Understanding the Causes and the Nature of Xenophobia in South Africa: A Case Study of De Doorns

By

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Declaration

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Abstract

This study seeks to understand the causes and nature of xenophobia in South Africa. It investigates this through the case of De Doorns, where in November 2009 3000 Zimbabweans were chased out of their homes, which were subsequently looted and destroyed. This case was chosen because it is an example of a xenophobic incident that went beyond xenophobic attitudes to manifest in violent behaviour towards African migrants.

The study was guided though three questions. (1) How can the violent xenophobic attacks in De Doorns be explained? (2) Do the explanations for xenophobia offer sufficient explanation for the causes and nature of xenophobia in De Doorns? (3) Are the causes for xenophobia still evident in De Doorns? To answer the first and third questions key informant interviews with relevant organisations were conducted with Agri Wes-Cape, the Hex River Valley Table Grape Association and People Against Suffering, Oppression and Poverty (PASSOP). In addition, published work (reports and an article) has been analysed. To answer the second question, literature on the topic of xenophobia was reviewed and the findings compared to the answers found for the first question.

The key findings in this study were, firstly, that the causes for xenophobia were twofold: there was a context and there were underlying causes; in addition there were specific triggers for the xenophobia. This twofold explanation is evident in Horowitz's ethnic violence theory, where he takes into consideration both external contextual causes and immediate locality-bound causes. The context was the farming community of De Doorns, characterised by casual work, job insecurity and (often) poor living conditions. The underlying causes were found to be locals' frustration with and perceptions of Zimbabweans; this led to the development of xenophobic attitudes. In addition, labour brokers were found to have worsened the situation by encouraging causal work and by skimming off workers' payments. Government insufficiencies were also an underlying condition: there was lack in an early warning system and there were service delivery failures. These underlying conditions gave a breeding ground for the triggers of the violence to operate. These triggers were found to be of a local political character, and these highlighted the explanatory value of Misago's *micropolitics* theory. A local councillor stirred up the xenophobia to gain popularity for re-election before the upcoming local government elections. From this

it is found that with similar or worse underlying condition xenophobia could flourish, given the 'right' triggers. This is an important finding in light of the up coming local government elections in 2016. In terms of the nature of the xenophobia in South Africa, it is argued that this often goes beyond the expression of xenophobic attitudes, and takes the form of violent xenophobic behaviour which is usually targeted at black African migrants. Explanations for this violence have historical roots in the armed struggle and it illicits a response from government. Why black Africans? Their proximity and their vulnerability are put forward as explanations, though it is also recognized that current explanations are insufficient.

Opsomming

Hierdie studie se oogmerk is om die oorsake en aard van xenofobie in Suid-Afrika te verstaan. Dit word ondersoek deur die geval van De Doorns, waartydens November 2009 3000 Zimbabwiërs uit hul huise gejaag is wat geplunder en vernietig is. Hierdie geval is gekies omdat dit 'n voorbeeld van 'n xenofobiese geval is wat verder as die xenofobiese houdings gegaan het om in gewelddadige gedrag teenoor immigrante uit Afrika te manifesteer.

Die studie is deur drie vrae gelei: (1) Hoe kan die gewelddadige xenofobiese aanvalle in De Doorns verduidelik word? (2) Bied die verduidelikings vir xenofobie genoegsame verduideliking vir die oorsake en aard van xenofobie in De Doorns? (3) Is die oorsake van xenofobie steeds sigbaar in De Doorns? Om die eerste en derde vrae te beantwoord is sleutel informante onderhoude met relevante organisasies gevoer naamlik Agri Wes-Kaap, Die Hexriviervallei Tafeldruif Vereniging en People Against Suffering, Oppression and Poverty (PASSOP). Daarby is gepubliseerde werk (verslae en 'n artikel) ook ontleed. Om die tweede vraag te beantwoord is literatuur oor die onderwerp van xenofobie hersien en die bevindinge vergelyk met die antwoorde op die eerste vraag.

Die sleutel bevindings in hierdie studie was eerstens dat die oorsake vir xenofobie tweeledig was: daar was 'n konteks en onderliggende oorsake; daar was ook bykomende snellers vir die xenofobie. Hierdie tweeledige verduideliking is duidelik in Horowitz se etniese geweldsteorie, waar hy beide eksterne kontekstuele oorsake en onmiddelike ligging-gebonde oorsake. Die konteks was die plaasgemeenskap van De Doorns wat gekenmerk is deur informele werk, werksonsekerheid, en (dikwels) swak lewensomstandighede. Hierdie onderliggende oorsake is bevind om die plaaslike inwoners se frustrasie met en siening van Zimbabwiërs te wees; dit het aanleiding gegee tot xenofobiese houdings. Daar is verder gevind dat arbeidsmakelaars die situasie vererger het deur die aanmoediging van informele werk en die afskeer van werkers se betalings. Regeringstekortkominge was ook 'n onderliggende oorsaak: daar was 'n gebrek aan 'n vroeë waarskuwingstelsel terwyl diensverskaffing ook misluk het. Hierdie onderliggende toestande het 'n broeiplek aan die snellers van die geweld gegee om te funksioneer. Daar is bevind dat die snellers 'n plaaslike politieke karakter gehad het en beklemtoon die verklarende waarde van Misago se mikro-politieke teorie. 'n Plaaslike raadslid het

die xenofobie aangewakker om gewildheid te verwerf vir herverkiesing voor die toekomstige plaaslike verkiesings. Vanuit hierdie is daar bevind dat xenofobie met soortgelyke of erger onderliggende toestande kan floreer, met die 'regte' snellers. Dit is 'n belangrike bevinding in die lig van die toekomstige plaaslike regeringsverkiesings in 2016. In terme van die aard van xenofobie in Suid-Afrika word daar gearguenteer dat dit dikwels verder gaan as die uitdrukking van xenofobiese houdings en die vorm neem van gewelddadige xenofobiese gedrag wat dikwels op swart immigrante van Afrika gemik is. Verklarings vir hierdie geweld het geskiedkundige oorsake in die gewapende stryd en ontlok 'n reaksie van die regering. Hoekom swart Afrikane? Hulle nabyheid en kwesbaarheid word aangebied as verklarings terwyl dit egter ook herken word dat huidige verklarings onvoldoende is.

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Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
AU	African Union
BVM	Breede Valley Municipality
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CoRMSA	Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa
ESTA	Extension of Security of Tenure Act
FMSP	Forced Migration Studies Programme
HTA	Hex River Valley Table Grape Association
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress
PASSOP	People Against Suffering Oppression and Poverty
SAHRC	The South African Human Rights Commission
SAMP	Southern African Migration Project
SAPS	South African Police Service
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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Chapter 1: Introduction

"All good people agree,

And all good people say,

All nice people, like Us, are We

And every one else is They:

But if you cross over the sea,

Instead of over the way,

You may end by (think of it!) looking on We

As only a sort of They!"

― Rudyard Kipling, *Debits and Credits*

1.1 Introduction

Fear of the unknown is something one can witness all over the world, and as the movement of people has accelerated with new technologies of transport and communication so has the fear of strangers. This fear of strangers is what we call xenophobia. It derives from two Greek words: *xénos* and *phóbos*, meaning 'stranger' or 'guest' and 'fear', respectively. Consequently xenophobia means fear of the guest or the stranger, though today it has the stronger meaning of hatred of strangers. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) defines xenophobia as "the deep dislike of non-nationals by nationals of a recipient state" (in Bekker 2010: 127). It is important to bear in mind that xenophobia is more than just an attitude towards foreigners; it can also take shape as a practice. This practice could again turn into violent behaviour (Harris 2002).

The end of the isolating apartheid regime in South Africa opened the borders to many new migrants. This also increased the potential for xenophobia, and it has been a problem in South Africa ever since. Xenophobia in South Africa is expressed as negative attitudes towards immigrants, but also it occurs in xenophobic practices such as discrimination, exploitation and violence. There have been several studies on xenophobia, as the literature review will show in the next chapter, but not enough has been done to curb these attitudes and practices. This thesis will look at the explanations and the nature of xenophobia in South Africa. The purpose is to understand the reasons for the attitudes and practices of xenophobia in the country. This is an important topic to investigate, as xenophobia is something that happens in

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South Africa on a regular basis, and it violates the South African Constitution, that bases itself on human rights.

Because this is a Master's thesis with limited time and resources the xenophobic events in De Doorns in November 2009 will serve as a case study. De Doorns has been selected in part because of its proximity to the researcher's University, and because it is an example of a xenophobic incident which went beyond xenophobic attitudes and turned into violent behaviour.

1.2 Background

This section on background gives an idea of the severity of xenophobia in South Africa. As stated above, since South Africa's independence xenophobia has grown, along with the rising number of foreigners coming into the country. Foreigners in this country have been harassed, attacked and even killed. The attitudes towards immigrants held by sections of the South African population have become more hostile. The attitude of hatred towards foreigners is especially held against people coming from other African countries (Hopstock & de Jager 2011). A Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) survey from 2001 shows that 21 per cent of the respondents wanted a complete ban on immigration, while 64 per cent wanted strict limits on entry (Hopstock & de Jager 2011). Xenophobia runs deep in South Africa and goes beyond the fear and dislike of foreigners, since even fellow citizens have been attacked. This indicates that the fear of the 'other' in this country is extreme and may express itself in violent behaviour (Hopstock & de Jager 2011).

A number of xenophobic events have taken place since independence. In 1998 the police set dogs on three Mozambicans in Johannesburg in a gruesome training session; the event was captured on video and the policemen were tried in court. The video shows the three foreign men pleading for help while the policemen stand by laughing. It became known that it was 'normal procedure' to set dogs on criminals or foreigners in order to train the dogs to bite. These groups of people were chosen as targets because they were least likely to complain. Johannes Niemand, a former dog handler, told the court: "It was a pity that the video was taken. Because of that video the whole matter has been blown out of perspective" (CNN 2001).

In another xenophobic incident in 1998, three foreigners lost their lives on a train in Pretoria. While the men were being harassed by an angry mob, one of the

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three jumped or was pushed off the train to his death, while the other two were electrocuted by the power lines as they were trying to get to safety (Zvomuya 2013).

In May/June 2008 South Africa experienced two weeks of violence which left 62 people dead, 21 of them South African citizens, over 100 000 people displaced and 1 300 people arrested (Monson & Arian 2011: 26). Mozambican Ernesto Nhamuave, who became an awful symbol of the violence, was burnt alive in Ramaphosaville on the East Rand (Zvomuya 2013). Perpetrators stole millions of rands worth of goods and destroyed homes. Those especially targeted were foreigners, people married to foreigners, anyone who refused to participate, and those who belonged to groups that were unable to 'justify' their claim to their piece of urban land (Landau 2011: 1). The government claimed that this violence was random acts of criminality, but the violence was specifically targeted at people who were believed to be a threat to South Africa (Landau 2011: 1). These events are the focus of much of the literature written on xenophobia in South Africa (For example; Landau ed. 2011 and Hassim, Kupe & Worby eds. 2008). However the violence did not end in 2008 as dozens have been killed since then (Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA) 2011: 56).

In the aftermath of the World Cup in 2010, when hundreds of thousand fans visited the country from around the world for this global feast, threatening pamphlets were distributed and foreigners were told that they must leave their communities and the country (Landau 2011: 22).

In 2013 Emidio Marcia died in police custody after being handcuffed and dragged behind a police van. The Mozambican taxi-driver had parked on the wrong side of the road, and he resisted being arrested. Although this also was captured on tape and broadcast around the world, the police's initial response was one of denial (Zvomuya 2013). Also in 2013, violence against foreigners broke out in the Eastern Cape in communities around Port Elizabeth after a 19-year-old South African was shot to death, allegedly by a Somali immigrant (SABC 2013).

These examples show that xenophobia can and often does become violent in nature in South Africa. One must not, however, forget that xenophobia also takes less extreme forms and often affects the daily life of foreigners. The xenophobic events that are the focus of this case study took place in De Doorns. De Doorns is a small rural town in the Western Cape, which mainly produces table-grapes. On the 15th and 17th of November 2009 the Zimbabwean community was forcefully chased from the

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informal settlement, and as the Zimbabweans fled, their homes were torn down, burned and destroyed. This led to 3000 people being displaced, and living either on the farms of their employers or at the shelter erected on the local rugby field (Kerr & Durrheim 2013: 583-584). These events will be presented and explored further in Chapters 3 and 4. The explanations as to why these people were targeted at this time are the focus of this thesis.

1.3 Preliminary literature study

The literature survey for this thesis involves several different disciplines. The literature on xenophobia includes the fields of sociology, anthropology, migration studies and political science. These fields propose different explanations for the presence and severity of xenophobic attitudes and practices in South Africa, but it is noteworthy that these explanations do not mutually exclude each other. The literature review will be divided into two sections: the explanations for xenophobia and the nature of xenophobia, although the first section is much bigger.

The explanations have been placed into three different groupings. The first grouping consists of *socio-cultural explanations*. Here we find social identity theory, which focuses on a person's self-image; this derives from the social group(s) that the individual believes himself/herself to belong to (Tajfel & Turner 1979:40). As most individuals want to maintain or even enhance their self-image, it is important that the 'membership' of their group is perceived as something positive. In turn this leads to a need to reject and even express hostility towards the out-group. When this translates into nationalism it becomes a way of promoting one's status as a citizen; this therefore also rejects the foreigner. When a country is going through a political transition, as South Africa has been doing for the last 20 years, nationalism can take the form of hostility towards foreigners and this provides an explanation for xenophobia (Mummendey, Klink & Brown 2001:159-160).

This grouping also includes the bio-cultural hypothesis, which explains why it is that black Africans that are the most frequently targeted group for xenophobia. Furthermore, this grouping includes an explanation of inherited culture. Throughout the history of Sourth Africa the mobility of people has been controlled. In the book *Exorcising the Demons Within* (ed. Landau 2011) the authors examined the issue of mobility and found that mobility was perceived as a threat to the insider community; they found that geographical and cultural belonging have been factors that determine

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one's usefulness and citizenship. The enclosed, isolated nature of apartheid society dictated where one should live on the basis of skin colour and created a society that was unable to deal with strangers (Harris 2002). The stress created by this can be overwhelming and it is argued that this can lead to xenophobia.

The second grouping includes *structural explanations*. In this group we have the relative deprivation theory, the theory of ethnic violence and the group threat theory. Relative deprivation theory suggests that social unrest comes from the perception that one gets less than one is entitled to (Harris 2002). This can create xenophobic attitudes and practices if the reason for this deficit is believed to be foreigners. It is seen as a zero-sum game where foreigners that have jobs are blamed for unemployment among South Africans (du Toit & Kotzé 2011: 163). In other words the foreigners become 'frustration scapegoats' and this is why xenophobia occurs (Harris 2002). The theory of ethnic violence by Horowitz (2001), states that external contextual causes in addition to immediate locallity-bound causes must be taken into account when looking at violent outbursts. This theory also gives a step-by-step description of how an violent ethnic event will unfold (du Toit & Kotzé 2011: 160-161). It points to causes that were present in South Africa prior to major xenophobic events, and therefore explains what caused these events to take place, thus providing an explanation for xenophobia in the country. Group threat theory suggests that inter-group hostility is largely a reaction to perceived threats from subordinate group(s). If the dominant group finds that its position vis-à-vis the minority group is in jeopardy and fears that it might lose its advantaged social position, hostility can arise (King 2007: 1225)

The third grouping comprises *institutional explanations*. This grouping consists of the role of the state. Attitudes and statements from state representatives where they deny xenophobia, or lay blame for crime on foreigners, could generate xenophobia (Bekker 2010:126). There is also the belief that the government is not doing enough to solve the 'problem' of immigrants (Landau 2011: 13). One can also look at the policies that affect migration into the country. There is a big gap between policy and practice in South Africa, and this also worsens the xenophobic phenomenon (Bekker 2010: 141), this will be disucssed later. Furthermore Misago (2011) argues that a key trigger for violence against foreign nationals and outsiders in specific locations is localised competition for political and economic power. In addition mistreatment of foreigners by border control officials, by the police and by

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detention centres has led to a norm where foreigners receive xenophobic treatment. This also reinforces xenophobia in South Africa (SAHRC 2006: 32; 35). The way the many branches of the state behave when it comes to foreigners creates and reinforces xenophobia in South Africa.

This leads us to the nature, with this I mean the observable features and qualities of xenophobia. Xenophobic attitudes tend, in some circumstances, to become violent and are directed predominantly at black migrants. Some argue that the nature is the real problem and that xenophobia is labelled a pathology to 'hide' the violence that is inherent in South African society (Harris 2002). Why is it that xenophobic attitudes often turn into violent behaviour? Xenophobia is not diminishing in South Africa, and this highlights the need to investigate the causes and to reverse this trend. Chapter 2 will examine these explanations in more detail.

1.4 Research Problem and questions

The South African Constitution is one of the world's most liberal and it has incorporated the human rights defined by the United Nations into its Bill of Rights in Chapter 2, for example everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law and the right to life in accordance with the Bill of Rights. In fact the Constitution protects all people within the borders of South Africa, guaranteeing basic human and legal rights to everyone living in South Africa (Preamble to the South African Constitution 1996). This is something that xenophobia violates, as people are targeted on the basis of their countries of origin. Xenophobia is ongoing, and is not decreasing; this leads to the need to understand its causes. It is the intention of this thesis to explore whether the current explanations are sufficient to explain the xenophobia that occurred in De Doorns. In addition to examining the causes of xenophobia, the nature of xenophobia will also be examined. Here it is important to try to explain why it is largely black Africans that are the targets of this xenophobic violence. The theoretical section of the research presents the current literature on the explanations for xenophobia and on the violent nature of xenophobia in South Africa. This provides the foundation for the research questions that follow. De Doorns, as the case study, was chosen as it exemplifies the nature of xenophobia in South Africa: it was violent (homes were looted and destroyed, people were threatened unless they left) and it was targeted at black migrants (Zimbabweans). The

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empirical research for this thesis is limited to the case of De Doorns in the Western Cape. This leads to the first research question:

How can the violent xenophobic attacks in De Doorns be explained?

The theories on xenophobia which will be presented in Chapter 2 will be assessed in terms of the empirical research conducted, to see if they help to explain the xenophobic events that took place in De Doorns in November 2009. Thus the next research question is:

Do the explanations for xenophobia offer sufficient explanation for the causes and nature of xenophobia in De Doorns?

It will also be interesting to see if the causes of the events in 2009 are still evident in the community in De Doorns today: is xenophobia still present and is it as explosive as it was in November 2009? This leads to a subsequent question:

Are the causes for xenophobia still evident in De Doorns?

Although conducting this study as a case study limits the explanatory reach of this thesis, this smaller case study is necessary, given the limits in terms of both resources and time.

1.5 Research Design and Method

For this thesis the research design that has been chosen is that of a qualitative single case study. This is chosen to conduct a descriptive and exploratory study of xenophobia in De Doorns. I will tackle the research question by doing text-analysis of reports and of an article previously written on the xenophobia at De Doorns. In addition I will conduct key informant interviews with members of relevant organizations to get an insight into how they see the xenophobic events of 2009, and to see if the causal factors I found in the reports and studies are there still. This will be interesting to see because if the explanation(s) found in the literature is/are still prevalent, one could expect to see xenophobia currently and in the future.

In this study I hope to put forward explanations for the nature of xenophobia in South Africa, and to test these against the events in De Doorns. A qualitative study is chosen because I am only looking at one case and I am examining this case in-depth. In addition a qualitative study goes together with key informant interviews, which is one of my chosen methods. A larger study with, for example, surveys, or a study of several cases, would be too expensive and too comprehensive (Burnham, Lutz & Layton-Henry 2008: 40).

A major weakness of the text-analysis and key informant interviews about De Doorns is that it will be difficult to generalize these findings to the rest of South Africa (Burnham, Lutz & Layton-Henry 2008: 64). To be able to generalize, more towns, both rural and urban, would have to be researched. However I am locating it in the broader research of xenophobia in South Africa. The case study will be used to validate or not what the current body of research explains. Furthermore, the research design and methods will yield valid answers to my chosen research questions and can help to shed further light on the explanatory value of current theories and explanations of xenophobia in South Africa. In addition, using text-analysis and key informant interviews enhances the study's reliability, as if one repeats the research the results should not differ greatly (Burnham, Lutz & Layton-Henry 2008: 39).

I have conducted key informant interviews with organizations that have interests in De Doorns. I have chosen to interview representatives from Agri Wes-Cape, the Hex River Valley Table Grapes Association (HTA) and People Against Suffering Oppression and Poverty (PASSOP). The three different organizations will be briefly introduced to demonstrate the relevance of their input. Agri Wes-Cape is an organization for the agricultural sector in the Western Cape. This organization is a mouthpiece for the farmers and promotes their interests. Agri Wes-Cape condemned the xenophobic attacks in De Doorns and openly gave their opinion of the reasons for the attack in 2009; they also expressed an opinion on what should be done (Kerr & Durrheim 2013: 594). This tells us that they played an active role prior to and in the aftermath of the xenophobic events in De Doorns; this makes them an interesting role player to interview.

The HTA is also a body that represents farmers, though this is a more local body; it represents the grape farmers in and around De Doorns (Robb & Davis 2009: 14). They had a role to play in the opening of a satellite Refugee Reception Office in De Doorns to accommodate the many Zimbabweans that were working as seasonal

workers (Robb & Davis 2009: 19-20). This association was also outraged by the xenophobic attacks in 2009. It is clear that they have a strong interest in De Doorns and particularly in the workers there, both permanent and seasonal.

The third association has a different stance. PASSOP is a "not-for-profit" human rights organization devoted to fighting for the rights of asylum-seekers, refugees and immigrants in South Africa" (PASSOP 2014a). They were the first organization on site after the mass displacement of the 17th of November 2009, and have since played a major role in the internally displaced persons (IDP) camp and for the displaced peoples (PASSOP 2010). Their role has in other words been very extensive both during and in the aftermath of the xenophobic events in De Doorns. They will provide a different perspective than that provided by the two organizations named above, as they will 'represent' the perspective of the foreigners in these events.

The difficulty here is of course that these organizations may answer the questions in a way that will make them look good. Nevertheless because of the limited time for this research project and in view of the difficulty of conducting interviews with the inhabitants of the De Doorns (given the security and language barriers) this option of conducting interviews with the inhabitants has been ruled out. This therefore left the possibility of interviewing key informants. The interviews were conducted as semi-structured interviews with open formatted questions. These semi-structured interviews are effective when it comes to sensitive topics like xenophobia, where views can be explored further, in more detail. The downside is that one needs to be an effective interviewer: one has to take care and consider the questions thoroughly, and this can take a lot of time to set up and to analyze. This is especially true in a case, where the sample size is small and the interviews could be difficult to set up (Burnham, Lutz & Layton-Henry 2008: 240-241).

The case of De Doorns was chosen for several reasons. A logistical reason was its proximity to the home University of the author. Another was that there has been quite substantial coverage of the events in November 2009, so that text-analysis was possible. However the main reason for its choice was that this was a major xenophobic event that seemed to shock South Africa. It was not merely an isolated event in a small rural town; it was evidence of the pervasive nature of xenophobia in South Africa (Robb & Davis 2009: 10). Although it is difficult to generalize the findings from De Doorns to the rest of South Africa, De Doorns is an example of what could happen in other places in the nation.

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1.6 Ethical considerations

The study will be conducted in line with professional ethical codes for social science research and the 'Framework policy for the assurance and promotion of ethically accountable research at Stellenbosch University'. The goals of the research will be stated and made clear to the key informant respondents before the interviews commence. In addition a written consent form will be given and signed. The respondents will participate without receiving any financial compensation.   The names of the respondents will be kept anonymous if they so wish. To ensure privacy and confidentiality the collected data will be kept on a password-secure computer, which only the researcher has access to. Finally all the sources of information will be duly acknowledged and referenced.

1.7 Outline of chapters

This thesis will have five chapters, including this chapter.

The second chapter will provid a literature review of the explanations given for xenophobia. The aim is to see to what degree the explanations (which were described above) are able to account for xenophobia in South Africa. This review will show the areas that must be explored in this case study. Chapter 2 will provid as a more detailed introduction to the topic of xenophobia in South Africa, including the nature of the attitudes and practices associated with this phenomenon.

Chapter 3 will give an overview of De Doorns as a society. This chapter will describe the composition of the town's wards, its social economy, its service delivery, the extent and nature of employment, etc. This chapter explores the situation of De Doorns to provide a context for this study. Furthermore, the xenophobic events of November 2009 will also be presented in this chapter.

In Chapter 4 the case of De Doorns will be analyzed through text-analysis and key informant interviews to find answers to the research questions: How can the violent xenophobic attacks in De Doorns be explained? Do the explanations for xenophobia offer sufficient explanation for the causes and nature of xenophobia in De Doorns? Are the causes for xenophobia still evident in De Doorns? This chapter will show whether the analysis and interviews confirm the explanations offered in chapter two. If not, are there other explanations?

The final chapter will conclude this thesis with an overview of the research conducted in the previous chapters in relation to the research questions. This chapter will point to the relevance of this study to xenophobia in South Africa. It will also suggest areas that need further study.

Chapter 2: Overview of Explanations of Xenophobia in South Africa

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will serve as a review of the existing explanations for xenophobia in South Africa found in the literature. This review will also suggest what I should look for when looking at the case of De Doorns. From the review a more detailed picture of xenophobia in South Africa can be painted. This chapter will also give an overview of the nature of xenophobia. This refers to the manifestations and features of xenophobia, in terms of attitudes and behaviour.

The explanations can be divided into three different groupings: socio-cultural, structural and institutional explanations. These groupings will be put forth in sequence, and through them much will be revealed regarding attitudes and practices in the course of presenting the explanations. The nature of xenophobia will also be discussed. Finally there will be a short analysis of the literature review.

It is important to bear in mind that the existing literature on xenophobia in South Africa is of an interdisciplinary nature, and includes perspectives drawn from sociology, anthropology, migration studies and political science. In other words it is a vast field. It should also be kept in mind that the different explanations are not mutually exclusive.

2.2 Socio-cultural explanations

This grouping looks at explanations that lean on social and cultural factors to explain the xenophobia occurring in South Africa.

2.2.1 Social identity theory

Social identity theory, in simple terms, looks at "the aspects of an individual's self-image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives himself belonging" (Tajfel & Turner 1979: 40). Two common assumptions in the theory are that individuals strive to maintain or enhance their self-esteem, and that social groups and membership of these groups are associated with negative and positive feelings. People like to think positively about the group to which they feel they belong. One way of being positive about your in-group is through nationalism. Within a nationalist

framework, one's positive feelings towards one's national in-group can also entail rejection of and hostility towards the out-group (Mummendey, Klink & Brown 2001:159-160). This rejection of the out-group can be seen as particularly strong in South Africa where the in-group is not an obvious group because there are many different languages and peoples in South Africa. The relationship between social identity and nationalism can therefore be explored as an explanation of the source of xenophobia.

Former president Thabo Mbeki stated that "What happened during these days (May 2008) was not inspired by a perverse nationalism" and that as "Africans we will never become enemies of other Africans" (Mbeki 2008). Though nationalism has been a building block in post-apartheid times when the 'rainbow nation' was beginning its consolidation, it can be seen as contributing to in-group thinking, in that it nurtures the view that one's own nation is superior to other nations and therefore it should be dominant. Consequently nationalism is inherently linked to out-group derogation (Mummendey, Klink & Brown 2001: 160). Hence it is possible that this constructed nationalism has contributed to the hatred of people who fall outside of the boundaries of this nationalism. Sally Peberdy (2009: 171) argues that "language and images of immigration discourses and their practices reveal whom the state sees as desirable and undesirable new members of the nation, and thus how it constructs national identity". Furthermore, she says that to understand the immigration policy of a nation, one must look at economic, structural, social and political factors in that country, but to truly understand the policy, one must also look at how the state imagines its national identity and nation-building project – its national vision (Peberdy 2009: 171).

The nation-building project becomes highly visible during times of political transition. South Africa has gone through many political transitions, the latest being in 1994 when it became a democracy. Much of the immigration policy was inherited from the previous regime, but the policy was not left completely unchanged. The new state reshapes its immigration policy to serve the ends of the country, so that the new policy delineates anew who are insiders and who are outsiders. This is reflected in the prioritization of those the state wants on the inside, and the exclusion of those it feels are a threat to the nation and therefore should be kept on the outside. Who is considered to be a threat has changed throughout South African history: in the 1990s and 2000s this threat was identified by the policy as both documented and

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undocumented migrants and immigrants, and especially other Africans (Peberdy 2009:172). Peberdy suggests that when democratic South Africa starts to feel less threatened by its own internal divisions and inequalities, the restrictions in the immigration policy could become more relaxed (Peberdy 2009:172-173). The major transition in 1994 redefined what it meant to be a South African; this no longer came down to the primordial signifiers of 'race', religion, culture or skin-color, but was based more on nationality and citizenship (Peberdy 2009: 177-8). This citizenship is based on indigeneity. Citizenship is granted on the basis of territory and birth, not political agency, and it is emphasized by state power. This is an exclusive concept of nationality, as those believed to be on the outside of the territorial boundaries are excluded from the rights and entitlements of citizenship (Neocosmos 2006: 16). To be a South African national after 1994 meant having a shared history, built on a foundation of democratic values, human rights and development. The 'new' South Africa came with the legacy of the inequality of apartheid in the economic, political and social arenas, and the nation-building project focuses on transforming these areas of inequality – for all of its citizens. Non-nationals are excluded from the benefits that nationals can claim, although these benefits may also be inadequate for many citizens. The inability, or unwillingness, to protect the rights of non-citizens also contradicts the new focus of South Africa and its liberal constitution (Peberdy 2009: 178). The treatment of foreigners contradicts the human rights notions embodied in the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution (Peberdy 2009: 177-8).

The narrative of South African immigration policy is filled with anthropomorphological metaphors and metaphors about the contamination of nation, about nationalism and about immigration. For example, immigrants today are seen as carriers of disease and also as potsential contaminats of the body politic of the nation by derailing the development and redistribution process and through criminal behaviour (Peberdy 2009: 178.180). So, in addition to the changes in policy, we can look to the language and imagery used to explain the way the nation and immigrants are seen. This type of language can both justify a current policy and help to secure the adoption of new policies. An argument that is often transmitted through language about immigration is that foreigners are a (perceived) threat to the national identity. The foreigners threaten the health of the South African body politic (the nation) and the state is extraordinarily vigilant in protecting this health (Peberdy 2009: 178-9). Immigrants are talked about as carriers of disease that can destroy the physical and

metaphysical South African nation; they can derail development, retard the redistributive process and increase criminality – in other words, destroy the foundation of the nation-state (Peberdy 2009: 180). It is an easy way out to blame foreigners for derailing the progress of the South African national project as long as the aims of the Constitution and thereby also of nationalism are not met.

Landau feels that the debates about xenophobia, which claim that the attacks are about an over-zealous nationalism and not a 'fear of strangers' as such are mistaken (Landau 2011:6). He (2008: 114) believes that in the aftermath of May 2008 we will see an increase of cosmopolitanism entering into the ethical basis of nationalism among the middle class and among government officials, though this is not the case for the whole population (as the attacks have shown us). Many South Africans hold on to the notion of the territorial project, where the country should preferably become an exclusively South African domain. These attacks have given xenophobia the same status as racism, homophobia and sexism, and so people may hesitate to speak in overtly nationalistic terms. Furthermore, Landau (2008:114) argues that this possible change in nationalistic attitudes can make the notion that South Africa belongs to all that live here more acceptable, despite some people's wish for stricter restrictions on who gets to live here (Landau 2008: 114). Building up a nation and nationalism is about creating cohesion and belonging, and this is done by way of contrast to something that is different – in other words, other nationalities. If nationalism were to be constructed without comparison to something different, there would be no reason to develop nationalism in the first place. Thus, in a hostile climate a strong nationalism that is still under construction can become a driving force for xenophobia.

2.2.2 Bio-cultural hypothesis

The term 'foreigner' is generally treated as if it referred to one homogenous group, though this does not explain why this anger and violence is directed mostly at black African foreigners, who become scapegoats. The bio-cultural hypothesis has an explanation for this: these foreigners are targeted because they are easy to spot (Harris 2002). In other words foreigners are targeted on the grounds of observable traits, as was the case during apartheid. For example, Morris (1998: 1125) writes that Congolese and Nigerians are targeted because they are easy to identify because of their language, physical features, their bearing, clothing and hairstyle and their

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inability to speak an African South Africa language. The police also practise this stereotyping in their work to try to establish wheter a suspect is an illegal or not (Harris 2008). These observable primordial signifiers are central in explaining xenophobic acts. But what these signifiers mean and how they acquire meaning are not explained by the hypothesis. Although these primordial traits may function as indicators which enable the perpetrators to target who is foreign and who not, they do not explain why it is mostly black Africans who are targeted. Language, accent, clothing and physical features also make Asian and white foreigners stand out as 'other' (Harris 2002).

2.2.3 Inherited culture

From the formation of South Africa in 1910 its citizens and visitors have been strictly restricted in terms of where they could live and where they were allowed to move. Although the restrictions were not as severe as many believe, it is claimed they fragmented the country's population, both socially and literally, and made people suspicious of movement across and within the borders (Landau, Polzer & Wa Kabwe-Segatti 2010: 218).

Under apartheid blacks in South Africa were turned into 'foreign natives' in their own country, as soon as they went outside of their Bantustans or 'independent homelands'. The law ensured that their presence in urban locations was only temporary. Their stay in the cities could not be longer than their usefulness there: they were there to build the city, care for gardens and pools, and nurture white children (Landau 2011: 3-5). The motivation for alienating and excluding some citizens was not only related to efficiency and health, but also to the concern that high population density and acute deprivation were factors that could resist the apartheid state's distorted and racist vision. This inheritance from the apartheid era helped form the socio-political configurations that shaped the 2008 attacks. Two features of this in particular are examined in the book *Exorcising the Demons Within* (ed. Landau 2011). Firstly, there was the view that unregulated and even regulated human mobility was a threat to the insiders' economic and physical wellbeing and to national/sub-national achievement. A former Minister of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, expressed this in 1997:

> South Africa is faced with another threat, and that is the SADC ideology of free movement of people, free trade and freedom to choose where you live or work. Free movement of persons spells disaster for our country (Landau 2011: 6)

These fears of movemnet have put the creation of any Schengen-like free movement plan like this on hold (Landau 2011:8). Secondly, individuals' geographic and cultural origins were used to determine their potential usefulness and claim to citizenship. In South Africa there is a deep suspicion of those who move around, both within popular and the official discourses. The government's restrictive and exclusionary immigration policies are intended to protect the new members of the new South Africa (Landau 2011:5).

So one can see xenophobia as a consequence of apartheid as this regime kept South Africans apart and away from contact with others. South Africans were isolated from the international world through sanctions, and were internally isolated by the apartheid regime (Harris 2002). When a group has no history of contact with other nationalities except for the counties of southern Africa, it might be difficult to be welcoming toward migrants of other nationalities coming into the country (Morris 1998: 1125). When the isolation broke down and people from other different counties came to South Africa, there could have been some inability to tolerate and incorporate the differences. In other words in the transition from isolation, xenophobic attitudes occurred as a reaction to allowing the 'other' closer (Harris 2002). The groups who longed for mobility under the apartheid system now called for restrictions to be imposed on the immigrants, a solution to the 'foreign-problem' that echoes the solutions used by the apartheid regime (Everatt 2011: 20). But to blame the xenophobic attacks on an inherited culture takes agency away from the people who committed these attacks, and therefore Hopstock and de Jager (2011) argue that while inherited culture might explain some of the xenophobia in South Africa, it is not enough to explain the frequent occurrence of such attacks. In addition this is a problematic argument in the light of South Africa's long history of migrant labour from other southern African countries like Botswana and Mozambique, and also in the light of the liberation movement's interactions with nationals of other countries whilst in exile. Zimbabweans, who come from a southern African country, are often targets of xenophobia – indicating again that isolation can be contested as a sufficient explanation.

2.3 Structural Explanations

This grouping will look at the structural aspect of society and at the socio-economic context to see how this can lead to xenophobia. It includes relative deprivation theory that explores the economic deprivation in South Africa while the theory of ethnic violence explains the makeup of ethnic violent events; group threat theory looks at how group positions play a part in intergroup hostility. Though this group does overlap with socio-cultural explanations, I have chosen to place these two explanations under 'structural explanations' because the explanations have a structural base.

2.3.1 Relative deprivation theory

Relative deprivation theory suggests that the psychological factor of relative deprivation is a key factor in explaining social unrest. The feeling of relative deprivation derives from the subjective feeling of dissatisfaction, based on the perception that one is getting less than one is entitled to. This gap between reality and aspiration means that it is likely that social unrest will develop (Harris 2002). It is because this feeling of deprivation has its origin in social-economics that it is placed in this grouping.

It is argued that the relative deprivation theory sheds light on the underlying causes of xenophobia in South Africa. It relates to the socio-economic context in which people find themselves. Poverty in the country is very high, with over 50 per cent of people living in extreme poverty. In addition, South Africa has the biggest gap between rich and poor in the world (Hopstock & de Jager 2011). The unemployment rates are very high, with an figure of 25,4 per cent in the third quarter of 2014 (Statistice South Africa 2014a). Although the true number of unemployed people is considerably higher taken into consideration that the people not registered as unemployed, though still with no job, are not taken into consideration by this number (Statistics South Africa 2014b). These economic conditions are still associated with racial categories. Poor groups, often blacks, live in townships on the edges of traditionally white residential communities, and this can be an explosive combination. These divided communities are easily inflamed (Landau 2011: 12). Places where there were outbreaks of xenophobic violence in May 2008 have also been sites of

violence and protest over other issues, such as service delivery problems (Coplan 2009: 76).

Poor black urban residents experience fierce competition over jobs, inadequate service provision in their informal settlements, and poor service delivery to their neighbourhoods. There is little effective government communication to residents on these issues and there is corruption among government officials and the police, particularly regarding the state treatment of foreigners living in these neighbourhoods (Bekker 2010: 134 and HSRC 2008). These urban residents are not getting what they expect, and this turns to frustration that "boils over" and often the most vulnerable are targeted. For example, service delivery failures are blamed on perceived competitors and on those who seem to be doing "better" than local residents, namely the foreigners (Bekker 2010: 132). Blame is thus deflected from the government that is failing to deliver the promised services. The people actually responsible for the deprivation of the poor – namely the African National Congress (ANC) government and its failure to deliver services to all the poor, the new multiracial economic elite and those who benefited from the redistributive policies – were not targeted; instead it was the foreigners who were blamed (Du Toit and Kotzé 2011: 162).

The instigators of the xenophobic attacks often come from groups that are unable to compete effectively in a modernizing economy and society, while the targets are those who are able to do this. Violence becomes a desperate act in which the perpetrators seek to compensate for their shortcomings (Du Toit & Kotzé 2011: 162). Steinberg (2008) argues that in the townships democracy in South Africa is understood to be about gaining access to largesse and resources that the state is able to distribute. They also see wealth as a measure of success, and its distribution is seen as a zero-sum game: if the wealth goes to a foreigner that means that a South African has lost the possibility to acquire this wealth. A more 'deserving' citizen has lost wealth when a foreigner gains it. Furthermore democracy is seen as a system based on patronage, thus if a foreigner prospers without any access to the state this offends that conception of the state. It also upsets the concept of what it means to be a South African living in a democracy and the entitlements that are due to citizens (Steinberg 2008: 2).

Devan Pillay (2008: 94) argues that despite the desire to share, or the existence of a redistributive discourse, in the aftermath of democratization there has arisen a system of violence against the majority of the people. The people hurt by this violence

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have in desperation lashed out against the people closest to them (foreigners) instead of at the people who are really responsible for their continued deprivation, their country's government. The rising inequality in South Africa will in his opinion breed perverse cultures of entitlement and a perception of relative deprivation, as these are the products of social instability. Pillay goes on to distinguish between illegitimate expectation and legitimate expectation. In the first category he places people who say they deserve a new sports car, because there are people who earn and spend even more money, or because there are Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) earning millions. The workers, however, earn next to nothing and they cannot afford to demand more as they must be happy to get anything at all. In this category of illegitimate expectation he also places criminals. Criminality may be chosen when socially legitimate ways of earning a living are unavailable. In a culture where corruption, greed and the glorification of consumption are flourishing, desperate people might not stop at stealing in order to survive. They also to seek to imitate richer lifestyles. In the second category, that of legitimate expectation, Pillay places demands for food, warmth, clean water, shelter and security – things that are entrenched in the Constitution and are indeed basic human rights (Pillay 2008: 97-98).

Democratization did give some blacks political power, but they are few indeed and constitute a new elite, while the majority have stayed poor and inequality keeps growing. The injustice felt by the poor is bubbling under the surface and when these people, who are on the outside of the wealth-creating sector, are not organized in unions or other social movements, violence can occur. When all this anger is not channelled into a political movement with some hope of bringing about a change, then together with a xenophobic press, for example calling immigrants aliens or illegals (Harber 2008: 162-163), and ill-advised government statements, this can lead to events such as those of May 2008 (Pillay 2008: 100-101). Relative depravation does not imply blaming poverty as a cause in itself; it implies recognising it as an underlying condition which leads to volatility when coupled with unmet expectations. These expectations and the perceived threats from foreigners when it comes to access to housing and resources do not cause people to commit violent acts, but they do lead to frustration. It is this frustration that leads to anger, and this anger is turned on "frustration scapegoats", namely foreigners (Harris 2002).

2.3.2 Theory of ethnic violence

Horowitz, a Professor at Duke University and a leading academic on ethnic conflict, has developed a theory of ethnic violence that can be used when examining xenophobia. He says that both external contextual causes in addition to immediate locality-bound causes need to be considered when looking at violent outbursts. Locality-bound causes imply local and short-term issues and therefore also imply spontaneity and the deep-seated emotions associated with outbreaks of violence (Horowitz 2001).

According to this theory violence against foreigners would emerge under very specific structural conditions. This is likely to emerge where there is little fear that the police will protect the victims; in other words police ineffectiveness or bias favours the perpetrators of violence. Furthermore, the authorities implicitly condone the actions of the perpetrators, the police do not act against them, and the perpetrators do not fear reprisals from the targets of the violence. Fluctuations in government policies also threaten the position of the instigators and these policies could push them even further down the social ladder (Du Toit and Kotzé 2011: 170).

Horowitz also explains who is likely to conduct a riot and how this will develop. Lethal ethnic riots, which is how some describe the May 2008 riots, are attacks by one ethnic group on another group. Frequently the riots are conducted by a lower-ranking group who attack a more successful higher-ranking group. A group is motivated by fear of being pushed into a dangerous position and having their social status being reduced. This fear then can lead to extreme physical harm to people whom they believe to be the cause of their (potential) decline in status. The targets are selected on the basis of the group they are perceived to belong to, on the basis of proximity, level of threat and (perceived) inability to retaliate. The aim of these attacks is to kill and to injure. Unlike genocidal violence, however, these attacks are not aimed at eliminating a particular group, but at rectifying perceived grievances regarding social status. Violence becomes an end in itself and a way of sending a message to the victims (Horowitz 2001).

These types of events usually follow a particular sequence. Firstly, there is a particular precipitant which initiates the first violent outburst. This may be perceived threats from the target group. This is followed by an unsettling event, most often in the form of low-intensity violence. Thirdly, there is a lull, and during this lull rumours are generated and spread. These rumours are not based on reality; they suggest that

the target group is a threat and in this way justify violence against this group. Fourthly, we have the extreme form of violence. This violence often takes the form of riots and it targets especially male victims, who may be murdered, mutilated or tortured etc. Mutilation of victims helps express contempt for the enemy and (for the attacker) retrieves honour. The final 'stage' of the riot is when the violence spreads to other locations and the similar events recur, often in a copycat fashion (Horowitz 2001: 71-123).

This description Horowitz gives of a riot is similar to the xenophobic events in May 2008 in South Africa. This is illustrated by a quote from an instigator after the events in 2008:

> "[G]overnment is fighting against us, employers are fighting against us and foreigners are fighting against us, that is why we fight against them because they are nearer; they don't support our struggle…" (HSRC 2008: 45).

It can be seen in this quote that this particular instigator blames the government and the employers for "fighting against" them – as well as blaming the foreigner. This goes back to Horowitz's point: he says that the violence happens for fear of receiving a reduced social status. The instigator explains that the foreigners are selected on account of their relative proximity. Furthermore, the instigators would heavily outnumber the foreigners and therefore would not fear retaliation. There is also evidence in this quote pointing to external causes, "the government" level, and to more local or immediate causes: "employers" and "foreigners", which Horowitz argues are needed for an ethnic riot to take place. Accordingly, an ethnic riot could well occur in South Africa, in accordance with Horowitz's theory.

2.3.3 Group threat theory

Group threat theory suggests that inter-group hostility is largely a reaction to perceived threats from subordinate group(s). If the dominant group finds that their position vis-à-vis the minority group is in jeopardy and feels that they might lose their advantaged social position, hostility can arise (King 2007: 1225). In this theory racial or group prejudice exists in a sense of group position and in the relationship between these groups rather than in a set of feelings which one group has towards another group. So this theory looks at the collective process of how a group defines and

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redefines another group, rather than at individual experiences with the other group (Blumer 1959: 3). If one defines oneself as belonging to a group, one must also define and assign other people to another group, otherwise there would be no reason for group definition. It would be like one hand clapping (Eriksen 2002:10).

Herbert Blumer (1959: 4), one of the key theorists here, writes that the sense of social position that emerges from the collective process of defining your own and other groups leads to prejudice. He identifies four basic types of prejudice that can be found in the dominant group. Firstly that the dominant group will have a feeling of superiority; they will feel that they are naturally better. Secondly they will feel that the subordinate group is different and alien, that they are "not of our kind" (Blumer 1959: 4). Thirdly, the dominant group will feel that they have proprietary rights to certain areas of privilege and advantage. This can include certain property rights, or rights to certain jobs, or membership of certain schools, churches etc. Lastly there is a fear and suspicion that the subordinate group threatens, or will threaten, the position of the dominant group. This is seen as an attack on their natural superiority. Blumer argues that the dominant group is not interested in the subordinate group as such, but they are interested in the position their group holds in relation to the subordinate group. He also points to the importance of this collective group feeling, which transcends the feelings of the individual members of the dominant group (Blumer 1958: 4). The prejudice will be more frequent where the fourth type of feeling, of threat, is strongest, for example where the subordinate group is relatively large and there is competition for social resources like jobs and housing (King 2007: 1225).

Although this theory was originally a theory of prejudice and discrimination, the threat hypothesis "informs a wealth of research on formal social control and criminal punishment" (King 2007: 1225-1226). There is also relevance to xenophobic events in this theory. The foreigner is seen as a member of a subordinate group that the dominant group, the locals, sees as threatening their dominant position. The feeling the dominant group has (that it is entitled to social goods and that it has a natural right to its superior position) can also be seen in the relationship between the "local group" and the "foreigner group". This is expressed in attitudes like '*They are taking our jobs'*. This theory therefore also provides an explanation for xenophobia in South Africa.

2.4 Institutional explanations

The role of the state falls under the heading of institutional explanations. In accordance with Max Weber's (1946) understanding of the state, the state holds a monopoly on violence and should offer security for its people so that democracy can flourish. Furthermore, the state has the responsibility for protecting its people's rights within the state's territory and the rights of nationals abroad (Du Toit & Kotzé 2011: 35). What a state does and signals can have a big impact on what goes on in a country. Therefore some state-centred explanations may help to explain the prevailing xenophobia.

2.4.1 Attitude and behaviour of civil servants

During the May 2008 violence the government at first denied that there was a crisis at all. Then they blamed criminal elements, opposition parties and a "third force" of pro-apartheid movements (Bekker 2010: 126). However statements from township residents during and after these events made it clear that the violence emanated from among their inhabitants (Landau 2011: 1). One particular actor the government blamed was the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), whose leaders were said to have encouraged members in workers' hostels to attack foreigners (Copland 2009: 76). Perhaps this was not without reason as Ephraim Sipho Mbatha, a leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party, justified the 2008 attacks with these xenophobic words, which also undermined the government as well:

> The government is now pampering them and taking care of them nicely. As long as the foreigners are here we will always have unemployment and poverty in South Africa. There was no poverty and unemployment in South Africa before the influx of foreigners … there is too much of them now. If the government does not do something people will see what to do to solve the problem because it means it's not the government problem it is our problem (Landau 2011: 13).

The riots in May 2008 and the way the government handled them showed the world that the government had failed to meet its legal and international obligations to refugees, which South Africa had previously committed to (Du Toit & Kotzé 2011: 171). It can be claimed that the government is culpable for the outbreak of the violence on two counts. (1) They failed in the implementation of their policies; they have been unsuccessful in uplifting the mass of the poorest in South Africa, who have

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not only had their collective self-esteem taken away, but have sunk even deeper into destitution. (2) In addition to their policy failures, the government allowed a large immigrant community to form; the legal standing of its members varied. Moreover, they have failed in their duty to protect this group, thereby conveying the notion that this group could be the target of violence without the fear of government intervention (Du Toit & Kotzé 2011: 171).

Many believed that President Jacob Zuma had promised to expel all foreigners if he became president during his election campaign, and the number of xenophobic attacks carried out in Zuma's name increased after he came to office (Coplan 2009: 77). Even the police said they did not approve asylum papers after Zuma became president, because they were 'Mbeki papers'. Foreigners were told to trade their papers in for correct ones or better still, to leave the country. However when Zuma came to power he did not expel all forigners, and rather promoted human rights and had talkes with foreign interest groups (Coplan 2009: 77).

The then Johannesburg mayor confirmed a widely held point of view when he commented in 2004: "While migrancy contributes to the rich tapestry of the cosmopolitan city, it also places a severe strain on employment levels, housing and public services" (Landau 2011: 7). This reflects on rapid urbanization and the problems that arise with this phenomenon. It also confirms the associated notion that new arrivals are going to make the situation worse, not better. Although many South African politicians are publicly tolerant and committed to regional integration, and recognize the country's humanitarian obligations, this is not reflected in their actions. Their public stand is not supported by the country's legal and administrative mechanisms, which actively discourage the movement of migrants with low or moderate skills (Landau 2011: 7). It is very hard for immigrants with temporary contracts, or no contracts, or with refugee/asylum-seeker status to regularize their stay or claim a permanent status in South Africa. As a consequence of this, most of the 1,5 million (2011) immigrants in this country stay in South Africa with few legal rights and little protection. Life for non-nationals has many parallels with life for blacks under the apartheid regime (Landau 2011: 7-8). They are vulnerable to attack and there is minimal state protection.

The way the state allows human rights violations and legal breaches to continue when it comes to immigrants has created conditions where the "proof of a criminal charge is a redundant complication- at least as far as foreign refugees are

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concerned" (Landau 2011: 9). This can be seen in statements made by government officials such as that by Defence Minister Joe Modise in 1997:

> As for crime, the army is helping the police get rid of crime and violence in the country. However, what can we do? We have one million illegal immigrants in our country who commit crimes and who are mistaken by some people for South African citizens. That is the real problem (Landau 2011: 9).

This statement reflects the way immigrants are equated with crime; in addition it is feared that they will blend into South African society. Furthermore, in 2002 the then Director-General of Home Affairs, Billy Masetlha, stated:

> Approximately 90 per cent of foreign persons who are in RSA with fraudulent documents, i.e., either citizenship or migration documents, are involved in other crimes as well… it is quicker to charge these criminals for their false documentation and then deport them than to pursue the long route in respect of the other crimes that are committed (Landau 2011:10).

These statements show that some government officials believe that outsiders can and should be alienated (Landau 2011:10). The bad reputation that government has given to mobile populations and the practical impossibility of controlling this mobility have made migration and migrants both an official and popular obsession; foreigners have been turned into convenient scapegoats for problems relating to poor service delivery, crime and other social pathologies (Landau 2011: 10-11).

According to Landau little effort was invested in building and supporting local government after the 1994 transition. In effect, political power became centralized within the national government and implicitly within the ANC, which meant that popular participation was limited (Landau 2011: 12). The poor in South Africa saw this elitist group as being unconcerned with issues such as unemployment, service provision and security, especially under the rule of President Thabo Mbeki (Landau 2011: 12). The high and rising food and fuel costs, the electricity crisis and the 'flood' of Zimbabwean immigrants all contributed to a sense of crisis in the country and to the feeling that the government was doing little to address it. This formed a perfect breeding ground for mobilizing the poor, and given the history of demonization of foreigners, it is not surprising that they became a target of mass action (Landau 2011:

12). A South African confirms this attitude in this statement after the May 2008 attacks:

> We are not trying to kill anyone but rather solving the problems of our own country. The government is not doing anything about this, so I support what the mob is doing to get rid of foreigners in our country (Landau 2011: 13).

An unemployed man outside Pretoria agreed: "…if the government is failing to stop them at the borders, we shall stop them here in Itireleng. We are not the police; we do not ask for passports, they are forged anyway" (Landau 2011: 13).

However Misago takes a different stand with regard to the local government and its officials, which he identifies as *micropolitics*. He says that throughout his research after the May 2008 xenophobia it was found that the violence was organized and led by local political players. He said they did this "as an attempt to claim or consolidate the power and the authority needed to further their political and economic interest" (Misago 2011: 105). He goes on to say that the way local politicians and leaders led their followers could either foster and trigger or prevent violence (Misago 2011: 89). Misago (2011: 100) argues that despite the violence being illegal and also destructive, there was another side to the story: Organizing the attacks on foreigners or other unwanted 'outsider' groups has been an effective strategy for "earning people's trust, gaining legitimacy and expanding a client base and the revenue associated with it" (Misago 2011: 100). In other words this suggests that that local political players, whether formally elected or not, have actively been the trigger for xenophobic violence and other types of violence.

Since these attacks the government has claimed that foreigners are safe and that "we have moved forward" (Landau 2011:1). But in spite of what the government claims, contemporary society in South Africa is ready to turn on itself (Landau 2011: 1-2). This section has shown that the government seeks to blame attacks like those in May 2008 on causes other than xenophobia: if these were xenophobic, the government would have to assume more responsibility. In fact government can also be seen as helping to create xenophobia with statements such as those cited above.

2.4.2 Gap between written policy and policy in practice

South Africa has experienced a significant influx of migrants from other African countries since 1994. Immigrants numbered just under 1.9 million in 2010 and 72 per cent of these came from other African countries (Crush & Ramachandran 2010). Most of these immigrants are undocumented; they usually end up in the Gauteng province and stay in informal urban settlements. The South African government has been slow to develop a response to this influx of migrants. The post-1994 government struggled to rewrite the racist immigration policy of the apartheid era to accord with its new role in the region (Bekker 2010: 141). In fact the Aliens Control Act No. 96 of 1991 allows officials to make random arrests based on such factors as skin colour, vaccination marks, accent or understanding of local dialects (Everatt 2011: 13). This act has been nicknamed "apartheid's last act", and is in great contrast to the rights-based focus of most post-apartheid legislation.

However acts such as the Refugee Act No. 130 of 1998 and the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 reflect this new focus. The Refugee Act No. 130 of 1998 bases its conditions for obtaining refugee status on United Nations (UN) guidelines. This act also says that no one shall be denied entry into the country if they are denied their human rights in their country of origin (Refugee Act No. 130 of 1998, Ch. 2). Furthermore, the interpretation, application and administration of this act shall follow the refugee conventions and protocols of the UN, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU[1]) and be consistent with other relevant international agreements South Africa is a party to. In addition it must follow the UN Human Rights Charter (Refugee Act No. 130 of 1998, Ch 6). The objectives of the Immigration Act No.13 of 2002 are, *inter alia*, to promote a human-rights-based culture, and to "prevent and deter xenophobia" within the Department of Home Affairs, the government, any organ of the state and on a community level (Immigration Act No. 130 of 2002, Ch 2). These two acts project the image of a country with a forward thinking and liberal policy towards immigrants. This was further emphasised when Zimbabwean projects were launched in 2010. These permits, or visas were only for Zimbabweans and served as a way of recording the many undocumented Zimbabweans in South Africa. The permits were free and could be obtained if the applicant possessed a Zimbabwean passport and a letter from his or her employer. Zimbabweans could live, study and work in South

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[1] OAU (Organisation of African Unity) was disbanded in 2002, and AU (African Union) has taken over its role.

Africa legally with this permit. Even if the application for this special dispensation visa was pending, the applicant had the right to work, study and have access to basic health care (PASSOP 2014b). This was a step which many will argue was in the 'right' direction – a step towards a rational, coherent and regionally beneficial migration management approach (Hopstock & De Jager 2011).

With the granting of Zimbabwean permits, South Africa should expect a greater number of Zimbabwean nationals crossing the border to be recorded on paper, though this might not mean there are more Zimbabweans in the country in total. This is because many more Zimbabwean migrants will opt to take the documented route than was previously the case. Almost 250 000 Zimbabweans have received this permit (Sapa 2014). Some argue that this may reduce the feeling of 'us vs. them' and thereby calm xenophobic sentiments. However this is perhaps wishful thinking, since a higher number in the records can seem like a higher number in general and this may hinder the issuing of further permits (Hopstock & de Jager 2011). These special dispensation visas were given out for a four-year period, which means they are expiring in 2014 (as this is being written), and to date the fate of this visa has not yet been decided (Sapa 2014). Perhaps this was the first and last dispensation of its kind.

Along with the Acts described above, the Constitution also guarantees basic human and legal rights to everyone living in South Africa (SA Constitution 1996: Preamble). This includes both documented and undocumented non-citizens, as they are also living in South Africa, but this is not always the case in practice. The laws governing asylum in South Africa are among the most progressive in the world, but the impact that foreigners may have on the country is nevertheless feared. To date there has been a focus on deportation, detention and the denial of these rights (Hopstock & de Jager 2011). In other words, there is a big gap between policy and practice (Bekker 2010: 141).

It is claimed that Home Affairs does not control the country's borders, and that it does not differentiate between legal and illegal arrivals, or make special provision for African immigrants (Copland 2009: 75). The undocumented arrivals have a diminished legal standing in accordance with state provisions and become easy targets for state agencies. There are frequent allegations of police brutality against foreigners as well as of degrading treatment by the Home Affairs officials (Du Toit & Kotzé 2011: 171). In Johannesburg the police call themselves "Border police", and they have made it their business to prey on African immigrants, extorting bribes from those

who have money, and detaining and deporting those who do not. There is also a lot of corruption at the actual border, where cash is substituted for passports, permits and visas (Coplan 2009: 71). Moreover, at the Office of Home Affairs South African identity documents are on sale, and any and every document is available for an unofficial charge (Coplan 2009: 71).

The stigma towards and vulnerability of foreigners in South Africa is evident in the great efforts the government makes to deport immigrants. People are detained throughout the country on the basis of their physical appearance, their inability to speak a specific language, or for fitting the 'typical' undocumented migrant profile. This leads to 'too-dark-skinned' people, undocumented people and/or people belonging to a linguistic minority who are South African being harassed and arrested as if they were foreigners, and even occasionally being deported (Landau 2011:8). South Africa deported 300 000 people in 2007, a year before the May 2008 attacks, which makes South Africa one of the world's leaders in deportation. In addition, Johannesburg police spend thousands of hours detaining, questioning and arresting foreigners, indicating a more than mild interest in immigration control (Landau 2011: 3) and suggesting that it is important to put foreigners in their place.

Landau (2011: 5-7) writes that the strong wish to divide insiders from outsiders is very evident in the practice of post-apartheid immigration control. The government has drawn up a regulation that serves as a cognitive and spatial means of distinguishing deserving citizens from outsiders who can be denied legal identities in spite of their proximity and utility and in spite of the Constitution. The post-apartheid state has used similar techniques to the apartheid regime to alienate and isolate non-nationals and keep them away from the urban centres. However in both the apartheid and the post-apartheid eras, outsiders managed to find a place in the city, mostly through fraud and dissimulation (Landau 2011: 7). Landau says there are three areas in particular where the state's legal and coercive efforts are focused to exclude immigrants: (1) legal status and documentation for refugees and migrants; (2) arrests, detention and deportation; and (3) a general lack of access to constitutional protection through the courts and the political process. Of these three areas, only detention and deportation are 'reserved' for foreign nationals, but what separates non-nationals from citizens is the degree to which the non-nationals are excluded is both bureaucratically and socially legitimate. So in addition to the material fact of being denied services or

being harassed, there is also a national discourse that justifies this treatment, and which marginalizes foreigners (Landau 2011: 7-8).

New policies are constantly being drawn up, like the policy in relation to Zimbabwean migration, and local government authorities have begun to see that migration is an issue that they cannot ignore. Although it is recognised that population movements are affecting the state's ability to deliver services and to reduce poverty levels, the knowledge and capability to address this is lacking. Although there is popular support to restrict movement into the country, this is not the appropriate way to address the issue: restricting migration is not possible and is not a solution to the issue. In fact Landau, Polzer and Wa Kabwe-Segatti write that despite the problems associated with swift urbanization, research suggests that moving from poor rural areas into the city is a quick way of promoting human development. Thus they argue that the government should look at ways to respond more effectively to mobility rather than seeking to restrict it. Although mobility is mostly criticized for its negative effects, these effects are not the only tangible outcomes, since there is proof of positive outcomes as well (Landau, Polzer & Wa Kabwe-Segatti 2010: 218-19). Furthermore, they argue that human mobility is linked to two key challenges: social cohesion and public service provision. One of the major problems in managing the issue of mobility is that it is not yet recognized across the board as something that needs management. Therefore officials need to be made aware of the importance of managing mobility and they need to overcome the fear and denial that comes with discussing migration (Landau, Polzer & Wa Kabwe-Segatti 2010: 232). Also because migration is not seen as a possible contributor to development, it is disregarded as a development strategy (Hopstock & de Jager 2011).

To neglect the topic of mobility and disregard the positive aspects of migration can lead to an excessive focus on the negative aspects of migration, thereby furthering xenophobic perceptions. Another problem related to the presence of Zimbabweans is that they are classified in South Africa as economic immigrants. This neglects the political aspect of Zimbabwean migration, despite the fact that the economic crisis in Zimbabwe is to a large extent of political origin. Classifying Zimbabweans as economic immigrants suggests that they are competing with South Africans for jobs in the country, and not that they are temporary immigrants who have fled for their lives (Hopstock & de Jager 2011). When the gap between the written policy and the actual execution of it is so great this also creates insecurity among South Africans and

foreigners about their place, rights and future, and this leaves room for xenophobia to continue.

2.4.3 State agencies: police and the detaining of foreigners

The police have a code of conduct that advises them to treat and protect all persons equally. Yet, as seen in the examples above and elsewhere, there are complaints about the police targeting foreigners for harassment, extortion and other corrupt activities. A survey conducted by Wits University found that 71 per cent of foreigners had been stopped by the police, while only 47 per cent of South Africans had been stopped. Thus there has been a high degree of foreign-profiling within the South African Police Service (SAPS), according to skin colour, language and the way of dressing (SAHRC 2006: 32). Moreover, police often refuse to recognize work permits or refugee identity cards and might even destroy them to justify an arrest. It has even been reported that foreigners who might face deportation could pay to jump off moving trains (SAHRC 2006: 32). Some of these actions might stem from seeing foreigners as "mobile ATMs" (Landau 2011: 9).

The police's 'role players' in the communities, who normally assisted the police, sided with the perpetrators during the May 2008 attacks in Cape Town. Furthermore, refugees seeking shelter with police did not go to the closest police station in the townships, but to more distant middle-class areas, as they were not confident that the local police would protect them. So civil society non-state policing agents, like traditional authorities, play a critical security role in South African society (Bekker 2010: 145). The difficulty arises when the state no longer has the capacity to make non-state policing accountable and these players endorse intolerance of outsiders and the associated violence, like that seen prior to, during and after the attacks in May 2008. Thus there is also a problem with the perceptions of local residents when it comes to the role and legitimacy of non-state police organizations (Bekker 2010: 146).

Police often use extra-legal forms of harassment and immigration to contain or prevent crime and to protect the South African social project. The city of Johannesburg and other municipalities have also used many resources to rid the city of what they perceive to be a hostile alien presence. Senior officers proudly report on their successes as a way of combating social exclusion and helping the city to realize

its potential (Landau 2011: 9). Thus the SAPS are a contributing force to xenophobia in South Africa, in addition to committing xenophobic acts themselves.

Those immigrants arrested and unable to pay for their release are often taken to the Lindela repatriation centre. This is a privately managed detention centre outside of Johannesburg. Section 35 (1) of the Bill of Rights provides for the rights of arrested, detained and accused persons: they should be informed of the reason for their being held; the conditions where one is held should be compatible with one's human dignity; and one should be able to communicate with relatives, religious counsellors and medical personnel (SAHRC 2006: 35). But in reports about the Lindela centre we see evidence yet again that immigrants are denied these legal rights. There have been reports of sexual abuse, assault, bribery, extortion, unlawful detention, poor conditions, inadequate nutrition, no medical care, interrupted sleep and overcrowded cells; people were denied the right to apply for asylum, and detainees were held for longer than was legally permitted (Landau 2011:9 and SAHRC 2006: 35). Inmates at the centre were also denied legal representation and were even forced to pay bribes to be deported (Landau 2011: 9). There were 176 prolonged detentions reported in September 2004 alone, and it is thought that this had to do with the R50 the centre gets per day per inmate from the state. Asylum seekers who have been denied asylum may be sent back to a country where their lives and freedom are at risk. There were also many deaths in the centre, often as a result of meningitis and pneumonia. It has also been reported that only people of African origin are arrested and deported as illegal aliens (SAHRC 2006: 35-36). The detainees are often kept in a state of uncertainty. About half do not receive any formal notification that they are to be deported before they arrive at Lindela, and only a few of them receive this notification after they have arrived. This leads to much confusion and insecurity. Many detainees are left with unanswered questions as to why they are there, what is going on and what the future will bring (Sutton & Vigneswaran 2011: 636). That this treatment is going on with virtually no improvement despite several reports is also a sign of the extent of xenophobia in the country. Allowing this to go on is not only xenophobic in itself, but it also strengthens xenophobic perceptions. The human rights and legal violations are known to exist, but they continue nevertheless. The centre has become a symbol of what is regarded as the 'appropriate' way to treat outsiders (Landau 2011: 9).

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2.5 The Nature of Xenophobia in South Africa

This section will cover the nature of xenophobia in South Africa. Nature of xenophobia refers to its basic features or characteristics. These are identified in South Africa as being violent behaviour and that this behaviour targets black African migrants. Xenophobia refers to the attitudes people have towards foreigners and the behaviour people direct towards foreigners. Xenophobic attitudes are those which are held against a group of people solely on the basis of this group's other nationality. Xenophobic behaviour consists of physical acts directed towards a group, again solely because members of this group belong to another nationality. This behaviour can often be violent. It is important to include actual behaviour because xenophobia often plays out in this country in a violent manner. This is what makes it such a grave problem, and this is why this thesis is being written. It is also important to keep in mind that these actions are not only carried out by members of the public. State officials have also carried out xenophobic attacks, as has been explained earlier in the chapter. Another aspect of South African xenophobia has to do with whom it usually targets. There are no incidents that I have come across where white foreigners have been targeted, and few where Asian foreigners have been targeted. The group that is targeted is mainly other black Africans as the litterature on the topic tells us since the incidents of xenophobic violence have targeted this group (Harris 2002).

When xenophobia was defined in the previous chapter it was said to reflect "the deep dislike of non-nationals by nationals of a recipient state" (SAHRC, cited in Bekker 2010: 127). The problem with this definition is that it implies that xenophobia is an attitude or a state of mind, but this phenomenon goes far beyond this in South Africa. As stated above, actions resulting from this "dislike" must also be included. That is why both xenophobic attitudes and the practices have been looked at. Harris (2002) argues that a new definition of xenophobia in South Africa should be adopted. Furthermore, she argues that this definition should not only include the practice of the xenophobic attitudes but also take into account who is being targeted, since a more open definition will include all foreigner-groups.

The freedom struggle in South Africa started out as a non-violent struggle, but in 1961 the African National Congress (ANC) changed direction and began their armed struggle. After the Sharpeville shootings in 1960, where 69 people were shot and killed by the police, and after the banning of the ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), it seemed as if the space for peaceful protest had been drastically

narrowed. This decision was not an easy one to make, given that some of the leaders of the struggle were pacifist Christians and that after the banning of their organisations it was difficult for them to remain in South Africa (Jeffery 2009: 1-3). Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the president of Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), said that he understood why the ANC had embarked on the armed struggled but argued that violence was "emotionally and intellectually alien" to black South Africans; he decided that the IFP would not join the ANC in their armed struggle (Jeffery 2009: 51). Nobel Peace Prize laureate and ANC leader Albert Luthuli came with a similar point of view:

> "[he] feared the government (apartheid government) repression was only hastening the onset of an aggressive African nationalism and that African leaders were quickly succumbing to extremism." (Couper 2010: 51)

So violence became a significant part of the freedom struggle in South Africa, though in the end freedom was not obtained through war, but through negotiations. As a result people have become used to violence, and violence has become a method of getting through to those in power.

The violence that is associated with xenophobic events is not unique to these events. South Africa has seen continuous protests throughout the country, especially when it comes to service delivery. These protests often include the blocking of major roads, the throwing of rocks, etc. and deaths have resulted from fighting the riot police (Serino 2014). Many of these protests do not even make the news, although major roads like the N1 might have been shut down. If it is mentioned it might be on the traffic news, with advice about about how to take a detour (Serino 2014). Parks Kaiyane, a local activist interviewed by Al Jazeera, said the following:

> "When people protest and burn tyres, and blood is shed, that is when you get a response. When you call a meeting and speak to them [local officials], it's like you're speaking another language. But when you burn tyres, that language is understood." (Serino 2014).

This implies that violence is perceived as being the most effective way of being heard. The local government authorities have failed to provide the participatory democracy that was promised the people, and so protests (often violent) have become the way for marginalised people to voice their grievances (Nieftagodien 2011: 112). This violence

is institutionalised through the way the police respond to protests, both by giving a violent response themselves, and through not reacting and allowing violence to continue (Harris 2001). South African society has seen violent responses throughout its history, and xenophobia has become a new form of violence in the democratic era (Harris 2001).

A violent history is not exclusive to South Africa. Most, perhaps all, African countries have violent histories, but African immigrants in South Africa have been surprised by the extent of this violence. In fact, many of the immigrants came to South Africa to get away from fighting and violence in their home countries, and do not wish to use violence as a solution to problems (Harris 2001). So to blame the violence on history is not sufficient in itself. Violence has been embraced by elements of South African society to the point that to qualify as newsworthy a certain level of violence must be met (Serino 2014). Xenophobia has been presented as a pathology because it is not a healthy feature of the new and democratic South Africa. Xenophobia is regarded as something negative and abnormal; it is not part of the healthy society. But in South Africa violence cannot be separated from normal society (Harris 2002).

Why is it that mostly black African foreigners are the primary targets of xenophobia? An easy explanation would be proximity, which is important in relative deprivation theory and in Horowitz's ethnic violence theory. In addition the group threat theory would explain that the subordinate group of foreigners must be relatively large and that there is competition for example jobs. This scenario will mostly occur in the townships where black African foreigners are situated. In other words that it is mostly in townships and lower socio-economic areas that this type of violence occurs – both xenophobic violence and the violence of service delivery protests. The foreigners that live in these areas are black Africans. It is the foreign black Africans that can most easily be reached by this violence. An additional factor may be that it is black African foreigners that live alongside the instigators and therfore they are believed to be competing with them when comes to housing, jobs, etc.

So the nature of South African society may be part of the explanation for the levels of xenophobia. The society accepts violence as a means to an end and also accepts that foreigners are a problem, and this may help to explain the violent nature of xenophobia. Perhaps this is where the work should start: one needs to give the South African people a different way of channelling their grievances.

2.6 Analysis

Do the above explanations fully explain why there is such a high level of xenophobia in South Africa, both in the terms of attitude and practice? Landau (2011: 3) argues that, no matter how invaluable they may be in documenting the events of May 2008 and the immediate reactions to these events, existing accounts more often than not reveal the authors' politics and ideological predilections, rather than explicating the causes or the significance of the events. Furthermore, many of the explanations falter when faced with empirical evidence or logical interrogation. For example, the explanations rooted in the bio-cultural hypothesis may explain how foreigners are singled out (by, for example, language, clothes, hair) but they do not account for what these differences signify and how these significations have arisen (Harris 2002). Nor does it explain why people from Swaziland and Lesotho were left alone, while South African minority groups were sometimes targeted.

I believe one can see strengths and weaknesses in all the explanations offered so far. Social identity theory along with nationalism and the state-centred explanations help to account for the way xenophobia has grown and amplified after 1994, but not why the xenophobia has been so violent in nature. Furthermore, using foreigners as scapegoats in the light of perceived relative deprivation may explain the context of the frustration, but not why it is foreigners who are picked out as scapegoats and not another group like wealthy whites. Location is perhaps a better explanatory factor. Similarly the inherited political culture can explain why South Africans find it difficult to deal with strangers since they have experienced separation from many nationalities, but it does not explain why this leads to hatred and anxiety, which again produces violent attacks. Lastly, as with the relative deprivation theory, the ethnic violence theory provides an explanation for the contextual conditions for a 'riot'. It explains the conditions which are needed for a riot to develop. We can see that these conditions have been present in South Africa before the xenophobic events took place. However Horowitz's theory does not explain what sparks the 'riot' in the first place. Therefore these explanations do help to explain xenophobia in South Africa, but do not provide a complete explanation.

Some people claim that this phenomenon is not about xenophobia as such, but that the perpetrators for example want to obtain housing – perhaps not even to live in themselves, but to rent out or sell; in other words, there may be an element of

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criminality involved, as the government claims (Coplan 2009: 75). Although this has some merit, the criminal and xenophobic arguments are not an either/or alternative; they are not mutually exclusive. There was a wish to take down the foreigner, and if there was something to be gained in the process, so much the better (Everatt 2011: 27) However to say that events like those in May 2008 were not xenophobic in nature, as Mbeki claimed, is evasive of the xenophobia in the country.

The role of the media has not been discussed, but they have supported popular perceptions with negative imagery – like 'floods' of immigrants, 'stealing' of jobs. This language makes it easy to target foreigners. Describing undocumented immigrants as 'illegal' will for example suggest that these immigrants also are criminals – since they are 'illegal'. The media has also separated South Africa from the rest of Africa, as if they are two different entities. They have pointed to South Africa as being better or more advanced than the rest of the continent; the implication may be that the reader should be aware that the presence of these foreigners might make South Africa just another African country (Harris 2002).

Although development has happened in South Africa, psychological scars remain. South Africa is still in transition and unstable (Everatt 2011: 28-33). I believe much of the explanation lies in the nature of South African society. Violence is frequently used as a tool to promote one's case, and violence is in effect indirectly endorsed by state institutions as it produces results. The above explanations suggest how attitudes have come to be what they are, and the way that people deal with their attitudes completes the story.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of some of the key explanations for xenophobia in South Africa. Since these explanations span a number of disciplines, ranging from anthropology to political science to sociology to migration studies, there is understandably some overlap in these explanations. They were divided into three broad categories. It was also noted that there is some overlap within these categories. The explanations were divided into three groups: (1) socio-cultural; (2) structural or contextual; and (3) institutional or state-centred explanations. The first group included: social identity theory, the bio-cultural hypothesis and the inherited culture. The second group consisted of relative deprivation theory, the theory of ethnic violence by Horowitz and group threat theory. The last group, state-centred

explanations, included factors such as expressed attitudes by state officials, policy formation and the role of state agencies. The different explanations could provide some explanation, but were, in my opinion, unable to provide a complete explanation. The nature of xenophobia were also emphasised to show their important role in the phenomenon.

Xenophobia is a crucial issue that urgently needs to be addressed. It targets groups in the society that are vulnerable. It makes many people insecure and leads them to live in constant fear of violence, often from the institutions that are supposed to protect them. It will be instructive to see the explanatory value of these theories about xenophobia looking into the specific case of De Doorns.

Chapter 3: Contextualisation of the Case Study: Xenophobic Attacks in De Doorns

Map 3.1: Location of De Doorns (Google Maps 2014)

3.1 Introduction

This chapter will provide an overview of events at De Doorns, the location of xenophobic attacks in November 2009. The purpose of the chapter is twofold: firstly, to provide the context in which the xenophobia took place, and secondly, to describe the course of events in November 2009 as well as to identify some of the key actors involved in responding to the attacks. It is therefore primarily a descriptive chapter.

3.2 De Doorns

3.2.1 History

De Doorns is a rural town in the Breede Valley Municipality (BVM) in the Western Cape, which is situated within the Cape Winelands District. It is located close to the N1 (a national road), 27 km north of Worcester, the major city in the area, and is 140

km from Cape Town. De Doorns lies in the beautiful Hex River valley and is surrounded by high mountains that are snow-capped in winter (Hex River Valley Tourism 2014). The first farmer to bring his livestock into the valley was Roelf Jantz Hoeting in early 1700, and this started the change towards the agricultural society that exists in the valley today. Before Hoeting's day Bushmen (or San) and wild animals inhabited the valley. Since the Bushmen hunted for their food there was no agriculture or animal farming before this time. Other cattle farmers followed Hoeting, and the first official farm names were registered on 8 December 1723. By the end of the 18th century there were six farms established in the valley. One of these farms was called De Doorns, which means 'the thorns' in English. It was the home of the De Vos family and has subsequently become a community centre for the Hex River Valley inhabitants. These six farms have today become nearly 150 subdivisions, and the value of one of these subdivisions has greatly multiplied when compared to the value of the six original farms (Hex River Valley Tourism 2014).

An economic revolution started in the valley back in 1875 when Wells Hood surveyed and built the railway through the valley at the cost of one million rand (Hex River Valley Tourism 2014). The railway was built to improve transport between Cape Town and the diamond fields in Kimberley. Seven years after the opening of the pass through the valley the first table grapes were exported to Britain (Tourism Cape Town 2014). A few years later, in 1886, the valley's red and white grapes were privately shipped to a Dr. Smuts in London. Unfortunately the type of grape the farms were growing at that time, Hanepoot, was rather fragile and did not arrive in the UK in good condition. As a solution to this problem another doctor, Dr. Perold, imported or smuggled in a Barlinka vine from his visit in Algeria. This new and tougher grape type grew well in the valley and was better suited for export to Britain and other countries (Hex River Valley Tourism 2014). This explains how this valley, centred in and around the town of De Doorns, became the successful grape farming community it is today.

3.2.2 Demographic composition

The Breede Valley Municipality is divided into 21 wards. De Doorns comprises three of these wards, wards 2, 3 and 4. Another ward (ward five) has been also listed under De Doorns in one report (BVM 2011:124) but in another report it is listed under another area (BVM 2012: 32). This fourth ward is located north of Worcester at the

entrance of Hex River Valley, but as it also includes a section of a Worcester neighbourhood it will not be counted here as part of De Doorns.

The De Doorns area comprises about 9500 hectares and is predominantly farmed for table grapes. The railway line separates the valley into a western part and an eastern part. This has become a socio-economic divide. West of the railway has traditionally been the white section of De Doorns. It is a lower density residential area in the "older" part of town. It is also on the western side that commercial development has taken place. The eastern side of the railway line accommodates those people that were previously disadvantaged by the apartheid regime. This eastern side has a high-density residential area and there is little commercial development. The only signs of development are schools, churches and small, scattered shops or market places. It is in the low-lying areas on the eastern side that most of the informal settlements are located. These settlements have been given the names of Stofland, Hassie Square and Ekuphumleni (BVM 2011: 102).

Ward 2 is located east of the railway line and this is where the three informal settlements are located (BVM 2011: 89). Ward 3 comprises De Doorns North of the N1 and covers both sides of the railway; it includes ± 75% of the residential area (BVM 2011: 102). Ward 4 is the central section of Hex River Valley and includes the town centre and adjacent farming community (BVM 2011: 113).

The three wards have a combined population of 25 723 (BVM 2011: 89-119). However the report does not mention an immigrant population or the fluctuating population of seasonal workers in the town. The age structure is similar in all the wards. 34% of the population in De Doorns is between 0 and 14 years, 36.2% is between 15 and 34 years, 26.9% is between 35 and 64 years and 3.7% is over 65 years. This means there is a rather young population (BVM 2011: 89-119). The population breakdown (based on old apartheid/racial categories) in De Doorns in 2011 varies from ward to ward, but the combined figures are as follows: 29.4% Black African; 63.9% Coloured; 0.04% Indian/Asian; and 6.5% White. The differences between the wards can be explained by the division caused by the railway: we find more black Africans in the eastern ward (Ward 2) and also in the northern ward (Ward 3); there are comparatively few black Africans in Ward 4. There are also more white people in Ward 4 than there are in Wards 2 and 3. Coloureds are the biggest group in

the valley and are concentrated in Wards 3 and 4 (69.9% and 76.8%). It is only in Ward 2 that the Black Africans outnumber Coloureds[2] (BVM 2011: 89-119).

When it comes to education the town has 17% of people with no schooling; 35.6% have some primary schooling; 11% have only primary schooling; 23.4% have secondary schooling, 9.1% have reached grade 12, and only 3.5% proceeded to higher education in 2011. The differences in levels of education between the wards are not very big (<10%)[3] (BVM 2011: 89-119). In all three wards most people fall into the category "some primary schooling". Ward 4 has a higher percentage of people with "higher education" than the two other wards. These numbers tell us that 86.9% of people in De Doorns do not even have Grade 12, which illustrates the low levels of education in the area. Furthermore, in 2007 only 67,7% of people in the Breede Valley Municipality were literate [4] (BVM 2013: 12).

3.2.3 Economy and employment

Agriculture forms the major part of the economy. Farming consists mainly of growing export-quality table grapes. This area is responsible for 90% of the total national supply. It is a big international exporter with a history dating from 1882 (BVM 2011: 102 & Tourism Cape Town 2014). Since the region has a long history of farming grapes this has become part of the inhabitants' traditional lifestyle or culture. This lifestyle has been passed on from generation to generation, and few changes have been made to the practices or to the relationship between worker and employer. The farm owners are predominantly white and the farm workers are predominantly coloured. Farms and farm work have been handed down through the generations (Robb & Davis 2009: 10). In the Breede Valley Municipality agriculture is responsible for 28.8% of employment, followed by community services with 21.9%

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[2] In Ward 2 (the eastern ward) the population is 52.6% black African, 42.8% coloured, 0% Indian/Asian and 4.4% white. In Ward 3 (the Northern ward, on both sides of the railway line) the population is 24% black African, 69.9% coloured, 0.08% Indian/Asian and 5.8% white. In Ward 4 (the western area and town centre) the population is 14.1% black African, 76.8% Coloured, 0.05% Indian/Asian and 8.9% white (BVM 2011: 89-119).

[3] In Ward 2 14.3% have no schooling, 31.4% have some primary schooling, 11.5% have primary schooling, 29.5% have secondary schooling, 10.4% have grade 12 and 2.5% have higher education. In Ward 3 22% have no schooling, 38.6% have some primary schooling, 11.5% have completed primary school, 18.8% have secondary schooling, 6% have grade 12 and 2.8% have higher education. In Ward 4 15.5% have no schooling, 36.9% have some primary schooling, 10.2% have completed primary school, 21.8% have secondary schooling, 10.2% have grade 12 and 5.1% have higher education (BVM 2011: 89-119).

[4] A literate person is here defined as someone who is14 years or older and has completed seven years of formal education (BVM 2013:12).

(BVM 2012: 41-2). It can be expected that the number for agriculture would be higher in De Doorns, given its reliance on table grape farming. The businesses in De Doorns are mainly on a small scale. The little business that does exist in town has as its customers the surrounding farming community. There are also mixed-use type developments in town to try to integrate the lower-income eastern part of town with the other more affluent parts (BVM 2011: 90).

The increase in labour demand in the Hex River Valley and the demise of apartheid led to an increase of migration into the area from 1992 onwards. These initial immigrants came from the Eastern Cape, Lesotho and the Free State; the first Zimbabweans came later, in 2002 (Robb & Davis 2009: 10-11).

According to the Integrated Development Report in 2007 of the Cape Winelands District, De Doorns is a district with one of the highest unemployment rates in the area (Robb & Davis 2009: 12[5]). It has an economically thriving, wealth-creating deciduous fruit agricultural economy, but this is in contrast to the poverty found in De Doorns. Farming is one of the lowest paid labour sectors, with a minimum wage of R6.31 an hour at the time of the xenophobic events in 2009 (PASSOP 2010, Robb & Davis 2009: 10). However the minimum wage for farming has increased to R12.41 in 2014 (SA 2014). In 2011 De Doorns had an unemployment rate of 9.4%, while 25.6% were "not economically active"[6] and 64.8 % were employed. However there are significant differences between the wards. In Ward 2 only 43.2% of the people were employed while the figure for Ward 3 was 77.9% and that for Ward 4 73.2% (BVM 2011: 89-119). This illustrates the differences that exist in the town. It was in the economically challenged Ward 2 that the xenophobic attacks started in 2009.

3.2.4 Living quarters: conditions

In the 90s there was an increase in forced evictions from the farms, which is where the workers traditionally stayed. The decreasing on-farm living quarters and the increasing migration (due to a higher demand for labour) contributed to the growth of the population in town (Robb & Davis 2009:10). De Doorns quickly developed a

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[5] This report is no longer available online.

[6] Note that 'economically active' is defined by Statistics South Africa as follows: "A person who is not working and not seeking work or not available for work is classified as not economically active. This group includes full-time students, housewives, the disabled who cannot work, retired people and others who cannot work. Again the term is only officially applied to those of working age, 15 to 65." (Statistics South Africa 2014b).

significant poor rural informal settlement. This settlement helped to meet the growing seasonal need for the farm workers. Housing is divided according to ethnicity, one of the effects of the categorization of labour and the policies of the past. However, despite the deep ethnic divisions that are evident geographically between Xhosa, Coloured and Basotho people there is no evidence of a concern for the potential for violent conflict between them (Robb & Davis 2009: 11). The public facilities available in town include a clinic, primary schools, churches, a police station, sports fields, public open spaces and a golf course (BVM 2011: 90).

In De Doorns as a whole 79.9% of households occupy formal housing, 18.9% occupy informal housing while 1% occupy traditional housing (in 2011). There are significant differences between the wards. Of the households that occupy informal dwellings, 81.6% live in Ward 2. In this poorer ward only 45.9% of people live in formal dwellings while 53.1% live in informal dwellings and 0.8% live in traditional dwellings. In Ward 3, on the other hand, nobody lives in an informal dwelling, and in Ward 4 only 2.5% live in informal dwellings (BVM 2011: 89-119).

In 2009 there was a housing backlog that (at the then current pace) would take 21 years to meet. Since this calculation does not take into account future population growth, the backlog is in reality much greater than 21 years. In 2009 there were 4000 applicants waiting for Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) housing, though only 600 units were planned for De Doorns (Robb & Davis 2009: 12). Those families that are approved for the housing are allocated a piece of land on which their house is going to be built. These families are allowed to erect a temporary dwelling on that plot of land, leaving space to build the house in front of the temporary structure. However this land belongs to the municipality, so if the land is vacated it reverts to the municipality; this means that this land can never be sold, legally. It is also stipulated that RDP housing is not to be leased out to other tenants, and that no other dwellings are to be built on the land. In 2009 there were 3400 families that were living in surrounding informal settlements, none of whom had tenure rights. This number did not include South Africans not listed for RDP housing, nor did it include the non-nationals who did not have the proper status to apply for housing (Robb & Davis 2009: 12).

More that 20% of families only have one or two rooms in their shack. These cramped living conditions become even worse during the grape season when many more have to be accommodated in the already limited space (Robb & Davis 2009:

12). In the poorer Ward 2, only 32.6% off people have access to water inside their dwelling; 22.9% have to walk more than 200m to get water at a communal tap. In the other two wards only 2.6% (Ward 3) and 2% (Ward 4) of the households must walk more than 200m to get water (BVM 2011: 89-119). When looking at energy used for lighting, in Ward 2 only 42.4% use electricity for this purpose, while 22.6% still use candles (BVM 2011: 95). Moreover the low wages and the seasonal work means that people's lives are uncertain and unsafe. The people living in these poor conditions are exclusively people who belonged to the apartheid "underclass", people that was suppressed during the apartheid rule in South Africa (Robb and Davis 2009: 12).

3.2.5 De Doorns' migrant population

The De Doorns migrant population has predominantly come from Zimbabwe. The first Zimbabweans started arriving in De Doorns in 2002. This was in response to the expanding industry and growing demand for labour. This first small group consisted of family and friends and was hired by an established farmer. They lived 'in town' next to the locals. As a consequence of the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe, South Africa became an increasingly popular refuge, being a neighbouring country and part of the South African Development Community (Robb & Davis 2009: 11).

There are several 'push' factors that explain the presence of Zimbabweans. These factors include political persecution and extreme economic hardship. Human Rights Watch (2008) reported that in 2007 83% of Zimbabweans lived below the poverty line and 80% were unemployed. This did not improve with the economic collapse in 2008 (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 46). In addition the health care institutions were failing with 50% of healthcare positions vacant. Life expectancy had dropped dramatically: for women it had fallen from 56 years in 1978 to 34 years in 2006, a drop of 22 years (Human Rights Watch 2008). 52% of the Zimbabweans in De Doorns say they were displaced by *Operation Murambatsvina*. In this operation the government of Zimbabwe conducted a demolition operation that displaced 500 000 residents in 2005. Another 'push' factor is the violence within the country (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 46). The situation in Zimbabwe was so bad that xenophobia would not necessarily discourage migration to South Africa (Robb & Davis 2009: 11).

The Zimbabweans fall within the age group 20 to 39 years. Half were married: 52% of the men and 46% of the women; in addition 8% of the women were widows.

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75% of the women and 48% of the men had children, but only 13% of these children were living with their parents in De Doorns (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 43).

Most of the Zimbabweans in De Doorns are over-qualified for the work they are doing. 74% of the migrants have an urban background, and only 4% had worked in agriculture before. Only 15% had experience with work involving some kind of physical labour (including agricultural work); while 46% were previously engaged in formal non-labour-intensive work. When it comes to education, the Zimbabweans had rather high levels of schooling. 15% had "A" levels, a university degree or diploma; 74% had "0" levels or less; only 11% had 9 years of schooling or less. The majority of the Zimbabweans in De Doorns (87%) had the status of asylum seekers; 5% had received full refugee status while 2% had work permits. This leaves 6% of the migrants undocumented – these were the only ones to be working illegally (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 42).

Although the wages at the farms in De Doorns are within minimum limits[7] the work is demanding: people work for long hours for a small amount of money. About 45% of the Zimbabweans worked for 9 hours a day or less; 26% worked for up to 12 hours a day; and 29% worked 10 or 11 hours a day. The minimum wage for a week's work was R284. Nobody said they earned less than R199 a week; 5% said they were paid R200-299 a week – which is below the minimum wage; 86% said they earned R300-399; only 9% earned more than this (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 46)

De Doorns is well known in Zimbabwe: it is described as an easy place to find a job and as a place where you do not need experience to get a job. Also since there are many Zimbabweans in De Doorns they are able to help newcomers while they look for work. De Doorns has become a headquarter for the migrating Zimbabweans. It serves both as a place to obtain jobs and also as an entry point before continuing the journey. Farmers come all the way from the Eastern Cape and Namibia to recruit workers in De Doorns (Robb & Davis 2009: 11). In 2009 13% of the Zimbabweans had been in South Africa for six months or less; 19% had been in the country for up to one year; 25% had been in the country for up to two years; and 43% had been in South Africa for between two and five years (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 46). By 2009 the number of Zimbabweans in De Doorns was estimated at 2500, though this

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[7] The minimum wage went from R69 a day to R105 a day in 2013 in the Hex River Valley (Coetzee 2013).

number would have been greater if displaced persons had been taken into consideration.

The rural town of De Doorns has become host to a large and growing number of migrants (Robb & Davis 2009: 11). In 2010, even after the xenophobic events, 11% of the Zimbabweans in De Doorns still considered this town a permanent destination. Another 10% thought they would stay another year. 53% believed they would move on in six months, as this was when the season ended. 15% were uncertain, but only 4% wished to move on immediately (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 46).

3.3 The xenophobic attacks

3.3.1 Overview of the event

The xenophobic attacks on 14 and 17 November 2009 were the biggest of their kind since the xenophobic attacks in May 2008, when 68 people were killed throughout South Africa (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 37). During these few days in De Doorns approximately 3000 foreigners (mostly Zimbabweans) were chased from their homes (PASSOP 2010). Basothos from Lesotho were also present in the township, but were not chased out because they threatened to retaliate with violence if this was attempted (Opperman 2014).

The violence occurred in the informal settlements of Stofland, Ekuphumleni and Hassie Square, which are located in the eastern ward (Ward 2). The first attacks happened at night from about 2.00 a.m. on Saturday 14 November in Ekuphumleni; these resulted in the displacement of 68 persons. The violence intensified and on Tuesday 17 November it spread to the two other informal settlements. This violence displaced about 3000 people (Misago 2009: 3). The community ordered the Zimbabweans out of the informal settlement, and fearing violence and fearing for their own safety they fled. Their houses were destroyed and their belongings were looted (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 37). The employers removed some of the migrants to their farms; others sought refuge at the police station or fled to other areas. A safe site was set up within 48 hours at a local sports field (Robb & Davis 2009: 15).

The police reportedly did little to protect the migrants or their belongings; they simply transported the Zimbabweans away from the violence and did not arrest a single looter. The police claimed they were overwhelmed, but they had not called for backup after 14 November when the 68 Zimbabweans had been displaced (Solidarity

Peace Trust 2010: 38). Also these were not the first events of this kind in De Doorns. Seven Zimbabweans had been burnt to death in their dwellings in the same area in February 2009 (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 37).

Disaster Management responded, in addition to the farming community, and helped provide for immediate needs and accommodation. Three large tents were set up, and portable toilets, washing facilities and a medical tent were provided. The Red Cross arrived within days and provided food and distributed donations. Several NGOs in addition to the Department of Social Development, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) and faith-based organizations assisted these Internally Displaced Persons (IDP). In response to this violence a Crisis Committee was organized to coordinate the different relief efforts and to start the reintegration of the displaced. Some 24 people were arrested three days after the major displacement (on 20 November) and were charged with public violence in relation to the attacks. These arrests angered the host community and this set back hopes for a 'quick fix' or a rapid reintegration of the Zimbabweans (Robb & Davis 2009: 15-16).

The host community claimed it chased the Zimbabweans out because the immigrants had allegedly agreed to work for less than the minimum wage and because they had refused to participate in strikes to obtain higher wages (PASSOP 2010: 4). PASSOP (People Against Suffering Oppression and Poverty) (2010: 4) also says that low-level politicians were behind the events in order to gain political support. They also claim that the mayor supported this political move and that it was implemented by a local councillor. The violence is also said to have been motivated by housing and service delivery frustrations (PASSOP 2010: 4). The community demanded that their service delivery concerns be immediately addressed, and were determined to keep the Zimbabweans out (Robb & Davis 2009: 16).

The Internally Displaced Persons safety site, located at the local rugby field, was opened as a result of the violence and was not closed until 17 October 2010, almost a year after the initial events. Most of the IDPs who had lived in the camp were reintegrated back into the surrounding communities (PASSOP 2010:4).

3.3.2 Actors involved in response to the xenophobic attacks

In this study I chose to conduct key informant interviews with three organizations: Agri Wes-Cape, the Hex River Valley Table Grape Association (HTA) and PASSOP.

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The first two organizations represent farmers and farmers' interests, while the third is an organization that works to improve the circumstances of immigrants. All three were involved in responding to the xenophobic attacks in De Doorns and played major roles during the xenophobic events. These organizations were selected because they are explicitly mentioned in existing reports and literature about the events and because they have on-site knowledge about what happened. All three organizations helped open the Home Affairs Satellite Office for immigrants in De Doorns, which shows that they also played a role in this town prior to the xenophobic events.

Agri Wes-Cape represents commercial farmers in the Western Cape and is also a part of Agri SA, which is a nationwide organization for farmers. It works with policy at the municipal, provincial and national levels. Before a policy regarding farming is passed it will come through the Agri Wes-Cape offices so that they can give their response to it. The organization also does a lot of lobbying work on behalf of farmers in the Western Cape (Opperman 2014). During the xenophobic events in De Doorns, Agri Wes-Cape came to their member association's (the HTA's) aid to help and support them in this conflict. In addition to supporting the HTA they had a direct link with the government departments in their efforts to try and find solutions to the problems that arose as a result of the xenophobic events. The organization's representatives were on site during meetings and negotiated with the different parties in the conflict and then went back to provincial and national government to present them with the facts regarding the conflict. Their main focus was policy issues and concerns with security around De Doorns. Donations were initiated by the local agricultural association, the HTA (Opperman 2014)

The HTA is an industry-related organization; its main aim is to improve the industry for the table grape producer. They give information both to the buyer and the producer of table grapes, such as regarding what type of grapes are produced and they inform farmers of changes in market demands. They also relay new research on the farming of table grapes, and on equipment, etc. The HTA also speaks on behalf of the farmers on certain issues, but not on labour issues. Whenever there is something in the valley that needs to be communicated to the inhabitants, the HTA is often contacted to spread this information. They also help to lobby and take cases in the valley to a higher level when necessary. During the xenophobic events in 2009 both fleeing foreigners and the farmers turned to the HTA to ask what could be done about the situation. The HTA tried to rally help for the displaced persons in the immediate

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aftermath of the displacement, and they also participated in meetings to help find a solution for the valley (Laubcher 2014).

PASSOP has a different stance from the other two organizations as they work more closely with immigrants rather than with the farmers. They are an organization that aims to unite the various working class communities. They also assist asylum seekers and immigrants with documentation and with day-to-day challenges. Though their main target group is migrants they also work with South African communities. During the xenophobic events they assisted in organizing provisions for the displaced people. They also represented the displaced as a structure elected by the displaced persons to negotiate on their behalf for a settlement with the municipality. This negotiation led to a settlement and to the closure of the camp where the displaced had lived for about 11 months. They also helped with the reintegration of the displaced persons back into De Doorns. PASSOP also had people on site during the xenophobic events and their aftermath (PASSOP 2014).

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has served to provide a contextual framework for the xenophobic attacks in De Doorns. It has given some of the town's history, discussed its composition and explained how people live their lives. Further it has made public the story of the Zimbabweans that have been residing in De Doorns: why they came there, what they do there, who they are and where they intend to go. The situation in De Doorns throws light on the xenophobic events of November 2009. Although this is a shocking story from one farming town, it is this tale that my thesis revolves around. These events should not be relegated to history and be forgotten. We must investigate the who, how and why of these events so that this tale does not repeat itself in this or in another town.

This investigation will be presented in the following chapter. It will be interesting to see what the organizations presented in this chapter have to say about the causes of the xenophobic attacks and also how the divides described in this chapter affected the events of that November.

Chapter 4: Underlying Causes and Triggers: Xenophobia in De Doorns

4.1 Introduction

On the 17th of November 2009 Zimbabweans in the informal settlements of De Doorns were ordered by local communities to leave their homes. Fearing violence they left, resulting in about 3000 Zimbabweans being displaced. In this chapter the research questions presented in Chapter 1 will be answered, namely: How can the violent xenophobic attacks in De Doorns be explained? Do the explanations for xenophobia offer sufficient explanation for the causes and nature of xenophobia in De Doorns? And, are the causes of the xenophobic attacks in 2009 still evident in De Doorns?

To answer these questions I use the information obtained from personal interviews and combine this with the findings of four reports and an article about the events. I have conducted three interviews with senior representatives in three organisations, presented in the last chapter. These were Agri Wes-Cape with the CEO Carl Opperman, the Hex River Valley Table Grape Association (HTA) with the chairman Michael Laubscher and People Against Suffering Oppression and Poverty (PASSOP) (with Respondent 1). These three organizations were chosen because they had all worked in De Doorns prior to and during the events, and they still maintain a presence in the valley. The interviews were conducted as semi-structured interviews and this enabled explanations to come through that exceeded my expectations. The reports that are combined with the personal interviews are: *The Doorns Monitoring Report: a monitor's manual for South African "internally displaced persons" safety sites* published by PASSOP (2010), *"Toil & Trouble. Fire Burn. Cauldron Bubble" Xenophobia and Civil Unrest in De Doorns, South Africa* published by the Scalabrini Center (Robb & Davis 2010), *Violence, Labour and the Displacement of Zimbabweans in De Doorns, Western Cape* published by the Forced Migration Studies Programme (FMSP) (Misago 2009) and *Desperate lives, twilight worlds: How a million Zimbabweans live without official sanction or sanctuary in South Africa* published by the Solidarity Peace Trust (2010). In addition to these four reports I have also used Philippa Kerr and Kevin Durrheim's (2013) article 'The Dilemma of Anti-Xenophobia Discourse on the Aftermath of Violence in De Doorns'. The combination

of interviews and published works gives a thorough picture of the possible explanations for the xenophobic events in De Doorns. To answer the question about the possibility of recurring xenophobia, the study leans on the interviews. This is because the reports were written in the aftermath of the violence and their focus was mainly to provide an explanation.

This chapter is divided into three parts, corresponding to the three questions it will answer. The first and main question will be divided into two parts. The first part will present the underlying causes for the xenophobia in De Doorns. The second part will focus on the specific 'triggers' for the xenophobic violence. The answer to the second question relates back to Chapter 2 and will show whether the theories described in that chapter can explain the xenophobic events in De Doorns. The answer to the third question will explore whether the underlying causes for xenophobia are still present in De Doorns, and if so whether similar or different triggers might recur. Here it will also be useful to examine the interviewed respondents' thoughts about preventing further xenophobic outbreaks in South Africa in addition to presenting my own thoughts on this matter.

4.2 How can the violent xenophobic attacks in De Doorns be explained?

In this section the first research question will be answered. The answer to the question will be divided into two parts: these examine the underlying context and conditions as well as the 'triggers'.

4.2.1 Underlying context and conditions

To understand the underlying conditions that made xenophobia possible one must know the history of the farming culture in De Doorns, seen in the *context of the society*. There is a paternalistic relationship between employer and employee. The local farm discourse has an element of mutual help and joint responsibility between the farmer and the farm workers. However this is an asymmetrical relationship where the farmer could use violence to maintain his authority. The post-apartheid era saw the introduction of more liberal agricultural policies and pro-worker legislation, but the farmers' response to this has been to employ more casualised labour and to reduce the number of permanent workers. This is because the farmers are unable, or unwilling, to give permanent workers the rights to which they are entitled. Acts like the Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 and Extension of Security of Tenure Act

(ESTA) of 1997 sought to protect the workers from being exploited by the farmers. However, the opposite has happened. The years after the ESTA saw a peak in the number of evictions from farms (Kerr & Durheim 2013: 592). It should also be noted that some farmers have battled to stay afloat after this restructuring, and that the granting of rights has made it difficult for farmers to keep on workers with these new labour rights. Currently the farmers in De Doorns will send a bakkie or lorry to collect day labourers in the townships. They will also use labour brokers to obtain the numbers of workers needed in the picking season. In this way the farmers are not responsible for the upkeep of their workers since most no longer live on their farms, but in the townships. In this way they have transferred the risk to the workers, as they no longer have to pay wages during the off-season months. This leaves the worker without benefits, housing or job security (Kerr & Durheim 2013: 591-593). The labour brokers have also paved the way for casual workers, and the employment of migrants ensures that the farmers will have enough workers during the harvest season. This has led to the growth of the informal settlements, and this creates more pressure on sanitation, and on the available living space in the township. These factors contribute to the underlying conditions that foster xenophobia.

The reason given by most of the perpetrators of the xenophobia in De Doorns was *economic competition*; it was felt that the Zimbabweans were stealing jobs from South Africans (Misago 2009, Opperman 2014, Laubscher 2014). Local people felt they were being displaced from their historic places on the farms and from the jobs they were entitled to; this applied especially to coloured workers who historically have supplied most of the labour force. Furthermore, the local workers felt that while farmers had always treated them badly and let them down, now it was worse because "they want to put other people from other countries in our place" (Kerr & Durheim 2013: 588-589). These were, however, perceptions rather than realities. One local South African said: "People are jobless here. There's no work for me, for the coloureds, but for the Zimbabweans there is work" (Kerr & Durheim 2013: 588-589). The fact is that there were enough jobs at the time of the attacks for everyone, according to the farmers and other observers (Misago 2009: 8, PASSOP 2014c, Laubscher 2014, Opperman 2014). The around 125 farms could employ about 14 000+ workers and since the locals were unable to fill all these jobs, outsiders were needed. There were more locals employed (6595), than Zimbabweans (1558) or

Basotho (from Lesotho) (630). In addition these number exclude the 5337 permanent workers, almost all of whom were South African (Misago 2009: 8).

The locals claimed that the farmers preferred the foreign workers because they were a source of cheap labour, and this would undermine their struggle for better wages (Misago 2009: 3, Rob & Davis 2010: 20, PASSOP 2010: 4). However both the Zimbabwean respondents and the farmers stated that Zimbabweans got paid the same as all the other workers; at the time the rate was R60 a day. In the report from FMSP they said that there was a suspicion that Zimbabweans might not be paid for overtime, though Agri Wes-Cape countered this by saying that everyone gets paid for the extra hours worked (Misago 2009: 9). Opperman (2014) said that the Zimbabweans were not paid less because of their sectoral determination and their production bonus system that encourages the employers to pay equal and minimum wages. Laubscher (2014) also explains the difficulty of paying workers differently; this is difficult because of the way the workers are employed on a daily basis, and are fetched by the trucks. He says that when the workers come in the trucks the farmer cannot tell who's who: it would be practically impossible for him to pay his workers differently.

Another allegation was that the Zimbabweans did not participate in the struggle for better wages and working conditions (PASSOP 2010: 4). Protest action was seen as an important aspect of community life and was symbolic of social cohesion. In De Doorns local people say that if they are conducting a strike, the Zimbabweans will still go to work. This they say was hurting their struggle and their cause: because of the Zimbabweans they were not heard by the employers (Rob & Davis 2010: 22). Some local respondents explained that they had attacked the Zimbabweans because they said they did not want to participate in a planned strike on November 17, and this would therefore prevent them from gaining what they wanted. The Zimbabwean respondents said they did not know about this strike. One informant said: "This is just another excuse because after chasing us, they (South African workers) immediately went to work; they reported for work the following day and there was no salary increase" (quoted in Misago 2009: 9-10).

A sentiment that goes hand-in-hand with the accusation that foreign workers were stealing locals' jobs is the claim that farmers preferred Zimbabwean workers. This feeling of *preference for the Zimbabweans* was also used as an argument to chase them out. The research finds that farmers experienced a difference in terms of work ethics between local South Africans and Zimbabweans (PASSOP 2014c,

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Laubscher 2014, Opperman 2014). They felt that Zimbabweans had a good work ethic. Some of the farmers described them as "quick learners", "more skilled", "honest", "reliable" and "grateful" (Rob & Davis 2010: 21). Local workers were said to lack dedication, especially during harvest season when there was a need for overtime work and for working on Saturdays (Misago 2009: 8). One farmer said that they "don't want to work" (quoted in Rob & Davis 2010: 21). Opperman (2014) said that when allegations were made against the farmers in the aftermath of the xenophobia that workers had been short paid, he went to talk to the people who claimed this. An example of an answer he had obtained was the response of one man who said: "I only work two out of the five days, but I need five days to live, so you got to give me five days". This is evidence of a lack of dedication to the work and to the employer. Furthermore, according to Opperman (2014) the paying of social grants is playing a negative role in South Africa: often the grants do not go towards their intended purpose. He also mentioned that alcohol abuse was a big problem. He claimed that if the social grant was paid out on, for example on a Tuesday, the farmer would be lucky if the workers showed up for work for the next couple of days. Other farmers also brought up the problem of alcohol within the local workforce. Local workers have throughout farming history abused alcohol, as they used to be paid in wine, bread and tobacco. The farmers' response to these vulnerabilities was to widen the labour pool rather than to tackle the problems with their existing workers. This created further alienation and widened the power differential between employer and workers, thereby creating more antogonism towards the (supposedly) preferred Zimbabweans (Rob & Davis 2010: 21).

Laubscher (2014) stated in the interview that he would prefer to use local South Africans on his farm, but if they do not arrive for work he does not have a choice. He will send his truck to the township and bring back the number of workers needed (Laubscher 2014). Laubscher also said that during the xenophobic events, in a meeting with the different parties to the conflict, it was claimed that Zimbabweans were stealing peoples' jobs. This made him very curious to find out who these people were. He suggested at the meeting that the unemployed people whose jobs had been stolen should meet up at the taxi-rank in the mornings, rather than at the place where workers were usually picked up; he would tell the farmers to pick up workers from there first. The HTA had then advised the farmers to go to the taxi-rank first, but no

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unemployed workers came. This further weakens the claim that Zimbabweans were taking local people's jobs away.

Another factor that made the South Africans feel the foreigners were preferred was the setting up of a satellite office in De Doorns by the Department of Home Affairs at the request of farmers and refugees. All three of the interviewed organisations were involved in the setting up of this satellite office (PASSOP 2014c, Laubscher 2014, Opperman 2014). The office was requested after complaints that Zimbabweans had experienced mistreatment and corruption at the Nyanga Refugee Reception Office. In addition there was a concern that the farmers taking the undocumented Zimbabweans to the office could be fined for doing so. An estimated 12 000 Zimbabweans and 5000 Basotho was quoted as the motivation for setting up this office (Rob & Davis 2010: 19). In view of these obstacles the Department of Immigration had agreed to open a satellite office in De Doorns. However the office, which was supposed to deal exclusively with farm workers, also attracted other foreigners looking to apply for refugee papers. There was a sudden influx of these people into the town and tensions rose. The office received threats of arson and violence and these led to its closure. The office may have been short-lived but it contributed to and strengthened the feeling that farmers preferred Zimbabweans. This raised the levels of frustration in the community (Rob & Davis 2010: 20, Misago 2009: 3).

The role of the *labour brokers* in the valley was also seen as an underlying cause. Laubscher (2014) brings up the issue of labour brokers when responding to the argument that Zimbabweans are cheap labour for farmers. Labour brokers, or contractors, bring in extra workers for the farmers during peak season when farmers are themselves unable to find enough people. The farmer would pay about R5 per worker recruited by contractors for every day worked (Misago 2009: 9). The farmer would then also give the money to the contractor who then would pay the workers he had supplied the farmer. Laubscher (2014) reports a situation on his own farm where one day he suddenly found he was short of 40 people after a break. He found out that they left because they had been paid less than the other workers. It was the labour broker who had paid these workers. Laubscher says he was in shock and told the workers that if they came back he would pay them directly and not go through the labour brokers. He stopped using labour brokers after this incident. Many of the

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farmers also stopped using these contractors for the same reason, that they had taken money from the workers and said that it was what the farmer paid.

Labour brokers are critical for the supply of seasonal workers in the agricultural sector. It is a lucrative business that ensures that the broker is paid for each worker everyday. There were between 60 and 80 labour brokers in the area at the time. They recruited on the basis of race and nationality: Zimbabwean, Xhosa, Coloured, and Basotho. Zimbabwean labour brokers were more successful than the others, perhaps because they were favoured by the farmers, but also because it was especially Xhosa contractors who underpaid their workers. The Xhosa community reported that they had lost income due to activities of the Zimbabwean contractors, though they admitted that they as contractors were more affected financially than the Xhosa farm workers. Though, a Xhosa labour broker will obtain work for other Xhosa people, and thus they say their loss affects their community. So in addition to the ethnic divide in the valley, the use of labour brokers made locals feel unwanted (Misago 2009: 4-5).

Another underlying cause for the xenophobia, it was argued in the reports, was *government inefficiencies*. The FMSP also states that failure of early warning and prevention mechanisms had contributed to the xenophobia (Misago 2009: 4). The local authorities confirm that they had been aware of the tension between South Africans and Zimbabwean residents and that this had become a regular occurrence. In February 2009 seven Zimbabweans had been burnt to death in their shacks in the same area. Although this was a result of an argument between a Zimbabwean and a Basotho, it created added tension (Laubscher 2014, PASSOP 2014c). Many individuals both outside and in government knew about the tensions that were building in the area; they knew of meetings where concrete plans of attack were being discussed, but no local elected or security authorities intervened to prevent these attacks. This was similar to the xenophobic violence in 2008, when the government failed to respond to early indications that a major xenophobic event was brewing (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 37). The government's stated goal to prevent recurring xenophobia, especially since the 2008 xenophobic violence in South Africa, did not result in the establishment of ground level, reliable and practical mechanisms (Misago 2009: 7).

Local authorities' lack of political and administrative power in relation to the commercial farmer was also said to be a factor that provided fertile ground for

xenophobia (Misago 2009: 4). A requirement of effective coordination by local government is that the local government institutions and officials should be recognized as legitimate and effective by *all* groups of local residents. This also applies to other levels of government. There were long-standing tensions in De Doorns which the local government was unable to resolve. It has not been seen as exercising legitimate authority over farming areas and was unable to resolve labour-related tensions. If the residents feel that they cannot trust their local authorities to solve problems, they may turn to vigilantism and mob justice. An example of this problem was the satellite Home Affairs office established on private farming land and used by farmers and labour brokers, but without the knowledge of the local authority. Also it was felt that both the national government (Home Affairs) and farmers' and refugee organisations were undermining the local authority (interview with Mayor Charles Ntsomi, cited in Misago 2009: 7). So tensions also arose from the fact that the local government was unable to exercise its authority.

As was mentioned at the beginning of this section, the problems go beyond allegations of stealing jobs, getting paid less or not supporting strikes. The housing and service delivery frustrations of the local South Africans (PASSOP 2010: 4) were also relevant. These frustrations also get directed towards newcomers: "The only people that are meant to be staying in the township are the people that need a place and it is 'not for business purposes' and not for building ten shacks and making a business out of it," says a leading role player of the Stofland Community, this person admitted to helping to organise the xenophobic violence (quoted in Rob & Davis 2010: 23). The same person stated that only a person who possesses a SA Identity Document with 13 digits was to be given a piece of land in the township. The land was for those who were chased away from the farms and had nowhere to stay. The fact that the foreigners also needed a place to stay was ignored because this did not accord with the perception that foreigners are not entitled to housing. The foreigners that live in the township are seen as taking those pieces of land away from South Africans. Blame is also given to the municipality, because the allocation of the houses was not done properly. Some locals had up to 10 shacks allocated to them; they had rented or sold these to Zimbabweans. This corruption was not being dealt with properly and this created conflict in the community (Rob & Davis 2010: 23). In other words, since local service delivery already was a source of social conflict, an influx of more people could only make things worse. When academics and politicians argue

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that migration benefits the country, they should ask, who benefits. In De Doorns the farmers benefit more than the general population, and more particularly than the people who live in the townships. De Doorns had big poverty-related problems such as poor sanitation, and this is overshadowed by the possible benefits that migrants might bring (Rob & Davis 2010: 24).

However, as in 2008, factors such as poverty, unemployment, the influx of large numbers of foreigners and poor service delivery are not adequate by themselves to explain the xenophobic violence. These underlying factors will create fertile ground, but will not trigger a xenophobic event by themselves (Kerr & Durheim 2013: 585). To focus solely on the allegations and conditions presented in this section cannot justify the attacks on the Zimbabweans (Misago 2009: 3). That is why these explanations to the situation are only the underlying conditions.

4.2.3 Triggers

What was it that triggered the xenophobic events in De Doorns? All my respondents replied that these events were *politically* triggered (PASSOP 2014c, Laubscher 2014, Opperman 2014). The two days of displacement were preceded by two public meetings, both held at night, on 13th and 14th of November. It was at these meetings that a local ANC ward councillor expressed his intention to get rid of the Zimbabweans (Kerr & Durrheim 2013: 583). Local South Africans, local councillors, the mayor and police from the Breede Valley Municipality attended the meetings, though they did nothing to prevent the planned chasing out of the Zimbabweans (Kerr & Durrheim 2013: 586). Displaced Zimbabweans said that local councillor Mpumelelo "Poyi" Lubisi (Ward 2) and the then mayor of the Breede Valley Municipality, Charles Ntsomi, where either directly involved in organising the events, or were at least tolerating or indirectly supporting the events (Misago 2009: 5-6). So the trigger was the ANC ward councillor who encouraged people at a meeting to attack the Zimbabweans the next day. However in an interview with FMSP the councillor denied that he had incited the violence (Kerr & Durheim 2013: 586).

The police also played a role in this. There was an indecisive and inconsistent response from the police, and adds to the belief that the local authority was an accomplice in these events (PASSOP 2014c). During the events of the 14 November, when 68 Zimbabweans were displaced, the police had responded swiftly with rubber bullets and arrests and were able to stop the violence. However on the 17 November,

when almost 3000 Zimbabweans were displaced, the story was different. The police did not act effectively on this occasion. The police only aided Zimbabweans to leave the township; and did not protect their right to stay there or safeguard their possessions (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 38). According to witnesses, police even aided the perpetrators, telling them to destroy the shacks, to loot and to chase the Zimbabweans out – but not to beat anyone (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 38). During the events no arrests were made, despite the presence of the police. The following Thursday (19 November) 23 people were arrested. However councillor Lubisi said that the wrong people were arrested. Though as the findings of this research shows that he was an instigator I would like to argue that he probably said this for his own political ends. According to Lubisi the police arrested people that attended the meetings and were trying to find a solution, instead of arresting the hooligans. He did not want to help the police find the guilty persons because he believed the police considered him a suspect as well. The locals staged protests and collected bail money to secure the release of those arrested. It is uncertain whether this was because they regarded them as innocent or because they felt the violence was justified (Misago 2009: 10). So all the evidence points to a local councillor, most likely Lubisi, acting as the political trigger. What motivated his actions?

In the reports an argument about the role of *labour brokers* plays an important part. The reports argue that labour brokers pressured local leaders and incited local residents to attack and chase the Zimbabweans out. This was a turf war between rival labour brokers, since many labour brokers had been laid off by the farmers. It is also puzzling that some contractors were also local political committee members. FMSP believe, though stress that they do not have conclusive evidence, that labour brokers were directly involved in fuelling the tensions and triggering the xenophobic events, because there seemed to have been competition between the labour brokers (Misago 2009: 4-5). The dishonesty among local labour brokers had led farmers to exclude them as middlemen, and this gave the Zimbabwean labour brokers more business. This provided the motivation for the xenophobia (Robb & Davis 2010: 18-19). The councillor reportedly gave in to demands by a powerful pressure group (the contractors) in order to protect his position during the upcoming local elections. This was because some ward committee members wanted to protect their jobs as contactors (Kerr & Durheim 2013: 585). The labour broker trigger is of a political nature, but in

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the interviews conducted for this research a different emphasis was placed on a different motivation.

Everything points towards the xenophobia being triggered at the night-time community meetings by political figures in the community. In the interviews *political contestation within the local ANC* emerges as the strongest trigger. The labour broker trigger was a factor, though the role of the labour brokers was not highlighted in the interviews. Opperman (2014) says that he believed there was political contestation within the local ANC: some councillors were not getting re-elected and therefore started the 'rumours' about Zimbabweans stealing jobs, and taking less pay. Laubscher (2014) also stated that the ANC leaders started this 'campaign' against the Zimbabweans. Respondent 1 from PASSOP (2014c) gives a more detailed version of this political contestation. He explains that there was a contest for popularity with regard to an upcoming internal election in the local ANC. The politicians nominated in this internal election would be the ones standing for election in the upcoming local government elections in 2011. The municipality was installing electricity in the township, but certain areas were beneath the floodplain so electricity could not be installed there because it was too dangerous. One councillor, (though Respondent 1 did not mention any name, it is most likely Lubisi (based on Misago 2009); he was up for re-election and was popular in the corner of the township that was beneath the floodplain and could not get electricity. He made a plan to displace the Zimbabweans so that the community he was popular in would be able to move to a higher piece of land were they would get electricity. By doing this he hoped to gain enough popularity to be re-elected. After figuring this out he called for a big public meeting and declared that the Zimbabweans were undermining the local labour. Respondent 1 (PASSOP 2014c) said that he had come to De Doorns on the morning of the 17th of November because he had been informed of the meeting the previous night where the councillor had said the attacks should start from his house.

Despite stakeholders like Agri Wes-Cape and United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) also pointing to the local political actors as the instigators of the xenophobia in De Doorns, there was no official response by the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs or by any other institution that is charged to oversee local government. The FMSP says that this is only suspicion and allegations: they do not have enough evidence to prove anything, but they do feel this reveals the widespread mistrust of the elected officials (Misago

2009: 5-6). The councillor's actions led to his suspension by the ANC (Kerr & Durheim 2013: 587).

Violence against foreigners was organised and led by political individuals who used popular frustration to mobilize people to commit the violence (Kerr & Durheim 2013: 585). Dislike of foreigners was used as a part of their campaign strategy to get re-elected. It was predicted that South Africa could expect more xenophobic attacks prior to the local elections in 2011 if this strategy was not abandoned (Solidarity Peace Trust 2010: 38). This led my respondents to claim that it in fact it was not xenophobia that occurred in De Doorns; the violence stemmed from the attempts of a politician to gain popular support (PASSOP 2014c, Laubscher 2014). Although it was not the underlying causes that motivated the politician to chase the Zimbabweans out, it was these underlying conditions that made people rally. I would argue that this makes the event even more xenophobic than if the Zimbabweans were really had been taking South Africans' jobs, etc. This can be argued because the "real" reason for the xenophobic violence was not what the foreigners were in fact doing but what it was *alleged* they were doing: this was enough to chase 3000 people from their homes. That suggests how easy it is to stir up xenophobia and violence. Xenophobia was thus used as a campaign strategy. So in contrast to arguments claiming other factors lead to the displacement I would argue the xenophobia was real, since a particular group was discriminated against.

4.3 Do the explanations for xenophobia offer sufficient explanation for the causes and nature of xenophobia in De Doorns?

In this section the following question is answered: Do the theories discussed (in Chapter 2) help to explain what happened in De Doorns? The aim is to interrogate the explanatory power of the theories (reviewed in Chapter 2) in an attempt to understand the De Doorns case. It was found that Horowitz's (2001) theory of ethnic violence and Misago's (2011) theory of micropolitics best explain the case of De Doorns, and they will be discussed last. However, as the other theories also have merit, they will each be examined briefly. All the social-cultural explanations could apply to the case of De Doorns. In social identity theory it is argued that a person's self-image derives from the feeling that person has for the social categories he perceives himself to belong to. Also a person will try to enhance their own self-image, and often this is at the cost of another social group (Tajfel & Turner 1979:40). One of the social groups one will find

oneself part of is one's nation. South Africans are still building their nationality as a new democracy. In De Doorns we could see that although there were ethnic divisions between Xhosa and Coloureds, both groups felt that they had more of a right to work than a foreigner, who fell outside their nation-group. The bio-cultural hypothesis says that it is the primordial markers that make the foreigner a target (Harris 2002); this can help to explain why the Zimbabweans were singled out, largely because they spoke a different language. Respondent 1 (PASSOP 2014c) told of a South African from Limpopo who was a Shangaan; the community thought this person was a Zimbabwean and therefore chased him out of the township too. This story supports this hypothesis. The inherited culture argument may not fit well with Zimbabweans in South Africa, as Zimbabwe is one of South Africa's neighbouring countries and they were closely connected during the apartheid era. However in the Hex River Valley the workers were initially only the locals, (mostly Coloured); the Zimbabweans had not resided in De Doorns for long. It might not have been Zimbabweans as being foreigners as such, but that they meant more competition for work.

In the structural explanation grouping all the three theories (especially Horowitz's theory that is discussed later) helps to explain the case of De Doorns to some extent. In the relative deprivation theory it is argued that dissatisfaction is based on the feeling that one gets less than one feels one is entitled to; social unrest will occur when there is a big gap between the two (Harris 2002). This gap existed in De Doorns at the time of the xenophobia because the locals felt they were entitled to more than they were getting. Two South African respondents said, in Kerr and Durrheim's research study (2013: 590): "They (the farmers) use the Zimbabweans against us. Zimbabwean now, it's like a remote controller." And "there is not a xenophobia because it's a negotiation". By this he implied that it is the farmers that they are unhappy with, not the Zimbabweans: it is the farmer that is not giving them what they feel entitled to, while the Zimbabweans are the scapegoats. The group threat theory deals with the relationship between groups. It argues that the dominant group does not necessarily care about the other social group; what matters is the relation between that group and their own. Perception of members of a majority group that an outside group threatens their position is positively associated with prejudice against the out-group (King 2007). Relating to the case of De Doorns this could be seen in the locals feeling that the farmers were favouring the Zimbabweans, and that this threatened their position as the dominant group.

The third and final group has to do with institutional explanations. It was found that the role of civil servants and the police was particularly relevant in this case. These institutions played a major role in triggering and enabling the xenophobic violence. In Chapter 2 it was argued that xenophobic statements by those in authority could encourage xenophobia. This was taken to another level in De Doorns, where it was the local councillor who instigated the violence in the first place. Furthermore, the police as a government agency enabled the xenophobia by not preventing it before and during the events that took place: they only escorted the Zimbabweans out of the township.

There were two theories that were found to provide a more satisfactory explanation for the xenophobia in De Doorns in November 2009. Horowitz's theory of ethnic violence suggests the need to look both at external contextual causes and at immediate locality bound causes. This is what was found in the case of De Doorns: there were both underlying causes and local triggers for the events. This theory therefore provides a better explanation than a theory that focuses on one or the other aspect. Horowitz lists a number of structural factors as preconditions for communal violence, and these were present in the case of De Doorns. These underlying causes were little fear that the police will protect the victims (this could be the result of either inefficiency or bias), that the authorities condone the actions, the perpetrators do not fear reprisals from the targets of the violence and that fluctuations in government policies threatens the position of the instigators and could push them further down the social ladder (Horowitz 2001). Most of these conditions apply in the case of De Doorns. The police were inefficient or showed bias (no back-up was called although they attended the meeting that preceded the violence). The authorities condoned the actions, as it was the local politician who instigated the violence. The Zimbabweans were known to be peaceful people and thus there was no need to fear reprisals from them (they simply left when the local mob arrived). The fluctuations in government policies can have two interpretations. Firstly we can look at the farmworkers' legislation (described above) and consider how it has enabled casualised work in the agricultural sector. Secondly we can see the situation from the local councillor's point of view: he was scared that he would lose his political position and thus his social status and power.

Misago's theory of micropolitics helps to explain the trigger in the case of De Doorns[8]. Misago argues that local political players have been active triggers for xenophobic violence. In the aftermath of the xenophobic violence in May 2008 he found that the violence had been triggered by local authorities "as an attempt to claim or consolidate the power and the authority needed to further their political and economic interests" (Misago 2011: 105). He also found that the role players who had triggered the violence saw it as an effective way of gaining peoples trust, obtaining legitimacy and expanding their clientele base (Misago 2011: 100). In the case of De Doorns a political player was an active trigger for the violence. He did so to retain his political position in the local council. His aim was to gain popularity, thereby also gaining peoples trust and getting more votes. The findings of this thesis are therefore very compatible with Misago's micropolitics theory, and with his explanations for the 2008 xenophobic attacks.

Although the theories described in Chapter 2 all explain the events in De Doorns to a greater or lesser degree, I believe that no single social theory will provide a complete explanation. As researchers of social events and behaviour we attempt to get to the bottom of what happened and provide an explanation for what happened, based on that event alone. Nonetheless we can be assisted by theories to understand what took place, but we should not accept these uncritically.

In terms of the nature of the xenophobia the theories does not provide much of an explanation. The exception is Horowitz's theory that tells that vulnerability of the targeted group is necessary for a violent riot. The Zimbabweans were vulnerable since the police did not protect them and the perpetrators did not fear retaliation from them. The other theories do not provide sufficient explanation for why the violence is targeted at black African migrants in particular.

4.4 Are the underlying causes for xenophobia still evident in De Doorns?

Five years having passed since the xenophobic attacks in De Doorns, and with local elections less than two years away, it is important to ask whether the underlying causes are still evident in De Doorns? Respondent 1 from PASSOP (2014c) says that quite a lot of housing has been provided in the area, which should help alleviate service delivery grievances. Furthermore Respondent 1 (PASSOP 2014c) says that his

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[8] Misago's (2011) theory of micropolitics is further explained under the explanation of *attitudes and behaviour of civil servants* in Chapter 2

perception is that relations between the Zimbabweans and the locals have improved a lot. For example has PASSOP held a healing ceremony in De Doorns for the Zimbabweans killed in the fire prior to the xenophobic events of November. They slaughtered a sheep and organized a party. Respondent 1 also says that it is important to remember that the displacement of the Zimbabweans was in fact a bloodless displacement. (PASSOP 2014c). The respondent goes on to explain that there has not been any violence in the valley since the events of that November, although there has been crime against foreign nationals. This could be because the foreigners are more vulnerable, are not supported by the community, and are therefore easier targets of crime (PASSOP 2014c).

Laubscher (2014) says there will always be tension between the Zimbabweans and the locals. He explains that there is tension between local coloured people in the valley: if even people with the same cultural background experience tensions, there will probably also be tension with the foreigners. However Laubscher does not think that similar xenophobic events will recur because the people that chased the Zimbabweans away did not get what they aimed for. They believed that this would remove the Zimbabweans from De Doorns and from their lives, but this did not happen; the Zimbabweans stayed on the rugby field and continued to work in the valley. After a while the same people who instigated the violence tried to put pressure on the municipality to remove the Zimbabweans from the rugby field as the community wanted to use it for its rightful purpose. Laubscher therefore believes they have learnt that this path does not lead to anything fruitful and that to resolve an issue is not going to be that easy.

Opperman (2014) on the other hand has a bleaker view. When asked if he thought an event like this could happen in De Doorns again he said it could happen anywhere in South Africa if it were to be politically driven. He explains that when migrant workers come into township and see the opportunity to start a little enterprise, this creates jealousy among South Africans. The locals wonder why the foreigner is making money when they are not. Opperman feels there is a lack of entrepreneurial enterprise and pride in their work, and this could lead to 'jealousy' that might again trigger xenophobic events. He goes on to say that at the moment there are more people in De Doorns than De Doorns can provide work for. In other words the grievances against Zimbabweans when it comes to jobs has now possibly become a real issue in the valley, whereas before these were largely perceptions.

Although a robust conclusion cannot be made based on these three interviews only, there is room to believe that many of the underlying conditions that were breeding ground for the violence may still exist in De Doorns today. These could provide an opportunity for self-serving and unscrupulous politicians or labour-brokers to trigger an event; underlying xenophobic attitudes can still be stirred and used as political tools. Although more houses have been built and relations have improved, there is still tension and the town has a larger number of people than it is able to cater for. This could provide for a new breeding ground for xenophobic violence, and this could be even worse than in 2009 since many of the Zimbabweans did not leave like the perpetrators wanted and were eventually reintegrated into the townships.

Could it happen again? The supply of electricity is no longer an issue in De Doorns, so this will not act as a trigger again (PASSOP 2014c). However with the upcoming local election in 2016 it is possible that local politicians could use xenophobia as a campaign strategy again if there is something to be gained from doing so. If there is political contestation before the local elections in 2016 we could see 'xenophobia' rising again.

This leads to the normative questions, of what should be done to hinder xenophobia in the future? Respondent 1 (PASSOP 2014c) suggests monitoring, stronger policing and early intervention. The monitoring, he says, should be conducted by civil society, by the National Intelligence Agency, by the police, by political parties, by religious organizations and even by NGOs. They all have a responsibility to ensure there is no recurrence. However, Respondent 1 (PASSOP 2014c) says if the local politicians are sympathetic to xenophobia then this makes it hard to stop. Furthermore, one needs get to the heart of the problem. In De Doorns labour grievances were not the real issue: the real issue was the political contestation between two people wanting the job of councillor and needing to gain popularity for their own ends.

 Laubscher (2014) suggests that the government should improve measures to control undocumented foreigners. Undocumented workers can give foreigners a bad reputation as *illegal* immigrants. He also talks about the special permit[9] the

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[9] This was a Zimbabwean project that gave Zimbabweans an opportunity to get a special permit. The permits were free and could be obtained if the applicant possessed a Zimbabwean passport and a letter from his or her employer. Zimbabweans could live, study and work in South Africa legally with this permit. Even if the application for this special dispensation visa was pending, the applicant had the right to work, study and have access to basic health care (PASSOP 2014b).

Zimbabweans were given. With this special permit, which was issued free of charge, Zimbabweans were able to work on the farms, while the other foreign groups (such as people from Lesotho) needed work permits, which were much harder to obtain. This also created tension and a feeling that Zimbabweans were favoured.

Opperman (2014) argues that there needs to be a balance in the area with jobs, as there are not enough jobs for the people living in the valley. He also argues for a balance in the ethical way that we should work with one another. He calls for social dialogue, and specifies that this dialogue must include leaders of the community who want to find solutions for the community rather than to create havoc.

 Some important questions remain. These include: why such events are a viable option for the people perpetrating them? Key areas for attention include the documentation that immigrants need to enable them to fit into society and feel secure. When the Department of Home Affairs is inefficient and corrupt (so that you can buy your visa, or so that you must wait indefinitely for an application) this creates instability for immigrants and uncertainty as to how a South African should view an immigrant. Furthermore, there needs to be a shift in the management of work relations. The workers must be able to gain more job security and the farmers must be able to rely on their workers, thus enhancing better and more reliable productivity. To achieve this, legislation such as the Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 and ESTA of 1997 must be revisited and tailored to suit a sector such as agriculture. These Acts, far from helping workers, made it difficult for the farmers to offer workers permanent positions. The prospect of permanency could perhaps also help the work ethic in the sector.

Another important point that I would like to make in this thesis has to do with trying to solve problems by violent means in South Africa. Respondent 1 (PASSOP 2014c) thinks that South Africa has a problem with violence. He explains that South Africa obtained its freedom through negotiations; it was not won through war. Many people were abused, tortured, beaten, killed and there has been retaliation. There is a lot of anger and frustration that still exist. There is also a big problem with mob justice. This respondent gives, as an example, the deportations before the xenophobia in 2008: the Department of Home Affairs went into the townships on immigration raids and arrested hundred of thousands of immigrants and deported them. Those immigration raids included police beating people, supported by the community

marching behind them. So the violence is not only carried out by township residents, but also by the South African Police Service.

The violent protests in De Doorns (and elsewhere) for the past decade have normalized the protest action, and violence has become a way of engaging the government's attention. The xenophobic violence, and other service delivery protests, could be seen as a battle between the townships (like the townships of De Doorns) and the state. Law and order is secured by rubber bullets, guns and night-time raids. There is a lack of mutual respect and cooperation, human rights are not observed and professional ethics are not adhered to. Under such conditions a community will be tempted to act outside the law and ignore human rights (Robb & Davis 2010: 16-18). Violence, which is a non-democratic tool, has been, is and will continue to be an accepted tool if something fundamental is not done about the situation. "Violence cannot be turned off 'like a tap'" (Jeffery 2009: 513). This I believe is the number one issue that must be dealt if xenophobic attacks are to be prevented: violence must be taken off the table as an accepted tool for expressing one's grievances.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has provided as an analysis of the causes, triggers and future prospects for xenophobic violence in De Doorns. The research questions that were posed in the first chapter have been answered through key informant interviews and an analysis of studies conducted in the aftermath of the xenophobia of 2009. The first question "How can the violent xenophobic attacks in De Doorns be explained?" was answered in two parts. The first part looked at the underlying conditions that provided fertile ground for the xenophobic events. This part looked at perceived and at times self-created economic contestation with the Zimbabweans. They were regarded as taking the jobs of locals, as accepting lesser wages and as not participating in strikes. This goes hand-in-hand with the perception that the farmers prefer Zimbabweans. Another factor was the role of the labour brokers in casualising jobs and paying the workers less. There were also the government inefficiencies. These included lack of an early-warning system, bad living conditions and insecure job situations for local workers. However the conclusion was that these conditions were insufficient to explain the eruption of violence in De Doorns that November. In the next part the triggers of the violence were identified. The main trigger was political contestation between local ANC politicians who wanted to be re-elected. It was said labour brokers had

pressured the councillor to instigate the violence because they felt their jobs were threatened. From the personal interviews it emerged there was a popularity contest among politicians who were up for election. Respondent 1 (PASSOP 2014c) spoke about an electricity issue in a corner of the township. The councillor wanted to solve this by displacing the Zimbabweans to make room for the locals. In this way he hoped to gain enough popularity to get re-elected. The clearest explanation of the xenophobic attacks is that what happened was the result of the politicization and mobilization of xenophobic attitudes with the assistance of broader underlying grievances. However, although the political competition was the trigger I argue that this was still a xenophobic event. The underlying causes were not sufficient to explain why the people of De Doorns chased the Zimbabweans out, but it was what made them rally.

The second section answered the second research question. It looked at the theories from Chapter 2 to see if they provided a sufficient explanation for the causes and nature of the xenophobia in De Doorns. It concluded that most of the theories provided only a partial explanation. It found that Horowitz's theory of ethnic violence and Misago's theory micropolitics yielded the best explanations for the events in De Doorns. It was also stated that generalization from a theory can supply a researcher with an unrealistic answer, and therefore each case must be seen in its own context. The theories, however, still remain insufficient for explaining the nature of xenophobia: why black African migrants and why violent?

The third section answered the third question posed in the introductory chapter: Are the causes for xenophobia still evident in De Doorns? In this section I found that although the problem of electricity has been resolved, the society was still poor and with an excess of people and not enough jobs. Thus if there is political contestation before the local elections in 2016 we could again see the rise of 'xenophobia', either in De Doorns or in other towns where similar conditions are present. Nevertheless, such a town must be seen in its own context. In this section some suggestions were offered on how xenophobia should be prevented in the future. These were:

- Monitoring and early intervention
- Controlling undocumented migrants
- Balance in jobs- reducing unemployment

- Mutual appreciation and respect between employee and employer and encouraging a good work ethic for both sides
- Stopping violence as a means of voicing one's grievances

I especially emphasize that the last point: stopping violence, which characterises xenophobia in South Africa, as an option is something that South Africa must address. Violence, as a means to an end is unacceptable in a democratic dispensation. After a long liberation war and after decades of violent protest, violence has become a first resort for many marginalized South Africans; this is the only way they feel that they can be heard. If this problem were to be properly addressed, this would not only prevent xenophobia, but also prevent other hate crimes and violent strikes.

Chapter 5: Conclusions

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will present the results of this Master's thesis, and present what has been accomplished. It will start off with an overview of the previous chapters, summarizing them and showing how they work as building blocks. Secondly, following the overview of the first three chapters, a summary of the findings of Chapter 4 will be presented. From there the conclusions that are drawn from this research will be set out. Then it will point out the contributions of this study and finally it will give suggestions for further research.

5.2 Thesis overview

Chapter 1 served as the introduction to the thesis. It gave the rationale for the thesis, presented the topic and the rationale for the case study; it also stated the research questions and described the research design and methodology that were to be used. The aim of the thesis was to explore the explanations for the violent xenophobia in South Africa. It presented the South African Human Rights Commission's (SAHRC) definition of xenophobia, which is "the deep dislike of non-nationals by nationals of a recipient state" (in Bekker 2010: 127). This was followed by the notion that it is important to understand that xenophobia goes beyond just an attitude towards foreigners; it also finds expression as a practice when these attitudes result in violent behaviour (Harris 2002). A background of xenophobic events that have taken place in South Africa was presented to show the severity of this phenomenon in the country.

The objective of the thesis was described: the aim was to try and find out why xenophobia happens and why it is so violent, thus violating the liberal South African constitution and its Bill of Rights. The empirical research was limited to a case study of the xenophobic events in the rural agricultural town of De Doorns in November 2009, when 3000 Zimbabweans were chased out of their homes, which were subsequently looted and destroyed. The research was guided by the following three research questions:

1) How can the violent xenophobic attacks in De Doorns be explained?
2) Do the explanations for xenophobia offer sufficient explanation for the causes and nature of xenophobia in De Doorns?

3) Are the causes for xenophobia still evident in De Doorns?

This thesis's descriptive and exploratory study is based on a single case, De Doorns, using a qualitative design. It set out to investigate the research questions by undertaking text analysis of four key reports (PASSOP 2010, Rob & Davis 2009, Misago 2009, Solidarity Peace Trust (2010)) and an article (Kerr and Durheim 2013) on the xenophobia in De Doorns and by referring to key informant interviews. Three organizations played major roles before, during and after the xenophobic events took place: these were Agri-Wes Cape, the Hex River Valley Table Grapes Association (HTA) and People against Suffering Oppression and Poverty (PASSOP).

Chapter 2 reviewed the different theories that try to explain xenophobia, with a focus on South Africa. In addition it looked at the nature of xenophobia. The theories were divided into three groupings: these were the socio-cultural, the structural and the institutional explanations. The first grouping (socio-cultural explanations) comprises three theories: social identity theory; the bio-cultural hypothesis; and the inherited culture theory. These explanations lean on social and cultural factors to explain the xenophobia occurring in South Africa. The second grouping (structural explanations) includes the relative deprivation theory, the theory of ethnic violence and the group threat theory. This grouping looks at the structural aspect of society and at the socio-economic context to see how this can create conditions conducive to xenophobia. The last grouping (institutional explanations) looks at the attitudes of and at the conduct of civil servants as well as state institutions when it comes to addressing or even creating xenophobia. The chapter also investigated explanations at a local level. It also looked at the gap between the state's policy on migration and its implementation. Lastly this grouping looks at state agencies, in other words at how the police behave and at how South Africa detains foreigners. It was pointed out that what a state does or signals can have a big impact on what goes on in a country; in this way state-centred explanations could help to explain the prevalence of xenophobia.

This chapter then looked at the nature of xenophobia. It was found that xenophobia consists of both attitudes and behaviour. Xenophobic attitudes are those that are held against a group of people solely on the basis of this group's other nationality. Xenophobic behaviour consists of physical acts directed towards a group, again solely because members of this group belong to another nationality. The chapter also points out that xenophobic behaviour has often turned violent on many occasions

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in South Africa, and this is what makes it such a grave problem. This section also addressed the fact that it is black African foreigners that are the target of xenophobic violence. This was explained by the proximity of this foreigner group to the townships, where the violence mostly occurs. It is also black African foreigners that the perpetrators feel they are in competition with: they feel that these foreigners are a threat. This chapter concluded that all of the explanations help to throw light on the xenophobia to a certain extent – and they are not mutually exclusive.

Chapter 3 was primarily descriptive. It summarised the history of De Doorns. It then looked at the composition of the town, its social economy, its service delivery, problems with employment, etc. The history explains how the town of De Doorns became the centre of the table grape exporting industry in the Hex River Valley. The valley is responsible for 90% of the total national supply of table grapes (Breede Valley Municipality (BVM) 2011: 102), and this is the major source of employment in the valley. It was revealed that the poorer ward (Ward 2) had the highest percentage of informal settlements and its residents had furthest to go for water, to mention some examples. This was also the ward where the xenophobia arose.

The chapter also presented information about the migrant population of De Doorns. It explained that the migrants were predominantly from the neighbouring country of Zimbabwe, although there was also a smaller group of Basothos from Lesotho. It was only the Zimbabweans that were targeted during the xenophobic violence. The Zimbabweans only started to arrive in the valley from 2002 (Robb & Davis 2009: 11). There were many 'push factors' to explain why the Zimbabweans decided to leave their country, such as political persecution and extreme economic hardship. This section explained that the rural town of De Doorns has become host to a large and growing number of migrants (Robb & Davis 2009: 11).

Lastly, in this chapter the xenophobic events were described. On the 15th and 17th of November in 2009 the Zimbabwean community was forcefully chased from the informal settlement; as the Zimbabweans fled, their homes where torn down, burned and destroyed. This led to 3000 people being displaced; they sought refuge either on the farms of their employers or at the shelter erected on the local rugby field, this camp was closed after 11 months (Kerr & Durrheim 2013: 583-584). This section also discussed the three organisations that were interviewed for this thesis. These were Agri-Wes Cape, which is a farmers' organisation operating at a provincial level, the

HTA, which is a local farmers' organisation in the Hex River Valley, and PASSOP which is an organisation that fights for refugees' rights in South Africa.

Chapter 4 presented and analysed the empirical research and this will be summarised in the next section.

5.3 Summary of Findings

This section will serve as a summary of the findings in Chapter 4; these are presented in relation to the research questions. *The first question* asked how the violent xenophobic attacks in De Doorns could be explained. This question was answered in twofold. Firstly there were the underlying conditions that were necessary for xenophobia to develop and erupt in November 2009. The context of the agricultural scene in South Africa has to be taken into account. This is a history of the exploitation of workers and also of the failure of legislation to improve the situation of farm workers. The farming sector has become an employer of casual workers and has been characterised by lack of job security, one of the unintended consequences of legislation relating to farm workers (see the Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA) of 1997). The underlying causes were identified as: firstly, local frustrations with and perceptions of the Zimbabweans that led to xenophobic attitudes in the South African residents of De Doorns. There was a general belief that Zimbabweans were taking jobs away from South Africans, leading to high levels of unemployment. There was also a belief that the Zimbabweans were accepting less pay from the farmers and undermining the farm workers' long struggle for higher wages. The locals felt that the Zimbabweans were preferred by the farmers. Evidence of this was the setting up of a Home Affairs satellite office to help the foreign workers obtain the necessary papers. Furthermore, the South Africans believed that the Zimbabweans would undermine their efforts to improve their work situation by breaking strikes and going to work. The second set of underlying causes was the presence of labour brokers, which encouraged the belief that Zimbabweans were accepting less money because some of the labour brokers were deducting money from their pay. Their services also encouraged the employment of casual labour. Another of the underlying causes was related to government inefficiencies, including the lack of an early-warning system and poor service delivery. These underlying conditions were, however, insufficient to explain

the *nature* of the xenophobia: why did this turn into violent behaviour targeting the Zimbabwean community?

The above-mentioned conditions help to explain why the xenophobia could progress from xenophobic attitudes to xenophobic behaviour. The eventual displacement of the 3000 Zimbabweans, was a result of specific triggers. These triggers were found through the research to be of a political character. From the reports there were also strong arguments about the labour brokers' role. Since many of the labour brokers had been laid off by the farmers, because of paying some of the workers less, they wanted to create a higher demand for workers in the valley. The reports described the way they put pressure on a local politician who was up for re-election to get the Zimbabweans to move out so that their services would be needed again; in return the politician would be re-elected. Instead, from my interviews it emerged that there was political contestation within the ANC: a local councillor was stirring the pot of xenophobia to gain popularity. Through my PASSOP (2014c) interview it emerged that the councillor had wanted the Zimbabweans out so that his section of the township could move to higher ground where electricity was installed; in this way he would gain the popularity needed for re-election. In other words local political role-players triggered the xenophobia.

The second question asked whether the theories (presented in Chapter 2) could offer sufficient explanation of the causes and nature of the xenophobia in De Doorns. The theories in Chapter 2 all offered some explanation for the xenophobic attacks in De Doorns in November 2009, but two of the theories were emphasized in Chapter 4; these were Horowitz's theory of ethnic violence and Misago's micropolitical explanation . The theory of ethnic violence explained the case more convincingly because it argues that both external contextual causes and immediate locallity-bound causes need to be considered when looking at violent outbursts (Horowitz 2001). Thus this theory takes into consideration the two-fold answer found by the research into underlying conditions and triggers. In his research of the May 2008 xenophobia, Misago argues that the violence was organized and led by local political players. He also states that this was "as an attempt to claim or consolidate the power and the authority needed to further their political and economic interests" (Misago 2011: 105). This scenario also applied to De Doorns during the xenophobic attacks. However it was stated that all cases must be viewed in their own local context, and not solely on

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the basis of a theory: otherwise one can easily find what one wishes to find, rather than uncovering the real answer.

The third question asked if the causes for xenophobia were still evident in De Doorns. There is reason to believe that many of the underlying conditions (now there is not enough jobs for everyone in the valley, casual work, the presence of a large group of migrants, poor living conditions) still exist in De Doorns; these provided a breeding ground for exploitation by self-serving and unscrupulous politicians. If the 'right' triggers are present the violence could happen again. On the other hand, the residents of the town of De Doorns saw that the Zimbabweans did not leave town: they stayed on the rugby field and continued working in De Doorns, thus chasing them did not solve the (perceived) 'problem' of the Zimbabweans. Also the electricity has now been installed in the township.

5.4 Conclusions

First one should reflect on the research design and method. Choosing a qualitative study turned out well, as this was a single case and this provided the depth and detail that made it possible to answer the research questions. Choosing a combination of text analysis and key informant interviews gave a balanced and comprehensive overview of the xenophobia in De Doorns. It was balanced in that the interviews were both from farmers' organisations and also from an organisation supporting refugees. In addition the text analysis yielded insights into both the perpetrators and the displaced Zimbabweans (something that was not possible in this research because of issues concerning security and language). Obtaining the interviews was not as difficult as had been feared: the selected organisations were forthcoming and very willing to assist with the research. The choice of the organisations was appropriate as all the respondents had good knowledge about the events and therefore were able to be of significant assistance.

The conclusions of this research closely resemble the findings described in the previous section, especially with regard to questions 1 and 2, which are of an explanatory nature. The conclusion with regard to the *first research question*, "How can the violent xenophobic attacks in De Doorns be explained?" is that underlying conditions in the Hex River Valley made it possible for a local politician to stir up xenophobic sentiments and direct local people to chasing the Zimbabweans out of the valley. He did this for personal political gain; the aim was to be re-elected in the

internal election for the local ANC. Thus xenophobic attitudes among the people of De Doorns made it possible for this political role player to act as a trigger. The conclusion regarding *question 2,* "Do the theories, as presented in chapter 2, offer sufficient explanation for the xenophobia in De Doorns?", also mirrors the findings; the theory of ethnic violence and Misago's theory of micropolitics were best able to explain the case of De Doorns. Although no single theory will be able to fully explain an event or a phenomenon, it is important conduct case studies (like this one) to explain what really took place.

     The third research question, "Are the underlying causes for xenophobia still evident in De Doorns?", is of a exploratory nature. In the findings it was explained that the underlying conditions are still evident in De Doorns. On the other hand it seems unlikely that the same violence will recur because the recollection of what happened in 2009 is still fresh, and because the Zimbabweans in fact stayed in the valley. What is interesting is that these conditions can be found in other places in South Africa, thus, given the right 'triggers', one might expect further xenophobic outbreaks. The major concern is that this could mean that migrants are particularly vulnerable at key political moments, such as at election time. The period around the upcoming local elections of 2016 could potentially become another flashpoint, should political opportunists seek to exploit migrants' vulnerability for their own political ends.

5.5 Summary of contributions

The first contribution of this thesis is that its empirical research has contributed towards validating the theoretical explanations. It has shown that there is a need not just to look for underlying causes or just for 'triggers' of xenophobic violence: To be able to paint the whole picture these events both need to be researched to arrive at a fuller explanation. A theory like Horowitz's theory of ethnic violence will give a more precise and fuller picture than, for example, the relative deprivation theory, as the latter theory looks more at underlying causes and does not take 'triggers' into consideration. However this does not mean that theories like the relative deprivation theory do not have explanatory value; rather it means that they offer a partial explanation. In general, the empirical research (the case study) has enhanced the explanatory value and relevance of the current explanations and theories.

The second contribution this thesis presents comes from its examination of the xenophobic events in De Doorns five years after they had occurred. This enabled the researcher to decide whether this could be a recurring phenomenon in the valley. It was found that there had been no recurrence of any comparable xenophobic behaviour. However it was found that such events could recur in communities with similar and/or heightened underlying causes with the 'right' triggers; this was liable to happen at election time. It shows that local role players can play a crucial role in stirring up social unrest at the time of local elections. In this case it was an internal campaign within a political party that led to the violence, rather than competition between different political parties.

The practical implication of the study is that local authorities' role in xenophobia needs to be addressed. I would argue that this applies to informal authorities (non-elected authorities) as well as to political role players. The sentiment embodied in the South African Constitution, built on human rights, is that xenophobia is wrong and thus should be stopped in its tracks. Consequently when authority figures are the triggers of these outbreaks their role and influence must be checked; elected officials are to be the representatives of the state at the local level.

5.6 Suggestions for further research

Since this research was limited to the case of De Doorns, further research could be conducted at other locations to see if the triggers found here occur elsewhere. A nation-wide study would enable its results to be generalised on a national level; such a study might make further recommendations for solving the problem of xenophobia. This research could subsequently put forward suggestions for targeted policy making and processes.

Another suggestion would be to compare the causes and triggers of the service delivery protests that are taking place throughout South Africa with similar violent nature, with the causes and explanations for the xenophobic attacks to see if there are any correlations.

In addition an international comparison could be possible. To take such research to an international level would allow the researchers to determine if similar xenophobic incidences have occurred and if so how to investigate if the causes are similar or not and to analyse policy responses.

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