My third presidency 1893-1898 - Paul Kruger

Paul Kruger
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In Chapter XI of his memoirs exiled ZAR president writes of Rhodes' machinations and the Jameson raid

CHAPTER XI

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PAUL KRUGER'S THIRD PRESIDENCY: 1893-1898

The result of the new election was:

Kruger - 7,854 votes

Joubert - 7,009

Chief Justice Kotze - 81

Joubert's party was dissatisfied with the result and entered a protest against my election. When the Volksraad met, on the 1st of May, a committee of six, consisting of three of Joubert's followers and three of mine, was appointed to hold a scrutiny. A resolution was passed, at the same time, by which I was to remain in office until the committee had given its decision, although my term of office nominally expired on the 5th of May. The majority of the committee were of opinion that the election had been legally conducted. Nevertheless the minority handed in their own report recommending a new election.

The Volksraad, on the other hand, accepted the report of the majority by 18 votes to 3, with the result that, on the 12th of May 1893, I was installed as State President for the third time. After being sworn in, I once more addressed the people, this time from the balcony of the new Government Buildings, while the public stood crowded in large numbers in the Church Square in front. I exhorted the burghers to remain unanimous, spoke a word of greeting to the women of the country and, lastly and particularly, admonished the children, with whom the future lay, to continue true to their mother tongue.[1]

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[1 This admonition was uttered especially in connection with the educational reforms which had been introduced in the previous year and which were based upon the principle that the Dutch language was to be employed as the educational medium.

The portion of Kruger's speech to which he refers, ran as follows:

"Dear children, you are the ones upon whom the State President keeps his eye, for I see our future Church and State in your hands, for when all the old people are gone, you will be the Church and State; but, if you depart from the truth and stray, then you will lose your inheritance. Stand firm by God's Word, in which your parents have brought you up. Love that Word. I shall endeavour with all my might to assist churches and schools, to let you receive a Christian education, so that you may both religiously and socially become useful members of Church and State, and I trust that the teachers and ministers will also do their best. It is a great privilege that your Government has ordered a Christian education, and you are greatly privileged in being able to enjoy a Christian education, and not you alone, for the object is to extend it so that every one may have the opportunity of receiving it and turning it to account. . . . It is also a great privilege for you that the Government and Volksraad have accepted our language as the State language.

Keep to that, keep to the language in which your forefathers, whom God led out of the wilderness, struggled and prayed to God, and which became ever dearer and dearer to them: the language in which the Bible comes to you, and in which your forefathers read the Bible, and which contains the religion of your forefathers. And, therefore, if you become indifferent to your language, you also become indifferent to your forefathers and indifferent to the Bible and indifferent to your religion ; and then you will soon stray away entirely and you will rob posterity of your Dutch Bible and of your religion, which God confirmed to your forefathers with wonders and miracles. Stand firm then, so that you shall not be trusted in vain, and keep to your language, your Bible and your religion.

It is a good thing to learn foreign languages, especially the language of your neighbors with whom you have most to do; but let any foreign language be a second language to you. Pray to God that you may stand firm on this point and not stray, so that the Lord may remain amongst you, and then posterity will honor you for your loyalty."

It was just the two points of view touched upon in this speech which President Burgers had neglected in the educational law which he had drafted in 1874, and, with the aid of his eloquence, had induced the Volksraad to pass. He was opposed to the religious convictions of the nation. He had abolished the religious basis upon which the schools were founded. And therefore his law, wherever he himself was not able to plead for it with the power of his rhetoric, remained a dead letter.

After the War of Independence, one of the first cares of the regency, at whose head Kruger stood as Vice-President, was to obtain an educational law that should satisfy the real needs and wishes of the nation.

Kruger thought he had found the man who possessed the necessary experience and who shared the convictions of the Boers in Dr. du Toit, and appointed him Superintendent of Education. He drafted a law which was passed by the Volksraad in 1882, but, although his intention was good, the execution was faulty. Du Toit was more of a politician than a schoolman, and he resigned his office in 1889.

The development of the gold-fields and the influx of emigrants at that time made such demands upon the powers and attention of the Government that it was unable to devote as much care to the schools as it would have wished. And so the post of Director of Education remained vacant for some time. After this, when a new holder of this post was looked for, the division of the people into different Church parties determined them not again to appoint an ecclesiastic. Professor Mansvelt, the Professor of Modern Languages at Stellenbosch, was therefore approached. He at first refused, but, when again called upon and after a personal interview with the President, accepted, at the end of 1891. After he had satisfied himself by a long journey of inspection as to the condition of the schools throughout the country, he drafted a new law with the assistance of a committee appointed by the Volksraad for that purpose. The law was first submitted to the people and afterwards passed unanimously by the Volksraad.

In the main points, the outlines of the law of 1882 were preserved, but in certain respects the new law was a great improvement and advance upon the old. President Kruger took part personally in all the deliberations; most of the sittings were even held in his house. He had originally entertained misgivings as to three points in particular.

The increased state grants caused him to fear lest private initiative should be relaxed and the duty incumbent upon Christian parents transferred to the state. He had seen in his own church how the heavy burdens which it owed towards the state church had strengthened its readiness to perform acts of self-sacrifice. But he was at last obliged to admit that the perception of the necessity for supplying the best possible education to the children of a people that was called upon to hold its own in the inheritance of its fathers against a great European influx was not yet sufficiently general to allow him to act in accordance with his idealistic views.

Moreover, model schools were required, and higher schools for the training of civil servants out of

the children of the country, and this necessitated financial sacrifices that could not be borne by private individuals.

And so now, as again later, the President accepted the position, without in any way surrendering his principle.

He also entertained misgivings regarding the demand of a general proof of the possession of a certain degree of qualification among the teachers, for he thought that this showed ingratitude towards the old teachers, who had given their services almost gratuitously to the land and people in bad times and who would now have to be dismissed. This objection was settled by a compromise, by which this class of teachers was allowed to continue in the "Outer " or " Boer Schools," at least if they were able to satisfy modest requirements.

The third point against which President Kruger at first raised an objection was the subsidy to the higher girls' schools. He feared that this would result in changes and revolutions in the life of the people, which had always considered that a woman's place was at home. But he gave way to his advisers, and, afterwards, it was he himself who recommended to the so-called Progressives the admission of clever girls into the State Gymnasium. And in 1894 he personally opened the State Girls' School at Pretoria with prayers and an address. The people was converted to these reforms at the same time as its President.

Determined to make education as general as possible, he was at once prepared to agree to the proposals that in districts with a mixed population, State subsidies should also be allowed, under certain conditions, to those schools in which education was not given in Dutch. A law of his own proposing was passed, with this object, on the 1st of June 1892, and a few English schools and the flourishing German school developed under his protection at Johannesburg. And when the President saw that the English population made too little use of the advantages granted them and the political Opposition established an educational commission with an educational fund of 100,000 for the maintenance of schools conducted in an anti-national spirit, despite his objection, on principle, to state schools, he gave his consent to the erection of Uitlander schools at the cost of the state, to which the mixed inhabitants of the gold-fields could send their children either gratuitously or on payment of very small fees.

The only duty prescribed to these schools was to give opportunities for instruction in the language of the country; and at the expiration of two years, there were twelve of these 'schools, with 49 teachers and 1,499 children, each of whom cost the state 20 a year. In this way the English enjoyed advantages superior to those of the whole population.

The fact, moreover, that the President would never give up his principle that the Dutch language should be maintained as the one and only educational medium merely shows that he saw, as did others, the necessity of the preservation of the national tongue for the independent development and consolidation of a nation, especially such a nation as that of the Boers, which had to hold its ground in the midst of an overwhelming foreign population.

Education made such great strides in the course of the next eight years that, at the Paris Exhibition of 1900, the commission received two grands prix: a distinction which is all the more deserved when one thinks of the many obstacles with which education in the South African Republic had to grapple, such as a scattered population, Kaffir wars, dearth of laborers, continuous droughts, the rinderpest and so on. - **Note by the Editor of the German Edition.]**

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Combined efforts on the part of the burghers were especially needed that year, as the country had been visited by heavy floods. The rivers rose higher than had been known within human memory and did enormous damage. In the year preceding the election of 1893, which placed me for the third time at the head of the state, an association had been formed at Johannesburg which exercised a most disastrous influence upon the fate of the Transvaal. This was the so-called "Transvaal National

Union," which made it its business to keep the Johannesburg population in a state of constant ferment and to manufacture complaints against the Government. Every method of agitation was put into force by these gentry for the furtherance of their intrigues. Apparently they were agitating for the franchise; but their real object was a very different one, as will be seen. That Rhodes's influence was here, too, paramount was proved by later events.

The seditious spirit which actuated the National Union stood clearly and distinctly revealed at the very first opportunity; and this came during the Kaffir War in the Blue Mountains. The Republic, at that time, had to contend against constant difficulties with the Kaffir tribes in the North. To-day it was this one, to-morrow that other, that assumed an insolent attitude towards the Government. At last, one of their chiefs, by name Malapoch, who lived in the Blue Mountains, behaved so outrageously that the Government was compelled to send a commando against him. His audacity had gone so far as to order a number of his subjects, who lived in the plains round about the Blue Mountains, to be murdered, because they had paid taxes to the Government of the Republic in accordance with their lawful obligations.

General Joubert collected the young men of Pretoria for an expedition against Malapoch. These young men of course included many subjects of foreign Powers, but all obeyed the field-cornet's summons with the greatest alacrity, with the exception of the English.

These, as "British subjects," thought themselves much too grand to fight for the despised Boers. The English clergy did all they could to stir up the minds of these young men by public addresses. At last, the field-cornet found himself compelled, in compliance with Article 5 of the Regulations of War, to arrest the recalcitrants.

These lodged a complaint with the Chief Justice, and demanded that the fieldcornet be ordered to leave them alone. The court, however, decided that they were obliged to serve, and so these fine young gentlemen were sent under a burgher escort to the commando. Meanwhile, the socalled National Union had not been idle, but made every possible attempt to harass the Government.

The insolence of these people would be incomprehensible, if it had not afterwards appeared who were behind them. The British Government took official notice of the occurrence and sent Sir Henry Loch to Pretoria to discuss the question with the Government of the Republic.

In the meantime, the Volksraad had passed a resolution by which any person not yet. enjoying full burgher rights might be released from military service on the payment of a certain sum of money.

Shortly afterwards, Sir Henry Loch came to Pretoria. On his arrival, the English behaved in the most disorderly fashion and, as soon as the Governor and I were seated in the carriage, the Jingoes took out the horses and drew us to the Transvaal Hotel, singing the usual English satirical ditties as they did so. One of the ring-leaders jumped on the box waving a great Union Jack. On arriving in front of the Transvaal Hotel, they stopped the carriage and read an address to Sir Henry Loch.

A number of Transvaal burghers, seeing what was going on, drew the carriage, in which I had remained seated alone, to the Government Buildings. I need not say that this incident made a very bad impression on the minds of the burghers and added new fuel to the already existing dislike of the English. The Volksraad was sitting at the time and passed a resolution asking the Government for an explanation why no measures were taken to prevent an exhibition so offensive to the people of the Republic. Soon after, a number of burghers assembled in the town, having come up determined to prevent a repetition of these insults.

Meantime, the so-called National Union continued their work. They invited Sir Henry Loch to visit Johannesburg; for they were fully aware that it would be much easier to provoke a riot there than at Pretoria. What they were working for was intervention from England. I was fully alive to the difficulties which must of necessity arise from Sir Henry Loch's visit to Johannesburg, and advised him most earnestly not to go. I even went so far as to say to him, in private conversation, that the responsibility, should he accept the invitation, must rest entirely with him.

He thereupon abandoned his proposed visit to Johannesburg. His whole public attitude was, in fact, perfectly correct. But how did he act in secret? When the National Union discovered that the visit to Johannesburg was not to take place, they sent some of their members, including Tudhope and Leonard, to Pretoria, with an address to Sir Henry Loch. The address contained the most insulting accusations against the Government and the Volksraad. But this caused no surprise to those who knew its source.

In public, Sir Henry Loch advised the deputation to carry their complaints quietly before the Volksraad. In secret, he asked them how many rifles and , / how much ammunition they had at Johannesburg, and how long they could hold out against the Government, until he was able to come to their assistance with English troops from outside.

How typically English was this conduct on the part of a high-placed British official! It is characteristic of the entire English policy in South Africa.

Lies, treachery, intrigues and secret instigations against the Government of the Republic: these have always been distinguishing marks of English politics, which found their final goal in this present cruel war. If, encouraged by the question, which amounted almost to a suggestion, the Johannesburgers did not rise there and then, this is owing only to the fact that they were without rifles and ammunition. But it is not difficult to trace the consequences of this advice in the events which, soon afterwards, ensued.

I have been obliged to anticipate, in order to give a connected picture of the nature and aims of the National Union; but events of great importance in foreign politics had taken place in the meantime. In 1893, the second Swaziland Convention was concluded. In this connection, a conference was held at Colesberg between the High Commissioner and myself: it led to no result, but was followed by a second conference at Pretoria. Here came Sir Henry Loch, with his wife, his two daughters and a numerous staff, and was given a brilliant reception.

Judging by the festivities held in Sir Henry's honor, an uninitiated observer would have thought that a solemn welcome was being offered to a true friend and ally of the Republic. The arrangement which was soon made was not of a nature to give rise to much rejoicing; but it was the best we could obtain.

The chief points were:

The Republic received the right to conclude a treaty with the Queen of the Swazis by which the suzerainty and right of administration passed to the Republic, while the internal affairs of the Kaffirs were left to the Queen and her council, so that Swaziland could not be considered to form a part of the Republic.

All the white male inhabitants of the country were to obtain full burgher rights in the Republic, provided that they applied for them within six months.

The Dutch and English languages were to enjoy equal rights in the law-courts.

The South African Republic confirmed her renunciation, already conceded in the first Swaziland Convention, of her claims on certain districts in the north and north-west of the country.

This arrangement was not to become valid until the Swazi queen and her council gave their consent.

A strong opposition now sprang up among the Swazis against our taking possession of their country, as we were to do in accordance with the convention. This opposition was provoked and strengthened by all sorts of English Jingoes and adventurers, including a certain Hulett, who had come from Natal. The latter persuaded the Swazis to send a deputation to England, to protest against the transfer of their country into the hands of the Republic.

The deputation achieved no result. Since, however, nothing but feuds and quarrels arose in Swaziland and since, under existing conditions, it was impossible for the South African Republic to suppress them, an unbearable situation arose and a new meeting accordingly took place between Sir

Henry Loch and myself at Volksrust, in 1894, at which a new, or third, Swaziland Convention was concluded, giving the Republic the right to take over Swaziland, without, however, making it an integral portion of this country. But for this restriction, Swaziland now practically formed part of the Republic. This convention was accepted by the Volksraad in an extraordinary session, in 1895, and thus this troublesome matter was settled.

We had hardly time to breathe after these difficulties about the native territories, when England suddenly annexed Sambaanland and Umbigesaland.

The Republic had long had treaties of friendship with both these countries and, during the time of the Swaziland negotiations, it had always been taken for granted that the Republic would later, as soon as the Swaziland question was settled, put forward her claims over the two countries and treat with England for their annexation. Nevertheless, as soon as the Volksraad had ratified the Swaziland Convention, in 1895, England suddenly annexed the territories in question, although she had no more claim upon them than upon the moon.

The object of this proceeding can only have been to vex and harass the Republic; for, by acting as she did, England cut off the Transvaal's last outlet to the sea, an outlet which England did not require. It goes without saying that the Republic protested against the annexation; but England did not trouble herself about that.

In 1895, one of my fondest wishes was at last effected. The railway to Delagoa Bay was solemnly opened at Pretoria. After many difficulties, the line had at last been completed, thanks to the industry of the Netherlands South African Railway Company.

All the governments of South Africa were represented at the inauguration, and the Volksraad voted 20,000 to enable the burghers who cared to avail themselves of this privilege to travel to Delagoa Bay and inspect the whole work. Thousands of burghers were thus enabled to become acquainted with the new enterprise and to appreciate its value.

This railway changed the whole internal situation in the Transvaal. Until that time, the Cape Railway had enjoyed a monopoly, so to speak, of the Johannesburg traffic. This was now altered. In order to facilitate friendly competition and to secure an adequate proportion of the profits on the railway traffic to the largest city in the Republic, the Government proposed that the profits on the joint goods and passenger traffic should be divided in equal shares between the three States whose railway-lines ran to Pretoria. These three were Cape Colony, Natal, and the Transvaal. Cecil Rhodes, who was then for the second time Premier of Cape Colony, and his advisers thought differently. They asked for 50 per cent, for Cape Colony, leaving the remaining 50 per cent, to be divided between Natal and the Transvaal.

The Government of the Republic would not hear of this proposal, and a tariff war ensued.

The Cape Government lowered their tariff as far as Vereeniging, the frontier station between the Orange Free State and the Transvaal (the Free State railways were at that time still under the control of the Cape Government). The South African Railway, on the other hand, raised its tariff on its own portion of the line, running from Vereeniging to Johannesburg, in order to neutralize the reduction in prices on the other portion. The Cape Government now thought out a new plan. In order to avoid sending their goods over the expensive stretch of line, they had them unloaded at Viljoensdrift, in order to convey them thence to Johannesburg in oxwagons.

Now the customs laws of the Republic contained a clause by virtue of which the President was enabled to proclaim certain places on the frontiers as "import ports"; while no goods could be imported except at places thus proclaimed. When, therefore, the Cape Government caused their goods to be carried in ox-wagons, the Government of the Republic (whose interests coincided with those of the Netherlands South African Railway Company, as they had guaranteed the latter 's profits) determined to close the existing "import ports," really fords, or "drifts," to goods from over the seas. The Government proclamation was directed only against goods from over the seas, so as

not to injure the home trade of the Orange Free State and Cape Colony.

What did Rhodes and his Government now do? They asserted that the London Convention had been violated. This Convention contained a clause according to which no article coming from any portion of the British Empire could be excluded, unless the importation of that same article from any other country was also forbidden. The Republic, therefore, had violated the Convention, inasmuch as she had favored Cape Colony, a British possession, and the Orange Free State, her sister state, above the countries over the seas.

She must now either withdraw her decision, or else resort to the odious measure of forbidding the entire importation. Rhodes addressed his complaint to the British Government. A general election had recently taken place in England, and the same Government was in power that held office at the time of the late war. Mr. Chamberlain was a member of this Government and was, of course, at once prepared to send the Republic an ultimatum.

He stipulated, however, that, if the ultimatum led to a war, Cape Colony should bear half the cost, raise a force of auxiliaries and lend her railway for the free carriage of troops. To the shame be it spoken of the Afrikanders who had seats in the Ministry, they agreed to this suggestion forthwith. The Republic received her ultimatum and was, of course, obliged to give way and to undertake not to close the drifts again.

The most striking event during my third presidency was Dr. Jameson's filibustering expedition, an enterprise of which the responsibility does not rest with Dr. Jameson. It is true that Mr. Chamberlain, at the time of the raid, declared that he knew nothing of the whole conspiracy. Later, however, it was shown that the British Government, or at least the Colonial Secretary, was fully informed of Cecil Rhodes's plans and intrigues, which resulted in Jameson's disgraceful raid.

Rhodes had long entertained the project of making himself master of the Republic in one way or another; and he devoted his money, his influence and his position as Premier of Cape Colony to this object. The National Union, of which I have already spoken, was employed by him to keep men's minds at Johannesburg in a constant state of ferment, and it soon became his chief tool in the conspiracy against the existence of the country.

Through his instrumentality, arms and ammunition were secretly smuggled into Johannesburg and concealed in the Simmer-and-Jack Mine, in which he was the largest shareholder. Rhodes was aware that Johannesburg alone was not able to start a revolution with any chance of success. He had therefore to try to obtain a place of his own, on the frontiers of the Republic, where he could collect troops in support of a rising.

With this object, with the aid of his factotum, Dr. Rutherfoord Harris, and a lady journalist called Flora Shaw, he opened negotiations with the British Government in order to extend the territory of the Chartered Company, so as to include the necessary strategic positions.' The telegrams exchanged between the above-named persons during the negotiations with the British Government show that Mr. Chamberlain knew all about the matter.

One of Miss Shaw's telegrams to Rhodes ended with the words :

Chamberlain sound in case of interference European Powers, but have special reasons to believe wishes you must do it immediately.

Add to this the following telegram from Rhodes to Miss Flora Shaw: Inform Chamberlain that I shall get through all right, if he supports me, but he must not send cables like he sent to the High Commissioner in South Africa. To-day the crux is I shall win and South Africa will belong to England.

And again:

Unless you can make Chamberlain instruct the High Commissioner to proceed at once to Johannesburg, the whole potion is lost. High Commissioner would receive splendid reception and

still turn position to England's advantage, but must be instructed by cable immediately. The instructions must be specific, as he is weak and will take no responsibility.

It must be remembered, moreover, that the British Government laid only a portion of the telegrams before the so-called Select Parliamentary Committee on British South African Affairs, and probably kept back those which were most compromising.

Why should this be done when an inquiry is instituted to discover the truth? Is it not the natural conclusion that Chamberlain was equally guilty with Rhodes? However, no one can seriously deny that the above-mentioned published telegrams clearly prove Mr. Chamberlain's complicity in the plot.

As soon as Rhodes was sure of obtaining the desired strip of land from the British Government, he at once began to take measures to collect the troops of the South African Police at that point and to equip them with horses and materials of war so that they might be ready to invade the Republic as soon as things at Johannesburg were ripe for the attack.

Meanwhile, he had entered into correspondence with the leaders of the National Union and sent his brother, Colonel Rhodes, to Johannesburg to work in his interest and represent him. Colonel Rhodes had his unlimited authority to spend as much money as he considered necessary^ Mr. Lionel Phillips, one of the conspirators, had gone to Cape Town, presumably to discuss the details with Rhodes in person.

He returned suddenly, on the pretext of opening the new buildings of the Chamber of Mines, of which he was chairman. The buildings, however, were not even finished, and the opening was only an excuse to give Mr. Phillips the opportunity of making a political speech.

It took place at the end of November, and Phillips delivered a speech full of violent attacks upon the Government. /jSome time earlier, one or two members of the National Union had gone to Cape Town to discuss the execution of the plan. In accordance with what was then arranged, Dr. Jameson came to Johannesburg at the end of November to concert the necessary measures with the leaders of the Union.

On this occasion, he asked them to give him a letter in which they appealed to him for his assistance and which he could use at any time as an excuse for an invasion. The letter contained the statement that a collision was imminent between the Uitlanders and the Government and that the women and children and private property at Johannesburg were in danger. This letter, which was signed by Mr. Charles Leonard, Colonel Frank Rhodes, Messrs. Lionel Phillips, J. Hays Hammond and Farrar, was left undated, so that Jameson might be able to make use of it at any time. In the meanwhile, the inhabitants of Johannesburg were incited in every possible manner by the Rhodes press in order artfully to prepare the way for an outbreak.

Towards the end of December 1895, Leonard, as chairman of the National Union, issued a long manifesto raising a series of accusations against the Government. Everything that could serve to excite men's minds against the Republic was dragged in. Of course, the franchise question was one of the main grievances, although Lionel Phillips, who was also a leading member of the Union, had not long before written to his partner in London, a German Jew called Beit, who was closely connected with Rhodes, that " we do not care a fig for the franchise."

Just when the ferment at Johannesburg was at its height, I returned to Pretoria from my usual annual tour of the districts, and it was then that, in reply to an address in which the burghers pressed for the punishment of the rebellious element, I used the words:

'You must give the tortoise time to put out its head before you can catch hold of it." An attempt has been made to prove from these words that I knew of the preparations for the Jameson Raid, and that by the tortoise I meant Jameson.

But this statement is quite unfounded. Neither I nor any of the Transvaal authorities at that time thought such a deed possible, much less expected it.

It is true that horses, provisions and fodder were being bought up by the English even in the Republic; but the English stated that the assembling of the police on the western frontier of the South African Republic was intended for an expedition against the Kaffirs, particularly against the Chief Linchwe.

And the burghers, therefore, entertained so little suspicion that they themselves assisted in the purchase of the military stores and in conveying the goods to all the places which afterwards represented roadside stations for Jameson's ride from Kimberley to near Krugersdorp. I myself had, but a short while before, offered the British High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson, the assistance of the Republic for the protection of the women and children against the Matabele, who were giving trouble to the English, and Sir Hercules had replied thanking me for my offer, but saying that our assistance would not be needed for the present. If I had had the smallest inkling of Jameson's plan, I should assuredly not have allowed him to push so far into the Republic.

In the days when the troops were being collected for the Jameson Raid, General Joubert, the Commander-in-chief of the Boer forces, was not even at Pretoria, but on his farm in the Wakkerstroom district, and he did not return to Pretoria until a couple of days before the raid.

What I meant by the tortoise was the National Union, which was continually abusing the Government and threatening to resort to force in order to obtain the removal of its grievances. I intended to convey that we must allow the movement quietly to take its course, until it revealed its true character and showed itself so undoubtedly guilty that the Government could punish the leading members, the real rebels, for high treason. Had those men been arrested earlier, they could still have tried to deny their misconduct and we should then, perhaps, have been unable to convince the world of their guilt.

Towards the end of December 1895, the state of affairs at Johannesburg was such that thousands left the town and fled for safety to the coast, while the National Union, which henceforth adopted the name of the Reform Committee, raised corps of volunteers to whom it distributed arms and ammunition. In order to avoid a collision and prevent bloodshed, the Government resolved to confine the police to barracks. We did not look upon the rebellion as serious, since it did not originate with the people, but was artificially manufactured from above by intriguers?) The whole thing would have presented a farcical spectacle, if the results had been less serious. The only man among the so-called Reformers who understood his business was Colonel Rhodes. All the others were theatrical revolutionaries.[1]

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[1 It has been related that the President kept his horse saddled in his stable and his rifle loaded by his bed-side during the time of the Jameson Raid. Not a word of this is true, except in so far that some friends advised him to leave Pretoria because of the danger of an attack, whereupon he replied: "If it comes to that, I shall take my horse and my gun and join my commando." - **Note by the Editor of the German Edition.]**

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I received different deputations from Johannesburg which made it clear that a large number of the inhabitants did not wish to have anything to do with the insurrection. I promised one of these deputations that I would meet the Uitlanders in the matter of certain grievances and propose a general grant of the franchise, and I also issued a proclamation in which I declared that the rioters formed only a small proportion of the population of Johannesburg, and expressed my confidence that the law-abiding inhabitants would support the Government in its endeavors to maintain law and order.

This injunction was issued on the 30th of December 1895. On the same day, however, General Joubert received a telegram from Mr. Marais, Commissioner of Mines at Ottoshoop, informing him that a commando of 800 of the Chartered Company's troops, with Maxims and guns, had gone past,

at half -past five that morning, in the direction of Johannesburg, and that the telegraph wire between Malmanie, Zeerust, and Lichtenburg had been cut.

General Joubert immediately dispatched telegrams to the different commandants, and first to those of Rustenburg, Krugersdorp, and Potchefstroom, acquainting them with these reports and charging them at once to summon the burghers and stop the invaders. Meanwhile, the Government had appointed a committee at Johannesburg to maintain order.

It is certainly due to the tact displayed by this committee that no bloodshed occurred. The Reformers now resolved to send a deputation to Pretoria to confer with the Government. They were received, on behalf of the Government, by General Kock and Judges Kotze and Ameshoff, and demanded that Dr. Jameson should be allowed to enter Johannesburg, in which case they would make themselves responsible for his peaceful departure from the town and his return across the frontier. In the meanwhile, the High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson, who had succeeded Sir Henry Loch at the end of 1895, offered his friendly mediation and proposed to come to Pretoria in order to prevent bloodshed. An answer was, therefore, given to the deputation to the effect that, pending the arrival of the High Commissioner, the Government would take no measures against Johannesburg, provided the town conducted itself quietly.

Meantime, Dr. Jameson had advanced with the greatest rapidity in the direction of Johannesburg.

The High Commissioner issued a proclamation calling upon Dr. Jameson and all his companions to withdraw across the frontier (this proclamation was shortly followed by Cecil Rhodes's resignation of the premiership of Cape Colony). The proclamation, together with a letter from Sir Jacobus De Wet, the British Agent at Pretoria, was carried to Dr. Jameson by Ben Bouwer, a Transvaal burgher. Dr.

Jameson, however, took not the slightest notice of it.

Lieutenant Eloff, of the Krugersdorp police, who rode out to meet him and to charge him to turn back, was taken prisoner by his orders. A number of Transvaal burghers, however, under Commandants Malan, Potgieter and Cronje had outstripped Jameson and taken up their stand on the hills near Krugersdorp.

Jameson at once turned the fire of his guns on the burghers' positions; but, as soon as his troops attempted a charge, they were driven back with loss. When Dr. Jameson saw that he could not get through, he faced about to the right, in order to try to turn the Boer position. He was stopped, however, during the night by Field-cornet D. Fouche, and the next morning, when he moved still further to the right, he came up against Cronje's burghers, at Doornkop, who compelled him to surrender after a short engagement.

It has been stated that Dr. Jameson surrendered on condition that his life and the lives of his men should be spared. Commandant Cronje had, in fact, in a note to Sir John Willoughby, the officer in command of Jameson's troops, informed him that he would spare their lives on the understanding that they surrendered with all that they had with them and paid the expenses entailed upon the South African Republic. But, while Commandant Cronje was still in conversation with Dr. Jameson, Commandant Malan, of Rustenburg, approached, asked what was being done and, when he heard the conditions, said to Cronje:

"We cannot make conditions of any kind; that is a matter for the Government at Pretoria."

Cronje agreed, and thereupon Commandant Malan caused Dr. Jameson to be informed, in English, that he must clearly understand that what Cronje had said was that the prisoners' lives were only guaranteed as far as Pretoria, where they would be handed over to the Commandant General.

"At this moment," he continued, "we cannot make any final conditions; those must be left to the Government."

Jameson thereupon bowed and said: "I accept your conditions."

It was not till that moment that the surrender was completed and Dr. Jameson and his men disarmed and taken to Pretoria.

In the meantime, the High Commissioner had arrived and at once had an interview with myself and my advisers. After expressing his regret at what had happened, he immediately began to speak of the grievances of the Uitlanders and of other necessary reforms. I cut him short at once, however, by pointing out to him that this was not the time to speak of those matters, and that the only questions that could now be discussed were those of the measures to be taken in order to avoid further bloodshed,[1]and how Johannesburg should be made give up its arms.

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[1 Sir Hercules had asked whether he might come to help to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Jameson business, and he received a reply saying: "Yes, come, you can perhaps prevent bloodshed." He took this to mean that he might do something to prevent the insurgents from being shot; but when he was told that he could advise the Johannesburgers to surrender and thus prevent bloodshed, he was no longer so assiduous with his offer. - **Note by the Editor of the German Edition.]**

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The High Commissioner asked:

"On what conditions is Johannesburg to give up its arms?"

I replied:

"Unconditionally."

And, when the High Commissioner continued to hesitate and to raise difficulties against my demand, I added:

"I will give Johannesburg twenty-four hours in which to surrender unconditionally. Otherwise, I shall compel the town to do so by force."

Sir Hercules could obtain no concession. I continued inexorable, and the interview ended.

The burghers and their commandants were in a condition of extreme excitement. It is easily understood that, after being plagued and provoked for so many years by the National Union, they were not in the mood to allow Jameson and the Johannesburg fire-brands to go unpunished. The following will serve as an instance of the spirit that prevailed among the burghers:

A commandant and some 400 burghers, who were on their way to stop Jameson, when the latter had not yet surrendered, passed through Pretoria and took the opportunity of calling on me to bid me goodday. I went out to thank the burghers, when the commandant addressed me in these words:

"President, we have come to greet you, and at the same time to inform you that, when we have captured Jameson, we intend to march straight on to Johannesburg and to shoot down that den with all the rebels in it. They have provoked us long enough."

I replied:

"No, brother, you must not speak like that. Remember, there are thousands of innocent and loyal people at Johannesburg, and the others have been for the most part misled. We must not be revengeful; what would be the result of such a step?"

The commandant answered:

"No, President, you speak in vain. What is the use of clemency? It is only because we have shown the rebels clemency too long that they have now gone so far. My burghers and I are determined to put an end to this sedition for good and all."

I thereupon lost my temper, or, at least, pretended to do so, and said:

" Very well, if you will not listen to me, you can depose me from the presidency and govern the

country after your own fashion."

The commandant now calmed down and said:

"No, President, I did not mean that; we are quite willing to listen to you, but we have been terribly provoked."

I too answered more calmly:

"Well, if you will listen to me, do what I say and leave the rest to me."

At the meeting of commandants which, together with the Executive Raad, was to decide Jameson's fate, I had a hard battle to fight. My intention, which had already been approved by the Executive Raad, was to hand over Jameson and his companions to the British Government, in order that the criminals might be punished by their own Government according to their own laws. But the commandants would not hear of this, and it was only after Messrs. Fischer and Kleynveld, of the Orange Free State,[1]had also advised them to follow my wishes that I succeeded in obtaining their consent to leave this matter to the Government. [1 Mr. Fischer is the gentleman who was afterwards dispatched as one of the delegates to Europe. He and Mr. Kleynveld had been sent by the Orange Free State to see if it was necessary for that state to come to the assistance of the Republic in accordance with her obligations. - **Note by the Editor of the German Edition.]**

When the High Commissioner saw that I insisted on the unconditional surrender of Johannesburg, he instructed Sir Jacobus De Wet to telegraph to that effect to the Reform Committee. It is hardly necessary to say that they complied before the twenty four hours had expired, for, with the exception of Colonel Rhodes and perhaps one or two more, there was not one among the conspirators but would have taken to his heels as soon as the first shot was fired.

They had wooed and organized rebellion only in the hope that England would pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them. They did not think of endangering their lives for the sake of a matter for which one of their principal members had declared, but a little while before, that he "did not care a fig." Meanwhile the Government had informed the High Commissioner that it intended to hand over Jameson and his men to the British Government so that they might be brought to justice in England.

Mr. Chamberlain telegraphed to me to thank me, in the name of Her Majesty, for my magnanimous act. Subsequent events have shown the depth of this gratitude and the way in which England has rewarded my magnanimity.

Johannesburg gave up its arms, but in much smaller quantities than was expected. Only some 1800 rifles and three damaged Maxims were handed in. Soon after, Dr. Jameson and his followers were delivered to the Governor of Natal, who sent them to England. The rank and file were at once set at liberty by the British Government. Jameson and a few of the other officers received short terms of imprisonment and were released before the expiration of their sentence.

On the 9th of January, the Reformers were arrested in their homes, or at their clubs, and taken to Pretoria. On the 10th, I issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of Johannesburg in which I declared that I only looked upon a small number of crafty men within and without Johannesburg as the conspirators, and pointed out that the plot might have led to fearful disasters.

I promised to confer a municipality upon Johannesburg, and ended by appealing to the inhabitants to enable me to appear before the Volksraad with the motto, " Forgive and forget." It is not necessary to enter into details concerning the trial of the conspirators. The Government applied to the Orange Free State to allow Judge Gregorowski to preside over the trial. The object of this request, which was readily granted, was to obtain a judge who was outside the quarrel and who could not be regarded as in any way prejudiced against the Reformers. Most of them escaped with imprisonment or fines : only the four leaders, Messrs.

Lionel Phillips, Farrar, Hammond, and Colonel Rhodes, were condemned to death; but this sentence was commuted by the Executive Raad to a fine of ,25,000 apiece. Thus ended the first act of the

drama of which the last act has just been finished on the blood-stained plains of South Africa.

Before closing this chapter, mention should be made of the great calamity with which Johannesburg was afflicted, on the 19th of February, 1896, by the explosion of a number of trucks loaded with dynamite. A portion of the suburbs of Jorisburg and Braamfontein was destroyed, very many persons were killed and wounded, and hundreds were rendered homeless.

The Uitlanders showed their sympathy with the victims by subscribing a sum of about 70,000 within two days. To this the Government added a gift of 25,000. I repaired without delay to Johannesburg, visited the wounded in the hospital and praised the sympathy displayed in this matter by the Uitlanders, which it cheered my heart to see.

I reminded them of the words of the Gospel:

"Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy."

And so the attempt upon the independence of the Republic failed. But now Mr. Chamberlain was to set to work to try whether he could not be more successful. With his assistance, Jameson's Raid was to be replaced by a gigantic British Raid.

His first step was to invite me to come to England to confer on Transvaal matters, while he began by declaring that he was not prepared to discuss Article 4 of the London Convention, the only article which still in any way restricted the foreign relations of the South African Republic. One would really think, to judge from this invitation, that it was the Republic and not England that had to make amends.

At the same time, Mr. Chamberlain sent off another dispatch, in which he proposed that a sort of Home Rule should be granted to Johannesburg, and he published this dispatch in the London official press before I had received it. When one reflects that it was the very question of Home Rule for Ireland that caused Mr. Chamberlain to withdraw from Gladstone's party and barter his Radicalism for his present Jingoism, one must stand astounded at the effrontery of his proposal, especially under the existing circumstances.

The Government of the South African Republic at first received only a short excerpt from the dispatch, embracing the principal points, whereas the whole text had already been published in the London official press, and to this it sent the reply, in brief, that it was undesirable and inadvisable to give pre245 vious publicity to views which the British Government thought fit to adopt towards the Republic, adding that the Republic could not permit any interference in her internal affairs.

This reply was now also at once published in the Staatscourant of the South African Republic. Shortly after its receipt, Mr. Chamberlain dispatched a telegram in which he said that, if his proposal was not acceptable to the parties concerned, he would not insist upon it. Thereupon I telegraphed the conditions upon which I would be willing to come to England. The chief point was the substitution of a treaty of peace, commerce, and amity for the London Convention.

Into this Mr. Chamberlain refused to enter. He continued to speak of admitted grievances which must be removed, as that was a matter of the highest importance to England as the paramount power in South Africa, stating, furthermore, that, even if the London Convention was replaced by another, Article 4 of that Convention must, in any case, be included in the new agreement. Where, then, would have been the sense of undertaking that troublesome journey?

And what would have been the use of substituting a new convention for the old one, if the only article by which the independence of the Republic was in any way restricted was to be included? Mr. Chamberlain, seeing that he could not induce me to visit England without giving some guarantee that my journey would not be futile, withdrew his invitation.

Meanwhile, it had become evident to the Government that it must prepare for possible events, and consequently a commencement was made in the purchase of ammunition, rifles, and guns. This was the more necessary inasmuch as, at the time of the Jameson Raid, the Republic was practically

defenceless. The burghers, at that time, had none but Martini-Henry rifles and many did not possess a rifle at all.

There was not sufficient ammunition to wage war for a fortnight. It must be added that, by the law of the land, every burgher was bound to be armed ; and, when it appeared, on the occasion of the Jameson Raid, how sadly this duty had been neglected, the Government took the necessary measures, but no more, for the proper arming of the burghers, in order that they might be ready to protect themselves against further filibustering raids.

Still greater supplies of ammunition, rifles and guns were ordered after the investigation of the socalled South African Committee had taken place in London, because matters then came to light which showed that Mr. Chamberlain was not so innocent of the Raid as he represented. This is proved by the telegrams which I have already quoted and which were laid before the committee, and still more by those which were deliberately kept back, while, shortly after the investigation_Mr. Chamberlain declared in the House of Commons that Rhodes was a man of honor, and that there existed nothing which affected Rhodes's personal position as such. It was impossible to avoid drawing the conclusion that Mr.

Chamberlain was Rhodes's accomplice, and that he now publicly defended Rhodes because he feared lest the latter should make statements which would be anything but pleasant hearing for the Colonial Secretary. This, at least, was the view taken of the matter in the Republic; and it was confirmed in this view by the fact that Dr. Jameson was released from prison on account of illness and recovered his health immediately afterwards.

In view of these facts, can the Government of the South African Republic be blamed for making preparations, so that it might not fall a prey to England without striking a blow? Nay, more ; was it not her bounden duty to take care, as she did, that the country was placed on a defensive footing?

Yet this is the action which was constantly thrown in my face, by way of reproach, by the English ministers and the English press, and which they afterwards quoted in order to justify their unjust war.

Shortly after the closing of the South African Committee, Mr. Chamberlain began his uninterrupted series of dispatches, which continued until the war broke out, and which had no other object than to embitter the British people against the Republic and to make them believe that it was constantly sinning against England and systematically violating the London Convention. Thus, for instance, in the early part of 1897, he sent a dispatch in which he declared that the Republic had broken the London Convention by the following acts: by joining the Geneva Convention; by the Press Law; the Immigration Law; the conclusion of an extradition treaty with Portugal, etc. He based his contentions particularly on the oft-quoted Article 4 of the Convention,[1]which lays down that no treaty shall be in force until the same has been approved by the British Government.

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[1 This article 4 reads as follows:

"The South African Republic will conclude no treaty or engagement with any State or nation other than the Orange Free State, nor with any native tribe to the eastward or westward of the Republic, until the same has been approved by Her Majesty the Queen.

"Such approval shall be considered to have been granted if Her Majesty's Government shall not, within six months after receiving a copy of such treaty (which shall be delivered to them immediately upon its completion), have notified that the conclusion of such treaty is in conflict with the interests of Great Britain or of any of Her Majesty's possessions in South Africa." **Note by the Editor of the German Edition.]**

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Mr. Chamberlain now contended that the intention of this article was that, as soon as a treaty was

drawn up (and therefore before its completion), a copy must be delivered to Her Majesty's Government, whereas the Government of the South African Republic maintained that this was not to be done until after the treaty was finally settled, and based its contention upon the words, "Upon its completion," which occur in the article. The Government, therefore, in its reply, laid stress upon the fact that it did not agree with Mr. Chamberlain's opinion, and suggested that, in view of the difference that existed as to this point, it would be best to submit the matter to an impartial arbitrator. To this Mr. Chamberlain replied that England was the suzerain of the South African Republic and, in this quality, could not consent to refer a difference to arbitration.

It is unnecessary to say that this reply of Mr. Chamberlain's was in the highest degree vexatious to the Government of the Republic. For what other purpose than to obtain the abolition of the suzerainty had we made the journey to London in 1883 and endeavoured to secure a new convention? And, since the Convention of 1884, no one had entertained the very slightest doubt but that the suzerainty was annulled. Even Sir Hercules Robinson, who was himself one of the authors of the Convention of 1884, declared in an interview with a journalist[1] that there was no question but that the suzerainty had been abolished by the Convention of 1884. [1 Mr. Frank Harris, at that time editor of the Saturday Review. - **Note by the Editor of the German Edition.]**

In his greatly praised reply of the 16th of April, 1898, Dr. Leyds irrefutably established this fact. He was able, moreover to quote a dispatch of Lord Derby's, of the 15th of February, 1884, in which the then Secretary for the Colonies enclosed a draft of a new convention intended to replace the Convention of Pretoria.

This draft commences with a reprint of the preamble of the Convention of 1881, followed by that of the Convention of 1884 and headed by the following note:

"The words and paragraphs bracketed or printed in italics are proposed to be inserted, those within a black line are proposed to be omitted."

And now the whole preamble of 1881 is contained within a black line; moreover, the words " subject to the suzerainty of Her Majesty, her Heirs and Successors " had been struck out by Lord Derby. It was especially important to prove that the preamble of the Convention of 1881, in which the suzerainty was mentioned, had lapsed, because Mr. Chamberlain contended that this preamble still existed and continued in force. In addition to what has been shown above, that this preamble was contained within brackets and had therefore lapsed, we should, had Mr.

Chamberlain's contention been correct, have had two conflicting preambles to one and the same convention. Which would have been absurd.

Now any reasonable person would have thought that Mr. Chamberlain would see that he was wrong ; but no : he simply continued to maintain that the suzerainty existed. It will be universally admitted that it is impossible to come to a logical understanding with a man like that; and we must blame the well known English insolence, where a small nation is concerned, which alone can have permitted Mr. Chamberlain to keep up his nonsensical argument.

The correspondence between the Government and Mr. Chamberlain was interrupted and accompanied by two important events in the internal life of the Republic: the negotiations concerning the work of the Industrial Commission and the conflict between the judicial and state authorities.

The Industrial or Mining Commission was appointed to investigate the complaints of the mining industry. That there were certain burdens which pressed too heavily upon that industry and which must be decreased was an undoubted fact, and was shown in the report of the committee; but the principal reason why some mines gave no profit and others less profit than the shareholders would have liked to see was to be found in over-capitalization, in the floating of companies on worthless properties, in the reconstruction of companies whose profits went to the financial houses, and in the speculative fever which drove up shares to such a height that it became impossible for the purchaser

to rely on receiving a good dividend. The great financial houses had everything in their hands and caused prices to rise or fall as they pleased; and the public was the victim of their manoeuvres.

The commission, which held its sittings at Johannesburg and heard a crowd of witnesses, made a series of suggestions in its report as to how the demands of the industry could be met. The principal suggestions were: A reduction of the import-duty on food-stuffs.

An agreement with the other States of South Africa to facilitate the engagement and cheapen the transport of colored laborers.

The appointment of a committee to enquire into the possibility of abolishing the dynamite monopoly.

Meantime, it was recommended that the Government should itself import dynamite and sell it to the mines at cost price, with the addition of an import duty of twenty shillings.

A reduction in the railway tariff equal to a decrease of 500,000 in the gross profits of the company.

These were the principal suggestions; a few others of lesser importance may be passed over. The Government submitted the report to the Volksraad, which appointed a committee to examine the report and make suggestions.

After long debates on the opinion of the Volksraad committee, it was at last moved and carried that the railway company should reduce its charges to the extent of reducing its takings by ,200,000 and that the Government should endeavor to find means for a cheaper supply of dynamite to the mines. The Government succeeded in reducing the freights, especially for coal and foodstuffs, and in diminishing the price of dynamite by five shillings a case. Moreover, an arrangement was concluded with Portugal by which large contingents of Kaffir laborers were obtained from Portuguese territory. Mr. Chamberlain afterwards accused the Government of disregarding the suggestions of its own Industrial Commission.

I have mentioned the conflict between the judicial and state authorities, in other words, between the Government and the Volksraad on the one side and a section of the Supreme Court on the other. The dispute arose as follows.

It was a generally accepted principle that the resolutions of the Volksraad were valid in law, even if they conflicted with the constitution. The Supreme Court, particularly Judge Kotze, with whom the conflict now arose, had, in former law-suits, as for instance in the " Doms " case, accepted and acknowledged this principle.

Suddenly, in a subsequent case, it refused to do so.

Certain tracts of land in the Krugersdorp district had been " proclaimed " as gold-fields, and, on the day when this proclamation was to come into effect, thousands of people assembled, each intending, as the law originally provided, to peg out his claims or bewaarplaatsen for himself.

They who first pegged out those bewaarplaatsen, to the extent to which each was entitled in law, became their owners, subject, of course, to the payment of the legal dues. The Government had been informed that there was a danger of disorders arising out of this manner of dividing the land, owing to the great rush to the new gold-fields.

They accordingly determined, so as not to give England a fresh opportunity for an undeserved attack, to ask the Volksraad to pass a resolution to the effect that the " proclaimed " places should not, as the gold-law prescribed, be pegged out, but drawn by lot. In this way, each applicant stood the same chance of success, and all disorder would be avoided.

A certain Brown, however, took no notice of this resolution, but, on the day when the proclamation (which had meantime been withdrawn) was to take effect, pegged out a large number of claims and tendered the legal dues, which were refused. When Brown's case was brought before the Supreme Court, which was sitting, Chief Justice Kotze went back upon his former decisions and declared that

the Volksraad had no right to pass resolutions which violated the principles of the constitution.

This decision would have upset the whole country, for a number of rules concerning the gold-fields, the franchise and so on depended on resolutions of the Volksraad. It was therefore impossible for the Government to acquiesce in this decision, which would have caused unspeakable confusion. In a country whose conditions undergo such rapid alterations as is naturally the case in a gold-producing country, and which harbors so many speculators and schemers as were constantly flowing into the South African Republic, it was absolutely necessary that, at any given moment, certain interests could be protected and dangers averted from the State by decrees of the Volksraad.

To give an instance: in November, 1896, the revised gold-law, which had been passed in the former session, was to come into operation. It contained one clause, however, which was not quite clear and which, unless the point in doubt was elucidated by force of law, might seriously injure the mining industry and deliver its rights into the hands of speculators. What happened? The mining industry naturally went to the Government and called attention to the danger. Dr. Leyds thereupon attended a sitting of the Volksraad, explained the position and obtained a decree which removed the danger. Every one looked upon this as the natural course. Now, suddenly, a different view was taken ; and it was this that caused the conflict.

Sir Henry de Villiers, the Chief Justice of Cape Colony, who, by the way, shared the opinion of the Government, brought about an adjustment: the judge promised to respect the decrees of the Volksraad and I, on my side, promised to move the revision of the constitution in the Volksraad. Not long before, a law had been passed by which every judicial functionary, on taking his oath of office, was to promise not to assume the right of toetsing,[1] that is to say, of testing the laws as to their validness. [1 Testing, or criticising. In my translation of President Kruger's speech, printed in the Appendix, in which he ascribes the invention of this right to the Devil, I have ventured to employ the phrase, " the right of criticism," throughout. - **Translator's Note.]**

In February, 1898, however, Chief Justice Kotze wrote to me saying that I had not effected the revision of the constitution which I had promised him, that he therefore considered himself to be released from his own promise and that he intended in future to test the validness of all the resolutions of the Volksraad by the constitution. This was too much: I had had no opportunity of introducing a bill for the revision of the constitution, seeing that the Volksraad did not meet till May.

I now gave the Chief Justice his dismissal. The English press ranted and raged, and Mr. Chamberlain afterwards turned this incident into an "Uitlander grievance."

Meanwhile Mr. Chamberlain had found the man he wanted for his dealings with the South African Republic. In 1897, Sir Alfred Milner was appointed Governor of Cape Colony and High Commissioner for South Africa. Sir Alfred had formerly served his country in Egypt, and, if he learned anything there, it was to look upon the fellahs as creatures of an inferior species. The ideas which he had imbibed in Egypt he brought with him to South Africa, so much so that he forgot that the Afrikander is a different creature from the Egyptian fellah. There is no doubt that Mr. Chamberlain appointed Sir Alfred Milner only with a view of driving matters in South Africa to extremes. The appointment was received by the Jingoes with loud jubilation.

The aim and principle of his policy are to be found in the words which he spoke to a distinguished Afrikander:

"The power of Afrikanderdom must be broken."

This tool of Mr. Chamberlain's has fulfilled his mission faithfully, and to-day enjoys the satisfaction of having turned South Africa into a wilderness and robbed thousands of innocent people of their lives.

Lord Milner is the typical Jingo, autocratic beyond endurance and filled with contempt for all that is not English.

When this man assumed office, my term as President had expired and new elections were about to

be held. This time three candidates presented themselves : myself, Joubert, and Schalk Burger, a member of the Executive Raad and Chairman of the Industrial Commission of 1897. This was the first election which, according to the new law, was held by ballotT/ ^^m Meanwhile, new elections had also taken place in the Free State, as President Reitz was obliged, owing to long illness, to resign his office. Judge M. T.

Steyn was elected President in his place. To give a portrait here of this man would be superfluous.

His heroism, his resolution and his patriotism are known to all the world ; and, write what one may, it will always remain an impossible task to give a description of the feelings of attachment, respect and love that fill the hearts of all true Afrikanders for President Steyn. He will certainly be handed down in the memory of his people to the furthest generation as one of the greatest and noblest men that have seen the light in South Africa.

Some time after President Steyn's election, a new conference was held at Bloemfontein with the object of bringing about a closer alliance between the two Republics. The impulse towards this closer alliance was felt on both sides and was due, above all, to the Jameson Raid. I and some of my councilors went to Bloemfontein with this object; and it was during our stay there, on the occasion of a dinner that was given us, that I made a jest in the course of my speech by saying that Queen Victoria was a "kwaaie vrouw."

Now, although every one who knows the Afrikander Taal understands that, by this, I meant to convey only that Queen Victoria was a lady with whom one must be careful what one does, the Jingo press tried to make it appear as though I had grossly insulted the Queen, whereas the opposite, of course, was true.[1] [1 The reader may take it that to call a woman a kwaaie vrouw in the Taal, or kwade vrouw in European Dutch, is equivalent to saying that she is "a bad woman to deal with, to quarrel with, or to trifle with." The epithet, in short, can be used in Dutch in an objective as well as in a subjective sense. - **Translator's Note.]**

The conference between the two Governments was eminently successful. It was resolved that burghers of both States should be treated on an equal footing, so that, for instance, the rights which a Transvaaler enjoyed in the Free State were also granted to a Free Stater in the Transvaal, only the franchise being left untouched. Furthermore, a political alliance was concluded, which created a council of delegates, or federal council, which was to sit every year, alternately at Pretoria and Bloemfontein, and make recommendations on matters that might lead to federation as well as suggestions for the assimilation of the laws of the two Republics. The Volksraad of each State approved this treaty, and the only modification introduced was to resolve that a burgher of either Republic should receive burgher rights in the sister state so soon as he had taken the oath prescribed.

Source: http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page72308?oid=648612&sn=Marketingweb+detail&pid=90389&utm_source=Po