainly in the urban areas and served the children of the colonisers, coloureds and some Mozambican *assimilados*. Apart from these there were a few missionary schools, located mainly in the rural areas and attended mainly by Mozambican scholars, while the few private schools and private teachers were highly exploitative. As for tertiary education, the one university was restricted to a small minority, attended exclusively by the capitalist bourgeoisie, and there was no experience or expertise in managing the education sector.⁵³ Thus, on 24 July 1975, at a rally attended by the Mozambican people, President Samora Machel announced that education, health and housing would be nationalised and be at the service of the

51 Ibid.

52 Interview, Joaquim Chissano, Maputo, 20 April 2013.

53 Ministry of Education and Culture, *Sistemas de Educaçãoem Mozambique* (Maputo: Government Printer, 1980), 41; Ministry of Education, *Aeducaçãoem Mozambique: Problemas e Perspectivas*, (Maputo: Government Printer, 1990), 1.

people at large. This symbolised a complete break from the colonialist past and was the dawning of a new paradigm. It also meant, of course that there was a demand for experts and qualified human resources.

In response to the shortage of skills and qualified public servants, MAGIC acted as a recruitment agency and managed to recruit qualified experts and left-wing European intellectuals, who became known as ‘co-operators’. In fact, it was through this process that part of the ANC and PAC’s exiled intellectuals and researchers came to Mozambique and contributed to the creation and transformation of the Eduardo Mondlane University. Alpheus Manghezi recalls that he was awarded his doctorate at the same time that Mozambique attained its independence. While searching for work he came across a MAGIC pamphlet advertising lecturing posts at the University in Mozambique:

I submitted my application without delay. However, before I was accepted, FRELIMO obtained information from the ANC about me. Only after the ANC had confirmed that I was a member of the movement, did I receive approval to enter Mozambique. I arrived in Mozambique in December 1976 and was immediately placed at the Department of History, Faculty of Arts, at the Eduardo Mondlane University as assistant lecturer. At the beginning of 1977, I received a brief written message from, and then personally met with, Ruth First [South African intellectual, journalist, researcher and member of the Communist Party] who invited me to work at the Centre for African Studies. Thus, I was transferred to the Centre where I joined a multidisciplinary team of researchers who were undergoing training. My areas of expertise at the Centre were: migrant labour, the history of forced labour, the history of forced labour in the rice and cotton industries, communal villages and agricultural production carried out by co-operatives. All studies were carried out in the south of Mozambique – Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo, where the local language is Tsonga. There, in the rural areas, I carried out my research and recorded the life experiences and stories of the locals through interviews and worker songs. Later, I would transcribe everything and translate it into English.⁵⁴

Corroborating Alpheus Manghezi’s story, Zarina Maharaj describes in her autobiography how, at the end of 1976, she read an advertisement in the SACP’s quarterly magazine, *African Communist*, which read: ‘Professionals committed to the development of Mozambique, we need you!’ She was very excited because she thought that if her application was accepted, she would have the opportunity of using her skills exactly where she most desired to do so – in the struggle for social equality. Furthermore, placement in Mozambique would bring her closer to home (South Africa). She immediately telephoned MAGIC and after various interviews with Mozambican government representatives and consultations between the Mozambican government and the ANC, she received a telegram in May 1977 from Professor Beirão,

54 Interview, Alpheus Manghezi, Eline, 23 March 2013.

head of the Mathematics Faculty at the Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM) in Maputo, offering her a post as Mathematics and Computer Science lecturer in his department. In December 1977, Zarina flew from London via Lisbon to Maputo, Mozambique, where she was met by Jacob Zuma, from the ANC office in Maputo, because Professor Beirão had other work commitments. The following day she was received by Mrs Alves at the university's residence, and later that day, was introduced to Lennox (*nom de guerre*), the ANC's chief representative in Maputo, and another South African lecturer, Albie Sachs, whom she had met previously in London and happened to be staying at the same residence with.⁵⁵

In 1979, Rob Davies, a South African who was based in London, was recruited by MAGIC to work at the Centre for African Studies (CEA) at UEM.⁵⁶ Besides the South Africans who were recruited by MAGIC, there were others like Ruth First who came to the centre at the invitation of Aquino Bragança, a journalist, intellectual and political advisor to the president of the People's Republic of Mozambique.⁵⁷ It was in fact a unique opportunity for Ruth First to return to southern Africa and continue with her intellectual work and political struggle – 'body and soul' on African soil – and to contribute to the building of socialism in an independent Mozambique. It also allowed her to be closer to the struggle against the white minority government in her mother country. Later, Ruth invited Dan O'Meara and other South African intellectuals to work in Mozambique. Dan O'Meara recalls that in London in 1979, Ruth had spoken to him privately, asking him if he would be interested in working at the CEA. She had explained that for socialism to be successful in Mozambique it was necessary to understand South Africa's politics and society.⁵⁸

Working at the CEA under the leadership of its director, Aquino de Bragança, and its director for scientific research, Ruth First, other South Africans contributed to the adoption of new teaching and research methods and techniques. These included the development of a postgraduate degree in Research and Education Development and the creation of the research hub for southern Africa, that focused on political and economic situation analysis in southern Africa, particularly the internal dynamics of the ANC's struggle and South Africa's destabilisation strategy for the southern African region. A lecturer, later professor, in the Faculty of Arts, Dr Manuel Araújo (now retired), stated that the South African academics who worked at the UEM, and especially at the CEA, contributed significantly to empirical research and to the development of an understanding of Mozambique within the southern African context. Various South African academics made speeches and presented academic papers on the invitation of the Faculty of Arts, and contributed to the assessment of

55 Maharaj, *Dancing to a Different Rhythm*, 86–87, 92–99.

56 Manghezi, *Amizade Traída e Recuperada*, 134. Rob Davies worked from 1979–1990 at the CEA as part of the team focusing on issues in southern Africa. He is now minister of Trade and Industry in South Africa.

57 Ruth First visited Mozambique for the first time in 1975, when she undertook research on the Mozambican migrant labour force in South Africa. In 1977 she headed the Mozambican Miner Research Project and in 1979 became the director of scientific research at the CEA.

58 C. M. D. Fernandes, 'Dinâmicas de Pesquisa em Ciências Sociais no Mozambique pós-independente: O Caso do Centro de Estudos Africanos, 1975–1990', PhD thesis, Salvador University, 2011, 240.

texts that were included as part of a History textbook for secondary school students.⁵⁹ He adds that:

The participation of the South Africans working at the CEA and Mozambican lecturers in debates and meetings, helped us Mozambicans to understand the sacrifice that Mozambique was making by agreeing to adopt sanctions against Rhodesia, since Mozambique shared the same space. Ruth's interventions were very important because she always explained what was happening in Mozambique in the context of the region. The empirical research produced by the CEA wasn't only important to Mozambique but also to South Africa and the entire world. The CEA's approach influenced students' paradigms and thinking at the time.⁶⁰

As a result of the Soweto uprising in 1976, many young South Africans fled to neighbouring countries and the Mozambican government received 20 students who were ANC members, integrating them immediately into various faculties at the UEM. Mozambique thus contributed to the educational and vocational training of ANC cadres. Alpheus Manghezi and Zarina Maharaj state that in February 1978, they, together with Ruth First and Albie Sachs, participated in discussions with the UEM rector, Fernando Ganhão, to find solutions to the lack of discipline and inadequate academic performance of South African students, which was creating friction between them and their university lecturers and Mozambican peers. In fact, the ANC office and ANC's Education Sub-Committee had already started offering political classes for both ANC students and staff alike. These classes were also used to address the problems identified by the Mozambican authorities. Another solution that was implemented was for the South African lecturers to provide extra group tutorials to the South African students. Alpheus and Nadja Manghezi recall three students, namely, Tommy [the only one to graduate from UEM], Enos and Karabo, who today are senior officials in the ANC.⁶¹

It is important to mention that the appeal for committed professionals to come to Mozambique to aid with the development and growth of the country also brought attracted many European intellectuals and experts, who were in solidarity with the South African liberation struggle and carried out very important tasks in Mozambique to advance that struggle. For example, from 1978 to 1979 Vanda de Angelis, an Italian statistician from the University of Rome worked in the Faculty of Mathematics at UEM. She was committed to the ANC struggle and because she was unknown to the apartheid security forces, she managed to smuggle weapons from Maputo to South Africa for the ANC's underground struggle. During the academic

59 This history book was produced by the Department of History, Arts Faculty of UEM to fill the need for balanced history at a new university in an independent Mozambique. Since Mozambique was now an independent country, it was important to develop new texts that focused on Mozambicans (as protagonists), their country in particular, and Africa in general.

60 Interview, Manuel Araújo, Maputo, 6 February 2013.

61 Maharaj, *Dancing to a Different Rhythm*, 86–87, 103–104; Interview, Alpheus Manghezi (with Nadja Manghezi), Eline, 23 March 2013.

holidays, Vanda's car was loaded with weapons, they were hidden in the doors, ceiling, chassis and wherever else it was possible to hide weapons. Accompanied on various occasions by her 9-year-old son, Daniel, she would drive the car from Maputo to a secret destination in South Africa.⁶² These weapons were then used by MK cadres in their attacks. Furthermore, Nadja Manghezi describes how many international organisations and individuals provided material assistance to the ANC, for example, a Danish and a Dutch couple who donated their cars to the ANC.⁶³

In South Africa, some Mozambican migrant workers with South African identity cards and under the cover of being a funeral agency, carried out political activities linked to FRELIMO and the ANC. Alice Mkatshwa (later known as Alice Ndllovu), Azarias Nkuna and Agostinho Machado Manjate described how in Chiawelo, Soweto, together with António Chambale (later known as Jim Moshotola, Alice's husband and the founder of Associação Lanterna) they discussed and disseminated information about the Mozambican liberation struggle and the ANC's political campaign. António Chambale held most of these meetings in his garage except when what was to be discussed was of a more sensitive political nature, in which case the meetings took place inside his home and only involved his closest friends. After Mozambique's independence, Associação Lanterna's mission became to support the ANC. According to Agostinho Machado Manjate, after the Soweto massacre on 16 June 1976, Associação Lanterna helped various South African youths to flee to Mozambique. After verifying the identity and checking out the conduct of the youngster, Manjate would provide him or her with a travel document stating that the father of the youngster had presumably worked in South Africa and returned to Mozambique, and that the youngster wished to visit his/her father. With the connivance of the head of emigration at Ressano Garcia, 'Mr Generoso', the youth would be taken to his or her destination in Mozambique, normally to an ANC operative. Tommy Ndhela, born in Soweto and an active member of the University of Turfloop's student movement in June 1976, who was later detained and released on R500 bail, is a typical example of the youths who reached Mozambique in October 1976 with the help of António Chambale and Associação Lanterna.⁶⁴ Many of the young Mozambican migrants later returned home to support the ANC's liberation struggle from their country.

Still in South Africa, after the declaration of Mozambique's independence, Cyril Ramaphosa, Frank Chikane and other members of the South African Students' Organisation (SASO) at the University of the North (Turfloop) participated in student demonstrations recognising Mozambique's independence and calling for an end to apartheid in South Africa. The leader of the student movement was detained by the apartheid police soon afterwards.⁶⁵ On one hand, the demonstrations were a sign of solidarity and satisfaction with the liberation attained by Mozambicans, while on the

62 Maharaj, *Dancing to a Different Rhythm*, 119–120.

63 Manghezi, *Amiza de Traída e recuperada*, 157.

64 *Ibid.*, 59–78.

65 Interview, Jacinto Veloso, Maputo, 28 February 2013; Interview, Alpheus Mangahezi, Eline, 23 March 2013.

other they were a show of strength and a catalyst for the struggle against apartheid. On the religious front, Bishop Dinis Sengulane of the Anglican Church explains that activities were carried out with the aim of exchanging information and experiences and showing solidarity with the South African people's struggle for liberation:

Through the Christian fellowship of the South African Council of Churches (SACC)... various conferences were organised in many countries in Africa, Europe and America, with the aim of allowing the South African Christian denominations clergy (members of SACC) to share political, economic, social and military information, share experiences and provide moral support to the South Africans, under the motto, 'never give up'. In March 1977, one such conference in New York was convened by Bishop Desmond Tutu, and the Bishops from Lesotho, Angola, Mozambique and Swaziland. In Mozambique, the Mozambican Christian Council and especially the Anglican Church created conditions to receive South African refugees and provide them with protection, integrate them into the congregation, support them materially and provide them with basic accommodation. Zuane, a member of the ANC, who later died of illness in Mozambique, was one of many refugees sheltered in this way. Many meetings were held with other denominations under the pretext of 'evangelising', but in reality to disseminate information on the political situation in South Africa and discuss possible solutions. On numerous occasions, the Anglican Church invited Father Michael Lapsley and Bishop John Woshen to come to Mozambique and discuss the liberation struggle in South Africa with the church, its parishioners and South Africans living there. Due to his political activism, Father Michael lost his hands when a letter-bomb sent to him by the apartheid security forces exploded. In recognition of his sacrifice and as a type of sacrament, he was elected chaplain of the Federation of Anglican University Students by the Anglican community in southern Africa.⁶⁶

It was in this context that the South African regime became more aggressive, both internally as well as against Mozambique.⁶⁷ However, FRELIMO and the Mozambicans did not waver in their efforts and solidarity with the liberation struggles in southern Africa. As mentioned earlier, as part of its 'detente' policy, the apartheid government invited Mozambique to sign a 'non-aggression pact'. When the FRELIMO government rejected the invitation, the apartheid regime implemented a number of stringent economic actions against Mozambique. Consequently, although the number of Mozambican miners recruited to work in South African mines had been increased to 118 000 in 1975, it was immediately reduced to 79 000 in 1976

66 Interview, Bishop Dinis Sengulane, Maputo, 13 March 2013. Dinis Sengulane was one of the first Mozambican bishops of the Anglican Church and president of the Christian Council of Churches in Mozambique after independence. He was also a prominent figure in the peace process between FRELIMO and MNR.

67 It is evident that MNR's (Resistência Nacional de Mozambique) expansion of military activities after 1977 was promoted by both Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Preparations seem to have commenced in 1972/1973. The Banda government in Malawi also supported these military activities.

and, later to 40 000.⁶⁸ Meanwhile, in 1975 a Mozambican delegation was invited to participate in discussions on Zimbabwe in Victoria Falls, in a clear attempt by the apartheid government to involve Mozambique in the 'detente' initiative. According to Jacinto Veloso, western secret services, the apartheid regime and Ian Smith's Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) encouraged the spreading of rumours that socialism would create instability in the country. In fact, shortly after these rumours, these forces managed to create a counter-revolutionary atmosphere in Mozambique. An example of the instability sown by the South African secret service was the uprising of FRELIMO soldiers at the Machava barracks in December 1975. According to the South African press, the uprising aimed to overthrow the FRELIMO government.⁶⁹

In the middle of 1976 it became evident that Vorster's 'detente' initiative had failed, partially due to the failed invasion of Angola by South African troops in 1975/6 and partially due to the brutal suppression of the Soweto student uprising in June 1976. It is important to mention that in 1976, in compliance with its United Nations obligations, the FRELIMO government imposed sanctions against Ian Smith's Southern Rhodesia and closed its borders with Rhodesia. For Mozambique, this decision implied a loss of vital revenues normally obtained as a result of Southern Rhodesia and Zambia's use of its railways and port infrastructures. At the same time, Southern Rhodesia intensified its attacks against the central parts of Mozambique, destroying roads, railway lines, port infrastructures, oil pipelines and high voltage power lines and pylons. The Rhodesian armed forces created the *Movimento de Resistência Nacional* (MNR) as a counter-revolutionary force that attacked targets in the Manica and Sofala Provinces. The economic sanctions imposed against Southern Rhodesia cost Mozambique approximately US\$600 million, due to the fact that compensation promises made internationally were never kept.⁷⁰

The failure of the apartheid regime's 'detente' policy led to the adoption of the 'Total Strategy' by P.W. Botha who replaced Vorster in 1978. This strategy was aimed to accelerate and diversify the militarization of South Africa, in order to protect the country's dominance and military position and that of its allies in southern Africa. To this end, the military budget more than doubled, and in 1979–1980 totalled R2 189 billion and from January 1978, the duration of compulsory military service doubled. At the end of the seventies, the total number of South African soldiers had increased to 180 000.⁷¹ Paradoxically, the collective mobilisation capabilities of

68 R. First and R. Davies, *Migrant Labour to South Africa: A Sanctions Programme?* (Geneva: 1980). Although there were many reasons why the Chamber of Mines decided to cut down on migrant labour, Mozambique was the most affected. This was partly due to the apartheid regime's attempt to show Mozambique that it would pay a high price if it reduced its ties with South Africa.

69 Veloso, *Memórias*, 109–110.

70 J. Hanlon, *Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots?* (London: Currey, 1991), 11.

71 Urnov, *África do Sul*, 146–147. The 'total strategy' depended on military co-operation from Western countries. This was vitally important for the apartheid regime. At an international conference on the implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa held in London, the SWAPO delegation denounced the arms provided to the South African Defence Force: the apartheid regime had received Mirage 111 and F1 jet fighter planes, SA-330 Puma helicopters and Panhard AML 245 armoured vehicles from France. Great Britain had supplied Canberra fighter-bombers, Centurion assault vehicles, 90mm and 140mm artillery weapons, long distance microwave radios and radars. The United States had provided Lockheed C-130 and L-100, Douglas C-47 and Cessna-185

Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, Botswana, Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe had decreased significantly. On the military front, apartheid incursions into Mozambique were often disguised as Rhodesian security forces. Air raids and helicopter drops were jointly planned and co-ordinated by the Rhodesian and the South African intelligence services, with the involvement of South African pilots and aircraft. The result of these incursions into Mozambique, as published in December 1979, was 1 338 soldiers killed, 1 538 injured and maimed, and 751 captured or detained. Economic infrastructure to the value of US\$45 million was destroyed.⁷² These operations reached their climax at the end of 1979, when Mozambican artillery forces repelled one of the biggest Rhodesian invasions, thereby putting an end to Ian Smith's military aspirations and accelerating the conclusion of negotiations at Lancaster House.

In point of fact, the intensification of the apartheid regime's military incursions into Mozambique was a result of the armed attacks that the ANC unleashed inside South Africa in 1977, 11 attacks were reported by the South African media; these increased to 15 in 1978 and by the middle of 1981 the number of attacks in the preceding four years totalled 62. The attacks were aimed at key strategic and economic installations (mainly transport and energy sectors), military bases, police stations and the symbols of repression and domination (government offices, courts, mayor's offices, etc.). These attacks included some spectacular operations, such as the attacks against two coal energy plants and SASOL's fuel storage tanks on June 1980. The attacks against SASOL and the energy plants were a clear demonstration that the ANC had contacts within the intelligence services of the three most important and constantly surveyed strategic targets in South Africa. In addition, at this time in South Africa, there were changes in the liberation struggle in terms of class, form and level. The liberation struggle was now spearheaded by legal and quasi-legal non-governmental organisations. Besides trade unions, a large number of new community-based organisations, civic associations, and women and student movements had emerged since 1978, while many of the older organisations had undergone important improvements in leadership. There was an increase in the liaison and unity between different organisations carrying out the mass struggle. For example, many community-based organisations started participating in boycott campaigns and supporting mass strikes.⁷³

At the beginning of 1979, P.W. Botha's government led an initiative to create an economic, political and military grouping in southern Africa known as the 'Constellation of Southern African States'. According to the apartheid government, the 'Constellation' would protect the region against 'Marxist interventions' and

airplanes. Canada sent 155 mm artillery shells. Italy provided Impala MK-11 fighter-bombers. The Federal Republic of Germany had sent G-3 machine guns. See *Weekly News Briefing*, 5, 14 (1981), 3.

72 Urnov, *África do Sul*, 154–155. In June 1978, apartheid agents placed bombs at a residence in Swaziland, near Namaacha, resulting in the death of various young men and women who were ANC members. See Maharaj, *Dancing to a Different Rhythm*, 124.

73 R. Davies, D. O'Meara and S. Dlamini, *The Struggle for South Africa: A Reference Guide to Movements, Organizations and Institutions* (London: Zed Press, 1984), 34–35. According to Zarina Maharaj, Motso Mokgabudi (alias Obadi), Krishna Rabibal (alias Ashwin), Guebuza and his brother 'Douglas' were members of the team who successfully attacked the SASOL refinery. See Maharaj, *Dancing to a Different Rhythm*, 122–124.

'subversive actions', and ensure the safety of South Africans and whites and blacks living in neighbouring countries who chose to pursue a moderate policy. To paraphrase President K. Kaunda of Zambia, the truth of the matter was that the 'Constellation of Southern African States' initiative had the objective of turning South Africa into the master and all other southern African states into satellite or puppet states.⁷⁴ The 'Constellation of Southern African States' would also give South Africa the right to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries in the region, on the pretext of helping them to repress 'terrorism' and maintain 'stability', while the real motive was to attack national liberation movements (ANC, ZANU-PF, SWAPO) and destabilise the independent countries in the region that were in solidarity with such liberation movements.

The countries in southern Africa were aware of the far-reaching consequences of joining the 'Constellation of Southern African States' and rejected and condemned the initiative. In July 1979 in Arusha, Tanzania, at a conference of the Frontline States (Tanzania, Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique and Angola) the government officials vehemently rejected apartheid's expansionist policy and adopted measures to diminish the economic dependence of the region on South Africa and to strengthen mutual economic ties. In pursuit of these decisions, and as a result of the ZANU-PF victory in the February 1980 elections and Zimbabwe's subsequent declaration of independence in April, the Frontline States together with Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi met in Lusaka in the following month to discuss the region's problems. Once again, the participants rejected P.W. Botha's 'Constellation of Southern African States' initiative and declared South Africa an obstacle to economic development in the region. The economic emancipation of these countries would only be viable if they reduced their dependence on South Africa and pooled their national resources. The conference approved a joint action programme for the development and optimised use of their transport and communication systems, co-ordination of construction in the industrial and energy sectors, co-ordination in the fight against drought and animal diseases, training of national human resources and the joint financing of multilateral projects. It was in fact the establishment of a new organisation: Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC).⁷⁵

The ZANU-PF victory in the February 1980 elections, and the Front line States Conference that led to the creation of SADCC in April of the same year, were in fact decisive blows to the CONSAS initiative. In February 1980, the apartheid regime, under the leadership of P.W. Botha, concentrated considerable military contingents on the border with Mozambique, threatening aggression. The pretext was that the People's Republic of Mozambique was engaged in ANC guerrilla actions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' memorandum to the Mozambican government stated that according to Pretoria's interpretation, Mozambique's support of the national liberation struggle in South Africa was tantamount to 'acts of aggression' on Mozambique's part, which justified the taking of 'counter-measures'.⁷⁶ Meanwhile, South Africa was providing

74 See chapter 1 of this volume.

75 Ibid.

76 *Notícias*, 24 December 1979.

considerable support to groups fighting against FRELIMO such as the MNR, which was based in Southern Rhodesia and which, after Zimbabwe's independence, had to seek refuge in South Africa. The British Royal Air Force (RAF) had transported these combatants to South Africa.⁷⁷ In fact, Agostinho Tiago, an MNR recruit, told journalists who entered the Sitonga base, after Mozambican Armed Forces attacked the base in June 1980, that two Nord-Atlas cargo planes had flown in from the south and dropped parachutes with war material near the main base. The boxes of munitions, grenades and explosives had labels and markings written in English and Afrikaans. Another prisoner stated that there were Portuguese and South African instructors at the base, as well as mercenaries of other nationalities.⁷⁸

In April 1980, Zimbabwe became independent and consequently there was peace throughout the Mozambican territory. After the war, economic development became the priority. In November, nine leaders of the independent states in southern Africa met in Maputo for the first Annual SADCC summit. Mozambique had great aspirations of rehabilitating and upgrading its railway lines and port infrastructures so that it could develop transport links with other SADCC countries and also improve its revenues. Thus, 1980 was a year of decompression and relative peace, so the government relaxed its defences. The year 1980 seemed to confirm the hope and dream of all Mozambicans. However, it was also the year in which the apartheid regime developed its plan to destroy Mozambique. It is within this context that Mozambique's support for the South African liberation struggle led by the ANC and its relationship with South Africa's apartheid regime must be understood.

From Mozambique's destabilisation, under the pretext of pursuing 'ANC terrorists' to the Nkomati Accord: 1981–March 1984

Once Zimbabwe's liberation war had come to an end, the immediate threat to Mozambique seemed to have disappeared and the country was able to focus on its development objectives. The 1980s were called the decade that would end underdevelopment, despite Mozambique's commitment to support the ANC-led liberation struggle in South Africa. The FRELIMO government continued to provide moral and logistical support and serve as a rear guard and transit route for the ANC's military operations in South Africa. In the media, programmes were introduced that on one hand, disseminated information on the reason for the liberation struggle in South Africa and Mozambique's solidarity with it, and on the other, provided information on South Africa's socio-political and economic situation under the apartheid regime as well as South Africa's relationship with other southern African countries. These programmes also sensitised Mozambicans, South Africans and other people in the region and the world about the South African liberation struggle pursued by the ANC, and the need to deepen solidarity and support for that struggle.

77 Vieira, *Participei, por isso Testemunho*, 456.

78 *Agência de Informação de Mozambique* (hereafter AIM), July 1980, 8.

Radio Mozambique's shortwave broadcasts had been used by Radio Free Zimbabwe during the war and had been heard by many South Africans in the east and south of the country during the colonial era. After Zimbabwe's independence they began to broadcast English news programmes on South Africa and the ANC, based on information obtained from UN radio programmes against apartheid or on information produced locally from interviews with ANC leaders about the movement's activities. Under Ian Christie's management, the radio had three programmes: the first was a news slot, the second a commentary and the third, a current affairs programme. These radio broadcasts were heard by English-speaking people living in Mozambique and in South Africa in those areas where coverage was possible. According to Dan Tsakane (then known as Leo Mthembu), a South African who presented these programmes, this radio station belonged to FRELIMO and not the ANC – it wasn't a Radio Freedom station. However, it was the ideal vehicle, because contrary to Radio Freedom, it couldn't be targeted directly by the enemy, although it was a vehicle for the dissemination of information, mobilisation and could raise awareness on the ANC-led liberation struggle in South Africa. The radio station often received letters from listeners in Cape Town, Durban and other parts of South Africa.⁷⁹ In addition, in the beginning of the 1980s, Radio Mozambique developed a slot called 'Apartheid: a crime against humanity', that was broadcast in Portuguese twice a week. The programme focused on the socio-political and economic situation in South Africa and on the ANC-led liberation struggle. It was based on information obtained from the UN radio programmes against apartheid, and included interviews and information obtained from South African leaders, intellectuals and other individuals. The programmes also covered all events in which the ANC was involved and any attack perpetrated by the apartheid regime in Mozambique. Later, the programme changed its name to *Tribuna Austral* and covered all countries in the region. It was supplied with information by *Agência de Informação de Mozambique* (Mozambique News Agency) (AIM) a media organisation in Johannesburg from the middle of 1985. According to Machado da Graça, founder of the programme, it had a significant impact domestically because it mobilised the Mozambican people's untiring support for the ANC's cause.⁸⁰

At the same time, AIM was restructured. Carlos Cardoso, who was assassinated in 2000, was editor-in-chief and Fernando Lima was sub-editor. Cardoso and Lima signed co-operation agreements with other news agencies such as PANA in Dakar; SHIHATA in Tanzania; ZANA in Zambia; ZIANA in Zimbabwe and ANGOP in Angola. In this way they were able to solve quality problems in the Portuguese radio service and re-invigorate the English service. They also recruited more staff. Through the Canadian non-governmental organisation (NGO) called CUSO, they recruited

79 Manghezi, *AmizadeTraída e Recuperada*, 152–154. Dan Tsakane, a South African who took part in the Soweto uprisings, left the country and was exiled in Mozambique where he became part of a group of South Africans who received journalism training from *Agência de Informação de Mozambique* (AIM). Ian Christie is a Briton who was a member of the anti-apartheid movement. He first worked as head of the English Department of AIM and later joined Radio Mozambique's foreign broadcasts. See also Interview, Fernando Lima, Maputo, 18 February 2013; Interview, Paul Fauvet, Maputo, 14 February 2013.

80 Interview, Machado da Graça and Teresa Lima, Maputo, 27 February 2013.

a Canadian journalist, Louis Browne and Paul Fauvet, from London. In addition, Cardoso developed a relationship with the South African press, including *Rand Daily Mail* and *The Star* newspapers, and even the Afrikaner *Beeld*. Cardoso's first priority was to ensure that the world was informed on the situation in Mozambique and in the wider region. It was important to inform on reality through professional and factual news broadcasting. Paul Fauvet recalls that on a specific occasion one of the abovementioned newspapers published news sent to them by AIM which made the apartheid government furious because the article contradicted the official version of South Africa's policy on southern Africa.⁸¹ In addition, AIM as a media organisation trained various young South Africans as journalists on request from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU's) Liberation Committee. Among these journalists were Dan Tsakane and David Baukman, who later died in Angola. Kibson, who died of poisoning in Maputo was trained by Radio Mozambique.⁸² The work that AIM published during the 1980s ensured that it became known as a reliable and trustworthy form of media. This helped to change Mozambique's reputation abroad contributed to the anti-apartheid movement's victory and the media became a valuable weapon of the struggle.

The work of the media as a whole can be said to have played a very important role in raising the Mozambicans' awareness and strengthening their solidarity with the ANC's cause. It contributed to the political sensitisation and awareness of South Africans living inside and outside South Africa, and to the dissemination of true facts about the ANC. Furthermore, it changed the thinking of many citizens in Western countries such as the UK, the US, France and Germany, because the media unmasked and challenged capitalism and the apartheid regime's manoeuvres, and consequently strengthened the anti-apartheid movement.

Another equally important contributor to the liberation struggle in South Africa was the academic work that was done by the Centre for African Studies (CEA) at UEM, with its many political ramifications. Under the leadership of Aquino de Bragança and Ruth First, the CEA produced applied research and politically orientated social research, based on empirical science. It offered a postgraduate course in Research Development and Education Development, and served as the hub for southern African studies. The scientific research that was carried out produced a significant range of knowledge on Mozambique's political economy, its relationship with South Africa, its national liberation experience and unemployment. This work was subsequently taught at universities, schools and in government departments.⁸³ The postgraduate course in Research Development not only provided university students, managers and senior government officials with a solid background on

81 Interview, Fernando Lima, Maputo, 18 February 2013; Interview, Paul Fauvet, Maputo, 14 February 2013; P. Fauvet and M. Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras: Uma Biografia de Carlos Cardoso* (Lisbon: Ndjira, 2004), 138–143.

82 Interview, Fernando Lima, Maputo, 18 February 2013; Interview, Paul Fauvet, Maputo, 14 February 2013; and Interview, Alpheus and Nadja Manghezi, Eline, 23 March 2013.

83 The CEA carried out research on the Rhodesian issue; exportation of Mozambican miners to work on South African mines; migrants on the tea and cotton plantations; agricultural co-operatives; factories, the Maputo harbour; unemployment, etc.

development, economics and politics, but also developed the analytical and research skills of Mozambican and South African students. People in the struggle also used the course material in political science circles.

The CEA developed a regular series of analytical studies based on the assessment of the political and economic situation in southern Africa. They focused primarily on the internal dynamics of the ANC-led liberation struggle as well as the political and economic analysis of South Africa's destabilisation strategy in the region. Despite their restricted circulation, the publications were made available in Portuguese and English. On various occasions the CEA joined forces with the Mozambican Centre for Information and Documentation (CEDIME) to publish important studies, such as the study on the Constellation of Southern African States under the title *Uma nova ofensiva estratégica da South Africa naregião* (1980), and *Background on the South African General Election, 29th of April: Crisis of the Total Strategy* in March 1981. In its mission to disseminate scientific studies, the CEA also published a journal called *Não Vamos Esquecer!* (We will not forget), that aimed to reach a larger audience, including the non-university population; and a quarterly journal called *Estudos Moçambicanos* (Mozambican studies) that was targeted at secondary and tertiary students, teachers, public servants and an international readership. It became one of the most effective and successful ways that the CEA reflected critically on contemporary Mozambique and its socialist path, as well as on the regional context of the liberation struggle in South Africa. On the other hand, these journals served to publish the CEA's research, contribute to the historical and sociological debate, and stimulate local and international discussion on the realities in Mozambique. Soon, Mozambican and foreign intellectuals living in Mozambique or abroad became interested in South African issues, and began to question and condemn the apartheid system. Furthermore, these studies warned people about the fact that events in South Africa could have a negative impact on Mozambique and the ANC's liberation struggle plans. The CEA became another thorn in P.W. Botha's side.

Besides being involved in research and teaching, the majority of the South African intellectuals and academics at CEA, many of whom were also ANC or SACP members, also carried out political activities in favour of the ANC. Alpheus Manghezi stated with a gratified 'mission accomplished' smile that South African intellectuals at CEA 'wore two hats... they were academics, but also ANC militants. They were not refugees, but rather ANC militants. I zealously carried out both my CEA responsibilities as well as my responsibilities towards the ANC and the struggle'. One of the responsibilities that the ANC conferred on Alpheus Manghezi, Rob Davies and Sipho Dlamini was that they should hold regular information briefings on the socio-economic and political situation, as well as the struggle in South Africa, with the embassies and NGOs in Mozambique, based on the research that they did at the CEA. These meetings had the objective of raising the awareness of and mobilising the international community about the ANC struggle. And, in fact, one of the results of these meetings was to increase the boycott campaign against South African products on international markets, which was led by NGOs and the anti-apartheid movement.

Another example of Manghezi's political engagement was his participation in a Radio Mozambique programme from 1979 to 1989 on Mozambican migrant workers in South Africa presented by Sansão Muthemba and Mwehi Banzima in Tsonga. The focus of these broadcasts was on the socio-economic and political situation in South Africa and there were other programmes on Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), South Africa and southern Africa in English. All these activities were intended to raise the political awareness of Mozambicans, South Africans and the international community alike. Another example was Manghezi's participation in reconnaissance activities that preceded ANC military actions. From 1972 to 1982, in conjunction with his research work at the CEA on the economic situation in the area of Matucanhane in the Moamba district which borders on South Africa, Manghezi tried to find out from the people how the men in particular, managed to cross the border into South Africa in search of work without being detected by the South African authorities. The communities and members of a facilitating group showed him how migrants crossed the border undetected. This information was used by ANC cadres in Mozambique to enter and exit South Africa. Manghezi explained as follows:

The members of the facilitating group and the Matucanhane communities that had established friendship ties and sympathised with the ANC's cause, provided lodging, food and companionship to the ANC members who came to attend meetings and other missions. I still remember that Daniel Cossa, a member of the group, took me to the Save River so that I could cross over to South Africa. They knew what we wanted and treated us like sons; this was the direct support that the Matucanhane community gave to the ANC. During one of my research trips I went with Lennox, the ANC representative in Mozambique, to Matucanhane. Daniel Cossa's family provided lodging and food for us on arrival, and the next day I introduced Lennox to the community and the facilitating group members. While I did my research work, Lennox chatted with them.⁸⁴

Ruth First and her South African companions created a strong research team in political and social sciences, at the Centre of African Studies at the UEM. They used their research and teachings as a powerful weapon against the apartheid regime. Perhaps it would be appropriate to consider the CEA as the ANC and SACP's political and ideological laboratory. After Zimbabwe's independence and ZANU-PF and Robert Mugabe's victory, the liberation organisations turned their support to the ANC-led liberation struggle in South Africa. Thus, the Mozambican Women's Organisation (OMM) signed an agreement with the ANC Women's League, thereby re-affirming and strengthening their continued mutual friendship and solidarity, which had begun with Mozambique's national liberation and now continued against the apartheid regime. The intention of the movements was to join forces and give greater impetus to the shared struggle against colonialism, imperialism and racism, in order to establish peace, democracy, social progress and the emancipation of women. In this context,

84 Interview, Alpheus Manghezi, Eline, 23 March 2013.

in Article IV of the agreement, the OMM undertook to give full political, moral and material support to the liberation movements, in particular the liberation movements in southern Africa. Article V provided that: 'The OMM will actively campaign for the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners in its speeches at conferences, seminars and/or sub-regional, regional and international meetings'. Article vi stated: 'The OMM, in co-ordination with government institutions, will create facilities for the integration of South African children in day-care centres operating in the country'. Article VII read: 'The OMM will integrate all members of the ANC Women's League residing in the country so that they may participate in all voluntary and organised activities of the OMM and other movements'. Article X stated that 'the OMM will organise solidarity campaigns to obtain resources and materials for South African refugees'.⁸⁵ In fact, in her testimony, Florence Numsane, a South African nurse and ANC militant residing in Maputo, confirmed that all provisions of the agreement were fully implemented. She confirmed that the ANC Women's League worked very closely with the OMM in all projects as well as in organising the 7 April Mozambican Women's Day and the 9 August South African Women's Day celebrations, meetings and other events. They worked hand in hand.⁸⁶

However, the hope, optimism and successes of the 1980s were short-lived. The early 1980s brought together a series of factors that dramatically destroyed President Samora Machel's dream of a 'decade of victory over underdevelopment'. The second increase in oil prices negatively affected the price of Mozambican exports, leading to increased interest rates and reduced credit. The worst drought of the century hit the southern African region between 1981 and 1983, with many countries requiring food aid. More importantly, international policies changed. Ronald Reagan was elected as president of the United States (US) in November 1980. His foreign policy was clearly anti-communist and he opted for 'constructive engagement' with South Africa. The US was particularly hostile towards Mozambique and Angola because they were Marxist states. The anti-communist apartheid regime, under the leadership of P.W. Botha, used Reagan's 'constructive engagement' as a pretext for attacking Marxist neighbouring countries and the US government did nothing to discourage these actions. In summary, with P.W. Botha, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in power, new hostilities were created against Mozambique and the SADCC, in an attempt to stop support for the ANC and its liberation struggle and to destroy independent southern African states.

In this period, P.W. Botha's policy towards Mozambique was characterised by a combination of pressure and military action; subversive actions by the MNR; economic pressure caused by Mozambique's dependence on South Africa since colonial times; and the destruction of strategic and economic infrastructure by Ian Smith's military forces and the MNR. In this context, economic relations with South Africa took on much greater importance. But in effect, at the beginning of the 1980s, economic relations with South Africa decreased significantly. The tonnage of

85 UFH, ANC Archives, Mozambique Mission, Box 41, Agreement between the Organization of Mozambican Women and the Women's Section of the African National Congress of South Africa, Maputo, December, 1980.

86 Manghezi, *Amizade Traída e Recuperada*, 166.

South African cargo exported daily through Maputo harbour decreased from 25 000 to 15 000–18 000 tonnes; the number of Mozambican miners recruited for South African mines was reduced from 100 000–110 000 to 40–60 000; and Mozambique was forced to sell part of the Cabora Bassa hydro-electric power facility to South Africa. Maputo now had to import electricity from South Africa and commit to the non-nationalisation of the power station. In March 1981, South African railway experts were withdrawn from Mozambique, and Mozambique lost the usufruct of railway rolling stock belonging to South Africa. There was also a drastic reduction in the supply of foodstuffs, equipment and electricity to the Mozambican capital.⁸⁷

Between 1981 and 1983, the south of Mozambique was affected by the worst drought of the century. Peasants in the Inhambane and Gaza had no food. At the end of 1982, MNR became very active in the less populated semi-desert areas to the west of Inhambane and Gaza, where they burnt agricultural land and destroyed the peasants' granaries and silos. Lorries transporting foodstuffs were attacked. In January 1983, the Mozambican government and the International Red Cross, that had just visited Inhambane, requested food aid, but the powerful Western donors refused or even reduced their aid despite the appeal for help. The UN World Food Programme (PAM), in which the US played an important role, refused the request for food aid for Inhambane. Meanwhile, in August 1983, when famine worsened, South African airplanes dropped 9 tonnes of war material at the MNR base in Tome, Inhambane, with a view to intensifying the destruction of food trucks. It was clear to the UN officials and embassies in Mozambique that the famine had important political ramifications. It had become an act of war and was no longer a natural disaster. It was the partners that were not normally associated with food aid, namely, the Soviet Union, Italy, Austria and the Mennonite Church, as well as Zimbabwe, which provided food for the famished population.⁸⁸ However, within this context of economic crisis and drought, the duties that South Africa paid for using the railway and port infrastructure in Maputo; the Mozambican migrants in South Africa and the remittances they sent home; the foodstuff, machines, equipment, spare parts, ferrous metals and fertilisers that Mozambique imported from South Africa, all remained important contributors to the Mozambican economy.

In turn, the apartheid regime launched a series of vicious direct attacks against Mozambique. The first shots in the new war were fired on 30 January 1981. South African commandos invaded the city of Matola, 10km from the capital city of Maputo, killing 12 ANC cadres and members of SACTU who were hiding in three safe houses, two belonging to MK special forces and one to SACTU. They also injured one combatant who later died in hospital and captured four cadres who were later assassinated. A Portuguese citizen was also assassinated. He was an electrician working at Electricidade de Mozambique and was mistaken for Joe Slovo, MK's regional commander.⁸⁹

87 Urnov, *África do Sul*, 276–278; L.A. Covane, *Migrant Labour and Agriculture in Southern Mozambique with Special Reference to the Lower Limpopo Valley 1920–1992* (London: 1996), 278–284.

88 Hanlon, *Mozambique*, 20–21.

89 Frelimo Party, *Boletim Da Célula*, Special Issue (February 1981), 2 and 8; *Tempo*, 539 (8 February 1981), 4–11 and Supplement; P. Stiff, *The Silent War: South African Recce Operations (1969–94)*, 326–334; Manghezi, *Amizade Traída*,

The attack on the South African houses in Matola caused a great shock, especially among residents in the area. Many lived through hours of absolute terror on that early morning, due to the heavy gunfire and violent explosions that took place. However, it was the extreme violence perpetrated against unarmed people that made the local population hate the aggressors.



Figure 17.2: The three transit houses in Matola (Operations Unit, the Castle in Matola, and COSATU's safe house) attacked by the armed forces of the apartheid regime on 30 January 1981. Sourced from documents of the Matola Monument and Interpretive Centre

Alpheus Manghezi, saddened yet proud of the solidarity, support and brotherliness that the Cossa family extended to Sibayoni, who was injured in the attack, said the following:

Sibayoni and William Kanyile were SACTU members who were living in Mozambique to learn more about Mozambique and about migrant labourers working in South African mines. At the time of the attack, the two were sleeping in the SACTU safe house, in Matola. When Sibayoni heard the shots, he tried to flee, but remembering his friend, he returned, only to find him dead. He fled again but was shot in the stomach and crawled to a neighbouring house to seek help. The Cossa family helped him and he was later hospitalised at the Military Hospital. When I visited Sibayoni in the hospital, I met Mr Cossa. After greeting him on behalf of the ANC and its staff at the Mozambican mission, I thanked him for the support provided to our compatriot, Sibayoni. Mr Cossa replied: 'Bava Manghezi, this youngster is not your son, he is our son, and this is our struggle.' This expression of support, solidarity and a shared identity both at a social level and at the level of the struggle was something rare. Regrettably, Sibayoni died one month later in the hospital.⁹⁰

At the funeral service in the Lhanguene cemetery in Maputo, while hundreds of people expressed their anguish and indignation at the barbaric attacks perpetrated by the apartheid regime, Mário Machungo, a member of the Permanent Political Committee and Minister of Planning and Agriculture stated, 'All of us, in sharing this moment of suffering, have grown in our conviction that no crime can prevent the total

171–174; Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 149; Veloso, *Memórias*, 142.

90 Interview, Alpheus Manghezi, Eline, 23 March 2013.

liberation of the South African people'. The president of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, declared vehemently: 'The struggle cannot stop'.⁹¹



Figure 17.3: ANC president, Oliver Tambo, delivering the eulogy during the funeral service for the martyrs of the Matola attack at the Lhanguene cemetery, Maputo. Sourced from documents of the Matola Monument and Interpretive Centre

In South Africa, despite the apartheid regime's ban on religious funeral services for ANC cadres, Bishop Desmond Tutu, secretary of the South African Council of Churches, announced that the churches would not respect the government's ban and organised a funeral service for the Matola martyrs at the Regina Mundi Cathedral in Soweto. Furthermore, all South African leaders, from the most radical to the most moderate, condemned the attack.⁹² On 14 February 1981, President Samora Machel led a rally in the city of Maputo. Various ANC leaders, including Oliver Tambo, participated in the event. President Machel explained the nature of the apartheid regime's aggression and guaranteed Mozambique's continued support and solidarity with the ANC and the anti-apartheid struggle. He exhorted the people to redouble their vigilance and actively prepare for war, so that Mozambique could defend its sovereignty and independence. At the event, Samora Machel challenged the apartheid regime by stating:

Apartheid is a form of colonialism at the heart of humanity. We therefore fully understand the legitimate struggle of the South African people. We are firmly behind the ANC... In total we are 35 million, 12 million Mozambicans and 23 million South Africans. We will not be defeated by a minority of 4.5 million that depends on corruption. We depend on the

91 *Tempo*, 540, 15 February 1981, 7–8.

92 *Tempo*, 543, 8 March 1981, 32.

strength of the people and their rejection of impurity. We are 35 million conscientious and determined people. We know what we want and we know who our enemy is... Together with the South Africans, we will fight, side by side, shoulder to shoulder, until we attain our final victory, which will put an end to apartheid. There is no war between our people. The war that is being imposed on us is the war between the Mozambican and South African people on one side, and the racist minority regime on the other... Therefore we declare, 'Let them come! Let all the racists come, even if they are more than 4 million... Let them come, so that we can end this war once and for all!' Then there can be true peace in this region; not the false peace that we have at present... Therefore we say with all conviction, 'A Luta Continua! The Revolution will triumph!'⁹³

President Samora Machel's speech rejecting and challenging the apartheid regime was a show of unity between the two peoples and their conviction that victory would be theirs in the war against apartheid – the enemy of the people. After this rally, provinces, public institutions and mass organisations studied the president's speech and proceeded to repudiate the Matola attack and show solidarity with the anti-apartheid struggle, as well as prepare for similar subsequent attacks. The Matola attack marked the moment when the unity and solidarity between the Mozambican and South African people strengthened, and when the relationship between the ANC and the Mozambican government solidified.

The Mozambican media, especially those with a foreign service like AIM and Radio Mozambique, showed images of the Matola attack, analysed the events in detail and uncovered the truth behind the false information published by apartheid supporters and other English newspapers that described the raid as 'brilliant'. These pro-apartheid newspapers claimed that according to international law the attack was legitimate and an effective counter-attack against the Marxist threat that the ANC symbolised in South Africa. They saw it as part of P.W. Botha's 'Total Strategy' aimed at opposing any 'foreign' Marxist threat in a 'just war'.

93 Speech by the President at the Praça da Independência, *FRELIMO Bulletin*, Special Issue, February 1981, 13 and 16.



Figure 17.4: The President of the People's Republic of Mozambique, Samora Moisés Machel, with the President of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, at a rally on 14 February 1981 that repudiated the apartheid regime's aggression and the assassinations in Matola. Sourced from documents of the Matola Monument and Interpretive Centre

On 30 January 1981 at 18:00, General Constand Viljoen himself announced on Radio RSA that South African forces had 'attacked ANC bases' and that 'these bases were the source from which ANC guerrilla actions were launched, namely, the attacks against SASOL oil installations'.⁹⁴ In turn, the Mozambican government invited resident diplomats in the country to visit the site where the Matola attacks took place and to see for themselves that there was nothing in the three South African safe-houses that could remotely resemble military equipment. The Mozambican government and the ANC received hundreds of messages from other governments, NGOs and anti-apartheid movements, expressing solidarity and condemning the Matola attack.⁹⁵

The South African attack, which had been carried out with the approval and under the co-ordination of the Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, did not come as a surprise, it simply proved that the apartheid military apparatus could act directly against Mozambique, under the guise of pursuing ANC combatants. It was an attempt to instil fear in the hearts of Mozambicans and make them accept apartheid's supremacy in the region. Furthermore, the Matola attack confirmed the fact that the apartheid regime considered the MK bases in Matola a serious threat to South Africa's security that had to be neutralised or destroyed. If MK's sabotage and destabilisation attacks were allowed to continue, they would intensify and cause incalculable economic and political damage, thus they had to be stopped.

The ongoing liberation of Africa caused despair among the racist apartheid regime and increased their aggression. This was equally true for their imperialist allies – notably the US and Britain. Thus on 4 March 1981, six American citizens, four of whom worked at the American embassy, were expelled from Mozambique because they were part of a CIA espionage network that had links with South Africa. Their denouncement and expulsion was greeted with approval by leftist countries and those supporting the liberation struggle in southern Africa. However, Mozambique was to pay a high price for this action. The US retaliated by freezing all development aid as well as the food aid that was so desperately needed to stem the economic crisis caused

94 *Tempo*, 543, 8 March 1981, 32; *Tempo*, 539, 8 February 1981, 10.

95 *Tempo*, 450, 15 February 1981, 40–41.

by the drought that had ravaged southern Africa between 1982 and 1984.⁹⁶ In addition, at the beginning of March, the South African Railways (SAR) declared a rail embargo on all goods travelling to Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana, except for perishables.⁹⁷ Although the embargo only lasted one week, it had a negative impact on Mozambique, because the Mozambican economy depended on the revenues collected from these services.

On the military front, South Africa increased the number of soldiers along the border with Mozambique during the early months of 1981. Under the operation codenamed Operation Bumper they intensified their military and logistical support to MNR.⁹⁸ On 17 March 1981, the South African armed forces carried out an incursion into Ponta de Ouro where they seriously injured a Mozambican soldier belonging to the Forças Populares de Libertação de Mozambique (People's Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique) (FPLM). The South African side did not come off lightly either, a watchman was killed and his body was transported to Maputo, the commander of the group and the radio-men were injured and transported back to South Africa by their colleagues. Importantly, the Mozambican forces received early warning because the incursion was detected by Elizabeth Hlahla and another woman, both peasants who were out searching for mussels in order to feed themselves.⁹⁹




Figure 17.5: Photograph of a dead South African soldier and some military equipment. Sourced from the magazine *Tempo* #545 of 22 March 1981

96 *AIM*, March 1981, 1–11; Hanlon, *Mozambique*, 20–21.

97 *AIM*, March 1981, 13. At the same time, the apartheid regime carried out attacks on Angola and seized 7 ANC localities. In Lesotho it attacked fuel tanks. It violated the border between Zambia and Namibia. It assassinated an ANC representative in Salisbury, Zimbabwe. See *Tempo*, 565, 9 August 1981, 34–35.

98 Veloso, *Memórias*, 144.

99 *Tempo*, 546, 29 March 1981, 14–15. On 14 March 1981, the apartheid regime bombed the ANC offices in London.

Towards the end of 1981 and January 1982, the apartheid regime carried out 11 violations of Mozambican air space, more specifically in the Maputo and Gaza provinces, south of the country. The objective of these incursions was to transport weapons, supplies and mercenaries to the MNR bases, and to carry out espionage. In a Maputo suburb, five enemy agents who were suspected of preparing to bomb the bridge over the Matola River were captured.¹⁰⁰ Despite the Matola attack, and in conformity with Oliver Tambo's statement that 'the struggle cannot stop!', ANC cadres carried out a series of attacks on the main transport lines – railway lines and other links – as well as police stations in South Africa. For example, in May 1981, during the twentieth anniversary celebrations of the formation of the republic, railway lines in Natal, the Cape and Johannesburg were sabotaged, and four police stations were bombed causing material damage and the loss of life. In July, a powerful bomb was planted on the main railway line in Richards Bay, close to the city of Durban. The bomb exploded and damaged an entire section of the railway line and two locomotives. In August, a spectacular rocket attack against the apartheid regime's military headquarters in Pretoria forced the Minister of Defence to say: 'Revolutionary efforts against us have now reached an extremely dangerous phase... Our permanent forces and the current number of soldiers doing their compulsory military service cannot guarantee your safety.'¹⁰¹ At the same time, there was a wave of labour strikes in South Africa.

Military aggression against Mozambique intensified, with houses being bombed and spies and agents infiltrating the city and suburbs of Maputo. Spy networks were established in Swaziland and even in South Africa itself. At the same time, South African armed forces were concentrated along the border with Mozambique, as a clear signal of war against Mozambique. Some military attacks were carried out with submarines and airplanes. The ANC's safety worsened due to frequent attacks between 1982 and 1983.

Challenging the apartheid regime's attacks, on 14 February 1982, one year after the rally at Praça da Independência, where he had challenged the South African regime and appealed to the Mozambican people to prepare for further aggression from racist South Africa, Machel re-affirmed Mozambique's support to the South African people and their ANC-led liberation struggle at a rally in Bairro da Liberdade. At this rally, attended by the ANC president, Oliver Tambo, and MK commander, Joe Slovo, President Machel declared 14 February as the Day of Friendship between the Mozambican and South African people, and said that it would henceforth be commemorated as such.¹⁰² Still in February, at a meeting with progressive Western movements that were in solidarity with southern African countries, President Samora Machel appealed to those who had supported the Mozambican liberation struggle and were still working in independent Mozambique to support the liberation of other countries in southern Africa, because there was still colonialism in the region.¹⁰³

100 *AIM*, 67, January 1982, 17.

101 *Tempo*, 561, 12 July 1981, 35; *Tempo*, 564, 2 August 1981, 34–35; CEA, *Dossier África Austral*, 26 May 1982, 2.

102 *AIM*, 68, February 1982, 6–7.

103 *AIM*, 68, February 1982, 8.

In March, at the Maputo Summit, despite the invasions, military aggressions, use of armed groups, acts of sabotage, economic blackmail and subversive propaganda carried out by the apartheid regime, the Frontline States declared that they intended to intensify their material and diplomatic support to SWAPO in Namibia and the ANC in South Africa. They also condemned the support that Western powers were providing to the apartheid regime by selling them weapons, trading with South Africa and transferring technologies, including nuclear technology.¹⁰⁴

From May to June 1982, the apartheid regime used psychological and propaganda warfare to destabilise Mozambique. They distributed pamphlets inciting the population to kill co-operators, the designation used for foreign experts working in Mozambique. They also circulated false rumours that Samora Machel had ordered the imprisonment of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joaquim Chissano, because he belonged to one of the factions that was breaking away from FRELIMO. In addition, the regime spread exaggerated information on MNR's successes and undermined the impact of preventative measures that President Machel was applying against South Africa's direct aggression. The propaganda war was disseminated by the Portuguese service of the South African government radio station and MNR's *Voz Livre de África* (Africa's Free Voice radio station). As a result of this psychological warfare, two days before the national Independence Day celebrations, AIM was repeatedly contacted by South African journalists wanting to know if Maputo was really under siege from dissident groups. This rumour also reached Portugal.¹⁰⁵ However, the celebrations were held without incident and Maputo remained calm. The psychological warfare to sow distrust and instability among Mozambicans, the ANC militants and the international community, had failed dismally.

On 22 July 1982, South African soldiers penetrated and established a base in Pangane, south of the Ressano Garcia border and west of Maputo. The population in the area detected their presence and quickly informed FPLM, which immediately attacked the South Africans, making them flee as never before. They left behind 70 pieces of military equipment, including grenades and radio transmitters.¹⁰⁶ On 17 August 1982, a distinguished intellectual and member of the SACP, the wife of Joe Slovo, Ruth First, was targeted. She was killed by a letter-bomb sent to her office at the Eduardo Mondlane University campus. Aquino de Bragança, the director of the Centre for African Studies (CEA), Bridget O'Laughlin, a close colleague of Ruth's, and Pallo Jordan, head of the ANC's research unit who was visiting the country and was in the room at the time, were all slightly injured. The CEA and the UNESCO National Commission for Mozambique had just held an experts meeting on 'problems and priorities in Social Science training in southern Africa', which Ruth First had largely organised.¹⁰⁷ As mentioned in this chapter, Ruth was dedicated and committed to research and political activism that could contribute to the liberation

104 *Tempo*, 596, 14 March 1982, 8.

105 C. Cardoso, 'Destabilisation: Notes on Psychological Warfare', *AIM*, 1982, 1–5.

106 *AIM*, 73, July 1982, 1–2.

107 *Tempo*, 619, 22 August 1982, 5–7; Manghezi, *Amizade Traída e Recuperada*, 182–183; Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 168–169; Veloso, *Memórias*, 142–143.

of people in southern Africa, especially those in South Africa. She focused mainly on academic issues related to South Africa's economics and politics, denouncing the regime in her studies and statements. As Anna Maria Gentili, a researcher and close colleague stated during the commemorations at the CEA:

In many conferences, articles and experiments, Ruth fearlessly challenged ostracism and imprisonment, contributing to a deeper understanding of the real essence of the apartheid regime and its power in southern Africa. We at the CEA, Maputo, would like to remember her for her great contribution to the understanding of the uniqueness of the liberation struggles in southern Africa and the whole of Africa. Her writings on the problems that plagued nation-states, and nationalist and revolutionary movements at the time, are still relevant today because we can take lessons from them on how to critically analyse today's policies, the state that African countries are in fifty years after independence, our advances and regressions, so that we can better understand the causes, the means and the beneficiaries of change.¹⁰⁸

Ruth First had contributed significantly to all the CEA's accomplishments, as well as strengthened the ties of solidarity, friendship and brotherhood that existed between the Mozambican and South African people, and the people of southern Africa in general. By assassinating Ruth First, the apartheid regime not only aimed to silence the voice of her research, but to destroy the regional solidarity that Ruth and her colleagues had sought to highlight and stimulate. At the time when the liberation struggle and the mass struggle were flourishing in South Africa, it was important for the apartheid regime to silence the voices of its opponents. In fact, years later in a liberated South Africa, Craig Williamson, Ruth's assassin, stated in an interview with Ruth's daughter, Gillian, that Ruth had to die because the apartheid regime was convinced that she was a key factor in the liberation struggle, one of the top ideologists of the SACP, and her involvement in Mozambique was of great concern to the South African regime.¹⁰⁹

The news of Ruth First's death caused great sadness and hate against the apartheid regime in the academic community, which was determined to continue supporting the ANC-led struggle. In recognition of Ruth's political and academic work, at the funeral service held at the Lhanguene cemetery, in the presence of senior officials from Mozambique, ANC leaders, the family, ANC militants, CEA and UEM colleagues and the people at large, Marcelino dos Santos, a member of FRELIMO's Permanent Political Committee, stated in his eulogy, 'Ruth First has fallen in battle – assassinated by the apartheid regime, but we will always remember her and the example she set as a consistent militant who fought for freedom'. He also reiterated that Pretoria's crime would not cause the People's Republic of Mozambique to abandon their support for

108 A.M. Gentili, 'Ruth First', Speech at a conference held in memory of Ruth, organised by the CEA at UEM on 28–29 November 2012, 4. In August 2013, the rector of UEM awarded a posthumous Honorary PhD in Sociology to Ruth First. Aquino de Bragança also received a posthumous Honorary PhD in Political Science.

109 Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 169.

the struggle in South Africa.¹¹⁰ In turn, the UEM organised a farewell service at the main campus during which Ruth First's personal, academic and political qualities were praised. Once again, the media applied its voice, images and words to describe Ruth First's barbaric and grotesque assassination to the country, the region and the whole world.



Figure 17.6: Ceremony paying homage to Ruth First at the University Eduardo Mondlane campus. Sourced from documents of the Matola Monument and Interpretive Centre

On 22 August, President Samora Machel responded to military threats by the South African Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, by saying:

What the apartheid regime really fears is the cultural alternative that Mozambican society represents, where races, colours and tribes co-exist. This is what apartheid fears. Yes, Mozambique has a sophisticated weapon – it is the civilised alternative represented by people like Ruth First.¹¹¹

The apartheid regime saw the CEA as a part of the ANC's intelligence network and thus other South African academics were also targeted by attempted bombings perpetrated by the South African government. For many years Robert Davies featured on the CCB intelligence information's list of assassinations that were to be carried out by agent Kaelo. However Rob Davies' assassination was aborted because the planned attempt coincided with FRELIMO's Fifth Congress, so there was heightened security in Maputo and many patrols evident in the streets. Another person on the hitlist was Alpheus Manghezi, who escaped an attempt on his life because he was warned by neighbours who were constantly vigilant. Manghezi describes the attempt:

Sometime after Ruth First's assassination, a stranger came looking for me in the street where I lived, driving a car with a foreign number [he was a South

110 *Tempo*, 620, 29 August 1982, 10–11.

111 Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 170.

African intelligence agent]. My neighbours told him that Manghezi didn't live there. My neighbours immediately informed me of what had happened. Sometime later, the stranger came back, so I called my neighbours and we encircled him and asked him who he was. My neighbours Patrocínio da Silva and Carilho telephoned the Ministry of Defence and then we took the man to the police station at Mao-Tsé Tung Avenue, close to University Residence II. The South African agent, William Mkomo, was from Botswana and for some unknown reason he was released that same afternoon. Probably he was released because the policemen at the station were bribed.¹¹²

These selective attacks on individuals were intended not only to silence their voices but also to terrorise and demotivate ANC militants and the mass struggle in South Africa. On 23 May 1983 the South African air force bombed Matola, killing six people and injuring 39. Carried out by eight Impala bombers and six Mirages, and lasting three minutes, the attack was also aimed at other targets. Four Impala bombers attacked the residential areas of Fomento and Liberdade another two attacked the jam factory, Somopal, with rocket launchers and machine guns. Anti-aircraft fire from FPLM prevented an attack by another two Impala bombers and two Mirages against the Petromoc oil refinery, but the Matola Bridge was hit. Three workers were killed by rock fragments at the SOMOPAL factory, namely, Xavier Marremise, Rosita Munamate and Ana Regina Mutombne, who was 8 months pregnant. Other workers were seriously injured. Miraculously, 18 children at the factory's crèche escaped the attack. In the Liberdade neighbourhood, five-year-old Aida Ribeiro and Fred Naledi, a South African refugee, were both killed. On the Matola Bridge, an FPLM soldier, António Chandine, was mortally wounded and died three weeks later. Besides these deaths, the attack also caused serious damage to the factory, to a reed house near the bridge and 14 houses that were occupied by Mozambicans. The most serious damage was suffered to the home of Francisco Morgadinho, the head of the State's Publicity Agency at the time. Only three of these houses had been occupied by South African refugees in the past.¹¹³ Chica Sumail, a Liberdade resident and owner of one of the houses destroyed in the attack, said:

The attack started around 7:30 am. My husband and daughter were getting ready to go to work and school, while I was sweeping. An airplane came from the direction of Ka'Tembe, I ran indoors and soon afterwards I saw that the veranda and bedroom had been destroyed. I grabbed my daughter and we ran to our neighbour, Mrs Deolinda's house. Mrs Deolinda's outside wall was damaged and she lost some goats that were hit by shrapnel. As you can see, the damage has never been fixed, although the government said it would.¹¹⁴

112 Interview, Alpheus Manghezi, Eline, 24 March 2013.

113 AIM, April/May 1983, 1–2; Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 195–196. *Tempo*, 29 May 1983.

114 Interview, Chica Sumail, Bairro da Liberdade, 22 March 2013.

Corroborating Chica's story, Maria Chissano Vilanculos and her daughter Isabel Vilanculos tell the story of how Isabel and other children in the neighbourhood, who were on their way to secondary school would catch lifts from the South Africans. On the day of the attack, Isabel had woken up late, and therefore didn't go to the place where they waited for their lift because she wouldn't be in time. Leaving home she heard a noise, saw the airplanes and ran with her mother for cover. After the attack, they heard that one of the South Africans had died when the car exploded. Their home was also covered in shrapnel.¹¹⁵



Figure 17.7: Mozambicans killed during the SOMOPAL factory attack on 23 May 1983. Sourced from documents of the Matola Monument and Interpretive Centre



Figure 17.8a: Graça Machel, Minister of Education and member of the OMM National Secretariat offering her condolences to the families of the victims of the attack. Sourced from the magazine *Tempo* #660 of 5 June 1983

Figure 17.8b: Maputo residents holding up posters repudiating the apartheid regime's attack during the victims' mass funeral at the Lhanguene cemetery. Sourced from the magazine *Tempo* #660 of 5 June 1983

AIM journalists Paul Fauvet and Fernando Lima wrote that less than one hour after the South African attack, they were at the factory taking photographs and gathering

115 Interview, Maria Chissano Vilanculos and Isabel Vilanculos, Bairro da Liberdade, 22 March 2013.

information, even before the Mozambican security forces arrived. They dismissed the South African government's announcement that it had only attacked military targets and 'ANC bases'. AIM successfully proved, with evidence, such as photographs, debris and an airplane's engine number, that the attack had been carried out against civilian infrastructure and ordinary citizens. Some South African newspapers published the Mozambican version of events, for example the Johannesburg *Star*.¹¹⁶ The *Sunday Tribune* published a long article by Joe Hanlon of the BBC, offering a true version of events.¹¹⁷ The impact of the information published by AIM and Joe Hanlon provoked the anger of the South African Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, who warned the South African press not to use 'foreign communist' sources. As part of its campaign to unmask the false information issued by the apartheid regime, the Mozambican government invited the international and South African press to visit the sites of the bombings and to listen to recordings made by the Maputo air traffic control tower of the warnings issued by the South African military planes.¹¹⁸

On 26 May, approximately 10 000 people, including Maputo workers, gathered at the Lhanguene cemetery for the funeral service of the victims of the South African attack. Marcelino dos Santos, a member of FRELIMO's Permanent Political Committee, stated in his address:

We have come here to say that, yes, we mourn the dead, and we mourn the child who will not grow up. But we have also come to say that we will transform our tears and pain into courage with which to pursue the struggle... They attack us with their armed forces, with their airplanes, because they know that their main destabilising weapon, the armed bandits, are being defeated.¹¹⁹

The pain and determination of the workers and people were reflected on their faces and on the posters they carried saying, 'Our tears will strengthen the struggle. We will defend peace. We will punish the aggressors. Our work will avenge the death of our friends.'¹²⁰ In fact, the apartheid regime's attacks simply served to increase the support and solidarity of Mozambicans with the ANC and the oppressed majority's resolve to fight for their freedom. On 30 May, an unidentified plane was detected violating Mozambican air space and was shot down over the Maputo bay by FPLM. After an initial rebuttal by the South African Air Force, the South African military intelligence services acknowledged to the *Rand Daily Mail* that the spy plane that had been shot down in Mozambique was in fact South African. It was an unmanned remote-

116 Interview, Paul Fauvet, Maputo, 14 February 2013; Interview, Fernando Lima, Maputo, 18 February 2013.

117 *Tempo*, 659, 29 May 1983, 4–12; Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 196–197.

118 Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 197.

119 *Tempo*, 660, 5 June 1983, 18–19. On 24 May, President Samora Machel, on behalf of the government, praised the courage and determination of the Mozambican people, their patriotism and the maturity they again demonstrated in the aftermath of the attack. On 25 May, Sérgio Vieira, a colonel in the armed forces and Minister of Agriculture, led a rally at the SOMOPAL factory, repudiating Pretoria's racist aggression. See *Tempo*, 659, 29 May 1983, 11 and 13–14.

120 *Tempo*, 660, 5 June 1983, 13 and 18.

controlled drone, of Israeli origin, that contained a powerful camera in its fuselage and was used for espionage.¹²¹ On 17 October 1983, ANC offices situated at 370 General Pereira D'Eça street were bombed. Four ANC members and a Mozambican woman were injured in the blast. A huge hole was left in the office's terrace and part of the terrace's surrounding wall was blasted into the street.¹²²

Parallel to its direct military aggression, the apartheid regime also intensified the military actions carried out by MNR, which functioned like an advanced arm of the South African military forces. MNR carried out its activities in most of the provinces, destroying bridges, railway lines, oil pipelines, hydro-electric power stations, schools, hospitals and shops.¹²³ The economic and social life in the provinces was paralysed and roads between the capital and the rural areas were very difficult to navigate. MNR soldiers terrorised and slaughtered the population and killed foreign experts or took them hostage.



Figure 17.9: The hole caused by a bomb explosion in the building where the ANC information offices were located. Sourced from the magazine *Tempo* #668 of 23 October 1983

All these actions were carried out as part of South Africa's ultimate aim to change the nature of Mozambique's socio-economic and political system and subject it to Pretoria's influence. This aim was shared by imperialist countries, especially the United States and Britain. They wanted to force FRELIMO to form a 'coalition government' with

121 AIM, April/May 1983, 13–14; Manghezi, *Amizade Traída e Recuperada*, 185.

122 *Tempo*, 68, 23 October 1983, 12–15; Manghezi, *Amizade Traída e Recuperada*, 185.

123 For further details see *Tempo*, 597, 21 March 1982, 4–9; Hanlon, *Mozambique*.

MNR (later RENAMO) and to bring about changes within FRELIMO that would make it renounce its communist ideology, and consequently its anti-imperialist and progressive policies. In fact, the military attacks were part of the West's more general policy of countering Soviet influence in Mozambique and southern Africa,¹²⁴ and not just because Mozambique supported the ANC. Recognising the military superiority of the apartheid regime and the danger of socio-economic and political collapse due to these attacks, Mozambique's government decided to enter into negotiations with South Africa. Mozambique sought to reach an agreement for peaceful co-existence with the Pretoria regime, while planning new strategies so as not to compromise its independence and the ANC-led liberation struggle. Negotiations began in late 1982 and ended on 16 March 1984 with the signing of the Nkomati Accord. On 16 March 1984, in Nkomati, the President of the Republic of Mozambique, Samora Moisés Machel and the prime minister of South Africa, P.W. Botha, signed a non-aggression and good neighbourliness pact. The signatories considered this agreement the legal document that would govern their future relations. Their mutual commitment to respect one another's sovereignty and independence and to refrain from interfering in each other's affairs formed the basis of the agreement. Thus, Article 3 stated:

The High Contracting Parties shall not allow their respective territories, territorial waters or air space to be used as a base, thoroughfare or in any other way by another state, government, foreign military forces, organisations or individuals which plan or prepare to commit acts of violence, terrorism or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other or may threaten the security of its inhabitants.¹²⁵

In other words, Mozambique had to forego the support they gave to the ANC and in turn South Africa would suspend its support to the MNR. In accordance with the Nkomati Accord, all ANC members had to leave Mozambique, except for ten people in the ANC office and those who had employment contracts with the Mozambican government.¹²⁶ A joint committee for security affairs was responsible for monitoring compliance with the conditions of the agreement. The agreement also provided for economic, transport and tourism development, but unfortunately none of this came about. In fact, the non-aggression and good neighbourliness pact caused diverse reactions, interpretations and feelings among Mozambicans, the ANC, South Africans, the region and even the world. According to Veloso, even Aquino de Bragança, who was responsible for creating a conducive atmosphere for the peace talks, had difficulty in understanding what the Nkomati Accord aimed to achieve, due to the lack of information at the time.¹²⁷ Journalists Paul Fauvet and Fernando Lima announced in AIM that with the exception of Carlos Cardoso who supported

124 It is irrefutable that the Soviet Union and the SACP strengthened their presence in southern Africa through their alliance with FRELIMO, MPLA, and mainly with the ANC and SACP.

125 National Directorate for Propaganda and Publicity, Nkomati Accord, 1984, 24.

126 Manghezi, *Amizade Traída e Recuperada*, 263; Urnov, *África do Sul*, 282; UFH, ANC Archives, Mozambique Mission, Box 8, Folder 49, 'Dossier on the Nkomati Agreement'.

127 Veloso, *Memórias*, 175.

President Samora Machel's view on the agreement, the others were reticent, because they saw the agreement as a huge step backwards. Furthermore, the apartheid regime did not honour its commitments because it continued to support MNR. However, the Nkomati Accord did help the Mozambican government to improve its reputation in the West. Fernando Lima says in retrospect that he was wrong about the agreement because it did indeed help to reduce the tension between the two countries. It showed South Africa that other countries in the region were open to negotiation and it pushed the ANC and the apartheid regime towards each other. Tactically, the Nkomati Accord was wrong because FRELIMO signed it alone without consulting the Frontline States. Subsequently President Machel spent a week in Tanzania on a retreat with President Nyerere trying to explain his motives in signing the agreement.¹²⁸ The journalists responsible for Radio Moçambique's 'Apartheid: a crime against humanity' programme, Teresa Lima and Machado da Graça, felt that the Accord was a sign of the Mozambican government's capitulation.¹²⁹ Contrary to the views of the Mozambicans mentioned above, the Minister of Inland Security, who was one of the negotiators of the agreement, Jacinto Veloso, explained:

Mozambique was on the verge of extinction. South Africa had a huge army, war tanks, a ready and prepared air force, heavy artillery, submarines that could 'if necessary' seize Maputo, under the guise of the MNR. The objective of the Mozambican government, in signing the agreement, was to stop the apartheid regime's direct military attacks on Mozambique... Moreover, the agreement had unexpected results: the Nkomati Accord destroyed the myth that there would never be conditions for negotiation between the apartheid regime and the ANC. If Machel, a black communist, and Botha and Malan, white apartheid leaders, could sign an agreement, then what reasons were there for the apartheid regime and the ANC not to do so? The agreement had a major political impact on the South African masses, irrespective of whether or not they were ANC supporters. It gave a great impetus to the ongoing political struggle in South Africa, increased internal disputes in South Africa, and intensified violent actions and it made the youth in particular put greater pressure on the regime to go to the negotiation table.¹³⁰

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joaquim Chissano, said:

We signed this agreement at a time when we measured [our] strengths and realised that we didn't have the capacity to confront the enemy [apartheid], and that we had to try to get closer to our enemy so that it could acknowledge our independence. We needed to speak a language of good neighbourliness, at a time when Botha demonstrated a heavy hand towards Mozambique. It was the best way to try and mitigate this [direct military] confrontation

128 Interview, Paul Fauvet, Maputo, 14 February 2013; Interview, Fernando Lima, Maputo, 18 February 2013.

129 Interview, Teresa Lima and Machado da Graça, Maputo, 27 February 2013.

130 Interview, Jacinto Veloso, Maputo, 28 February 2013. On Nkomati Accord see V. Shubin, *The Hot 'Cold War'*, 143–145.

and return to a more intense political struggle while studying ways in which to support ANC activities. We created a place that looked like a centre for refugees in the north – Nampula. We thought it was far enough from South Africa for it not to be detected, but South Africa got wind of it and instructed MNR to act in all areas of the country. The centre was attacked... The Nkomati Accord was negotiated in secret because of the nature of its content, and because for negotiations to succeed, few people could be involved. It was difficult for our allies to understand our strategy. We talked with the president of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, and he understood this very well, but others didn't understand because they wanted us to continue the struggle. FRELIMO knew the subtlety of the struggle, because even with Ian Smith's Rhodesia we maintained a dialogue with England. There was a dialogue with all the parties but eventually it was the Mozambican government alone – in the President Samora Machel and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher alliance – that held talks at Lancaster House. We convinced all the movements in Southern Rhodesia to participate in the negotiations at Lancaster House. The same reasons led us to follow this negotiation path with South Africa. We took our own precautions, and we were successful because once the Nkomati Accord was signed we proceeded to make contact with MNR. What failed afterwards was our attempt to keep MNR within the borders of South Africa. However, it is important to mention that FRELIMO continued to condemn apartheid and call for its end.¹³¹

For the South African masses, the Nkomati Accord came as an unpleasant shock that caused mixed feelings. Many felt betrayed and believed that the Mozambican government was cowardly and without scruples or character. Hence, Alfred Nzo's statement as secretary-general of the ANC, in which he compared Mozambique to a 'Bantustan' of the apartheid regime because it had signed a non-aggression pact with Pretoria.¹³² It was a clear expression of the sense of betrayal that the ANC felt and of the consequent hostility that could potentially develop. Days later, however, the president of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, took a different attitude to Nzo's in a press conference. He stated:

The South African regime decided to destroy Mozambique, annihilate it as an independent state. The leadership was forced to choose between life and death. If that meant embracing the hyena, they had no choice but to do so.¹³³

Supporting Oliver Tambo's statement, Alpheus Manghezi, a researcher at CEA stated at the time of the signing of the Nkomati Accord:

131 Interview, Joaquim Chissano, Maputo, 2 April 2013.

132 Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 216; Interview, Paul Fauvet, Maputo, 14 February 2013; Interview, Alpheus Manghezi, Eline, 23 March 2013.

133 Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 216.

One day Aquino de Bragança called us [South Africans] to inform us of the possible signing of an agreement between the Mozambican government and the government of South Africa. We were shocked, confused and speechless at the news. At dusk, Aquino called me saying that he needed help on how to spell the word 'Nkomati'. I explained [how the word was spelt]... The agreement came as a surprise to the leadership of the ANC because the movement was unaware of the reality in Mozambique. Hence the division into two groups: one group was of the opinion that the Mozambican government was a traitor; the other group considered the signing of the Accord [as] the logical step forward, because of Mozambique's economic crisis and military weakness... I think President Samora Machel did not consult Nyerere and Kaunda beforehand because Mozambique's situation was awkward and difficult to explain, and this was the reason he also did not consult the ANC.¹³⁴

Supporting Manghezi's inferences, Vladimir Shubin explains in his chapter 'The Nkomati Drama' that throughout 1983 Oliver Tambo was unable to meet President Machel. It was only on 9 January during the ANC celebrations that Alfred Nzo and Oliver Tambo were received by President Samora Machel in Bilene. For three hours, Machel explained, with an uncomfortable air about him, why Mozambique had signed the agreement with Pretoria, citing Mozambique's difficult situation and avoiding a discussion on the ANC's position. On 14 January, mandated by President Machel, the Minister of Security, Mariano Matsinha, informed the two ANC leaders that in accordance with the Nkomati Accord, the ANC would have to reduce the number of representatives in the Mozambican office. Furthermore, the ANC would have to stop all military action against South Africa initiated from Mozambican soil and the ANC would have to withdraw prominent figures from Mozambique. Thus, the ANC faced a strategic retreat without any prospect of returning. What irritated the South Africans most was the lack of consultation between FRELIMO and the ANC.¹³⁵

In turn, many Western solidarity groups that supported the liberation struggle in southern Africa rejected the signing of the Nkomati Accord and considered it treason by the FRELIMO government. However, the most common position of leftist groups was that Mozambique had had no option but to sign the agreement.¹³⁶ The Mozambican information organs and media played an important role in disseminating and explaining the situation, especially those that broadcasted outside the country. For example, Cardoso published several articles at the time in which he argued that, 'Botha and Malan's strategy towards Mozambique is one bent on forcing Mozambique to change direction, that is, to negotiate with the bandits and abandon their socialist programme... But the Pretoria regime has failed.'¹³⁷

134 Interview, Alpheus Manghezi, Eline, 23 March 2013.

135 V. Shubin, *ANC: A View from Moscow* (Bellville Mayibuye Books, 1999), 254.

136 Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 212; Interview, Paul Fauvet, Maputo, 14 February 2013.

137 Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 214.

In the light of all these different perceptions of the Nkomati Accord, the fact of the matter is that it was an attempt on Mozambique's part to defuse the situation along the border with South Africa and establish a 'truce' which at that stage was essential if Mozambique was to stabilise and give priority to the pressing tasks of national development. However, it is also a fact that the Accord created tension and conflict between the Mozambican government and the ANC, causing a crisis in the solidarity, friendship and brotherhood that had existed between them for so long.

In anticipation of the signing of the Nkomati Accord, the apartheid regime reorganised the MNR's military units and transferred them to the interior of Mozambique between December 1983 and March 1984. Approximately 2 000 men were transferred and the supply of arms and ammunition was accelerated so that the units would have enough reserves for about six months. Afonso Dhlakama and Evo Fernandes, MNR leaders, hereafter called the Mozambique Resistance Movement (RENAMO), were promised continued technical assistance, but given elusive instructions about future actions.¹³⁸ In short, the period from 1981 until March 1984, when the Nkomati Accord was signed, was defined by the imperialist nations and the apartheid regime's military, economic and diplomatic aggression towards Mozambique, and by Mozambique's solidarity with and support for the ANC-led national liberation struggle in South Africa. Moreover, it was also a period during which the ANC intensified its fight against apartheid, both by its own military action and the growth of underground mass action inside South Africa. The attacks on Matola and the CEA simply served to strengthen the ANC's resolve that, 'The struggle cannot stop', as stated by Oliver Tambo in 1981.

The destabilisation of Mozambique had resulted in substantial damage to people and property and in the near collapse of the Mozambican economy, which subsequently forced the Mozambican government to sign a non-aggression and good neighbourliness pact with South Africa. This agreement, which sought to reduce the apartheid regime's direct military attacks against Mozambique, was a setback for the ANC because its combatants were forced to withdraw from Mozambique, thus creating tension and a crisis in the solidarity, friendship and brotherhood between the peoples of South Africa and Mozambique, and between the Mozambican government and the ANC. However, it is important to mention that the people and government of Mozambique remained committed to their unconditional support of the ANC-led struggle of the South African people against the racist regime in their motherland.

From disappointment, mistrust and misunderstanding to the restoration and consolidation of solidarity and friendship, March 1984–1995

As mentioned above, the Nkomati Accord provoked different reactions and opinions in international circles and disillusionment in the ANC and some African countries. It was thus imperative to stabilise the relationship between Mozambique and the ANC.

138 Urnov, *África do Sul*, 290.

A few weeks after the signing of the Nkomati Accord, one of the ANC leaders, Thabo Mbeki, was sent to Maputo to restore relations with the Mozambican government. At the meeting, Mbeki said that it was patently obvious that 'the South African regime would like to cause a rift between Mozambique and the ANC. But both are still together and determined to destroy apartheid, whatever the problems, disagreements or misunderstandings' that may have resulted from the Nkomati Accord.¹³⁹

Another strategy that the ANC adopted was the creation of a study group consisting of Alpheus Manghezi, Rob Davies, Albie Sachs, Dan Moiane/Tsekane and sometimes Jacob Zuma, at the time a senior member of the ANC in Mozambique. The group met weekly to review the social, economic and political situation in Mozambique and then reported back to the ANC leadership resident in Mozambique, Tanzania and Lusaka. Whenever Oliver Tambo came to Maputo he met with the group, or some of its members. The aim of the group was to raise the ANC leadership's awareness about the situation in Mozambique. This information helped the leadership to understand the reality in Mozambique and the decisions that the Mozambican government took, thus improving relations between the ANC and the government. According to Alpheus Manghezi the split that occurred within the ANC leadership when the Nkomati Accord was signed was merely the result of ignorance about Mozambique's difficult situation.¹⁴⁰ At the 1985 summit of the Frontline States the Nkomati Accord was analysed and the summit issued a communiqué stating that the Frontline States hoped apartheid South Africa would keep its commitments.

However, time would show that the Nkomati Accord's critics were right. Subsequent events revealed that the apartheid regime was not an honourable party because it continued with its policy of direct and indirect destabilisation through its support for RENAMO. The objective was to force Mozambique to make more unilateral concessions. In fact, immediately after signing the agreement, AIM and Radio Mozambique were pressured by the Mozambican government to end or change the programme 'Apartheid: a crime against humanity' and their English newsletter on southern Africa – this at the insistence of the apartheid regime. According to Machado da Graça, on the day that the Accord was signed, he met with Julio de Andrade, President Machel's future secretary at Party level, who asked: 'What will you do with the programme?' to which da Graça answered, 'I will continue to produce it'. According to the perception of Julio de Andrade and other Mozambican leaders, the Nkomati Accord had established peace and the programme was no longer necessary.¹⁴¹ In turn, Teresa Lima explains the difficulties the media faced after the signing of the Accord:

After the agreement was signed, those of us who worked on the 'Apartheid: crime against humanity' programme were pressurised by Radio Moçambique to end the programme. The pressure came from the radio station and from the Minister of Information. I was called in by management and informed

139 Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 216–217.

140 Interview, Alpheus Manghezi, Eline, 23 March 2013.

141 Interview, Machada da Graça and Teresa Lima, Maputo, 27 February 2013.

that I should change the programme because South Africa felt that it was offensive... now that there were good relations of peace and friendship between the countries, the programme was unnecessary. 'You don't have to end the programme, Teresa, just change it, speak about racism but not apartheid, because that is too sensitive', management told me... 'How do I change a programme from one day to the next?' I asked. 'It is impossible. Nor do I agree as this is against my principles'. Such a sudden change would be clearly understood by the people as the radio station's attempt to please someone. The Minister of Information, Cabaco, decided that I should continue with the programme until the end of the year while creating a new programme that would fit the post-Nkomati era. It was thus that in mid-1985 we began with the 'Tribuna Austral' programme which discussed the entire southern African region, including South Africa.¹⁴²

Similarly, at AIM, Fernando Lima was told that the minister had said that before negotiations and after the Nkomati Accord, the South Africans came with a stack of documents that were written in unacceptable language. They said the government of Mozambique should stop its attacks against South Africa and also claimed that the documents were written by ANC journalists and members of the Soviet Union's KGB who were supposedly infiltrated in the radio station. Besides criticising the AIM Newsletter, the Minister of Information also criticised Radio Moçambique's 'Apartheid: crime against humanity' programme.¹⁴³ As can be seen, the Mozambican government was determined to meet its obligations in the spirit of the Accord and immediately took action against those programmes that contributed to raising the political awareness of the population and unmasked the apartheid regime. Despite these measures, however, Radio Mozambique's 'Tribuna Austral' programme continued to analyse and disseminate information about South Africa and its relations with other countries in the region, as well as cover and disseminate news on South Africa's attacks against Mozambique. AIM's foreign broadcasting programme managed to get a boost from a member of the ANC, David Rabkin, who used the pseudonym John Khumalo.¹⁴⁴ He strengthened the AIM newsletter with articles analysing events in South Africa. At his request, a journalist residing in South Africa, Maria de Lurdes Torcato, became AIM's correspondent in Johannesburg and later a correspondent for Radio Mozambique, BBC and Radio France International – a Portuguese channel. From 1985 to 1997, Maria de Lurdes Torcato sent insider and impartial news about socio-economic, political and military events in South Africa to the outside world, challenging the information that was disseminated by the South African media and press.¹⁴⁵ Inspired by such examples, the media remained determined to support and show solidarity with the South African people's struggle against the racist regime. Neither the Nkomati Accord nor the apartheid regime's direct pressure managed to silence the voices of ANC supporters.

142 Ibid.

143 Interview, Fernando Lima, Maputo, 18 February 2013.

144 Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 217.

145 Interview, Maria de Lurdes Torcato, Maputo, 13 March 2013.

On the military front, the apartheid regime prepared for war in leaps and bounds. In the 1984/1985 state budget, the military was allocated a 21.4 per cent increase on the previous year. The budget allocation was for the purposes of acquiring new-generation weapons, building new military bases and airfields along the northern borders of South Africa and increasing the number of army personnel.¹⁴⁶ In addition, the apartheid regime continued to provide RENAMO with weapons and equipment, instead of taking action against the movement. RENAMO also received weapons from Malawi, Comoros and Swaziland, although on a smaller scale. Indeed the range and intensity of RENAMO activities increased after the Nkomati Accord. In September 1984, all provinces in Mozambique were affected by RENAMO's military activities, including Maputo province, which until then had been untouchable.¹⁴⁷

On the economic front, after the signing of the Nkomati Accord, the apartheid regime launched an intensive campaign to demonstrate that Mozambique's economic co-operation with South Africa was more advantageous to Mozambique than socialism. However, this increased Mozambique's economic dependence on South Africa, which was the original intention of the 'Constellation of Southern African States policy'. In accordance with this strategy, important economic agreements were signed between the two countries. For example, in May 1983 a tripartite agreement was signed between South Africa, Mozambique and Portugal on energy supplied by Cabora Bassa. The new tariffs were calculated on the amount of energy produced by the turbines. It was also agreed that the safety of the electricity pylons would be the responsibility of both countries. In August, another agreement between the respective ministers of transport was signed, whereby the South African Department of Transport would provide technical assistance for the implementation of the Maputo harbour development plan. Then in November of the same year, the South African Minister of Labour visited Maputo and signed a partial agreement that 'legalised' about 150 000 illegal Mozambican migrants working on Transvaal farms. It was also agreed that the Chamber of Mines would spend R750 000 on rehabilitating recruitment centres in Mozambique and that the two joint committees, one on mines and another on agriculture, would formulate proposals for a ministerial discussion.

Furthermore, the apartheid regime acted in various ways to encourage the private sector's involvement in Mozambique. Several state mechanisms were created to support South African capital investment in Mozambique, namely, the South African Tourism Board, which participated in numerous negotiations with a view to simplifying procedures for South African tourists to visit Mozambique, and a special economic government committee was set up to manage government and private sector economic relations with Mozambique. In addition, a number of representatives of major capitalist organisations and small enterprises visited Mozambique in order to investigate the prospects of investing capital in the country. They included delegates from the Associated Chambers of Commerce (ASSOCOM); the South African

146 Urnov, *África do Sul*, 285.

147 Davies, *South African Strategy*, 19.

Foreign Trade Organisation (SAFTO); the Federation of Chambers of Industry; the South African Agricultural Union; and the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut.¹⁴⁸

However, despite the initial euphoria, expectations and investment promises made, the reality was that the investment was extremely modest. There was a great focus on phrases such as ‘creation of favourable conditions for investment’ in Mozambique, but this merely translated into demands for concessions such as: (i) a guarantee not only against nationalisation, but that the private sector and individual endeavours would continue to play a central role in the Mozambique economy in the future; (ii) an improvement of infrastructure, especially communications with South Africa, quality hotels and ease of procedures for obtaining visas for businessmen; (iii) ensuring that the supply agreements with communist countries would not be an impediment to the development of trade with South Africa; and (iv) relaxation in exchange controls and the introduction of measures that could raise Mozambique’s foreign trade relations to the standards set by international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF).¹⁴⁹ As a result, in August 1984, Mozambique enacted a new law on foreign investment, accepting and responding positively to the abovementioned demands.

In August 1985, in collaboration with Zimbabwean troops, Mozambican troops attacked and seized RENAMO’s main base called Casa Banana, in the Gorongosa Mountains, where they discovered ample evidence of South Africa’s support to RENAMO after the signing of the Nkomati Accord. They discovered that the South Africans had built an 800 metre runway suitable for landing modern aircraft in Gorongosa. They found documents that proved that senior South African military personnel such as Constand Viljoen, Jannie Geldenhuys and others were involved with RENAMO and that liaison was facilitated by senior officers in the South African military intelligence services such as Colonel Charles van Niekerk and General van Tonder. They also discovered that the deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, Louis Nel, had made three trips to Gorongosa in June and July 1985 to assure Afonso Dhlakama that South Africa would force Mozambique to negotiate with RENAMO. Physical evidence suggested that the United States was aware of South Africa’s support to RENAMO. President Samora Machel confronted the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Roelof (‘Pik’) Botha, who was also the chief negotiator for the Nkomati Accord, with the Gorongosa documents and Botha had to admit to their authenticity.¹⁵⁰ Thus, the duplicity of the apartheid regime was exposed. It was evident that before, during and after the Nkomati Accord the racist regime had materially and financially supported RENAMO.

The disillusionment with the outcome of the Nkomati Accord led to a process of rapprochement and restoration of friendly relations, solidarity and mutual aid between the Mozambican government and the ANC. In February 1985, as part of the 14 February celebrations commemorating the Day of Solidarity and Friendship

148 Ibid., 32–42; CEA, *Southern Africa Dossier*, November 1989, 1–27.

149 Davies, *South African Strategy*, 48–49.

150 Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 229–232; Urnov, *África do Sul*, 300–311.

between the Mozambican and South African people, Alan Boesak, the president of the World Council of Churches and one of the leaders of the United Democratic Front (UDF) came to Mozambique to talk about the struggle's progress in South Africa.¹⁵¹ In an interview with journalist Carlos Cardoso, Alan Boesak said, 'this visit to Mozambique broke the monopoly of the South African government. From now on we have the right to say we were there, we spoke with the people... And this is very important both diplomatically and politically'.¹⁵² This meeting, held at a time when the security situation was critical due to RENAMO's attacks, was a sign that the Mozambican government and people were still determined to support the struggle of the South African people. This event, which was attended by South Africans and Mozambicans alike, was proof of renewed solidarity and friendship.

Jacinto Veloso recognised the practical constraints that the Nkomati Accord had put on the ANC's movements, but states that Mozambique did not waver in its determination to provide logistical support to the armed struggle inside South Africa. However, the support now had to be provided in extreme secrecy by only a small number of people. The government had to act in this way because South African secret service agents had infiltrated both the Mozambican government and the ANC itself. The intelligence services knew almost everything and they would notify the Mozambican security forces whenever they detected a violation of the Accord, denouncing for example 'the existence of guns in the home of a certain member of the ANC' or that the number of ANC combatants in Mozambique was 'above the agreed quota'. Veloso states: 'We ended up confirming their accusations, and were forced to act to show our commitment to fulfilling the agreement'. In this way, the Mozambican government ensured that it neutralised the threat of South African direct military attacks, safeguarded the country's sovereignty and prolonged the ANC's survival in Mozambique.¹⁵³

Corroborating Veloso's testimony, Joaquim Chissano said that despite the stipulations of the Nkomati Accord, the Mozambican government 'turned a blind eye' to the ANC's bringing in of weapons and to the clandestine operations that the ANC launched from Mozambican soil.¹⁵⁴ In this regard Nadja Manghezi wrote:

It was time to say goodbye and remember his life [Moses Mabhida]. A large number of ANC cadres came from Lusaka. Despite the sadness of the occasion, they did not miss the opportunity to bring all kinds of weapons in their luggage, probably thinking that Mabhida would not have begrudged them the opportunity of bringing vital weapons to comrades. Tommy and Zola managed, at the very last moment to 'clean' the rooms at Hotel Rovuma where the cadres had stayed, before the Mozambicans had a chance to do so.¹⁵⁵

151 Manghezi, *Amizade Traída e Recuperada*, 329.

152 *Ibid.*, 333.

153 Veloso, *Memórias*, 177–178.

154 Interview, Joaquim Chissano, Maputo, 2 April 2013.

155 Manghezi, *Amizade Traída e Recuperada*, 337.

Alpheus Manghezi recalls the events mentioned above, and adds that the ANC cadres living in Maputo often hid guns at home, and that ‘the FRELIMO government knew what was happening, but simply cautioned us to act carefully’.¹⁵⁶ Still, in an effort to strengthen the solidarity between the ANC and the Mozambican government, President Samora Machel came up with a secret proposal for the release of Nelson Mandela and his subsequent political exile in Mozambique. In October 1985, Machel invited the president of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, to talks in Maputo.¹⁵⁷

Despite the renewed relations between the ANC and the Mozambican government, the war in late 1985 seriously affected the city of Maputo. RENAMO mounted ambushes on all roads, railways (Maputo/Swaziland) and power transmission lines (Komatipoort/Maputo) that led to Maputo and struck the city’s outskirts with surprise attacks. On 5 December 1985, South African sabotage experts crossed the border into Mozambique and blew up a railway bridge just 8 miles from where the Nkomati Accord¹⁵⁸ had been signed. Because of these attacks Maputo was often in the dark, with resulting increases in the cost of living and huge losses to industries and services. These acts of terror were intended to affect the psychological stability of citizens and create a climate of insecurity in the capital.

In March 1986 Moses Mabhida, who was the general-secretary of the South African Communist Party (SACP) and a prominent SACTU leader, died after suffering a stroke. Mabhida, a militant who defended the liberation struggle of the South African people, had lived in Maputo from 1982 until early 1985, when under pressure from the apartheid regime, the Mozambican government advised Mabhida to seek refuge in another country. He then went to Lusaka, Zambia, against his will. In early 1986, a very ill Moses Mabhida returned to Maputo to rest and he died there in March 1986.¹⁵⁹ According to Alpheus Manghezi, Mabhida had expressed the wish to be buried in South Africa. However, in view of the apartheid regime’s brutal approach, the Mozambican authorities, in the person of the Minister of Health, Hélder Martins, advised that Mabhida’s body should not be transported to South Africa. Politically, it was not the right moment, and so the funeral was organised in Maputo. In turn, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pascoal Mocumbi, created the necessary conditions for the family, activists and leaders of the ANC and the SACP as well as other sympathisers, to attend the funeral.¹⁶⁰ In recognition of the political role played by Moses Mabhida and the friendship between him, FRELIMO and the Mozambican people, the Mozambican government organised a state funeral for him, with his coffin lying in state in the chamber of the Municipal Council of Maputo. This was followed by a burial ceremony at the Lhanguene cemetery where he was laid to rest among senior Mozambican officials. Apart from President Machel and the president of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, the funeral was attended by thousands of people including senior Mozambican officials, ANC leaders, various communist

156 Interview, Alpheus Manghezi, Eline, 24 March 2013.

157 Shubin, *ANC: A View from Moscow*, 295.

158 CEA, *Southern Africa Dossier*, September 1988, 1.

159 Manghezi, *Amizade Traída e Recuperada*, 337–348.

160 Interview, Alpheus Manghezi, Eline, 23 March 2013.

leaders and representatives from a number of churches. In 2007, twenty years after his burial, Moses Mabhida's remains were exhumed and transferred to his homeland in a free and democratic South Africa.

According to Nadja Manghezi, the prestige given to this funeral was FRELIMO and the Mozambican government's way of silently yet publicly declaring their unconditional support for the liberation struggle in South Africa, and their invitation to ANC cadres to launch their operations from Mozambican soil, although this was already happening secretly. The ANC and FRELIMO, the Mozambique government and the peoples of both countries were determined to continue the fight against apartheid. That day, the disappointment and lack of trust which had marred the solidarity and friendship of the past, were buried. It was a very important day – a day of restoration and the consolidation of solidarity, friendship and brotherhood between the two countries, their people and political parties.

As part of the commemoration of the International Year of Peace, the Mozambican Youth Organisation's (OJM) secretariat organised the Week of Solidarity and Friendship with the South African People and Youth in their struggle against apartheid in Maputo, from 11–18 June 1986. A delegation of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL), led by a member of its secretariat, Ace Mekgwe, participated in political and cultural events that week. They also attended the launch of the petition for the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners by the apartheid regime. OJM also took the opportunity to reaffirm their ongoing support for the South Africans in their liberation struggle, adding that 'no respite should be given to the monster of the century [apartheid]'.¹⁶¹ This was another sign that the people of Mozambique supported the South African people in their fight against apartheid.

While the solidarity and friendship grew between the ANC and FRELIMO, and between their people, the South African regime decided to change its tactics. It therefore transferred the base of its support for RENAMO to Malawi. In the light of this, during the Eighth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) held in Harare in September 1986, President Samora Machel informed Presidents Nyerere, Kaunda and Mugabe of the situation, and together, they decided to travel to Lilongwe, a few days later (11 September) to confront President Banda. With documents to support his accusations, Machel accused Malawi of being South Africa's accomplice in its war against Mozambique. On his return, Samora Machel announced at a press conference: 'The South African military use Malawian territory to destabilise and destroy the People's Republic of Mozambique; they do so together with Malawi's police, military and security services'. He vowed that his immediate action would be to place 'missiles all along the border with Malawi'. And secondly, he would 'close the border between Mozambique and Malawi', so that Malawians would no longer be able to transit through Mozambique to reach Zimbabwe and South Africa.¹⁶²

These public threats against Malawi, South Africa's only ally in the region, caused the apartheid regime to make harsh and belligerent threats against Samora Machel. In early October, South Africa's Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, stated: 'It seems

161 *Tempo*, 819, 22 June 1982, 16.

162 Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 259–260; Vieira, *Participei, por isso Testemunho*, 483–484.

that President Machel has lost control of the situation... If the Mozambican president chooses terrorism and revolution, South Africa will react accordingly'. In another development, Malan warned that the leaders of the Frontline States had to 'share responsibility for the ANC's acts of terror and would have to suffer the consequences of the ANC attacks launched from their countries'. In subsequent days, the deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ron Miller, re-iterated Malan's threats against Samora Machel. South Africa also launched a media campaign against the Mozambican leader and warned of a possible direct intervention in Maputo by South African armed forces. Furthermore, on 8 October, four members of the South African government signed a note stating 'the recruitment of Mozambican workers is henceforth prohibited. This is a result of the ANC and SACP's activities, which have led to the deterioration of the security situation along our shared borders'.¹⁶³ This was a potential blow not only to Mozambique's political leadership but also to its economy, which depended so heavily on the remittances of the 55 000 Mozambican migrants working on South African mines.

In the light of these threats, the Mozambican government accused South Africa, on 11 September, of preparing a direct attack against Maputo and denounced the massive infiltration of RENAMO forces in Tete and Zambezia from Malawi's side. On 12 September, the Frontline States met at an emergency summit in Maputo and later issued the following statement: 'South Africa has entered the path of fascism and war against the people of southern Africa' and also denounced the 'complicity of the Malawi government with the South African authorities in the terrorist campaign against Mozambique'.¹⁶⁴

The increase in tension in the southern African region spread to President Mobutu's alliance with UNITA. The Frontline States were aware that a large portion of US support to UNITA was channelled through Zaire. In this context, the objective of the Frontline States was to intimidate and stop southern African states from co-operating with South Africa, first Malawi and then Zaire. Thus, on 19 October 1986, President Machel travelled to Mbala, Zambia, where he, Kenneth Kaunda and dos Santos submitted documental evidence of Zaire's support to UNITA. After the summit, near nightfall, the Tupolev 1343 aircraft carrying President Samora Machel left Mbala bound for Maputo, but never made it home. According to the Minister of Security, Sérgio Vieira, a little after 6am on 20 October he received a call from the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, 'Pik' Botha, informing him that the presidential plane had crashed in Natal and it was feared that the president was dead. Later he was informed that the plane had crashed in the Transvaal.¹⁶⁵ Thus, the tragedy that journalist Carlos Cardoso predicted on 11 October at a meeting between Machel and a select group of journalists, had come to pass. He had warned the president that 'they [the apartheid regime] are going to kill you'. In an article published outside

163 *Tempo*, 838, 2 November 1986, 84–87; Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 261–263.

164 Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 262–263.

165 Vieira, *Participei, por isso Testemunho*, 484–485.

Mozambique on 15 October, Carlos Cardoso warned of the possible assassination of President Samora Machel.¹⁶⁶

A few minutes before 9:00am on 20 October 1986, the Mozambican people were informed by Radio Mozambique and on all provincial stations, that the president had been killed. A Politburo statement was read by Marcelino dos Santos announcing the plane crash in South African territory. Funeral music played on the radio, confirming that President Samora had died. However, many Mozambicans refused to believe it and hoped that it wasn't true. Although the rest of the world had heard of the death of Machel in the early hours of the morning because of a broadcast from Pretoria, the Mozambican people only found out later, when Marcelino dos Santos announced the death of the president. There were cries, screams, and then silence and endless questions about how it all happened. Why in South Africa? And now? And Carlos Cardoso was right. The AIM correspondent in Johannesburg, Maria de Lurdes Torcato recalls that 'Pik' Botha, had spoken on South African radio early in the morning about the plane crash, before he even met with Mozambican authorities. She called friends in Mozambique but they weren't even aware of what had happened.¹⁶⁷

President Samora Machel died in Mbusuzi, Eastern Transvaal, 5km from the point where the borders of Mozambique, Swaziland and South Africa converge. There were 33 passengers on board, among them: Luís Maria Alcantara Santos (Minister of Transport and Communications); José Carlos Lobo (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs); Aquino de Bragança (director of the CEA); Fernando Honwana (personal aide to the president); Cox Sikumba (ambassador of Zambia); and Tokwalu Batale Okulakama (ambassador of Zaire). Nine people sitting at the back of the plane survived the impact of the crash.¹⁶⁸



Figure 17.10a: Wreckage of the presidential plane. Sourced from the magazine *Tempo* #837 of 26 October 1986



Figure 17.10b: Homage paid to President Samora Machel by the Mozambican delegation that visited the site of the accident. Sourced from the magazine *Tempo* #837 of 26 October 1986

166 Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 264; *Tempo*, 838, 2 November 1986, 84–87.

167 Interview, Maria de Lurdes Torcato, Maputo, 13 March 2013.

168 *Tempo*, 838, 2 November 1986, 44–63.

The plane crash and death of President Machel provoked a range of diverse feelings including pain, sadness, melancholy, anger, disgust and even courage to continue the liberation struggle of the people living under racist, colonial and imperialist regimes. In Zimbabwe, the event sparked violent riots in the streets of Harare. Angry protesters attacked cars driven by whites, accusing them of having killed President Machel.¹⁶⁹ President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and president of the Frontline States accused South Africa, saying 'Until proven otherwise I accuse them [the apartheid regime] openly' of being responsible for President Samora Machel's death.¹⁷⁰ For his part, Bishop Desmond Tutu, secretary general of the South African Council of Churches reacted to the news of the death of President Machel by saying:

Many of our people fled South Africa and sought refuge in Mozambique, exposing that just land to reprisals and the so-called 'pre-emptive raid'. We thank God for the fact that Samora Machel was engaged in non-racism, and that he looked upon white South Africans with bitterness while recognising, with realism and pragmatism, that they are African.¹⁷¹

The president of the Republic of Cuba, Fidel Castro, also sent his condolences to Mozambique and said that Machel's death had occurred 'in combat at a time when Pretoria's fascist forces had increased their threats'.¹⁷²

On 27 October 1986, funeral services were held for the 17 victims who perished in the plane crash that killed President Samora Machel. Others were transported to their provinces or countries, at the request of their families. Thus the corpses of the Russian crew, the Zambian and Zairean ambassadors and the Cuban doctors were all transferred home. At the Palace of the 4th Congress and the Lhanguene cemetery, ceremonies were attended by thousands of people including family, friends, members of the Party, government officials, the people of Maputo and foreign delegations. Among them were the ANC's Oliver Tambo, the president of Cape Verde, Aristides Pereira and the president of Portugal, Ramalho Eanes. On that sad occasion, a member of the Politburo, Joaquim Chissano, said in his eulogy, 'We bid farewell to close companions whose lives enriched our lives... they will remain in the hearts and minds of the people forever'.¹⁷³

President Machel's funeral service was held on 28 October 1986. It commenced with a final homage paid to him at the Praça de Independência (Independence Square). This was followed by a procession from Praça de Independência to Praça dos Heróis (Heroes Square) where President Samora Machel's remains were laid to rest in the presence of his family, members of the Politburo, FRELIMO members and government officials, and eighteen presidents and heads of state representing their respective countries, namely, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, São Tomé e Príncipe, Burkina Faso, Ghana and Kenya.

169 Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 270.

170 *Tempo*, 838, 2 November 1986, 90.

171 *Tempo*, 837, 26 October 1986, 52.

172 *Ibid.*, 58.

173 *Tempo*, 838, 2 November 1986, 40–41.



Figure 17.11a: Homage paid at the Palace of the IV Congress in Maputo to the seventeen victims who died in the plane crash in Mbuzini. Sourced from the magazine *Tempo* #838 of 2 November 1986

Figure 17.11b: Arrival of the coffins at the Lhanguene cemetery. Sourced from the magazine *Tempo* #838 of 2 November 1986

Also present were Reverend Jesse Jackson of the United States; the president of the Executive Committee of the PLO, Yasser Arafat; the president of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, and 160 other foreign delegations. And there were also crowds of ordinary Mozambicans who came to pay their respects.¹⁷⁴ Praça da Independência and Praça dos Heróis were too small to accommodate the thousands who formed a silent and tearful mass and who were still in shock after the brutality of the week before. A member of the Politburo, Marcelino dos Santos delivered the eulogy:

You fought consistently against apartheid. You saw apartheid as a problem that concerns all humanity, because you understood that it is the very concept of humanity that is undermined in South Africa. You deeply hated the racist system. You saw the destruction of apartheid as the political liberation of all South African people, the oppressed majority and the white minority who are trapped behind fences of fear of their own making. That is why you said that only when all South Africans reached the top of the mountain of equality, would they be able to see the beauty of their country and their people. Death has not allowed you to see the realisation of your dream. But History will prove your logic to be true, even though not everyone can understand it now... You have fallen at a crucial moment in our difficult history. Prolonged aggression against our country has already caused deep wounds. We do not have the peace of mind that we need to rebuild our land... Now we have to learn how to go on without you. We will know how to pursue the struggle, Comrade President, because your spirit cannot be extinguished. You will remain with us, with each Mozambican. You will remain alive and present in our minds. You shaped and informed our future. You have overcome the issues of our times, and therefore you will continue to guide our struggle and feed our hope... We will not give up our internationalist principles. We will remain firm in our solidarity and

174 *Tempo*, 838, 2 November 1986, 17, 18, 40 and 68.

support of those who fight against racism, colonialism and oppression. The People's Republic of Mozambique will remain squarely behind the struggle of other peoples. No force, no obstacle will be able to lead us astray from the path that you traced... We will never say goodbye. No people can forget its past. SAMORA LIVES!¹⁷⁵

Marcelino dos Santos' eulogy expressed clearly who was responsible for the president's death and why his voice had been silenced. At the same time, Marcelino dos Santos reiterated in a loud voice that Mozambique would continue the work that Machel had begun – the solidarity and unconditional support for the fight against racism, colonialism and oppression... and in particular the ANC-led struggle against apartheid. Machel died in the battlefield – returning home from another mission aimed at ensuring the eventual liberation of the Namibian and South African people. The physical disappearance of President Samora demonstrated the friendship and brotherhood between FRELIMO and the ANC. And to complete the homage, love and respect for this leader and founding father of the independent Mozambican nation, at the moment when the coffin entered the crypt, rain clouds broke and showered a deluge of rain on the crowd, although not a single person sought shelter. Many of those present recalled the saying that 'when great men are buried, the sky cries as a sign of blessing'... and it did.



Figure 17.12a: The final journey to the untimely rest of President Samora Machel. Sourced from the magazine *Tempo* #838 of 2 November 1986



Figure 17.12b: Funeral procession through the streets of the capital where the population of Maputo stood by mourning and paying their final respects. Sourced from the magazine *Tempo* #838 of 2 November 1986

To paraphrase Paul Fauvet and Marcelo Mosse, the Mbusuzini tragedy took the lives of Mozambican whites, blacks and those of Indian origin, as well as white Soviets, black Cubans, black Zambians and Zaireans – all of whom perfectly represents President Machel's ideal world. After all, he led a relentless struggle against all forms of racism. Machel had never seen the enemy in racial terms, but rather as an unhealthy

175 *Tempo*, 838, 2 November 1986, 27, 28 and 30.

social system.¹⁷⁶ Messages of condolence on the death of President Samora Machel continued to arrive from around the world, including from the imprisoned South African national liberation leader, Nelson Mandela, and his wife Winnie Mandela. Their letter stated:

Our suffering for Comrade Samora is so deep that it cuts to the heart. We watched with you through the night. During the day we will cry with you, mourning a powerful soldier, a brave son and a noble statesman. We believe that his death will strengthen both our and your determination to be free at last. For you, to finally beat the immoral and bought-over bandits. For us, the victory over oppression. Our struggle has always been linked and together we will be victorious... AMANDLA!¹⁷⁷

In turn, Albertina Sisulu, president of the UDF and wife of the South African nationalist, Walter Sisulu, who was also imprisoned with Mandela, said: 'We saw him [Samora Machel] as one of our own commanders in the fight against exploitation and racism... We, the people of South Africa and the people of Mozambique will fight and destroy the MNR criminals and the criminals of the Boer regime'.¹⁷⁸ The ANC reaffirmed its conviction that the victory of the shared struggle in the region was certain, stating, 'this giant was killed by the one enemy who hopes to gain from his death – apartheid.... Samora was an unvanquishable fighter who tried to change southern Africa into a liberated zone for humanity'.¹⁷⁹ In Soweto and Johannesburg, the South African people in their thousands mourned the death of Samora intensely, and religious services and wakes were held throughout the country in his memory. Several journalists and white South African actors visited the home of AIM's Johannesburg correspondent, Maria de Lurdes Torcato, to express their regret at the tragic event, because for them Mozambique, with Samora as president, represented a model of a multi-cultural society. The white owner of the condominium where Maria de Lurdes Torcato lived also expressed his condolences, saying 'this was the work of the Boers'.¹⁸⁰ These messages of condolence clearly expressed solidarity, brotherhood and unity between the two peoples in the struggle against racism and oppression in southern Africa. They showed clearly that it was the apartheid regime that had killed Samora Machel, because it was the common enemy of the South African and Mozambican people.

Shortly after the Mbusini plane crash that killed President Samora Machel, a tripartite commission of inquiry was created to carry out the investigation into the accident, in compliance with international aviation regulations. Mozambique (the country that operated the plane); South Africa (the country where the accident occurred); and the Soviet Union (the country that manufactured the plane) made up

176 Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 270.

177 *Tempo*, 838, 2 November 1986, 68.

178 *Ibid.*, 70.

179 *Ibid.*, 65.

180 Interview, Maria de Lurdes Torcato, Maputo, 13 March 2013.

the commission. The inquiry examined various black boxes; studied the credentials of the pilots; inspected the factory where the plane was manufactured; had the electronics checked in Switzerland; and finally listened to the cockpit voice recordings in South Africa. The commission heard the navigator, when questioned by the pilot, stating that he was following the directions of the signals that were supposedly being emitted from Maputo and other data. The parties wanted to pursue a clue that they discovered while listening to the voice recordings, especially as the commander-in-chief of the South African Police (SAP), Ian Coetzee, said to Sergio Vieira's delegation in Komatipoort on 20 October, 'You know, my people and pilots tell me that we should look for a beacon over there [a radio beacon, or VOR, not specified]' while pointing in the direction of the crash site.¹⁸¹ Moreover, the factual investigation report also stated that during the investigation an abandoned campsite was found on the South African side of the border, approximately 150m to the southeast of where the plane had hit the ground. Witnesses on the Mozambican side of the border said that a tent that had been erected on the site had been removed the day after the accident.¹⁸² Thus, the commission of inquiry asked the SAP in Komatipoort to investigate, firstly, who would have erected a large tent on the site; and secondly, when it was erected. Abruptly, the South African side unilaterally terminated the investigation, even though the commission wished to have these two points answered. The apartheid regime blamed the Russian crew for the accident. Both the Mozambican authorities and the Russians rejected the findings that were announced on 9 July 1987, and Armando Guebuza, member of the Politburo and head of the Mozambican team in the inquiry, reaffirmed that the work of the commission of inquiry was by no means over.¹⁸³

Incredibly, in 1988, Paulo Oliveira, RENAMO's resident representative in Lisbon who fled to Mozambique, revealed to reporters that on the night of 19 October 1986, he had been contacted by South Africa to prepare a statement with an important claim by RENAMO – that they had shot down President Samora Machel's plane. But hours later, he received a contrary order. On a different note, the commander of the South African Air Force, General Dennis Earp, said in the South African press that he had followed the president's plane from Mbala in Zambia, and noticed the communication and search manoeuvres that were undertaken by the Mozambican side.¹⁸⁴ This information not only increased the suspicion around the president's death, but also spiked the interest of certain individuals (such as journalist Carlos Cardoso).¹⁸⁵ In 2006 the democratic government of South Africa also showed interest in re-opening the investigation. According to Joaquim Chissano, the former Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, 'Pik' Botha, refused to discuss the plane crash that killed Machel, at the Truth and Reconciliation

181 Vieira, *Participei, por isso Testemunho*, 486–488.

182 Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 280–281.

183 Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 284; Vieira, *Participei, por isso Testemunho*, 490.

184 *Tempo*, 912, 3 April 1988, 11–12; Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 281; Vieira, *Participei, por isso Testemunho*, 491

185 The journalist, Carlos Cardoso, received the first ONJ prize for outstanding investigative journalism from President Joaquim Chissano, in recognition of the series of articles he wrote on the circumstances surrounding President Samora Machel's death. Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 285.

Commission (TRC) held in South Africa. Their reluctance simply reinforced suspicions.¹⁸⁶ The fact remains that the mystery surrounding President Machel's death and that of his entourage is yet to be unravelled.

Joaquim Chissano, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, was elected by FRELIMO and the Politburo, to succeed Samora Machel as president. Aware of the difficult times that his country faced, Chissano continued on the path set out by his predecessor, but pragmatically adapted it to the reality of each moment. Thus, the struggle against apartheid continued, and Mozambique continued to provide unconditional support and show solidarity with the ANC-led struggle for liberation. At that time, it was necessary to attenuate the virulence and aggressive nature of the apartheid regime. Chissano's tactics were to use moderate speech against the enemy without departing from FRELIMO's principles. Thus he made non-belligerent but forceful speeches. He recalls:

We needed to create conditions that would allow us to maintain a dialogue with the apartheid regime while still supporting the ANC and its fight against apartheid. A permanent dialogue was needed. We spoke with the South African regime about the way in which it should behave in order to negotiate with the ANC. It was necessary to operationalise the railways and ports and ensure that Mozambicans could go and work on South African mines... I was aware that the apartheid regime continued to give advice and logistical support for RENAMO, but following in the footsteps of Samora, I decided to deal with South Africa and RENAMO separately. RENAMO consisted of Mozambicans, so we needed to work towards peace and reconciliation. And how could we do this? By creating conditions whereby we could offer RENAMO something without violating the principles of dialogue already initiated in Pretoria: safeguarding the independence and sovereignty of Mozambique, ensuring that RENAMO recognised the Constitution and Mozambique's state organs, creating conditions for changes to the governance system, especially the introduction of changes to the constitution. To date Mozambique was a single-party state; we needed to create a multi-party state. With regard to the world, Mozambique was not an island. We could not escape the economic reforms that were taking place around the world. There was a wave of liberalisation that we could not escape. Mozambique had to open the doors to the market economy.¹⁸⁷

In fact, Joaquim Chissano's ideas on governance were a continuation of the gradual and cautious changes that the Mozambican government had been introducing under Samora Machel's leadership since 1983. The difference was in the way that Chissano expressed the principles that underpinned the struggle against apartheid, the way he told the world that Mozambique continued to fight apartheid and support the ANC. Thus, internal changes, especially economic changes, had started at the 4th Congress,

186 Interview, Joaquim Chissano, Maputo, 2 April 2013.

187 *Ibid.*

held in April 1983, when the private sector was called to play a more active role. This marked the beginning of the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. The price policy was adopted, immediately liberalising vegetable prices and the price of other agricultural products such as onions, cassava, sweet potatoes, corn, fruit, rabbits, ducks and turkeys. The free movement of goods throughout the country was allowed, as well as the direct importation of certain goods, without having to obtain permission from foreign trade monopolies.¹⁸⁸ The decisions to join the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) and to participate in the Lomé Agreement (co-operation with the European Economic Community or EEC, now the European Union, EU),¹⁸⁹ were all part of the changes that the government made to adhere to a Western economic model and overcome the difficult economic situation that the country was experiencing. President Samora Machel had visited the US in September 1985 and had managed to convince the US government to support the Nkomati Accord on the one hand, and to support the elimination of apartheid and the independence of South West Africa (Namibia) on the other. He also managed to obtain an undertaking from the US government that they would provide humanitarian aid that in 1985 reached US\$45 million and encourage the US private sector to invest in the development of Mozambique.¹⁹⁰

Important changes were also taking place in South Africa and in other countries worldwide. For example, in September 1985, a delegation of South African businessmen comprising of Gavin Relly, Zach de Beer and Tony Bloom, who were concerned with the situation in the country, met with the ANC leadership at the Mfuwe game reserve in Zambia. The meeting was hosted by Kenneth Kaunda, the president of Zambia and was the first of many such meetings. The businessmen were reacting to a resurgence of the mass struggle and to Pretoria's apparent inability to find a viable solution to the crisis. In April 1986, a meeting was held in Lusaka between the ANC and a delegation from the Catholic Bishops Conference of Southern Africa. After the meeting, they came out with a joint statement recognising that apartheid could not be remodelled and had to be destroyed in its entirety.¹⁹¹ In May 1986, the US called the ANC a liberation movement for the very first time. In October, Gorbachev and Reagan met in Reykjavik to talk about geopolitical issues and in November, the president of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev, and the president of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, met and reviewed the results of the meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan as well as the political situation in southern Africa.¹⁹²

However, the apartheid regime intensified its direct and indirect aggression against Mozambique and the ANC. In December 1986, Chissano told the ANC that Pretoria had demanded the departure of 10 ANC members from its Maputo office. These members had been allowed to work in Mozambique after the Nkomati Accord. They

188 Veloso, *Memórias*, 189–193.

189 *Ibid.*, 193–194.

190 *Ibid.*, *Memórias*, 198–199; Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 233–234.

191 CEA, *Southern Africa Dossier*, September 1989, 3–5; Shubin, *ANC: A View from Moscow*, 295. For more information, see the CEA's collection for September 1989.

192 Shubin, *ANC: A View from Moscow*, 295, 394.

were Zuma, Indres, 'Sue', and 'Bobby', among others.¹⁹³ This was another setback for the ANC and it was necessary to find a way around it. At the same time, the Mozambican government received information that between December 1986 and January 1987 the apartheid regime would supply RENAMO with 250 tonnes of ammunition. The ammunition would be dropped off in the centre of the country to support the introduction of 4 000 RENAMO soldiers into the country from across the Malawi border. The supplies would be brought into Mozambique by air and sea, as part of Operation Blockade.¹⁹⁴

On 5 April 1987, Gibson Ncube, a member of the ANC and journalist at Radio Mozambique, died after a drinking beer that had been poisoned by South African agents at a party organised by the new representative of the ANC, Siphso Dlamini. Later, Leslie Lesia became known as Gibson's killer.¹⁹⁵ On 29 May, South African commandos attacked an apartment close to the one where the ANC representative lived. A Mozambican couple with the surname Panguene was killed in the attack. In fact, this attack was carried out in retaliation for the ANC's attack in Johannesburg, where four members of the SADF were killed. The Mozambican government described the attack as a 'gross violation of the norms and principles of international co-existence, a violation of our sovereignty and a flagrant violation of the Nkomati Accord'.¹⁹⁶ Also in May, South African commandos attacked the heart of the city, destroying a house where the ANC kept clothing. The bomb killed three Mozambicans who were mistaken for ANC cadres.¹⁹⁷

In June 1987, three South African paratroopers were arrested in Vilanculos, Inhambane and on 2 November, South African Impala bombers violated Mozambican air space near Ponta de Ouro, Maputo. Two other aircraft violated the air space near Matsequenha, Namaacha. The air space violations became increasingly frequent.¹⁹⁸ Despite the apartheid regime's aggression, Mozambique did not waver in its resolve to support the liberation struggle of the people of southern Africa. In this context, Mozambique participated with Angola, France and South Africa in the complicated and delicate process of prisoner exchange. Thus, on 7 September 1987 the Maputo airport hosted the exchange of 133 soldiers detained by UNITA for Captain Petrus Wynand du Toit, and the exchange of the corpses of two South African soldiers for a French citizen and a Dutch citizen, both of them linked to the ANC and arrested in South Africa on charges of terrorism.¹⁹⁹ In late 1987, the US sent the Mozambican government a RENAMO document with the title 'Preliminary proposal for a peace agreement between RENAMO and FRELIMO'.

193 Shubin, *ANC: A View from Moscow*, 316; Manghezi, *Amizade Traída e Recuperada*, 359.

194 CEA, *Southern Africa Dossier*, November 1988, 4.

195 Manghezi, *Amizade Traída e Recuperada*, 391–392; Interview, Teresa Lima and Machado da Graça, Maputo, 27 February 2013.

196 Manghezi, *Amizade Traída e Recuperada*, 392–393; CEA, *Southern Africa Dossier*, November 1988, 5; Interview, Teresa Lima and Machado da Graça, Maputo, 27 February 2013.

197 Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 286–287; CEA, *Southern Africa Dossier*, November 1988, 5.

198 CEA, *Southern Africa Dossier*, November 1988, 7, 11, 12.

199 Veloso, *Memórias*, 211–212.

It was a document that outlined conditions for negotiations, namely democratic, free and transparent elections; withdrawal of all foreign military forces; access of the International Red Cross to the rural population; constitutional guarantees for the Mozambican people and international supervision of the peace process by Western democratic states. In addition to this, the first economic adjustment programme (PRE) was launched, as part of Mozambique's agreements with the IMF and the World Bank. The programme required the devaluation of the Mozambican metical and the introduction of economic measures that would reactivate the market.²⁰⁰ These events demonstrated Mozambique's willingness to pursue its policies of non-violence, peace, non-alignment and independence. Moreover, the new policy of dialogue and peace advocated by Mikhail Gorbachev made it harder for the West to maintain an aggressive stance.

In South Africa in 1987, during a massive miners' strike, mine owners did everything possible to separate the Mozambican miners from their South African counterparts. This attempt failed because the Mozambicans were firmly on the side of their South African fellow workers in their demand for better living conditions. When the National Union of Mineworkers told the strikers to abandon the mines and return to their homes, hundreds of South African families opened their doors and accommodated Mozambican mineworkers, on the request of the churches and community organisations.²⁰¹ This was another moment when the historical ties between the peoples of these two countries were put to the test and once again they triumphed. They had shared and experienced many difficult times in the past and had achieved successes together.

In February and March 1988 three RENAMO soldiers, one of whom was captured and the other two who surrendered to Mozambique's Armed Forces (FPLM), confirmed that RENAMO continued to be supplied by South African aircraft that made frequent drops at the Furancungo military base, where eight black South African soldiers provided training and helped RENAMO to plan operations. The RENAMO soldiers also confirmed that there were orders to intensify the attacks against high voltage pylons and roads, especially in the centre of the country. At the same time, the FPLM captured an Australian missionary called Ian Grey, who told Mozambican and foreign media that a South African pastor, Peter Hammond, had entered Mozambique several times in the company of former members of the SADF. They travelled in a plane piloted by 'Fanny', a former member of the South African Air Force. Peter Hammond also travelled to Malawi where he met with Rodney Heine, the resident RENAMO representative.²⁰² All these actions were unequivocal evidence of the apartheid regime's direct interventions in Mozambique and their flagrant breach of the Nkomati Accord.

On 7 April 1988, Albie Sachs, a member of the ANC and lecturer at the UEM's Law Faculty, was severely wounded when his booby-trapped car exploded. Various

200 Veloso, *Memórias*, 237–240.

201 UFH, ANC Archives, Mozambique Mission, Box 11, Folder 69, 'ANC Statement on the occasion of the Day of Friendship between the people of Mozambique and South Africa', 14 February 1988, 1.

202 CEA, *Southern Africa Dossier*, November 1988, 14; CEA, *Southern Africa Dossier*, December 1988, 27.

Mozambicans were also injured. Government sources accused the apartheid regime of having organised the attack and questioned the extent to which the international community was prepared to 'tolerate a state of terrorism that knows no borders or boundaries in terms of the death and destruction it is prepared to unleash'.²⁰³ In solidarity with the victims of the bomb blast and in response to South Africa's terrorist deeds, organisations and individuals from Denmark, Britain, Sweden, Holland, Canada and Italy working in the country donated US\$7 093 to the victims and their families.²⁰⁴



Figure 17.13: Photograph of Albie Sachs after the attempt on his life. From the book *Amizade Traída e Recuperada: O ANC em Moçambique (1970–1990)* by Nadja Manghuezi.

Despite the apartheid regime's aggressive policy towards southern African independent states, as time went on it lost a great deal of ground, both militarily and in terms of diplomatic international relations, especially with the West. In this context, in May 1988, while South African forces withdrew from Cuito Cuanavale in Angola, important quadripartite discussions on the independence of South West Africa (Namibia) began in London, between delegations from Angola, South Africa, Cuba and the United States. On the margin of these discussions, senior military

203 CEA, *Southern Africa Dossier*, December 1988, 28; Manghezi, *Amizade Traída e Recuperada*, 394.

204 *Tempo*, 920, 29 May 1988, 5.

officials from Angola met for the first time with their South African counterparts.²⁰⁵ In fact, South Africa acquiesced to negotiating and signing an agreement that would ensure the independence of South West Africa. This happened as a result of the fact that the SADF forces were repelled and suffered heavy losses and consequent defeat at the final battle near the Calueque Dam in Angola. In December, the final agreement on the independence of Namibia was signed in New York, and a timetable for the withdrawal of Cubans troops from Angola was adopted.

Alongside these developments, the ANC met with several important entities, namely:

- the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU) at a meeting hosted in Lusaka, where the two parties reaffirmed that the legitimate aspirations of South Africans could only be achieved in a non-racial and democratic country;
- with a group largely made up of Afrikaans-speaking students at a meeting hosted in Maputo;
- with members of the Transvaal and Natal Indian Congress and 52 other members of the Indian community at a meeting hosted in Lusaka, where the focus was the unbanning of the ANC, the release of political prisoners, the lifting of the state of emergency and negotiations for the creation of a non-racial and democratic South Africa;
- and a religious delegation led by Desmond Tutu at a meeting hosted in Harare where the main focus was a call for unity among all those who wanted a future of peace and democracy in South Africa.

Moreover, the apartheid regime's ambassador in the United States, Dr Piet Koornhof telephoned the ANC's offices in New York to present his condolences on the death of a member of the ANC's National Executive Committee (NEC), Johnny Makathini, and also made himself available to facilitate the family's travel to attend the funeral.²⁰⁶ These events were a clear demonstration of the fact that peace in South Africa had to be negotiated and required the involvement of all South Africans irrespective of race, religion, class, gender or age.

In Mozambique in July and September 1988, three blacks with South African passports were caught in the city of Nampula, where they were doing reconnaissance of possible ANC bases in that province. In addition there was a confrontation between the South African and Mozambican forces along the southern border of Maputo province.²⁰⁷ The year 1989 was marked by a series of events that brought the hope of peace and freedom to the people of South Africa, and the hope of peace and development to Mozambique and southern Africa in general. Despite the difficult situation that the country faced as a result of war, FRELIMO held its Fifth Congress in July. There, political, economic and ideological guidance was given with the aim of

205 Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 319.

206 CEA, *Southern Africa Dossier*, September 1989, 7–9.

207 CEA, *Southern Africa Dossier*, December 1988, 34.

changing policies and economic measures that had applied since 1983 and adjusting them to the new international political environment. The terms 'Marxism-Leninism and worker-peasant alliance' disappeared from the Party's documents and it became a party for all people. In August, the government sent a 12-point document to RENAMO in Nairobi, through the intervention of a religious delegation headed by Cardinal Alexandre Maria dos Santos of Maputo. In response to the government's 12-point document, RENAMO presented a 16-point document, in which it recognised the Mozambican state and declared its intention to abandon the idea of seizing power through armed struggle.²⁰⁸ Thus, the country was on the way to peace, reconciliation between Mozambicans and the normalisation of everyday living in the nation.

In South Africa, P.W. Botha was replaced by F.W. de Klerk as president in August 1989. De Klerk was viewed as more pragmatic and was not as closely connected to the parallel governance structure that was dominated by the military as his predecessor had been. De Klerk's rise to power in the apartheid regime took place as a result of the emergence of important new realities at domestic, regional and international level, namely:

- i. the military setbacks that the SADF had suffered at Cuito Cuanavale;
- ii. the failure of the 'total strategy' and the 'constellation of states';
- iii. the increasing pressures of international isolation, particularly South Africa's exclusion from international financial markets;
- iv. changes in the international arena especially those resulting from the adoption of policies such as 'glasnost', 'perestroika' and the Soviet Union's paradigm shift.²⁰⁹

It is significant that before the rise of F.W. de Klerk, it was clear that these 'new realities' had generated new circumstances that the apartheid regime could not ignore.

Thus, once De Klerk came to power in mid-August, he took the following measures: In his inaugural speech as head of state, he declared that all South Africans should take part in the political process in a fair and equal manner, and that no group should dominate the other. In September, he unbanned anti-government demonstrations and created conditions for the unconditional release of Walter Sisulu and six other members of the ANC as well as PAC leaders. In 1990 he proposed limited local elections for black people who did not belong to a homeland. He also allowed the ANC demonstration in Soweto on 29 October and opened up all beaches to people of all races, etc.²¹⁰ Despite these changes, most of them collectively labelled 'petty apartheid', Pretoria still continued to attack ANC members and provide support to RENAMO's war of destabilisation in Mozambique. For example, in early 1989, ANC members 'Tommy' and 'Zola', and Alto Maé residents in Maputo were

208 Veloso, *Memórias*, 244–248; Fauvet and Mosse, *É Proibido Pôr Algemas nas Palavras*, 334, 340.

209 CEA, *Dossier África Austral*, December 1989, 1–2.

210 *Ibid.*, 9.

victims of attempted murder. In November, the prime minister, Mário Machungo, speaking at a conference in Brussels, denounced the supplies of weapons that South Africa continued to provide to RENAMO. However, President Joaquim Chissano at a rally in Guro, Manica Province, said that South Africa had significantly reduced its logistical support to RENAMO, and that there was division within the executive of the apartheid regime as to whether they should continue to provide support to RENAMO or should stop their support and allow for its total elimination.²¹¹

In pursuit of the peace, freedom and reconciliation processes that had come to a head in 1989 in South Africa and Mozambique, even more important events marked the history of these two countries during the 1990s. In South Africa, on 2 February 1990, de Klerk decreed the lifting of the ban on the ANC and initiated formal negotiations with the liberation movements in order to end apartheid. On 9 February 1990, Nelson ‘Madiba’ Mandela, was released from prison. Shortly thereafter, other political prisoners were released, followed by negotiations for a new democratic political order. In the first democratic elections held in South Africa on 27 April 1994, the African National Congress was elected to power and Nelson Mandela took office as the first democratically elected president of South Africa.²¹² The Mozambican government and the people sang, danced and wept for joy at the victory – ‘Freedom and a non-racial and democratic government at last!’ Both peoples felt tremendous pride because their friendship and solidarity had proved indestructible in the face of violent racist attacks. An exuberant Sergio Vieira stated:

Samora predicted that the day would come when apartheid would fall and his actions were always directed towards that end. He is not here to witness this day, but the day has come. The ANC and the South African people triumphed in their long walk to freedom and with them, we are all victorious.²¹³

In Mozambique, in January 1990, President Chissano announced the preliminary draft of a new constitution that would guarantee individual rights and freedoms – freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly. Conditions were also created for the adoption of a multi-party system.²¹⁴ In early July, the first meeting of the negotiating process was held between the government and the RENAMO delegation. The meeting took place at the headquarters of the Community of Saint Egídio in Rome. The following participated as observers: two representatives of the Community of Saint Egídio and the Archbishop of Beira. This complex and difficult process took two years to agree upon a ceasefire and the comprehensive Peace Agreement, which was eventually signed on 4 October 1992. This agreement ensured the immediate opening of roads as well as the free movement of people and

211 CEA, *Southern Africa Dossier*, January 1990, 5, 7.

212 Manghezi, *Amizade Traída e Recuperada*, 400. On 2 February 1990, a letter-bomb exploded in Harare not far from where ANC members were participating in an economic seminar. Michael Lapsley lost his arms in the explosion.

213 Vieira, *Participei, por isso testemunho*, 493.

214 Fauvet and Mosse, *É proibido pôr algemas nas palavras*, 340.

goods.²¹⁵ In October 1999, the first multi-party elections took place in Mozambique. Joaquim Chissano and FRELIMO were democratically elected by the majority of the population. Mozambique was considered exemplary in Africa and the world, because after such a prolonged and violent conflict, the people put aside hatred and the spirit of revenge and proceeded to the effective reconciliation of the Mozambican family. The destabilisation war in Mozambique had ended and the apartheid regime had been dismantled. The South African and Mozambican people could circulate freely between the two countries. The relations of friendship, solidarity and fraternity had been consolidated.

EPILOGUE

Matola and Mbuzini: Symbols of unity, friendship, solidarity and fraternity between the Mozambican and South African people

It has been said that one cannot choose one's neighbours but one can choose one's friends. In our case, we are proud to be both neighbours and friends of the brave people of Mozambique. The ties that bind our two peoples together date back to the very beginnings when our ancestors settled in this region. Our friendship covers centuries of the shared experience of colonial domination and centuries of fighting for the shared ideals of self-determination and social justice and against a common enemy... We are 35 million.²¹⁶

The relations between Mozambique and South Africa date back centuries to pre-colonial times when there was permanent contact between the two peoples, resulting in a strong affinity, social ties and trade networks. The colonial presence in Mozambique and South Africa reconfigured the relations between the people of these two countries. With the development of commercial agriculture and the mining industry in South Africa, Mozambique, particularly its southern provinces, became integrated into the capitalist economic system in southern Africa. South Africa became the economic and political hub of the region and systemically linked territories that had been segregated by the colonisers into Mozambique, Malawi, Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho and Southern Rhodesia. African peoples of the region, who had a common history and heritage, were now subject to exploitation, oppression and racial discrimination. However, this not only served to fortify the bonds of friendship and solidarity between them, but also gave them a common cause – liberation from the yoke of colonialism.

On 19 October 1986, the South African apartheid regime committed another heinous act – the assassination of President Samora Machel in a plane crash in

215 Veloso, *Memórias*, 250–251; CEA, *Southern Africa Dossier*, October 1990, 3, 6, 7.

216 UFH, ANC Archives, Mozambique Mission, Box 11, Folder 69, 'Statement on the occasion of the Day of Friendship between the people's of Mozambique and South Africa', 14 February 1988, 1.

Mbuzini. Mozambique and South Africa mourned the loss of a brilliant statesman, military leader and intellectual. In recognition of the role played by Samora Machel in the fight against apartheid, oppression and all forms of domination, the non-racial and democratic government of South Africa under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, built the Samora Machel Memorial in Mbuzini and inaugurated it on 19 January 1999, five years after the end of apartheid. On this auspicious occasion, President Nelson Mandela eloquently said in his inaugural address:

As South Africans who loved freedom – whether we were underground; in exile; in prison; in our work-place or our communities – we vowed then that we would never forget, and that a fitting memorial would be created when South Africa became a democracy... Today, we redeem that pledge... We have gathered on the soil of a democratic South Africa, at the site that was drenched with Mozambican blood. We have come to unveil a monument that will forever declare our homage to the life and vision of Samora Machel and to all those who lost their lives on that fateful day... . It is painful that our quest to understand the causes of the crash remains unfinished. The work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, imperfect as it may be, has laid a foundation on which South Africans can work to forge a common understanding of their past... . This monument is a tribute to the men and women who lost their lives on that night. Visitors and tourists to this site will not be able to forget the names of Samora Machel, his colleagues and comrades. Because of the kind of people they were, and the principles that inspired them, it will do more than that... . Through our part in creating this memorial we are doing all we can to ensure that our children's children and future generations will remember those who opened the way for their freedom, as well as the principles which inspired them... . May this memorial serve as a beacon of the new morality that must emerge strong if we are to bring lasting improvements in the lives of our peoples... . May it impress upon us that the greatest homage we can pay to Samora Machel and those who perished with him, is to work together for peaceful and prosperous societies based on the principles of justice and equity, to which they dedicated their lives.²¹⁷

Thus, the Samora Machel Memorial helped affirm a history that was distorted and neglected under the old order. By giving lasting life to these memories and recalling the noble principles that gave birth to our democratic societies, they help build our new nations and strengthen the unity of our region. For the South African people, the Samora Machel Memorial is the symbol of heartfelt respect and gratitude for the solidarity and friendship that the Mozambican people provided during the freedom struggle. It is also recognition of the great contribution made by all those Mozambicans and others from various parts of the world who perished at Mbuzini.

217 Nelson Mandela, 'Speech at the Unveiling of the Samora Machel Memorial', Mbuzini, 19 January 1999.



Figure 17.14a: Front view of the Samora Machel Monument. Internet images of Samora Moisés Machel



Figure 17.14b: South African President Nelson Mandela, President of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, and Graça Machel at the inaugural ceremony of the Samora Machel Memorial Monument in Mbuluzi. Internet images of Samora Moisés Machel



Figure 17.15: The President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma and the President of Mozambique, Armando Guebuza greeting crowds at Mbuluzi on the occasion of the commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the death of Samora Machel. Internet images of Samora Moisés Machel

It has become a tradition for the peoples of Mozambique and South Africa to pay tribute and homage to the victims who died in the Matola raid on 14 February 1982. Driven by the need to honour the Matola martyrs and strengthen existing historical, political and cultural ties between the two countries, the governments of the Republic of Mozambique and the Republic of South Africa signed an agreement in 2006 to build a monument in the city of Matola. On 14 February 2009, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosasana Dlamini Zuma, reiterated the need for a memorial to be built in memory of the Matola victims, as well as the need to continue celebrating the ties of friendship, solidarity and fraternity between the peoples of Mozambique

and South Africa.²¹⁸ On 14 February 2011, a Memorandum of Understanding for the design, development and implementation of the construction of the Matola Monument and Interpretation Centre was signed. On 8 July 2011, representatives of the two governments laid the foundation stone marking the commencement of construction of the Matola Monument and Interpretation Centre.

The Matola Monument and Interpretation Centre is part of the tradition of co-operation between the peoples and governments of Mozambique and South Africa. The Memorial and Interpretation Centre pay homage to the martyrs of the struggle against apartheid. However, it also celebrates the solidarity between the people and governments of the Republic of Mozambique and the Republic of South Africa, which President Samora Moisés Machel so proudly invoked on 14 February 1982.



Figure 17.16a: Construction of the Interpretive Centre. Photo from the archives of the Matola Monument and Interpretation Centre

Figure 17.16b : The monument consisting of a panel with the maps of South Africa and Mozambique for the placement of flowers, 3 obelisks representing the 3 houses attacked in the bomb blast and 11 pillars representing the SADC countries and the international community. Photo from the archives of the Matola Monument and Interpretive Centre

218 Available on the internet at AllAfrica.com: South Africa: Monument to Commemorate Matola Raid in Mozambique.htm. 16 February 2009.



Figure 17.17a : Front view of the Interpretive Centre. Archive of the Matola Monument and Interpretive Centre

Figure 17.17b: Interior of the Centre, depicting some of the exhibitions. Archive of the Matola Monument and Interpretive Centre

The Samora Machel Memorial and the Matola Monument and Interpretation Centre pay tribute to the blood that was spilt by those who remained faithful to the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. As stated by the president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, ‘may the blood of our martyrs continue to unite us towards a better life for all our people. We are one people’.²¹⁹

All the Mozambicans who were interviewed were visibly proud when they emphasised:

The sacrifice which the Mozambican people consented to was worth the price. Mozambique paid a heavy price for its unconditional support and solidarity with the freedom struggle of the South African people. Today, we have a non-racial and democratic South Africa... so it was worth it.²²⁰

And Albie Sachs wisely stated:

We do not owe a debt, since no debt is due when people defend the principles of freedom, rather we owe a memory, an answer, a lesson in humanity, a sense of solidarity, not just when making speeches and reciting slogans on commemorative days, but every day, in terms of fraternity, joint efforts, shared aspirations, and taking forward all the values for which all these people, and so many others, gave their lives.²²¹

219 ‘Address by the President of South Africa, at the commemoration of the death of Samora Machel’, Mbuzini, 17 October 2011.

220 Interviews with, Joaquim Chissano, Jacinto Veloso, Mariano Matsinha, Hama Thai, Teresa Lima, Maria de Lurdes Torcato, Fernando Lima, Maria Chissano Vilanculos, Isabel Vilanculos, Chica Sumail, Bishop Dinis Sengulane and Manuel Araújo.

221 Interview, Albie Sachs, April 2013, speaking about the construction of the Matola Monument.



©Africa Institute of South Africa

President Agostinho Neto of Angola