

RACE RELATIONS

SURVEY

1992/93

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NOTES

1 References to *Fast Facts* are to a monthly, eight-page publication dealing with current events,

published by the Institute.

2 We decided this year not to use Roman numerals for the preliminary pages and the *Synopsis and Update* as they are more difficult to read. Instead, we allocated the first 100 pages to the preliminary pages and *Synopsis and Update*, which is written after the other chapters have gone to press. However, as the *Synopsis and Update* is shorter than expected, pages 73 to 100 have not been used and have, therefore, been omitted.

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APPENDIX: LEGISLATION

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In October 1992 the state president, Mr F W de Klerk, apologised for apartheid, saying that the National Party had insisted on separate nation states for too long and that this had led to discrimination. Speaking at a function to mark the 150th anniversary of Winburg (Orange Free State), he said, 'For too long we clung to a dream of separate nation states when it was already clear that it could not succeed. For that we are sorry. That is why we are working for a new dispensation.'¹ [¹ *The Citizen* 10 October 1992]

Earlier, in September 1992, Mr de Klerk said that all South Africans, irrespective of colour, would vote in the next general election.² [² *The Star* September 1992] He added that the last racially based poll in South Africa had been held when white South Africans over the age of 18 years had voted in the referendum on 17 March 1992 to indicate whether or not they supported the continuation of the reform process which had begun on 2 February 1990 and which was 'aimed at formulating a new constitution for the country through negotiations'. In the referendum 69% of voters said that they were in favour of Mr de Klerk's reform initiatives.

According to the minister of local government and national housing, Mr Leon Wessels, the first nonracial municipal elections would be held in 1994 at the earliest, when it was hoped that an interim government would be in place.³ [³ *Business Day* 20 March 1992]

The President's Council proposed in April 1992 that political parties be prohibited from encouraging

racial hatred or violence between groups and individuals, and that political interest groups that propagated racial hatred be prohibited from registering as political parties.

The minister of constitutional development, Mr Roelf Meyer, said in September 1992 that the government was preparing legislation to reabsorb the powers and functions of the administrations of the six non-independent homelands and the four 'independent' homelands. If the 'independent' homelands were reincorporated into South Africa, he added, they would lose their armed forces.⁴ [⁴ *The Star* 18 September 1992]

South Africa opened four new foreign missions in August 1992, extending its presence in the former Soviet Union and breaking new ground in the Far East. The new missions were established in Bangkok (Thailand), Kiev (Ukraine), Singapore and St Petersburg (Russia), and brought to 24 the number of foreign missions established or upgraded since January 1992.⁵ [⁵ *Business Day* 12 August 1992] In November, ambassadorial relations were established with Albania.

The minister of foreign affairs, Mr Roelof (Pik) Botha; the president of the African National Congress (ANC), Mr Nelson Mandela; and the chief minister of KwaZulu and president of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, were among the South African leaders who addressed the United Nations (UN) Security Council in New York in July 1992. The council had convened a special meeting to discuss the continuing violence in South Africa and the breakdown of negotiations after talks at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) had ended in a deadlock and the ANC had suspended participation in Codesa in protest against the killings at Boipatong (Vaal Triangle) on 17 June 1992. The Security Council subsequently adopted a resolution backing both the South African government's call on the ANC to resume negotiations and the demand by the ANC that a UN special representative be appointed to investigate the violence in South Africa.⁶ [⁶ *The Star* 16, 17 July 1992]

After the adoption of the resolution the UN sent a former American secretary of state, Mr Cyrus Vance, as its special envoy to South Africa. Mr Vance was mandated to recommend measures to end the violence and to create conditions in South Africa conducive to negotiations. During his ten-day stay in South Africa Mr Vance met a wide range of people, among them Mr de Klerk; government officials; leaders and officials of the ANC and of the IFP;⁷ [⁷ *The Citizen* 23 July 1992] the chairman of the Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation (the Goldstone commission), Mr Justice Richard Goldstone; the chairman of the National Peace Committee, Mr John Hall; and the Anglican archbishop of Cape Town, the Most Rev Desmond Tutu.⁸ [⁸ *Ibid* 25 July 1992] The South African Institute of Race Relations submitted a memorandum on violence to Mr Vance.

In October 1992 Mr de Klerk told Parliament that he would not form a multiparty government with the ANC unless the organisation became a political party. Mr de Klerk said that the onus was on the ANC to abolish Umkhonto we Sizwe and to commit itself to 'democratic rules of conduct'.⁹ [⁹ *Business Day, The*

Citizen, The Star 14 October 1992₁

The Commission of Inquiry into the Appropriation of the Lebowa Revenue Fund and Alleged Mismanagement, which had been appointed in May 1989 with Mr Oelof de Meyer as its chairman and sole member, published its report in November 1992. The De Meyer commission found that gross financial mismanagement and corruption was rife in the Lebowa administration.¹⁰ [¹⁰ *Business Day* 11 November 1992₁

The commission recommended that the names of several officials, including some in very senior positions, be referred to the attorney general for criminal prosecution. I the South African government and the administration of Lebowa subsequently announced the appointment of a high-level joint committee to ensure that the recommendations of the De Meyer commission were implemented.¹¹ [¹¹ *Ibid*₁

The minister of regional and land affairs, Mr Jacob de villiers, said in November 1992 that neither he nor his predecessors, Dr Stoffel van der Merwe and Dr Gerrit Viljoen, could be held responsible for the maladministration which had occurred in Lebowa because it was impossible to keep 'adequate control' over a portfolio with such a wide ambit. The chief minister of Lebowa, Mr Nelson Ramodike, also denied responsibility for corruption in his administration and blamed officials seconded by the central government.¹² [¹² *Ibid*₁ Mr Ramodike criticised the government for seconding incompetent officials to the homelands 'to further the idea of apartheid' without real regard for sound financial management.¹³ [¹³ *Ibid* 18 November 1992₁ A week later Mr Ramodike announced that he would take steps to end incompetence and corruption. He said that ministers could not escape responsibility for the activities of their departments even if they were not personally involved in irregularities.¹⁴ [¹⁴ *The Citizen* 18 November 1992₁

Soon after the publication of the De Meyer report Mr de Villiers announced that joint committees to oversee spending in the six nonindependent homelands were in the process of being established.¹⁵ [¹⁵ *Ibid* 13 November 1992₁

Political violence

Political violence continued throughout the country during the period under review, especially in African communities on the Reef and in Natal. The *National Peace Accord*, which was signed in September 1991 and which was aimed at reducing political violence, was said to have failed. According to the South African Institute of Race Relations, 2 706 people died in political violence in 1991, representing a decrease of 27% on deaths recorded in 1990. However, the provisional figures compiled

by the Institute for deaths from political violence in the first seven months of 1992 represented an increase of 14% on the comparable period in 1991. By the end of November 1992 the figure for the year was above 2 820. By September 1992, the Institute said, political violence had claimed more than 14 000 lives since its outbreak eight years earlier in September 1984.

The Human Rights Commission (HRC) said in September 1992 that deaths from political violence had increased by 28% since the signing of the accord, claiming that the accord had been a failure.¹⁶ [¹⁶

Business Day 15 September 1992.] The director of the HRC, Dr Max Coleman, said that the major weakness of the accord had been its inability to deal with the covert activities of hit squads and special

under-cover forces.¹⁷ [¹⁷ *The Star* 14 September 1992.] The executive director of the South African Institute of Race Relations, Mr John Kane-Berman, said the accord needed to be amended to prohibit strategies to bring about the collapse of organs of government.

However, the chairman of the National Peace Committee (NPC), Mr John Hall, said that the peace accord was useful despite the committee's inability to act against signatories who violated the accord.

Lack of political tolerance, he added, was responsible for the increase in political violence.¹⁸ [¹⁸ *Ibid* 10 September 1992.]

In March 1992 the publicity and communications subcommittee of the NPC urged that copies of the simplified version of the *National Peace Accord* be distributed at grassroots level. Political leaders were also asked 'actively to combat the phenomenon of war talk and incitement'.

In May 1992 the minister of law and order, Mr Hernus Kriel, appointed a former regional magistrate, Mr Willem Krugel, to lead an investigation into alleged irregularities in the police investigation of the massacre of 11 people at a night vigil at Trust Feed, an African community near Pietermaritzburg (Natal), in 1988. The investigation was still in progress at the time of writing.

In April 1992 the Goldstone commission published its second interim report on political violence. The commission said in its report that it had received no evidence of a third force involved in the violence. (It defined a third force as 'a sinister and secret organisation or group that [committed] acts of violence in furtherance of some nefarious political aim.') The commission said that the causes of the violence were 'many and complicated'. They included:

- the actions of security forces which had been used as 'instruments of oppression';
- the unbanning of large political organisations suddenly and unexpectedly;
- the existence of a climate of political intolerance combined with a period of economic deterioration;
- 'state complicity in undercover activities, which include criminal conduct'; and

- the setting up of arms caches in single-sex hostels, informal settlements and township houses.

In July 1992 Judge Goldstone criticised the government and the security forces for failing to act on some of the commission's recommendations. Judge Goldstone said that he was 'distressed that some of the considered and urgent recommendations have been ignored'. At a preliminary hearing into the killings of 48 people at Boipatong (southern Transvaal) in June 1992, Judge Goldstone explained that:

- no action, apart from an allocation of funds for upgrading, had been taken on his recommendation for the immediate fencing off of hostels;
- recommendations concerning the carrying of weapons in public had been 'partially but inadequately implemented';
- the commission's suggestions regarding the controversial 32 Battalion had been met 'with what can generously be described as an unhelpful response from a senior member of the South African Defence Force (SADF)';
- recommendations on policing in Mooi River (Natal Midlands) 'had been ignored ... with no reasons furnished'; and
- a police investigation into a prima facie case of police involvement in a plan to assassinate a leader of the African National Congress (ANC) in Schweizer-Reneke (western Transvaal) had 'taken unacceptably long'.

In addition, Judge Goldstone said that whether or not the Koevoet unit of the SADF was involved in political violence, 'the very existence of such a group in South Africa in 1992 is calculated to cause yet further distrust of the security, forces'.¹⁹ [¹⁹ Ibid 7 July 1992] He stressed that 'no evidence had been submitted to the commission which justified in any way allegations of direct complicity in, or planning of, current violence' by the state president, any member of the cabinet, or any highly placed officer in the SADF.²⁰ [²⁰ *The Citizen* 7 July 1992]

A special committee of the Goldstone commission, set up to investigate train violence, announced in Pretoria in July 1992 that 'it cannot be determined who is to blame for the violence on trains on the Reef. The committee, which investigated violence on trains that had claimed 138 lives between July 1991 and April 1992, also said that 27 hostels along the railway network and adjacent to the townships were a factor in the violence and that records of violence on the trains were destroyed routinely by the police.'²¹ [²¹ Ibid 29,30 July 1992]

In a statement in response to the committee's findings, the ANC said, 'It is an outrage that the statistics of the incidents of violence kept by the police are incomplete due to what the committee calls routine destruction of records' and that the committee's report provided the government with 'additional reasons, if any were needed, why it should immediately phase out the hostels and ban the carrying of weapons in public'.²² [²² Ibid 30 July 1992]

The Goldstone commission suspended further inquiries into violence at hostels following the record of understanding reached between the government and the ANC in September 1992. The agreement, which included the fencing off of several hostels, was based on an interim report submitted to the state president, Mr F W de Klerk, in September 1992 by the chairman of the hostels subcommittee of the commission, Mr Bob Nugent.²³ [²³ *Business Day* 9 October 1992]

In September 1992 Judge Goldstone established a team of 26 advocates, attorneys, policemen and members of the SADF to head five special investigation units which would be answerable to his commission. The special investigation units, to be deployed in Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth/East London (eastern Cape) and Pietermaritzburg (Natal), were intended to help the commission in probing violence.²⁴ [²⁴ *The Citizen* 14 September 1992]

On 7 September 1992, 29 people were killed and hundreds injured in a march on Bisho (Ciskei) when members of the Ciskei Defence Force (CDF) opened fire on the marchers. The march had been organised by the ANC as part of its mass action campaign and to protest against what it described as 'political repression' in the homeland. Mr de Klerk subsequently blamed 'ANC mass action' for the bloodshed, while the ANC laid the blame for the killings on the South African government, which, it said, supported the Ciskei administration.

The Goldstone commission decided to investigate the deaths at Bisho, while the Ciskei administration appointed the chief justice of the Ciskei, Mr Justice B de V Pickard, to investigate the deaths as well.

In his report to the Ciskei administration. Judge Pickard said. It seems ... to me that a large amount of the blame for what occurred on this fateful day should be laid at the door of the ANC leadership. It seems most unlikely that the bulk of the marchers were aware of the risks they were running and it is extremely likely that a large portion of the crowd at least may have been led into the situation like lambs to the slaughter. In the knowledge of all these risks, the leadership saw fit to lead them on and egg them on and ... it seems that their attitude was that they were prepared to sacrifice a number of their supporters for the cause.'²⁵ [²⁵ *The Star* 2 October 1992]

However, Judge Goldstone said in his report, 'The commission is of the view that had the Ciskei authorities acceded to the pleas of the South African government, the South African Police [SAP] and the national peace secretariat to allow a peaceful and negotiated mass demonstration to take place, the violence which occurred on 7 September could have been averted ... The manner in which the Ciskei

forces fired at the demonstrators can only be condemned in the strongest terms ... The firing was indiscriminate and, even if there had been isolated firing from the demonstrators, the reaction of the Ciskei soldiers was completely disproportionate. Not one soldier in that area was injured.'

'When the crowd turned to flee ... the continued and prolonged firing was quite unjustified and unlawful. Even if they believed that one of their members had been shot by a demonstrator, their indiscriminate and prolonged shooting at innocent demonstrators was morally and legally indefensible and is deserving of the strongest censure,' he said. Judge Goldstone continued: If one adds to the foregoing the firing of four grenades, one can only conclude that the conduct of the Ciskei soldiers was deliberately aimed at causing as many deaths and injuries as possible. If South Africa is to survive the present period of change, and if it is to succeed in establishing a democratic form of government in which the individual rights of all are protected, the level of political tolerance will have to rise radically and quickly.'²⁶ [²⁶ *Business Day* 1 October 1992]

Thousands of members of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), led by the chief minister of KwaZulu and the president of the IFP, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and armed with axes, knobkerries, sharpened metal sticks and spears, marched through the streets of Johannesburg in October 1992 in defiance of the government's ban on the carrying of traditional weapons. The crowd marched to John Vorster Square where it delivered to police authorities a petition in protest against the ANC/ government agreement several days earlier to ban the carrying of traditional weapons in public and to fence in hostels (see also *Constitutional Change* below).²⁷ [²⁷ *The Star* 19 October 1992] During the march several bystanders were injured when some of the marchers attacked them. A senior spokesman of the IFP, Mr Walter Felgate, said that the ban on the carrying of 'traditional weapons' was unenforceable and would, therefore, be defied.²⁸ [²⁸ *The Citizen* 19 October 1992]

The minister of justice, Mr Kobie Coetsee, said in October 1992 that the date for a final political amnesty beyond which those who committed crimes would not be pardoned had to be decided at future multiparty negotiations. The government view, he added, was that a general amnesty with a final date could be introduced before the start of the transitional process.²⁹ [²⁹ *Ibid* 17 October 1992]

Mr Coetsee also said that the Further Indemnity Bill, tabled in Parliament in October 1992, aimed to supplement procedures adopted in the Indemnity Act of 1990 and would give legal endorsement to the release of prisoners in accord with the record of understanding reached with the ANC on 26 September 1992. The Further Indemnity Bill would extend the amnesty to cover only identified crimes committed with a political motive and would not apply to those prisoners already released in error.³⁰ [³⁰ *Ibid*]

The ANC said that attempts by the government to force through the Further Indemnity Bill showed the gravity of actions perpetrated in the defence of apartheid and that it was an indication of the 'seriousness of the crimes the state president is trying to prevent becoming known'. The organisation said further that there was no link between the bill and the record of understanding reached with the government in

September 1992 and warned that it would nullify any amnesty legislation that 'is introduced by this government' (see also *Constitutional Change* below).³¹ [³¹ Ibid 23 October 1992]

The president of the Association of Law Societies, Mr Mervyn Smith, said that the society found it totally unacceptable that amnesty would be granted to people who had committed serious crimes without the details of such crimes being made known. Instead of contributing to the atmosphere of reconciliation which is so necessary in South Africa today, secrecy about the crimes in respect of which persons will receive amnesty will only create suspicion and mistrust in the eyes of the public,' Mr Smith said.³² [³² Ibid 24 October 1992]

In November 1992 the Goldstone commission announced that it had confiscated files which revealed that a former agent of the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB), Mr Ferdi Bamard, had been employed by Military Intelligence (MI) to discredit the military wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe, by implicating its members in criminal activities. This finding contradicted earlier denials by the SADF that it had employed Mr Bamard. Judge Goldstone said the files showed that Mr Bamard's employment in June 1991 had been recommended by the chief of staff of intelligence of the SADF, Lieutenant General Rudolph Badenhorst, and that he had been dismissed on the orders of the minister of defence, Mr Roelf Meyer, in December 1991.

Mr Meyer subsequently denied that he had known that Mr Bamard was in the employ of MI and that he had ordered his dismissal. Judge Goldstone reacted by saying that Mr Meyer had been falsely implicated in the matter.³³ [³³ *Business Day* 18 November 1992]

In response to the Goldstone commission's findings Mr de Klerk said that the security services had no mandate to undermine the ANC, but that such activity had occurred because of a 'few individuals who broke the rules'. Mr de Klerk nevertheless appointed the chief of staff of the SADF, Lieutenant General Pierre Steyn, as the new head of MI and requested him to investigate further the security forces.³⁴ [³⁴ *The Citizen* 18 November 1992]

Judge Goldstone requested that the commission's powers be extended to include the investigation of public and private security forces and armies in South Africa and the homelands so that it could follow up evidence and conduct its investigations more effectively.³⁵ [³⁵ Ibid 17 November 1992] However, at a meeting between Mr de Klerk and Judge Goldstone it was decided that its powers would not be extended, but that the SAP would provide the necessary manpower and support to the commission to carry out its investigations.³⁶ [³⁶ Ibid 21 November 1992]

The ANC said that the findings of the Goldstone commission were confirmation of what it had experienced since the organisation's unbanning in 1990. It added that the government was conducting 'a vicious campaign of misinformation and propaganda' against it. The ANC called for the terms of

reference of the commission to be extended so that it could carry out further investigations of the security forces.³⁷ [³⁷ Ibid 17 November 1992]

Also in November, two witnesses at a reopened inquest into the death of an activist and academic at the University of the Witwatersrand, Dr David Webster, who was killed in May 1989, testified that Mr Bamard had admitted to killing Dr Webster when Mr Bamard was working for the CCB.³⁸ [³⁸ *Business Day* 18 November 1992] Mr Bamard denied the allegations of the two witnesses, Mrs Johanna Smit and Mr Andrew Vorster.

In the same month Amnesty International (Amnesty) published a report which documented physical abuse, torture and execution of prisoners in ANC camps in Angola, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia over the previous decade. The report said, 'Although the victims of these abuses were often labelled as South African government spies, most appear to have been genuine ANC members. They were imprisoned because they raised grievances in the ANC camps or because of differences in policy ... this pattern of gross abuse was allowed to go unchecked for many years, not only by the ANC's leadership in exile, but also by the governments of the frontline states.' Amnesty urged the authorities of the countries in which abuses had taken place to investigate the conduct of ANC security officials and to 'bring them to justice'. It said that those in the ANC who were responsible for the physical abuse of prisoners should not be allowed to hold positions of authority in the organisation.³⁹ [³⁹ *The Citizen* 28 November 1992]

Amnesty criticised the commission of inquiry which had been set up by the ANC to investigate allegations of torture and physical abuse in its camps, and whose report had been published in October 1992. Amnesty said that two of the three members of the commission had also been ANC members and the body was thus not seen to be impartial. There were also serious gaps in the terms of reference of the commission, in that it could not inquire into executions or establish which ANC officials had been responsible for the abuses.⁴⁰ [⁴⁰ Ibid]

The president of the ANC, Mr Nelson Mandela, announced several days before the publication of the Amnesty report that it had set up a new and independent commission to investigate atrocities committed in ANC camps. The three-member commission was to comprise a prominent businessman and former president of the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Dr Sam Motsuenyane; a former official in the Zimbabwean government, Mr David Zamchiya; and the chairman of the Black Lawyers' Association of America, Ms Margaret Burnhan.⁴¹ [⁴¹ *The Weekly Mail* 27 November 1992]

In December 1992 the Azanian People's Liberation Army (Apla) claimed responsibility for a bomb explosion and a hand grenade attack earlier in the month in the eastern Cape, in which five people were killed. A spokesman for Apla claimed that the two attacks were part of a campaign against white civilians and that a number of South African cities would be targeted. (Earlier in the year, Apla had claimed responsibility for attacks on farmers in the eastern Cape and policemen in various areas.) Mr de

Klerk condemned the attacks and said that it would suspend talks with the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) until the organisation had clarified its stand on acts committed by its armed wing. The PAC refused to distance itself from Apla's activities, saying that Apla had 'operational independence'. The attacks were widely condemned by local and foreign organisations, including the ANC and the Organisation of African Unity.⁴² [⁴² *The Star* 8 December 1992]

Security

A special task force was established in February 1992 by the South African Police (SAP) to stop the cross-border importation of arms, in which AK-47 assault rifles and other weapons were being smuggled into the country. According to the police, the most common route for the smuggling of weapons was through Mozambique and Swaziland.

According to the minister of correctional services, Mr Adriaan Vlok, about 17% of the 53 748 prisoners released on parole in 1990 had not adhered to their parole conditions and had been rearrested in connection with other crimes or were wanted for questioning in connection with other crimes. He added that nearly 12% of the 47 379 prisoners released on parole in 1991 had failed to adhere to their parole conditions.

In November 1992 the Commission of Inquiry into the 1986 Unrest and Alleged Mismanagement in KwaNdebele, headed by Mr Justice Benjamin Parsons, presented a 1400-page report detailing malpractices and irregularities in the homeland's Department of Law and Order. Judge Parsons said that homeland police had tortured prisoners, detained civilians without cause and manufactured evidence to support homeland leaders. He found that dockets of criminal cases opened against the police had disappeared, the quality of crime investigation had been poor and promotions in the police force had been made too quickly. Judge Parsons said that the establishment of the KwaNdebele police force in 1986 had been a 'grave error' and recommended that the police force be completely restructured and possibly reincorporated into the SAP. He called for the prosecution of homeland police implicated in the malpractices. According to Judge Parsons, the head of the KwaNdebele police during the period in which the irregularities had occurred, Brigadier Hertzog Lerm, had had a relationship with the chief minister, Mr Simon Skosana, which had been so close that there had been no differentiation between the functions of police commissioner and chief minister.⁴³ [⁴³ *Business Day* 13 November 1992]

Constitutional change

The period under review saw the continuation of negotiations in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa), which had begun in December 1991. However, constitutional negotiations broke down in June 1992. Agreement could not be reached in Codesa II on fundamental issues such as the majorities needed to entrench the boundaries and powers of the regions and the role of a second chamber in constitution making.

Significant agreements were, however, reached in Codesa before its dissolution. These included agreement on an interim government, consisting of a national assembly and a senate functioning in terms of special majorities and general constitutional principles to be agreed upon during further negotiations. Provision was made in the agreements for the creation of a multiparty transitional executive council with six subcouncils for defence, elections, finance, foreign affairs, law and order, and regional and local government. It was also agreed that an independent electoral commission would be created and that it would be responsible for the holding of free and fair elections. Codesa agreed that the boundaries and the powers of the regions should be entrenched once these had been defined but agreement could not be reached on the margin of votes required to amend or repeal such provisions. There was also consensus that an elected national assembly would act as a constitution-making body and adopt the new constitution while it continued to act as a legislature.

In May 1992 Codesa declined to accede to demands by the chief minister of KwaZulu and the president of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, for the Zulu monarch, King Goodwill Zwelithini, to be afforded full status (including full voting rights) at Codesa. Chief Buthelezi subsequently refused to attend the second plenary session of Codesa, which began on 15 May 1992. Another major point upon which consensus could not be reached was the reincorporation of the 'independent' homelands. While 18 parties at Codesa agreed that the 'independent' homelands should be reincorporated into South Africa, the Bophuthatswana administration stated its preference for non-incorporation. It was, however, agreed that the citizens of these homelands would take part in national negotiations in such a way that their votes would signify support or rejection of reincorporation.

A number of other agreements relating to the creation of a climate for free political participation were reached, including an agreement allowing for the establishment of an independent body to regulate the telecommunications media. The release of political prisoners and the return of exiles was referred to the African National Congress (ANC) and the government for bilateral discussions.

The period under review was characterised by a partial realignment of political forces. In February 1992, after a number of defections from the parliamentary caucus of the Labour Party (LP) to the National Party (NP), the LP lost control of the House of Representatives to the NP. In April five members of the Democratic Party (DP) parliamentary caucus left the party and joined the ANC, whereupon they sat as independents in Parliament but represented the views of the ANC. In August four members of the Conservative Party (CP) parliamentary caucus resigned to form their own party, the Afrikaner Volksunie (AV), after it became clear that their proposed changes to CP policy, which included involvement in the negotiation process, would not be accepted by the CP.

The period, however, also saw moves towards negotiations by a number of organisations outside Codesa which had previously declined to be involved in constitutional talks. The government held bilateral talks with the Azanian People's Organisation, the CP and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) with a view to involving them in constitutional negotiations.

In October 1992 the government held a meeting with the PAC in Gaborone (Botswana), at the end of

which the two groups issued a joint statement saying that they had agreed on the urgent need for establishing a more representative forum which would be inclusive and managed impartially. The parties agreed that the negotiating forum should decide on transitional arrangements.⁴⁴ [44 Ibid 26 October 1992]

However, talks were suspended by the government in December 1992 after the armed wing of the PAC, the Azanian People's Liberation Army, claimed responsibility for two attacks in the eastern Cape, in which five people died (see *Political violence* above).⁴⁵ [45 *The Star* 8 December 1992]

Hopes for the resumption of constitutional negotiations were raised on 26 September 1992 when a government delegation led by the state president, Mr F W de Klerk, and an ANC delegation led by the president of the ANC, Mr Nelson Mandela, held a meeting aimed at resolving the impasse in negotiations which had resulted when the ANC had withdrawn from the process in June. The record of understanding which came out of this meeting made provision for an elected constitution-making body sitting as a single chamber to draft and adopt a new constitution. It would be bound by constitutional principles agreed to at Codesa and other negotiation forums and would operate within a fixed time frame. It would be elected within a predetermined time period, would arrive at decisions by certain predetermined majorities and would have adequate deadlock-breaking mechanisms. It was agreed that the details of the agreement would be the subject of further negotiations.⁴⁶ [46 *Record of Understanding* 26 September 1992]

It was agreed further that the constitution-making body would act as an interim government of national unity. This body would operate in terms of an interim constitution which would also provide for regional government during the interim period as well as for a bill of rights. The interim parliament would function as either a unicameral or a bicameral body, it was agreed. The two delegations also agreed that all political prisoners whose freeing could 'make a contribution to reconciliation' would be released but that where proposed releases were disputed they would be reassessed and carried out in stages before 15 November 1992. The parties indicated that they had started a process of identification of political prisoners to this end. The government also undertook to implement security measures such as the fencing and policing of certain hostels associated with violence. It undertook further to ban the display and carrying of dangerous weapons on all public occasions, subject to exemptions which would be agreed upon. The government acknowledged the right of political parties to peaceful mass action, while the ANC reaffirmed its commitment to the provisions of the code of conduct for political parties.⁴⁷ [47 Ibid]

In a press statement after the meeting Mr Mandela revealed that 150 political prisoners had been released that day. A number of other prisoners were released on 28 September, including a member of Umkhonto we Sizwe, Mr Robert McBride, who had planted a bomb at a bar in Durban in June 1986 which had killed three people and injured 69.⁴⁸ [48 Press statement by the president of the ANC, Mr Nelson Mandela, World Trade Centre, 26 August 1992]

A former policeman and a member of the Wit Wolwe, Mr

Barend Strydom, who had been convicted of the killing of eight black people in November 1988, was released at the same time. The releases of Messrs McBride and Strydom provoked serious public criticism.

As a result of the progress of these talks the national executive committee of the ANC approved the organisation's return to multilateral constitutional negotiations. The organisation added, however, that there would have to be thorough preparation before the resumption of such talks⁴⁹ [⁴⁹ *Beeld* 1 October 1992]

Shortly after the meeting, however, the IFP announced its withdrawal from negotiations. The party cited the bilateral agreements reached in the record of understanding as the chief reason for its withdrawal. Chief Buthelezi rejected the agreements reached at the de Klerk/Mandela meeting, saying that bilateral talks between the government and the ANC had given rise to government action to which parties not involved in these discussions would be subject. He added that the IFP and the KwaZulu authorities would not be bound by the agreement.⁵⁰ [⁵⁰ *Sowetan* 28 September 1992] Chief Buthelezi later demanded the disbandment of the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, before the IFP would rejoin negotiations.⁵¹ [⁵¹ *Ibid* 9 October 1992] On 15 October 1992 the minister of constitutional development, Mr Roelf Meyer, held talks with representatives of the IFP in an attempt to set up a meeting to settle the differences that had led to the IFP breaking off contact with the government and the ANC.⁵² [⁵² *The Star* 16 October 1992] The talks did not succeed in setting up this meeting.

In October 1992 the Constitution Amendment Bill, which had been defeated on its first vote in Parliament, was passed by the majority of members in each house after the removal of a clause which had been widely criticised. The clause which was removed from the bill had provided for the state president to nominate a cabinet chairman to act as state president if he had to absent himself from the cabinet. Other provisions which allowed, inter alia, for the appointment of cabinet members who were not members of Parliament were passed.⁵³ [⁵³ *Ibid* 21 October 1992]

The CP opposed the bill on the grounds that it was aimed at allowing the 'Mandelas and Hanis' to be brought into Parliament.⁵⁴ [⁵⁴ *The Citizen* 16 October 1992] The DP said that the government should withdraw the bill, renegotiate it and reintroduce it only when black leaders had shown their approval of it. In his opposition to the bill Mr Rob Haswell, an independent MP and a member of the ANC, said that the government was promoting autocracy. He pointed out that the government had not repealed section five of the constitution which prevented Africans from assuming the office of state president. He added that there was always the danger that if negotiations turned sour from the state president's point of view that he would appoint an 'anti-ANC alliance cabinet'.⁵⁵ [⁵⁵ *Ibid*] The government denied these charges and said that the bill was in line with agreements reached in Codesa on the desirability of separating the legislature from the executive.⁵⁶ [⁵⁶ *Ibid*]

Also in October 1992, the Further Indemnity Bill was introduced in Parliament. The bill provided for a national council of indemnity to hear applications for indemnity in camera and for the publication of only the names of those who were granted indemnity and not their offences.⁵⁷ [⁵⁷ *The Star* 21 October 1992] The bill was, however, rejected by Parliament and the government was compelled to pass it on to the President's Council for consideration.⁵⁸ [⁵⁸ *Ibid* 22 October 1992] The bill was subsequently passed by the council on 30 October 1992.⁵⁹ [⁵⁹ *Business Day* 3 November 1992]

The Joint Administration of Own Affairs Bill was passed in the October 1992 session of Parliament. The bill made provision for the state president, in concurrence with the three ministers' councils, to transfer any department from an own affairs administration to a national state department.⁶⁰ [⁶⁰ *The Citizen* 26 September 1992] The bill also empowered the state president to amend any existing laws referring to own affairs by way of proclamation in the *Government Gazette*.

In October 1992 Mr de Klerk undertook to see that South Africans of all races would have the opportunity to take part in a general election within the following two years, and before his mandate came to an end. He added the proviso that a transitional constitution would have to be negotiated before an election could be held.⁶¹ [⁶¹ *Ibid*] Addressing a group of businessmen in Durban in the same month, the secretary general of the ANC, Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, said that there was nothing to stop the country from going to the polls in the middle of 1993.⁶² [⁶² *Ibid* 17 October 1992]

Also in October 1992, the president of Bophuthatswana, Chief Lucas Mangope; the military ruler of the Ciskei, Brigadier 'Oupa' Gqozo; and Chief Buthelezi co-convened a meeting, known as the 'conference for concerned South Africans'. Other delegates included representatives of the Afrikaner Freedom Foundation, the Afrikaner Volksunie, the CP and the IFP.⁶³ [⁶³ *Business Day* 7 October 1992] The conference called for the abolition of Codesa and its replacement by a more representative forum, as well as for a halt in the implementation of the record of understanding.⁶⁴ [⁶⁴ *The Star* 7 October 1992] The meeting resolved further to support calls by the IFP for Umkhonto we Sizwe to be disbanded before the resumption of negotiations.⁶⁵ [⁶⁵ *Business Day* 7 October 1992]

In the period under consideration there was also a review of plans by both the government and the ANC on a new regional dispensation. Government advisers in the Department of Constitutional Development presented a plan to a conference on regionalism which was called by the government in Pretoria in September 1992. The plan provided for the division of South Africa into seven provinces, rather than the nine development regions previously favoured by the government. Further details were revealed when Mr de Klerk spoke to delegates at a provincial administrators' conference in Pretoria in October 1992.

He proposed that each province should have its own entrenched constitution and be financially independent. Provincial assemblies would be elected by proportional representation and some provision should be made for the representation of traditional leaders. The provincial assemblies could have multiparty provincial cabinets.⁶⁶ [⁶⁶ Ibid 9 October 1992]

The ANC also published a discussion document in February 1992, giving details of its proposals on regionalism. It favoured the official nine development regions as a basis for the division of the country but called for a tenth region which would include the Border region, the Ciskei and the Transkei. This plan was, however, shelved at the organisation's policy conference in June 1992 when it referred the matter to its regional structures for more discussion.

At a joint meeting of Parliament in October 1992 Mr de Klerk listed the obstacles that the government wanted removed in order for the negotiation process to proceed. These were continuing underground activities, private armies, arms caches and 'unacceptable' mass action, which was seen as economically disruptive.⁶⁷ [⁶⁷ *The Citizen* 13 October 1992] Mr de Klerk added that he would not be prepared to sit in a government of national unity with the ANC until it had converted itself into a democratic political party 'stripped of its uniforms and its weapons'.⁶⁸ [⁶⁸ Ibid 14 October 1992]

In October 1992 the President's Council published a report which proposed the election of 300 members of a national assembly by proportional representation on a regional basis, with a further 100 members being allocated to losing parties in such a way that the assembly correctly reflected the proportion of votes for each of the parties. The chairman of the council's constitutional affairs committee, Mr J Heyns, said that there was general agreement that an impartial electoral commission should meet to allocate seats to regions on the basis of population figures.⁶⁹ [⁶⁹ Ibid] According to the report, the number of potential voters in the country's nine development regions was as follows: the Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging (PWV) area, 5 017 000; Natal, 4 675 000; eastern Cape, 2 568 000; western Cape, 2 267 000; northern Transvaal, 2 276 000; Orange Free State, 1 456 000; eastern Transvaal, 1 090 000; western Transvaal, 967 000; and northern Cape, 626 000.⁷⁰ [⁷⁰ Ibid]

In November 1992 it was reported that the national executive committee (NEC) of the ANC had changed its position on power sharing. The NEC said that it was willing to contemplate power sharing 'provided that it does not delay or obstruct the process of orderly transition to majority rule and that the parties which have lost the elections will not be able to paralyse the functioning of government'. A member of the NEC, Mr Mac Maharaj, added that all parties that won more than 5% of seats in an interim Parliament would be represented in the interim cabinet, and that the same principle could apply after the adoption of a new constitution.⁷¹ [⁷¹ *Business Day, The Citizen* 26 November 1992]

In the same month Mr de Klerk published a timetable of the government's plans for the transition to a new political dispensation. He stressed that the timetable was a draft proposal and that it had not been

discussed with other organisations. Mr de Klerk said that some of the target periods were ‘too short’ and ‘rather ambitious’, but that they could be met if all parties to negotiations were fully committed to the process. The timetable envisaged:⁷² [⁷² *Business Day, The Star* 27 November 1992]

- bilateral discussions with political organisations for the resumption of multilateral negotiations completed before the end of February 1993;
- a multilateral negotiating forum reconvened before the end of March 1993;
- multilateral agreements reached by the end of May 1993 on a transitional constitution, a transitional executive council (TEC) and an election commission;
- legislation to implement these agreements passed in May and June 1993;
- the TEC and the election commission to begin work in June 1993;
- a transitional constitution providing for a constitution-making body to be enacted before the end of September 1993;
- election regulations to be formulated and promulgated by the end of October 1993; and
- elections for a ‘democratic government of national unity’ to be held not later than March or April 1994.

In response to Mr de Klerk’s announcement the ANC said that the timetable was unacceptable and that it wanted elections to be held in 1993. The PAC said that it wanted a democratic government installed by early 1994. The DP said in response that it saw no reason why elections for a constitution-making body should not be held before the end of 1993⁷³ [⁷³ *The Star* 27 November 1992]

On 1 December a proposed constitution for a future state of KwaZulu/Natal was adopted by the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. Designed to be submitted to a referendum and fed into a wider negotiating process, it contained the following main provisions:

- KwaZulu/Natal would be regarded as a member state of the Federal Republic of South Africa;
- all personal, social, economic, labour and cultural rights would be recognised and would be justiciable;
- all citizens would have equal rights but the state would be compelled to promote and guarantee equal access to political, social and economic opportunities;

- the components of civil society would be protected from domination by government;
- rights to free expression and access to information would be guaranteed;
- state assistance to the elderly, women and youth would be prescribed;
- welfare programmes dealing with housing, health and education would be mandated;
- a privatisation commission would be established and the state would be prohibited from operating monopoly enterprises;
- private enterprise would be guaranteed and private property protected;
- state expropriation of property would be limited and would have to be accompanied by market-value compensation;
- the state's ability to accumulate debt would be severely restricted;
- Durban would be operated as a 'free port';
- petitions of the citizenry could cause legislation to be brought to the legislature or to be overturned in referenda;
- the lower house in the legislature, the house of delegates, would be elected on a constituency basis for a five-year term;
- the upper house, the senate, would be elected on the basis of proportional representation, also for a five-year term. The combined legislature would be known as the general assembly;
- a popularly-elected governor would serve a maximum of two three-year terms and would have the power to veto state legislation, although such a veto could be overturned by the legislature;
- the independence of the judiciary would be guaranteed;
- provision would be made for an independent auditor general;
- commissions would be established for economic planning, consumer affairs, environmental protection and for the supervision of the civil service, among others;
- an ombudsman and a constitutional court would be established;

- capital punishment would be prohibited, as would be detention without trial and forced removals;
- pro-choice rights for abortion would be recognised;
- ‘unreasonable or unnecessary licensing and permitting requirements’ would be prohibited;
- communal property would be recognised while ‘practices and agreements in restraint of free trade and free market competition shall be prohibited’;
- legal protection for women would be entrenched and a ministry for women’s affairs established;
- a state militia, for which conscription would be allowed but not prescribed, would be established. No federal armed forces would be allowed to be stationed in KwaZulu/Natal; and
- no federal law would be able to override any state law and no federal taxes would be levied in the state without the express permission of the state.

Chief Buthelezi said that he would ask the Natal Joint Executive Authority to put the planned constitution to a referendum of ‘all citizens of KwaZulu and Natal’. If it were ratified the constitution would become ‘the supreme law of the land ... in spite of whatever course the negotiations at central level happen to take’, he said.⁷⁴ [⁷⁴ Ibid 3 December 1992]

The government subsequently called for an urgent meeting with Chief Buthelezi. Mr de Klerk said that the move by Chief Buthelezi had given rise to serious concern. He added that the IFP appeared to be moving away from the ‘consensus achieved at Codesa’. Mr de Klerk accused Chief Buthelezi of ‘abandoning previous constitutional agreements’ and of adopting a confrontational course with the government. He warned that Chief Buthelezi’s promotion of the constitutional plan could disrupt efforts to resume multiparty negotiations and escalate violence.⁷⁵ [⁷⁵ Ibid]

The constitution approved by the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly was welcomed by the CP, which said that it represented a rejection of a unitary South African state. The ANC rejected the plan, saying that it was ‘apartheid-inspired’ and served the ‘narrow interests of ethnicity’. The constitution was also rejected by the DP.⁷⁶ [⁷⁶ Ibid 2 December 1992, *The Citizen* 4 December 1992]

There was also an intensification of negotiations at local government level during 1992 and several white towns were amalgamated with their adjacent black townships in terms of the Interim Measures for Local Government Act of 1990. In March 1992 the process was given further impetus when the minister of local government and national housing, Mr Leon Wessels, announced that 1 January 1993 had been set as a target date for all local authorities to be converted to joint local government administrations. The

target date was later changed to 1 July 1993. The Provincial and Local Authorities Affairs Bill, which was passed in July 1992, provided for an administrator to act where local authorities did not progress satisfactorily with negotiations, as contemplated in the Interim Measures for Local Government Act. Administrators were empowered to overrule such local authorities, apportion revenue and define the boundaries of councils.⁷⁷ [⁷⁷ *Argus* 1 July 1992]

As a result of the new legislation the CP altered its policy on local government and urged CP-controlled towns to enter into negotiations with neighbouring black towns urgently. However, it said that joint administration also meant the provision of services to these areas on an agency basis.⁷⁸ [⁷⁸ *Beeld* 22 July 1992]

At the end of September 1992 a task group, which included representatives of the South African National Civic Organisation, provincial administrators and representatives of local authorities, met to prepare the way for a new national forum on local government. Mr Wessels said that the new forum would work on the future structure and financing of local government and would either be a reconstituted council the co-ordination of local government affairs or a parallel body. Recent legislation, including the Interim Measures for Local Government Act and the Provincial and Local Authorities Amendment Act, would be up for negotiation in the new forum, he said.⁷⁹ [⁷⁹ *Business Day* 28 September 1992]

Despite this move, at its third annual congress in October 1992, the PWV branch of the ANC resolved to suspend its participation in local government negotiations until a national framework and guidelines for local government had been adopted. The branch decided that negotiations at local government level should be limited to the provision of services.⁸⁰ [⁸⁰ *Ibid* 19 October 1992]

Leaders of the AV met members of the ANC for the first time in November 1992. The leader of the AV, Mr Andries Beyers, said that he had put forward his party's concern for Afrikaner self-determination and the establishment of an Afrikaner 'volkstaat'. The ANC outlined its policy on regional government at the meeting. Both parties agreed that a new dispensation should provide for equal citizenship for all citizens and should be free of all forms of discrimination and oppression. The ANC said that it welcomed the opportunity to hear the views of Afrikaner nationalists.⁸¹ [⁸¹ *The Star* 20 November 1992]

Population

According to the Urban Foundation, the population of South Africa (including the ten homelands) was 39,4m in 1992. Some 44% of the total population lived in the ten homelands (which constituted 14% of the total surface area of South Africa). Average population density in 1992 was 32 people per square kilometre, but varied from an average density in the homelands of 101 people per square kilometre to an average density in the non-homeland area of 21 people per square kilometre.

The Development Bank of Southern Africa said that the population had grown at a high but declining rate between 1970 and 1992. The average population growth rate declined from 3% a year between 1970

and 1980 to an estimated 2,4% between 1991 and 1992. A study conducted by the United States Bureau of the Census showed that South Africa was the only country in sub-Saharan Africa with an annual birth rate of less than 35 per 1 000 people.

In 1991 there was a net gain of 8123 people as a result of immigration. In 1991 the ratio of economically active immigrants to non-economically active immigrants was 0,95:1 and there was a net gain of 1 594 skilled people. According to the national director of the Immigration Information Centre, Dr Riaan Badenhorst, immigration had not again reached the high levels recorded in 1981 and 1982 (when there had been a net gain of more than 30 000 people in both years) because of the 'severe recession in South Africa'.

It was reported in February 1992 that the actual number of immigrants to South Africa exceeded government figures, owing to illegal immigration. The director of Operation Hunger, Mrs Ina Periman, said that every month there was an influx of between 500 and 1 000 people from other countries in Africa to homelands in the northern Transvaal. In 1991, 61 384 illegal immigrants were repatriated.

The Central Statistical Service (CSS) said in November 1992 that the number of immigrants to South Africa in the first seven months of 1992 (4 483) had shown a decline of 34% on figures for the same period in 1991 (6 761). According to the CSS, the number of South Africans emigrating had declined by 11%- from 2 747 in the first seven months of 1991 to 2 443 in the same period in 1992.⁸² ^[82] *The Citizen* 25 November 1992₁

The results of the 1991 population census were published in December 1992. According to the census, there were 37 737 620 people living in South Africa (including the ten homelands) in 1991, of whom 6 750 700 lived in the 'independent' homelands. This was a 12% increase on the 1985 population census figure. The population of the 'independent' homelands increased by 15% over this period. It was estimated that in 1991 the population of South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands) consisted of 21 646 471 Africans, 3 285 718 coloured people, 986 620 Indians and 5 068 110 whites. (According to the CSS, figures do not add up because of rounding during adjustment for undercount.) Other findings of the census were as follows:

- 37,5% of the population was economically active (ie working, or unemployed and looking for work);
- 6% of the total population (2,1m people) was unemployed. This was 18,3% of the economically active population (EAP);
- a breakdown of unemployment by race showed that 7,8% of Africans (1,7m), 6,9% of coloured people (229 000), 4,8% of Indians (48 000) and 1,8% of whites (95 000) were unemployed;
- the proportion of the population in possession of a level of education of standard 6 or higher increased from 32,6% in 1985 to 37,4% in 1991;

- about 48% of the population lived in formal houses, 24% in huts and 9% in shacks;
- the service sector was the most important employer with one out of every five people in the EAP employed in this sector. Manufacturing employed one in eight of the EAP, followed in importance by commerce and agriculture; and
- while 38% of the white population earned between R10 000 and R29 999 a year, 32% of Africans earned between R1 000 and R2 999 a year.

Environment

The Report of the Three Committees of the President's Council on a National Environmental Management System was published in October 1991. Some of its most important findings were that:

- the high population growth rate in South Africa posed the most serious threat to the environment because of increasing pressure on natural resources;
- each year between 300m and 400m tonnes of arable topsoil in South Africa were washed away. Despite this, only 28% of cultivated land was subject to conservation measures;
- overcrowding and unplanned development had degraded large areas of the coastline;
- over the previous 50 years the intertidal zone had been stripped substantially of edible shellfish and stricter law enforcement was necessary to prevent over exploitation of rock lobster and abalone;
- the concentration of dissolved substances in a number of state dams exceeded South African Bureau of Standards specifications;
- South Africa contributed 2% of the gases responsible for the global greenhouse effect; and
- the system of solid waste management in South Africa was 'most unsatisfactory'. It posed a serious threat to human health and caused extensive environmental damage.

The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) said in July 1992 that it had found that management of hazardous waste in South Africa was 'primitive', with insufficient controlling legislation, unsuitable disposal sites and almost no adequate management of the transportation of hazardous waste.⁸³ [⁸³ *Engineering News* 3 July 1992]

In August 1992 the CSIR also found traces of two banned insecticides—dieldren and benzine hexachloride—in fish taken from the Schoemans River and the Boskop Dam (both in the western Transvaal).⁸⁴ [⁸⁴ *The Star* 13 August 1992] The head of the Biotox Foundation, Mr Abre Steyn, said that of 36 insecticides listed internationally as dangerous, 30 were registered for use in South Africa.

The President's Council (PC) report said that improved quality of life in South Africa depended on both conservation and development and recommended that a system of integrated environmental management be adopted to satisfy both these needs. It said that all development should be sustainable.

In a report submitted to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in March 1992, the government said that apartheid policies had served to aggravate poverty and had resulted in overexploitation of agricultural land and incalculable environmental damage. It added that no unified strategy existed in South Africa for sustainable development and environmental conservation.

In a *White Paper on Tourism* published in May 1992, the government announced a three-year plan to promote South Africa as an important 'ecotourism' destination. The government said that it hoped that economic development could be encouraged at the same time as promoting environmental conservation.⁸⁵ [⁸⁵ *Ibid* 14 May 1992]

Also in May, the Industrial Development Corporation announced that it was to allocate R600m to finance new game parks, tourist accommodation and facilities in and near game reserves.⁸⁶ [⁸⁶ *Ibid* 13 May 1992]

The African National Congress (ANC) said that it espoused a policy of sustainable development but that it was impossible to pursue a rational environmental protection strategy under the apartheid system. It said that subject to absolute upper limits a system of 'polluter pays' should be implemented to reduce pollution. Comprehensive legislation regarding environmental impact assessment, monitoring of the environment and prevention of pollution should also be passed, the ANC suggested.

The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) also espoused a policy of sustainable development, saying that it would plan development to meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. The IFP also believed there was a need to control population growth so that there was a balance between family size and available resources.

It was estimated in 1992 that if mines and the chemical industry were excluded, a total of 15m tonnes of waste was recycled each year in South Africa (excluding the ten homelands). Fifteen percent of newspapers and magazines and 18% of plastic were recycled.

As a signatory in 1986 of the Montreal Protocol, South Africa had committed itself to phasing out completely the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) by the year 2000. According to the PC, the country

appeared to be in a position to meet this deadline. The Aerosol Manufacturers' Association said that more than 96% of all aerosols used in South Africa were already free of CFCs. However, CFCs were still used for underground cooling in the mining industry because substitutes had proved to be more flammable.⁸⁷ [⁸⁷ *Business Day* 12 August 1992] AECI, which was the only manufacturer of CFCs in South Africa, announced in September 1992 that it would stop CFC production completely by the end of 1995.⁸⁸ [⁸⁸ *Ibid* 2 September 1992]

Housing and urbanisation

The De Loor task group, which has been established under the chairmanship of a former auditor general, Dr Joop de Loor, to provide recommendations to the government on the formulation of a new housing policy, estimated that in 1990 approximately 22m people or 63% of the population of South Africa (including the ten homelands) were urbanised. The task group said that the urbanised population was expected to increase to nearly 33m (or 75% of the total population) by 2000. The rural population was expected to decline slightly from 16m in 1990 to 15m in 2000.

In February 1992 the Department of Regional and Land Affairs published a guide plan entitled *Spatial Development Framework for the Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging (PWV) Area*. The plan suggested that all unsuitable, unused and central land in the PWV area should be considered for the development of affordable housing. In July 1992 the Urban Foundation (UF) urged 'the total withdrawal' of the draft plan, arguing that 'old apartheid ideas and practices live on' in the conceptualisation of the draft plan.⁸⁹ [⁸⁹ *The Star* 29 July 1992] In September 1992 it was reported that the UF and the government had reached agreement on a number of key issues concerning the draft plan for the PWV, including the need from the outset to involve key players in planning and the need for a new vision for the region.⁹⁰ [⁹⁰ *Business Day* 2 September 1992]

In August 1992 researchers of two urban planning organisations, the Urban Problems Research Unit (Cape Town) and Planact (Johannesburg), said that the government was selling off public urban land without adequate consultation. At the time of writing some 8 290ha of government-owned land in the Transvaal was in the process of being sold.⁹¹ [⁹¹ *Indicator South Africa* winter 1992, *Wort in Progress* July/August 1992]

A study undertaken in February 1992 by the BMI Building Research Consulting Unit on formal house construction in 1991 for all races found that in 1991, 101 formal builders interviewed had built some 10 000 houses. Only 27% of these houses were built at a cost of less than R65 000 each. Research conducted between 1986 and 1992 by two building economists, Messrs Wilsey Kilian and Johan Snyman, showed continued racial inequality in the number of houses built, the values of such houses and the quality of such housing. The Department of National Health and Population Development found

in early 1991 that only 33% of the rural population of South Africa (excluding the ten homelands) had housing of an 'acceptable' standard.

The De Loor task group said in April 1992 that 198 000 houses needed to be built each year for the next ten years to eliminate the housing backlog. The task group estimated further that in 1990 the housing backlog in the urban areas of South Africa (including the ten homelands) was 1,3m units.

By May 1992 the Independent Development Trust had approved 104 site-and-service schemes involving the provision of serviced sites for some 665 560 people countrywide. Between June 1991 and April 1992 the South African Housing Trust was responsible for the funding of 104 housing projects countrywide, which included the provision of 9 776 formal houses and 9 247 serviced sites. During 1991 The New Housing Company Group (NEWHCO) (formed by the merger of the UFs four utility companies) sold 216 residential stands and 3 672 starter homes. Between January 1992 and April 1992 NEWHCO provided 3 171 serviced sites and 877 starter homes countrywide.

The National Housing Forum was set up at a meeting in Randburg (near Johannesburg) in November 1991 with the aim of formulating a national housing accord. The forum comprised political parties and other interest groups with a stake in hous'ing. The forum was officially launched in Johannesburg in August 1992,⁹² [⁹² *The Star* 1 September 1992] despite the government's withdrawal from the forum in January 1992.

The De Loor task group published its report in April 1992. The task group called for the proportion of gross domestic product allocated to housing to be increased from 3% to 5%. The task group also suggested a subsidy scheme comprising four categories, graduated according to income and aimed at lower-income groups. A copy of the report was submitted to the National Housing Forum for discussion.

The content of the report was criticised by the UF and Planact.⁹³ [⁹³ Urban Foundation Focus, *Report on the De Loor Proposals*, forthcoming publication; *Work in Process* October 1992] The UF said that there were 'fundamental weaknesses' in the report that 'undermined the proposals'. If the suggestions contained in the report were implemented, the UF believed that 'the poor would be further marginalised'. The UF further argued that 'there was profound confusion as to what private-sector housing delivery actually means' and criticised the proposed subsidy approach as 'complex'.

In November 1992 the committee for economic affairs of the President's Council (PC) published a report on a revised urbanisation strategy for South Africa. According to the report, the biggest challenges facing town planners and local authorities were establishing viable communities in informal settlements, replanning and upgrading existing African townships, and incorporating informal settlements into white urban areas. The PC report said that municipalities would need financial assistance from central and regional government to make such development possible. It proposed the creation of a national urban development corporation to oversee the development and upgrading of urban areas.⁹⁴ [⁹⁴ *The Citizen* 25,26 November 1992]

In 1992/93 budgeted spending by the government on housing and related infrastructure was R2,15bn. The total figure included R1,65bn set aside in the budget and R500m from the sale of strategic oil reserves. The amount allocated in the main budget increased from R1,4bn in 1991/92 to R1,65bn in 1992/93, yet represented a decrease of 8% in real terms.

The Department of Local Government and National Housing estimated in June 1992 that in 1991 some 3,6m people were living in informal settlements countrywide. The chairman of Operation Masakhane for the Homeless, Mr Dan Moshugi, put the figure of people informally housed in 1992 at 10m. After withdrawing proposals to move the informally housed Zevenfontein community (north of Johannesburg) to Diepsloot and Bloubaarsdrand owing to pressure from local ratepayer associations, the Transvaal Provincial Administration (TPA) announced in June 1992 that it would pay more than R5,4m to expropriate land in Diepsloot West and Nietgedacht, on which to provide housing for the Zevenfontein community.⁹⁵ [⁹⁵ *Business Day* 11 June 1992] However, the Diepsloot residents' committee⁹⁶ [⁹⁶ *The Star* 6 July 1992] and the Jukskei Crocodile Catchment Area Land Owners' and Residents' Association sought court interdicts to prevent resettlement at Diepsloot West and Nietgedacht respectively. In July 1992 the Pretoria Supreme Court granted an interdict preventing the TPA from moving the Zevenfontein informal settlers to Nietgedacht.⁹⁷ [⁹⁷ *Business Day* 17 August 1992] The outcome of a similar application to the Supreme Court to prevent the development of Diepsloot West by the TPA was postponed to November 1992.⁹⁸ [⁹⁸ *Ibid* 9 September 1992]

In October 1992 the Hendricks family, a coloured family who had lost property in Cape Town in 1982 when their land was declared white in terms of the Group Areas Act of 1966, had a freeze placed on the resale of this property following an application to the Advisory Commission on Land Allocation. The Legal Resources Centre in Cape Town said that the case had important implications for the right of the government to sell land obtained as a result of removals under the Group Areas Act.⁹⁹ [⁹⁹ *Ibid* 16 October 1992]

A spokesman for the Department of Local Government and National Housing, Mr Francois Jacobs, said that in June 1992 there were 240 hostels countrywide for Africans, of which 177 were owned by local authorities and provincial administrations. While there were 456 202 hostel beds for Africans countrywide,¹⁰⁰ [¹⁰⁰ *Fast Facts* no 10, October 1992] the Congress of South African Trade Unions said that in certain areas there were as many as six residents per hostel bed. In May 1992 the government set aside R295m from the 1992/93 budget for the upgrading or conversion of African hostels. By August 1992 negotiations concerning the upgrading and conversion of hostels were finalised at 38 hostels and in progress at another 65, planning was finalised at 24 hostels and in progress at another 14, and construction was in progress at two hostels.¹⁰¹ [¹⁰¹ *Ibid*]

In 1992 an estimated 23m people in South Africa (including the ten homelands) had no access to

electricity in their homes. In the ten homelands less than 10% of the population had access to electricity.

By September 1992 Eskom had secured rights for the direct supply of electricity from 43 African local authorities and negotiations for a take over by Eskom were in an advanced stage in 40 other townships. The strategy represented an attempt by Eskom to bypass African local authorities who are seen by many township residents as politically illegitimate and technically incompetent, to supply electricity directly to township residents and in so doing, to ensure improved electricity payments.¹⁰² [¹⁰² Information supplied by the electrification market research consultant at Eskom, Mr I van Gass, 22 September 1992]

Following the national meeting on electrification in Cape Town in February 1992, the Development Bank of Southern Africa was asked to facilitate the creation of a permanent national electrification forum where obstacles to the electrification process could be discussed.¹⁰³ [¹⁰³ *New Ground* spring 1992] Some 150 delegates from interested parties met in September 1992 in Johannesburg but failed to agree on who should serve on the electrification forum. It was expected that the forum would be launched by December 1992.¹⁰⁴ [¹⁰⁴ *Business Day* 22 September 1992]

The Transport General Amendment Bill was introduced in Parliament in April 1992 and made provision for the National Road Safety Council (NRSC) to be abolished. The director general of transport would take over the functions of the NRSC.

Health and welfare

In September 1992 the minister of national health, Dr Rina Venter, announced that health services were to be rationalised and that legislation was being prepared to phase out own affairs departments and to allow for the formation of a single national department of health. She warned that health services were under severe financial pressure.¹⁰⁵ [¹⁰⁵ *Business Day, The Citizen* 29 September 1992]

A member of the national executive committee of the African National Congress (ANC), Ms Cheryl Carolus, said in the same month that the private and public health sectors needed to be rationalised and unified into a system which allowed for accessible and affordable health care. She added that the ANC was considering the possibility of a national health insurance scheme.¹⁰⁶ [¹⁰⁶ *Argus* 18 September 1992]

In March 1992 the minister of finance, Mr Barend du Plessis, announced that the government was to spend R9,93bn on health services in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands) in the 1992/93 financial year, which represented an increase of 22% on expenditure in the previous financial year. The most significant increases were in the programme for combating malnutrition (where expenditure increased from R220m to R440m) and in the allocation to fighting acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) (where the allocation increased from R5,4m to R20,9m).

Membership of medical aid schemes stood at 2,3m in December 1990, with 6,2m people receiving benefits from such schemes. However, although a majority of whites were members of medical aid schemes, only 5% of Africans enjoyed such membership. In August 1992 the marketing director of Affiliated Medical Administrators, Mr Ray Welham, said that about 25% of medical aid contributions were wasted on fraud and overutilisation of medical services, which cost medical aid schemes R1bn a year.

A researcher at the Centre for Health Policy at the University of the Witwatersrand, Dr Max Price, said that medical aid schemes failed to provide medical care for the majority of South Africans. He proposed that medical aid schemes be replaced by a compulsory national health insurance scheme to be run by the state. In such a scheme the contributions of the unemployed and the informal sector would be covered by cross-subsidisation and tax revenue.

There were 24 619 doctors and 140 460 nurses in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands) in 1991. During 1991 and 1992 the number of registered doctors was increased substantially by an influx of doctors from eastern Europe, India and Burma. Between April 1990 and June 1992, 2 314 foreign doctors were granted limited registration to practise in South Africa without having to write South African medical examinations. However, in May 1992, after complaints that immigrant doctors did not meet local standards and that they were taking jobs away from local doctors, examination requirements were reinstated. More than 50% of those who wrote subsequent examinations failed them.

The number of nurses registered in 1991 showed a decline of 5% on the number registered in 1990. In May 1992 the Transvaal Provincial Administration (TPA) was reported to be unable to fill 4 016 (or 12%) of its nursing posts. The problem was aggravated in 1991 by a decline of 10% in the number of student nurses registering for training in the Transvaal. The South African Nursing Association said that nurses were also leaving public-sector hospitals 'in droves' for the more lucrative private sector.

Services at provincial hospitals were affected by a strike in June 1992 by about 18 000 hospital workers who were members of the National Education, Health and Allied Workers' Union (Nehawu). The union demanded that workers be granted a minimum salary of R724, an across-the-board salary increase of 15,3% and a 40-hour working week. The strike was resolved speedily in the Cape and Natal, but it continued for more than a month in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. The TPA dismissed more than 7 000 general assistants at 18 hospitals at the end of June. In violence surrounding the strike in the Transvaal ten people were killed, some 100 people were injured and R5m worth of damage was done to property, including the destruction of five community clinics in Soweto.¹⁰⁷ [107 *Sowetan* 28 September 1992]

In September 1992 it was reported that after lengthy negotiations which were facilitated by the Witwatersrand/Vaal regional dispute resolution committee (set up in terms of the *National Peace Accord*) the TPA and Nehawu had reached agreement about the resolution of the strike. The published statement by the parties involved made no reference to salaries. However, in terms of the agreement:¹⁰⁸

[¹⁰⁸ *The Citizen* 26,28 September 1992]

- most of the fired workers would be reinstated;
- Nehawu would not take further industrial action for six months;
- parties to the agreement would not use language which incited violence or hatred towards each other;
- demonstrations by workers during normal working hours would concern only unresolved issues directly related to employer/worker relationships; and
- people who had been employed to replace fired strikers would be offered voluntary retrenchment packages.

Health indicators showed that the health status of Africans, especially in the homelands, continued to be far poorer than that of coloured people, Indians and whites. In 1990 infant mortality rates per 1 000 live births in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands) were as follows: Africans, 52,8; coloured people, 28; Indians, 13,5; and whites, 7,3. The infant mortality rates for Africans in the homelands were: non-independent homelands, 54,4, and 'independent' homelands, 59,8.

The cumulative total number of cases of AIDS reported in South Africa (including the ten homelands) up to 30 June 1992 was 1 316. By that date 50% of AIDS cases were heterosexual African men and women, 27% homosexual white men and 14% African infants. By 1992 the disease was spreading fastest among Africans and in Natal.

In October 1992 the government convened a meeting with more than 32 other organisations to develop a national policy on AIDS. The meeting was constituted as the National AIDS Convention of South Africa (Nacosa). The organisations which attended the meeting included the ANC, homeland administrations, the National Council of Trade Unions, the Progressive Primary Health Care Network, the South African Chamber of Business, the South African Council of Churches and the South African Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs.¹⁰⁹ [¹⁰⁹ *The Star* 23,26 October 1992] Nacosa was unable to agree on an AIDS policy for South Africa.

Tuberculosis (TB) continued to spread during the period under review as a result of poor socio-economic conditions, including unemployment, malnutrition and overcrowded housing. The South African National Tuberculosis Association said in November 1991 that the total TB case load had increased from 88 268 cases in 1985 to 124 635 in 1990, ie by 41% over a five-year period. The estimated prevalence rate per 100 000 people increased from 463 in 1985 to 590 in 1990. The largest increase of new cases in 1990 was in the western Cape (34%).

A survey published by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in August 1992 found that in the 1990/91 financial year 4m people in South Africa (including the ten homelands) had received welfare payments totalling R4,43bn (in comparison with R1,9bn in 1987/88). Calculated on a per capita basis, Africans received R100; coloured people, R246; and Indians and whites, R200. The HSRC said that of the 3,9m people-who received welfare grants, 2,6m were in receipt of pensions and 830 000 of disability grants, it stated that an additional 300 000 people could be unaware that they were eligible to apply for pensions.

In his budget speech in March 1992 Mr du Plessis said that monthly old-age pensions would be increased as follows: Africans, from R225 to R293; coloured people and Indians, from R263 to R318; and whites, from R304 to R345. The ratio of white to African pensions was thereby reduced from 1,35:1 to 1,18:1. Other social assistance payments were to be increased by 10%. Mr du Plessis said that social pensions could not be equalised immediately, but he undertook to ensure full parity in the 1993/94 budget.

As many as 25 000 African old-age pensioners throughout the country had their pensions stopped in 1992 because of the provincial administrations' desire to prevent the misuse of pension funds. A spokesman for the Cape Provincial Administration said that the provincial administrations were required by law to have pensions reviewed annually in order to determine whether or not beneficiaries still qualified for grants. However, a spokesman for the TPA admitted that in at least one instance letters warning of upcoming reviews and dated August 1991 had been received by pensioners only in March 1992. After being threatened with legal action, the provincial administrations agreed to resume payments in all such cases.

In September 1992 the executive director of Operation Hunger, Mrs Ina Periman, said that by the end of the year 2,5m people could be starving owing to the effects of the drought, crop failure and widespread unemployment. Earlier Dr Venter said that by May 1992 the government had spent only R125m of its 1991/92 allocation of R220m for food aid, and only R15m of its 1992/93 allocation of R440m for the same purpose.

Education

During 1992 the government took the initiative in educational reform. Aspects of policy proposals contained in the *Education Renewal Strategy* and *Curriculum Model* documents (published in 1991) were implemented. These included the devolution of certain powers to local school governing committees, the creation of semi-privatised model C schools in former white schools, the removal of racial restrictions and language policy changes in all schools administered by the Department of Education and Training (DET), a common certification authority for all students writing the standard 19 and national N3 examinations at the end of 1992, the upgrading of colleges of education and an extensive process of rationalisation in the teaching sector.

Speaking at a conference for ministers of education in July 1992, the minister of education and training, Mr Sam de Beer, said that a single nonracial system of education would probably be in place within 18 to 24 months. The state president, Mr F W de Klerk, had indicated earlier, in May 1992, that the government favoured a three-tiered system of education within a federal constitutional arrangement.

Some progress towards redistribution of resources within the educational system was made during the period under review. The ratio of per capita expenditure on African education (outside the ten homelands) to expenditure on white education was reduced to 3:1 during 1991/92. Spending on African education rose by 35,5% between 1991/92 and 1992/93, compared to an increase of 10% in the white education budget. In March 1992 Mr de Beer announced plans by the DET to upgrade and reform African education outside of the homelands. In terms of the package:

- capital projects would be speeded up. The DET hoped to reduce the classroom backlog to 4 596 by the end of 1992, while 15 new schools were to be completed in 'informal settlement areas';
- services to improve pupil performance in languages, mathematics and physical science would be implemented. An educational television service was launched in March 1992 to assist standard 10 pupils;
- 3 299 new teaching posts would be created at public ordinary schools in 1992, 330 new posts at farm schools and 53 new posts at technical colleges. The subject advisory service would also be strengthened, with the creation of 354 new posts for subject advisers in comparison with just 90 posts in 1990;
- teacher training colleges under the DET would be restructured to enhance their tertiary character; and
- a new post of staff commissioner would be created within the DET to improve labour relations. The commissioner would hear representations from aggrieved educators on an individual basis or from 'recognised teachers' associations'.

Enormous backlogs in black education persisted in 1992. The gap in resource provision in urban African schools (largely administered by the DET) and schools in the homelands widened. In 1992 the number of pupils per teacher, for example, varied from 14:1 in the Department of Education and Culture (House of Assembly) to 36:1 in the DET, while in some homelands (such as KwaZulu and the Transkei) the pupil/teacher ratio was 49:1. Pupil/classroom ratios remained high in all the African educational departments and exceeded 60:1 in some primary schools.

Per capita expenditure in the homelands (excluding capital costs) was R440 in KwaZulu, R428 in KaNgwane, and an average of R523 in the 'independent' homelands.¹¹⁰ [¹¹⁰ *Cape Times* 22 September 1992] Statistics supplied by the Research Institute for Education Planning indicated that at the present annual pupil growth rate of 5,8% in African education an additional 132 000 teachers and an equal

number of extra classrooms would be required by the year 2002. However, the statistics did not take account of the effects of the possible introduction of compulsory schooling. In 1992 an estimated 1,7m children of school-going age were not in school.¹¹¹ [¹¹¹ *Business Day* 21 September 1992]

Speaking in Parliament during the national education budget vote, the minister of national education, Mr Louis Pienaar, said that educational spending would be limited in future to 6% of gross domestic product and would be based on a projected growth rate of 1% in the economy. In terms of this the government would be able to fund only the first seven years of schooling over the next decade.

Various programmes to rationalise government spending in education were initiated during the period under review within an own affairs framework but failed to eliminate the duplication and underutilisation of some resources. The unilateral implementation of the rationalisation programme sparked pressure from political organisations, community associations, parents, teachers and pupils for wider consultation regarding educational financing and policy planning.

The conversion in 1992 to a semi-privatised model C system in white education resulted in the loss of 4 000 teaching posts in the Department of Education and Culture in the House of Assembly, while 3 299 new teaching posts were created in the DET.

The implementation of the model C system provided an indication of the difficulties which could follow government withdrawal from full funding of education. Mr Douglas Gibson MP (Democratic Party) said in October 1992 that a number of schools would be compelled to close down if the government refused to pay municipal rates for schools situated on valuable property. He pointed out that, for example, the King Edward VII and Helpmekaar high schools in Johannesburg would face rates bills of R200 000 per year.¹¹² [¹¹² *The Star* 16 September 1992] After representations from parents' associations, school governing committees and teachers' associations, the government announced in the same month that municipal rates on model C and private schools would continue to be paid until such time as further arrangements, such as exemptions, could be negotiated.¹¹³ [¹¹³ *Business Day* 23 October 1992] The government was also considering tax relief on school fees after representations from the Federation of Parents' Associations.¹¹⁴ [¹¹⁴ *The Citizen* 20 October 1992] In October 1992 it was reported that three model C schools in Natal had applied to revert to being ordinary state schools because the financial burden of model C status was too great.¹¹⁵ [¹¹⁵ *Business Day* 27 October 1992]

The minister of education and culture in the House of Assembly, Mr Piet Marais, said in November 1992 that the government was aware of the financial difficulties that some parents of children at model C schools were facing. For this reason, in March 1992 the government had set aside an amount of R70m for subsidies to such parents, of which R40m was still available in November. Mr Marais added that the government was also providing funds for maintenance work at schools and that it would continue to pay property taxes on schools. He denied the claims of some critics of the government's educational policy

that the school system was disintegrating and said that it was to be expected that with such radical change there would be initial difficulties.¹¹⁶ [¹¹⁶ *The Citizen* 19 November 1992]

A survey conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in September 1991 found that more whites were in favour of open schools than had been the case in 1989. The HSRC survey found that 51% of white respondents in 1991, in comparison with 35,2% in 1989, believed that children of all races should share the same schools and classrooms. However, in 1991 more than 50% of white respondents felt that standards would drop if children from other race groups were admitted to white schools.¹¹⁷ [¹¹⁷ *The Star* 18 February 1992]

In September 1992 the minister of education and culture in the House of Representatives, Mr Abe Williams, said that 5 790 teachers would be granted early retirement as part of a rationalisation package in his department. His announcement sparked protests from teachers, parents and school pupils around the country. Within three weeks of the announcement teachers at 40 schools in the Transvaal embarked on an indefinite chalkdown, while teachers in the Cape and Natal embarked on go-slows.¹¹⁸ [¹¹⁸ *The Citizen* 21 October 1992, *The Star* 22 October 1992] Following representations from the Union of Teachers' Associations of South Africa (Utasa), Mr Williams announced the suspension of the rationalisation package.

Talks on education initiated at a meeting in February 1991 between a delegation led by the president of the African National Congress (ANC), Mr Nelson Mandela, and the government stalled after seven months, allegedly due to the inability of the joint working group, which it established, to take decisive and legally binding action. Prospects of a fully representative negotiations forum on education being constituted faded with the stalling of constitutional talks. The education delegation was subsequently disbanded at a conference at Broederstroom (west Rand) in March 1992. A post-conference committee was mandated to formulate and develop a two-pronged strategy for change in education, including mobilising for a reconstituted forum while strengthening mass-based education campaigns.

Speaking in May 1992 the head of the Department of Education of the ANC, Mr John Samuels, called for a 'national emergency programme' to address the deepening crisis in education. He said that such a programme should address short-term demands such as increased resources and finance within a rational national framework. Bureaucratic structures at educational institutions should be fundamentally changed and a set of educational targets should be established which could be achieved in the short-term. Such targets could include improving the ratio of books per student, improving mathematics and science learning, improving teacher/pupil, pupil/classroom, and teacher/administrator ratios, and improving retention rates at black schools.¹¹⁹ [¹¹⁹ Samuels J, unpublished paper delivered at the CTU seminar on 'Education Enrichment in South Africa', Volkswagen Conference Centre, 26-27 May 1992]

Boycotts, teacher strikes and protest action in black education continued throughout 1992. The year

started with teaching at African schools in the Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging area being disrupted as pupils attempted to take control of admission procedures, pupil promotion and other administrative responsibilities at their schools. These attempts were accompanied by physical assaults on unpopular principals and teachers. By June 1992 more than 16 African schools on the Reef had been closed for limited periods owing to continuing violence and protests. By mid-year student protests at the decision by the DET to increase examination fees resulted in 35 schools failing to meet the May deadline for examination registration.

On 3 and 4 August 1992 thousands of pupils and teachers joined the national mass action campaign called by the ANC despite calls by the ANC and other political organisations for schooling not to be disrupted. The Johannesburg region of the DET revealed by August that pupils in Soweto had lost 50% of class attendance and that many schools had covered only 20% of the year's syllabus. The regional director of the DET for the Johannesburg region, Mr Richard Motau, said that one million pupil hours had been lost in the week of mass action and that over R4m had been wasted on teacher salaries and the costs of running empty schools during the year.¹²⁰ [¹²⁰ *The Weekly Mail* 21 August 1992, *Business Day* 25 August 1992] In Soweto a further two days of schooling were lost during September as more than 5 000 teachers embarked on a two-day chalkdown in support of dismissed colleagues. The decision by the DET to recognise the South African Democratic Teachers' Union (Sadtu) on 3 September 1992 narrowly averted the threat of a national teachers' strike just four weeks before the final examinations.

In May 1992 schooling in the Ciskei, particularly in Mdantsane, was totally disrupted after the refusal of the Ciskei educational authorities to recognise parent, teacher and student associations and teacher protests over the suspension of colleagues and non-recognition of Sadtu. The situation worsened after the shootings at Bisho on 7 September 1992 as students fled the area and most schools around Mdantsane remained closed.¹²¹ [¹²¹ *Daily Dispatch* 12 June 1992, 17 July 1992, 10 September 1992] Clashes between ANC and Inkatha Freedom Party supporters disrupted schooling in KwaZulu and Natal throughout the year.

Lectures at seven African teacher training colleges were suspended during the year. Classes stopped at the Kathorus College of Education (east Rand) in February 1992 after students set a senior lecturer alight. The East Rand College of Education closed down for a month after students demanded the resignation of the rector. At the Soweto College of Education sporadic boycotts occurred throughout the year after ten first-year students who had failed were refused readmission in 1992. Other colleges of education which were closed down during the year by student unrest included the College of Education in Fort Beaufort (eastern Cape), the Mphohadi College of Education in Kroonstad (Orange Free State), the Setotlwane College of Education in Lebowa, and the Transvaal College of Education in Soshanguve (Pretoria).¹²² [¹²² *Sowetan* 19 February 1992, 5 March 1992; *The Weekly Mail* 20 March 1992]

Land and agriculture

The deputy minister for land affairs, Mr Johan Scheepers, said in July 1992 that a system of private freehold ownership of land and a market-oriented economy were central to the government's land policy. He rejected any form of affirmative action in the redistribution of land and said that the government would consider for restitution to people who had been removed under apartheid legislation only land which was still in the possession of the state and which had not been developed.

The African National Congress (ANC) said that there was an urgent need for redistribution, and proposed measures such as land taxes and expropriation in accordance with principles laid down in a bill of rights to facilitate such a process. The ANC said that the need to maintain food production would nevertheless have to be taken into account.

The Advisory Commission on Land Allocation was constituted in November 1991 with the aim of identifying land for reallocation to communities which had been removed and facilitating the restoration of such communities to land which they had previously occupied. More than 31 communities made representations to the commission, which was to make known its findings in March 1993.

In spite of assurances by Mr Scheepers in June 1992 that state land being claimed by removed communities would not be sold without the permission of an interdepartmental committee, in the same month the Department of Agricultural Development persuaded the registrar of deeds in Kimberley (northern Cape) to accelerate the transfer to white farmers of land that was being claimed by the Majeng community. A similar incident occurred in August 1992 when the Advisory Commission on Land Allocation had to intervene to stop the sale by the Department of Public Works to white farmers of 4 125ha of land in the eastern Cape claimed by the Thornhill community.

The government announced in August 1992 that it was considering transferring administrative control of more than 1m hectares of land which had previously been under the control of the South African Development Trust to homeland administrations. The announcement was condemned by the ANC, the Association for Rural Advancement, the Democratic Party and the national land committee. The ANC said that the transfer of administrative control would have the same negative effect as incorporation into the homelands and accused the government of reverting to grand apartheid strategies and of disregarding reassurances made in the *White Paper on Land Reform* that no more land would be incorporated into the homelands. Mr Scheepers denied these allegations, saying that the white paper still formed a working document, but that when 'investigating possibilities, [one went] beyond it'. He said that there was pressure from people living in the homelands for more land, which necessitated the transfer of this land.¹²³ [¹²³ *Sunday Times* 23 August 1992, *The Star* August 1992]

Mr Scheepers announced in November 1992 that an advisory committee on land policy, which included community representatives, had been established. The objective of the committee would be to advise the minister on land reform and the formulation of policy on rural development.¹²⁴ [¹²⁴ *The Citizen* 19 November 1992; Interview with a spokesman of the Department of Regional and Land Affairs, Mr Paul Barbard,

23 November 1992₁

While the government recognised the importance of part-time and tenant farmers, it sought to promote financially sound owner and occupant farmers. The ANC said, however, that it believed that there should be a move away from large-scale single-crop agriculture to a more diversified system which included family farms and co-operative farming. The Conservative Party saw the white population as the most important agricultural entrepreneurs and urged the government to provide an assistance scheme to return white farmers to the land.

In 1992 South Africa experienced what was termed the worst drought since 1921, with severe consequences for agriculture, the economy and the rural areas. The effects of the drought were particularly severe in the northern Transvaal and northern Orange Free State, although the impact was felt throughout the country. In August 1992 about 7 000 people in Venda were relying on less than two litres of water a day, compared with a minimum of 15 litres considered necessary to maintain adequate health and hygiene.

Most crop yields declined as a result of the drought. It was estimated that the total maize yield would drop from more than 7m tonnes in 1990/91 to about 2,5m tonnes in 1991/92. The government said that as a result it would have to import about 4,6m tonnes of maize at a cost of R1,8bn. It was expected that winter crops would also be affected. The national crop estimates committee said that 1,1m tonnes of wheat would be harvested in the 1992/93 season, compared with 2,1m tonnes in 1991/92. The Wheat Board announced that it would begin importing wheat in October 1992.¹²⁵ [125 *Business Day* 15 September 1992₁

Wool production was expected to drop from 102m kilogrammes in 1991 to 78m kilogrammes in 1992 (ie by 22%). (This was the lowest level of wool production since 1924.) The Wool Board said that the drought conditions would continue to influence wool production and forecast a total clip of 73,5m kilogrammes in 1993. In 1991 wool had constituted the largest proportion of agricultural exports (15,3%).

In 1991 agriculture contributed R12,5bn (4,7%) to gross domestic product (GDP). The South African Reserve Bank estimated that as a result of the drought the gross value added by agriculture to GDP would decline by 14%, causing total GDP to decrease by 1,8%.

The South African Agricultural Union said that more than 1m people were employed in agriculture and it was estimated that some 5m people were directly and indirectly reliant on agriculture for employment. The Development Bank of Southern Africa reported in August 1992 that 70 000 people in the northern Transvaal had lost their jobs as a result of the drought and estimated that 30 000 more jobs were under threat.

In May 1992 the government announced that it had allocated R3,8bn for financial assistance to farmers

to be paid out over the next four financial years. Although this assistance was termed 'drought relief, it included an amount of R2,4bn for the repayment of debt incurred by white farmers in favour of agricultural cooperatives as a result of loan guarantees made since 1983. This meant that R 1,4bn was available solely for drought relief. Of the total amount of R3,8bn, R1bn was to be paid out in the 1992/93 financial year, with R250m allocated for debt repayment.

International agencies also provided drought assistance. The European Community donated R2,6m to the Water Supply Task Force (a joint government and private-sector initiative) to assist in the supply of water to parts of the northern Transvaal. It was the first international donation in many decades to an agency involving the government. The International Monetary Fund gave South Africa access to credit of R2,8bn from a special fund which covered losses on grain exports or increased costs of grain imports.

Although farmers' gross income increased from R5,9bn in 1980 to R21bn in 1992 (ie by 260%), net income increased by only 150% (from R2,2bn to R5,5bn). Input costs increased by almost 313% over the same period, while the producer price index increased by only 203%. In the same period the consumer price index had increased by nearly 353%, making the financial situation of farmers even more serious.

It was estimated that agricultural debt stood at R17bn at the end of 1991. The chairman of the South African Co-operative Council, Mr Charles van Veijeren, estimated that total agricultural debt would increase to more than R20bn by the end of 1992. In 1992 interest repayments on loans to the agricultural sector amounted to R2,7bn a year, or 36% of net farming income. An economist at Boland Bank, Mr Louis Fourie, said that in 1975 farmers had been able to pay off their average debt with about 1,4 years offarming income. He added that the drought in 1992 would cause the average period required to pay off farming debts to increase to five years.

In November 1992 a consultant to the Independent Development Trust, Mr Steyn du Plessis, said that between 5 000 and 7 000 farmers were likely to be sequestered as a result of the drought and subsidy cuts to farmers. Such sequestrations could lead to the loss of 100 000 jobs in agriculture, he added.¹²⁶ [126 Ibid 26 November 1992]

A report published in June 1992 by the Board of Trade and Tariffs (BTT), which had been commissioned to investigate the cause of food price increases, said that agricultural control boards contributed considerably to food price increases and recommended that they no longer be allowed to set prices. The BTT said that agriculture should be deregulated from government to municipal level, that consumers should be permitted to buy food directly from producers and that health and hygiene rules were inappropriately stringent for South African conditions.

The minister of agriculture, Dr Kraai van Niekerk, criticised the report, saying that it was inadequate and that he took issue with the emphasis on the contribution of marketing boards to rising food prices. He said that a policy committee representing a broad spectrum of interested parties would be established to investigate the matter and he referred the report back to the BTT for further investigation.

The economy and business

According to the Central Statistical Service, real economic growth as measured by gross domestic product (GDP) at constant 1985 market prices was -0,6% in 1991, compared with a revised figure of -0,5% for 1990. The minister of finance, Mr Derek Keys, said in May 1992 that it was necessary to increase investment in order to improve the economic growth rate. The governor of the South African Reserve Bank, Dr Chris Stals, said in October 1992 that the bank expected a modest economic growth rate of 1% in 1993. Dr Stals said that this forecast was based on expectations of a cyclical rise in demand, better agricultural conditions and an improvement in the world economy. He added that an improvement in South Africa's political situation would provide further impetus for economic

growth.¹²⁷ [¹²⁷ *The Star* 21 October 1992]

According to the reserve bank, the surplus on the current account of the balance of payments was R7,4bn in 1991, compared with R5,8bn in 1990. South Africa's foreign reserves were valued at R9,8bn at the end of 1991.

The average London gold price in 1991 was US\$362 (R1 000), compared with \$384 (R992) in 1990. According to Rand Merchant Bank International Futures, in 1992 the average London gold price (uptoll December 1992) was \$343.¹²⁸ [¹²⁸ *Business Day* 14 December 1992] The chairman of the gold and uranium division of the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, Mr Clem Sunter, said in September 1992 that a gold price of \$500 an ounce was needed to keep South Africa's output stable. A price of \$600 was necessary if South African production was to increase, he added.¹²⁹ [¹²⁹ *The Star* 10 September 1992]

In 1991 the nominal value of the commercial rand was 36,2 American cents, lower than the average of 38,6 American cents in 1990. On 11 December 1992 the rand was worth 33,1 American cents. The financial rand was valued at 21,0 cents on the same day.¹³⁰ [¹³⁰ *Business Day* 14 December 1992]

The average inflation rate for 1991, as measured by the consumer price index, was 15,3%. In August 1992 the year-on-year inflation rate was 14,3%, compared with 14,6% in July 1992.¹³¹ [¹³¹ *Cape Times* 1 October 1992] By October the rate had dropped to 11,7%, the lowest year-on-year level since June 1984.¹³² [¹³² *Financial Mail* 27 November 1992]

South African exports (including gold) totalled R66,23bn in 1991, an increase of 8,7% on the revised figure of R60,93bn for 1990. According to figures provided by the Department of Customs and Excise, total exports in the first nine months of 1992 were valued at R50,9bn and imports at R38,9bn. The trade surplus was 17% higher than for the same period in 1991.¹³³ [¹³³ *The Citizen* 21 October 1992]

In November 1992 Dr Stals reduced bank rate by one percentage point to 14%. Dr Stals said that the cut was justified by the more stable financial situation and expectations that the inflation rate would decline further in the near future.¹³⁴ [¹³⁴ *Business Day* 18 November 1992] The cut was also seen as a move to stimulate the economy after the weakening in real economic activity in the third quarter of 1992.¹³⁵ [¹³⁵ *The Star* 18 November 1992] The major banks subsequently reduced their prime overdraft rate from 18,25% to 17,25%.¹³⁶ [¹³⁶ *Business Day* 19 November 1992]

During 1992 sanctions against South Africa continued to be lifted by foreign governments. The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference suspended 'people-to-people' sanctions in January 1992. The European Community (EC) ratified its decision to lift sanctions on the importing of South African gold coins, iron and steel in February 1992. In the same month the president of the United States (US), Mr George Bush, authorised the Export Import Bank to consider requests from the South African government for loan guarantees. However, the *Guide to American State and Local Sanctions on South Africa*, which was published in September 1992, said that 164 US cities, counties and states continued to observe sanctions against South Africa. Only two authorities, namely the state of Oregon and Fairfax county in the state of Virginia, had lifted sanctions against South Africa since Mr Bush had repealed federal sanctions in July 1991 (see *1991/92 Survey* p417).¹³⁷ [¹³⁷ *New Nation* 25 September 1992]

A study commissioned by the South African Chamber of Business (Sacob), which was published in October 1992, advised that while economic co-operation with neighbouring states was important. South Africa should be cautious in the short term about committing itself to full integration with any existing trade blocs. It quoted the Africa Institute as saying that South Africa had to establish links with the EC and other overseas markets or it would 'impoverish itself'.¹³⁸ [¹³⁸ *The Star* 20 October 1992]

The Department of Finance said in March 1992 that the objective of monetary policy continued to be the protection of the internal and external value of the rand. Dr Stals said in the same month that there was no justification for a general relaxation in monetary policy. According to the *Budget Review*, which was published in March 1992, South Africa's fiscal problems were characteristic of other developing countries engaged in constitutional and economic reforms. These included the difficulty of reducing the fiscal deficit because of lower revenue and higher expenditure and political instability, which aggravated fiscal problems.

The minister of finance, Mr Barend du Plessis, said in his budget speech in March 1992 that the 1992/93 budget would continue with the objective of the 1991/92 budget, that is to alleviate material deprivation while attempting to encourage growth. The Department of Finance said in October 1992 that the 1992/93 budget deficit was expected to reach 7% of GDP, compared with a budgeted 4,5%. The department attributed the higher deficit to the 'intense' recession, which had lasted longer than expected.¹³⁹ [¹³⁹ *Business Day* 16 October 1992] The state president, Mr F W de Klerk, said in the same

month that the government intended reducing its consumption expenditure from the current figure of 21% of GDP to 16% of GDP.¹⁴⁰ [¹⁴⁰ *The Star* 21 October 1992]

The Department of Finance announced in September 1992 that the central government and the 'independent' homelands were negotiating with South African banks to avert a major debt crisis arising from the fact that about R4bn of short-term debt incurred by the homeland authorities was falling due. The department said that although the central government was ultimately responsible for the debts, there was no possibility that the government would take them over.

A discussion document drawn up by the committee of investigation into intergovernmental fiscal relations in October 1992 proposed a land tax that could yield R500m in revenue and a mineral levy that could raise R400m for local government. The objective of the document was to promote the idea of devolving revenue and spending power to lower levels of government. The report said that new taxes at regional and local levels should not increase the total tax burden. Therefore, they had to be accompanied by a reduction in the central government's tax burden. The report added that it was possible to reduce central government spending as a proportion of total government spending from its present level of 60% to about 40%.¹⁴¹ [¹⁴¹ *Business Day* 16 October 1992]

In March 1992 Mr du Plessis announced that exemption from value added tax would be extended indefinitely on canned pilchards, dried beans (including soya beans), dried whole mealies, lentils, mealie-rice, powdered milk and dairy powder mixtures, and samp. The temporary zero-rating of fresh milk and rice was lifted in April 1992.

In March 1992 the minister of regional and land affairs, Mr Jacob de Villiers, announced that foreign industrialists who wished to invest in South Africa would be considered for a maximum relocation grant of R1m regardless of the location of the industry. Relocation grants were, therefore, to be extended to the Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging and Durban/Pinetown areas.

In October 1992 a national economic forum comprising business, labour and government representatives was launched. According to Mr Keys, the forum's agenda would comprise unemployment, the budget and the government's economic plans (see *Labour relations* below).

The managing director of Job Creation SA, Mr Ian Hetherington, said in October 1991 that Africans owned far more of the economy than the 2% that was usually attributed to them. Increasing numbers of Africans were acquiring stakes in life assurance companies, pension funds and unit trusts, which had the largest stake in blue-chip companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Furthermore, there were several public companies owned by blacks that were not quoted on the JSE, including The African Bank and National Sorghum Breweries (NSB).

In August 1991 the executive director of the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Nafcoc), Mr Mofasi Lekota, announced that the organisation would open its membership to

white businesses provided they accepted its business charter.

The Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) launched the Business Entrepreneurship Initiative in April 1992 to promote small- and medium-sized businesses. According to the managing director of the SBDC, Dr Ben Vosloo, 89% of all formal businesses in South Africa were small- and medium-sized enterprises. He said that in the light of the country's high unemployment rate, it was important that self-employment was promoted as a viable and exciting career opportunity. In July 1992 the International Finance Corporation pledged R450m in investments and loan finance to help the development of black small- and medium-sized businesses over a period of three to four years.¹⁴² [¹⁴² *The Natal Witness* 28 July 1992]

Among the successful African business initiatives during the period under review were The African Bank, which had assets to the value of R320m at the end of 1991, and NSB, which increased its earnings per share by 23% in the financial year ended 30 June 1992.¹⁴³ [¹⁴³ *Business Day* 2 October 1992] In September 1992 NSB acquired Jabula Foods from The Premier Group.¹⁴⁴ [¹⁴⁴ *Ibid* 29 September 1992] In October 1992 NSB signed a distribution agreement with Pepsi Cola.¹⁴⁵ [¹⁴⁵ *Ibid* 22 October 1992] In the same month NSB opened a new clear beer brewery at a cost of R1,2bn in Verwoerdburg (near Pretoria). The chairman of NSB, Mr Mohale Mahanyele, said at the opening that the brewery was expected to generate a turnover of R500m a year. He said that it was the first time that Africans had set up a clear beer brewery.¹⁴⁶ [¹⁴⁶ *Ibid*]

In September 1992 the South African Rail Commuter Corporation signed contracts for the upgrading of nine Soweto railway stations with five black contractors. The corporation said that the contracts had been kept small in order to enable small black entrepreneurs to tender for them.¹⁴⁷ [¹⁴⁷ *Ibid*, *The Citizen* 9 September 1992]

In January 1992 the Foundation for African Business and Consumer Services, Nafcoc and the South African Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs committed themselves to the formation of a united nonracial organisation to represent employer interests. A working group of the three participating organisations was set up in May 1992 with the purpose of studying the issues that would be involved in the establishment of the proposed body.

The SBDC said in March 1992 that the Businesses Act of 1991 (which had repealed laws requiring trading licences in more than 70 categories) had not been implemented yet in any of the provinces. The necessary regulations had to be published in each province and the specific ordinances mentioned by the act had to be repealed by the provincial administrators before the act would be fully operational, according to the SBDC.

While most of the legal constraints on black business had been removed, informal obstacles continued to

operate during the period under review. These included the unwillingness of financial institutions to provide start-up finance because of high risk (especially in the townships), the deepening economic recession, violence and intimidation, the lack of management and technical skills, competition from white organisations and poor marketing.

According to the president of the African Council of Hawkers and Informal Businesses (Achib), Mr Lawrence Mavundia, the organisation's members accounted for R81m worth of total economic activity in the country in 1991. He added that in areas where Achib had negotiated to ease restrictions on hawkers they had trebled their incomes. According to a Markinor survey, there were about 1,3m stokvel members in the major metropolitan areas in 1991. During the same period stokvels collected an estimated R84m a month, compared with R52m a month in 1989.

In May 1992 Gower Properties, the Johannesburg City Council and the Southern Africa Black Taxi Association announced the joint development of the Metro Mall Transport Centre which, once completed (in 1994), was expected to be used by 100 000 people, 8 000 taxis and 1600 buses daily.

Employment

According to the National Manpower Commission (NMC), in 1991 the economically active population (EAP) of South Africa (including the ten homelands) was 13,4m. Of this number 8m were employed in the formal sector and the remaining 5,4m were either unemployed or working in the informal sector. The NMC said that women as a proportion of the EAP had increased from 23% in 1960 to 36% in 1990.

During the period June 1990 to June 1991 there was a net gain of 4 405 economically active immigrants. Between 1979 and 1989 the net gain through immigration accounted for about 8,3% of the increase in high-level manpower and 9,3% of the increase in middle-level manpower. The NMC regarded selective immigration as especially important in redressing the shortage of high-level manpower.

The minister of finance, Mr Derek Keys, announced in September 1992 that the government would save about R1,4bn if within a year it reduced public service staff in South Africa (including the six non-independent homelands) by 5% (or 35 000 jobs). However, no time frame was set for the proposed cutbacks.¹⁴⁸ [¹⁴⁸ *Business Day* 7 September 1992]

The Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs said that the average number of people employed on all mines in South Africa declined from 715 170 in 1990 to 679 547 in 1991 (ie by 5%). The decline in employment was mainly the result of the rationalisation of labour on the gold mines because of the low gold price. According to the Chamber of Mines of South Africa, employment on South African gold mines fell by more than 140 000 people to 392 748 between January 1987 and June 1992. However, 64 000 additional jobs would have been lost over this period had the industry not dealt 'vigorously' with rising working costs.¹⁴⁹ [¹⁴⁹ *The Star* 14 September 1992] Unskilled and semi-skilled workers on the member mines of the chamber earned an average monthly wage of R946 in 1991, while fringe benefits

were valued at some R323 a month.

According to the NMC, in 1991 there were about 5,4m people unemployed or working in the informal sector. The commission added that between 1980 and 1990 job opportunities had increased by 503 000, while the EAP had increased by 3,3m. The South African Reserve Bank said in June 1992 that formal employment in the private sector decreased by 3,6% in 1991, while public-sector employment increased by 1,6% over the same period. The South African Chamber of Business (Sacob) expected unemployment to increase between June 1992 and June 1993 as the recession began to affect industrial production and manufacturers retrenched more people. The first report of the 1991 population census, published in March 1992, said that in March 1991 one out of every five people in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands) considered themselves unemployed.

The chief economist of the Small Business Development Corporation, Dr Edwin Basson, said in October 1992 that the formal economy's absorption rate was declining by 10% each year. An economist at Sacob, Mr Keith Lockwood, said in the same month that only about 3% to 4% of new job seekers would find work in 1993, compared to 7% in 1992. He added that the annual increase in the number of unemployed people was currently about 400 000.¹⁵⁰ [¹⁵⁰ *The Citizen* 20 October 1992]

Dr Basson said in 1992 that 3,5m out of an economically active population of 14,3m in South Africa (including the ten homelands) were employed in the informal sector. According to the Institute for Futures Research at the University of Stellenbosch, the informal sector would provide income opportunities to 4,7m people in the year 2000.

From April 1991 to April 1992 the Department of Manpower's special job-creation programme created 12 017 job opportunities. According to the Department of Manpower, about 91 000 work seekers were placed in employment between November 1990 and October 1991.

The president of the South African Association for Consulting Engineers, Mr Peter Thompson, said in October 1992 that South Africa would experience a shortage of engineers once the South African economy emerged from the recession and began growing in the medium term at between 3% and 6% a year. He said that South Africa would have to resort to importing foreign engineers.¹⁵¹ [¹⁵¹ *Business Day* 20 October 1992]

In March 1992 the African monthly household subsistence levels for Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg and Pretoria were R781, R787, R826, and R799 respectively. The All Media and Products Survey found that between February 1990 and January 1991 the average monthly household income of Africans was R779; of coloured people, R1 607; of Indians, R2 476; and of whites, R4 679. The Bureau of Market Research at the University of South Africa published a report in 1992 which showed that the average annual household income of whites in rural towns in 1991 (R63 844) was six times that of Africans (R10 785). Such inequality was exacerbated by the fact that white households were much smaller than African

households, the report said.¹⁵² [¹⁵² *Engineering News* 4 September 1992]

An annual survey on living standards in 48 major cities, carried out by the Economic Research Department of the Union Bank of Switzerland in 1992, found that Johannesburg was 30th in terms of wage and salary levels. The buying power of salaries and wages in Johannesburg was ranked 28th.¹⁵³ [¹⁵³ *The Star* 14 September 1992]

According to an industrial relations consultancy, Andrew Levy and Associates, the average level of wage settlement in 1991 was 16,1%, compared with an average of 17,4% in 1990.

There was no significant narrowing of the wage gap between whites and blacks between 1990 and 1991. The ratio of white to African earnings in the manufacturing sector increased from 3,4:1 in 1990 to 3,6:1 in 1991, while the ratio of white to coloured earnings remained unchanged at 3,2:1 and the ratio of white to Indian earnings declined from 2,3:1 to 2,2:1. The ratio of the average earnings of whites and Africans in the public sector was 2,5:1 in 1991, while that of whites and coloured people was 2:1, and that of whites and Indians was 1,3:1.

The Foundation for Research Development (FRD) estimated in March 1992 that about 66% of the African population and 50% of the total population of South Africa lived below the poverty datum line. The FRD said that science and technology, together with education and training, had a major role to play in ameliorating the impact of poverty on rural communities and in empowering people to solve their economic problems.

White poverty also increased during 1992. The number of whites fed by Operation Hunger increased from none in 1984 to about 100 000 in September 1992. The head of the Department of Social Work at the University of the Witwatersrand, Dr Brian McKendrick, said in October 1992 that the level of poverty among whites was the highest since the government had created social welfare structures to solve the 'poor white problem' of the 1920s. A Galiup poll held in the first half of 1992 found that 60% of whites said they were poorer than in 1991, while 46% expected to be poorer in 1993 and 23% expected to be better off. Twenty-five percent of Africans expected to be worse off in 1993 and 39% expected their economic situation to improve.¹⁵⁴ [¹⁵⁴ *The Weekly Mail* 2 October 1992]

Labour relations

Preliminary statistics published by the Department of Manpower in September 1992 showed that in the first six months of 1992 there was a total of 169 strikes, involving more than 43 000 workers and a loss of 339 000 mandays. Workers lost an estimated R 18,5m in wages as a result of strike action. (Figures exclude political stayaways and strikes in agriculture, and domestic and public service.)

According to Andrew Levy and Associates, wage disputes were the dominant trigger in strikes during the first nine months of 1992 and accounted for 76% of all walkouts. The most active unions in terms of mandays lost were the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Nurnsa) (61,8%); the National Education, Health and Allied Workers' Union (Nehawu) (13%); and the South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union (Saccawu) (4,6%).

Dissatisfaction over wages was the trigger in two of the more protracted strikes in 1992. In August about 80 000 metal workers went on strike countrywide in protest against the metal employers' offer of a 9,1% wage increase. Nurnsa, which represented the workers, had called for a 9,5% increase. About 3 000 workers were dismissed as a result of the month-long strike, which cost an estimated R880m in lost production and R110m in lost wages. In October 1992, after seven months of negotiations, an agreement was finally reached for the industry. Effective from 1 July 1992, it provided for a 9,1% wage increase for 320 000 employees. For the first time the agreement would apply to actual rather than to scheduled minimum wages. In return, the unions agreed to a clause that would bar them from compelling employers to negotiate additional increases at plant level. Another unusual feature was the undertaking by parties to the industrial council to give sympathetic consideration to applications from companies in certain economically depressed areas for permission to pay less onerous increases. Employers in the Orange Free State and in the northern Cape could apply for an exemption allowing them to implement the increase from 1 January 1993. Natal employers could apply to pay only a 7,3% increase. A previous arrangement whereby Border (eastern Cape) employers could pay 5% less than the scheduled rate remained in force. A union spokesman, Mr Les Kettleidas, said that it was not an agreement that members could be jubilant about.¹⁵⁵ [¹⁵⁵ *Business Day* 14 October 1992]

In June 1992 about 20 000 workers at hospitals countrywide went on strike in support of demands for a minimum wage of R724 a month and a 15,3% increase across the board, among other things. Workers had been offered an increase of 9,2% and a minimum wage of R708,50. About 7 700 workers were dismissed during the Strike. In terms of an agreement reached at the end of September between the Transvaal Provincial Administration and the union with the aid of the chairman of the Witwatersrand/Vaal dispute resolution committee, Mr André Lamprecht, 5 000 strikers would be taken back immediately.¹⁵⁶ [¹⁵⁶ *Ibid* 28 September 1992] Violence claimed the lives of 12 people in the countrywide health strike.

A survey by Andrew Levy and Associates showed that the average level of wage settlement on payroll for 1992 was 12,6% as against the average level of claim of 56,4%. The average time to settle was 88 days. The highest average increase was in the retail sector at 16,2%, followed by 15,4% in the manufacturing sector.

In July 1992 amendments to the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) of 1983 and the Unemployment Insurance Act (UIA) of 1966 brought farmworkers under the ambit of the acts for the first time. The provisions were to come into effect on a date determined by the state president.

In November 1992 an agreement was reached between Cosatu and the government detailing labour reforms for farm and domestic workers. In terms of the agreement the government would promulgate the amended UIA not later than 1 January 1993, and the amended BCEA not later than 1 March 1993. The government would also introduce draft legislation to extend the Labour Relations Act (LRA) and the Wage Act to farmworkers by the end of 1992 with a view to passing the legislation in 1993. The government also undertook to extend the BCEA to domestic workers by the second half of 1993, and to extend the UIA and the Workmen's Compensation Act to them by 1994. Committees would investigate the extension of the LRA and the Wage Act to domestic workers and report to the minister of manpower by April 1993 and October 1993 respectively. The parties also agreed to the establishment of a committee to consider how the recommendations of an International Labour Organisation (ILO) fact-finding mission (which visited the country in February 1992) could be implemented and amendments made to the LRA by February 1993 to enable public-sector unions to register under the act.¹⁵⁷ [¹⁵⁷ Ibid 10 November 1992]

The agreement led to concerted protest by the South African Agricultural Union (SAAU) which said it had not been consulted on the plans for new legislation. A spokesman for the organisation said that it was to meet the minister of manpower, Mr Leon Wessels, on 20 November to discuss its proposals on a labour statute for agriculture.¹⁵⁸ [¹⁵⁸ *The Citizen* 10 November 1992] Explaining the agreement with Cosatu, Mr Wessels said that the SAAU was to have submitted its proposals for an 'agriculture friendly' law by 30 September 1992. He said that what was eventually submitted to him did 'not even approximate the needs for reform and the need for timeous and swift performance in this process'.¹⁵⁹ [¹⁵⁹ *Business Day* 11 November 1992] After further discussions between the SAAU and the minister an agreement was reached whereby the government would publish draft legislation for the extension of the LRA and the Wage Act to farmworkers by the end of 1992. All interested parties would have two months to comment and negotiations between these parties on the law could continue until the end of March 1993, when the cabinet would decide whether the existing acts would be extended to farmworkers or whether new legislation would be put to Parliament.¹⁶⁰ [¹⁶⁰ Ibid 19 November 1992]

The government announced in August 1992 that the National Manpower Commission (NMC) would be restructured to comprise one third business, one third labour and one third government representatives. Discussion between the three parties over the commission's restructuring had been under way since the Laboria Minute was signed in September 1990 (see *1991/92 Survey* pp270–271). Cosatu, which had withdrawn from the NMC in October 1991 because of a lack of progress in its restructuring, announced that it would rejoin the body. It was expected that the NMC's brief would include consolidating the Labour Relations Act of 1956, clarifying strike law, and taking up matters raised by the report of the ILO's fact-finding and reconciliation commission.¹⁶¹ [¹⁶¹ *The Citizen* 21 October 1992]

As stated above, a national economic forum comprising business, labour and government representatives was launched in October 1992 after protracted negotiations between the three parties. The government had been reluctant to join the forum, citing as one reason a proposed pay-as-you-earn tax boycott called

for by Cosatu in September 1992. The federation called off the boycott in October 1992 after talks had resumed between the government and the African National Congress (ANC).¹⁶² [¹⁶² *Business Day* 9 October 1992] Unions saw the forum as a means whereby they could participate in decisions affecting the economy. Business representatives included the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, the Chamber of Mines of South Africa, the Foundation for African Business and Consumer Services, the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa and the South African Chamber of Business (Sacob). Labour delegates included representatives from Cosatu, the National Council of Trade Unions and the Federation of South African Labour Unions.

According to the minister of finance, Mr Derek Keys, unemployment, the budget and the government's economic plan, to be published in November 1992, would feature high on the forum's agenda. He said that the forum would give parties a place to discuss inputs from their constituencies. Consensus could then be identified and joint action taken to address economic growth and social development.

Commenting on the forum's establishment, the state president, Mr F W de Klerk, said that the government hoped that it would develop practical programmes to create a business climate conducive to economic growth, but that the government would resist the temptation to resort to 'populist policies' as a means of reviving the economy.¹⁶³ [¹⁶³ *Ibid* 30 October 1992]

In May 1992 several of the country's biggest trade unions formed a unit trust—the Community Growth Fund (CGF)—which would invest workers' pension and provident funds in companies with strong capital and earnings growth and which complied with the unions' social responsibility criteria. The fund was to be managed and administered by Syfrets. In the same month Times Media transferred R1m from its pension fund to the CGF. Not all unions agreed with the establishment of the fund, some arguing that it was premature.

During the period under review Cosatu launched a programme of mass action in conjunction with its alliance partners, the ANC and the South African Communist Party. The programme was in support of its demands for an interim assembly by the end of June 1992, elections for a constituent assembly by the end of 1992, a democratic constitution in place by 1993, the immediate reincorporation of the homelands into South Africa, the establishment of a unitary state without excessive regional decentralisation, the release of political prisoners and an end to 'vigilante and state-sponsored violence'. Economic demands included the immediate suspension of the unilateral restructuring of the economy, the establishment of a national economic forum (see above), and the permanent removal of value added tax from basic foodstuffs and services.

The programme of action, which comprised protest marches, sit-ins, factory occupations and boycotts, culminated in a political stayaway on 3 and 4 August 1992. Discussions between the South African Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs and Cosatu on ways of avoiding the stayaway were unsuccessful. The main stumbling block was the federation's demand for businesses to agree to a voluntary shutdown on 3 August with workers being paid for the day and that the public sector be

included in the action. Cosatu said that 4m people stayed away on the first day of the stayaway, representing about 90% of formal-sector employees. Organised industry disputed these figures and Sacob estimated that 2,5m people took part. It was estimated that the stayaway resulted in R900m in lost production.

Accidents on the mines came under the spotlight during the period under review. In February 1992 the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) called for a commission of inquiry into safety on Anglo mines after accidents had claimed the lives of 23 miners in the first two months of the year. The total number of deaths at Western Deep Levels (west Rand), which is managed by Anglo, was reported to be 57 by the beginning of October 1992. Anglo rejected the need for a specific commission of inquiry but said it would consider an industry-wide commission which would provide the legislative framework for health and safety on all mines. In April 1992 the Chamber of Mines of South Africa agreed to the NUM's proposal for an independent judicial inquiry into health and safety on the mines.

In June 1992 Anglo and the NUM signed a code of conduct aimed at ensuring peace on the mines. The code's provisions included the recognition of the right to picket, to freedom of association and that hostels need no longer be divided on ethnic lines.

Conflict between the United Workers' Union of South Africa, which is linked to the Inkatha Freedom Party, and Cosatu affiliates continued during the period under review and claimed at least 20 lives between January and July 1992.

In August 1992 Nurnsa reported that at least 21 union members and officials had been killed since May, saying that many of the deaths had occurred in the run-up to the four-week metal strike by about 80 000 workers held in August 1992.

During the period under review Cosatu affiliates increased pressure on employers to set up national bargaining forums. The Chemical Workers' Industrial Union held the first-ever meeting with employers at national level to discuss the setting up of such a forum, while Saccawu declared a dispute with employers in the retail and catering sectors when a meeting called by the union to discuss setting up a national bargaining forum was poorly attended by employers.

The question of retrenchments featured strongly in negotiations between labour and employers during annual wage negotiations during the period under review. In the mining industry protracted discussions between Rand Mines, the NUM and the government over the future of the marginal Harmony gold mine (Orange Free State) led to the government's agreeing to Sunday work on the mine. The Council of Mining Unions opposed the plan, while it had the support of the officials' associations and the NUM, which agreed to the plan on condition that it was a temporary measure.

In September 1992 the Bophuthatswana authorities postponed the implementation of the territory's new Industrial Relations Act, which had been passed in September 1991. The act would have barred South African unions from operating in the homeland. Both Cosatu and a number of employers operating in

the homeland had voiced dissatisfaction over the act. Earlier in the year, the NUM, in a major policy switch, formally applied to the homeland authorities to operate there in terms of the territory's Industrial Conciliation Act of 1984. Previously the union had refused to apply for this permission on the grounds that it would imply a recognition of the homeland administration.

Cosatu remained the country's largest trade union federation during the period under review. At the time of its launch in 1985 the federation had 462 000 paid-up members in 33 affiliates, by 1987 it had about 712 000 paid up members and by 1989, 959 000 members in 14 affiliates (following a process of amalgamation). At its 1991 congress the federation claimed 1,26m members. The Department of Manpower put the figure at 1,2m in 1991—or 11% of the economically active population.¹⁶⁴ [164 Ibid 19 October 1992]

BUSINESS

Key Points

- The managing director of Job Creation SA, Mr Ian Hetherington, estimated that there were between 700 000 and 1m sole proprietorships or informal partnerships among blacks in South Africa (including the ten homelands).
- The Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) launched the Business Entrepreneurship Initiative in April 1992 to promote self-employment and encourage entrepreneurship.
- The managing director of the SBDC, Dr Ben Vosloo, said in March 1992 that 89% of the approximately 810 000 formal business entities were small- or medium-sized enterprises.
- Dr Vosloo said in December 1991 that 50% of retail businesses in the formal sector collapsed within five years of their inception.
- According to the annual report of National Sorghum Breweries, there were about 500 000 small-time distributors making a living out of sorghum beer in 1991.
- In January 1992 the Foundation for African Business and Consumer Services, the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the South African Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs committed themselves to the formation of a united nonracial organisation representing employer interests.
- In January 1992 the deputy minister of trade and industry, Mr David de Villiers Graaff, announced the formation of a special division in his department to deal with small business creation.

- By the end of December 1991 the Small Business Unit of the Angle American Corporation of South Africa had entered into R27m worth of contracts spread between 106 small businesses, 65% of which were black owned.
- According to the president of the African Council of Hawkers and Informal Businesses (Achib), Mr Lawrence Mavundla, Achib members accounted for economic activity worth R81m in 1991.
- In 1991 Markinor found that there were 1,3m stokvel members in the major metropolitan areas.
- The managing director of the marketing branch of the South African Taverners' Association, Mr David Moshapalo, said in 1992 that 90% of all beer in South Africa was sold in the townships.

African Business

Statistics and structure

The managing director of Job Creation SA, Mr Ian Hetherington, said in October 1991 that it was sometimes asserted that no more than 2% of the economy was owned by blacks and that there was only one black-owned company, Yabeng, quoted on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). However, according to Mr Hetherington, the largest stakes in JSE blue-chip companies were owned by life assurance companies, pension funds and unit trusts, all of which had a large and rapidly growing number of black stakeholders. Mr Hetherington believed that blacks owned far more than 2% of the South African economy, although he said that it was difficult to put a figure to their share. There were also several public companies owned by blacks which were not quoted on the JSE, such as The African Bank, Blackchain and National Sorghum Breweries. Mr Hetherington said that apart from privately owned companies there were several that were sponsored by homeland development corporations with shares made available to local residents. There were also several thousand black-owned close corporations.¹ [¹ *South Africa Foundation Review* October 1991]

However, the majority of black businesses were sole proprietorships or informal partnerships. Mr Hetherington estimated that there were between 700 000 and 1m such businesses. Another area of business activity included traditional healers and herbalists (involving about 100 000 people) (see chapter on *Health and Welfare*). The range of existing African businesses was such that 'just about every sector of the recorded, corporate-dominated economy had its more humble counterpart in the unrecorded economy'.² [² *Ibid*]

Emphasising the importance of the small- and medium-sized enterprise sector (SME), the managing director of the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC), Dr Ben Vosloo, said in March 1992 that of the approximately 810 000 formal businesses in South Africa, about 720 000 (89%) were SMEs. He added that large corporations paid taxes at a lower average rate than SMEs, which hindered the

development of SMEs. Dr Vosloo called on the government to abandon its bias towards large business.³
[³ *Business Day* 27 March 1992]

Dr Vosloo said in June 1992 that the SBDC had set up 35 industrial hives which had provided a launch pad for about 2 000 small enterprises. Six more hives were being planned for 1992. The hive concept aimed to provide small manufacturing businesses with basic accommodation at reasonable rentals and under SBDC tutelage.⁴ [⁴ *Update* 17, December 1991, p4; *Sowetan* 5 June 1992]

The SBDC launched the Business Entrepreneurship Initiative (BEI) in April 1992 to promote small- and medium-sized businesses. Dr Vosloo said at the launch of the BEI that its aim was to promote self-employment as a viable and exciting career opportunity and to establish an environment in which entrepreneurship could thrive.⁵ [⁵ *The Star* 28 April 1992, *Sowetan* 30 April 1992] A competition for innovative small- and medium-sized enterprises was included in the project. An increase in the number of business skills training courses provided through the SBDC's Training Foundation was also planned. The SBDC was to invest an initial amount of R2m in the BEI and invited participation from the private sector.⁶ [⁶ *Sowetan* 30 April 1992]

Successes and failures

According to the deputy president of the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Nafcoc), Mr Archie Nkonyeni, blacks controlled many businesses in the formal sector, among them African Business Publications, the Broadcast Interest Group (which aimed to establish a television station), Lebowa Bakeries, National Sorghum Breweries and many small- to medium-sized general dealerships throughout the rural and homeland areas of South Africa.⁷ [⁷ *Die Suid-Afrikaan* April/May 1992]

Dr Vosloo said in December 1991 that in the retail sector of the formal economy, 50% of businesses collapsed within five years of their inception.⁸ [⁸ *Barlows '91* no 2, 1991]

Although statistics on successful and unsuccessful business ventures are not readily available, some successful African business ventures are noted below.

The African Bank, which was established by Nafcoc in 1975, had one branch and deposits worth R1,5m at the end of its first year of operation. By 1990 it had capital to the value of R86m and eight branches, seven mini-branches and three agencies. During 1991 The African Bank opened branches in Bisho (Ciskei), Giyani (Gazankulu), Nelspruit (eastern Transvaal) and Queenstown (eastern Cape). The bank

targeted the eastern Cape, Natal and the Orange Free State for further expansion in 1992.⁹ [⁹ *City Press* 18 August 1991] In May 1992 the chief executive of The African Bank, Mr Jack Theron, said that about 70% of the bank was African owned. Its assets exceeded R320m in the same period.¹⁰ [¹⁰ *Business Day* 25 May 1992]

According to the results for the six months ended 31 December 1991, the turnover of National Sorghum Breweries (NSB) increased by 24% and earnings increased by 23% compared to the same six-month period in 1990. An interim dividend of ten cents per share was declared in February 1992.¹¹ [¹¹ *Sowetan* 4 March 1992]

NSB had the largest informal distribution network in southern Africa, which helped to reduce the company's transportation and distribution costs. There were 18 breweries manufacturing sorghum beer and each brewery had its own group of 'runners', who collected beer from it. Approximately 500 000 distributors made a living out of sorghum beer.¹² [¹² National Sorghum Breweries, annual report 1991]

A conglomerate listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange invested R500m in an NSB venture in March 1992, whereby NSB was to expand into new sorghum-related products. The chief executive of NSB, Mr Mohale Mahanyele, said that NSB was also negotiating a distribution agreement with one of the big retail chains.¹³ [¹³ *Business Day* 5 March 1992] He announced in April 1992 that NSB intended to expand into the cold drink and general beer market.¹⁴ [¹⁴ *The Star* 23 April 1992]

However, the progress made by NSB in the year since its privatisation (see *1991/92 Survey* pp168–169) was marred by alleged acts of sabotage and malpractice. In an advertisement in the *Sowetan* in March 1992, NSB accused its rivals of dumping low-quality sorghum beer products on the market and supplying them at 'ridiculously' low prices. It claimed that they were also bribing certain employees to commit acts of sabotage at NSB breweries. NSB alleged that the aim of such activities was to discredit it in the eyes of millions of African consumers.¹⁵ [¹⁵ *Sowetan* 11 March 1992]

Traditional Beer Investments (TBI), a subsidiary of The South African Breweries, subsequently denied involvement in the alleged campaign to discredit NSB. The managing director of TBI, Mr Ron Schreuder, said that TBI could not be regarded as competition to NSB as it was confined to selling sorghum beer in the homelands. NSB had exclusive rights to manufacture, sell and deliver sorghum beer in the non-homeland area until October 1995.¹⁶ [¹⁶ *Sowetan* 12 March 1992, *Business Day* 19 March 1992]

In October 1991 Afsure launched Unity-Afsure Brokers, to concentrate on financial planning services, retirement planning, education investment and business insurance primarily for Africans. The chairman

of Afsure, Mr Khehla Mthembu, said at its launch that most life assurance was taken out by blacks and it was, therefore, important to empower black life assurance brokers.¹⁷ [¹⁷ *Sowetan* 3 October 1991]

Another African business success was the chain of hairdressing salons, Alex Hair International, owned by Mr Alex Molokoane. He had established Alex Hair International in 1982 and by 1992 he owned seven salons employing about 120 people. In November 1990 Mr Molokoane opened the Alex Hair College of Cosmetology in Johannesburg to train students in all aspects of hair care and product knowledge. In 1992 he launched Alex Hair International Franchise. Interest in this franchise -was expressed by businessmen and businesswomen in major urban centres in South Africa, as well as in Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.¹⁸ [¹⁸ *Enterprise* February 1992]

In April 1991 the Letsema Investment Corporation (LIC) was launched by the National Association of Cooperative Societies of South Africa (Nacssa) to establish catering companies, funeral parlours, and coffin and tombstone manufacturers in various parts of the country. The chairman of the Centre for Black Economic Development, Dr Nthato Motlana, said that LIC was also considering acquiring a farm where livestock would be bred for catering at funerals. Funeral clubs and societies were shareholders of LIC at a cost of R5 000 a share.¹⁹ [¹⁹ *Update* 17, p4] According to the executive director of Nacssa, Mr Sam Muofhe, about 40 000 blacks had joined LIC by November 1991.²⁰ [²⁰ *Sowetan* 29 November 1991]

In September 1991 the African Hair and Beauty Association of Southern Africa signed an agreement with Revlon, whereby Revlon would provide sponsorship worth R600 000 over two years for, among others, the designing of a home hairdressing unit for use by backyard salons.²¹ [²¹ *Business Day* 18 September 1991]

A development project called the Broadcast Interest Group (BIG) was launched in December 1991 to formulate strategies to extend black economic empowerment to radio and television. A spokesman for BIG said that its first step would be the establishment of a venture capital company to assist blacks to start their own radio and television stations. He added that blacks needed to exploit the impending deregulation of the airwaves. Blacks were reported to control less than 1% of the broadcasting and audiovisual industry in South Africa.²² [²² *City Press* 18 August 1991, *Business Day* 23 December 1991]

Fabfoods, launched by the Foundation for African Business and Consumer Services (Fabcos) and Fedics in 1991 (see *1991/92 Survey* pxcvi), announced in December 1991 that it had bought the Longhorn franchise. Fabfoods opened its first food outlet in Daveyton (east Rand) in January 1992. The outlet was to be owned jointly by Fabfoods and an African entrepreneur and to *be* run by Fabfoods staff trained at Fedics.²³ [²³ *Business Day* 30 December 1991, 14 January 1992] Fabfoods was to provide training in the correct handling and presentation of food and supply semi-prepared meals which would require only

finishing touches before they were served.²⁴ [²⁴ *Sunday Times* 1 September 1991, *The Star* 2 September 1991] According to the marketing director of Fabfoods, Dr George Msibi, the joint venture would open up the catering industry to the black entrepreneur.²⁵ [²⁵ *Sowetan* 16 January 1992]

Future Bank, a joint venture between Fabcos and Wesbank, began operations in January 1992 with initial capital of R18m. Wesbank had 49% of the equity; Fabcos, 44%; the marketing wing of the Southern Africa Black Taxi Association, 5%; and the Get Ahead Foundation, 2%.²⁶ [²⁶ *The Star* 5 September 1991, *Sowetan* 29 November 1991] A ten-year management agreement was signed between the two parties, whereby black staff would be trained by Wesbank. The general secretary of Fabcos, Mr Joas Mogale, believed that this type of affirmative action would provide training and on-the-job experience to potential black managers rather than retraining existing ones, and thereby increase the pool of skilled black managers. Initially the bank had branches in Bloemfontein (Orange Free State), Johannesburg and Pretoria. Although the bank was to provide loans to a less traditional market, credit was still to be given according to proper credit principles. However, Future Bank would offer special loan schemes based on the principle of collective responsibility.²⁷ [²⁷ Interview with the general secretary of the Foundation for African Business and Consumer Services (Fabcos), Mr Joas Mogale, Pretoria, 25 May 1992]

In March 1992 the African Builders' Association announced that it had awarded a contract worth R277 000 to Entrepreneurial Development Southern Africa to provide training to some 270 members of its affiliated associations. Funds were to be provided by the United States Agency for International Development.²⁸ [²⁸ *Enterprise* March 1992]

The Soweto Developers' and Builders' Forum was launched in April 1992. According to the secretary of the forum, Mr Chris Jiyane, it aimed to become a channel for the allocation of land and building contracts in black areas, to educate people in all aspects of home ownership and to provide training for black entrepreneurs in the construction industry.²⁹ [²⁹ *Sowetan* 27 April 1992]

During the course of 1992 Fabcos was negotiating the establishment of the first major black insurance company in South Africa. Future Bank was to provide financial assistance to the venture and Eagle and Aegis Insurance were also reported to be involved. Black staff for the company were to be trained by Business and Personal Insurance.³⁰ [³⁰ *Financial Mail* 10 January 1992, *Sowetan* 23 January 1992]

Business organisations

In January 1992, at a meeting of the International Labour Organisation in Harare (Zimbabwe), the Foundation for African Business and Consumer Services (Fabcos), the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Nafcoc) and the South African Consultative Committee on Labour

Affairs (Saccola) committed themselves to the formation of a united nonracial organisation to represent employer interests. The new organisation was to focus on labour issues, and occupational safety and health. It would also be active in the development of entrepreneurship, training of managers and staff, job creation and human resources development.³¹ [³¹ *Business Day, The Natal Mercury* 4 February 1992]

In May 1992 the three participating organisation announced that a working group had been appointed to study the issues that would be involved in the establishment of the proposed body. The working group was to consult employers and employer organisations, including those not affiliated to Fabcos, Nafcoc and Saccola.³² [³² *Business Day* 26 May 1992]

In August 1991 the executive director of Nafcoc, Mr Mofasi Lekota, said that Nafcoc would open its membership to white businesses provided they accepted Nafcoc's business charter which sought, among other things, full private sector involvement in working for the deracialisation of South Africa and full black participation in the economy.³³ [³³ *Ibid* 6 August 1991] At its 27th annual conference, held in August 1991 at Sun City (Bophuthatswana), Nafcoc adopted the following resolutions:³⁴ [³⁴ *Enterprise* September 1991]

- poverty should be addressed by urging business to deploy its resources in a more equitable manner and increase its investment in education, electrification, employment and housing;
- education should be restructured to develop the technical skills and technology necessary to process raw materials and move away from the 'colonial practice' of exporting them;
- programmes should be initiated to develop a spirit of self-reliance within black communities; and
- the role played by women in promoting the organisation's aims and objectives should be recognised. Women were called on to participate in the decision-making structures of Nafcoc.

In its efforts to establish international ties Nafcoc opened an office in the United States in 1991 to promote black business development in South Africa.³⁵ [³⁵ *Ibid*]

At the Nafcoc conference the African National Congress, the Azanian People's Organisation and the Pan-Africanist Congress called on Nafcoc and Falicos to merge. The deputy president of Nafcoc, Mr Archie Nkonyeni, said, however, that 'unity for the sake of unity would not be of benefit to black business'. There had to be commonality of values if unity was to work.³⁶ [³⁶ *Ibid*]

Policy

Deregulation

Although the Businesses Act of 1991 repealed laws requiring trading licences in more than 70 categories (see *1991/92 Survey* p170), the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) said in March 1992 that the act had not been implemented in any of the provinces. The reason for this delay, the SBDC said, was that the necessary regulations had to be published in each province and the specific ordinances mentioned by the act had to be repealed by the administrator of the province before the act could become fully operational.³⁷ [³⁷ *The Citizen* 7 March 1992]

The African Council of Hawkers and Informal Businesses and the Foundation for the African Informal Business Sector said that some local authorities, especially in Conservative Party-controlled towns, were opposed to the act and were, therefore, delaying its implementation.³⁸ [³⁸ *Sowetan* 5 March 1992] A spokesman for the Transvaal Provincial Administration said in March 1992 that the requirements contained in the act needed thorough study by legal experts before they could be implemented. He hoped that the matter would be finalised by October 1992.³⁹ [³⁹ *African Business* March/April 1992]

The senior manager of the SBDC in the western Cape, Mr Johan Naude, stressed in March 1992 that the SBDC would continue to campaign for the removal of legislation which it regarded as unnecessarily restrictive. The enactment of one set of standardised health regulations for the manufacture, distribution and selling of foodstuffs was a particular aim of the SBDC.⁴⁰ [⁴⁰ *The Citizen* 7 March 1992]

In January 1992 the deputy minister of trade and industry, Mr David de Villiers Graaff, announced the formation of a special division in the Department of Trade and Industry to deal with small business creation. The division was to be in operation by June 1992.⁴¹ [⁴¹ *Business Day* 13 January 1992]

A National Manpower Commission (NMC) report on the influence of labour legislation on the small business sector, requested by the Department of Manpower in 1989, was published in April 1992. The investigation aimed to identify ways of stimulating the development of micro-businesses in order to promote employment without detracting from the basic rights of employees (see *1991/92 Survey* p 169). Regarding regulation, the report said that while it hampered large businesses, it affected small businesses to a greater extent because of their 'particular sensitivity to the higher costs associated with compliance with legal requirements ... What was considered justifiable regulation in large businesses could be considered as "overregulation" in smaller businesses'.⁴² [⁴² *Government Gazette*, no 13925, 16 April 1992, p22]

The report recommended that an office for micro-businesses be set up within the Department of Manpower and headed by a facilitator who would promote the interests of both micro-businesses and their employees. He would interact with all parties concerned, including industrial councils, small

business organisations and trade unions.⁴³ [⁴³ Ibid. p24,26] The report emphasised that it did not recommend granting blanket exemptions from existing labour legislation to all micro-businesses.

The NMC proposed that each industrial council agreement include a provision stating that the agreement would in no way restrict entrepreneurial initiative and employment opportunities. A council would then be able to grant exemptions from specific provisions of such an agreement.⁴⁴ [⁴⁴ Ibid, p25] Micro-businesses should not be excluded from the Labour Relations Act of 1956, but their lack of knowledge regarding the law should be overcome through greater use of guidelines that would constitute an extension of a general code of conduct, the NMC said. Simplified dispute-settling procedures for micro-businesses should be provided through mediation and arbitration rather than through industrial councils, conciliation boards and the Industrial Court. The NMC said that micro-businesses should be exempted from aspects of the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act of 1983, such as the requirements for change rooms, dining rooms, rest rooms, sanitary conveniences and washing facilities. It proposed further that the administrative burden on small businesses (those employing up to 20 people) should be simplified.⁴⁵ [⁴⁵ Ibid, pp27-35]

Finance

By the end of December 1991 the Small Business Unit of the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa (Anglo) had entered into R27m worth of contracts spread between 106 small businesses, 65% of which were black.⁴⁶ [⁴⁶ Telephonic interview with Mr Johan Kniger, manager of the Small Business Unit, Anglo American Corporation, 21 May 1992] LITET, the other arm of Anglo's Small Business Initiative, which acted as a vehicle for investing in smaller business concerns, had invested in eight businesses between its inception in 1989 and December 1991. These businesses were either wholly black owned or had a black majority holding. The manager of the Small Business Unit, Mr Johan Kruger, said that at the end of 1991 their combined turnover was R8m.⁴⁷ [⁴⁷ Telephonic interview with Mr Johan Kniger, 21 May 1992]

The Get Ahead Foundation granted 6 000 loans and created 8 000 jobs in 1990/91, according to its annual report.⁴⁸ [⁴⁸ Get Ahead Foundation, annual report 1990/91] The Informal Business Enrichment Centre assisted about 350 informal businesses in the eastern Cape with start-up loans averaging R1 000 between its inception in 1990 and June 1992. It also assisted 70 emerging or manufacturing businesses.⁴⁹ [⁴⁹ *The Weekly Mail* 5 June 1992]

The senior general manager of the SBDC, Mr Jo Schwenke, said in May 1992 that funds invested in venture capital funds could create 500 000 to 2m jobs over a period of five years. He proposed that the state should invest R2bn a year for five years in development venture capital funds. These funds, he argued, should be invested in trusts managed by the private sector. Mr Schwenke estimated that about 50

000 enterprises could be created by this type of investment.⁵⁰ [⁵⁰ *Business Day* 19 May 1992.]

In May 1992 the chairman of the Africa subcommittee in the American House of Representatives, Mr Mervyn Dymally, introduced a bill which sought to establish a \$240m fund to help black South Africans acquire or establish private businesses. The bill sought to promote 'equitable participation in a competitive free market in South Africa by the black population ... including the ownership of business concerns, participation in the agricultural sector and joint ventures between United States persons and black citizens of South Africa'. The bill stressed, however, that funding would be made available only if the South African government was demonstrably committed to economic reforms based on market principles.⁵¹ [⁵¹ *Ibid* 13 May 1992, *Sowetan* 4 June 1992] Mr Dymally pointed out in June 1992 that if the measure was passed, the funds available might be less than the proposed \$240m and no funds were likely to be spent until 1994.⁵² [⁵² *Rapport* 14 June 1992, *Business Day* 17 June 1992]

Constraints on black business

Official constraints

According to the executive officer of the Law Review Project, Professor Louise Tager, although the Businesses Act of 1991 provided for African local authorities to grant licences to backyard traders, the same powers were not extended to coloured, Indian and white local authorities. Informal traders in the coloured township of Brent Park in Kroonstad (Orange Free State) were fined in February 1992 for operating spaza shops, while their counterparts in the neighbouring African township of Maokeng traded freely.⁵³ [⁵³ *Business Day* 13 February 1992]

According to the executive director of Job Creation SA, Mr Ian Hetherington, some 30 statutes governing business operations continued to exist which made it difficult for informal entrepreneurs to emerge and expand.⁵⁴ [⁵⁴ *Sunday Tribune* 26 April 1992]

Unoticial constraints

Informal obstacles to the significant development of African business continued to operate during the period under review. One problem was the unwillingness of financial institutions to provide start-up finance because of high risk, particularly because of political violence in the townships (see chapter on *Political Developments*). Furthermore, according to the managing director of the Get Up Foundation, Mr Lin Anderson, big business preferred group lending to Africans to individual loans, since they believed that such loans were less risky.⁵⁵ [⁵⁵ *The Weekly Mail* 22 May 1992]

Other informal constraints during the period under review included the deepening economic recession; violence and intimidation; the lack of management and technical skills; competition from white organisations, especially retailers who were beginning to establish shopping centres near the townships; and poor marketing.

The implementation of value added tax (VAT) in October 1991 affected small businesses and retailers (see *1991/92 Survey* pp438–440). The human resources manager of the African Council of Hawkers and Informal Businesses, Mr Nick Motsatse, said in December 1991 that VAT had placed a strain on the cash flow of many vendors with the result that vendors had less stock readily available.⁵⁶ [⁵⁶ *Ibid* 6 December 1991] Small businesses which did not register for VAT could not claim refunds on input credits, hence making their supplies more expensive.⁵⁷ [⁵⁷ *Employment Law* November 1991] A major consequence of this, according to the executive director of the National Economic Initiative, Mr Lionel Grewan, was that big companies did not want to deal with such businesses. Mr Grewan believed that registering for VAT would not solve the problem as it would compel small businessmen to incur additional expenses such as those of bookkeeping.⁵⁸ [⁵⁸ Telephonic interview with the executive director of the National Economic Initiative, Mr Lionel Grewan, 14 January 1992]

Informal sector

Statistics

The senior regional manager of the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) in the western Cape, Mr Wolfgang Thomas, said in March 1992 that hawking was one of the most visible informal activities but that informal activities ranged from home-based and subsistence agriculture, the supply of water to homes, micro-level electricity generation and small-scale (often illegal) mining, to drug dealing and the ‘retailing’ of stolen goods, which involved large numbers of people and generated ‘vast income among some small sections of society’.⁵⁹ [⁵⁹ Thomas W, Informal retail trade’, *Trade and Commerce*, Bureau for Economic Research, March 1992, pp6-7]

The chief economist of the SBDC, Dr Edwin Basson, said in 1992 that 3,5m out of an economically active population (EAP) of 14,3m in South Africa (including the ten homelands) were employed in the informal sector (see also chapter on *Employment*). He said that if the people working in the informal sector were regarded as employed then the unemployment rate would only be 20% of the EAP (rather than 44%). Dr Basson predicted that no more than 8,5m of the expected EAP of 20,2m in 2005 would be employed in the formal sector, and 58% of the population would be unemployed. If the number of people expected to be active in the informal sector was taken into account (7,3m in 2005) then only 4,5m (22%) of the EAP would in fact be unemployed. Dr Basson emphasised that defining unemployment realistically was not a matter of semantics but of the utmost importance for future

planning.⁶⁰ [⁶⁰ *Die Burger* 27 January 1992, *New Nation* 1 February 1992]

According to the Institute for Futures Research at the University of Stellenbosch, the informal sector would provide income opportunities to 4,7m people in the year 2000.⁶¹ [⁶¹ Kirsten M, 'A quantitative assessment of the informal sector', in Preston-Whyte E and Rogerson C (eds). *South Africa's Informal Economy*, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1991, p158]

Using data obtained from 45 studies on the African informal sector, a journalist, Ms Mari⁶ Kirsten, estimated that in 1985 the following proportions of the African EAP were involved in informal activity: 18% (250 000) in metropolitan areas, 21% (200 000) in informal settlements, 39% (704 000) in urban areas and 18% (678 000) in rural areas. In 1985 participation in the informal economy in South Africa reached an average of 23% or one out of every four economically active Africans. Ms Kirsten also estimated the informal sector's contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) in 1985 at R5,9bn or 5,3% of **GDP**. Furthermore, if this figure was added to the recorded personal income of Africans in 1985, it would increase from R20,6bn to R26,5bn, which meant that 22% of the total income of Africans was unrecorded.⁶² [⁶² *Ibid*, pp155-156]

Hawkers

A survey of hawkers in Pietermaritzburg (Natal) in 1991 by a research fellow in the Development Studies Research Group at the University of Natal, Mr Timothy Mosdell, revealed that the average street trader had been operating for about 14 years. All but one of the hawkers surveyed were women, many being the sole breadwinners in their families. Mr Mosdell found that most of them did not have the skills and capital necessary to expand beyond pavement trading.⁶³ [⁶³ Mosdell T, 'Power, patronage, and control: ambiguities in the deregulation of street trading in Pietermaritzburg', in Preston- Whyte E and Rogerson C (eds), *South Africa's Informal Economy*, p327]

During 1992 many programmes were set in motion to assist hawkers to become more environmentally conscious and business oriented. The Informal Markets Training and-Information Centre was opened in February 1992 in the Johannesburg central business district (CBD). According to the chairman of the tenders, licensing and markets committee of the Johannesburg City Council, Mr Koos Roets, there were 61 000 registered hawkers operating in Johannesburg in 1992.⁶⁴ [⁶⁴ *Business Day* 14 February 1992] A council official, Mr Dinkie Pillay, appealed to the private sector in April 1992 to assist hawkers with the storage of their equipment so as not to compel them to attach it to poles on pavements.⁶⁵ [⁶⁵ *The Star* 16,24 April 1992]

In March 1992 the council announced the introduction of mobile vending units for hawkers in the CBD.

The carts were to be rented to vendors at R3 a day. Advertisements on the carts would help raise revenue to fund manufacture of the carts.⁶⁶ [⁶⁶ *Business Day* 13 March 1992]

First National Bank said in April 1992 that it would set aside areas for informal trading stalls in its Bank City complex in Johannesburg. A square with facilities for dozens of traders was to be set up at one end of the complex. Traders would also be provided with barrows at selected street corners.⁶⁷ [⁶⁷ *Ibid* 15 April 1992]

The African Council of Hawkers and Informal Businesses (Achib), together with Fedlife, First National Bank and Investec, launched a micro-loan scheme for hawkers and spaza shopowners in February 1992. The Development Bank of Southern Africa was to guarantee up to 50% of the amounts required.⁶⁸ [⁶⁸ Telephonic interview with the president of the African Council of Hawkers and Informal Businesses (Achib), Mr Lawrence Mavundla, 15 January 1992] Hawkers would have to deposit a minimum of R55 a month for a year in order to qualify for a loan of R1 000. Of the monthly deposit, R35 would go towards a life policy, R5 to funeral benefits and another R5 to an indemnity policy. After three years a hawker could make a claim on his or her life insurance premiums to expand his or her business.⁶⁹ [⁶⁹ Information supplied by Achib, 21 May 1992]

According to the president of Achib, Mr Lawrence Mavundla. Achib members accounted for R81m worth of total economic activity in the country in 1991. He added that in areas where Achib had negotiated to ease restrictions on hawkers they had trebled their incomes. Hawkers had an average turnover of between R2 000 and R10 000 a month. Mr Mavundla estimated that there were about 900 000 informal businesses in the street trading and spaza shop categories and that the sector employed about 3m people.⁷⁰ [⁷⁰ Mavundla L, *Freedom to be Enterprising*, Pavement Books, Johannesburg, 1991, pp49,58]

Spaza shopowners

An associate professor in the Department of Geography at the University of the Witwatersrand, Professor Christian Rogerson, said that home enterprises functioned in at least one in every five households in South Africa, and included backyard workshops, hairdressing salons, shebeens and spazas. He believed that the emergence of informal spaza retailers was owing to the lack of provision of formal retail outlets in newly developing township areas⁷¹ [⁷¹ Rogerson C, 'Home-based enterprises of the urban poor: the case of spazas', in Preston-Whyte E and Rogerson C (eds), *South Africa's Informal Economy*, p338]

According to the managing director of Projects International, Ms Bridgette Mosepe, spazas had a

turnover of about R5bn in 1991. About 30% of all fresh produce was sold by spazas. They also sold about R1,2bn worth of mealie meal and R720m worth of rice a year.⁷² [⁷² *Die Suid-Afrikaan* April/May 1992]

According to a Markinor survey conducted in 1990, there were more than 60 000 spazas in townships in the non-homeland area. In his book, *Freedom to be Enterprising*, Mr Mavundla said that the rapid growth of the spaza shop could be ascertained from the fact that close to two thirds of all Achib members were spaza owners. Spaza shops had a monthly turnover of between R8 000 and R22 000, he said.⁷³ [⁷³ Mavundla L, *Freedom to be Enterprising*, p39]

The franchise director of National Beverages, Mr Douglas Jackson, believed that although apartheid was in the process of disappearing, townships would not. He said that the spaza shops of today would become the supermarkets of tomorrow.⁷⁴ [⁷⁴ *Enterprise* June 1991] A partner at Perry and Associates, Mr Neil Ross, said, however, that most retailers agreed that the spaza would be replaced by a more formally structured retail development. The absence of infrastructure, especially in informal settlements, had made it difficult for conventional developments in retailing. Once infrastructure was developed in these areas, more formal retailers, as well as distribution networks, would emerge.⁷⁵ [⁷⁵ *Ibid*]

Stokvels

Research conducted by Markinor in November 1991 found that 28% of Africans in the major metropolitan areas (Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg and the informal settlements in these areas) were members of stokvels. Markinor estimated that there were 1 344 000 stokvel members in these areas in 1991. Stokvel members tended to be female and older than 35 years of age and 25% of stokvel members belonged to more than one stokvel. Furthermore, people with household earnings less than R1 000 a month were just as likely to be members as those earning more than R1 500, the report said.⁷⁶ [⁷⁶ Research results supplied by Mr Andrew K Lukhele, president of the National Stokvels Association of South Africa (Nasasa), 12 May 1992]

In 1991 stokvels collected an estimated R84m a month, compared with R52m a month in 1989.⁷⁷ [⁷⁷ *Business Day* 29 May 1992] The Markinor report on stokvels summarised the findings of the survey of stokvels in the major metropolitan areas as follows:⁷⁸ [⁷⁸ Research results supplied by Mr Andrew Lukhele, 12 May 1992]

Stokvel in metropolitan areas: 1991

Purpose

Estimated number of stokvels

Members per stokvel

Members

Burial costs

13 240

1 139 000

86

Business investment

9 440

86 000

9

Buying major items

18 200

328 000

18

Parties

6 470

110 000

17

Other

2 560

210 000

82

Total

49 910

1 873 000

In 1992 the membership of the National Stokvels' Association of South Africa (Nasasa) was estimated to be about 9 000 groups with an average membership of 12 people per group (or 108 000 people). However, the president of Nasasa, Mr Andrew Lukhele, said that there were about 800 000 stokvel groups nationwide.⁷⁹ [79 Interview with Mr Andrew Lukhele, Johannesburg, 12 May 1992]

The cash flow of stokvels was estimated to be more than R200m a month in 1992.⁸⁰ [80 *Sunday Times* 10 May 1992] Banks and building societies were reported to be adapting their services to meet the specific needs of stokvels. Some banks offered higher interest rates and no administrative charges in order to attract stokvel funds.

In December 1991 Nasasa announced that it planned to divert a sizeable portion of stokvel savings from commercial banks to unit trusts. The proposal was prompted by the realisation that group savers were unable to collateralise their deposits for the benefit of individual members. Mr Lukhele said that because poor people had no conventional collateral, 'an adequate substitute would be a personal credit history offered with a stokvel's guarantee'. A key feature of the unit trust concept was that the financial risk of loan defaulting would be taken away from the bank and assumed by the stokvel. This would minimise risks which banks were unwilling to undertake in townships, citing violence and non-repayment of loans as reasons.⁸¹ [81 Interview with Mr Andrew Lukhele, Johannesburg, 12 May 1992] According to an All Media and Products Survey in 1990, African unit trust investors comprised only 24% of all unit trust holders.⁸² [82 *Sunday Star* 11 May 1992]

The general manager of First National Bank, Mr Jimmy McKenzie, said that his bank would consider accepting unit trust certificates as collateral for home loans. This scheme would make people in the low-income category credit worthy by enabling them to acquire assets and build up a track record of payment.⁸³ [83 Unpublished article written by Mr Andrew Lukhele, May 1992]

Subsistence farmers

See chapter on *Land and Agriculture*.

Taverns

The public affairs manager of The South African Breweries (SAB), Mr Adrian Botha, said in May 1992 that 45% of the volume of beer produced by SAB went to shebeens.⁸⁴ [⁸⁴ Telephonic interview with Mr Adrian Botha, the public affairs manager of The South African Breweries, 14 May 1992.] The managing director of the marketing branch of the South African Taverners' Association (Sata), Mr David Moshapalo, believed that 90% of all beer was sold in the townships. Bottlestores and taverns in the townships were responsible for about 5% of total sales while 85% was sold through shebeens. He added that sorghum beer was also increasing its market share, partly because of emotional reasons (it was seen as an African product) and partly because it was cheaper than beer.⁸⁵ [⁸⁵ Telephonic interview with Mr David Moshapalo, the managing director, marketing of the South African Taverners' Association, 22 May 1992.]

According to the 1991 report of the National Taverners' Association (NTA), it had a membership of over 20 000 people. Most of its members were situated in the Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging (PWV) area.⁸⁶ [⁸⁶ *African Business* March 1991, September/October 1991.] Sata had approximately 15 000 members in 1992. According to Mr Moshapalo, the NTA and Sata co-operate in order to address problems experienced by shebeen owners.⁸⁷ [⁸⁷ Telephonic interview with Mr David Moshapalo, 22 May 1992.]

A number of taverns broke away from Sata in 1991 to form the United Taverners' Association of South Africa (Utasa). One of its aims was to help members improve their properties and to buy equipment and furniture. Benefits offered by Utasa included financial assistance to set up or improve existing taverns, legal assistance, insurance schemes, medical and pension schemes, and the development of management skills.⁸⁸ [⁸⁸ *Enterprise* October 1991.]

In 1991 the NTA said that 2 445 licences had been issued to its members in 1990, legalising their taverns.⁸⁹ [⁸⁹ *African Business* July/August 1991.] However, according to figures provided by the Ko-operatiewe Wynbouers Vereniging (KWV), 2 855 special licences had been issued to shebeens in 1990 compared to 2 924 licences to liquor stores in 'white' areas. *Finance Week* said that the more liquor licences issued to Africans the fewer opportunities there were for bootleggers to exploit consumers in African townships.⁹⁰ [⁹⁰ *Finance Week* 8 August 1991.]

The shebeen trade in the centre of Johannesburg was discussed at length at the annual general meeting of

the Federated Hospitality Association of South Africa in Johannesburg in May 1992. It was alleged that shebeens operated 24 hours a day in flats and on street corners in this area and that they were unfair competition for hotels and bottlestores. Complainants said that the shebeens had also led to an increase in crime and a decline in foreign tourists.⁹¹ [⁹¹ *Business Day* 7 May 1992]

In 1992 the financiers of Partuma, a liquor depot and hotel complex in Tumahole, near Parys (Orange Free State), went into liquidation (see *1991/92 Survey* p175). Mr Moshapalo said in May 1992 that Sata would attempt to buy Partuma back. He also said that since Sata considered the food and allied industry to be linked to the liquor industry, it was examining the prospect of expanding into the distribution of dehydrated foods (ie food in powder form which could be easily prepared by tavemers). The imminent privatisation of the meat industry was also an encouraging prospect, according to Mr Moshapalo, and could provide Sata with the opportunity of entering the meat industry.⁹² [⁹² Telephonic interview with Mr David Moshapalo, 22 May 1992] In 1992 Sata entered into a joint agreement with Funa Food, a subsidiary of the Tongaat Group, to supply a variety of foodstuffs to thousands of shebeens and taverns in the PWV area.⁹³ [⁹³ *Sowetan* 2 April 1992]

The NTA entered into an agreement with Zimbabwe National Breweries in February 1992 to import and distribute Zambezi Lager through its members.⁹⁴ [⁹⁴ *Business Day* 13 April 1992]

Taxis

In 1992 the taxi market share of the Southern Africa Black Taxi Association (Sabta) was about 60%, according to the marketing director of Sabta, Mr Cyprian Lebeso.⁹⁵ [⁹⁵ Telephonic interview with the marketing director of Southern Africa Black Taxi Association, Mr Cyprian Lebeso, 19 May 1992]

The National African Federated Transport Organisation (Nafto) said in July 1991 that it represented five organisations and 15 associations involved in freight and passenger road transport. Nafto had 51 000 members. Apart from establishing a network of branches in South Africa (including the ten homelands), Nafto had finalised negotiations with Zimbabwe to operate officially there. Nafto was also negotiating for expansion into Namibia.⁹⁶ [⁹⁶ *African Business* July/August 1991]

The increasing incidence of bad debt and high finance costs affected sales of taxis in 1992. The rise in bad debt forced some financial institutions to demand much higher deposits than previously and to reduce periods for repayment. A report in the *Sunday Times* in May 1992 stated that most taxi purchases in 1992 had been replacements of vehicles. Mr Lebeso said that in previous years, vehicle sales to Sabta members, approximately two thirds of all taxi sales, had totalled about 400 a month. However, since January 1991 the number of purchases per month had begun dropping and in January and February 1992

they had totalled only 80 vehicles. Mr Lebesse attributed this decline to high interest rates and the general recession.⁹⁷ [⁹⁷ *Sunday Times* 10 May 1992]

The managing director of marketing of Sabta, Mr Jabu Mabuza, said in August 1991 that violence was gripping the industry because there were too many permits and too few ranking facilities (see chapter on *Political Developments*). Order would be restored only through stricter regulation, he added. The general secretary of the Foundation for African Business and Consumer Services, Mr Joas Mogale, said that Sabta had called for the establishment of a control board comprising representatives of taxi organisations which would have the power to withdraw permits and impound vehicles.⁹⁸ [⁹⁸ *Business Day* 9 August 1991; Interview with Mr Joas Mogale, Pretoria, 25 May 1992]

In May 1992 Gower Properties, the Johannesburg City Council and Sabta announced that they were to develop jointly a complex in the city to be known as the Metro Mall Transport Centre. Construction was expected to begin in late 1992 and take two years to complete. More than 100 000 people, 8 000 taxis and 1 600 buses were expected to use the complex daily. Facilities were to include banks, clothing stores, a creche, a day clinic, doctors' rooms, restaurants and supermarkets.⁹⁹ [⁹⁹ Interview with Mr Joas Mogale, Pretoria, 25 May 1992; *Business Day*, *The Citizen* 28 May 1992]

In March 1992 the Johannesburg City Council issued 130 licences to Sabta to operate tuk-tuks (small three-wheeled vehicles) in Johannesburg. The council envisaged six routes within a 5km radius of the city hall to transport businessmen, shoppers and tourists between various shopping centres and business areas in the CBD.¹⁰⁰ [¹⁰⁰ *TheStar* 16 March 1992]

Black consumers

In 1991 the Bureau for Economic Research (BER) at the University of Stellenbosch commissioned Market Research Africa to conduct a survey of white and African consumers. The survey of Africans in metropolitan areas found that consumer confidence had declined from an index of 104 in June 1991 to 99 in September 1991.

The survey found that 39% of Africans expected their financial position to improve over the following 12 months, while 33% expected no change and 26% anticipated a decline. On a regional basis Africans in Cape Town were the most optimistic about their financial position (68% expecting an improvement). Africans in Pretoria were the most pessimistic, with 60% expecting a deterioration in their financial situation. Only 22% of Africans surveyed believed that the present time was the right time to buy durable household appliances, compared to 36% who thought it was the wrong time to purchase. Forty-two percent were undecided. The BER said that this unwillingness to purchase durable domestic appliances was evident at every income level and in most metropolitan areas. The survey of whites

indicated that 34% believed it was the wrong time to buy durable household appliances, while 25% regarded it as the right time.¹⁰¹ [¹⁰¹ University of Stellenbosch, Bureau for Economic Research, *Trade and Commerce*, January 1992, p12] A regional analysis of African perceptions of South Africa's economic situation is given below:¹⁰² [¹⁰² Ibid, pp13,15]

African respondents' expectations regarding the economy: September 1991^a

Area

Improvement

Deterioration

Bloemfontein/Welkom

64%

24%

Cape Town

76%

17%

Durban/Pietermaritzburg

32%

69%

Johannesburg

61%

38%

Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage

35%

58%

Pretoria

27%

66%

a

Rounded therefore figures may not add up to 100%. 'Do not knows' not included.

The chairman of the South African Consumer Union, Mrs Lillibeth Moolman, said in March 1992 that the financial position of consumers was critical as a result of unemployment, inflation and rapidly increasing food prices.¹⁰³ [¹⁰³ *Sowetan* 24 March 1992]

Sales House, a member of the Edgars group, which focused on black consumers, reported an increase in sales of 14% for the year ending March 1992. Its profits also increased by 31%.¹⁰⁴ [¹⁰⁴ *The Star* 7 May 1992]

Another clothing retailer. Smart Centre, saw an increase in its attributable profit of 5% between June and December 1991.¹⁰⁵ [¹⁰⁵ *Business Day* 12 February 1992]

Figures published by the Furniture Traders' Association (FTA) in May 1992 indicated that income from sales of appliances, furniture, sound equipment, television sets and video cassette recorders in the first quarter of 1992 had dropped by 7% in real terms compared with the first quarter in 1991. The executive director of the FTA, Mr Frans Jordaan, said in April 1992 that sales to the black market, 'traditionally the mainstay of the industry', had declined sharply since June 1991. He added that only political stability and an improvement in the economy would lead to an increase in sales.¹⁰⁶ [¹⁰⁶ *The Star* 30 April 1992, *Business Day* 12 May 1992]

The chairman of the Natal branch of the Federated Hospitality Association of South Africa, Mr Alan Gooderson, said in March 1992 that the bulk of Durban's tourists came from the Pretoria/ Witwatersrand/ Vereeniging area and that most of them were black. He added that over Christmas 1991, 70% to 75% of hotel customers in Durban were middle-class African people. The chairman of the management committee of the Durban City Council, Mr Peter Mansfield, said in the same month that black tourists would play an increasingly important role in the internal tourism mar

In recognition of the growing importance of blacks (and more particularly Africans) in the tourism industry, the National Parks Board (NPB) attempted during the period under review to make blacks feel welcome in national parks which had previously been regarded as 'playgrounds for rich whites'. The NPB aimed to promote environmental awareness among blacks as part of this strategy. A spokesman for the Kruger National Park said in February 1992 that blacks were mostly day visitors, but that the park expected more blacks to stay in the park in future.¹⁰⁸ [¹⁰⁸ *Business Day* 13 February 1992]

Private Sector and Social Responsibility

The chairman of the Independent Development Trust, Mr Jan Steyn, said in Cape Town in May 1992 that the private sector had to become involved at the highest level in social upliftment programmes. He suggested that it give substantial support to postmatric and postgraduate management development programmes and to technical and vocational training.¹⁰⁹ [¹⁰⁹ *Ibid* 5 May 1992]

Corporate social responsibility

In its 1991 annual report AECI stated that for the 12th year running it had devoted 1% of its previous year's profit before tax to its social investment programmes. In 1991, R4,0m was invested in 129 projects. About 50% of this amount was invested in projects to promote scientific and technical education, to upgrade teachers' skills and qualifications and to promote job-creation programmes.¹¹⁰ [¹¹⁰ AECI, annual report 1991, ppl7-18]

Barlow Rand undertook in 1991 to contribute R80m over a five-year period to the Private Sector Initiative, an education trust. This amount would be in addition to the normal social investment expenditures, according to the company's 1991 annual report. The Barlow Rand Education Trust also made the single largest donation of R3m to the Alexandra Technical College (Johannesburg), which opened in 1991. The 1991 report said that 60% of all social investment allocations went to education, while 22% went to health and welfare, 12% to small business promotion and 6% to housing.¹¹¹ [¹¹¹ Barlow Rand, annual report 1991, p39]

The Life Offices Association announced in June 1992 that it would invest up to R5bn of its funds a year in 'socially desirable' projects.¹¹² [¹¹² *Business Day* 4 June 1992]

The Southern Life Association set up the Southern Foundation in January 1991 with the aim of 'enhancing the development of the disadvantaged and underprivileged and creating and upholding equality of opportunity'. According to its 1991 annual report. The Southern Life Association allocated some 50% of its expenditure on social responsibility programmes to educational activities, with the

emphasis on pre-school education and the quality of teaching at all levels.¹¹³ [¹¹³ The Southern Life Association, annual report 1991, p14]

In 1991 The South African Breweries provided funding for education, health and welfare. Its largest allocation went to education, including the upgrading of teaching facilities and the improvement of teaching skills in the classroom.¹¹⁴ [¹¹⁴ The South African Breweries, annual report 1991, p15]

European code

The rapid process of political developments led many British and multinational companies operating in South Africa to recommend that the European Community code of conduct governing minimum pay and conditions for black staff be dropped. Unilever SA, which employed about 4 000 black people in South Africa, said in May 1992 that it was increasingly difficult to identify employees by race. The Congress of South African Trade Unions commented in the same month that while the code needed updating, it was still necessary.¹¹⁵ [¹¹⁵ *Business Day* 25 May 1992]

American guidelines

In May 1992 Colgate Palmolive launched a R10m foundation for social investment in southern Africa. The vice president of Colgate Palmolive, Mr Gerry Nocker, said that the social change taking place in South Africa required a renewed commitment to the Sullivan Principles (see 1982 *Survey* p55, 1983 *Survey* pp109–112).¹¹⁶ [¹¹⁶ *The Citizen* 20 May 1992]

According to the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (CAAA), American companies operating in South Africa are obliged to abide by a set of fair employment standards. This condition in the CAAA was not expected to be lifted in the foreseeable future. Compliance with the code was assessed in two ways: firms could answer a questionnaire prepared by the State Department or they could become signatories to the Statement of Principles which had developed from the Sullivan Principles. The firms were rated annually according to amounts spent in various areas. In 1990, 26 firms were assessed by the State Department, while in 1991, 52 were evaluated by Arthur D Little, an accounting firm which assesses those companies which have signed the Statement of Principles.¹¹⁷ [¹¹⁷ *Business Day* 3 March 1992]

The decline in the number of signatories to the Statement of Principles was a result of disinvestment under political and economic pressure. However, according to the senior vice president of Arthur D Little, Mr Reid Weedon, every American business operation had satisfied the first three principles of the code: non-segregation of races in all work facilities, equal and fair employment practices for all employees and equal pay for all employees doing comparable jobs in equal timespans.¹¹⁸ [¹¹⁸ *The Star* 7 February 1992]

According to Arthur D Little, the cost to signatories of satisfying the principles was R74m in 1991 or R4 179 for each employee. Furthermore, the companies devoted jointly 70 600 mandays to social responsibility activities. The companies monitored by the State Department spent an average of R3 052 per employee in 1990. Of this amount, R724 went to employee education and training, R1 141 to non-employee education, R758 to community development and R428 to various social and political activities. Cumulatively, the firms spent R22m on these items between 1986 and 1990. Only R6m of this sum was spent on employee training.¹¹⁹ [¹¹⁹ *Business Day* 3 March 1992]

Employee share-ownership plans

Employee share-ownership plans (Esops) were cited in August 1991 by the president of the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Dr Sam Motsuenyane, as one means of black empowerment (see *1991/92 Survey* p180). However, Esops were opposed by some trade unions. In April 1992 a national organising secretary of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, Dr Bernie Fanaroff, dismissed Esops as a source of empowerment because in his view they gave workers no say over the affairs of the companies involved. The chairman of the marketing wing of the Foundation for African Business and Consumer Services, Mr Gaby Magomola, argued that because Esops in South Africa had become so politicised, any such schemes would have to be referred to the labour movement for approval.¹²⁰ [¹²⁰ *Finance Week* 23 April 1992]

The Anglo American Corporation of South Africa and De Beers Consolidated Mines announced in May 1992 that about 130 000 workers who had accepted the offer made by both companies in 1987 to place free shares in trust for them over a five-year period would now be able to decide whether to cash in these shares (see *1987/88 Survey* pp659–660). The total value of the shares at current prices was more than R70m.¹²¹ [¹²¹ *Business Day* 7 May 1992]

As stated in previous *Surveys* it is very difficult to determine how many shares in Esops are held by Africans. According to the 1991 annual report of Anglo-Alpha, 189 400 shares were allocated to employees in terms of the employees' share participation scheme. A cumulative 815 400 shares were held by employees in terms of the scheme as at 31 December 1991, leaving a balance of 2,2m shares for future allocation.¹²² [¹²² Anglo-Alpha, annual report 1991, p27]

During 1991 Iscor issued 12,2m shares to employees in respect of The State Share Trust. The balance of shares available for utilisation in terms of the scheme totalled about 26m in June 1991.¹²³ [¹²³ Iscor, annual report 1991. p31]

Key Projections

- The chief economist of the Small Business Development Corporation, Dr Edwin Basson, said in 1992 that the only sector offering job opportunities to matriculants in the following year would be the informal sector.
- Dr Basson predicted that no more than 8,5m of the expected economically active population of 20,2m would be employed in the formal sector in 2005.
- According to the Institute for Futures Research at the University of Stellenbosch, the informal sector would provide income opportunities to 4,7m people in the year 2000.
- A Market Research Africa survey in September 1991 found that 39% of Africans in metropolitan areas expected their financial position to improve over the following 12 months, while 33% expected no change and 26% anticipated it to worsen.

SECURITY

Key Points

- In its second interim report, published in May 1992, the Goldstone commission said that it had found no evidence of a 'third force' involved in orchestrating political violence.
- By mid-March 1992, eight regional dispute resolution committees and 11 local dispute resolution committees had been established.
- In March 1992 the government established a new riot policing unit, the Internal Stability Division, comprising 5 600 members. The unit was to be expanded to a force of 17 500 people.
- In December 1991 there were 96 540 prisoners in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands), or 13 000 more than prisons were designed to hold.
- The average cost of imprisonment in 1992 was R41,85 per prisoner per day.
- Some 17% of 53 748 prisoners released on parole in 1990 had been rearrested by February 1992 or were wanted in connection with other crimes. The comparable figure for 1989 was 12% of released prisoners.
- In March 1992 not a single person was being detained in South Africa (including the 'independent' homelands) under security legislation.

Initiatives Against Political Violence

National Peace Accord

The *National Peace Accord* was signed on 14 September 1991 by 29 signatories, including the government, the African National Congress (ANC), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and trade unions (see *1991/92 Survey* plvxii). It aimed to end the chronic political violence in African communities, especially in Natal and on the Witwatersrand.

In March 1992 the Ciskei administration agreed to sign the *National Peace Accord* despite differences between the administration and the ANC and the administration's withdrawal from a conflict resolution committee, on the grounds that the ANC was plotting to topple the territory's military rulers. The accord was signed by the chairman of the Ciskei council of ministers, Mr N Nogcantsi, at a national peace conflict resolution committee meeting.¹ [¹ *The Citizen* 5 March 1992]

The chairman of the national peace accord committee, Mr John Hall, told a meeting of the committee in Johannesburg in March 1992 that lack of funds was hindering progress by the subcommittee for socio-economic reconstruction and said that development agencies would be approached for financial aid for projects in the most underdeveloped region.² [² *Ibid*]

A report in March 1992 of the publicity and communications subcommittee stressed the urgency of distributing copies of the simplified version of the peace accord at grassroots level.³ [³ *Ibid*]

Two months later the National Peace Secretariat (NFS) expressed its 'deep concern' about inflammatory language used by speakers at political meetings, saying that such language put at risk the slow and painstaking progress towards peace and stability in the country in that it exacerbated violence, intimidation and political intolerance.⁴ [⁴ *Ibid* 23 April 1992]

The chairman of the NFS, Dr Antonie Gildenhuys, appealed to political leaders 'actively to combat the phenomenon of war talk and incitement'. The work of local dispute resolution committees, he added, was being frustrated 'or even nullified' by the highly inflammatory language being used. Such conduct violated the code of conduct for political organisations agreed to in the *National Peace Accord*.⁵ [⁵ *Ibid* 23 March 1992]

The national peace accord committee decided in April 1992 that such breaches of conduct should be addressed more vigorously in future. Transgressions would be brought to the attention of political parties by the administrative arm of the national peace committee which would also check the accuracy of alleged statements. In the absence of satisfactory explanations, leaders would be summoned before the national peace committee. The transgressions would also be made public.⁶ [⁶ *The Citizen, Sowetan* 23 April

1992₁

According to preliminary calculations by the South African Institute of Race Relations, 2 161 people died in political violence in the nine-and-a-half months before the *National Peace Accord* was signed, and 2 328 in the subsequent nine-and-a-half months, an 8% increase.

Both the ANC and the IFP blamed each other and the police for flouting the peace accord.⁷ [⁷ *The Weekly Mail* 13 March 1992₁

Mr Hall said there were obstacles to peace, not the least being that political leaders had not given the accord their fullest support. They signed it and attended meetings but they were 'not driving it with enough vigour', he said. The chairman of the greater Soweto subcommittee on train violence, Mr Barry Jammy, said that his subcommittee was not making much progress because the ANC and the IFP were not demonstrating total commitment to the peace accord.⁸ [⁸ *Business Day* 23 April 1992₁

In June 1992 Mr Justice Richard Goldstone criticised the way in which the government had dealt with the publication of the second interim report of the Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation (the Goldstone commission) (see *1991/92 Survey* p466), saying that it had led to confusion. He added that the commission was concerned about the manner in which its views were 'unfairly and selectively' used by public representatives who had been in possession of all the information for some weeks.⁹ [⁹ *Ibid* 2 June 1992₁

Judge Goldstone believed the 'unfortunate confusion' that arose after the report was published could have been avoided if all interested parties, particularly the signatories to the *National Peace Accord*, had been given the report before government and police spokesmen had made public comments about it.¹⁰ [¹⁰ *Ibid*₁

In its second interim report, the commission said that the causes of the violence were many and complicated. It said that it had found no evidence of a 'third force' involved in 'orchestrating political violence on a wide front'. The commission said that among the causes of the violence were:¹¹ [¹¹ *Second Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation*, Cape Town, 29 April 1992₁

- economic, social and political imbalances as a result of 'three centuries of racial discrimination and over 40 years of an extreme form of racial and economic dislocation in consequence of ... apartheid';
- the actions of the police force and army, which had for many years been 'instruments of oppression' and which were still, for the majority of South Africans, not community orientated;

- the ‘unexpected and sudden legalising’ of large and predominantly black-supported political organisations;
- the climate of political intolerance, especially in the black community;
- the deterioration in the South African economy, which had made all South Africans, especially the lower-income groups, poorer;
- the failure of the ANC and IFF to take ‘adequate and effective steps’ to stop the violence by imposing discipline and accountability on their membership; and
- the government’s failure to take ‘sufficiently firm steps’ to prevent criminal conduct by members of the security forces.

The commission said that no purpose would be served by trying to apportion blame for past violence. However, it expressed concern about the activities of the KwaZulu Police and of Umkhonto we Sizwe. The commission recommended that:

- an effective police presence be deployed in local communities;
- the Goldstone commission continue its investigations into the violence;
- organisations whose members were responsible for the violence establish committees to report to the commission on allegations of public violence;
- hostels, which were common to the worst areas of violence, be securely fenced. The police should ensure that no arms were taken in or out of the hostels and that hostel dwellers were protected from attack; and
- the carrying of dangerous weapons in public be outlawed.

In May 1992 a one-man committee comprising an advocate, Mr R W Wise, was appointed by the Goldstone commission to inquire into allegations made by *The Weekly Mail* that members of the police either planned or instigated violence in the Vaal Triangle (southern Transvaal) area.¹² [¹² *The Citizen, Sowetan* 27 May 1992.] At a preliminary inquiry detailed statements were read to the commission on behalf of both the police and the newspaper. The ANC, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party also submitted to the commission that, in addition to investigating specific allegations, the commission should launch an inquiry into the structure, training and activities of

the Crime Investigation Service as well as covert operations of the security forces.¹³ [¹³ *The Citizen* 27 May 1992]

Dispute resolution committees

Regional

Eight regional dispute resolution committees have been established, on which representatives of the ANC, the IFP and the government, as well as the police, mediating bodies and other interest groups meet. The establishment of more committees is in the pipeline.¹⁴ [¹⁴ *The Weekly Mail* 13 March 1992]

Local

At the local level 11 dispute resolution committees were already operating in March 1992, while 30 more were still to be formed. Representatives of local government, churches, trade unions and other community groups participated in the dispute resolution committees at local level.¹⁵ [¹⁵ *Ibid*]

Commenting on the creation of the committees, a peace secretariat member and the Democratic Party spokesman on law and order, Mr Peter Gastrow, said that it was a victory in the short term that so many structures had already been formed. In many instances,' Mr Gastrow added, 'people are communicating for the first time. However, the structures are fragile to start with. There is a high level of mistrust ... The formation itself takes a long time and for the committees to begin to act as a whole is a long and difficult process.'¹⁶ [¹⁶ *Ibid*]

Mr Hall said in March 1992 that it would take another six months before the peace accord began to make real and visible inroads on deaths from political violence. 'We have to keep our heads down, keep at it and not give up even though there are times when frustrations are great', he said, adding that the *National Peace Accord* was already helping South Africans to 'find each other'.¹⁷ [¹⁷ *Ibid*]

The co-ordinator of community, conciliation and mediation services of the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa in Natal, Mr Steve Collins, said that people working at regional and local level stressed the need for monitoring bodies and non-aligned service organisations to mediate, facilitate and act as centres where complaints about violence could be lodged on a 24-hour basis. Without such facilities being available, meetings deteriorated into political posturing and never-ending arguments, he said. Furthermore, non-political conflicts often became political when there was no recourse to mediation by independent, non-aligned bodies.¹⁸ [¹⁸ *Ibid*]

Mr Collins added, 'We need more provision to be made for structures that are accountable to communities and not political parties if we are concerned about the future.' He stressed the need for the

National Peace Accord to have more full-time employees and pointed out that most members of regional and local committees had party-political commitments as well as full-time jobs in industry.¹⁹ [19 Ibid]

The director of the Independent Mediation Service of South Africa (IMSSA), Mr Charles Nupen, who was also the chairman of the Witwatersrand/Vaal Triangle regional dispute resolution committee, said in March 1992 that he believed there was also a need for the creation of mediation training programmes. He added that IMSSA was already running such a programme, and that he hoped that all parties, including the police, would participate in it.²⁰ [20 Ibid]

New police unit

During March 1992 the government established a new riot unit, the Internal Stability Division, in a bid to defuse the political violence in African communities, especially in Natal and on the Witwatersrand. The unit was intended to relieve ordinary police of riot duty so that they could concentrate on fighting crime.

At its inception the Internal Stability Division comprised 5 600 members, 280 of whom were women, but it was to be expanded eventually to a force of 17 500. The unit was established under the command of a former Soweto police commissioner. Lieutenant General Johan Swart.

The unit was initially made up of former members of the riot squad who had been taught new methods of policing and who had undergone training in mediation skills. Only policemen who were 21 years of age or older were accepted into the unit.

Gen Swart said that the necessity to do one's duty in an 'accessible and accountable manner' had been impressed upon each policeman in the unit. 'We will concentrate on defusing political unrest situations by means of negotiation as far as possible. If we have to use force, we will do it in a manner for which we can account in a court of law. Our challenge is to improve on the work done by previous riot squads.'²¹ [21 *The Weekly Mail* 20 March 1992, *Sunday Star* 22 March 1992]

Gen Swart added. In the past, we were expected to maintain dual identity-combating crime and dealing with the public at large. The police will never be acceptable to the broad community as long as riot control remains a primary police function. That is why it was decided that the time was now ripe to establish a new and semi-autonomous unit primarily responsible for riot control.' The highly mobile nonracial squad. Gen Swart explained further, would have its own headquarters, uniforms, insignia and distinctly marked vehicles. It would also use aircraft to transport its members at short notice to any flashpoint in the country. The emphasis would be placed on preventative action such as patrols in areas of high unrest and intimidation.²² [22 *The Weekly Mail* 20 March 1992, *Sunday Star* 22 March 1992]

It was envisaged that members of the unit would liaise with regional and local dispute resolution committees which had been created by the National Peace Accord. There will be a unit established in all 11 regions of the country and each unit will have a component which will negotiate, mediate and communicate,' Gen Swart said.²³ [²³ *The Weekly Mail* 20 March 1992, *Sunday Star* 22 March 1992]

Troops in the townships

On the night of 8 April 1992 members of 32 Battalion of the South African Defence Force (SADF) allegedly attacked residents of the Phola Park shack settlement at Tokoza (east Rand). In the wake of the attack two people died, two women were allegedly raped and 47 residents, as well as two soldiers, were injured.

The Goldstone commission (see *National Peace Accord* above and see *1991/92 Survey* p466) was subsequently requested to hold an inquiry into the raid. The chairman of the commission, Mr Justice Richard Goldstone, said in a statement that the commission would attempt to establish what injuries had been incurred by the residents and SADF members. It would also ascertain why the soldiers entered Phola Park and whether they were in fact guilty of misconduct.²⁴ [²⁴ *City Press* 12 April 1992; *The Citizen, The Star* 23 April 1992]

The commission obtained affidavits from most of the residents who had alleged that soldiers had been guilty of criminal conduct. An investigation was to be instituted into the possibility of charges being laid against nine soldiers who had been pointed out by residents at an identification parade following the alleged assaults.²⁵ [²⁵ *The Citizen, The Star* 23 April 1992]

A representative of the police told the commission that charges against the soldiers ranged from rape to theft and assault. However, an SADF officer, Major Albie van Eeden, denied that the troops had assaulted and raped Phola Park residents. He said that the soldiers could have been 'hard-handed with residents because they did not co-operate after shots had been fired from Phola Park at an SADF patrol'. The patrol had returned the fire, Maj van Eeden added, and two soldiers had been injured in the exchange of fire.²⁶ [²⁶ *City Press* 12 April 1992; *The Citizen, The Star* 23 April 1992]

The officer who was in command at the scene. Lieutenant Frederik Ras, testified that on the night in question 32 Battalion had come under heavy automatic rifle fire and that during the attack a sergeant had been wounded. After the attack, during which 28 AK-47 shots were fired at members of 32 Battalion and at least 175 shots were fired in return by the soldiers, he arranged a 'sweeping line' to establish if there were any wounded in the settlement and to see if his troops could find any firearms. The procedure had taken 45 minutes and several houses had been broken into by the soldiers. Lt Ras said that his troops had not discovered any wounded people, nor had they confiscated any firearms.²⁷ [²⁷ *Business Day, The*

Citizen 5 May 1992₁

Thousands of Imbali (Natal) residents stayed away from work on 4 May 1992 to demand the withdrawal of 32 Battalion, riot police and KwaZulu police from Imbali. Some 26 members of the ANC Women's League began an indefinite sit-in at a Pietermaritzburg (Natal) police station on the same day.²⁸ [28

Business Day 5 May 1992₁

Crime

Statistics

The government provided the following figures for reported cases of crime in Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg and Pretoria in 1991:²⁹ [29 *Hansard* (A) 3 q cols 95-96, 17 February 1992; *Hansard* (A) 4 q cols 315-322, 26 February 1992; information supplied by the office of the commissioner of police, Pretoria, 9 June 1992₁

Crime statistics: 1991

Cape Town

Durban

Johannesburg ^a

Pretoria ^b

Total

Assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm

8 040

1 434

9 934

1 427

20 835

Car theft

6 017

2 618

16 928

4 178

29 741

Common assault

10 442

5 165

14 175

3 978

33 760

Culpable homicide

616

481

822

144

2 063

Damage of property

6 863

4 618

11 958

2 725

26 164

House breaking

18 617

7 696

31 219

8 791

66 323

Murder

1 144

798

2 661

115

4 718

Possession of drugs

5 447

2 386

2 879

1 696

12 408

Rape

1 520

575

2 909

457

5 461

Robbery

6 630

2 554

14 894

1 497

25 575

a

Including Alexandra and Soweto

b

Including Attridgeville and Laudium, but excludin

Government initiatives

In February 1992 the South African Police (SAP) put 1000 extra policemen on the beat in Johannesburg as part of the government's anti-crime strategy.³⁰ [³⁰ *Business Day* 6 February 1992] The divisional head of visible policing of the SAP, Lieutenant General Louw Malan, said, 'The deployment of the additional members in the Johannesburg central business district is a result of the undertaking given by the minister of law and order, Mr Hemus Kriel, to combat increasing crime. Members drawn from different units throughout the country are being sent to Johannesburg to reinforce the existing crime prevention and tourist protection units.' The deployment followed a meeting between Mr Kriel and business leaders after which it had been announced that a 24-hour anti-mugging patrol would be introduced and that a crime task force would be formed for Johannesburg.³¹ [³¹ *The Citizen* 7 February 1992]

Another 150 additional policemen were deployed in the city by the end of February 1992. Gen Malan said that the rise in the number of cases of robbery, handbag snatching and pickpocketing within the city centre was cause for concern. It was hoped the deployment of more men would help to reduce crime.³² [³² *Ibid* 28 February 1992]

In a weekend anti-crime operation on the Reef, which began on 28 February and which was code-named 'Operation Visibility', police arrested 13 000 people. More than 7 000 suspects were arrested on charges ranging from unlawful possession of firearms to shoplifting. Police seized 135kg of dagga and arrested 44 dealers, 40 suspects were arrested on charges of robbery and another 14 on charges of armed robbery, 20 people were arrested on murder charges, while 19 were arrested on charges of attempted murder.³³ [³³ *City Press* 1 March 1992, *The Citizen* 2 March 1992]

In March 1992 Mr Kriel said that legislation which prevented police reservists from belonging to political parties would be repealed in order to boost the police force in the fight against crime. Any South African with any political affiliation would be able to join the police reserve, he added.³⁴ [³⁴ *The Star* 6 March 1992]

The anti-crime campaign included the recruiting of 3 500 new policemen and women in 1992 and the deployment of 11 000 police assistants countrywide. Provision was also made for the purchase of 10 000 bicycles, 2 000 motorcycles and 1000 motor vehicles for patrols.³⁵ [³⁵ *Ibid*]

Mr Kriel added that other measures which would be adopted included the provision of R53m for the building of 80 new satellite police stations, 400 'contact points' and 50 mobile charge offices, the upgrading of the police air wing, more countrywide crime-prevention operations and the deployment on active duty of 1 000 members previously in administrative posts.³⁶ [³⁶ *Ibid*]

Mr Kriel said that ongoing patrols and crime prevention had been instituted at national and regional levels. He gave as an example 4 557 search operations by the Internal Stability Unit in April 1992

which, he said, involved 81 330 vehicles. Mr Kriel commented further that regular crime-prevention units had been activated nationwide to bring about greater involvement by neighbourhood, business and farm watches. He believed that the Crime Investigation Service's new information gathering system, which was implemented on 1 April 1992, was helping to trace more suspects.³⁷ [³⁷ *The Citizen* 14 May 1992]

Commenting on the government's anti-crime plans, the Business Watch co-ordinator of the South African Chamber of Commerce, Mr Gerald Heine, said that while the provisions for visible policing and expanding and upgrading the SAP were welcome, 3 500 new recruits were not enough. 'We need 15 000 new regulars every year,' he said.³⁸ [³⁸ *The Star* 6 March 1992]

Police Matters

Retraining and restructuring of the police

In February 1992 the South African Police (SAP) established a special task force (which included some of the force's top intelligence officers) in a bid to stop a major cross-border gun racket in which AK-47 assault rifles were being smuggled into South Africa. According to the police, one of the most common routes for smuggling weapons into the country was through Mozambique and Swaziland.³⁹ [³⁹ *The Argus* 4 February 1992] A police spokesman said that in 1991, 102 armed robberies were committed with AK47s and that the weapons were also used in 313 incidents of unrest during the same year.⁴⁰ [⁴⁰ *Ibid*]

The media liaison officer of the minister of law and order, General Leon Mellet, said in February 1992 that the SAP was considering training 10 000 assistant policemen to increase visible policing.⁴¹ [⁴¹ *The Citizen* 6 February 1992]

In April 1992 the government established the Police Board in terms of the *National Peace Accord*. Members included civilians, among them academic lawyers, to 'correlate the interests of the community and those of the South African Police'. Members of the board were appointed by the minister of law and order, Mr Hemus Kriel, on the recommendations of the national peace accord committee.⁴² [⁴² *The Citizen, The Star* 28 April 1992]

Mr Kriel said in May 1992 that his department was involved in the creation of an international policing strategy for Africa which included the co-ordination and exchange of information, the establishment of an African policing association and the holding of inter-state conferences. Discussions were also under

way regarding the SAP's admission to Interpol, he added.⁴³ [⁴³ *The Citizen* 14 April 1992]

According to Mr Kriel, 2 500 police assistants were being trained in May 1992 and more than 800 administrative policemen had been transferred to policing services. Mr Kriel also said that 600 police reservists had been recruited in the previous two months in a continuing recruitment drive.⁴⁴ [⁴⁴ *Ibid* 14 May 1992]

Mr Kriel said in June 1992 that 2 700 bullet-proof vests had been distributed among policemen in order to protect their lives and a further 2 500 such vests were on order. He added that policy was to make sufficient vests available where 'there is a need'.⁴⁵ [⁴⁵ *Ibid* 4 June 1992]

Inquiries into police misconduct

Members of the SAP and military police implicated in the assassination of Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo in February 1991 (see *1991/92 Survey*, p498) were cleared of all blame when an inquest held in the Natal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court in Pietermaritzburg in March 1992 found that unknown people were responsible for the killing. The judge said that no motive had been established which would cast suspicion on any particular group or person.⁴⁶ [⁴⁶ *Business Day* 17 March 1992]

In April 1992 Mr Justice Andrew Wilson sentenced Captain Brian Mitchell, a former police station commander, to death in the Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court on II counts of murder arising from a massacre at a night vigil in Trust Feed (Pietermaritzburg) in December 1988 (see *1991/92 Survey* p501). Four special constables who appeared in court with the police captain—Messrs Marshall Khambule, Dumisane Ndwalane, Kehia Ngubane and Thabo Sikhosana -were each sentenced to an effective 15 years' imprisonment for their part in the killing of the 11 people.

Judge Wilson passed the death sentence on Capt Mitchell 11 times and also sentenced him to three years' imprisonment on each of two counts of attempted murder. The special constables were sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment each to run concurrently in respect of each count of murder, and to three years' imprisonment to run concurrently on each of the two counts of attempted murder.

The court found that Capt Mitchell had planned to attack United Democratic Front supporters in an attempt to weaken that organisation and to bolster the Inkatha Freedom Party at Trust Feed. The special constables were found to have acted under Capt Mitchell's orders.⁴⁷ [⁴⁷ *The Citizen* 1 May 1992]

Judge Wilson criticised the initial police investigation into the murders, saying that investigating officers had either been incompetent or not interested in investigating the case properly. He also said that

inquiries should be carried out regarding other cases where policemen were involved in unlawful activities and that the public should be made aware that it was no longer acceptable for the police to commit criminal offences.⁴⁸ [⁴⁸ *Business Day* 22 April 1992, *The Citizen* 1 May 1992]

In May 1992 the minister of law and order, Mr Hernus Kriel, appointed a former regional court magistrate, Mr Willem Knigel, to take charge of an investigation into alleged irregularities in the police investigation into the massacre at Trust Feed in 1988. In appointing Mr Krugel, Mr Kriel bowed to public opinion that an internal police inquiry into the Trust Feed case was insufficient. Mr Krugel was to report to the minister at the end of his investigation. However, the minister declined to call a full independent judicial investigation, as requested by some politicians and other interest groups, such as the General Council of the Bar of South Africa.⁴⁹ [⁴⁹ *Business Day*, *The Star* 6 May 1992]

After press reports of widespread police corruption in the Athlone police district (western Cape) the regional commissioner of police for the western Cape, Major General Nic Acker, announced in March 1992 that he had commissioned a 'project team' to identify the district's problems and to formulate a plan of action. The team consisted of representatives of police psychologists, social workers, chaplains, planning and research staff and the police internal liaison department. The team was asked to make recommendations regarding the development of management skills and teaching the police how to deal with stress, how to handle conflict and how to prevent corruption. Gen Acker added that the programme recommended would eventually be applied to all districts in the western Cape region. However, no major changes in personnel or in the district's management structure were envisaged.⁵⁰ [⁵⁰ *Cape Times* 4 March 1992]

Justice

Sentencing policy and the judiciary

The minister of correctional services, Mr Adriaan Vlok, said in March 1992 that short-term prisoners would serve at least a third of their sentences. The minister explained that acting on the advice of the Advisory Release Board he had amended prison release policy to ensure that prisoners with sentences of six months or less served a 'substantial portion' of their sentences.⁵¹ [⁵¹ *The Citizen* 6 March 1992] 'To ensure the consistent application of the release policy,' Mr Vlok added, 'this will apply to all prisoners except child molesters who do not qualify for parole.' Although Mr Vlok said that he believed the new policy would affect adversely already overcrowded prisons, he added that 'changing circumstances' left his department with no other options.⁵² [⁵² *Ibid*]

Speaking in Parliament in May 1992 Mr Vlok said that provision had been made in terms of the Correctional Services Amendment Bill for certain prisoners to be allowed out on weekends. Reasons

listed in the bill for granting weekend leave to prisoners included participation in therapeutic programmes, consolidation of family ties and preparation for release. Mr Vlok also mentioned the planned repeal of a clause in the Correctional Services Act of 1959 which prohibited publication of false information regarding the experiences of a prisoner or of the administration of a prison.⁵³ [⁵³ *The Star* 6 May 1992]

The minister of justice, Mr Kobie Coetsee, said in May 1992 that one of the reasons first offenders had been given amnesty at the same time as political prisoners was because many of them had been imprisoned for similar crimes, although not with a political motive.⁵⁴ [⁵⁴ *Ibid* 8 May 1992]

Prison population reduction and releases

According to Mr Vlok, there was an average of 96 540 prisoners in South Africa in December 1991-nearly 13 000 more than prisons were designed to hold. There were a further 23 694 unsentenced prisoners in the country in the same month.⁵⁵ [⁵⁵ *The Citizen* 18 February 1992]

The prisons showing the greatest overcrowding were at Ladismith (western Cape), 112%; George (southern Cape), 106%; and Odendaalsrus (Orange Free State), 83%. There were 25 758 prisoners serving terms of imprisonment ranging from two to five years, 20 026 from five to ten years, 7 059 serving from ten to 20 years and 1350 with sentences longer than 20 years. The balance of prisoners was made up of those serving up to six months (5 254), more than six months but under two years (9 360), suspended sentences (4 081), the unsentenced and psychopaths, and prisoners who were receiving corporal punishment or who had been sentenced to death.⁵⁶ [⁵⁶ *Ibid*]

Mr Vlok said in Cape Town in January 1992 that the country's prison population was rising at the rate of 1 000 prisoners a month. He added that prisons currently held 96 909 prisoners while there was room only for 83 000. Mr Vlok also said that an average of 10 000 prisoners was released every month while 111 000 were admitted, giving an increase of 1 000 prisoners a month. He added that the average cost of imprisonment was R41,85 per prisoner per day.⁵⁷ [⁵⁷ *Business Day* 28 January 1992]

Reacting to criticism by Mr Justice M J Strydom regarding problems caused by the early release of prisoners, Mr Vlok said that average prison sentences in South Africa were among the highest in the world and that the judicial system was often to blame for this. Without the option of a parole system and alternative methods of sentencing, Mr Vlok added, the country's prison population would rise to 'unacceptable' levels. The main aim of the prison system, he said, was to remove hardened criminals from society but also to have a flexible mechanism for release.⁵⁸ [⁵⁸ *The Citizen* 12 February 1992]

A study by the sentencing project, a research and prison reform group which is based in Washington DC

(United States), showed that in 1990 South Africa, with 311 prisoners for every 100 000 people, ranked second to the US in terms of prisoners per capita. In the same year the figure for the US was 455 prisoners for every 100 000 people.⁵⁹ [⁵⁹ *The Star* 12 February 1992]

Mr Vlok said in February 1992 that 17% of 53 748 prisoners released on parole in 1990 had not adhered to their parole conditions and had been arrested in connection with other crimes or were wanted in connection with other crimes. In 1991, 12% of the 47 379 prisoners released on parole had failed to adhere to their parole conditions. Mr Vlok argued that the figures showed that a large number of people had benefited from the parole system. The authorities, he said further, could not resort to 'mediaeval policies of no remission of sentence' because of criticism or because of a few prisoners who 'misbehaved'.⁶⁰ [⁶⁰ *The Citizen* 20 February 1992]

Internal Security Act and other matters affecting civil liberties

A spokesman for a group calling itself the Human Rights Commission, Mr Eric Pelser, said in March 1992 that not a single person was being detained in either 'South Africa' or the 'independent' homelands. He believed that this was an indication that detention without trial legislation might be falling into disuse in South Africa. Mr Pelser said that to the best of his knowledge the last people to be detained were five people in the Ciskei and that they had since been released. Previously, three members of the armed wing of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the Azanian People's Liberation Army, had been held under section 29 of the Internal Security Act of 1982 for alleged attacks on police stations. Two of the suspects had subsequently been charged under the Internal Security Act of 1982, according to Mr Pelser.⁶¹ [⁶¹ *Business Day* 11 March 1992]

A police spokeswoman, Lieutenant Nina Barkhuizen, said in March 1992 that it was no longer common for anybody to be held in detention without trial. Apart from the PAC members, she added, the last detainees had been right-wing whites suspected of terrorist activities.⁶² [⁶² *Ibid*]

The minister of correctional services, Mr Adriaan Vlok, announced in March 1992 that section 44(1) of the Correctional Services Act of 1959 would be repealed. Earlier in 1992 section 27(B) of the Police Act of 1959 had been repealed by Parliament. Both these clauses had placed severe restrictions on the freedom to report on police and prisons in South Africa.⁶³ [⁶³ *Sunday Star* 29 March 1992]

According to press reports, nine other laws restraining free political activity, including a law that enabled the government to expel from the country any person unable to read and write a European language, were also to be reviewed by the minister of justice, Mr Kobie Coetsee, and to be discussed by the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) (see also chapter on *Constitutional Change*). The nine laws were the Admission of Persons to the Republic Act of 1972, the Affected Organisations

Act of 1974, section 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977, the Demonstration in or near Court Buildings Act of 1982, the Disclosure of Foreign Funding Act of 1989, the Gathering and Demonstrations Act of 1973, the Intimidation Amendment Act of 1982, the Prohibition of Foreign Financing of Political Parties Act of 1968 and the Secret Services Account Act of 1978⁶⁴ [⁶⁴ *Business Day* 19 February 1992]

South African Defence Force

South Africa was requested by the United States (US) government in February 1992 to halt its international arms sales and to scale down its missile manufacturing capacity.⁶⁵ [⁶⁵ *Saturday Star* 15 February 1992] The request was made at talks held in Cape Town between the US ambassador to South Africa, Mr William Swing (who was accompanied by American officials), and the South African ambassador to the US, Mr Harry Schwarz; the director general of foreign affairs, Mr Neil van Heerden; and officials of Armscor, a parastatal organisation which manufactures armaments.

According to the press, the South African delegation gave the Americans ‘mixed’ signals. Faced with having to retrench 5 000 employees, Armscor and some South African politicians were said to be reluctant to abide by the wishes of the US government. They were reported to want the South African and US governments to ‘agree to disagree’ about arms sales.⁶⁶ [⁶⁶ *Ibid*]

Addressing a seminar in April 1992 on the integration of military forces in South Africa, the head of the Transkei Military Council, Major General Bantu Holomisa, said that serious talks about the integration of military forces could begin only when a new government had been installed in South Africa. The seminar was attended by senior officers of the defence forces of Bophuthatswana, the Ciskei, South Africa, the Transkei and Venda as well as members of the military wing of the African National Congress (ANC), Umkhonto we Sizwe, and the armed wing of the Pan-Africanist Congress, the Azanian People’s Liberation Army.⁶⁷ [⁶⁷ *City Press* 12 April 1992]

The chairman of the Venda Council of National Unity, Brigadier Gabriel Ramushwana, told a conference on southern Africa security relations in March 1992, ‘The integrated security forces should be neutral and free from political involvement ... The process of integration should be free from coercion, and members of the respective forces should be granted the right to render alternative service if they no longer wish to remain in the military.’⁶⁸ [⁶⁸ *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* March 1992]

A spokesman for the South African Defence Force (SADF), Major Charl de Klerk, said in June 1992 that members of Umkhonto we Sizwe and units of white right-wing organisations such as the Ystergaarde of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging could join the SADF on application ‘if they qualified’ to do so. While the SADF was not yet ready to accommodate whole units of Umkhonto we

Sizwe or right-wing private armies, there was ‘no problem in accommodating individuals’, Maj de Klerk added.⁶⁹ [⁶⁹ *Business Day, The Citizen* 8 June 1992]

Maj de Klerk’s statement was confirmed by the chief of the SADF, General Kat Liebenberg, who said that a rationalisation programme known as Plan 2 000 would involve the inclusion in the SADF of about 50% of 12 000 soldiers in the ‘independent’ homelands. Gen Liebenberg also said that the majority of personnel in the new SADF would be black and that he envisaged that some form of conscription would remain.⁷⁰ [⁷⁰ *Business Day* 8 June 1992]

Gen Liebenberg said that he was already preparing the defence force for the transition period, during which time various political bodies would enjoy joint control over the security forces. He pointed out that the minister of defence, Mr Roelf Meyer, had said earlier that the government and the ANC had reached ‘80% agreement’ on the principles governing a new defence force. However, reacting to the statement by Gen Liebenberg, the Democratic Party said that the shape of a new defence force would depend on the outcome of multilateral negotiations.⁷¹ [⁷¹ *Ibid*]

Scaling down the defence force

In response to claims that conscripts who did not report for the January 1992 call-up might not be prosecuted, Mr Meyer said that the Defence Act of 1957 had not been relaxed. The present provisions of the act relating to compulsory military service remained unchanged, he added.⁷² [⁷² *The Citizen* 23 January 1992]

The controversy regarding conscription for military service arose in 1991 when those opposing conscription claimed that the call-up system had been rendered illegal by the repeal of the Population Registration Act of 1950 in 1991.

The Conservative Party (CP) subsequently called on its youth to report for military training only if they could do service in their own communities. The CP spokesman on defence, Dr Pieter Gous, said that conservative whites were no longer prepared to do compulsory military service in ‘support of a future black government’ and that it was now time for military service to become voluntary.⁷³ [⁷³ *Business Day, The Citizen* 24 March 1992]

Conscientious objection

The minister of defence, Mr Roelf Meyer, said at the opening of Parliament at the end of January 1992 that legislation on conscientious objection was being drafted based on the recommendations of the Gleeson committee, which had been appointed by the South African Defence Force (SADF) in 1991 to

look into the issue of conscientious objection (see *1991/92 Survey* p462).

The Defence Amendment Bill, which was tabled in Parliament early in 1992, provided for:⁷⁴ [74 Defence Amendment Bill, B112-92 (GA)]

- broadening the scope of objection to military service to include moral and ethical objections to military service. Previously, only religious objection had been recognised;
- compulsory jail sentences of between six and 18 months for those who were not recognised as conscientious objectors and who refused to serve in the SADF;
- compulsory sentences of detention and imprisonment of up to three years for those who were classified as conscientious objectors and who refused to render community service;
- the removal of the right to apply for conscientious objection in times of war;
- the allotment of conscripts to the South African Police without obtaining the consent of such conscripts, as had previously been the case;
- the removal of ambiguities in the Defence Act, regarding registration for military service and reporting for call-ups. In the months preceding the tabling of the bill several conscripts had successfully challenged legal action taken against them by the SADF regarding their failure to register for military service or to report for call-ups; and
- a ten-fold increase in fines for most offences in terms of the Defence Act.

Troops in the townships

See *National Peace Accord* above.

Security in the Homelands

Bophuthatswana

Early in February 1992 the Bophuthatswana administration detained Chief Abraham Kekana of Majaneng, near Hammanskraal, under the territory's Internal Security Act of 1982. Chief Kekana had been installed as chief by the Amandebele-a-Moletlane tribe in defiance of the Bophuthatswana administration after the administration had appointed another tribesman, Mr Maxwell Kekana, as head

of the community.⁷⁵ [⁷⁵ *Sunday Times* 9 February 1992]

In terms of the Bophuthatswana Internal Security Act no gatherings can take place unless authorised by the territory's minister of law and order-that is by the president. Chief Lucas Mangope. A meeting of more than two people is considered to be a gathering.

During the period under review a number of people, including members of the African National Congress (ANC) and members of the Black Sash, a banned organisation in Bophuthatswana, were detained and charged under the provision prohibiting unauthorised gatherings.⁷⁶ [⁷⁶ *Mayibuye* March 1992]

Ciskei

On 3 February 1992 the full bench of the Bisho Supreme Court heard argument that Ciskei's detention laws and section 26 of the National Security Act of 1982, which provides for indefinite detention without trial, should be declared invalid.

The applicant in the case, Miss Thozama Bongobi, asked that the detention of her brother, Mr Matela Soganga, be declared null and void, and that his release be ordered forthwith. She also asked that section 26 of the National Security Act be declared invalid. The respondents in the case were the military ruler of the Ciskei, Brigadier Joshua 'Oupa' Gqozo, the Ciskei administration, the Ciskei minister of police and the Ciskei commissioner of police.⁷⁷ [⁷⁷ *Daily Dispatch* 4 February 1992] Appearing for the applicant, Mr Dawid de Villiers said that although Mr Soganga had already been released from detention he had been instructed to continue with the application for a ruling declaring section 26 of the act invalid since there were 17 other people still in detention, and detentions in the Ciskei were frequent. Mr de Villiers argued that section 26 was in conflict with the fundamental rights contained in the constitution in the form of a bill of rights. He added that where there was a conflict between a superior law and an inferior law, the superior law should enjoy preference, and that the introduction of fundamental rights into the constitution effectively repealed the old laws, of which section 26 was a part.

Appearing for the respondents, Mr David Gordon argued that the court had no powers to declare existing laws null and void. It was there to examine draft laws in advance to determine whether they infringed human rights and thereafter to refer them back to the council of state which might reconsider, or amend, draft legislation. Judgement was subsequently reserved in the case.⁷⁸ [⁷⁸ *Ibid*]

After a meeting on 10 March 1992, the Ciskei administration, the ANC and the South African government announced that the Ciskei administration would review its National Security Act to enable political parties to hold peaceful public meetings and marches. The meeting had been held to resolve differences between the ANC and the Ciskei authorities.⁷⁹ [⁷⁹ *The Citizen* 11 March 1992]

KwaZulu

In February 1992 the KwaZulu deputy commissioner of police, Brigadier Siphos Moses Mathe, told the standing commission on public violence (the Goldstone commission) that in 1986, 150 loyal young Zulus' had been sent to a South African Defence Force (SADF) camp in the Caprivi Strip (Namibia) and that the group had been trained to protect KwaZulu cabinet ministers, including the chief minister of KwaZulu and president of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi.

Brig Mathe also told the commission that after their training many of the recruits had spent time at the Mkuze camp in KwaZulu (see *1991/92 Survey* p501). Their salaries were allegedly paid by South African military intelligence from 1986 until 1989, when they were absorbed into the KwaZulu police force. However, the recruits did not have files with the KwaZulu Police, he said. The commission was investigating allegations by *The Weekly Mail* newspaper that the SADF and its 'front' organisations were training IFP members to promote violence in African communities.⁸⁰ [⁸⁰ *Ibid* 6 February 1992; *Business Day, Sowetan* 7 February 1992]

Some of the men trained at the camp in the Caprivi Strip, among them Messrs Brian Gcina Mkhize and Vela Mchunu, allegedly became members of a KwaZulu Police 'hit squad' which sought out and killed opponents of the IFP. Mr Mkhize and Mr Mchunu were implicated in several murders in Natal.⁸¹ [⁸¹ *The Weekly Mail* 13,20 March 1992]

The KwaZulu administration barred a group of leaders of the ANC, including Messrs Chris Hani and Harry Gwala, from entering Nseleni township (northern Natal) early in February 1992, apparently for security reasons. According to the ANC regional deputy secretary, Mr Khulekani Mhlongo, the leaders were barred despite a series of meetings which the ANC leadership in the region had held with the South African Police (SAP) to facilitate the visit.

Mr Mhlongo said that the ANC regional leadership had been warned by the SAP the day before the planned visit that the IFP would not allow their representatives entry into the township. When asked to provide security for the visit, the SAP said that it would be difficult but that they 'would try'. On arrival at Nseleni, Mr Gwala and his party found a large contingent of armed IFP members, soldiers and police at the entrance to the township. They were told that they could not enter. According to Mr Mhlongo, much of northern Natal fell under the KwaZulu administration and townships such as Nseleni were virtually 'no-go' zones for ANC members.⁸² [⁸² *Mayibuye* March 1992]

Transkei

In February 1992 at least 19 people who had allegedly conspired with the former head of the Transkei Defence Force, Colonel Craig Duli, a Butterworth businessman, Mr Vulindlela Mbotoli, and others between May 1989 and January 1990 to mount a coup against the Transkei administration, appeared in court in Urntata charged with conspiring to murder the head of the Transkei Military Council, Major General Bantu Holomisa, in the aborted coup. The Urntata Supreme Court heard that some of the accused were trained on a farm near Queenstown (eastern Cape) prior to the coup attempt in November 1990, and that the final preparations for the putsch were conducted in South Africa. Almost all the accused pleaded not guilty to the charges.⁸³ [⁸³ *Daily Dispatch* 14 February 1992]

According to reports, the Transkei police were involved in a skirmish with members of the ANC in Qumbu in April 1992. Although it was initially believed that members of the military wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe, were involved in the shootout, the ANC said that ordinary members of the organisation, who had formed defence units to stop spiralling stock theft and violence, were involved. They had been mistaken for bandits by the Transkei police, the ANC added.⁸⁴ [⁸⁴ *Cape Times* 2 April 1992]

Venda

In February 1992 an Askari (a former member of the ANC who has changed sides and is working for South African security forces) tried to entrap a returned exile and member of Umkhonto we Sizwe, Mr Mashudu Mphaphuli, in Venda by offering to sell him arms. The Askari was subsequently detained by members of the ANC and handed over to the local Venda police. A Venda police spokesman, Lieutenant Benno de Klerk, said that the Askari, whose name was given as 'Richard', was attached to the South African Police (SAP) special unit combating arms smuggling from Zimbabwe.⁸⁵ [⁸⁵ *City Press* 16 February 1992]

Mr Mphaphuli, who had returned to South Africa in 1991 after ten years in exile, said that when 'Richard' had attempted to sell him ammunition he had suspected that 'Richard' worked for the police because he drove an expensive car. He later discovered from documents in the car that 'Richard's' real name was Mr Phillip Selepe and that he was attached to the SAP mechanical training centre in Benoni (east Rand). Mr Mphaphuli claimed that 'Richard' was the third special operative who had been assigned to entrap him for arms smuggling and that he often feared for his life.⁸⁶ [⁸⁶ *Ibid*]

An ANC spokesman at Sibasa, Mr Eddy Managa, later accused the Venda police of handing over the alleged Askari to the SAP. He said that the Venda police had released the man after he had made a call from their office to Louis Trichardt (northern Transvaal) and had spoken to a senior officer then⁸⁷ [⁸⁷ *Sowetan* 17 February 1992]

ENVIRONMENT

Key Points

- The President's Council report said that between 300m and 400m tonnes of arable topsoil were washed into South African rivers each year.
- The founder of the Biotox Foundation, Mr Abre Steyn, said that of 36 insecticides regarded internationally as undesirable, 30 were registered for use in South Africa.
- During the period under review 800m litres of effluent were discharged daily into the sea around South Africa.
- South Africa consumed 1% of the world's chlorofluorocarbons in 1986, compared with Britain, which consumed 3% and the United States of America, which consumed 25%.
- The government's report to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 said that policies under apartheid had aggravated environmental degradation.
- It was estimated that if the mines and the chemical industry were excluded, a total of 15m tonnes of waste was recycled each year in the non-homeland area of South Africa.
- The President's Council said that between 1981 and 1991 a total of R2bn was spent on the control of air pollution.

Environmental Damage

Population pressure

The *Report of the Three Committees of the President's Council on a National Environmental Management System*, published in October 1991, said, 'The rapid increase in population in South Africa is indisputably the biggest threat to the environment. Unless the excessively high growth rate ... is reduced drastically in the near future, all environmental conservation actions will be futile.'¹ [¹ President's Council, *Report of the Three Committees of the President's Council on a National Environmental Management System*, Cape Town, 1991, p9]

The Urban Foundation (UF) predicted in 1990 that the population would grow from 37,5m in 1990 to 47,5m in the year 2000. The UF said that during this period the African population would grow by 2,8% a year, the coloured population by 1,5% a year, the Indian population

by 1,4% a year and the white population by 0,7% a year.² [² *Fast Facts* No 4 1991] The President's Council report said that the growing population placed greater pressure on natural resources through greater demand for water, increased waste and other pollution, and greater use of national parks and nature reserves.

The President's Council report added that the increasing concentration of people in the metropolitan areas would result in growth in the number of people housed in informal settlements (see also chapter on *Housing and Urbanisation*). It said that essential services such as sewerage, rubbish removal, electricity and running water were already inadequately provided and that unless there was a 'drastic revision of urban management and a greater allocation of funds, a chaotic future [was] predicted with intractable problems for the environment'.³ [³ President's Council report, 1991, p11]

The President's Council report said further that urbanisation and informal settlement posed a threat to conservation. Where such settlements were on the perimeter of nature reserves the collection of building materials and firewood, overgrazing, overexploitation of the water supply, and poaching and snaring posed severe threats to such reserves.⁴ [⁴ President's Council report, 1991] The minister of water affairs and forestry, Mr Magnus Malan, said in May 1992 that informal settlers in the Dukuduku forest area (Natal) had caused large scale destruction of the indigenous forests.⁵ [⁵ *The Natal Mercury* 28 May 1992] *New Ground* reported in its autumn 1992 edition that as much as 50% of South Africa's wetlands had been destroyed through burning, channelisation and erosion caused by the pressure of human population in urban as well as rural areas.⁶ [⁶ *New Ground* Autumn 1992]

In a report submitted to the Business Council for Sustainable Development, the chairman of Pick 'n Pay, Mr Raymond Ackerman, said that although prosperity had been shown worldwide to be the only successful way of limiting the birth rate, it was 'extremely improbable that the general mass of people in southern Africa would become so economically prosperous that they would voluntarily restrain their fecundity'. He said that a policy of limiting family size by drastic coercion would probably unseat any government. Mr Ackerman recommended that a policy of persuasion be adopted and no effort or cost be spared in establishing a new ethic that was condemnatory of large families.⁷ [⁷ Ackerman R D, *Business and Environment in Southern Africa: Conditions, Problems, Opportunities and Recommendations*, Cape Town, March 1992]

Land degradation

According to the President's Council report, between 300m and 400m tonnes of arable topsoil were washed into South African rivers each year. The report said that despite this PACt, only 28% of cultivated land in South Africa was subject to conservation measures.⁸ [⁸ President's Council report, 1991]

The Black Sash reported in January 1992 that the average area of potentially arable land per person in the homelands was 0,2ha, compared with 2,9ha per person in the non-homeland area. It said that the unequal agricultural system had led to overpopulation, overgrazing and inappropriate land use in the homelands, which in turn had resulted in serious soil erosion in large parts of the Ciskei, KwaZulu and the Transkei.⁹ [⁹ *Sash* January 1992] The director of the Environment and Development Agency, Mr David Cooper, said that erosion was worst in the homelands and that for rural people erosion was probably as serious a problem as unemployment.¹⁰ [¹⁰ Cooper D, 'From Soil Erosion to Sustainability: Land Use in South Africa', in Cock J and Koch E, *Going Green: People, Politics and the Environment in South Africa*, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1991] Mr Cooper added that much of the erosion in the non-homeland area was caused by incorrect land use which had been encouraged by inappropriate agricultural subsidies. He said that the maize subsidy, together with a few good, wet years, had encouraged farmers to grow maize in unsuitable parts of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Consequently in the drought years of the 1980s soil conditions in these areas had deteriorated rapidly (see also chapter on *Land and Agriculture*).¹¹ [¹¹ *Sash* January 1992]

The President's Council identified the following PACtors as having contributed to the poorer quality of the soil: ¹² [¹² President's Council report, 1991]

- serious financial problems PACed by farmers, which had led to overexploitation of the soil;
- mining and forestry, which often required the use of high quality agricultural land;
- overexploitation of the soil, which led to soil erosion;
- acidification and loss of nutrients, which resulted in a drop in fertility; and
- incorrect and excessive irrigation practices, which resulted in soil having high alkalinity and high salinity.

The President's Council report identified overgrazing as a major cause of soil degradation. It pointed out that only 10% of grazing land could be classified as high quality, 30% as reasonable quality and 60% as poor quality and added that the grazing system as a whole was in a very poor condition. The report said that among the most important reasons for this situation was an exploitative attitude towards the environment which led to insufficient attention being paid to conservation and overexploitation of grazing resources for financial gain. ¹³ [¹³ *Ibid*]

The President's Council also found that about 55% of the total surface area of South Africa was

threatened by desertification and that more than 10m hectares could be identified as a 'nucleus risk area' for desertification.¹⁴ [¹⁴ Ibid] The Black Sash said that the eastward encroachment of the Karoo desert (Cape province) had been encouraged by overstocking of the land by Karoo farmers. It claimed that these farmers had overstocked their farms by as many as 3m sheep.¹⁵ [¹⁵ *Sash* January 1992]

The report of the President's Council said that the Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act of 1983 had not been properly enforced because responsibility for enforcement was divided between two government departments and there was a shortage of staff to perform these functions. The act had also been targeted at large commercial farmers only and had not addressed other types of farming.¹⁶ [¹⁶ President's Council report, 1991]

Afforestation and deforestation

In 1992 there were approximately 1m hectares of commercial plantations and 164 000ha of indigenous forests in the non-homeland area of South Africa. The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry estimated that a further 40 000ha of forest needed to be planted each year to accommodate the expected increase in the demand for wood for fuel and commercial use. The President's Council report said that about 60% of the population used wood as a source of fuel and approximately 14m tonnes of wood were used each year for this purpose.¹⁷ [¹⁷ Ibid]

The director of the Environment and Development Agency, Mr David Cooper, said that tree plantations were damaging to the environment. He argued that unlike natural forests, they did not encourage biodiversity. Mr Cooper added that because of their high demand for water, many plantations were on the escarpment, which was the catchment area for South Africa's major rivers. Plantations therefore absorbed much of what would have entered the river system. He said that communities in KwaZulu had experienced water shortages as rivers dried up and rain-fed agriculture had become marginal as the water table dropped. Pesticides used on the forests also drifted into the air and dissolved in rainwater, affecting communities downstream.¹⁸ [¹⁸ Cooper D, 'From Soil Erosion to Sustainability: Land Use in South Africa', in *Going Green*]

However, the President's Council report said that plantations were beneficial to the environment in that they controlled the run-off of rainwater, helped prevent soil erosion, helped purify water in streams and improved the quality of topsoil by producing mulch from fallen leaves.¹⁹ [¹⁹ President's Council report, 1991]

The Black Sash reported in January 1992 that of 250 indigenous woodlands identified in KwaZulu in 1942 only 50 remained and that there were no forests left in QwaQwa at all. The organisation ascribed the disappearance of forests to the stripping of woodlands for fuel in densely populated rural areas.²⁰ [²⁰

Sash January 1992]

Fertilisers, insecticides and pesticides

Mr Cooper and a founder member of Earthlife Africa, Mr Henk Coetzee, said that fertilisers were washed out of the soil and into rivers. Nitrates and phosphates in such fertilisers promoted a process of eutrophication, ie the growth in streams of plants which used up oxygen in the water and starved other aquatic life. Eutrophication also led to rising water purification costs, greater difficulty in producing safe drinking water and possibly to the formation of carcinogenic trihalomethanes when water was chlorinated during purification for human use.²¹ [²¹ Coetzee H, Cooper D, 'Wasting Water: Squandering a Precious Resource', in *Going Green*, President's Council report, 1991]

Spraying of the red-billed quelea (a type of finch) with the pesticide Quelatox in the Nylsvie Wetlands Nature Reserve (northern Transvaal) was stopped in February 1992 after birds from 16 other species, including some on the endangered list, were killed. The Nylsvie reserve was reported to be one of the most important wetlands in South Africa and was inhabited by many rare and endangered bird species.²² [²² *The Citizen* 13 February 1992] The Department of Nature Conservation said that national parks were the only areas in which spraying was forbidden.²³ [²³ *The Star* 24 March 1992]

An ecologist, Mr Andrew Duthie, commented that no research had been undertaken to assess whether spraying of queleas killed sufficient birds for the spraying programme to be regarded as effective or whether they were sufficiently destructive to warrant spraying. The director of the Animal Rehabilitation Centre in Pretoria, Ms Karen Trendler, said that while farmers were obliged to pick up the dead birds so that they did not pose a threat to the environment, the queleas sometimes flew as far as 60km before dying. She said that kites and Bateleur eagles sometimes ate the dead birds and incurred secondary poisoning from the poison remaining on the queleas' feathers.²⁴ [²⁴ *Ibid*]

According to the founder of the Biotox Foundation, Mr Abre Steyn, of 36 insecticides regarded internationally as undesirable, 30 were registered for use in South Africa. Mr Steyn said that the Department of National Health and Population Development used an average of 20 tonnes of dichlorodiphenyl trichloroethane (DDT) in controlling malaria in the lowveld (eastern Transvaal) each year. He added that research had shown that there were high residues of DDT in mothers' milk and infant body tissue in these areas and that dolphins off the Natal coast also had a high residue of DDT in their blubber. Mr Steyn said that the most damaging use of pesticides occurred in white farming areas and added that 51 species of bird had disappeared from the Orange Free State as a result. He added. In other parts of the world people are much more aware of the dangers of pesticides, but here ... if the price is right and it's available people use it.'²⁵ [²⁵ *New Ground* Autumn 1992]

Droughts and floods

Although the Kruger National Park was said to be suffering from the worst drought since its inception, the head of the park, Dr Salomon Joubert, said that the drought was ‘not necessarily a bad thing’ because tourists would be able to see greater concentrations of game in areas which usually had denser vegetation. He added that many species of animals would be strengthened as the weaker individuals would not survive the drought. Nevertheless, it was reported in March 1992 that the Letaba and Luvuvhu rivers, which flowed through the park, had virtually dried up and that this posed a serious threat to the survival of crocodiles, hippopotami and certain riverine vegetation.²⁶ [²⁶ *The Star* 27 March 1992,²⁹ April 1992₁] (See also chapter on *Land and Agriculture*.)

Mining

The minister of water affairs and forestry, Mr Magnus Malan, said in May 1992 that it would cost at least R51m over the next three decades to combat pollution from abandoned coal mines.²⁷ [²⁷ *The Citizen* 28 May 1992₁]

The controversy over the mining of dunes at St Lucia (northern Natal) continued during the period under review (see *1991/92 Survey* p400). It was estimated that the value of heavy minerals in the dunes, such as illiterate, ruble and zircon, was R6bn. The results of an investigation on the environmental impact of mining were expected in the middle of 1992 and the minister of mineral and energy affairs, Mr George Bartlett, said that a decision about mining the area would be made following publication of the investigation’s findings. A spokesman for Richards Bay Minerals said that if the investigation concluded that mining would lead to irreparable damage, it would withdraw its application to mine the area.²⁸ [²⁸ *The Star* 8 May 1992₁]

In May 1992, after considering the results of an environmental impact assessment, the government granted permission to Senna to mine kaolin with an estimated value of R1bn at Chapman’s Peak (western Cape). The government set the following conditions for mining in the area:²⁹ [²⁹ *Business Day* 8 May 1992₁]

- a committee consisting of representatives of the Cape Provincial Administration, government departments and other interest groups would be appointed to monitor mining and subsequent rehabilitation of the area;
- a trust fund, the size of which was unspecified, would be established and dedicated to rehabilitation only; and

- the company would have to adhere to the government's directives concerning lessening the visual impact of mining, noise abatement, the prevention of soil erosion, protection of the ecology, rehabilitation of the land and water management.

The Save Chapman's Peak Action Group said, however, that the report submitted by Senna to the government was 'blatantly subjective' and that it had ignored scientific input from groups protesting against the mining. This statement was denied by Serina, which said that the environmental assessors had been chosen by a panel consisting of representatives of Serina, the government and the opposition lobby.³⁰ [³⁰ *The Citizen* 14 March 1992]

Damage to the coastline

The President's Council report said that overcrowding and unplanned development had degraded large areas of the coastline. An environmental lawyer at the University of Cape Town, Mr Jan Glazewski, added that it was predominantly features such as dunes and estuaries which had been affected by development.³¹ [³¹ President's Council report, 1991; Glazewski J and Manuel F, *The Oceans: Our Common Heritage*, in *Going Green*]

Mr Glazewski said that despite the critical role that dunes played in providing reservoirs of sand and protecting areas behind them, some local authorities had allowed development to encroach on the dunes, thus destabilising the dune system. He added that virtually all of the 365 estuaries in South Africa had been altered or affected to some extent by human activities. According to Mr Glazewski, the Mtwalume estuary (Natal) was an example of an estuary that had suffered such damage. Whereas in the 1930s it had been up to 6 metres deep and had extended 4km inland, by 1991 it had been reduced to a lagoon 700 metres long and less than 1,5 metres deep. Sugar farming on the banks and the floodplain of the estuary had destroyed the natural vegetation and caused large-scale siltation. Embankments built to support a new railway line had also restricted floodwaters and had caused the silt to be deposited in the estuary.³² [³² Glazewski J and Manuel F, 'The Oceans: Our Common Heritage', in *Going Green*]

During the period under review over 800m litres of effluent were discharged daily into the sea around South Africa through 61 pipelines. The rationale behind disposal into the sea was that the huge volume of water in the oceans would dilute the waste so that it would become harmless. However, half of the pipelines were situated in bays which had limited exchange of water with the open seas, therefore leading to a build-up of pollutants in such bays. Pollutants also tended to be trapped by physical features within the bays and many of the more toxic pollutants were taken up into the tissues of marine organisms where they could be concentrated at levels many thousands of times higher than those in the surrounding waters.³³ [³³ *Ibid*]

Overfishing

The President's Council report said that the total catch of fish along South Africa's coastline averaged 770 000 tonnes a year. In the 1988/89 financial year about 7 000 tonnes of rock lobster and 1 120 tonnes of abalone had been caught. Concern was expressed in the report that these species were being overexploited because of the difficulty in enforcing daily fishing limits on fishermen. The report said that over the previous 50 years the intertidal zone had been stripped substantially of edible shell fish and bait organisms. It said that stricter law enforcement was necessary.³⁴ [³⁴ President's Council report, 1991]

The chief director of sea fisheries for the Department of Environment Affairs, Mr Louis Botha, said in February 1992 that long-line fishing with up to 15 000 hooks on each line had nearly destroyed South Africa's kingklip shoals in the 1980s and was threatening to do the same to shoals of hake. The Sea Fishery Act of 1988 did not apply to long-line fishing and consequently the estimated 5 000 tonnes of hake caught in this way in 1991 fell outside the quota of 138 000 tonnes set by the minister of environment affairs. The chairman of the Deepsea Trawling Industry Association, Mr Eckhardt Kramer, said that the stock of hake would be in jeopardy if long-line fishing was allowed to continue, particularly since it targeted mature female fish which were responsible for stock growth. The chairman of the South African Line Fish Management Industrial Association, Mr Richard Ball, said that if allowed on a limited scale, long-line fishing should pose no threat. He said that long-line fishing boats should be allocated a portion of the quota given to trawlers.³⁵ [³⁵ *Financial Mail* 17 February 1992]

Water pollution

The founder of Earthlife Africa, Mr Henk Coetzee, and the director of the Environment and Development Agency, Mr David Cooper, said that salination had seriously affected surface water. According to the President's Council, measurement of the concentration of total dissolved substances in a number of state dams showed that the specifications of the South African Bureau of Standards were exceeded in most cases. Such high salinity was caused, the report said, by increased industrialisation, irrigation, urbanisation, and the use of fertilisers and pesticides. According to Messrs Coetzee and Cooper, 60% of the salt load entering the Vaal barrage came from mining operations on the Transvaal highveld which pumped large quantities of salts into the river systems.³⁶ [³⁶ President's Council report, 1991; Coetzee H and Cooper D, 'Wasting Water: Squandering a Precious Resource', in *Going Green*]

Messrs Coetzee and Cooper said further that a number of companies emitted excessive amounts of toxic pollutants into streams. They alleged that in Sasolburg (Orange Free State), the toxic content of effluent emitted by the AECl plant exceeded internationally accepted standards as well as locally imposed limits. This was denied by the group manager for safety, health and environment of AECl, Dr Bob Fogel. He said that although the water contained tiny traces of mercury, it was not toxic. Messrs Coetzee and Cooper pointed out that pollution in South Africa was dealt with using the 'best practicable means'

approach, whereby industry decided what means it could apply to stop pollution and government then applied these standards. They said that industry therefore set the agenda for pollution control. However, Dr Fogel said that using the best practicable means approach meant that at the time of construction, the government would specify that the methods with the best proven efficiency in pollution control would have to be used.³⁷ [37 Coetzee H and Cooper D, 'Wasting Water: Squandering a Precious Resource', in *Going Green*, Interview with the group manager: safety, health and environment of AECl, Dr Bob Fogel, 24 August 1992]

The assistant director of the Oceanographic Research Institute, Mr Michael Schleyer, said that commercial and industrial pollution was turning South Africa's rivers into 'cesspools', particularly in the Durban area. He added that waste being dumped ranged from old engine oil to highly toxic heavy metal waste. He said that sewerage facilities in Durban were inadequate and that unless the harbour pollution problem was addressed urgently, it would affect Durban's status as a tourist centre.³⁸ [38 *Business Day* 10 March 1992]

A spokesman for the Department of Water Affairs, Dr Andrew Deacon, said in May 1992 that the drought in the lowveld (eastern Transvaal) posed a pollution threat to rivers in the area. He said that although the flow of water in rivers had fallen, the same amount of waste was being dumped into the rivers.³⁹ [39 *The Star* 7 May 1992]

Research undertaken by the Natal Town and Regional Planning Commission indicated that wetlands, which had constituted between 10% and 15% of the rainfall catchment area of Natal about 50 years previously, were almost completely destroyed. It said that the remaining wetlands were degraded by drainage canals, the extraction of water, forest encroachment and waste dumping. The President's Council found that what it termed the 'haphazard exploitation of wetlands for perceived short-term agricultural benefit' was invariably destructive of these areas and not beneficial in the long term to farming.⁴⁰ [40 President's Council report, 1991]

Air pollution

The following table shows the extent of emissions of some of the most important pollutants in 1987:⁴¹ [41 *Ibid*]

Emissions of air pollutants: 1987

Substances

Amount in tonnes

Carbon dioxide

332 000 000

Carbon monoxide

43 000

Chlorofluorocarbons

13 000

Nitrogen oxide

720 000

Sulphur dioxide

1 950 000

Volatile hydrocarbons

580 000

It was estimated that South Africa contributed 2% of the gases responsible for the global greenhouse effect. The President's Council said that in 1987 approximately 332m tonnes of carbon dioxide were emitted into the air in South Africa alone, of which some 250m tonnes were produced by the energy industry.⁴² [⁴² Ibid]

In 1986 South Africa was responsible for consuming 1% of the world's chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), Britain for 3% and the United States for 25%. In South Africa 50% of CFCs were used in aerosol spray cans, 20% in refrigerators and air conditioning units as coolant gases and almost 30% were used to produce foam plastic for such items as fast food packaging and polystyrene cups. In 1992 the mines used about 400 tonnes of CFCs a year for refrigeration (7% of South Africa's total consumption).⁴³ [⁴³ Clarke J, 'The Insane *Eimf-nmpnt*-Tampering with the Atmosphere', in *Going Green*]

The Weather Bureau said in March 1992 that the ozone layer over the highveld had thinned by between 7% and 8% over the previous 20 years. It said that over the same period the manufacture of ground-

level ozone, which was a pollutant, had increased more than six fold.⁴⁴ [⁴⁴ *The Star* 23 March 1992]

The minister of national health, Dr Rina Venter, said in May 1992 that with the exception of Soweto, where smoke from coal fires had reached unacceptable levels, no place in South Africa should be concerned about air pollution levels.⁴⁵ [⁴⁵ *Business Day* 14 May 1992] Dr Colin Turner of Eskom said that Soweto's particulate air pollution exceeded the recommended limits of the World Health Organisation for more than a quarter of the year. He said that at times its pollution level was double the recommended limit. Smoke emanating from coal stoves was believed to be the main cause of such pollution. While Dr Turner said that the only means of reducing the air pollution was to provide cheap electricity, fuel scientists were reported to be investigating the possibility of smokeless coal.⁴⁶ [⁴⁶ *The Star* 7 May 1992]

Eskom believed that township electrification could reduce township smoke emissions by 75% and result in savings owing to improved health.⁴⁷ [⁴⁷ *Financial Mail* 15 May 1992] Eskom said in May 1992 that after ten years of research and monitoring of pollution it had concluded that although the technology existed to reduce emission of pollutants, air quality did not justify its use and the costs were exorbitant. Eskom said that flue gas desulphurisation would add 20% to the cost of electricity generated in the lifetime of an average power station. This amount, it said, could better be used to electrify 420 000 ho

According to the medical officer of health for the Cape Town City Council, Dr Michael Popkiss, air pollution guidelines for nitrogen oxides were exceeded for more than 50 hours on 28 occasions in Cape Town between April and September 1991.⁴⁹ [⁴⁹ *Cape Times* 4 March 1992]

A study conducted by the Airkern project of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) showed that air pollution in the Edenvale, Kempton Park and Modderfontein areas (all east Rand) periodically exceeded recommended maximum levels. According to the CSIR, the 24-hour maximum level of sulphur dioxide was exceeded on 29 November 1991 and 19 January 1992 and the average concentration in November 1991 was close to the maximum limit. In December 1991 there were high levels of dust pollution in the area, but the 24-hour maximum level was exceeded only once.⁵⁰ [⁵⁰ *The Star* 20 March 1992]

The director of air pollution control in the Department of Environment Affairs, Mr Martin Lloyd, said in February 1992 that fewer than 100 companies in South Africa had ever been prosecuted for polluting the atmosphere and that the maximum fine that could be imposed was R500. He said that this should be increased to R20 000 for the first day on which the offence was committed, with a further fine for every subsequent day of offence.⁵¹ [⁵¹ *The Natal Mercury* 11 February 1992]

Waste

The President's Council report said that the system of solid waste management in South Africa was 'most unsatisfactory', posed a serious threat to human health and was causing extensive environmental degradation. It was estimated in 1991 that the average South African produced 1kg of waste a day and that this figure would rise to 1,5kg by the year 2000. The majority of this waste (95%) was disposed of on land. According to the report, about 40m tonnes of domestic waste were produced each year in South Africa. A total of 7% by weight of this waste was plastic material.⁵² [52 President's Council report, 1991]

The following table details the tonnage of solid waste produced in South Africa:⁵³ [53 Department of Environment Affairs, *Building the Foundation for Sustainable Development in South Africa: National Report to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development to be held in Rio de Janeiro, June 1992*, March 1992]

South African total waste stream ^a

Source

Tonnes per year

Mining waste (1991)

330m

Coal ash (1991)

29m

Agricultural waste (1989)

20m

Urban waste (1986)

15m

Sewage sludge (1983)

12m

Non-metallurgical industry waste (1991)

7m

Metallurgical industry waste (1991)

6m

a

The most recent figure for each source of waste are given

Most waste disposal in South Africa was controlled by local authorities. A study submitted to the President's Council found

- the majority of local authorities had problems with pollution;
- about 36% of local authorities had not identified future disposal sites for waste;
- of disposal sites surveyed, 62% posed water pollution problem, 65% contributed to air pollution, 71% caused a nuisance to the community and many had a combination of these problems;
- few sites were adequately designed, monitored or supervised;
- many sites were located in environmentally sensitive areas or areas of high tourist potential;
- some towns, and in particular informal settlements, had no provision for waste disposal and indiscriminate dumping occurred; and
- many authorities were ignorant of, or apathetic about, standards for waste control.

A survey conducted on 50 beaches between the Kei River (eastern Cape) and Cape Point (western Cape) indicated that pollution by plastic materials had increased by 190% between 1984 and 1990 and that about 3 500 pieces of plastic were found in every square kilometre of coastal water. Such pollution was caused largely by boat owners and fishermen.⁵⁵ [⁵⁵ Ibid]

Nuclear power

Eskom said in February 1992 that it had sufficient power generating capacity to supply South Africa's needs for the following decade. The power stations' capacity was 36 000MW in 1991 and peak demand in the winter of 1991 was 22 050MW. A spokesman for Eskom said that coal supplies were limited and that alternative sources of energy were being investigated. He said that nuclear power seemed to be the only viable alternative, except where hydroelectric power was possible.⁵⁶ [⁵⁶ *Business Day* 14 February 1992]

The public relations manager of the Atomic Energy Corporation, Mr Nic Ligthelm, said that the Koeberg nuclear power station (western Cape) provided about 5,5% of South Africa's electricity, and that a second nuclear power station would probably be built by 2010. He said that the Council for Nuclear Safety went to 'extreme lengths' to ensure the safety of the nuclear plant and that storage of uranium was less hazardous than people feared. He argued that the environmental impact of nuclear power generation was minimal because no noxious gases were released and toxic water was kept in a closed circuit. Mr Ligthelm said that in the eight years of the Koeberg power station's operation, the raising of the sea temperature around the station had had no effect on marine life. In addition, while a truckload of nuclear fuel was sufficient to keep Koeberg operating for 12 months and a truckload of waste was produced each year, coal-fired stations used 28 truckloads of coal a day and produced a heap of ash 40m in diameter every day.⁵⁷ [⁵⁷ *Ibid*]

The chief public relations officer of the Atomic Energy Corporation, Mrs Lola Patrick, said that nuclear waste was treated in the following way in South Africa:⁵⁸ [⁵⁸ Telephonic interview with the chief public relations officer of the Atomic Energy Corporation, Mrs Lola Patrick, 8 June 1992]

- spent fuel (which comprised uranium rods that had been used for the generation of electricity) was taken out of the reactor after three years. It was then stored under water for a further ten years and finally taken to Vaalputs (northern Cape) and stored underground for a further 50 to 60 years;
- medium-level waste (such as oils and valves from the reactor) was sealed in concrete drums and stored at Vaalputs; and
- low-level waste (such as gloves, overalls and paper which had been used at the Koeberg power station or the Pelindaba experimental station, central Transvaal) was sealed in steel drums, lined with special plastic and stored at Vaalputs.

Policy

Sustainable development

During the period under review there was widespread comment on the lack of participation by Africans

in conservation. In 1992 there were more than 400 environmental groups in South Africa and all had predominantly white membership.⁵⁹ [⁵⁹ *Sowetan* 13 March 1992] The President's Council obtained only two submissions from Africans out of a total of almost 300 submissions.⁶⁰ [⁶⁰ President's Council report, 1991]

The director of the Endangered Wildlife Trust, Mr John Ledger, said that conservation had been discredited for the majority of South Africans by the perception that it was a Eurocentric, colonial idea and that endangered species were large, hairy or irrelevant creatures'.⁶¹ [⁶¹ *Financial Mail* 4 October 1991]

The African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress saw the apartheid system as the primary cause of the negative perception by Africans of environmental issues (see below). An environmental scientist, Ms Farieda Kahn, said that PACtors such as the impact of colonisation, the dispossession of the indigenous population, discriminatory land legislation and the imposition of apartheid had distorted environmental perceptions and attitudes and alienated Africans from the environment.⁶² [⁶² *Ibid*]

A member of the justice and social ministries division of the South African Council of Churches, Mr Charles Ndabeni, said in March 1992 that because of the disproportionate distribution of land, conservation had become the preserve of whites in South Africa. He said that in the formulation of the Environment Conservation Act of 1989 there had been no consultation with Africans.⁶³ [⁶³ *Sowetan* 13 March 1992]

An African environmentalist, Mr Joe Simelane, said that Africans had to realise that liberation would be meaningless if it meant that they would inherit a country that was 'infested with toxic nuclear waste, polluted streams and rivers, and eroded agricultural land'.⁶⁴ [⁶⁴ *Ibid* 6 March 1992]

Mr Ledger said that environmental education was essential if the perception of environmental issues was to change. Ms Sue Hart of Eco-Link said that such education had to be 'community driven' if it was to succeed and the director of education of the Natal branch of the Wildlife Society of Southern Africa, Mr Malcolm Powell, added that it had to point out what purpose wildlife could serve in economic terms.⁶⁵ [⁶⁵ *Financial Mail* 4 October 1992]

An official of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa commented in October 1991 that none of the environmental organisations campaigning against the proposed dune mining at St Lucia (northern Natal) had consulted the union about the issue (see *Mining* above). He said that some of the union members were wondering if environmentalists thought that it was acceptable to save insects and animals while people had to sacrifice wages and jobs. Mr Ledger also argued that it was not possible to talk about food cycles and loving the planet to someone who is so hungry he'll eat worms'.⁶⁶ [⁶⁶ *Ibid*]

President's Council report

The *Report of the Three Committees of the President's Council on a National Environmental Management System*, published in October 1991, said that improved quality of life in South Africa depended on both conservation and development. It proposed that a system of integrated environmental management be used to try to marry these two needs and that a national environment management policy should be based on the principle of sustainable development. The council proposed that the minister of environment affairs be given far more centralised control over management of the environment and that it no longer be necessary to obtain the permission of other ministers or administrators before carrying out conservation measures.⁶⁷ [67 President's Council report, 1991]

Further recommendations of the President's Council report were that:⁶⁸ [68 Ibid]

- the land user should assume a far greater responsibility for the conservation of agricultural resources. Failure to perform specified conservation actions should carry heavier penalties, and financial aid packages should be structured so as to benefit conservation-minded farmers;
- detailed planning of urbanisation should occur and towns should be developed vertically so as to house more people in less space;
- regional bodies should be established to manage entire river systems;
- the submission of rehabilitation plans should be a prerequisite for the issuing of mining or prospecting permits;
- definite maximum emission limits should be set for each air pollutant and these should be monitored by annual air audits;
- immediate steps should be taken to extend the area of those national parks and nature reserves which were not ecologically viable. Since certain veld types such as wetlands and the sandveld of the west coast were not included in national parks, land should be acquired to ensure their protection;
- a thorough survey of the entire coastline should be conducted to designate the habitats of rare species, sensitive ecological areas and other features worthy of conservation. This would enable coastal development to take place that would cause the least harm to the environment;
- the concept of sustainability as the major objective of conservation should be included in syllabuses and become the underlying principle in the school curriculum; and
- laws pertaining to the environment should be rationalised to avoid duplication and confusion.

Government policy

In its report to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, which was published in March 1992, the Department of Environment Affairs indicated that government policies under apartheid had aggravated environmental degradation. The report said that attempts to control agriculture through a command economy had not stopped damage being done to the environment nor had they made agriculture more productive. It also stated that the policy of moving large numbers of people to the homelands had not led to economic development but had aggravated poverty and had resulted in overexploitation of agricultural land and incalculable environmental damage.⁶⁹ [69 Department of Environment Affairs, *Building the Foundation for Sustainable Development in South Africa*]

The report also stated that no unified strategy for sustainable development and environmental conservation existed in South Africa, but added that the recommendations of the President's Council would provide a major impetus towards formulation of such a policy. The department said that it hoped that the principles of conservation would be discussed as part of the process of constitutional reform (see also chapter on *Constitutional Change*).⁷⁰ [70 Ibid]

The Department of Environment Affairs said that overseas models for environmental impact control could not be applied directly to South Africa. However, during the period under review the department started a number of investigations to help in the formulation of environmental policy. These were as follows:⁷¹ [71 *South African Panorama* March/April 1992]

- the Environmental Evaluation Unit of the University of Cape Town and the Department of Environment Affairs started developing a system of procedures for integrated environmental management, with the aim that they would be accepted by the government as policy;
- in conjunction with the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), the department also began investigating whether environmental audits (assessments of individual companies' impact on the environment and of procedures to control the environmentally damaging effects of their operations) should form part of a national environment policy;
- the department commissioned research into the possibility of using measures such as taxes, subsidies and permits to encourage economic growth that was compatible with sustained development;
- the CSIR was commissioned to determine the feasibility of creating environmental potential atlases for metropolitan areas to help developers use land in these areas optimally. If this project was found to be feasible, the atlases would be published within the following four years; and

- an investigation was started which would provide guidelines for the reclamation and rehabilitation of land. Results were expected to be available at the end of 1992, with guidelines to be published in 1993.

In a document entitled *Water Quality Management Policies and Strategies in the RSA*, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry outlined its policies and strategies for water quality management. Some of the major conclusions were that:⁷² [⁷² Department of Environment Affairs, *Building the Foundation for Sustainable Development in South Africa*,]

- the ‘polluter pays’ principle, which was currently in use, should be supplemented by incentive-based pollution control strategies;
- a co-operative rather than an adversarial approach should be used to solve pollution problems and charges should be laid only as a last resort; and
- whereas historically, emphasis had been placed on the protection and quality of surface and marine water resources, strategies for the control of groundwater pollution were urgently needed.

Mr Rupert Lorimer MP (Democratic Party) said in March 1992 that the government lacked the vision and the ability to implement a comprehensive environmental management system. He said that the government had still not reacted to the President’s Council report, which had been published six months previously, and added that the Department of Environment Affairs should already have been given additional powers to enforce adequate environmental management.⁷³ [⁷³ *The Citizen* 3 March 1992]

African National Congress

The environmental policy of the African National Congress (ANC) was expressed in a discussion paper entitled *Future Environment Policy for a Changing South Africa*. The ANC said that it was committed to conservation and the protection of natural resources for the benefit of present and future generations and that it would follow a strategy of sustainable economic development. It added that it was impossible to pursue a rational environmental protection strategy under the apartheid system and that the land degradation occurring in the homelands was the inevitable result of the overpopulation of these areas under apartheid.⁷⁴ [⁷⁴ *Financial Mail* 15 May 1992]

The discussion paper set out guiding principles, including that:⁷⁵ [⁷⁵ *Ibid*]

- those who exploited natural resources should be required to develop alternative technologies so that

future generations would not be disadvantaged;

- subject to absolute upper limits, a system of ‘polluter pays’ should be introduced. Funds raised in this manner should be used to compensate those affected adversely by pollution and to pay for environmental rehabilitation;
- environmental impact studies should be conducted for each new project;
- standards should be set for the sustainable use of resources and the appropriate disposal of effluent and waste; and
- comprehensive legislation governing such issues as environmental impact assessment, monitoring of the environment and prevention of pollution should be passed.

Inkatha Freedom Party

The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) said in May 1992 that it would plan development to meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. The IFP believed that it was important to have an adequate supply of energy to meet the country’s development needs but that in supplying this energy renewable resources should be used as far as possible. It said that the IFP aimed to create awareness of the water cycle and the importance of aquatic systems and to pay attention to controlling land-based sources of marine pollution. The IFP added that it would undertake a long-term campaign to educate people about the implications of phenomena such as climatic change and ozone depletion, and of the actions necessary to prevent such changes.⁷⁶ [⁷⁶ Ibid]

The IFP also referred to the need to control population growth. It said that while parents should have the right to decide on the size of families, it believed that family health could best be achieved by having a balance between family size and available resources.⁷⁷ [⁷⁷ Ibid]

Pan-Africanist Congress

The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) said in May 1992 that although the environment was a ‘people’s concern’, the issue should be seen in the context of the inequalities of the apartheid system which had resulted in many black people being hostile to environmental concerns. It said that there was a fundamental difference in the attitudes of Africans and whites to the environment, with basic needs being the central issue for Africans and aesthetic issues being of primary concern to whites. The PAC said that there were certain preconditions necessary for future environmental strategies to succeed: the destruction of apartheid, the enhancement of quality of life and the democratisation of society. The organisation said that it accepted the concept of sustainable development, on the understanding that a

prerequisite for sustainability was that disparities in economic, political and social development were ended.⁷⁸ [⁷⁸ Ibid]

Business

The Industrial Environment Forum (IEF), which was established in 1990, adopted a ten-point code of practice in 1991. The IEF consisted of approximately 30 organisations including AECI, the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, Caltex Oil, Eskom, Iscor, Shell and Toyota. The IEF aimed to improve environmental awareness among companies in South Africa and to act as a catalyst to educate business of the importance of environmental audit programmes.⁷⁹ [⁷⁹ Interview with a spokeswoman for the Industrial Environment Forum, Ms Karin Ireton, 11 June 1992]

The IEF adopted a ten-point code of conduct in 1991, which stated that:⁸⁰ [⁸⁰ Ibid]

- members would develop environmental stewardship as one of their corporate priorities;
- they would work with agencies in researching and formulating effective environmental legislation, policies and standards which would balance the impact of their operations on the environment and the goal of higher living standards for all South Africans;
- members were committed to promoting environmental management as an integral part of business practice and would be prepared to consider alternative means of production that would be more environmentally sound;
- members were committed to applying the most practical and cost-effective environmental protection procedures;
- members were committed to cost-effective environmental standards;
- members would promote greater environmental education, awareness and motivation of their employees so as to foster greater environmental responsibility;
- they would advise consumers making use of their products of the environmental and safety implications of the storage, transport, use and disposal of these products;
- members would develop appropriate contingency plans to deal with pollution related emergencies and accidents;
- they were committed to fostering openness on environmental issues and to sharing information on the

principles of environmental management; and

- members undertook to promote sustainable development of renewable resources and optimal exploitation of finite resources, and to encourage the widespread adoption of the principles contained in the code of practice.

The chairman of Pick 'n Pay, Mr Raymond Ackerman, suggested that a body such as a southern African conference of development and environment ministers be formed. He said that such a conference should strive firstly to prevent its constituent countries from competing with one another by setting up differential inducements for foreign investment likely to damage the environment. It should also play a part in environmental education and attempt to reverse perceptions that the environment was the domain of the 'haves' or only a construct of 'sentimental city dwellers'.⁸¹ [⁸¹ Ackerman R, *Business and Environment in Southern Africa.* 'Conditions, Problems, Opportunities and Recommendations', p9]

Mr Ackerman said that although security of land tenure was essential, any land reform legislation should prioritise protection of the land over protection of the occupant's rights to that land. He said that legislators should consider seriously a 'stewardship responsibility' programme in which landowners would be fully accountable for environmental abuse.⁸² [⁸² Ibid, p10]

Conservation Measures

Legislation

The **National Parks Amendment Act** was passed in 1992. There were two main amendments to the principal act. Whereas under the principal act land in national parks was protected from mining and prospecting activities only if it was included in a schedule to the act, the amendment act provided for the National Parks Board to acquire the mineral rights to any land which it owned, thus preventing any mining or prospecting on such land.⁸³ [⁸³ *Hansard* (A) 5 cols 2357-2358, 19 March 1992] Under the principal act only the minister of public works was entitled to acquire land for a national park. The amendment act provided for the National Parks Board to acquire land with the approval of the Department of Environment Affairs and after consultation with the minister of mineral and energy affairs.⁸⁴ [⁸⁴ *Hansard* (A) 5 col 2358, 19 March 1992]

Mr Rupert Lorimer MP (Democratic Party) welcomed the amendments and added that it was regrettable that the Department of Environment Affairs had not enjoyed the same veto on mining activity as the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs had had overproposed conservation activity. He said that had this been the case the controversy surrounding the mining of the dunes at St Lucia (northern Natal) and the mining of Chapman's Peak (western Cape) could have been avoided (see *Mining* above). Mr

Lorimer argued that it should be incumbent on the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs to consult the Department of Environment Affairs before allowing any mining to take place.⁸⁵ [⁸⁵ *Hansard* (A) 5 col 2362, 19 March 1992]

The **Sea Fishery Amendment Act** was promulgated in 1992. It made provision for the Quota Board to allocate both the quota offish that could be harvested as well as permits to fish along the South African coast. The bill was welcomed by all parties in Parliament, although Mr Jan Momberg MP (DP) said that he thought that the quota system applied under the original act had been sufficient. Mr Momberg said that the Quota Board had, however, succeeded in allocating the largest parts of the fishing quotas to four big fishing companies at the expense of coloured fishermen. This view was supported by the Labour Party and Solidarity. The minister of environment affairs, Mr Louis Pienaar, refuted this view, saying that there were many other companies operating in the fishing industry and that these four companies provided numerous people with employment.⁸⁶ [⁸⁶ *Hansard* (A) 7 cols 3437-3455, 2 April 1992]

The **Agricultural Pests Amendment Act** was also passed in 1992. It provided for the extermination of the red-billed quelea (a type of finch) by the Department of Agriculture by specifically designating it as a pest. The amendment act provided for the department to be notified by farmers immediately of the presence of roosting or breeding queleas. It was supported by all parties in Parliament, although Mr Lorimer said that the DP was not happy with the presumptions of the principal act. He said that actions taken by the department against locusts and red-billed queleas had had environmentally damaging consequences, such as the killing of rare bird species which ate poisoned queleas. He said that there was a lack of adequate research into the efficacy of the current control measures.⁸⁷ [⁸⁷ *Hansard* (A) 1 cols 805-806, 3 February 1992]

National parks and nature reserves

In 1992 the National Parks Board controlled 15 national parks and two lake areas. The total land area under the control of the board was approximately 3,3m hectares.⁸⁸ [⁸⁸ *Hansard* (A) 5 col 2361, 19 March 1992]

The Cape Provincial Administration controlled 130 conservation areas, including forests, nature reserves, off-shore islands and rock lobster sanctuaries. The Natal Parks Board managed 81 protected areas, including Africa's three oldest game reserves—the Hluhluwe, St Lucia and Umfolozi reserves. The Orange Free State Provincial Administration controlled 14 nature reserves. The Transvaal Provincial Administration managed 59 provincial nature reserves. There were a further 450 private game reserves in the Transvaal which, together with the provincial reserves, covered 15% of the surface area of the province. There were a total of 79 private game reserves in the Cape province, seven in the Orange Free State and, although no private reserves had been proclaimed in Natal, in 1992 there were numerous properties managed as nature reserves.⁸⁹ [⁸⁹ *South African Panorama* March/April 1992]

The Conservation Corporation opened the Phinda Game Reserve (northern Natal) in October 1991. It covered about 15 000ha between Lake St Lucia, the Mkuzi Game Reserve and the Sodwana state forest. At the time of opening the Conservation Corporation had already reintroduced elephant and white rhino, and buffalo, cheetah and lion were also to be returned to the area. The Phinda reserve was to use as many local products as possible and contract out as many services as possible to the local population. The head of the Conservation Corporation, Mr Dave Varty, believed that this arrangement would provide sustainable long-term economic benefit to the people living around the Phinda reserve, give them an interest in the success of the reserve and discourage poaching. He said that more than 400 local people were employed in the construction of the reserve and there were permanent jobs for 170 people. According to the community relations officer of the reserve, Mr Walter Zulu, it had made a 'significant difference' to more than 1 000 local people.⁹⁰ [⁹⁰ *Financial Mail* 4 October 1991, *Enterprise* February 1992, *Business Day* 18 March 1992] The administrator of the Transvaal, Mr Danie Hough, announced in May 1992 that a conservation area was to be established in the Limpopo River valley, north of the Soutpansberg (northern Transvaal). He said that the co-operation of private landowners was important in establishing the reserve and that private entrepreneurship would be encouraged. He did not elaborate how this would occur.⁹¹ [⁹¹ *The Citizen* 8 May 1992]

The Bophuthatswana administration started stocking the Madikwe Game Reserve near Zeerust (western Transvaal) in 1992, with the aim of opening the park in December 1993. The reserve comprised 75 000ha of land which had previously been farmland owned by the South African government. About 10 000 animals were to be moved to the Madikwe reserve, including 250 elephants from the Kruger National Park and the Klaserie reserve (eastern Transvaal). A total of 1200 jobs would be created in the Madikwe reserve, with minimum wages of R700 per month.⁹² [⁹² *The Star* 20 April 1992, *Sowetan* 6 May 1992]

Elephant conservation

At a meeting of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), held in Tokyo in March 1992, it was decided to continue the ban on trade in ivory and other elephant products which had been introduced in 1989. The decision was taken despite a strong call from Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe to be allowed to conduct strictly controlled trade in elephant products.⁹³ [⁹³ *Business Day* 12 March 1992] These countries believed it would be possible to control such trade as a result of a technique developed at the University of Cape Town which enabled ivory to be certified in terms of its country of origin.⁹⁴ [⁹⁴ *Ibid* 12 February 1992]

According to the director of special services for the National Parks Board of South Africa, Mr Anthony Hall-Martin, South Africa's elephant population had grown from 120 in 1920 to 8 500 in 1991. He said

that 350 elephants had to be culled each year in the Kruger National Park to limit the number of elephants in the park to a manageable number (7 500), and added that R3,5m would be lost annually as a result of the ivory ban which could have been used in elephant conservation.⁹⁵ [⁹⁵ *Leadership*, vol11 no1, 1992]

Both the head of the Department of Wildlife in Kenya, Mr Richard Leakey, and an adviser to the European Community on elephant conservation projects, Mr Iain Douglas-Hamilton, said that since the ban on ivory trading had been imposed poaching of elephants in Africa had decreased dramatically. They expressed concern that the five countries in southern Africa which wanted to resume trade did not have the ability to ensure that ivory emanating from these countries only would be traded and believed that poaching would increase in the rest of Africa as a result.⁹⁶ [⁹⁶ *Ibid*] The National Parks Board said that despite the decision by Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe to try to sell their ivory stockpiles through the Southern African Centre for Ivory Marketing, South Africa would continue to adhere to the CITES regulation.⁹⁷ [⁹⁷ *Business Day* 23 March 1992, *The Star* 31 March 1992]

Afforestation

The organisation Trees for Africa was founded in August 1991 by the Department of Environment Affairs, the Jewish National Fund in Southern Africa, the National Botanical Institute, the South African Institute for Parks and Recreation and the South African Nurserymen's Association. Between its inception and February 1992 it had planted 566 trees per day and the organisation aimed to plant 5m trees by 1996. The trees were planted mainly in African townships in urban areas.⁹⁸ [⁹⁸ *South African Panorama* March/April 1992]

Mining land recovery

The Mines and Works Act of 1956 and the Mining Rights Act of 1967 required that a rehabilitation plan be established before mining activities could commence. The Minerals Act of 1991 provided further that mining activities could be suspended if the rehabilitation plan was not adhered to.⁹⁹ [⁹⁹ President's Council report, 1991] The President's Council report said that the Chamber of Mines of South Africa had provided a rehabilitation contracting and advisory service for its members for more than 30 years and that individual groups and members of the chamber undertook to rehabilitate land affected by open-cast mining.¹⁰⁰ [¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*]

Recycling

It was estimated that if the mines and the chemical industry were excluded, a total of 15m tonnes of waste was recycled each year in South Africa (excluding all ten homelands). The average cost per tonne for collection and disposal was R60 and the total cost of recycling exceeded R900m each year.¹⁰¹ [¹⁰¹ Ibid] The divisional manager of paper and processing of Mondi, Mr John Lay, said that about one third of the 1,7m tonnes of paper used in South Africa each year was recycled and that 15% of newspapers and magazines were recycled. According to the chairman of the Institute of Waste Management, Mr Ray Lombard, 18% of the plastic produced in South Africa was recycled.¹⁰² [¹⁰² *The Star* 13 February, 8 May 1992]

Mr Lay said that 1 000 tonnes of newsprint could be turned into 850 tonnes of blank paper, whereas 15 000 trees would have to be used to make the same amount of virgin pulp. He said that Mondi recycled about 600 000 tonnes of paper a year, thus saving 23m trees.¹⁰³ [¹⁰³ Ibid 13 February 1992]

Control of air pollution

The President's Council report said that between 1981 and 1991 a total of 2bn had been spent on the control of air pollution in South Africa.¹⁰⁴ [¹⁰⁴ President's Council report, 1991]

In its report to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, the Department of Environment Affairs said that the government was a signatory of the Montreal Protocol and as such aimed by the year 2000 to have phased out completely the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), batons and carbon tetrachloride (see also *1989/90 Survey* p429). The President's Council report said that the Department of National Health and Population Development had undertaken extensive planning regarding controlling the production of CFCs and appeared to be in a position to implement this deadline. The following table compares the usage of CFCs in South Africa in 1989 and 1990:¹⁰⁵ [¹⁰⁵ Department of Environment Affairs, *Building the Foundation for Sustainable Development in South Africa*]

Usage of CFCs in South Africa in tonnes

1989

1990

Aerosols

3 060

2 038

Electronics

680

76

Foam blowing ^a

2 040

1 798

Refrigeration

2 720

2 495

Total

8 500

6 407

a

The process of producing foam plastic for such item as polystyrene cups and food packaging

The aerosol industry made the greatest contribution to the reduction in the use of CFCs between 1989 and 1990. One of the largest users of refrigeration was the mining industry, with at least half of South Africa's gold production relying on CFCs. to act as coolants for the air underground. The equipment in the mining industry was expected to be in use until 2030, with modification to exclude the use of CFCs being difficu

Action taken against offenders

In April 1992 officials of the endangered species protection unit of the Bophuthatswana Parks Board

arrested a man for smuggling ivory and confiscated 26 elephant tusks weighing 374kg. A spokesman for the parks board said that in the previous five weeks nine people had been arrested on charges of illegal possession of tusks and horns.¹⁰⁷ [¹⁰⁷ *The Citizen* 4 April 1992] In separate incidents in March 1992, two men appeared in the Johannesburg Regional Court on charges of illegal possession of ivory and another was prosecuted in the Durban Regional Court on charges of illegal possession of rhino horn.¹⁰⁸ [¹⁰⁸ *Ibid* 7 March 1992, 31 March 1992]

In February 1992 the second International Water Tribunal, which was held in Amsterdam, said that there should be an independent environmental assessment of Thor Chemicals in Cato Ridge (Natal) with full public disclosure of the findings. (The International Water Tribunal had been established by a number of international non-government environmental organisations in Rotterdam in 1982.) At the meeting of the tribunal in 1992 Earthlife Africa brought a case against Thor Chemicals, which had a British parent company, alleging that the company was polluting the Mngweni River near its PACtory and thus endangering water users downstream. It was subsequently found that three of the company's employees were suffering from severe mercury poisoning. The tribunal said that the company should monitor the release of pollutants into the river and ensure that no mercury was released into the river. Thor Chemicals was also asked to introduce more effective controls against accidental spills. The company subsequently decided to shut down permanently all chemical production involving hazardous mercury-based compounds.¹⁰⁹ [¹⁰⁹ *Business Day* 6 May 1992, *New Ground* Autumn 1992; Interview with a spokesman of Earthlife Africa, Mr Brendan Wolff-Piggott, 12 June 1992]

Green organisations

In 1991 there were more than 400 organisations involved in conservation activities and research in South Africa, operating both regionally and nationally. The largest and most influential organisations were the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), Earthlife Africa, the Endangered Wildlife Trust, the Environment and Development Agency, the South African Nature Foundation and the Wildlife Society of Southern Africa.¹¹⁰ [¹¹⁰ Interview with Ms Bev Geach of the Environment and Development Agency, 12 June 1992]

The CSIR had 14 divisions devoted to environmental research, including energy, estuarine and water pollution, and forestry. In 1991 the CSIR published a document entitled *The Situation of Waste Management and Pollution Control in South Africa* which was used extensively in compiling the President's Council report. The CSIR was also commissioned by the government to conduct research to help formulate future environmental policy (see *Policy* above).¹¹¹ [¹¹¹ *The Green Pays 1991/1992: Environmental Network and Resource Directory for Southern Africa*, Cape Town, 1991]

Earthlife Africa, which was founded in 1989, had 15 branches nationwide in 1991. The organisation

aimed to develop attitudes that were respectful of, and nurturing towards, the environment and to ensure grassroots involvement in decision making around conservation measures.¹¹² [¹¹² Ibid]

The Environment and Development Agency was founded in 1976. In 1991 the organisation supported six village-based projects in rural areas, in which the population was trained to manage projects related to food production, health care and water supply. Issues such as land degradation and sanitation were also dealt with by the agency.¹¹³ [¹¹³ Ibid]

The Endangered Wildlife Trust, which was founded in 1973, was concerned with the ‘conservation of genetic diversity’. The trust’s operations concentrated on three areas—conservation activities, creating awareness of threats to genetic diversity and research. In 1991 it had a budget of R1,6m.¹¹⁴ [¹¹⁴ Ibid]

The South African Nature Foundation was established in 1968. It was the only conservation organisation in Africa to be affiliated to an international organisation, the World Wildlife Fund. The foundation’s activities focused on identifying high priority conservation projects; raising, administering and distributing funds; purchasing land for conservation; and education and training. Between 1968 and 1991 the foundation had raised R40m for conservation activities, funded 250 projects and helped create five national parks and 30 nature reserves.¹¹⁵ [¹¹⁵ Ibid]

The Wildlife Society of Southern Africa started off in 1926 as the Wildlife Protection Society, making it the oldest conservation organisation in South Africa. In 1992 it had 30 000 members, seven branches nationwide and eight environmental education projects.¹¹⁶ [¹¹⁶ Ibid] The society aimed to promote and participate in environmental education on a grassroots level so as to create a high level of environmental awareness, to promote the integration of conservation and development, and to be relevant and adaptive to changing circumstances.¹¹⁷ [¹¹⁷ *African Wildlife* July/August 1992; Interview with the public relations officer of the Wildlife Society of Southern Africa, Ms Pat Adier, 4 August 1992]

Key Projections

- The President’s Council report said that unless the population growth rate declined all environmental conservation measures would be futile.
- Eskom believed that electrification of the townships would reduce air pollution in these areas by 75%.
- The minister of water affairs and forestry, Mr Magnus Malan, said that it would cost R51m over the following three decades to combat pollution from abandoned coal mines.

EMPLOYMENT

Key Points

- According to the National Manpower Commission (NMC), there were 13,4m economically active people in South Africa (including the ten homelands) in 1991.
- Employment in the construction and manufacturing sectors declined by 5,6% and 5,1% respectively between June 1981 and June 1991, according to the NMC.
- Employment in the public sector increased by 0,8% between June 1990 and June 1991.
- The Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs said that the average number of people employed on all mines in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands) declined from 715 170 in 1990 to 679 547 in 1991, ie by 5%.
- The NMC estimated that there were about 5,4m people in South Africa (including the ten homelands) without formal employment in 1991. Of this figure about 2,5m to 3m earned a living in the informal sector, while another 2,5m to 3m were unemployed.
- The number of new applications for benefits from the Unemployment Insurance Fund increased by 44% between 1990 and 1991.
- The Small Business Development Corporation said in 1991 that 75% of all new job opportunities were created by the small business sector.
- The average annual growth rate in unit labour cost in manufacturing in South Africa between 1985 and 1990 was 14,4%, compared with -1% for Japan.
- The average monthly household income of Africans, coloured people, Indians and whites in 1991 was R779, R1 607, R2 476 and R4 679 respectively. Africans earned 17% of the average monthly household income of whites.
- Fifty-eight percent of African households earned below R700 a month in 1991, while 51% of white households earned over R4 000 a month.
- The Foundation for Research Development estimated in March 1992 that about 66% of the African population and 50% of the total population lived below the poverty datum line.

Economically Active Population

According to the National Manpower Commission (NMC), the economically active population (EAP) of South Africa (including the ten homelands) was 13,4m in 1991, which represented an annual increase of about 2,8% since 1980. Of this number 8m were employed in the formal economy and the remaining 5,4m (40% of the EAP) were either unemployed or operating in the informal sector. The EAP of the 'independent' homelands was more than 1m in 1991, of which women comprised 33%. The NMC said that women as a proportion of the EAP in South Africa had increased from 23% in 1960 to 36% in 1990. The average annual growth rate in the female EAP was 4,3% between 1960 and 1990, compared with 2,2% for men. The acting chairman of the NMC, Dr Frans Barker, estimated in 1992 that the EAP would increase to 17,6m by the year 2000, 74% of which would be African and 14% white.¹ [¹ National Manpower Commission, annual report 1991, ppl6,28-29]

The following table gives a breakdown of the EAP in South Africa (including the ten homelands) from 1970 to 1990, as well as projections for 1995 and 2000:² [² Ibid]

Economically active population: 1970-2000

1970

1980

1990

1995 ^a

2000 ^a

African

5,09m

6,97m

9,38m

10,99m

12,98m

Asian

0,20m

0,28m

0,37m

0,42m

0,46m

Coloured

0,76m

0,99m

1,35m

1,51m

1,65m

Whites

1,57m

1,94m

2,32m

2,44m

2,52m

Total

7,62m

10,18m

13,42m

15,36m

17,61m

a

Projects

According to estimates published by the Development Bank of Southern Africa in September 1991, in 1990 the six non-independent homelands accounted for 13% (1 691 317 people) of the EAP in South Africa, while the 'independent' homelands accounted for 8% (1028 643 people). However, because of migrancy, the de facto supply of labour in 1990 amounted to 1,6m in the non-independent homelands and 964 000 in the 'independent' homelands. Between 1980 and 1990 the average annual rate of increase in the EAP in the non-independent homelands was 2,5%; in the 'independent' homelands, 2,7%; and in the nonhomeland area, 3,1%. Thirty-three percent (4,2m) of the EAP in 1990 was found in region H (Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereemging area, KwaNdebele and parts of Bophuthatsw

Structure of the workforce

The Central Statistical Service (CSS) provided the following racial breakdown of employment in the private and public sectors as at June 1991 and the proportional change over June 1990:⁴ [Central Statistical Service (CSS), *Labour Statistics: Employment and Salaries and Wages*, Statistical News Releases as follows: *Building Societies, Banking Institutions and Insurance Companies: June 1991*, P0262,4 September 1991; *Mining and Quarrying, Manufacturing, Construction and Electricity: September 1990*, P0242.1,29 November 1990; *Mining and Quarrying Manufacturing Construction and Electricity: June 1991*, P0242.1,2 September 1991; *Wholesale, Retail and Motor Trade and Hotels: June 1991*, P0244, 14 November 1991; *Public Sector: June 1991*, P0251,4 November 1991]

Private sector employment: June 1991

Construction

Finance

Manufacturing

Trade and catering

African

280 800

25 916

755 000

367 700

Increase

(decrease)

(7,3%)

0,4%

(2,8%)

(1,6%)

Coloured

57 200

20 677

269 900

102 500

Increase

(decrease)

(3,5%)

3,3%

(2,2%)

(4,5%)

Indian

6 300

9 904

91 718

43 400

Increase

(decrease)

(8,7%)

4,9%

(0,5%)

(0,9%)

White

46 700

130 048

314 200

256 200

Increase

(decrease)

(3,3%)

(0,7%)

(1,0%)

(2,7%)

Total

391 000

186 545

1 430 818

769 800

Increase

(decrease)

(6,3%)

0,1%

(2,1%)

(2,3%)

In the construction sector employment in June 1991 had dropped by 5,6% compared with employment levels in 1981, and employment in manufacturing had dropped by 5,1%, while trade and catering had increased by 0,7% compared to employment in that sector in 1981. Between 1981 and 1991 employment in the finance sector increased by 41%.⁵ [5 CSS, *South African Labour Statistics*, 1991]

Employment in the public sector as at 30 June 1991 was as follows:

Public sector employment: June 1991

Central government

Provincial administration

Local authorities

African

213 056

110 583

121 261

Increase

(decrease)

5,4%

(1,3%)

(4,4%)

Coloured

91 472

33 860

38 193

Increase

(decrease)

5,5%

0,5%

00,2%

Indian

21 800

7 277

7 547

Increase

(decrease)

5,7%

44%

0,7%

White

238 599

70 900

61 857

Increase

(decrease)

4,7%

(5,2%)

(0,2%)

Total

564 927

222 620

228 858

Increase

Public sector employment: June 1991(continued)

Transnet

Post and telecommunic-ation

civil service of non-independent homelands ^a

African

73 744

28 467

203 022

Increase

(decrease)

(4,7%)

0,7%

3,0%

Coloured

13 180

12 293

—

Increase

(decrease)

(3,4%)

3,5%

—

Indian

1 953

2 816

—

Increase

(decrease)

9,0%

12,8%

—

White

73 308

53 829

—

Increase

(decrease)

(1,6%)

1,3%

—

Total

162 185

97 405

203 022

Increase

(decrease)

(3,0%)

1,7%

3,0%

a

Coloured, Indian and white civil servants are paid by the South African government and are, therefore, not under non-independent homelands.

Public sector employment: June 1991(continued)

Parastatal institutions

Universities and technikons

Agricultural marketing boards

African

9 276

13 031

826

Increase

(decrease)

(7,3%)

(2,9%)

1,7%

Coloured

1 629

5 716

247

Increase

(decrease)

1,7%

6,0%

9,3%

Indian

167

2 452

32

Increase

(decrease)

8,4%

1,8%

(28,9%)

White

10 237

33 805

1 895

Increase

(decrease)

1,7%

1,3%

(1,6%)

Total

21 305

55 004

3 000

Increase

Public sector employment: June 1991 (continued)

public corporation

Total

African

63 442

836 708

Increase

(decrease)

(1,4%)

0,5%

Coloured

7 331

203 917

Increase

(decrease)

(16,6%)

1,9%

Indian

571

44 615

Increase

(decrease)

30,1%

5,2%

White

55 278

599 708

Increase

(decrease)

(6,2%)

0,5%

Total

126 622

1 684 948

Increase

(decrease)

(

Foreign workers

The NMC said in 1991 that in the period June 1990 to June 1991 a total of 13 681 immigrants entered South Africa (6 609 of whom were economically active) and 4 680 emigrants left the country (2 204 of whom were economically active). Over this period there was a net gain of 9 001 people, of whom 4 405 were economically active. Between 1979 and 1989 the net gain through immigration accounted for about 8,3% of the increase in high-level manpower and 9,3% of the increase in middle-level manpower. The NMC regarded selective immigration as especially important in redressing the shortage of high-level manpower in certain vocational categories. The following table shows the proportion of immigrants in high-, middle- and low-level positions as a proportion of economically active immigrants:⁶ [6 National Manpower Commission, annual report 1991, p19]

Proportion of immigrants in high-, middle- and low-level positions: 1980, 1985 and 1990 ^a

High-level positions

Middle- and low-level positions

Unspecified

1980

37%

58%

5%

1985

38%

56%

5%

1990

40%

55%

5%

a

Figures have been rounded and may therefore, not add up to 10

According to the CSS, there was a net gain of 1 031 immigrants in professional, semi-professional and technical occupations in 1991 compared with a net gain of 887 in 1990. There was a net gain of 561 immigrants in managerial, executive and administrative occupations during 1991 compared with a net gain of 598 in 1990.⁷ ⁷CSS, *Tourism and Migration: December 1991*, Statistical News Release, P0351, 19

March 1992]

In 1991 the Department of Home Affairs repatriated 47 074 illegal immigrants to Mozambique and 7174 to Zimbabwe as well as returning 7 097 refugees to Botswana, Swaziland and other neighbouring countries (see also chapter on *Population*).⁸ [⁸ *The Star* 20 May 1992]

A survey carried out by the NMC in 1991 to determine occupations in which there were usually shortages of manpower found that no shortages were currently being experienced. However, the NMC, in consultation with the Department of Manpower, identified certain occupations in which there might be critical shortages of skills in the longer term. These were:⁹ [⁹ National Manpower Commission, annual report 1991, pp36-37]

- artisans: diesel mechanic, electrician, lithographer and millwright;
- computer science occupations: computer systems analyst and software systems engineer;
- engineers: chemical, electrical, electronic, mechanical and transport;
- technicians: electronic and instrumentation;
- technologists: chemical and instrumentation; and
- general: accountant (registered), chemist, mathematical related occupations, metallurgist, town and regional planner and veterinary professions.

Occupations in which there were large surpluses were administrative occupations (clerks, sales personnel, secretarial personnel, typists and unqualified accountants/bookkeepers), computer science occupations (operators), trades (bricklayers and plasterers), and general (certain Bachelor of Arts graduates, operators and labourers, security personnel, supervisors, and certain teachers and vehicle drivers).¹⁰ [¹⁰ *Ibid*]

Migrant workers and hostels

The minister of local government and national housing and of public works, Mr Leon Wessels, said in May 1992 that the government had allocated R297m for the upgrading or conversion of single-sex hostels into family units. This would take place after negotiation between hostel residents, the residents of houses and shacks in adjacent areas, the owners of the hostels and all other groups concerned, Mr Wessels said (see also chapter on *Housing and Urbanisation*).¹¹ [¹¹ *Daily Dispatch* 26 May 1992] Many

civic associations were reported to be in favour of converting hostels into family units to allow migrant workers to live with their families. However, conversion of hostels would be expensive and few hostel residents could afford to buy homes. The vice chairman of the West Rand Hostel Residents' Association, Mr Joseph Kubheka, said in May 1992 that no hostel resident favoured conversion.¹² [¹² *Business Day* 27 May 1992] A spokesman for the Inkatha Institute of South Africa, Mr Senzo Mfayeza, said in May 1992 that if hostels were abolished, two issues would demand immediate attention: accommodation of hostel residents at the same or lower cost in a way that would not jeopardise their financial support of their families, and the provision of adequate education, employment and housing opportunities for families of hostel residents brought to the cities. Such a move would affect rural communities both socially and economically.¹³ [¹³ Independent Board of Inquiry, *Fortresses of Fear*, 1992]

A report by the Independent Board of Inquiry into the role of hostels in political violence, published in June 1992, quoted two researchers as saying that the disintegration of apartheid signalled the end of migrant labour and hostels, a development that hostel residents considered as the 'destruction of their entire urban survival base' rather than their salvation from poverty.¹⁴ [¹⁴ *The Star* 5 June 1992]

According to a survey carried out by the Human Sciences Research Council in November 1991 at hostels owned by the Johannesburg City Council, between 50% and 65% of respondents preferred any other accommodation to hostels. The report said that the reasons most often given for staying in hostels were that hostels were close to places of employment and that hostel residents could not afford to buy homes.¹⁵ [¹⁵ *Ibid* 2 April 1992]

After the massacre at Boipatong (southern Transvaal) in June 1992 (see chapter on *Political Developments*), the national executive committee of the African National Congress (ANC) demanded that the government proceed with the programme of phasing out hostels and converting them to family units, that fences be installed around hostels and that hostels be guarded permanently and searched regularly. These conditions had been agreed upon by the government and the ANC in 1991 (see *1991/92 Survey* p237).¹⁶ [¹⁶ *Business Day* 24 June 1992]

Mining

The Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs said in its 1991 annual report that the average number of people employed on all mines in South Africa declined from 715 170 in 1990 to 679 547 in 1991, ie by 5%. Compared to the 1980 employment figure of 824 432, employment on mines in 1991 had dropped by 18%. The report stated that the decline in employment was mainly the result of rationalisation of labour on the gold mines because of the persistently low gold price. The distribution of mineworkers in 1991 was as follows:¹⁷ [¹⁷ Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, annual report 1991]

Disruption of mine workers in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands): 1991

Coal mines

82 790

Gold mines

426 830

Other mines

169 927

Total

679 547

The number of migrant workers employed on the Chamber of Mines' coal and gold mines continued to decline in 1991, as shown below

Migrant workers on Chamber of Mines' member coal mines: 1981 and 1991*Place of origin*

1981

1991

Proportional increase (decrease)

Bophuthatswana

365

137

(62%)

Botswana

4

4

0%

Ciskei^a

—

704

—

Lesotho

12 314

5 037

(59%)

Malawi

258

32

(88%)

Mozambique

1 354

1 136

(16%)

‘South Africa’^b

39 725

24 169

(39%)

Swaziland

608

361

(41%)

Transkei

11 921

3 798

(68%)

Venda

59

26

(56%)

Zimbabwe

16

2

(88%)

Other areas

4

—

—

Total

66 628

35 406

(47%)

Migrant workers on Chamber of Mines' member gold mines: 1981 and 1991

Place of origin

1981

1991

Proportional increase (decrease)

Bophuthatswana

12 804

9 470

(26%)

Botswana

17 539

13 388

(24%)

Ciskei ^a

—

7 713

—

Lesotho

98 228

88 281

(10%)

Malawi

12 937

5

(99%)

Mozambique

40 094

41 956

(5%)

'South Africa' b

104 230

89 703

(14%)

Swaziland

8 872

15 623

76%

Transkei

120 873

86 790

(28%)

Venda

2 175

1 524

(30%)

Zimbabwe

2 968

—

—

Other areas

1 337

—

—

Total

422 057

354 453

(16%)

a

Figures for 1980 included in 'South Africa'

b

Excluding the 'independent' homelands, except for 1981 figur

The total number of migrant workers employed on coal and gold mines of members of the Chamber of Mines decreased by 20% between 1981 and 1991 or at an average annual rate of 2,3%. The rate of decline in employment on coal mines was more marked (at 6,1% a year), while the rate of decline on gold mines was 1,7% a year. Migrant workers from South Africa (including the ten homelands) comprised 58% (224 034 workers) of the total number of migrant workers in 1991. Workers from the 'independent' homelands comprised 49% (110 162 workers) of the labour force from South Africa. In 1991, 57% of all foreign workers were from Lesotho.¹⁹ [¹⁹ Ibid]

According to the chamber almost 90% of the mineworkers on South African mines in 1991 were semi-skilled or unskilled men from rural areas of southern Africa. Their earnings (60% of which ended up in economically depressed areas) supported families and dependants estimated at some 3,8m people.²⁰ [²⁰ Ibid]

Unskilled and semi-skilled mineworkers earned an average monthly wage of R946 in 1991, while fringe benefits (accommodation, food, medical aid, and sporting and recreational facilities) were valued at some R323 a months.²¹ [²¹ Ibid] According to the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, wages and salaries paid to employees in the mining industry in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands) during 1991 amounted to R11,7bn, compared with R10,9bn in 1990.²² [²² Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, annual report 1991]

The amounts paid out to mineworkers by The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA) between January and December 1991 were as follows:²³ [²³ Chamber of Mines, annual report 1991]

Amounts paid out by TEBA's regional office: 1990 and 1991

1990 Rm

1991 Rm

Proportional increase (decrease)

Bophuthatswana

19,8

27,1

37%

Botswana

18,5

14,2

(23%)

Cape province

6,2

9,2

48%

Ciskei

3,6

1,9

(47%)

Gazankulu

1,3

1,8

38%

KaNgwane

0,6

0,7

17%

KwaZulu and Natal

15,6

18,9

51%

Lebowa

2,4

3,0

25%

Lesotho ^a

472,4

344,4

(27%)

Malawi ^b

1,4

0,3

(79%)

Mozambique

139,4

152,6

9%

Orange Free State

3,6

1,4

(61%)

QwaQwa

2,7

3,9

44%

Swaziland

17,8

20,8

17%

Transkei

101,5

122,4

21%

Transvaal

8,0

8,0

0%

Venda

0,6

0,9

50%

Total ^c

815,4

731,7

(10%)

a

During 1991 the rate of compulsory deferred pay for citizens of Lesotho was reduced from 60% to 30%, resulting in a substantial decline in TEBA payment

b

No recruitment of mineworkers took place in Malawi after February 1988, following a decision by the government of Malawi not to continue facilitating the recruitment of its citizens for migrant work in South Africa

c

Figure may not add u

Unemployment

Statistics

According to the National Manpower Commission (NMC), the labour absorption capacity of the economy declined from an average of 97% in the 1960s to an average of only 7% during the period 1985 to 1990. This meant that only seven new job opportunities were being created in the formal sector for every 100 new entrants to the job market. The NMC said that between 1980 and 1990 job opportunities increased by 503 000, while the economically active population (EAP) increased by 3,3m. Therefore, at least 2,8m people had been added to the pool of unemployed since 1980. However, the NMC added that if the greater participation by women in the labour market, immigration gains and increasing numbers of legal and illegal workers from neighbouring countries were taken into account, the number of unemployed had probably increased even more rapidly. The NMC estimated that in 1991 about 5,4m people (40% of the EAP) in South Africa (including the ten homelands) were without formal employment. Of this figure about 2,5m to 3m were active in the informal sector, while another 2,5m to 3m were unemployed. The NMC added that about 70% of unemployed Africans were under the age of 35, while about 60% had an educational level below standard 6.²⁴ [²⁴ National Manpower Commission, annual report 1991]

In May 1992 the deputy director of the NMC, Mr Norman Muller, said that the country was in the midst of the longest recession since the Second World War. He added that unemployment was unlikely to decline until the political and economic situation improved.²⁵ [²⁵ *Cape Times, The Citizen* 14 May 1992] A report published by the International Labour Organisation in May 1992 predicted that by the year 2005, 57% of South Africa's population would be either out of work or would have to find jobs in the informal sector.²⁶ [²⁶ *Daily Dispatch* 27 May 1992]

According to the South African Reserve Bank *Quarterly Bulletin*, published in June 1992, formal employment in the private sector decreased by 3,6% in 1991, while public sector employment increased by 1,6% during the same period.²⁷ [²⁷ South African Reserve Bank, *Quarterly Bulletin*, June 1992]

According to the Central Statistical Service (CSS), unemployment and underemployment figures in June 1990 and June 1991 for coloured people and Indians living in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands) were as follows (proportion of EAP indicated in brackets):²⁸ [²⁸ CSS, *Current Population Survey: Development Regions and Provinces: Coloureds - June 1991*, Statistical News Release, P0342, 23 September 1991; CSS, *Current Population Survey: Development Regions and Provinces: Indians - June 1991*, Statistical News Release, P0343, 18 September 1991]

Number of people unemployed and underemployed June 1990 and June 1991

EAP (000)

Unemployed (000)

Underemployed

Coloured

1990

1 248

99 (7,9%)

2 703 (0,2%)

1991

1 258

108 (8,6%)

4 701 (9,4%)

Indian

1990

326

20 (6,1%)

742 (0,2%)

1991

334

15 (4,5%)

690 (0)

CSS figures for the number of African and white unemployed were unavailable.

Fifty-five percent of coloured people unemployed in June 1991 were under the age of 25 compared with 59% in June 1990. One third of the coloured people unemployed under the age of 25 in June 1991 were female. Among Indians the proportion of unemployed under the age of 25 was 73% in June 1991. Male underemployment among coloured people in the same month, was 71% higher than in the previous year, while female underemployment increased by 77%. The unemployment rate among Indians declined by 1,6 percentage points between June 1990 and June 1991. Only 27% of the total number of Indians unemployed in June 1991 were women.

According to the NMC, the number of registered unemployed people in 1985, 1990 and 1991 in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands) was as follows:²⁹ [29 National Manpower Commission, annual report 1991]

Registered unemployed (seasonally adjusted): 1985, 1990 and 1991

Female

Male

Total

1985 ^a

45 530

84 541

130 071

1990 ^b

38 937

87 586

126 523

1991^b

65 321

157 726

223 047

a

Average over 12 months

b

Average over six months

The unemployment insurance commissioner, Mr Jack Scheepers, said in March 1992 that the Unemployment Insurance Fund had paid out about R105m each month during 1991 to about 250 000 beneficiaries. An average of 62 000 new applications for benefits were received each month in 1991, compared with 43 000 each month in 1990.³⁰ [³⁰ *The Star* 6 March 1992]

According to the South African Chamber of Business, unemployment was expected to increase between June 1992 and June 1993 as the recession began to affect industrial production and manufacturers retrenched more people.³¹ [³¹ *Ibid* 10 June 1992] The general secretary of the Congress of South African Trade Unions, Mr Jay Naidoo, said in April 1992 that the current drought would reduce employment by 80 000.³² [³² *Ibid* 15 April 1992]

The first report of the 1991 population census, published in March 1992, said that in March 1991 one out of every five people (19% of the EAP) in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands) considered themselves unemployed. The census indicated that African unemployment was the highest at 25% of the African EAP (1,6m people), while the coloured unemployment rate as a proportion of EAP was 17% (202 000 people); the Indian rate, 13% (43 000 people); and the white rate, 4% (83 000 people).

The Bureau of Market Research (BMR) at the University of South Africa published a study in September 1991 which predicted an annual growth of 450 000 in the labour force from 1990 to 2000 and an annual growth of 510 000 from 2000 to 2005. The BMR predicted that some 11,5m people (or 57% of the EAP) would not have formal sector employment by the year 2005.³⁴ [³⁴ Keet D, 'Unemployment',

South African Labour Bulletin, October/November 1991, p38] The NMC estimated that an annual economic growth rate of 5% was necessary just to accommodate new entrants to the labour market every year. The NMC added that the return of between 20 000 and 40 000 exiles and refugees during 1991 and 1992 would also have to be taken into account in calculating the number of new jobs required. A growth rate of about 10% was required to lower the current level of unemployment significantly. The following table shows job provision and unemployment in 1995 at various projected economic growth rates:³⁵ [35 National Manpower Commission, annual report 1991]

Projected job provision and employment in 1985

Economic growth rate

1%

3%

5%

EAP

15,57m

15,57%

15,57m

Job provision

8,37m

9,63m

11,11m

Unemployment and involved in informal sector

7,19m

5,93m

The managing director of the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC), Dr Ben Vosloo, said in February 1992 that the term unemployment had to be redefined in order to reflect the realities of a developing economy with a large informal and semi-formal sector. The present definition of unemployment included those people between the ages of 15 and 65 years who could work and who wished to find employment, but could not find work in the formal sector. The definition should be revised to exclude those employed in the informal sector, Dr Vosloo said

Regional disparities

According to the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), no figures for registered unemployment in 1991 were available in the 'independent' homelands because of the low incidence of registration in these areas.³⁷ [37 Telephonic interview with Mr David Viljoen, Centre for Information Analysis, Development Bank of Southern Africa, 1 July 1992] However, unemployment figures for the various development regions (which included the ten homelands) showed that during the period 1980 to 1985 the average annual rate of increase in unemployment was 11,4% in South Africa (including the ten homelands). The highest rate of increase (14,6%) was experienced in region F, while region B had the lowest (9,7%).

Actual unemployment in South Africa increased by 42% between 1985 and 1990, with region C experiencing the largest increase (52%). In 1990 the ten homelands accounted for 38% (711 193) of the country's unemployed. Of the homelands, KwaZulu had the highest number of unemployed (271 737), followed by Bophuthatswana (133 428), Transkei (97 938), Lebowa (73 940), Ciskei (48 001), Venda (26 950), KaNgwane (20 175), KwaNdebele (15 760), Gazankulu (13 778) and QwaQwa (9 486). In the Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging (PWV) area the number of unemployed was 487 999 or 26% of total unemployment in 1990.³⁸ [38 Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), *Labour and Employment in South Africa. A Regional Profile 1980-1990*, September 1991]

According to the DBSA, reasons for the increase in the numbers of unemployed in all regions included the lack of economic growth in real terms and an increase in capital intensity by many firms to counter the problems of rising labour costs, low productivity and work stoppages. In rural and non-metropolitan areas where the level of economic activity was limited unemployment rose markedly.³⁹ [39 DBSA, *South Africa: An Inter-regional Profile, 1991*]

In 1990 unemployment figures for the various development regions (including the ten homelands) were as follows (the DBSA pointed out that these unemployment figures were underestimates since they

made no provision for hidden unemployment and underemployment):⁴⁰ [40 DBSA, *Labour and Employment in South Africa. ' A Regional Profile 1980-1990*, September 1991]

Unemployment by development region: 1990

Region

Unemployment

Proportion of labour force of region

A (Western Cape)

149 406

9,6%

B (Northern Cape)

47 117

14,6%

C (Orange Free State)

114 943

11,2%

D (Eastern Cape)

279 277

24,7%

E (Kwazulu/Natal)

436 345

19,2%

F (Eastern Transvaal)

68 239

8,8%

G (Northern Transvaal)

123 052

17,0%

H (PWV) ^a

564 498

13,5%

J (Western Transvaal)

92 742

14,7%

Total

1 875 619

14,9%

a

Pretoria/Witwaterstand/Ve

Job creation

The minister of manpower, Mr Piet Marais, said in Parliament in May 1992 that the government had invested R797m in the special job-creation programme between April 1985 and December 1991.⁴¹ [⁴¹

Hansard (R) 12 cols 6381-6382, 6 May 1992] According to the annual report of the Department of Manpower, R55m was spent on job-creation projects during the period I October 1990 to 30 September 1991. From April 1991 to April 1992 the programme created 12 017 job opportunities. Funds for job-creation programmes were allocated to various departments and administrations as follows:⁴² [⁴² Department of Manpower, annual report 1991]

Allocation of job-creation programmes funds to departments or administration: 1991/92 ^a

Departments/administrations

Rm

Administration: House of Representatives

0,1

Development Aid

5,5

Foreign Affairs

5,2

Manpower

38,9

Provincial administration: Orange Free State

0,3

Total

50,0

a

Figures have been ro

In his budget speech in March 1992 the minister of finance, Mr Barend du Plessis, said that because job-creation programmes were important in curtailing unemployment, the 1992/93 budget would emphasise more labour-intensive methods for the implementation of existing and new government projects. Both the central government and development organisations such as the DBSA and the Independent Development Trust (IDT) were to undertake initiatives to contain unemployment in 1992/93. These included the following:⁴³ [⁴³ Department of Finance, *Budget Review*, 18 March 1992]

- R22m was to be carried over from 1991/92 to 1992/93 by the Department of Manpower, as a continuation of the special job-creation programme;
- the IDT was expected to spend R800m on socio-economic projects in 1992/93, including R500m to be transferred to the DBSA by the Industrial Development Corporation;
- the operation of a low-interest rate scheme would provide assistance to small- and medium-sized industries;
- R3,8m was to be transferred to the development fund of the SBDC for the maintenance and expansion of small business development initiatives; and
- the new regional industrial development programme was to promote job creation.

According to the Department of Manpower, about 91 000 work seekers were placed in employment between November 1990 and October 1991 by the department, a decline of 18% over the number of placements in 1990. Private employment bureaus placed about 95 000 work seekers in employment during the same period in 1990, 15% less than in 1989.⁴⁴ [⁴⁴ National Manpower Commission, annual report 1991] Employment opportunities created by development corporations and other statutory bodies in the non-independent homelands in 1990/91 were as follows:⁴⁵ [⁴⁵ *Hansard* (A) 6 q cols 514-518, 24 March 1992]

Employment opportunities created by development corporation/statutory bodies in the non-independent homelands: 1990/91

Gazankulu

414

KaNgwane

2 099

KwaNdebele

529

KwaZulu ^a

4 813

Lebowa ^a

2 136

QwaQwa

1 850

SADT ^b areas

3 500

Total

15 341

a

Figure for new employment in housing were not available

b

South African Developmen

The new job opportunities created in the non-independent homelands were as follows: agriculture, 2 721 (18%); commerce and services, 2 986 (19%); housing, 849 (6%); industry, 3 576 (23%); mining, 1 502 (10%); small industries, 3555 (23%); and other, 152 (1%). The total number of people employed in undertakings established by development corporations in the non-independent homelands in September 1991 was as follows: Gazankulu, 4 529; KaNgwane, 10 801; KwaNdebele, 4 631; KwaZulu, 25 317; Lebowa, 16 131; and QwaQwa, 5 285.⁴⁶ [⁴⁶ *Hansard* (A) 6 q cols 517-518, 24 March 1992]

The SBDC said in 1991 that 75% of all new job opportunities were created by the small business sector. According to its estimates, one new job opportunity in the small business sector cost between R8 000 and R9 000.⁴⁷ [47 National Manpower Commission, annual report 1991]

In 1992 the SBDC devised a two-tier strategy which it believed could boost the number of new jobs by about 2,5m by 1997. The first part of the strategy would seek to channel about R400m a year of long-term insurance and pension funds into venture capital funds or equity investment funds. An injection, over five years, of approximately R2bn into venture funds was expected to create 4 000 or more medium-sized businesses and provide about 500 000 new job opportunities. The second part of the strategy would involve the government in investing R2bn a year in development venture capital funds to fund the establishment of 50 000 smaller businesses which could create between 500 000 and 2m new jobs.⁴⁸ [48 *The Star* 16 June 1992]

The minister for administration and tourism, Dr Org Marais, said in April 1992 that if South Africa received about 1m tourists in 1995 this would create about 150 000 new jobs.⁴⁹ [49 *Hansard* (R) 11 col 5613,28 April 1992] The chairman of Eskom, Mr John Maree, said in May 1992 that its mass electrification programme could create more than 500 000 jobs in the next five years. Furthermore, a national housing programme could provide another 500 000 jobs by 1995.⁵⁰ [50 *Business Day* 20 May 1992]

In order to boost employment in urban areas, particularly in the PWV and the Durban/Pinetown areas, the government announced in March 1992 that maximum relocation grants of R1m would be extended to those areas for foreign companies wishing to invest in South Africa.⁵¹ [51 *Ibid* 10 March 1992]

Skills and training

Skills shortages

While skilled workers continued to leave the country in 1991, a net increase occurred in all the occupational categories outlined in the table below. There was a net increase of 288 engineers and related technologists in 1991, compared with a net increase of 340 in 1990. South Africa also had a net gain of 206 medical practitioners and specialists in 1991 and a net gain of ten dental practitioners, while in accounting and related occupations there was a net gain of 35 (see also chapter on *Population*). According to the Central Statistical Service (CSS), the following number of professional people left South Africa in 1990 and 1991 (with the net gain in each occupational category owing to immigration also provided):⁵² [52 CSS, *Tourism and Migration: January 1992*, Statistical News Release, P0351,4 June 1992]

Emigrants by occupation: 1990 and 1991

1990

1991

Occupation

Emigration

Net gain

Emigration

Net gain

Professional, semi-professional and technical

975

887

803

1 031

Managerial, executive and administrative

222

598

221

561

Clerical and sales

535

1 349

531

1 042

Transport, delivery and communications

17

26

9

75

Service

58

209

55

191

Farming and related

10

63

8

59

Artisans, apprentices and related

359

797

281

506

Production foreman and supervisor, miner and quarry worker, operator, production and related

80

221

55

163

Occupation unspecified and not classified elsewhere

121

200

45

404

Total

2 377

4 350

2 008

4 032

Total not economically active

2 345

5 427

2 248

4 091

Grand total

4 722

9 777

4 256

8 123

The National Manpower Commission (NMC) said in 1991 that, using CSS data for 1985, almost 51% of the economically active population had a level of education lower than standard 6. The comparable figure for Africans was about 69%. The NMC considered this to be an unfavourable situation as regards the productive utilisation and trainability of the existing labour force.⁵³ [⁵³ National Manpower Commission, annual report 1991]

The chief executive of Damelin College, Mr Johan Brummer, said in January 1992 that South Africa would need about 500 000 managers by the year 2000. He added that the country's universities and technikons could not meet this demand.⁵⁴ [⁵⁴ *The Star* 17 January 1992]

In one of two surveys conducted in 1992 by the Foundation for Research Development, it was found that 83% of respondents felt that the country needed more engineers and 94% believed the country needed more tec

The executive director of the South African Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors (Safcec), Mr William Vance, said in March 1992 that skilled and professional people who left the construction sector very rarely returned to it. Safcec estimated that since 1990 about 35 000 skilled people had been lost to the sector, mostly through retrenchments. Mr Vance warned that a situation could emerge where the South African construction sector no longer had the capacity to cope with the construction needed in South Africa, let alone to provide assistance to neighbouring countries to meet their infrastructural needs.⁵⁶ [⁵⁶ *The Star* 4 March 1992]

The building industry was also losing essential and irreplaceable skills through lack of foresight and an insistence on too high an academic standard for tradesmen, according to the chairman of the Cape Clay Brick Association, Mr Charles Pritchard. He said that during the recession the industry neglected training and poorer materials were used. Furthermore, authorities and employers insisted on very high qualifications for jobs that did not require them.⁵⁷ [⁵⁷ *The Citizen* 30 June 1992, *Business Day* 2 July 1992]

According to the Department of National Health and Population Development, the largest number of people infected with the human immuno-deficiency virus (HIV) were in the 15- to 39-year age group, ie they were in their most productive and economically active years. The NMC believed that this trend could change the composition of the population and the supply of labour. The acting chairman of the NMC, Dr Frans Barker, said in 1992 that there could be between 3,75m and 4,3m carriers of HIV in the year 2000 and between 407 800 and 435 000 deaths could have occurred from acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) by then. Dr Barker added that the incidence of HIV infection would stabilise at between 30% and 40% of the sexually active population in the next ten to 15 years (see also chapter on *Health and Welfare*)⁵⁸ [⁵⁸ National Manpower Commission, annual report 1991]

Training

The managing director of Consolidated Training International, Mr David Mark, said in January 1992 that effective training was one of the keys to revitalising the economy. Mr Mark said that if illiteracy among the workforce was addressed the trainability of workers would be improved, making workers potentially more skilled and more productive.⁵⁹ [⁵⁹ *The Star* 30 January 1992]

In his budget speech in Parliament in May 1992, the minister of manpower, Mr Piet Marais, said that training should be linked to specific career paths and it should be marketed as an attractive alternative to formal education. For these reasons, he said, a task group under the jurisdiction of the National Training Board had been established to serve as a forum where all interest groups could work towards consensus on a national training strategy.⁶⁰ [⁶⁰ *Hansard (R) 12 col 6380,6 May 1992*] Mr Marais added that 38% (R115m) of the Department of Manpower's 1992/93 budget would be utilised for training. Furthermore, a total amount of R93m would be available for the training of unemployed people during 1992/93.⁶¹ [⁶¹ *Hansard(R)13col6603,7May 1992*]

Business and Marketing Intelligence (BMI) said in 1991 that an average of R620 was spent each year on training the average worker. However, BMI said that the amount spent had to increase tenfold in order to make an impact on the current skills shortage. If the training backlog was not addressed the manager/worker ratio could worsen, increasing to 1:8 by the year 2000.⁶² [⁶² *The Star* 30 January 1992]

The divisional manager of the education and training division of the Standard Bank, Mr Ray Johnson, said in April 1992 that few companies spent more than 2% of total staff costs on training and resource development. He said that the target for expenditure in training ought to be about 5%. According to Mr Johnson, too much money was spent on executive and management development and too little on the development of basic skills.⁶³ [⁶³ *Business Day* 8 April 1992]

A professor of sociology at the University of the Witwatersrand, Professor Eddie Webster, and the director of the department's Sociology of Work Programme, Mr Jean Leger, wrote in an article on training in June 1992 that skills training ought to recognise the existence of tacit skills ('tricks of the trade' that workers use in carrying out production). Their research indicated that only a small proportion of workers mentioned training centres as their most important source of knowledge. Therefore, they said, there was a need to re-examine how skills were actually acquired in the workplace and how best actual trainers could be trained. Professor Webster and Mr Leger emphasised that it was important to recognise that knowledge was also acquired informally.⁶⁴ [⁶⁴ Ibid 19 June 1992]

Training schemes

In June 1992 the Building Industries Federation of South Africa announced the launch of an artisan training scheme which sought to alleviate the shortage of skilled workers in the industry. The new scheme allowed the trainee to work through progressively more difficult groups of skills until he had reached his maximum competency level.⁶⁵ [⁶⁵ *The Star* 10 June 1992]

The national co-ordinating committee for the repatriation of South African exiles introduced projects for returning exiles in the fields of skills training and income generation in February 1992. The courses included auto-electrical work, bricklaying, carpentry, computers, construction, electricity, mechanics, plumbing, small-scale business management and welding. The committee's national co-ordinator, Mr Moss Chikane, said in March 1992 that it had not been successful in placing many people in jobs. Very few returning exiles had found jobs in the private sector, most of them finding employment in the trade union movement, universities and other non-governmental organisations.⁶⁶ [⁶⁶ *The Weekly MailY!* March 1992]

Mr Marais said in Parliament in May 1992 that during the period 1985–1991, 1,4m unemployed people were trained through the Department of Manpower's training scheme for the unemployed. He said that an average of 25% of the trainees were placed in employment immediately and another 15% entered the informal sector or were placed in employment later. However, Mr Marais added that because it was very difficult to keep track of trainees the placement figure could in fact be higher.⁶⁷ [⁶⁷ *Hansard (R)* 12 col 6381,6 May 1992] He said that R93m was available for the training of unemployed people during the 1992/93 financial year.⁶⁸ [⁶⁸ *Hansard (R)* 13 col 703,7 May 1992]

During the period 1 November 1990 to 31 October 1991 training was undertaken by 359 contractors at 706 training venues throughout the country (excluding the 'independent' homelands). The number of people trained (160 555) was 5,2% lower than in 1990 (169 415). The number of unemployed people trained annually by the Department of Manpower has been declining since 1986.⁶⁹ [⁶⁹ Department of Manpower, annual report 1991]

The training conducted in terms of the scheme could be classified broadly into the following categories (proportion of funds allocated shown in brackets):⁷⁰ [⁷⁰ Ibid]

- training for entry into the formal sector (38%). Only 15% of those trained obtained employment, compared with 22% in 1990;
- training for entry into the informal sector (45%). Only 21% of those trained were able to find employment, compared with 31% in 1990;
- training in building-related skills (14%). While the department did not specify how many of the trainees were able to find jobs, it said that most were accommodated after training on work-creation projects under the department's special job-creation programme;
- training of the disabled (2%). Of those trained 20% were placed in employment, compared with 26% in 1990; and
- training of computer programmers (0,6%). Only 32% could find employment by the end of October 1991, compared with 66% in the same period in 1990.

During 1991 the department launched several pilot projects for the training of entrepreneurs but no figures were provided.⁷¹ [⁷¹ Ibid]

The Department of Manpower provided the following figures for people trained in various programmes in 1990 and 1991:⁷² [⁷² National Manpower Commission, annual report 1991]

Persons trained in various programmes: 1990 and 1991^a

Type of training

1990

1991

Artisan training

Apprentices

24 448

26 714

Trainees enrolled

389

349

In-service training

Regional training centres

31 650

24 160

Private training centres and training schemes

251 094

262 511

Training schemes where levies apply

19 686

13 475

Training schemes on industrial councils

17 640

9 185

Training of unemployed and workseekers

169 415

160 555

Total

514 322

496 949

a

For the period 1 November 1989 to 31 October 1990 and 1 November 1990 to 31 Oct

Apprentices

According to figures provided by the Department of Manpower in its 1991 annual report, the number of new apprentices registered increased from 9 054 in 1990 to 10 758 in 1991, ie by 19%. The department said that this was encouraging as the indenturing of apprentices would have to be given even greater attention in the future in order to meet the increasing demand for trained manpower. During 1991 there was also an increase of 9% in the number of current contracts compared with 1990. However, there was a decline of 2% in the number of contracts completed in 1991.⁷³ [⁷³ Department of Manpower, annual report 1991] The NMC said that in 1984, 11 306 people had completed their contracts, compared with 6 987 in 1991. The NMC added that the following sectors had been responsible for the greatest number of declines in contracts since 1981: transport services, 70%; building industry, 64%; furniture industry, 40%; and metal industry, 13%. During the same period the following sectors experienced sustained increases: the printing industry, 41%; electricity supply, 34%; the mining industry, 14%; and the automobile industry, 9%.⁷⁴ [⁷⁴ National Manpower Commission, annual report 1991]

The following tables give a breakdown of the number of apprenticeships that were registered, in operation, completed and rescinded in 1990 and 1991.⁷⁵ [⁷⁵ Department of Manpower, annual report 1991]

Number of apprenticeship contracts registered and in operation: 1990 and 1991

Sector

Registered

In operation

1990

1991

1990

1991

Aerospace

234

259

550

501

Automobile manufacturing^a

169

187

408

499

Building

273

417

850

786

Diamond cutting

2

7

8

9

Electrical contracting industry

147

162

340

397

Electricity supply

200

225

382

453

Explosives and allied industries

73

126

266

266

Furniture

15

179

116

271

Government undertakings

208

202

489

476

Hairdressing

464

335

876

695

Jewellers and goldsmith

49

63

92

127

Local authority undertakings

1

566

94

574

Metal engineering

1 942

3 911

8 202

9 567

Mining

1 987

880

4 523

3 929

Motor

2 231

1 855

4 867

5 033

Printing

499

422

1 182

1 236

Sugar manufacturing

23

43

126

119

Transnet

500

907

989

1 704

Tyre and rubber manufacturing

37

12

88

72

Total

9 054

10 758

24 448

26 714

a

Port Elizabeth and th

Number of apprenticeship contracts completed and rescinded: 1990 and 1991

Sector

Completed

Rescinded

1990

1991

1990

1991

Aerospace

225

299

24

9

Automobile manufacturing^a

83

73

8

23

Building

262

442

26

39

Diamond cutting

10

5

1

1

Electrical contracting industry

74

82

15

23

Electricity supply

129

115

27

39

Explosives and allied industries

123

118

14

8

Furniture

18

15

18

9

Government undertakings

191

189

18

26

Hairdressing

376

391

109

125

Jewellers and goldsmith

21

22

8

6

Local authority undertakings

34

82

1

4

Metal engineering

2 052

2 067

238

479

Mining

1 959

1 326

236

148

Motor

940

1 222

188

467

Printing

261

310

53

58

Sugar manufacturing

50

45

3

5

Transnet

304

162

37

30

Tyre and rubber manufacturing

20

22

3

6

Total

7 132

6 987

1 027

1 505

a

Port Elizabeth and the

Productivity

The National Productivity Institute (NPI) compiled the following figures on productivity in South Africa (including the ten homelands) in various years from 1970 to 1990:⁷⁶ [76 National Productivity Institute, *Productivity Statistics 1991*, June 1991]

Productivity indices in the private sector (excluding agriculture): 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990

Year

Capital productivity

Labor productivity

Multifactor productivity^a

1970

157,2

95,8

116,1

1975

132,2

94,9

108,9

1980

17,9

99,6

108,9

1985

100,0

100,0

100,0

1990

98,9

104,5

101,7

a

Capital and labour indices are combined to give an aggregate labour and capital input index which is the

multifactor input in

Multifactor productivity declined at an average annual rate of 0,7% between 1970 and 1990 and by 0,9% between 1989 and 1990. Labour productivity increased marginally at an average annual rate of 0,5% over the 20-year period but declined by 0,1% between 1989 and 1990. Capital productivity also declined by 1,8% over the 20-year period and by an average of 2,4% annually between 1970 and 1990. The cost of labour per unit in the private sector (excluding agriculture) increased by an average annual rate of 13,4% in the 20-year period and by 15,6% between 1989 and 1990.⁷⁷ [⁷⁷ Ibid] The average annual growth rate of unit labour costs in manufacturing for South Africa between 1985 and 1990 was 14,4%, compared with -1% for Japan, -0,2% for the United States and -0,1% for France. According to the National Manpower Commission (NMC), the disparity between increases in average salaries and wages and labour productivity had raised the unit labour costs of production and reduced South Africa's ability to compete, which made the creation of new employment opportunities 'virtually impossible'.⁷⁸ [⁷⁸ National Manpower Commission, annual report 1991]

According to the NPI, South Africa's negative rate of capital productivity implied an inefficient use of scarce resources.⁷⁹ [⁷⁹ *Business Day* 18 February 1992] The executive director of the NPI, Mr Jan Visser, said in March 1992 that higher productivity would create more job opportunities in the long term because it would lead to more competitive prices and to a greater demand for the products and services provided by more productive organisations.⁸⁰ [⁸⁰ Ibid 26 March 1992]

In its 1991 annual report the NMC said that productivity improvement as a determinant of economic growth did not receive enough attention in South Africa. The NMC cautioned that a more equitable distribution of wealth in a future political and economic system was not possible unless improved productivity could stimulate growth.⁸¹ [⁸¹ National Manpower Commission, annual report 1991]

Income

Income levels

In March 1992 the African household subsistence levels (HSLs) for Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Pretoria were R780,07, R787.26, R825.55, R809.22 and R798.77 respectively. These figures represented an average increase of 6,7% on figures for September 1991. The average HSLs for coloured people in these areas in March 1992 were R787.82, R964.21, R922.55, R852,30 and R943,05 respectively. These figures represented an average increase of 9,1% on figures for September 1991.⁸² [⁸² University of Port Elizabeth, Institute for Planning Research, *The Household Subsistence Level in the Major Urban Centres of the RSA - March 1992*, Fact Paper no 92, April 1992]

HSLs for 1990 and 1991 for an African family of six and a coloured family of five, as calculated by the Institute for Planning Research at the University of Port Elizabeth, are shown in the tables below:⁸³ [83
 University of Port Elizabeth, Institute for Planning Research, *The Household Subsistence Level in the Major Urban Centres of the Republic of South Africa - September 1991*, Fact Paper no 89, October 1991]

Household subsistence levels for Africans: 1990 and 1991

Centre

September 1990

September 1991

R/month

R/month

Increase

Benoni

625,13

730,41

16,8%

Bloemfontein

651,86

714,32

9,6%

Boksburg

590,03

767,10

30,0%

Brakpan

649,99

734,11

12,9%

Brits

614,84

748,08

21,7%

Cape Town

603,72

725,79

20,2%

Durban

593,36

743,50

25,3%

East London

577,70

698,26

20,9%

George

590,30

692,98

17,4%

Germiston

628,18

741,47

18,0%

Johannesburg

624,98

760,60

21,7%

Kimberley

652,07

808,57

24,0%

King William's Town

557,64

670,50

20,2%

Krugersdorp

599,08

711,29

18,7%

Mossel Bay

627,09

668,63

6,6%

Peddie

554,44

629,64

13,6%

Pietermaritzburg

577,03

677,65

17,4%

Port Elizabeth

621,02

757,69

22,0%

Pretoria

596,28

716,86

20,2%

Queenstown

551,34

716,26

29,9%

Springs

627,72

731,27

16,5%

Uitenhage

589,97

740,15

25,5%

Umtata

620,94

759,06

22,2%

Vaal Triangle

599,27

702,76

17,3%

Household subsistence levels for coloured people: 1990 and 1991

Centre

September 1990

September 1991

R/month

R/month

Increase

Bloemfontein

661,97

816,49

23,3%

Cape Town

647,54

710,04

9,7%

Durban

714,61

834,10

16,7%

East London

686,70

788,46

14,8%

George

627,00

734,42

17,1%

Johannesburg

755,75

839,54

11,1%

Kimberley

722,96

799,38

10,6%

King William's Town

611,74

678,18

10,9%

Mossel Bay

615,80

698,79

13,5%

Port Elizabeth

730,07

773,68

6,0%

Pretoria

800,50

888,36

11,0%

Queenstown

673,22

769,

A survey was conducted by the South African Advertising Research Foundation between February 1990 and January 1991 in which a sample of 22 537 urban and rural Africans, coloured people, Indians and whites were interviewed. The survey, which was part of the All Media and Products Survey (AMPS), found that the average monthly household income of Africans, coloured people, Indians and whites was R779, R1 607, R2 476 and R4 679 respectively. The average household income of these race groups

increased by 17,7%, 25,6%, 23,5% and 19% respectively between 1989/90 and 1990/91. The table below gives the AMPS breakdown of monthly household income according to race group:⁸⁴ [84 All Media and Products Survey, *AMPS '91 and Trends 1986 -1991*, September 1991]

Monthly household income: 1991^a

Income group

African

Coloured

Indian

White

R/month

proportion

proportion

proportion

proportion

1–399

36,1%

17,5%

4,1%

1,5%

400–699

22,0%

13,8%

5,6%

3,0%

700–1 199

25,8%

21,8%

19,9%

6,0%

1 200–1 999

9,1%

20,5%

20,5%

9,5%

2 000–2 499

3,1%

7,4%


11,2%

8,1%

2 500–3 999

2,6%

10,4%



As figures have been rounded, columns may not add up to 100%.

A survey carried out by the Human Sciences Research Council in September 1991 revealed that about 70% of Africans, 76% of coloured people, 63% of Indians and 75% of whites believed that their household income was lagging behind the inflation rate, and 20%, 18%, 29% and 21% respectively thought it was 'keeping pace' with the inflation rate, while 10%, 5%, 7% and 4% respectively said that their household income was 'outstripping' the inflati

Regional disparities

According to the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), there were significant disparities in the population's share in the production of each region in 1990. Personal income as a percentage of gross geographic product (ie the proportion of production in the region which was retained by the

inhabitants of the region as income) in the development regions in 1985 was as follows: region A, 93%; region B, 87%; region C, 68%; region D, 90%; region E, 88%; region F, 41%; region G, 88%; region H, 77%; and region J, 55%. The DBSA said that regions C, F and J had low income to GGP ratios because of large mining sectors which saw an outflow of revenue to companies in other regions. Thus, although production in those regions may have increased, the inhabitants of the region were not correspondingly wealthier. Regions D, E and G had high ratios because they were net suppliers of migrant workers who remitted a large part of their income to families in these regions. The DBSA added that regions with large manufacturing sectors (regions A, D and E) also recorded high income to GGP ratios.⁸⁶ [⁸⁶ DBSA, *South Africa: An inter-regional profile*, 1991]

Wages

According to the Actual Wage Rates Database of the Labour Research Service (LRS), the commercial sector achieved an average wage increase of 22% in the period July to December 1991. Average wages in the paper sector increased by 22% during the same period, while the wages of workers in municipalities increased by an average of 21%. The LRS said that the average wage set in 128 bargaining units (excluding local authorities and mining) was R214,05 in July to December 1991. If local authorities and mining were included the average wage would drop to R 151,33.⁸⁷ [⁸⁷ *South African Labour Bulletin* March/April 1992]

The average wage increase for artisans between July 1990 and June 1991 was 17,4%, which was lower than the average wage increase of 20,7% for labourers during the same period. Over the same period artisans in the iron and steel production sector won increases of 19,6%, followed by artisans in building and building products with increases of 18,6%; auto manufacturing, 18,4%; transport, 18,1%; the motor industry, 17%; mining, 15,7%; local authorities, 15,6%; electrical industry 14,9%; and metal products, 14,2%. The inflation rate for this period was 14,5%.⁸⁸ [⁸⁸ *Ibid* January 1992, pp89-90]

According to the industrial relations consultancy, Andrew Levy and Associates, the average level of wage settlement in 1991 was 16,1%, significantly below the average of 17,4% in 1990. The average settlement level in 1991 was the lowest since 1986 when it was 15,5%. The consultancy added that the average wage settlement level for the last six months of 1991 was 15,3%, an indication of the basis of expectations for 1992. It said that 1991 figures did not include wage settlements in the mining industry, where the low basic settlement level was not indicative of actual wage movements in the industry caused by supplementary earnings triggered by performance and productivity.⁸⁹ [⁸⁹ Andrew Levy and Associates, *Annual Report on Labour Relations in South Africa 1991-1992*, 1991, pp29-30]

According to the consultancy's *Bargainers' Bulletin*, real wages increased by 3,1% in 1989 and by 2,9% in 1990. However, in 1991 real wages increased by only 0,3%.⁹⁰ [⁹⁰ Andrew Levy and Associates, *Bargainers' Bulletin* February 1992]

The consultancy said in June 1992 that the national settlement rate in the period January to May 1992 was

15,9%. It predicted an average 13% to 14% wage settlement for 1992.⁹¹ [⁹¹ *Business Day* 15 June 1992]

The South African Reserve Bank said in June 1992 that the rate of increase in the average monthly salaries of workers declined from 18% in 1989 to 16,9% in 1990 and 15,4% in 1991. The increase in wages in the private sector was 16,3% in 1989, 16,6% in 1990 and 14,9% in 1991. Nominal salaries in the private sector increased by 15,7% in 1991 compared with a high of 21,9% in 1989. The bank said the increase in average wages in the public sector was higher than increases in the private sector for the third consecutive year. Average real wage increases in the non-agricultural sectors declined from 2,9% in 1989 to 2,2% in 1990 and remained at 2,2% in 1991.⁹² [⁹² South African Reserve Bank, *Quarterly Bulletin* June 1992]

According to a survey published by Kelly Personnel in April 1992, starting salaries in the period July to December 1991 did not keep pace with inflation. The survey said that salaries in Johannesburg remained the highest in the country, followed closely by those on the east and west Rand. The lowest starting salaries were recorded in the eastern Cape, where salaries were on average 24% lower than in Johannesburg.⁹³ [⁹³ *The Natal Witness* 30 April 1992]

A survey by the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa of minimum monthly wages in different sectors in March 1992 showed that the minimum monthly wage in the motor industry was the highest, with Volkswagen paying R1 499 a month and the Delta Motor Corporation R1 153 a month. In the steel and engineering industry the highest payer was Kolbenco (R1 044 a month). In the liquor sector The South African Breweries paid R1 410 a month, while Gilbey Distillers and Vintners and the Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery both paid a minimum wage of R1 048. Nedbank paid the highest minimum wage in the banking sector (R900) and Checkers was highest in the retailing sector with R910.⁹⁴ [⁹⁴ *Business Day* 24 March 1992, *Eastern Province Herald* 25 March 1992]

Wage gap

There was no significant narrowing of the ratio of average earnings of whites and blacks between 1990 and 1991. Figures provided by the Central Statistical Service (CSS) showed that the ratios of average real earnings of whites and Africans in the construction sector in 1991 was 4,7:1, compared with 4,5:1 in 1990 and 5:1 in 1989. The ratios of average real earnings of whites and coloured people and whites and Indians in the construction sector were 3,1:1 and 1,8:1 in 1990 respectively and 3,4:1 and 2,1:1 in 1991 respectively.⁹⁵ [⁹⁵ CSS, *Labour Statistics: Employment and Salaries and Wages: Mining and Quarrying, Manufacturing, Construction and Electricity: June 1991*, Statistical News Release, P0242.1,2 September 1991]

The average ratio of white to African and Indian earnings in the finance sector remained constant in 1990 and 1991 at 2,1:1, and 1,4:1 respectively, with only the ratio of white to coloured people declining

from 1,8:1 in 1990 to 1,7:1 in 1991.⁹⁶ [96 CSS, *Labour Statistics: Employment and Salaries and Wages: Building Societies, Banking Institutions and insurance Companies: June 1991*, Statistical News Release, P0262, 4 September 1991]

The ratio of white to African earnings in the manufacturing sector increased from 3,4:1 in 1990 to 3,6:1 in 1991, while the ratio of white to coloured earnings remained unchanged at 3,2:1 and the ratio of white to Indian earnings declined from 2,3:1 in 1990 to 2,2:1 in 1991.⁹⁷ [97 CSS, *Labour Statistics: Employment and Salaries and Wages: Mining and Quarrying Manufacturing, Construction and Electricity: June 1991*, Statistical News Release, P0242.1, 2 September 1991]

The ratio of average earnings of whites and Africans and whites and coloured people in the trade and catering sector declined from 3,4:1 and 2,6:1 in 1990 to 3,1:1 and 2,5:1 in 1991 respectively. The ratio of average earnings of whites and Indians remained constant at 1,8:1.⁹⁸ [98 CSS, *Labour Statistics: Employment and Salaries and Wages: Wholesale, Retail and Motor Trade and Hotels: June 1991*, Statistical News Release, P0244, 14 November 1991]

The ratio of average earnings of whites and Africans in the public sector was 2,5:1 in 1991. The ratio of earnings of whites and coloured people was 2:1 and the ratio of earnings of whites and Indians was 1,3:1 in 1991.⁹⁹ [99 CSS, *Employment and Salaries and Wages: Public Sector: June 1991*, Statistical News Release, P0251, 4 November 1991]

According to the National Manpower Commission (NMC), the average real annual change in earnings of Africans in the non-primary sectors between 1980 and 1990 was 2,8%, while that of coloured people, Indians and whites was 1,9%, 2,3% and 0,1% respectively. In 1985 Africans in these sectors earned 27,5% of the earnings of whites, while this had increased to 33,2% in 1990. Coloured people earned 36,3% and 40,4% of the earnings of whites in 1985 and 1990 respectively and Indians 49,9% and 55,5% of the earnings of whites in 1985 and 1990. The NMC said that the wage gap between race groups would continue to narrow because of the greater utilisation of Africans in higher- and middle-level positions, the sustained elimination of wage discrimination, better opportunities for education and training, and the abolition of discriminatory legislation.¹⁰⁰ [100 National Manpower Commission, annual report 1991]

Earnings per sector

The average monthly salaries and wages per race group in the private sector in June 1991 and the actual and constant percentage changes over June 1990 were as follows (decreases are indicated in

brackets).¹⁰¹ [101 CSS, Statistical News Releases as follows: *Labour Statistics: Employment and Salaries and Wages: Building Societies, Banking Institutions and Insurance Companies: June 1991*, P0262,4 September 1991, *Labour Statistics: Employment and Salaries and Wages: Mining and Quarrying, Manufacturing, Construction and Electricity: June 1991*, P0242.1, 2 September 1991; *Labour Statistics: Employment and Salaries and Wages: Wholesale, Retail and Motor Trade and Hotels: June 1991*, P0244,14 November 1991]

Average monthly salaries and wages for the private sector for June 1991

Construction

Finance

Manufacturing

Trade and catering

African^a

R/month

771

1 743

1 056

878

Change

13,9

18,9%

5,4

25,2%

Real change

(1,0%)

34,4%

(8,4%)

9,0%

Coloured^b

R/month

1 076

2 095

1 187

1 107

Change

9,9

20,2%

11,7%

19,9%

Real change

(5,1%)

3,8%

(3,6%)

3,6%

Indian^b

R/month

1 757

2 546

1 727

1 552

Change

4,6%

16,7%

17,3%

16,4%

Real change

(9,7%)

0,8%

1,3%

0,5%

White^c

R/month

3 593

3 630

3 793

2 753

Change

17,1%

18,6%

10,9%

15,7%

Real change

1,5%

2,8%

(3,8%)

0,4%

Total^d

R/month

1 169

3 137

1 725

1 571

Change

15,3%

18,3%

10,0%

18,7%

Real change

0,0%

2,6%

(4,6%)

2,9%

a

Lower-income group consumer price index (CPI) used

b

Middle-income group CPI used

c

Higher-income group CPI used

d

All items CPI used

The CSS provided a weighted average of expenditure per month on domestic workers' wages per household in urban areas. In real terms average expenditure increased by 3,4% between 1989 and 1990
The breakdown of

Weighted average of expenditure per month on domestic workers' wages^a per household in urban areas: 1989 and 1990

1989

1990

R

R

Cash wage

133,86

138,31

Food

41,97

43,83

Quarters

15,81

16,19

Other goods and services

7,45

7,49

Total

199,09

205,82

a

At constant 1990 prices, using the CPI for the lower-income group

The average monthly salaries and wages per race group in the public sector for June 1991 and the actual and constant percentage changes over June 1990 were as follows (decreases are indicated in brackets):¹⁰³ [103 CSS, Employment and Salaries and Wages: Public Sector: June 1991, Statistical News Release, P0251, 4 November 1991]

Average monthly salaries and wages for the public sector for June 1991

Central government

Provincial administration

Local authorities

Post and telecommunications

Transnet

African^a

R/month

1 172

1 203

1 013

1 232

1 265

Change

9,8%

5,8%

26,9%

37,9%

4,6%

Real change

(4,5%)

(8,0%)

10,4%

19,9%

(9,0%)

Coloured^b

R/month

1 876

1 517

1 477

1 565

1 261

change

6,8%

22,1%

26,5%

42,5%

4,3%

Real change

(78%)

5,5%

9,2%

23,1%

(9,9%)

Indian^b

R/month

2 719

2 192

2 032

2 485

1 238

Change

9,0%

1,5%

19,0%

29,2%

2,5%

Real change

(5,9%)

(12,4%)

2,8%

11,6%

(11,5%)

White^c

R/month

2 979

2 366

3 980

2 826

4 545

Change

0,2%

0,7%

17,4%

26,3%

13,5%

Real change

13,1%

(12,7%)

1,9%

9,6%

(1,5%)

Total^d

R/month

2 314

1 649

1 918

2 191

2 746

Change

3,5%

4,9%

22,5%

29,5%

12,0%

Real change

(10,2%)

(9,0%)

6,3%

12,3%

(2,9%)

a

Lower-income group CPI used

b

Middle-income group CPI used

c

Higher-income group

Average monthly salaries and wages for the public sector for June 1991 (continued)

Civil services for non-independent homelands^a

Public corporations

Parastatal institutions

Agricultural marketing boards

Staff of universities and technikons

African^b

R/month

1 565

1 065

672

863

1 374

Change

15,1%

6,4%

(2,9%)

7,3%

12,3%

Real change

0,1%

(7,5%)

(15,6%)

(6,7%)

(2,4%)

Coloured^c

R/month

—

1 763

1 138

847

1 747

Change

—

25,7%

(1,6%)

(1,7%)

5,6%

Real change

—

8,6%

(15,0%)

(15,2%)

(8,8%)

Indian^c

R/month

—

3 033

2 114

2 125

2 808

Change

—

22,4%

10,0%

26,9%

6,9%

Real change

—

5,7%

(5,3%)

9,6%

(7,7%)

White^d

R/month

—

4 114

3 902

3 736

4 184

Change

—

7,2%

(1,0%)

(2,5%)

(1,8%)

Real change

—

(7,0%)

(14,2%)

(15,4%)

(14,8%)

Total^e

R/month

1 565

2 445

2 255

2 681

3 118

Change

15,1%

6,5%

1,6%

(2,5%)

1,3%

Real change

0,1%

(7,6%)

(11,9%)

(15,4%)

(12,2%)

a

Coloured, Indian and white civil servants were paid by the South African government and were, therefore, not recorded under the non-independent homelands.

b

Lower-income group CPI used

c

Middle-income group CPI used

d

Higher-income group CPI use

Poverty

According to the director of the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit at the University of Cape Town, Professor Francis Wilson, poverty had four components: race, geography, age and gender. Poverty was most likely to be encountered among Africans living in rural areas. Most poorer people were young or very old and usually women. Professor Wilson emphasised that poverty concerned not only income but also dirty drinking water, high infant mortality rates and poor housing. He added that poverty was not restricted to Africans. The removal of the colour bar which had protected whites from competition in the job market and the stagnating economy had led to an increase in the number of whites with few means of survival.¹⁰⁴ [¹⁰⁴ *Monitor* October 1991]

According to the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), more than 200 000 whites (10% of the white economically active population) were without a formal job in 1991.¹⁰⁵ [¹⁰⁵ *Sowetan* 18 June 1992] The Foundation for Research Development (FRD) estimated in March 1992 that about 66% of the African population and 50% of the total population of South Africa lived below the poverty datum line. In rural areas almost 80% of the African population lived below the poverty datum line.¹⁰⁶ [¹⁰⁶ *Ibid* 25 March 1992]

The executive director of Operation Hunger, Mrs Ina Periman, predicted a winter of 'maximum deprivation' in 1992.¹⁰⁷ [¹⁰⁷ *Ibid* 23 April 1992, *The Star* 7 May 1992]

Since the drought there had been an increase in the number of people needing nutritional assistance, according to the deputy director of Operation Hunger, Mrs Norma Cohen. Furthermore, during 1992 most of the 1,8m people who had previously received partial assistance from Operation Hunger had begun to require total assistance, she said.¹⁰⁸ [¹⁰⁸ *The Citizen* 6 March 1992, *The Star* 7 May 1992]

Mrs Perlman told the Africa subcommittee of the United States Congress in May 1992 that although South Africa would be able to import enough maize to meet the shortfall in its harvest, up to 2,5m destitute people would not be able to afford to buy it. She added that Operation Hunger required about R9m a month to feed about 2,2m people.¹⁰⁹ [¹⁰⁹ *The Star* 7 May 1992] Mrs Perlman suggested in April 1992 that one way of pre-empting rural starvation would be to introduce a minimum wage for farm labourers.¹¹⁰ [¹¹⁰ *Ibid* 22 April 1992]

In May 1992 the Independent Development Trust earmarked R100m for short- and medium-term projects to relieve poverty in drought-affected areas (see also chapter on *Land and Agriculture*).¹¹¹ [¹¹¹ *Business Day* 1 June 1992] In 1991/92 the Department of Foreign Affairs allocated R10m to the 'independent' homelands for poverty relief. The non-independent homelands received R14m over the same period.¹¹² [¹¹² *Sowetan* 20 May 1992]

The minister of national health, Dr Rina Venter, announced in June 1992 that only R125m of the R660m allocated to the nutritional development programme since 1991 had been spent. Mr Brian Goodall MP (Democratic Party) said in the same month that South Africa faced an unprecedented food crisis which could exacerbate violence in urban areas. He added that the crisis would be aggravated by growing unemployment and the concomitant inability of African families to pay for food.¹¹³ [¹¹³ *Business Day* 4 June 1992]

Criticising the government's poverty relief programme, the African National Congress said in January 1992 that, while in 1991/92 the government would collect R420m as a result of value added tax on basic foodstuffs, it had provided only R220m for relief in 1991/92.¹¹⁴ [¹¹⁴ *The Weekly Mail* 24 January 1992]

The president of the National Black Consumer Union, Mrs Nonia Ramphomane, said in June 1992 that the 20% increase in the price of maize meal forecast by Foodcorp, which would follow an increase of 40% earlier in 1992, would make the staple food of most Africans unaffordable. The price of bread and sorghum was also expected to increase by more than 45% and oil seed by about 30% during the course of 1992. The drought and the necessity of importing many basic foodstuffs was one reason given for the increases.¹¹⁵ [¹¹⁵ *Sowetan* 4 June 1992] The prices of brown bread and maize meal were reported to have increased by 553% and 490% respectively during the period 1980 to 1992, while the overall inflation rate had increased by only 367%.¹¹⁶ [¹¹⁶ *Sunday Star* 3 May 1992]

Regional disparities

Poverty is closely related to the high population growth in South Africa (see also chapter on *Population*). The greatest poverty and lowest living standards in South Africa were found in the rural areas, according to a special report in *The Star* in July 1992. In February 1992 the chairman of the drought crisis committee, Mr Willie Lewies, said that between 1,5m and 2,5m farm labourers and their families in the Transvaal faced hunger as a result of the drought. A field co-ordinator of Operation Hunger, Mr Anthony Mfila, said in the same month that about 55% of children in the Orange Free State between the ages of five and 15 years were malnourished.¹¹⁷ [¹¹⁷ *The Star* 17 February 1992] It was reported in May 1992 that entire communities in Lebowa were without water as most boreholes had dried up and hunger was rife owing to unemployment and crop failures.¹¹⁸ [¹¹⁸ *Ibid* 20 May 1992]

While determining regional variations in poverty is difficult, an indication may be derived from the dependency ratios of the development regions provided by the DBSA for 1990. Dependency ratios indicate the number of people supported by every economically active person. The northern Transvaal (region G) had the highest dependency ratio of 4.8:1 in 1990, followed by the eastern Cape (region D) at 3,1:1 and Natal/KwaZulu (region E) at 2,8:1. Region H (Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging) had the

lowest dependency ratio of 1,1:1. However, within the development regions, the homelands had much higher dependency ratios than the non-homeland areas. The area of Bophuthatswana in region B had a dependency ratio of 8.3:1, while the parts of Bophuthatswana in region C (Orange Free State) had a ratio of 3,4:1, in region H (PWV), 3,1:1; and in region J (western Transvaal), 3,5:1. The Ciskei's dependency ratio was 4:1. Gazankulu had the highest dependency ratio in the country (8,4:1), although this figure was less than its dependency ratio in 1980 (9,7:1). KaNgwane's ratio was 4,1:1, while that of KwaNdebele was 5,6:1. KwaZulu had a dependency ratio of 3,9:1, Lebowa, 6,2:1; and QwaQwa, 5,1:1. Southern Transkei in region D had a dependency ratio of 7.3:1, lower than the dependency ratio of northern Transkei in region E, which was 8,3:1. Venda had a dependency ratio of 5,4:1 although this had declined considerably from its 1980 figure of 10,6:1.¹¹⁹ [119 DBSA, *Labour and Employment in South Africa: A Regional Profile 1980-1990*, September 1991]

The 'underclass'

According to Professor Wilson, problems such as the erosion of social structures (ie the family) and the high level of violence could all be traced to poverty and the overcrowding, unemployment and frustration that accompanied poverty.¹²⁰ [120 Monitor October 1991]

In a paper delivered at a Joint Enrichment Project workshop in June 1991, a deputy vice chancellor of the University of Cape Town, Dr Mamphela Ramphele, said that communities undergoing social disintegration displayed the following behavioural patterns: low job participation with both high unemployment and high rates of unemployability; high alcohol and drug abuse; low performance in all spheres of life, including school education and skills training; high crime rates and endemic violence at all levels of social interaction; and despair and acceptance of the 'victim image'. Dr Ramphele said that a similar phenomenon had been observed among blacks in the United States and had been characterised as an emergence of an 'underclass'. She believed that in South Africa this phenomenon was threatening to affect the majority of South Africans, making it thus a mainstream trend. The system of apartheid had ensured that high unemployment affected mainly those who had been disadvantaged and denied education, training and other essential resources for successful economic performance.

According to Dr Ramphele, poverty, overcrowding, migrant labour and a general sense of worthlessness had weakened the ability of the family to face the challenge of coping with politicised and rebellious youth or the 'lost generation', as it had become known. She added that in a society where self-esteem and respect for human dignity had been compromised, short-term gains might become the norm at the expense of long-term prospects. Furthermore, the criminalising of family life and of the right to seek employment, which occurred under the pass laws, had diminished respect for the law among those disadvantaged by such policies. Despair in both urban and rural areas was compelling many people to abuse alcohol and drugs to 'dull the pain of humiliation and hopelessness'. The 'victim-image' and the culture of entitlement posed a serious problem for the future, Dr Ramphele believed, as this attitude legitimated irresponsibility. Social disintegration and the concomitant increase in the 'underclass' was compounded by poor and inadequate housing, deteriorating public services and the shrinking job

market.¹²¹ [¹²¹ Ibid]

According to the FRD's report on rural poverty, published in March 1992, science and technology had a major role to play, together with education and training, in ameliorating the impact of poverty on rural communities and in empowering people to solve their problems.¹²² [¹²² *Sowetan* 25 March 1992]

Key Projections

- The National Manpower Commission (NMC) estimated that by the year 2000 the economically active population (EAP) would increase to 17,6m, 74% of whom would be African and 14% white.
- The NMC projected that the EAP of South Africa (including the ten homelands) was expected to increase at an annual rate of 2,7% between 1990 and 1995, and at 2,8% between 1995 and the year 2000.
- The International Labour Organisation predicted in May 1992 that by the year 2005, 57% of South Africa's EAP would be either out of work or would have to find jobs in the informal sector.
- The South African Chamber of Business expected unemployment to increase between June 1992 and June 1993 as the recession began to affect industrial production.
- The Bureau of Market Research at the University of South Africa predicted an annual growth in the labour force of 450 000 from 1990 to 2000 and an annual growth of 510 000 from 2000 to 2005.
- At an annual growth rate of 1%, 46% of the EAP in 1995 would have no formal jobs, while a 3% annual growth rate would leave 38% of the EAP unemployed.
- If South Africa received about 1m tourists in 1995, 150 000 new jobs could be created, according to the minister for administration and tourism, Dr Org Marais. Eskom's mass electrification programme could create more than 500 000 jobs by 1997, according to the chairman of Eskom, Mr John Maree.
- The chief executive of Damelin College, Mr Johan Brummer, said in January 1992 that South Africa would need about 500 000 new managers by the year 2000.

HOUSING AND URBANISATION

Key points

- The De Loor task group estimated that in 1990, 63% of the population of South Africa (including the ten homelands) was urbanised.

- According to the BMI Building Research Consulting Unit, only 2 700 ‘affordable’ formal houses (costing less than R65 000) were built in 1991.
- The National Housing Forum was formally launched in August 1992 to develop a national housing accord. The forum was seen as the start of the process which would enable the provision of houses to increase once agreement among the various interest groups had been established.
- Estimates of the number of people living in informal settlements and backyard shacks in 1992 ranged from 3,5m to 10m.
- The De Loor task group recommended that the government should increase expenditure on housing from 3% to 5% of gross domestic product.
- The government made available R1,6bn in the 1992/93 budget for housing and related infrastructure, which represented a decrease of 8% in real terms compared to the previous year.
- The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development argued that the government should implement an ‘enabling policy framework’ for housing and suggested that life offices should make more resources available than previously for low-income housing.
- In 1992 there were approximately 604 000 beds in hostels in South Africa. However, the Congress of South African Trade Unions estimated that in some hostels there were as many as six residents per hostel bed.
- In 1992 Eskom generated 95% of all electricity used in South Africa (including the homelands). However, an estimated 23m black people had no access to domestic electricity.
- The Development Bank of Southern Africa estimated that in 1992 some 20% of the population (4m people) had a minimal water supply and 33% (7m people) had minimal sanitation.
- The government allocated R2,3bn for roads in the 1992/93 budget despite the Department of Transport’s estimate that R4,5bn was required.
- While the taxi industry continued to capture the largest share of African commuters in 1991, its share of the African commuter market declined from 44% in 1990 to 42% in 1991.

Urbanisation

Statistics

The Urban Foundation estimated in February 1992 that the number of people living in the metropolitan areas of South Africa would more than double by 2010. The Cape Town and Port Elizabeth metropolitan areas were expected to experience population growth of 5% a year, making them the fastest growing areas in the country. The Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging (PWV) area, however, was expected to contain by far the largest concentration of people in the country by 2010 (13,4m). The estimated African population of metropolitan areas in 1990 and 2010 is given below:¹ [¹ *Financial Mail* 21 February 1992]

Estimated African population in metropolitan areas: 1990 and 2010

Metropolitan area

Population

Annual growth

1990

2010

Bloemfontein

382 600

786 700

4,0%

Cape Town

570 000

1 343 100

5,0%

Durban

2 063 200

4 513 400

4,4%

East London

342 800

687 400

3,8%

OFS^a goldfields

470 000

861 800

3,2%

Pietermaritzburg

338 700

648 900

3,5%

Port Elizabeth

580 000

1 366 500

5,0%

PWV^b

6 280 200

13 436 800

4,3%

Total

11 027 500

23 644 600

4,3%

a

Orange Free State

b

Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging

The De Loor task group, which had been set up under the chairmanship of a former auditor general, Dr Joop de Loor, to provide recommendations to the government on the formulation of a new housing policy, published its report in April 1992. The task group estimated that approximately 63% of the population of South Africa (including the ten homelands) was urbanised in 1990. The urbanised population was believed to total 22m people in 1990 and was expected to increase to nearly 33m or some 75% of the total population by 2000. The rural population was expected to decline slightly from 16m in 1990 to 15m in 2000.² [2 De Loor task group on national housing policy and strategy, *Housing in South Africa: Proposals on a policy and strategy*, April 1992]

The total urban population of South Africa (including the ten homelands) is given below:

Total urban population: 1990–2000

Race

Urbanised in 1990

Urbanised in 2000

African

13 357 000

23 228 000

Coloured

2 923 000

3 417 000

Indian

992 000

1 130 000

White

4 995 000

5 194 000

Total

22 2

Regional data

Durban/Pietermaritzburg

The director of the Centre for Social and Development Studies at the University of Natal (Durban), Professor Simon Bekker, said in 1992 that the largest urban concentration in the KwaZulu/Natal region was the Durban/Pietermaritzburg axis, whose population grew between 1980 and 1985 by 6% a year. The area was home to approximately 4m people, according to Professor Bekker, of whom half could be classified as 'have-nots' living in informal settlements located on the peri-urban fringe. More than half of the population of KwaZulu/Natal was urbanised and more than half of the population would be living in the Durban functional region alone by the year 2000. Black youth made up a large proportion of the urban population. Moreover, blacks represented some 75% of the total urban population of the KwaZulu/

Natal region. Professor Bekker pointed out, however, that the rate of urbanisation was slowing down.³ [³ *Indicator South Africa* autumn 1992]

Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging

In February 1992 the Department of Regional and Land Affairs published a guide plan entitled *Spatial Development Framework for the Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging (PWV) Area*. The draft paper stated that in the near future certain parts of the PWV area would take on the appearance of cities in developing countries which are characterised by informal structures. The paper recommended more compact urban planning which would ensure that low-income settlements were as near as possible to work places.⁴ [⁴ *Finance Week* 5 March 1992] It stated that all suitable, unused and central land in the PWV area should be considered for affordable housing development. Such land would include:

- areas south of the Witwatersrand around the N1 motorway, the Johannesburg/Vereeniging railway and the Germiston/Vereeniging railway;
- parts of the mining belt which were no longer required for mining activity, stretching from Randfontein in the west to Brakpan in the east
- areas south of Boksburg, Brakpan and Springs:
- areas around Kempton Park, Midrand, Sandton and Verwoerdburg; and
- areas adjacent to the railway line between Mabopane/Soshanguve and Pretoria/Rosslyn.

In May 1992 the deputy minister for regional development, Mr André Fourie, said that the population of the PWV region would double in the next 20 years, mainly as a result of population growth. He added that about 60% of the expected population increase would be in the low-income group which lived mainly in informal housing.⁵ [⁵ *The Citizen* 19 May 1992]

Policy

The head of the Urban Problems Research Unit at the University of Cape Town, Ms Vanessa Watson, noted in 1991 that South Africa had no coherent approach to the management of its urban areas. She believed that a workable urban policy needed to be developed to prevent South African cities from becoming 'disaster cities' like Calcutta (India) and Lagos (Nigeria).⁶ [⁶ Watson V, 'Urbanisation policy. Lessons from South America for South Africa', *Social Dynamics*, 17 (2), 1991, pp155-167]

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (world bank) promotes the rejection of traditional 'spatial' urban policies (which target investment in, or regulations directed at, particular areas) in favour of 'space-blind' urban policies integrated with economic planning.⁷ [⁷ Rogerson C, 'Managing urban growth in South Africa: Learning from international experience', *South African Geographical Journal*, 71 (3), pp129-133] The Urban Foundation (UF) has adopted the world bank's urban policy proposals, arguing for a regional policy based on 'sound macro-economic sectoral policies' and regional development based on 'comparative advantage' (ie regions compete for investment).⁸ [⁸ Urban Foundation: Urban Debate 2010, no 3, *Regional Development Reconsidered*, 1990, Johannesburg]

Ms Watson argued, however, that to discard 'spatial' planning in South Africa, a country with extreme spatial inequality, would worsen the effects of uneven regional development. Ms Watson believed that future urbanisation policy should involve the restructuring of cities so as to increase the poor's access to urban services and opportunities.⁹ [⁹ Watson V, 'Urbanisation policy']

The general manager of the urban development group at the Development Bank of Southern Africa, Mr Johan Kruger, pointed out in January 1992 that previous urban policies had contributed to low densities and extensive urban sprawl, the combined effect of which had been destructive to the economy, the revenue base of local authorities and the individual. For example, an estimate of the economic cost associated with the location of Khayelitsha (Cape Town) was R2bn per year, of which a substantial portion was the cost of transport subsidies. Mr Kruger said that substantial savings could be made through innovative land rezoning and increasing urban densities. Increasing densities would contribute towards more effective use of land, transport systems and infrastructure; increase population thresholds to create and sustain markets for economic activities; and increase the access of low-income households to urban opportunities.

Mr Kruger argued that tax incentives should be introduced to ensure that unused or underused land and buildings were efficiently used, thereby promoting higher population densities.¹⁰ [¹⁰ *Housing in Southern Africa* January 1992]

The general secretary of the Civic Associations of Johannesburg, Mr Cas Coovadia, argued in February 1992 for land for the poor to be identified close to city centres, rather than on the outskirts of cities. Mr Coovadia said that the Transvaal Provincial Association's strategy of buying land to house the poor on the urban periphery, where land was cheaper, would prove to be more expensive in the long run in terms of transport costs.¹¹ [¹¹ *The Star* 15 February 1992]

The executive director of the UF, Ms Ann Bernstein, said that in a situation of rapid urbanisation with a large demand for land, a coherent regionally based urbanisation plan was essential.¹² [¹² *Ibid*] Ms

Bernstein added that the UF believed that the following elements were crucial to an adequate urban policy:¹³ [¹³ *New Nation I* February 1992]

- planning should be unconnected to race;
- all affected actors should be involved in the process of land identification for future settlement;
- land for low-income settlements should be obtained ahead of need; and
- legal mechanisms for conflict resolution of disputes regarding the use of land needed to be established.

Housing

Statistics

Supply

The table below illustrates the provision of formal houses by the private sector from 1986 to June 1991 in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands):¹⁴ [¹⁴ *Research for Marketing*, vol 8 no 2, 1991]

Formal houses completed by the private sector: 1986–June 1991

Year

African

Coloured

Indian

White

Total

1986

4 248

4 127

2 586

16 649

27 610

1987

7 330

5 493

2 795

17 443

33 061

1988

11 168

7 512

2 874

18 226

39 780

1989

12 067

8 521

3 377

15 301

39 266

1990

14 631

6 951

2 737

11 789

36 108

1991^a

4 364

2 744

1 016

6 094

14 218

a

By June 1991

A study undertaken in February 1992 by the BMI Building Research Consulting Unit on formal house building activities for all races during 1991, found that 101 formal builders interviewed had built approximately 10 000 houses in 1991. Only 27% of these houses were built at a cost of less than R65 000. The table below shows the proportion of formal houses built in 1991 in each price range:¹⁵ [15 BMI Building Research Strategy Consulting Unit, *Quarterly survey into the state of the home building industry*, February 1992]

Houses built in 1991 according to price

Cost of house

Proportion of houses built

Less than R12 500

3%

R12 500–R35 000

7%

R35 001–R65 000

17%

R65 001–R100 000

19%

R100 001–R175 000

24%

R175 001 and above

3

The study revealed that half of the builders surveyed had built fewer than 25 houses in 199 while 75% had built fewer than 100 houses in the same period. Some 7% of the builders surveyed experienced worse economic conditions for house building in 1991 than in 1990. The Transvaal experienced worse conditions during 1991 compared with 1990, while the eastern/western Cape and Natal/Orange Free State experienced marginally improved conditions. Of significance was the apparent withdrawal from the bottom end of the market of builders interviewed in the eastern and western Cape. Builders interviewed believed that the factors (in diminishing order of importance) inhibiting the provision of housing costing less than R65 000 were: current interest rates, political uncertainty, political unrest, bond boycotts and the limited availability of mortgage bonds.¹⁶ [¹⁶ Ibid]

Research published by two building economists, Messrs Wilsey Kilian and Johan Snyman, in April 1992 showed continued racial inequalities in terms of the number of houses completed, house values and the

quality of houses completed for each race group. Between 1986 and 1992 the value of the average house built and the number of houses completed for whites increased, while the average value and the number of houses built for Africans and coloured people declined. The average size of houses built for Africans and coloured people declined between 1986 and 1992 from 90 square metres to 55 square metres, and from 105 square metres to 70 square metres respectively. In contrast, the average size of a house built for whites increased from 150 square metres to 180 square metres over the same period.¹⁷ [¹⁷ Kilian W F and Snyman G J J, Medium-Term Forecasting Associates, *Housing trends: Biannual report on home building trends*, Stellenbosch, April 1992]

Research conducted by the Department of National Health and Population Development in early 1991 found that only 33% of the rural population of South Africa (excluding the ten homelands) had housing of an 'acceptable standard'. The research found that 42% of houses surveyed were structurally inadequate for health protection, while 50% of the rural population had inadequate sleeping space. The proportion of the rural population in each region occupying housing which provided adequate health protection was as follows:¹⁸ [¹⁸ Department of National Health and Population Development, *Health Trends in South Africa*, 1992]

Proportion of rural population occupying housing providing 'health protection': 1991

Region

Proportion of rural population

Eastern Cape

27%

Northern Cape

33%

Western Cape

52%

Natal

39%

Orange Free State

45%

Northern Transvaal

41%

Southern Transvaa

Stock

The Division of Building Technology at the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research was commissioned by the De Loor task group to determine the available housing stock in urban areas of South Africa. (The De Loor task group had been set up under the chairmanship of a former auditor general, Dr Joop de Loor, to provide recommendations to the government on the formulation of a new housing policy.) The results of the investigation are summarised below: ¹⁹ [19 De Loor task group. *Housing in South Africa*]

Housing stock in urban areas: mid 1990

Type of shelter

African

Coloured

Indian

White

Formal

Flats

32 931

42 267

35 522

431 871

Hostel beds

529 627

8 612

3 242

62 651

Houses

1 192 896

441 521

174 951

1 324 104

Sub-total

1 755 454

492 521

213 715

1 818 626

Informal

Backyard

354 670

30 104

1 812

133

Illegal^a

177 444

6 704

219

445

Legal

760 764

6 014

1 202

458

Vacant ser-vised sites

179 389

42 780

23 469

165 939

Sub-total

1 472 267

85 602

26 702

166 975

Total

3 227 721

578 123

240 417

1 985 601

a

Informally housed people who were settled illegally on property belonging to an

Shortages

According to the minister of local government and national housing and of public works, Mr Leon Wessels, in January 1992 the official housing backlog for Africans in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands) was 935 972 units. The shortage in the Cape totalled 235 885 units; in Natal, 238 205; in the Orange Free State, 73 991; and in the Transvaal, 387 891.²⁰ [²⁰ *Hansard* (A) 4 q cols 249-250, 24 February 1992]

¹ According to Mr Wessels, the Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging region had the greatest housing shortage (305 478 units), followed by KwaZulu/Natal (238 205 units), the western Cape (105 120 units) and the eastern Cape/Ciskei/Transkei (105 106 units).²¹ [²¹ *Hansard* (A) 4 q col 250, 24 February 1992]

Mr Wessels said in April 1992 that there was a misperception that there was no housing shortage for whites in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands). He said that 104 000 poor white families needed housing.²² [²² *Hansard* (A) 7 q cols 619-626, 1 April 1992]

¹ According to the minister of regional and land affairs, Mr Jacob de Villiers, by January 1992 there was a shortage of 8 400 units in Gazankulu, 700 000 in KwaZulu and 2 500 in OwaQwa.²³ [²³ *Hansard* (A) 3 q cols 61-62, 12 February 1992]

The public relations officer of the South African Housing Trust (SAHT), Mr Hennie Crowther, estimated that in January 1992 the housing backlog in the urban areas of South Africa (excluding the

‘independent’ homelands) was 1,8m units. The SAHT said that 550 houses, at an average price of R20 000 for a house and stand, needed to be built every day to eradicate the backlog by 2020. This represented an investment of R11m in low-cost housing each day.²⁴ [²⁴ *Sowetan* 30 January 1992]

According to a housing consultant for the SAHT, Mr Philip Hamm, almost 2m low-cost houses needed to be built by 2000 (or 200 000 units per year) to meet the increased demand caused by population growth. An additional 150 000 houses were expected to be required each year for the next eight years to meet the current backlog.²⁵ [²⁵ *Ibid* 5 February 1992]

The De Loor task group suggested that 198 000 houses needed to be built each year for the next ten years to eliminate the backlog. The task group estimated that in 1990 the housing backlog in the urban areas of South Africa (including the ten homelands) was 1,3m units, including a shortage of 1284 000 units for Africans, 43 000 units for coloured people, 3 000 for Indians and 1 000 for whites. The De Loor task group noted that information on housing backlogs in rural areas was not available but added that a large proportion of the houses of the 3,1m families living in rural areas in 1990 needed upgrading.²⁶ [²⁶ De Loor task group, *Housing in South Africa*]

Engineering News estimated in February 1992 that 1 300 new houses needed to be built every day for the next ten years to overcome the housing crisis.²⁷ [²⁷ *Engineering News* 21 February 1992]

Policy

The De Loor task group, which had been set up under the chairmanship of a former auditor general, Dr Joop de Loor, to provide recommendations to the government on the formulation of a new housing policy, published its report in April 1992. Commenting on the report, the minister of local government and national housing and of public works, Mr Leon Wessels, said that the recommendations would not result in a white paper or in legislation because the government wanted to discuss the report with key housing groups and the political parties at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) (see also chapter on *Constitutional Change*).²⁸ [²⁸ *Business Day* 14 May 1992] Mr Wessels’ decision was in accord with the thinking of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (world bank), which wanted full agreement on a housing accord before granting South Africa financial assistance for housing.²⁹ [²⁹ *The Star* 27 January 1992]

The De Loor task group argued that informal housing should be accepted as part of the national housing stock. The task group suggested that the provision of housing could contribute significantly to relieving unemployment, as well as correct the distorted spatial structure of South African cities. The key recommendations contained in the report included the following:³⁰ [³⁰ *Business Day, The Citizen* 14 May

1992]

- a single national housing department and a national finance corporation should be established;
- the government should play an enabling and facilitating role in the provision of housing;
- a key role should be played by the private sector and by communities;
- the government should ensure that the share of gross domestic product spent on housing increase from 3% to 5%;
- township establishment procedures should be simplified and unified;
- priority should be given to the identification and development of land for low-income settlements to prevent ‘squatting’;
- mechanisms should be developed to ensure consumer protection and provide advice about housing;
- an investigation should be conducted into monopolies and over-concentrations in the building materials supply industry;
- rent controls should be abolished; and
- a single subsidy scheme, graduated according to income and aimed at the lower-income groups, should be introduced.

The National Housing Forum was established at a meeting in Randburg (near Johannesburg) in November 1991 with the aim of formulating a national housing accord. The forum comprised representatives of the African National Congress, the Azanian People’s Organisation, the Inkatha Freedom Party, the Pan-Africanist Congress, the national civic movement, trade unions, provincial and local authorities, the private sector and other interest groups.³¹ [³¹ *Finance Week* 9 November 1991] The executive director of the Building Industries Federation of South Africa, Mr Neil Fraser, said that the forum was ‘the most encouraging development in many years’.³² [³² *Engineering News* 10 April 1992]

In January 1992 the government withdrew from the forum, arguing that it would ‘not allow interim government by stealth’ and added that Codesa had still to agree on ‘whether transitional arrangements would take the form of transitional government or forums’.³³ [³³ *Finance Week* 27 February 1992] However, the government maintained contact with the forum and submitted a copy of the De Loor report

to the forum for discussion.³⁴ [³⁴ Ibid 21 May 1992]

The general manager of the urban development group at the Development Bank of Southern Africa, Mr Johan Kruger, highlighted four key preconditions to be met before the vision of ‘housing for all’ by the year 2000 could be realised:³⁵ [³⁵ *Housing in Southern Africa* January 1992]

- a social agreement needed to be formulated in which key actors agreed on the ‘rules of the game’;
- a clearly articulated, nonracial and equitable housing policy and strategy needed to be established by consensus, in which government intervention was clearly targeted at the poor;
- a single housing department needed to be established; and
- financial institutions needed to redirect their funds to the part of the housing market where the biggest demand existed.

The executive director of housing policy at the Urban Foundation, Ms Jill Strelitz, said in January 1992 that policy makers would have to accept informal housing and consider ways in which informal housing delivery could be accommodated within a broader national housing policy. The foundation saw the upgrading of existing informal settlements and the delivery of serviced sites as integral to a future housing policy. Preconditions for the success of these strategies included a clearly articulated housing policy, a single housing department, community participation, access to credit, building advice and investment in public infrastructure ³⁶ [³⁶ Ibid]

In a paper presented at the *Housing Indaba 2000—Shelter for All* conference in Durban in November 1991, Mr Jaya Appalraja of the Swedish International Development Authority pointed out the important role that the community-based, non-profit or non-government sector could play in providing houses for low-income groups. Over the past decade, he said, the emergence of non-profit organisations in many countries, working with local resident associations and the public sector, had been at the forefront in the delivery of housing and infrastructure to the poor.³⁷ [³⁷ Appalraju J, ‘The emerging urban challenge and institutional reforms of the transitional period and beyond’, paper presented at the *Housing Indaba 2000 Shelter for All*, Durban, 4-6 November 1991]

At its fourth national congress held in Johannesburg in July 1991, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) resolved that since housing was a fundamental right, housing provision should be determined by need rather than by profit. Cosatu said that both the government and the private sector should fund housing development programmes in consultation with relevant community organisations but that the government had an overall responsibility for the provision of housing. Furthermore, housing

and land markets should be regulated to eliminate speculation. Cosatu also suggested that measures be introduced to make small housing loans available to all citizens on a nondiscriminatory basis.³⁸ [³⁸ *History in the Making* October 1991]

In a memorandum written after a second visit by officials of the world bank to South Africa in November 1991, the world bank criticised the concentration in the South African house construction and building supplies industries. The bank argued that lack of competition could affect adversely the supply of houses to the homeless. It noted that when measured against other developing countries of comparable per capita income, South Africa had the highest proportion of consolidated assets of the banking sector devoted to residential mortgages (almost 40%). However, only 12% to 15% of such funds were allocated to black township borrowers. While acknowledging that banks needed better collateral in the townships, the world bank noted South Africa's low default rate. The bank favoured an 'enabling policy framework', as opposed to a policy in which the government played a strongly interventionist role but suggested that life offices should play a far greater role than previously in making resources available for low-income housing.³⁹ [³⁹ *Finance Week* 16 January 1992]

Provision and constraints

Informal housing

The Department of Local Government and National Housing estimated that almost 3,6m people lived in informal settlements or backyard shacks in 1991. It said that the number of people in backyard shacks had decreased from 1,9m in 1990 to 1,7m in 1991. The department noted that over the same period migration from the 'independent' homelands to the cities had been more limited than anticipated but that large-scale intra-urban movement had accounted for increasing numbers of informal settlers.⁴⁰ [⁴⁰ *Business Day* 9 June 1992]

The chairman of Operation Masakhane for the Homeless, Mr Dan Moshugi, estimated in May 1992 that 10m people were living in informal settlements.⁴¹ [⁴¹ *Ibid* 30 April 1992] In the document *Informal Housing, Part 1: The Current Situation*, published in August 1991, the Urban Foundation (UF) said that in 1990 more than 7m people lived in informal housing in urban and metropolitan areas in South Africa (including the ten homelands). Slightly more than half the African metropolitan population lived in informal settlements, as indicated below:⁴² [⁴² Urban Foundation, *Policies for a new urban future: Informal housing, part J: The current situation*, 1991]

Distribution of informal housing: 1990

Area

Total African population

Informally housed African population

Proportion informally housed

Bloemfontein

470 100

160 100

34%

Cape Town

570 000

330 000

58%

Durban

2 600 000

1 800 000

69%

East London

342 800

105 000

31%

Port Elizabeth

580 000

320 000

55%

PWV^a

5 213 000

2 260 000

43%

Total

9 775 900

4 975 100

51%

a

Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Verec

Cape Town

According to Professor David Dewar, Mr Tony Rosmarin and Ms Vanessa Watson of the Urban Problems Research Unit at the University of Cape Town, the rapid growth of free-standing settlements in the greater Cape Town area arose from the spillover of people living in the backyard shacks of formal townships. According to the deputy director of land development co-ordination for the Cape Provincial Administration, Mr Chris Letter, there were 500 000 informal settlers in greater Cape Town in March 1992. The *Weekend Argus*, however, claimed in the same month that the figure was closer to 1,5m.⁴³ [⁴³ *Weekend Argus* 21 March 1992]

The UF noted that three main types of spontaneous informal settlement existed in the greater Cape Town area: official site-and-service schemes offering security of tenure (Khayelitsha, Old Crossroads); settlements where occupants had tacit permission to remain (Brown's Farm, Miller's Camp); and peri-urban settlements, where tenure status varied (Hout Bay, Noordhoek).⁴⁴ [⁴⁴ Rosmarin T, *Location and*

distribution of squatting in Cape Town, Urban Problems Research Unit report, prepared for the Independent Development Trust, 1990; Urban Foundation, *Policies for a new urban future*]

Durban

The UF noted that the growth of spontaneous informal settlements around Durban had arisen from rapid population growth in the 1970s which paralleled that of the fastest growing cities in the world. The number of shacks in the Durban functional region (DFR) increased at an annual rate of 3 600 shacks throughout the 1980s. The UF estimated in August 1991 that close to two thirds of all dwelling units for Africans in the DFR were informal shacks. More than 60% of the African population (1,8m people) lived in informal housing.⁴⁵ [45 Urban Foundation, *Policies for a new urban future*]

The director of the Centre for Social and Development Studies at the University of Natal (Durban), Professor Simon Bekker, estimated in mid 1992 that some 300 000 new dwelling units were required in the DFR over the next ten years. In addition some 320 000 shacks currently occupied in informal settlements needed either to be replaced with serviced sites or to be upgraded, he said.⁴⁶ [46 *Indicator South Africa* autumn 1992]

It was estimated in 1989 by the Tongaat-Hulett group that some 40 000 people were located in backyard shacks and outbuildings in the DFR. Free-standing settlements housed approximately 1,8m people.⁴⁷ [47 Tongaal-Hulett, *The Durban Functional Region: Planning for the 21st Century: Report 2: Scenarios for 2000: Executive Summary*, 1990] The group's report said that the main concentration of informal settlements occurred in large areas adjacent to formal townships. The UF argued that the growth of informal settlements on the outskirts of the DFR was to a limited extent a reflection of migration to urban areas. Natural population growth and the formal housing shortage, however, continued to play a major part in the growth of these informal settlements.⁴⁸ [48 Urban Foundation, *Policies for a new urban future*]

East London

It was estimated that some 105 000 people in the East London region were informally housed in 1990. In Gompo Town overcrowding in backyards occurred to the extent that shacks encroached on roads, leaving many impassable. The UF noted that evictions from some informal settlements in the area occurred in 1990.⁴⁹ [49 *Ibid*]

Orange Free State

Research conducted by the UF and published in 1991 found that informal settlements in the

Bloemfontein/Botshabelo region were concentrated in Botshabelo and the township of Mangaung (Bloemfontein). Some 90 000 of the 220 000 people in Botshabelo lived in a site-and-service scheme. High transport costs, low wages and the lack of employment opportunities in Botshabelo had, however, resulted in a slow exodus of people from the settlement, the UF noted.

By contrast there appeared to be a growth in informal settlements in Bloernfontein and the goldfields.⁵⁰ [50 Botes L, Krige S and Wessels J, *Informal settlements in Bloemfontein*. Urban Foundation, Bloernfontein, 1991] In addition to the free-standing settlements of Mangaung, the UF noted that the township had developed a large lodger population, including people living in backyard shacks and outbuildings, which accommodated between 40 000 and 50 000 people in 1989.⁵¹ [51 Ibid]

Port Elizabeth

The UF noted that 320 000 people living in informal settlements and backyard shacks in the Port Elizabeth area were concentrated mainly in African townships surrounding the city. In 1990 the total population of Port Elizabeth was 984 100, with an African population of 580 000. During 1991 spontaneous informal settlements developed (particularly in the Zwide area) as land invasions occurred from overcrowded backyards of the formal townships. Furthermore, the UF recorded shack building on vacant land within townships in Port Elizabeth in 1990.⁵² [52 Urban Foundation, *Policies for a new urban future*]

Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging

The UF estimated that half (2,26m) of the African population of the Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging (PWV) region lived in informal housing in 1990. Nearly 60% of the total of 976 755 African homes were of an informal nature. Furthermore, the majority of these structures (86%) were backyard shacks or outbuildings, while a minority (14%) were located in informal settlements. The number of backyard structures in formal townships increased during the 1980s. More recent research indicated, however, that the population of backyard informal housing was growing less rapidly than the population of informal settlements.⁵³ [53 Ibid]

The UF said that in 1990 there were approximately 47 informal settlements (each with more than 90 shacks) in the PWV region. Of these, 25 settlements were located in proclaimed African townships and 22 outside such townships (see table below). The 22 settlements outside proclaimed townships contained only 15% of the total population housed in informal settlements. Informal settlements in the PWV region were distributed as follows:

Distribution of informal housing: 1990

Area

Total African population

Informally housed African population

Proportion informally housed

Bloemfontein

470 100

160 100

34%

Cape Town

570 000

330 000

58%

Durban

2 600 000

1 800 000

69%

East London

342 800

105 000

31%

Port Elizabeth

580 000

320 000

55%

PWV^a

5 213 000

2 260 000

43%

Total

9 775 900

4 975 100

51%

a

Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereë

Provision by the government

Formal housing

The minister of local government and national housing and of public works, Mr Leon Wessels, said in February 1992 that in 1991 the government provided 873 houses for Africans in the Cape, none in Natal, 201 in the Orange Free State and 492 in the Transvaal.⁵⁴ [⁵⁴ *Hansard* (A) 4 q cols 249-250, 24 February 1992.] According to the minister of regional and land affairs, Mr Jacob de Villiers, the South African government has built no houses in the non-independent homelands since 1984. The Gazankulu authority provided 217 houses in 1991, while the authorities of KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa and QwaQwa supplied no houses during the same period.⁵⁵ [⁵⁵ *Hansard* (A) 3 q cols 61-64, 12 February 1992.] In February 1992 Mr Wessels said that the government had approved of a number of housing construction

projects, as indicated below:⁵⁶ [⁵⁶ *Hansard* (A) 4 q cols 255-256, 24 February 1992]

Houses to be provided by the government in 1992

Region

Number of units

Eastern Cape

189

Northern Cape

74

Western Cape

798

Natal

170

Orange Free State

78

Northern Transvaal

613

Southern Transvaal

661

Total

Government expenditure

Budgeted spending by the government on housing and related infrastructure was R2,15bn in 1992/93, in comparison with R1,56bn in 1991/92. The figure for 1992/93 included R1,65bn set aside from the budget and R500m from the sale of strategic oil reserves. The amount to be spent in 1992/93 represented an increase of 41% on the amount allocated in 1991/92. In addition, the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), the South African Housing Trust (SAHT) and the Independent Development Trust were to spend a further R1,1bn on housing and related infrastructure during the 1992/93 financial year.⁵⁷ [⁵⁷ *The Star* 19 March 1992]

The Inkatha Freedom Party and the DBSA welcomed the increased amount allocated to housing in 1992/93, saying that it would stimulate the economy and help alleviate the housing backlog.⁵⁸ [⁵⁸ *Business Day* 19 March 1992] The African National Congress (ANC) welcomed the amount allocated but added that the central issue was the way that the funds were to be spent and managed rather than simply the amount allocated.⁵⁹ [⁵⁹ *The Star* 19 March 1992]

The managing director of the SAHT, Mr Wallie Conradie, noted that direct budgetary allocation increased only marginally from R1,4bn in 1991/92 to R1,65bn in 1992/93, representing an increase of only 14%. He added that investment in housing in South Africa was less than 3% of gross domestic product (GDP), while other developing countries spent an average of 5% of GDP on housing.⁶⁰ [⁶⁰ *Sowetan* 26 March 1992] The following table illustrates trends in government spending on housing as a proportion of the total budget:⁶¹ [⁶¹ Information supplied by the Department of Finance, 1 April 1992]

Budgeted expenditure on housing: 1985/86–1992/93

Financial year

Rm

Proportion of budget

1985/86

588

1,8%

1986/87^a

1 367

3,4%

1987/88

745

1,6%

1988/89

934

1,7%

1989/90

959

1,5%

1990/91

1 208

1,6%

1991/92

1 356

1,6%

1992/93

1 653

1,6%

a

Includes R400m granted to the South African Housing Trust

Mr Paul Hendler of Planact, a service organisation to civic associations, said that although the increase in expenditure on housing between 1991/92 and 1992/93 was substantial, the way that funds were spent rather than the amount allocated was crucial. Analysis by Planact of previous budgets had shown that funds for housing were spent largely on civil servant subsidies, subsidies for first-time home buyers and bridging finance to black local authorities.⁶² [⁶² *Business Day* 19 March 1992]

The table below shows government financial assistance to first-time home buyers in the form of interest subsidies on mortgage loans from 1989/90 to 1992/93:⁶³ [⁶³ Medium-Term Forecasting Associates, *Housing Trends*, biannual report on home building conditions, Stellenbosch, April 1992]

FinYear

African Rm

Coloured Rm

Indian Rm

White Rm

Total Rm

1989/90

8,0

8,1

6,5

28,9

51,5

1990/91

40,0

15,0

9,2

46,0

110,2

1991/92

61,0

30,0

14,0

36,0

141,0

1992/93

69,0

38,0

19,0

29,0

155,0

Provincial administrations

In 1991 the government granted R466m of the R1bn raised from the sale of strategic oil reserves to the provincial administrations for infrastructural upgrading. In allocating these funds to the provincial administrations, the government aimed to provide 53 770 serviced sites and accommodate some 270 000 people. Funds were also to be used to upgrade 15 hostels and to provide potable water to 53

communities.⁶⁴ [⁶⁴ *Engineering News* 14 February 1992] Amounts made available by the government to the provincial administrations in August 1991 are listed below:⁶⁵ [⁶⁵ Information supplied by the deputy director general of community services at the Cape Provincial Administration, Mr Ci Coetzee, 16 June 1992]

Funds granted to the provincial administration from the sale of strategic oil reserves: August 1991

Cape Rm
Natal Rm
OFS ^a Rm
Transvaal Rm
Community facilities
4,1
3,1
1,7
5,2
Infrastructure
81,2
61,6
33,6
103,4
Hostels
16,1
4,6

2,5

7,8

Roads

61,7

5,0

42,0

15,0

Sport facilities

5,4

3,9

1,2

6,5

Totals

168,5

78,2

81,0

137,9

a

Orange Free State

The deputy director general of community services for the Cape Provincial Administration (CPA), Mr

Gert Coetzee, said that the number of serviced sites provided by the CPA during 1990/91, 1991/92 and 1992/93 was 7 225, 14 071 and 13 436 respectively. Over this period 208 392 people benefited from the CPA's housing projects. Mr Coetzee added that from August 1991 to March 1992 the proclamation of 34 less formal townships in the Cape was approved.⁶⁶ [⁶⁶ Information supplied by the deputy director of liaison services at the Natal Provincial Administration, Mr R Singh, 12 May 1992]

The deputy director of liaison services at the Natal Provincial Administration (NPA), Mr Raj Singh, said in May 1992 that the NPA was primarily involved in the upgrading of existing informal settlements rather than the provision of serviced sites. Since 1990 a total of 1532 sites had been upgraded in Natal. A total of 403 formal low-cost houses (valued at R10 000 each) had also been constructed by the NPA since 1990, although in 1992 it was not NPA policy to provide formal houses. In 1992 the NPA was in the process of upgrading five informal settlements, at which 7 653 sites were to be upgraded by 1993/94.⁶⁷ [⁶⁷ Information supplied by Mr A van den Heever of the Central Statistical Service, Pretoria, 31 January 1992]

The Orange Free State Provincial Administration was involved in 63 site-and-service and upgrading projects during the 1991/92 financial year, which would provide shelter for some 111 000 people.⁶⁸ [⁶⁸ Information supplied by the director of communications, Mr R Botes, 25 June 1992]

During the 1991/92 financial year the Transvaal Provincial Administration (TPA) developed 14 678 serviced sites. A further 43 904 serviced sites were to be provided during 1992.⁶⁹ [⁶⁹ *Finance Week* 13 February 1992] The TPA's site-and-service schemes were at Doornkop (east Rand), Ivory Park (Midrand), Orange Farm (southern Transvaal), Poortjie (Johannesburg), Rietfontein (southern Transvaal) and Zonkizizwe (east Rand).

In February 1992 a spokesman for the TPA, Mr Piet Wilken, confirmed that 12 areas to the north and north-west of Johannesburg had been identified provisionally for site-and-service schemes. The areas identified were Cosmo City, Diepsloot, Knoppieslaagte, Kromdraai, Olievenhoutbosch, Olifantsfontein, Zevenfontein, and areas south and east of Irene, north-west and south of Lanseria, north of Muldersdrift and north of Sandton.⁷⁰ [⁷⁰ *Business Day* 4 February 1992] He added that accommodation for approximately 3m people would have to be found on the Witwatersrand by the year

Mr Wilken said that all the relevant parties would be consulted before the TPA developed these areas. The Greenbelt action group (GAG), which represented some of the ratepayers of the subregion identified by the TPA for site-and-service schemes, said that the subregion should be preserved as a 'green lung' and used for limited development and recreation.⁷² [⁷² *Ibid* 4 December 1991] The ANC and the Civic Associations of Johannesburg (an umbrella body for 12 civic organisations in greater Johannesburg) accused the TPA of formulating a new apartheid housing policy unilaterally by resettling black 'squatters' in isolated rural areas. The 12 squatter villages would consolidate apartheid urban planning,

they argued.⁷³ [⁷³ *Sowetan* 13 December 1991]

In January 1992 the TPA announced that approximately 750 families of informal settlers living on a farm at Zevenfontein would be moved to Diepsloot. The proposed move was blocked by protest from GAG (which represented some of the ratepayers of the area) and member the Afrikaner

Weerstandsbeweging.⁷⁴ [⁷⁴ *The Citizen* 23 January 1992] The chairman of GAG, Mr Anthony Duigan, argued that the Randburg and Sandton municipalities should find accommodation for the informal

settlers since most of the worked in Randburg.⁷⁵ [⁷⁵ *The Star* 24 January 1992] In February 1992 the TPA announced that the Zevenfontein families would be permanently settled at Bloubostrand (Randburg).⁷⁶ [⁷⁶ *Ibid*]

The administrator of the Transvaal. Mr Danie Hough, said that the decision was made after consultation with the Randburg and Sandton municipalities and all other relevant parties. The Bloubostrand residents' committee, which had been formed to oppose the proposed resettlement, denied that it had been consulted and warned that the move would be a 'catalyst for conflict'.⁷⁷ [⁷⁷ *Ibid*]

A 15-member task group was established by the TPA in February 1992 to identify areas for low-cost housing north of Sandton and Randburg and west of Midrand and Verwoerdburg. The task group members included representatives of city councils, regional services councils, local areas committees, GAG and Operation Masakhane for the Homeless, a body representing informally housed people.⁷⁸ [⁷⁸ *Business Day* 4 February 1992]

The Bloubostrand residents' committee introduced a rates and taxes boycott in February, in response to declining property values in the area. A protest march to the Randburg Civic

Centre was also held.⁷⁹ [⁷⁹ *The Star* 6 February 1992, *Business Day* 1 February 1992] The TPA later announced that plans to relocate the Zevenfontein informal settlers to Bloubostrand had been dropped, adding that they would be allowed to remain at Zevenfontein, where rudimentary services would be provided, until the end of July 1992.⁸⁰ [⁸⁰ *Business Day* 11 February 1992]

By May 1992 the task group responsible for identifying land for low-income housing had not reached

consensus over the resettlement of the Zevenfontein community.⁸¹ [⁸¹ *The Citizen* 6 May 1992] Earlier, in February 1992, a second forum had been established by the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber, to identify land for the 3m people with low incomes who were expected to require housing in

the central Witwatersrand in the following 151 020 years⁸² [⁸² *The Star* 13 February 1992]

The national organiser of Operation Masakhane for the Homeless, Mr Eric Ngeleza, said that it was essential that the Zevenfontein informal settlers be consulted as they had 'constructive plans for the

future'.⁸³ [⁸³ *Sowetan* 6 February 1992] The executive director of the Urban Foundation (UF), Ms Ann Bernstein, condemned the TPA's response to the Zevenfontein issue as crisis management. The UF

proposed that a region-wide forum comprising all interested parties should be established to discuss problems and solutions in identifying land for low-income housing. Ms Bernstein also suggested that the state president, Mr F W de Klerk, in consultation with parties participating in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, should appoint a task force, headed by a Supreme Court judge, to identify land for settlements for the poor in the PWV region. A spokesman for the ANC, Mr Ronnie Mamoepa, proposed a regional planning forum for the PWV area, which would include all interest groups in the region.⁸⁴ [⁸⁴ *Business Day* 12 February 1992]

Private sector

In November 1991 the Building Industries Federation of South Africa (Bifsa) appointed a task force to find ways to implement the Nedcor/Old Mutual proposal of building 200 000 low-cost houses a year. The Nedcor/Old Mutual scenario proposed that 200 000 low-cost houses be built, 400 000 plots be serviced and 1m houses be electrified every year, for three years. Bifsa estimated that providing services for 200 000 houses a year would provide jobs for 55 000 people, while a further 90 000 people could be employed in construction.⁸⁵ [⁸⁵ *Sowetan* 28 November 1991]

In the same month Sappi and the Foundation for African Business and Consumer Services announced a joint venture involving the investment of R200m in a finance scheme for affordable housing aimed at informally housed people in the PWV and Durban areas. Finance was to be provided by Finansbank.

The pilot project involved housing 200 families near Atteridgeville (Pretoria).⁸⁶ [⁸⁶ *Housing in Sout)iem Africa* November 1991; *Sowetan* 28 November 1991]

In December 1991 the president of the National Stokvels' Association of South Africa (Nasasa), Mr Andrew Lukhele, announced that R200m a month in black savings would be diverted from banks to unit trusts to serve as collateral for home loans. Mr Lukhele explained that because poor people had no access to conventional collateral, an adequate substitute was a personal credit history offered with a stokvel's guarantee.⁸⁷ [⁸⁷ *Sunday Star* 27 December 1991: Information supplied by the president of the National Stokvels Association of South Africa, Mr A Lukhele, May 1992]

Nasasa initiated the Stokvel City Housing Project, which involved the establishment of building materials depots in townships. Furthermore, loans were made available to Nasasa members from the Stokvel Investment Corporation, which was the investment wing of the project for housing construction.⁸⁸ [⁸⁸ *Business Day* 11 March 1992]

The financial director of Time Housing, Mr Norman Jeffery, said in February 1992 that home building for the low-income group was grinding to a halt owing to a number of problems facing the building industry, which included the unclear government housing policy, the poor state of the economy, high interest rates and a disruptive socio-political environment.⁸⁹ [⁸⁹ *Ibid* 5 February 1992]

A spokesman for the Housing Advice Centre, Mr Brian Leveson, said in April 1992 that more than 700 potential black home owners had been cheated by would-be property developers in the PWV area since the beginning of the year.⁹⁰ [⁹⁰ *Sowetan* 30 April 1992] Mr Leveson had said earlier that the centre was dealing daily with at least five complaints from people who had been cheated or who had had difficulties with developers. People who demanded low-cost housing costing about R2 500 were the main victims of unscrupulous developers, he said.⁹¹ [⁹¹ *Ibid* 27 February 1992]

Employer provision

The De Loor task group, which was set up to advise the government on a national housing policy, noted that because of the variety of employers in the South African economy, it was not possible to quantify the contribution of employers to housing. Nevertheless, the De Loor report noted that a great variety of housing schemes existed. In some instances employers provided loans to their employees at subsidised rates to enable them to buy or construct their own homes. Employers also made collateral investments with mortgage lending institutions to enable their employees to borrow from such institutions for housing loans. The De Loor task group estimated that approximately 60% of all borrowers from mortgage institutions received housing assistance from their employers. Employers also built houses, flats and hostels which were sold or rented to employees.⁹² [⁹² De Loor task group *Housing in South Africa* April 1992]

The De Loor report noted that in terms of the housing scheme for public sector employees, which had been introduced in 1957, mortgage institutions granted loans of 100% of the purchase price to public servants and employees of statutory and parastatal institutions, while the state guaranteed 20% of the total amount borrowed. By the end of 1989 loans valued at R8,4bn had been granted under this scheme, while the amount guaranteed by the state totalled R1.6bn.

Provision by farmers

The De Loor report said that no information existed regarding housing provided by farmers for their employees. The report noted, however, that the nature of farming required employees to be housed on farms and housing was often regarded as part of their remuneration package. According to the report, a new housing scheme for farm workers had been introduced by the government on 1 April 1991. The scheme involved a one-off capital subsidy to farmers for the erection or improvement of housing for their workers. The subsidy amounted to 50% of the cost of the superstructure but certain minimum standards and maximum costs were set. The scheme was also limited to the erection of four new dwelling units a farmer per year or in the case of upgrading of existing units, to an amount of R12 000 a farmer per year. The scheme was applicable to the non-homeland area only.⁹³ [⁹³ *Ibid* April 1992]

Non-profit organisations

Independent Development Trust

In March 1991 the Independent Development Trust (IDT) announced a R750m capital subsidy scheme to provide 100 000 sites for first-time home owners earning less than R1 000 a month (see *1991/92 Survey* p351). The director of housing at the IDT, Mr Ben van der Ross, said in April 1992 that the IDT believed that some 1m homeless families qualified for the capital subsidy scheme. This meant that the R750m budget for capital subsidies could meet no more than 10% of the demand for subsidised serviced sites. By May 1992 the IDT had approved 104 housing projects involving the provision of sites countrywide for some 665 560 people.⁹⁴ [⁹⁴ Information supplied by the director of communications of the Independent Development Trust. Mr Jolyon Nuttall, 21 May 1992]

The chairman of the IDT, Mr Jan Steyn, said in April 1992 that construction had been completed on the following site-and-service schemes: Manyatseng (Orange Free State), 234 stands; Moleleki (east Rand), 1 500 stands; Thabong (Orange Free State), 1 898 stands; Zwelihle (southern Cape), 460 stands; and Zizamele (eastern Cape), 568 stands.

The IDTs once-off capital subsidy scheme for serviced sites was criticised by a number of experts in the housing field. The president of Operation Masakhane for the Homeless, Mr Dan Moshugi, maintained that the IDT gave subsidies to contractors who provided poor workmanship and that it did not consult homeless people. The director of communications for the IDT, Mr Jolyon Nuttall, rejected these claims, saying that the IDT had consulted widely across the political spectrum before it had begun operating.⁹⁵ [⁹⁵ *The Star* 6 May 1992] He added that the IDT did not hand over funds for development unless there was evidence of community involvement in a project.⁹⁶ [⁹⁶ *The Weekly Mail* 17 January 1992]

Planact, a service organisation to civic associations, said there were five problems with the manner in which the IDT operated:⁹⁷ [⁹⁷ *Work in Progress* February 1992]

- the IDT designed a standard product and then insisted on community participation, assuming that all communities would demand the same product;
- the IDT allocated the subsidy without interest. The community was thus penalised for the time it took to plan its project, since with each month that passed, inflation reduced the R7 500 subsidy effectively by approximately R100;
- residents were expected to pay monthly service charges which they often could not afford. Consequently, better-off residents often bought sites intended for poorer residents, who ended up back in unserviced informal settlements;
- the IDT insisted on community participation but had failed to allocate resources for this purpose; and

- since the subsidy was intended to cover land costs, there was pressure to locate sites on land on the periphery of cities where land was cheapest.

The chairman of the Development Bank of Southern Africa and of the South African Housing Trust (SAHT), Dr Simon Brand, said in October 1991 that instead of funding home-building activities, the IDTs scheme had created 'islands of privilege' for certain developers. Where IDT subsidies applied to a piece of land adjoining another piece of land for which there was no subsidy, the owners of the latter found it impossible to sell sites because of unequal access to the subsidy scheme. Dr Brand added that the government's failure to formulate a standard national subsidy programme had exacerbated the problem.⁹⁸ [⁹⁸ *Housing in Southern Africa* October 1991]

The general manager of the SAHT, Mr Johan de Ridder, criticised the subsidy for offering buyers limited freedom of choice about where to acquire property. He was also critical of the cut-off point which prevented those earning more than R1 000 a month from qualifying for subsidised land. In contrast, the chairman of the Urban Foundation, Mr Mike Rosholt, believed that the scheme had opened the way for the more appropriate use of state subsidies for housing. He added that if the housing crisis was to be overcome there had to be a government commitment to provide adequate funding for the next five years.⁹⁹ [⁹⁹ *Financial Mail* 22 November 1991]

In a report published in August 1991 the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (world bank) criticised two aspects of the IDTs subsidy scheme. The bank recommended that less capital should be granted to qualifying individuals, thereby reaching a broader spectrum of the poor. Furthermore, the monies should be granted to the buyers rather than to the developers. The world bank said that this would minimise the possibility of corruption while stimulating competition between developers.¹⁰⁰ [¹⁰⁰ *Sunday Tribune* 18 August 1991] In response, the IDT justified the capital grant of R7 500, arguing that in the case of a development costing less than R7 500, the recipient would be able to purchase building materials with the excess capital. To contain corruption, 40 consultants had been appointed to monitor the implementation of the project. The IDT argued that the world bank's critique did not take account of the unique aspects pertaining to housing in South Africa.¹⁰¹ [¹⁰¹ *South* 22 August 1991]

South African Housing Trust

The aim of the SAHT is to facilitate the ownership of fixed property for residential purposes and to provide affordable housing for lower-income communities. Its primary activity is the provision of mortgage loans to home owners requiring loans of less than R25 000 through the SAHT's long-term lending subsidiary, Khayaletu Home Loans (KHL). By April 1992 KHL had provided more than 24 800 loans amounting to more than R560m in 50 communities across the country. Between June 1991 and April 1992 the SAHT was responsible for the funding of 104 housing projects countrywide, with 13 located in the Cape, three in Natal, 13 in the Orange Free State, 60 in the Transvaal and 15 in the non-

independent homelands. In the same period the SAHT financed the provision of 9 776 houses and 9 247 serviced sites.¹⁰² [¹⁰² Information supplied by the corporate communications and promotions manager of the South African Housing Trust, Mr Mike Fowlds, 5 June 1992]

In May 1992 Mr de Ridder said that no more than 600 houses were being built monthly by the SAHT. He said that its capacity to grant long-term loans had diminished because financial institutions had stopped almost entirely providing loans to the lower-income market. Funding from the government was essential for the SAHT to continue its operations, he added.¹⁰³ [¹⁰³ *Financial Mail* 15 May 1992]

Urban Foundation

During 1991 the four utility companies of the Urban Foundation (UF), Blomanda Housing (Orange Free State), FHA Homes (Transvaal), Innova (Natal) and Unifound Housing (eastern Cape) were consolidated as regional divisions of The New Housing Company Group, (NEWHCO) which is both legally and financially independent of the UF. The primary focus of the group is the development of site-and-service projects and starter homes.

During 1991 the utility companies sold 216 residential stands to individuals and other housing agencies and constructed and sold 3 672 starter homes despite difficult market conditions, which included:¹⁰⁴ [¹⁰⁴ Urban Foundation, *Annual Review* 1991]

- high mortgage interest rates;
- increasing construction costs;
- sporadic violence in some areas of operation; and
- the tightening of financial institutions' lending requirements.

In addition, 3 171 serviced sites and 877 starter homes were provided by NEWHCO companies in the period January 1992 to April 1992, as indicated below:¹⁰⁵ [¹⁰⁵ Information supplied by the finance manager of the New Housing Company Group, Ms J Mackellar, 19 May 1992]

Shelter provided by The New Housing Company Group: January–April 1992

Region

Serviced sites

Starter houses

Eastern Cape

1 009

—

Natal

—

311

Orange Free State

1 124

161

Transvaal

1 038

405

Total

3 171

877

The Land Investment Trust (LIT), a non-profit organisation, was established in 1991 to fund the land purchases of NEWHCO as well as to provide land development loans to other housing agencies fulfilling the shelter needs of low-income people.¹⁰⁶ [¹⁰⁶ Information supplied Ms J Mackellar, 19 May 1992]

A low-interest loan of R70m was secured from the IDT when LIT was established. In April 1992 LIT secured R120m from the pension funds of AECI, the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, De Beers Consolidated Mines, Eskom, Everite, Fedlife, Metals Industries Group, the Old Mutual, Sage Life and Sanlam.¹⁰⁷ [¹⁰⁷ *Business Day* 2 April 1992]

Since 1990 the UF has been involved in the upgrading of informal settlements at Bester's Camp (Durban), Freedom Square (Bloemfontein, Orange Free State) and Soweto-on-Sea (Port Elizabeth)

The UF founded the Group Credit Company in 1989 to assist people to obtain housing through a group finance scheme which would operate on a similar basis to a stokvel (see *1991/92 Survey* p353). During 1991, R20m was raised for this initiative from four financial institutions and from Pretoria Portland Cement, which contributed R1m. These funds were secured against R11m from the IDT and R8m from the Development Bank of Southern Africa. The number of people making use of the initiative increased from 30 groups of 468 individuals at the end of 1990 to 240 groups of 3 840 individuals in May 1992. Clients resided only in Guguletu, Khayelitsha, Langa and Nyanga (all in greater Cape Town), with 60% of clients earning R600 or less a month.¹⁰⁹ [109 Information supplied by the personal secretary of the general manager of the Group Credit Company, Ms G Gamieldien, 19 May 1992]

The Loan Guarantee Initiative was launched by the UF and the Association of Mortgage Lenders in July 1990 (see *1991/92 Survey* p 352). The number of loans insured by June 1991 was 1 567, with associated properties valued at R46m and loans granted totalling R41m. Between July 1991 and April 1992 the number of loans insured increased to 4 993, with associated properties valued at R164m and loans granted totalling R143m. The average loan value increased from R26 340 in June 1991 to R28 605 in April 1992.¹¹⁰ [110 Information supplied by the manager of the Home Loan Guarantee Company, Mr D MacArthur, 20 May 1992] In April 1992 it was reported that very few of the 13 financial institutions which had undertaken initially to provide financing through this initiative were still active.¹¹¹ [111 *Housing in Southern Africa* April 1992]

Home ownership

The minister of local government and national housing and of public works, Mr Leon Wessels, said in March 1992 that no official statistics were available on black home owners since no distinction was made in respect of the various races since the abolition of racial legislation.¹¹² [112 *Hansard* (A) 6 q cois 575-576, 26 March 1992] In April 1992 Mr Wessels was able to supply the following information regarding the number of applications granted under freehold title by the Department of Local Government and National Housing in 1991:¹¹³ [113 *Hansard* (A) 10 q cols 764-766, 22 April 1992]

Applications for freehold title: 1991

Region

Applications

Grants

A (Western Cape)

42

36

B (Northern Cape/Western Cape)

—

—

C (Orange Free State/QwaQwa)

499

499

D (Eastern Cape)

109

109

E (KwaZulu/Natal)

—

—

F (Eastern Transvaal)

142

142

G (Northern Transvaal)

675

189

H(Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging)

1 342

822

J (Western Transvaal)

—

—

Total

2 8

It was reported in July 1992 that the sale of the government's housing stock in African townships had virtually come to a halt. Between June 1991 and April 1992, 2 825 houses had been sold. By April 1992, 38% (129 398 units) of the total government-owned stock of 337 381 units had been sold. The government said that the lack of interest in the sale of houses had been aggravated by the instability in townships which had frightened away financial institutions.¹¹⁴ [¹¹⁴ 1991/92 *Survey* p359, *Business Day* 20 July 1992] The number of government-owned houses that had been sold by April 1992 is given below:¹¹⁵ [¹¹⁵ *Housing in Southern Africa* June 1992]

State sales of African houses: April 1992

Region

Number for sale

Sales

Proportion sold

Eastern Cape

37 407

11 302

30%

Northern Cape

13 444

7 928

59%

Western Cape

22 295

5 023

23%

Natal

10 670

6 704

63%

OFS^a

21 258

11 288

53%

Transvaal

232 423

87 284

38%

Total

337 497

129 529

38%

a

Orange Free

Residential segregation and desegregation

The group managing director of the Camdons Group (an estate agency), Mr Scott McRae, said in September 1991 that since the repeal in June 1991 of the Group Areas Act of 1966 there had been a steady demand by blacks for houses in areas previously demarcated for whites. Mr McRae said that the agency had experienced little resistance from whites to black people buying in areas which were predominantly occupied by whites. In more conservative areas residents had initially objected strongly but such protest had largely died down.¹¹⁶ [Information supplied by the managing director of the Carndons Group, Mr Scott McRae, 19 September 1991]

It was reported in *Beeld* in September 1991 that at least 45 black families had bought houses in the former white areas of Pretoria since the Group Areas Act had been repealed. Most of these families had bought in the more liberal suburbs in the east and the south of the city.¹¹⁷ [¹¹⁷ *Beeld* 4 September 1991]

In September 1991 the Johannesburg City Council set up a single nonracial waiting list for the rental of its houses. Many black people were reported to have queued for hours outside the offices of the council's housing department to apply for these homes. Before the repeal of the Group Areas Act there had been three waiting lists for the 30 000 houses owned by the council in coloured, Indian and white areas. According to the acting housing director of the council, Mr Ken Cunningham, the council was

receiving more than 1000 applications a day, mainly from Africans.¹¹⁸ [¹¹⁸ *The Star* 10 September 1991]

The chairman of the Block AK Action Committee (Durban), Mr Sunil Brarndow, said in March 1992 that black people had shown apathy in the submission of claims to the Advisory Commission on Land Allocation for compensation for forced removals (see *1991/92 Survey* p386). Mr Brarndow urged former black residents of Berea, Cato Manor, Hillary, Mayville, Queensburgh, Riverside and Stellahill (all in Durban) who had been removed under the Group Areas Act to submit claims to the commission.¹¹⁹ [¹¹⁹ *The Leader* 20 March 1992]

In February 1992 it was reported that black people seeking rented accommodation in 'elite' suburbs near Johannesburg were being discriminated against by apartment owners. Estate agents interviewed said that some apartment owners believed that renting to blacks would lead to overcrowding and rent boycotts.¹²⁰ [¹²⁰ *Sowetan* 3 February 1992] A survey completed in January 1992 by *The Star* in the Johannesburg suburb of Triomf found that the majority of white residents interviewed accepted the racial desegregation of the suburb, provided that newcomers were of the same social class as the host community.¹²¹ [¹²¹ *The Star* 23 January 1992] In contrast, Indian families who moved into the suburb of Montclair (Durban) were reported to have received threats of violence.¹²² [¹²² *Post Natal* 15 January 1992]

A study undertaken by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) between October and December 1991 in the Johannesburg inner city area revealed that Berea, the flatland district of the central business district, Hillbrow and Joubert Park were the most desegregated areas of the inner city. In these areas whites were in a minority (23%), with Africans being the largest race group (46%), while coloured people and Indians constituted 19% and 12% respectively of the population. Other areas with diminishing numbers of whites were Bertrams (50%), Braamfontein (64%) and Fairview (60%). Fordsburg remained largely Indian (71%), while Pageview and Vrededorp remained largely white (82%).¹²³ [¹²³ Crankshaw 0 and White C F, *Results of the Johannesburg inner city survey*. Human Sciences Research Council, Braamfontein, 1992]

Headstan, a non-profit company, was to redevelop District Six as well as several other areas in the Cape Town inner city area as working class residential areas. (Large numbers of coloured people had been removed from District Six in the 1960s.) Issues which still had to be resolved before the redevelopment could occur included the questions of who should control the land trust, and how and by whom the land should be developed. The most contentious issue was reported to be who should be allocated housing and who should be responsible for the allocation process. A Cape Town city councillor, Mr Clive Keegan, said that it had been suggested that a community controlled land trust and a non-profit company to develop the area be established. An executive member of the western Cape region of the African National Congress (ANC) and a member of the District Six steering committee, Mr Basil Davidson, said that a politically unaligned body which was representative of all the interest groups should be

responsible for identifying the future residents of District Six. The redeveloped District Six was expected to offer homes to some 23 000 people. It was anticipated that the construction of the first new housing units would begin by late 1993 or early 1994.¹²⁴ [¹²⁴ *Business Day* 9 January 1992, *Financial Mail* 21 February 1992, *The Weekly Mail* 8 May 1992]

It was reported in April 1992 that a forum had been established to deal with the development of Cato Manor (Durban) as a nonracial residential area for low- and middle-income people. (The area had seen large-scale forced removals of blacks during the 1960s.) The Cato Manor Development Forum consisted of the Cato Manor Development Committee (which included representatives of the ANC, the Chesterville Residents' Association, the Civic Working Committee, the Durban Housing Action Committee, informal housing organisations in the area and the South African Communist Party) and representatives of the Department of Regional Development, the House of Delegates, the Natal Provincial Administration and Operation Jumpstart. In August 1991 the forum agreed that a trust comprising representatives of all the parties involved should be established to guide the redevelopment of Cato Manor. It was further agreed that the land, which was owned by various government departments, should be pooled and managed by the trust. However, in December 1991 the deputy minister for regional development, Mr André Fourie, decided against the pooling of government-owned land. The question of the forum's powers and who would be responsible for financing the low-cost housing projects was undecided at the time of writing.¹²⁵ [¹²⁵ *Work in Progress* April 1992]

A survey undertaken between October and December 1991 by the HSRC said that elderly whites on small pensions and blacks were the main victims of unscrupulous landlords who operated in the Johannesburg inner city area. The HSRC survey disclosed that there was an enormous demand by blacks for inner city accommodation and a hopelessly deficient supply. The HSRC maintained that landlords had been able to raise rentals (which ranged from R200 to R500 a month) to well above their rent control levels yet many landlords had failed to maintain their premises adequately. A sample of landlords interviewed claimed that they had kept their buildings in good condition but that once Actstop (an organisation representing inner city residents) had begun organising tenants in their buildings, the tenants had stopped paying rent. The survey noted that those landlords who had been prepared to negotiate with Actstop had generally come to equitable agreements.

The HSRC survey also identified absentee landlords, who employed agents to manage their buildings, as responsible for many inner city buildings being run down. Tenants interviewed generally believed that the city council did not use its powers to inspect buildings and fine owners who charged exorbitant rents and who failed to meet required health regulations. Many tenants also felt that the city council should take over responsibility for buildings which had been badly managed.¹²⁶ [¹²⁶ Crankshaw O and White C F, *Results of the Johannesburg inner city survey*]

Two estate agents operating in the area held lending institutions (banks and building societies) responsible for the deterioration of the Johannesburg inner city area through their 'excessively

conservative' lending policies. Lending institutions interviewed by the HSRC said that they were not lending in Hillbrow, Joubert Park and parts of Berea because these areas were perceived as 'high risk'. A number of lending institutions suggested that collateral for mortgage loans would need to be provided by the government before lending of funds could resume.

Two suggestions were made by the HSRC to enable funds to be made available to people living in the Johannesburg inner city areas:¹²⁷ [¹²⁷ *Ibid*]

- an independent non-profit housing trust should be formed to lend funds at reasonable rates on property in the inner city areas, particularly to joint ownership schemes; and
- a forum should be established by the city council to bring together the lending institutions.

In May 1992 the Central Johannesburg Partnership (CJP), a forum representing business, inner city residents and the Johannesburg City Council, announced the establishment of a scheme that would make funds available to inner city residents to enable them to own blocks of flats in Hillbrow.¹²⁸ [¹²⁸ *Business Day* 12 May 1992] The project was part of a broader plan, under the management of the CJP, which had as its objective the revitalisation of the Johannesburg inner city area.

In the same month the publicity secretary of Actstop, Mr Cas Coovadia, said that the CJP was finalising a fund for the purchase of seven buildings in the Johannesburg inner city area.¹²⁹ [¹²⁹ *The Star* 18 May 1992] The project was to be managed by the Legal Resources Centre in Johannesburg and assisted by Actstop, Co-operative Education and Planning, and Planact. The project was believed to be the first of its kind in South Africa. It would allow residents to buy the seven buildings as a co-operative housing scheme and to elect a management committee to administer the buildings. The buildings were to be removed from the property market and to be maintained as a stock of low-cost housing to prevent slum formation or gentrification.¹³⁰ [¹³⁰ *The Weekly Mail* 24 April 1992]

Hostels

Statistics

A spokesman for the Department of Local Government and National Housing, Mr Francois Jacobs, said in June 1992 that there were 240 hostels countrywide under the jurisdiction of local authorities or provincial administrations. The Cape had 43 hostels (50 158 beds); Natal, 18 hostels (26 125 beds); the Orange Free State, 23 hostels (24 904 beds); and the Transvaal, 156 hostels (207 158 beds).¹³¹ [¹³¹

Information supplied by a spokesman for the Department of Local Government and National Housing, Mr F Jacobs, 23 July 1992]

The De Loor report said that there were approximately 604 000 hostel beds in the country in mid 1990. *Business Day* noted, however, that hostel overcrowding was a serious problem and that the ratio of occupants to beds was possibly as high as three to one.¹³² [¹³² *Business Day* 26 June 1992] The Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) said that there were as many as six residents per hostel bed.¹³³ [¹³³ Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression, *Fortresses of Fear*, Braamfontein, May 1992] A spokesman for the Soweto City Council, Mr Mojalefa Moseki, said that women and children made up about 30% of the hostel population on the Reef.¹³⁴ [¹³⁴ *Business Day* 14 April 1992]

Policy

The De Loor report noted that the government's current policy on hostels was that their original purpose, namely to provide accommodation for single people linked to the migrant labour system, no longer applied. The De Loor report noted, however, that the government acknowledged that there existed a need for accommodation for single people. The government's policy was that the construction of new hostels should be limited and left to the private sector. Existing government-owned hostels should be privatised, but those that could not be privatised should be maintained at a 'reasonable and habitable level'. In addition, government policy was that hostels should be integrated into the surrounding community.¹³⁵ [¹³⁵ The South African Housing Advisory Council, *Housing in South Africa: Proposals on apolicy and strategy*, April 1992]

In June 1991 Cosatu and the African National Congress (ANC) advocated the transformation of hostels into family units after consultation with hostel residents. A survey undertaken by Cosatu in the southern Natal region revealed that 'some' hostel residents favoured the upgrading of single quarters. Cosatu argued that the upgrading and integration of hostels into surrounding communities would ease tensions between hostel residents and township residents.¹³⁶ [¹³⁶ Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression, *Fortresses of Fear*]

The minister of local government and national housing and of public works, Mr Leon Wessels, announced in May 1992 that the government was to make available R295m in the 1992/93 financial year for the conversion or upgrading of hostels.¹³⁷ [¹³⁷ *The Citizen* 15 May 1992] In June 1992 Mr Wessels said that his department had noted that the Goldstone commission regarded hostel residents as common participants in political violence and that attention would be given to fencing hostels as recommended by the commission (see also chapter on *Security*).¹³⁸ [¹³⁸ *Business Day* 3 June 1992]

A study of Reef hostels undertaken by the Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression between July 1990 and April 1992, said that hostels were a key element in the Reef violence (see also chapter on *Political Developments*). The board also noted that hostel residents on the east Rand had expressed ‘grave concern’ about the proposed plan of the Transvaal Provincial Administration to invest R7,7m in upgrading hostels in the east Rand without consulting hostel residents.¹³⁹ [¹³⁹ Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression, *Fortresses of Fear*]

After the massacre at Boipatong (southern Transvaal) in June 1992 which left 39 people dead, the ANC stated that the hostel system should be phased out completely in the long run (see also chapter on *Political Developments*).¹⁴⁰ [¹⁴⁰ *The Weekly Mail* 26 June 1992;] This view was supported by the Soweto Civic Association (SCA), which had argued in April 1992 that hostels should be completely dismantled rather than converted since hostels were the centre of violence in both Alexandra (Johannesburg) and Soweto. The SCA believed that hostel residents should be settled in ordinary township houses.¹⁴¹ [¹⁴¹ *The Star* 3 April 1992]

A spokesman for the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), Mr Bafana Mazibuko, said that the IFP believed that hostels should be upgraded but that it was opposed to transforming them into family units.¹⁴² [¹⁴² *The Weekly Mail* 26 June 1992] This view was supported by the chairmen of the east Rand and the west Rand hostel residents’ associations, Messrs Zakhele Mlambo and Joseph Kubheka, who said that most hostel residents’ families had homes in rural areas which they were not prepared to leave.¹⁴³ [¹⁴³ *Business Day* 14 April, 27 May 1992] In response to the ANC’s call to phase out the hostel system in the long term, the Transvaal Hostel Dwellers’ Association said in June 1992 that should the hostels be destroyed, hostel residents would occupy township houses.¹⁴⁴ [¹⁴⁴ *Sowetan* 25 June 1992]

A senior researcher at the Centre for Social and Development Studies at the University of Natal (Durban), Dr Mike Morris, argued that while he agreed with the ANC that there was an urgent need to bring law and order to the hostels, closing the hostels would exacerbate the violence, as well as ‘destroy the only foothold’ that migrants had in the cities. This view was shared by an organiser for the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, Mr Geoff Schreiner, who said that ‘simplistic calls for the abolition of the hostel system will be taken by hostel residents as a direct attack on themselves’. He added that hostel residents should be consulted about any proposals for changing the hostels.¹⁴⁵ [¹⁴⁵ *The Weekly Mail* 26 June 1992]

The Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression argued in its report *Fortresses of Fear* that a solution could be to build much smaller hostels which were integrated into township communities. Such smaller units, the board argued, should be spatially dispersed and should be a combination of single

quarters and family units. It noted, however, that transforming large multi-storey hostels into family dwelling units could prove to be impractical.¹⁴⁶ [¹⁴⁶ Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression, *Fortresses of Fear*]

The De Loor report suggested that the demand for single-sex accommodation should be left to private-sector employers to satisfy. The report argued that new hostels should be built closer to workplaces and 'not in the midst of family accommodation'. As far as existing hostels were concerned, the report recommended that problems experienced should be resolved primarily at a local level with the participation of all interested parties. It suggested that it might be necessary to demolish some existing hostels, while others would need to be upgraded or converted into family dwelling units. The report recommended that a moratorium be placed on hostel demolitions unless local negotiations sanctioned such action.¹⁴⁷ [¹⁴⁷ South African Housing Advisory Council, *Housing in South Africa*, pp296-297]

Developments

It was reported in March 1992 that the three hostels at Tokoza (east Rand) were being upgraded at a cost of R11 m. Hostel residents had initially wanted new hostels to be built but insufficient funds were available for this purpose.¹⁴⁸ [¹⁴⁸ *The Weekly Mail* 27 March 1992] The first hostel to be upgraded was to be maintained as single-quarter accommodation. A spokesman for the Tokoza Town Council said that the remaining two hostels could be upgraded as single quarter accommodation or converted to family dwelling units. Funds for upgrading were provided by the National Housing Commission.¹⁴⁹ [¹⁴⁹ *Business Day* 17 March 1992]

In the same month it was reported that two hostels in Dobsonville (Soweto) were to be upgraded and converted into two- and three-bedroomed flats with the assistance of the Central Witwatersrand Regional Services Council.¹⁵⁰ [¹⁵⁰ *The Star* 25 March 1992]

The Johannesburg City Council announced in April 1992 that it was in the process of developing a portion of Power Park (Soweto) as a pilot project to provide family housing for hostel residents. Approximately 130 sites were to be serviced at the cost of about R2m. The initiative was in response to a survey completed by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in 1991 in council-owned hostels, which had found that between 50% and 65% of hostel residents would prefer any other type of accommodation to a hostel. The most important reasons given by respondents for remaining in the hostels were that the migrants' families lived elsewhere, hostels were located closer to places of work and hostel residents could not afford to buy houses. Sixty percent of the respondents said that they would prefer to live in houses, while more than 85% indicated that they would prefer to rent accommodation. The survey results led the HSRC to suggest that hostel residents needed alternative

forms of accommodation.¹⁵¹ [¹⁵¹ *Sowetan* 1 April 1992, *The Star* 2 April 1992] In May 1992 it was reported that 42 hostel blocks housing more than 6 000 people in Lwandle (Cape Town) were to be upgraded and transformed into family dwelling units.¹⁵² [¹⁵² *The Argus* 22 May 1992]

Infrastructure

Energy

Indicator South Africa noted in early 1992 that, while Eskom generated 60% of all electricity on the African continent and 95% of all electricity used in South Africa (including the ten homelands), and had a surplus generating capacity sufficient to meet growth of 13% in the gross domestic product, an estimated 23m people in South Africa did not have access to domestic electricity. In the homelands less than 10% of the population had access to electricity. A researcher at the Centre for Social and Development Studies at the University of Natal (Durban), Mr Stavros Stavrou, argued that the immense economic and political power that whites held had resulted in the skewed distribution of resources on a racially discriminatory basis. While white urban and rural areas had access to electricity, a rudimentary system of electricity supply existed in African townships, he said. Moreover, electricity services were almost entirely absent from African rural areas and informal settlements on the peripheries of urban areas.¹⁵³ [¹⁵³ *Indicator South Africa* autumn 1992]

According to Eskom, there were 208 townships in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands) where at least 70% of households were without electricity. Eskom estimated that only nine out of 259 townships had been fully electrified by November 1991. In the Cape, 68 out of 89 townships had less than 10% electrification, while in Natal and the Transvaal the figures were 15 out of 20 and 63 out of 70 townships respectively. Figures were not available for the Orange Free State.¹⁵⁴ [¹⁵⁴ *The Weekly Mail* 15 November 1991]

The minister of local government and national housing and of public works, Mr Leon Wessels, gave the following figures in Parliament in 1992 for households in South African townships (excluding the ten homelands) without electricity:¹⁵⁵ [¹⁵⁵ *Hansard* (A) 5 q cols 365-371, 10 March 1992]

African townships without access to electricity: February 1992

Proportion of houses without electricity

Number of townships

0%

8

1-9%

9

10-19%

10

20-29%

6

30-39%

7

40-49%

15

50-59%

20

60-69%

11

70-79%

19

80-89%

27

90-99%

93

100%

50

Total

275

The managing director of Eskom, Dr Ian McRae, said in March 1992 that Eskom planned to supply 164 000 new households with electricity through 280 electrification programmes in 1992. Dr McRae added that some 38 000 households had been provided with an electricity supply in 1991.¹⁵⁶ [¹⁵⁶ *Business Day* 26 March 1992] It was Eskom's aim to supply 164 000 new households a year with electricity. If this plan succeeded, all households in its area of supply would be electrified by 1996. Eskom estimated that at the end of 1991 some 700 000 homes in areas in which Eskom was responsible for the supply of electrical power had no electricity.¹⁵⁷ [¹⁵⁷ *Ibid* 24 December 1991]

A senior lecturer in the Department of Economics at the University of Stellenbosch, Professor Servaas van der Berg, said in February 1992 that he believed that 'substantial' electrification of rural areas and informal settlements was unlikely to occur during the current decade. He added that he foresaw most formal houses having electricity within the next 20 years.¹⁵⁸ [¹⁵⁸ *Ibid* 10 February 1992]

Eskom was proceeding with its electrification programme even though loss of revenue owing to non-payment of accounts amounted to R291m in 1991. The cumulative figure was expected to reach R390m in 1992. Dr McRae noted, however, in March 1992 that payments had

In December 1991 Eskom had launched a toll-free telephone service (Powerline) to canvass township residents' grievances about the quality of electricity provided by local authorities, as well as to establish their reasons for not paying electricity accounts. Dr McRae said that he believed that non-payment of electricity accounts arose from the incompetence of African local authorities rather than being a form of protest against such authorities.¹⁶⁰ [¹⁶⁰ *Business Day* 10 December 1991] The co-ordinator of Powerline, Mr Peter Kgame, said in January 1992 that the most commonly reported problems included local authorities giving bad service, overcharging and sudden cut-offs of the electricity supply.¹⁶¹ [¹⁶¹ *The Weekly Mail* 17 January 1992] Mr Kgame added that requests had been made to Eskom to supply electricity directly to residents.

In May 1992 the negotiations manager for Eskom, Mr Martin Opperman, said that Eskom was in the process of negotiating with more than 100 African local authorities countrywide to assist in the provision of electricity or to take over supply rights and assets. Only the Soweto Town Council had agreed to transfer its rights and assets to Eskom by then.¹⁶² [¹⁶² *Business Day* 14 May 1992]

A national conference on electrification was held by the African National Congress (ANC) in February 1992 at the University of Cape Town. The meeting was attended by representatives of civic organisations, the Development Bank of Southern Africa, Eskom, local authorities, political organisations and trade unions. The government declined to attend the conference on the grounds that the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs was involved in its own investigations into electrification. *Finance Week* said in February 1992 that it believed that the government did not want to lose the initiative on such an issue and that it was thus trying to avoid legitimising interim groups that could turn into decision-making bodies.¹⁶³ [¹⁶³ *Finance Week* 13 February 1992] The conference agreed that:¹⁶⁴ [¹⁶⁴ Stavrou S, 'Electrizing the nation'. *Indicator South Africa* autumn 1992]

- the process of electrification should begin now and not only once political solutions were found;
- although a national approach to energy supply was required, this should not undermine local and regional initiatives;
- electrification should not be addressed only as a technical issue. Policymakers should be sensitive to social, political and gender needs; and
- electrification of homes should include consultation with all parties concerned. This meant community involvement at all levels of implementation.

Researchers at the Energy for Development Research Centre at the University of Cape Town argued that before electricity could be provided to all, institutional and financial 'blockages' in the present electricity distribution system had to be addressed. It was said that such blockages were the result of electricity distribution being linked to the racially fragmented system of local government.¹⁶⁵ [¹⁶⁵ Theron P, Eberhard A and Dingely C, 'Electricity provision in the urban areas of South Africa: Towards a new policy framework', *Urban Forum*, vol 2 no 2, 1991, ppl-24]

In a paper delivered at the conference. Professor Charles Dingley of the Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering at the University of Cape Town, pointed out that agents in the electricity distribution system included approximately 400 municipal electricity undertakings, the 'independent' homeland authorities, African local authorities and the House of Representatives. He argued that this fragmented system should be replaced by between five and ten regionally based electricity distribution

authorities which could make more effective use of existing expertise. Moreover, this strategy would be the only possible way that distributors could break even on the cost of supplying electricity to rural areas, Professor Dingley said.¹⁶⁶ [¹⁶⁶ *Headway*, newsletter of the Development Bank of Southern Africa, April 1992]

The president of the Association of Municipal Electrical Undertakings, Mr Charles Adams, argued at the same conference that co-operation between black and white local authorities could ensure cost pooling and provide local solutions to the electricity distribution problem. Mr William Cobbett, a researcher at Planact, a service organisation to civic associations, said in response to Mr Adams that local initiatives were unlikely to solve electrification problems, as there were several Conservative Party-controlled municipalities in the country which would not co-operate with such plans. Mr Cobbett believed that while local solutions could emerge, there was a need for guiding principles for a fully negotiated national settlement regarding electricity supply. It was decided at the conference to initiate a national electricity forum, which would include a wide range of organisations and seek solutions to the regional nonracial distribution of electricity.¹⁶⁷ [¹⁶⁷ *Ibid*]

Water and sewerage

It was reported early in 1992 that some 12m people in South Africa had no access to a water supply of reasonable quality.¹⁶⁸ [¹⁶⁸ *New Ground* autumn 1992] The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) estimated that 20% of the population (4m people) in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands) had a minimal water supply and 33% (7m people) had minimal sanitation provision. The DBSA said that the cost of improving these services to an acceptable level by 2000 would be R15,6bn (R5,2bn for water and R10,4bn for sanitation), as well as operating and maintenance costs of R1,2bn a year.¹⁶⁹ [¹⁶⁹ *Business Day* 15 April 1992]

A planner for the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, Mr Simon Forster, said that 18% of the country's urban population (excluding the 'independent' homelands) had no access to a private water kiosk, a standpipe or a yard tap, while 23% had access to these services and 59% had access to house water connections in their homes.¹⁷⁰ [¹⁷⁰ *New Ground* autumn 1992] The standing committee on water supply and sanitation (a national development forum which involved representatives of the parties at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, the Azanian People's Organisation and all of South Africa's water boards) estimated in March 1992 that in the urban areas of South Africa (including the ten homelands) some 60% of the population of 22m was 'well supplied' with water and 7m had adequate sanitation. The cost to redress the backlog in urban areas was estimated at R3,5bn to R5bn for water supplies and R5bn to R10,5bn for sanitation, depending upon the technology used.

The standing committee on water supply and sanitation estimated that of the country's rural population

of 16.5m, 53% (or 8.8m people) had an adequate water supply. Only 14% of rural inhabitants had access to adequate sanitation facilities. Depending on the technology used to redress the backlog, it could cost anything between R400m and R10bn for water supplies and R1bn to R8.5bn for sanitation in rural areas, the committee said.¹⁷¹ [¹⁷¹ *Finance Week* 19 March 1992]

Research conducted by the Department of National Health and Population Development in 1991 revealed that 61% of the rural population of South Africa (excluding the ten homelands) had access to safe drinking water. The main problems identified in the study were 'distance from point of use' (70%) and unsatisfactory water quality (40%). The department aimed to ensure that 60% of the total population had access to safe water supplies by 2000. The study also showed that only 24% of the rural population of South Africa (excluding the ten homelands) had access to adequate latrine facilities.¹⁷² [¹⁷² Department of National Health and Population Development, *Health trends in South Africa, 1992*]

A document published in February 1992 by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry revealed that domestic water use varied considerably according to income level. Household water consumption in the high-income Cape Town suburb of Constantia ranged from one kilolitre to 50 kilolitres a day and averaged seven kilolitres. In comparison, water consumption in a medium-income area such as Mitchell's Plain was about 150 litres a day per person. In Khayelitsha shack dwellers used about 15 litres a day. People living in site-and-service schemes used approximately 90 litres a day and those in starter houses, 120 litres a day. A researcher at the Group for Environmental Monitoring, Mr Henk Coetzee, noted that the World Health Organisation estimated that basic health criteria could be met only when every person had access to at least 50 litres of drinkable water a day.¹⁷³ [¹⁷³ *The Weekly Mail* 30 April 1992]

Mr Forster said in 1992 that South Africa had enough water for all its people, even though water was a scarce resource.¹⁷⁴ [¹⁷⁴ *New Ground* autumn 1992] The main obstacles to an adequate water supply and sanitation that were identified by the standing committee on water supply and sanitation included:¹⁷⁵ [¹⁷⁵ *Finance Week* 19 March 1992]

- the lack of a single agency responsible for water supply and sanitation. South Africa had 13 regional water boards;
- the lack of institutions at the local level to secure a sustainable water supply; and
- the high cost of water for many poor people.

Refuse removal

Research conducted by the Department of National Health and Population Development in 1991 showed that 35% of the rural population of South Africa (excluding the ten homelands) already had effective refuse removal systems in 1991. The department aimed to ensure that 70% of the population had effective refuse removal systems by 2000 (see also chapter on *The Environment*).¹⁷⁶ [176 Department of National Health and Population Development, *Health trends in South Africa*, 1992]

Stormwater drainage

The target for 2000 set by the Department of National Health and Population Development is to ensure that stormwater will not cause a health risk to more than 30% of the population of South Africa. A study completed by the department in 1991 found that 78% of rural housing in South Africa (excluding the ten homelands) had adequate stormwater drainage.¹⁷⁷ [177 Ibid]

Urban Facilities

Policy

In October 1990 the **Discriminatory Legislation regarding Public Amenities Act** came into effect, effectively repealing the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953, which had allowed public facilities to be reserved for particular race groups. However, the government did not make discrimination in admission to public facilities illegal (see *1991/92 Survey* pp359–362). In March 1992 the Durban City Council became the first council in South Africa to remove officially all forms of discrimination from its bylaws. The council also made illegal discrimination on the basis of race, gender or religion in any bylaw or policy of the council.¹⁷⁸ [178 *The Star* 24 March 1992]

A survey undertaken by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) between October and December 1991 in the Johannesburg inner city area revealed that a number of sports clubs in the area did not permit black people to become members. An example cited was the Grosvenor Recreation Centre's bowls club. The Mayfair (Johannesburg) municipal swimming pool was noted as practicing an indirect form of discrimination by increasing charges to the extent that it was out of reach of poorer (mainly African) families. The HSRC survey also revealed that the Johannesburg West branch of the African National Congress had been consistently denied access to meeting places owned by the Johannesburg City Council, while other political parties were permitted to hire halls owned by the council.¹⁷⁹ [179 Crankshaw O and White C F, *Results of the Johannesburg inner city survey*]

Provision

The 1991 edition of the *South African Township Annual* provided the following information on the availability of urban amenities in some African townships:¹⁸⁰ [¹⁸⁰ IR Information Surveys, *South African Township Annual*, 1991]

Availability of urban amenities in selected South African townships: 1991

Township

Cinema

Sports stadiums

Swimming pools

Alexandra (Johannesburg)

1

2

2

Atteridgeville (Pretoria)

4

2

4

Duncan Village (eastern Cape)

—

1

—

Greater Soweto

3

3

7

Guguletu (western Cape)

—

2

2

Inanda (Durban)

—

2

—

Khayelitsha (western Cape)

—

1

—

Mamelodi (Pretoria)

1

3

6

Mdantsane (eastern Cape)

1

1

1

Umlazi (Durba

Transport

Policy

In a paper delivered at the Annual Transport Convention in August 1991 in Pretoria, the deputy director general of transport, Dr Malcolm Mitchell, said that the policy of his department was to develop a multinodal integrated transport system for South Africa which was safe, secure, affordable and which met the social, economic and mobility needs of the country. Dr Mitchell said that the department recognised that rapid urbanisation would create enormous pressures for the maintenance and expansion of transport infrastructure, while simultaneously jeopardising the land needed for transport infrastructure. Only through building consensus with different interest groups, he suggested, would an acceptable integrated land-use pattern be achieved.¹⁸¹ [¹⁸¹ Mitchell M F, Strategic initiatives in the Department of Transport, paper delivered at the Annual Transportation Convention, Pretoria, August 1991]

In February 1992 the National Transport Policy Forum was established with the aim of bringing together a range of interest groups which had been excluded from contributing to the formulation of transport policy.¹⁸² [¹⁸² *Business Day* 20 March 1992] Groups represented in the forum included the African National Congress, civic associations, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa, the National African Federated Transport Organisation, the Pan-Africanist Congress, the Southern Africa Black Taxi Association and Transnet. The chairman of the forum, Mr George Negota, argued that transport subsidies should be extended to include black taxis and should be paid by employers or by the government.¹⁸³ [¹⁸³ Telephonic interview with the chairman of the National Transport Policy Forum, Mr G Negota, 9 June 1992]

After its second fact-finding mission to South Africa in 1991, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (world bank) argued that while the deregulation of transport was a commendable objective, it was not an advisable one to pursue currently. The world bank believed that the co-ordination of different forms of transport could be compromised by excessive deregulation. The government should rather focus on regulating route allocation, fare integration, the use of shared facilities and safety. The world bank noted that in 1991 the average annual subsidy per bus passenger exceeded R1 000 because of dispersed patterns of settlement and low wages brought about by apartheid.

The world bank argued that long-term solutions to subsidy reduction lay in redressing the current pattern of racial land allocation. In the short-term it suggested that subsidies be granted directly to transport users and managed by employers.¹⁸⁴ [¹⁸⁴ *Finance Week* 6 February 1992]

Legislation

The **Transport General Amendment Bill**, introduced in Parliament in April 1992, made provision for the National Road Safety Council (NRSC) to be abolished. The minister of transport would be empowered to determine road safety, with the director general of transport taking over the functions of the NRSC.

The **National Roads Amendment Bill** of 1992, introduced in Parliament in April 1992, proposed that:

- tolls collected on toll roads be used to service loans contracted to build toll roads;
- local authorities be empowered to maintain roads within townships;
- the South African Roads Board (SARB) be empowered to approve of the display of advertisements on national roads, with due regard for the environment;
- the SARB be empowered to approve of trading on national roads; and
- fines pertaining to damage of property of the SARB be increased.

In April 1992 the minister of transport and of posts and telecommunications, Dr Piet Welgemoed, said that toll roads would remain the property of the government, thus reversing previous government policy on toll roads which had been that ownership of toll roads would pass eventually to toll companies.¹⁸⁵ [¹⁸⁵ *The Star* 23 April 1992]

Introducing the second reading debate on the National Roads Amendment Bill in Parliament in June 1992, Dr Welgemoed said that all national roads could be declared toll roads. International experience showed that deaths on toll roads were fewer than on other roads, he added. Mr Robin Carlisle MP (Democratic Party) said, however, that toll roads were not always economically viable as toll roads as many roads did not carry sufficient traffic. He added that routes which provided alternatives to toll roads were not always acceptable. Mr Pierre Cronjé MP (Independent) said that the African National Congress did not support the privatisation of infrastructure and that he, therefore, did not support the bill.¹⁸⁶ [¹⁸⁶ *The Citizen* 3 June 1992]

Roads

In May 1992 the director of road design, Mr Paul Fenner, said that the Department of Transport was drafting a bill for the establishment of a new toll road authority for the financing, building and administration of toll roads.¹⁸⁷ [¹⁸⁷ *Business Day* 21 May 1992] The government allocated R2,27bn for roads in the 1992/93 budget, despite the Department of Transport's estimate that R4,5bn would be required to repair and maintain the country's road network in 1992/93. The chairman of the South African Bitumen and Tar Association, Mr Wally Babb, said in March 1992 that as South Africa entered a period of socio-economic rehabilitation the government should know that economic recovery depended substantially on the country's R100bn road network. Mr Babb and the president of the Southern Africa Road Federation, Mr Michael Withers, called for the reinstatement of a dedicated road fund.¹⁸⁸ [¹⁸⁸ *Ibid* 30 March 1992, *The Star* 14 April 1992]

In April 1992 the Auto mobile Association of South Africa (AA) urged the government to increase road funding and to make public details regarding the decline in the financing of roads. The AA estimated that in real terms funding for roads had declined by about 45% since 1975.¹⁸⁹ [¹⁸⁹ *Business Day* 21 April 1992]

In April 1992 the minister of transport and of posts and telecommunications, Dr Piet Welgemoed, said that the government had experienced a shortfall of R500m in funds allocated for road repairs in the 1991/92 financial year. He added that while R3,2bn was needed by the Department of Transport, only R2,7bn had been received after funds for roads had been allocated to the ten homelands. The executive director of the South African Bitumen and Tar Association, Mr Piet Myburgh, said in March 1992 that the present backlog in spending on roads exceeded R15bn.¹⁹⁰ [¹⁹⁰ *Ibid* 30 March 1992] There were about 55 000 km of surfaced roads and 250 000km of gravel roads in South Africa (excluding the ten homelands). Four percent of surfaced roads were in a very poor condition and a further 11% were in a poor condition, Dr Welgemoed said.¹⁹¹ [¹⁹¹ *The Citizen* 30 April 1992]

Statistics published by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research in April 1992 showed that 16% of all carriers of goods overloaded their vehicles. Furthermore, overloaded heavy vehicles accounted for 58% of the cost of road maintenance. Eliminating overloading in the Transvaal alone had the potential to save taxpayers as much as R63m a year.¹⁹² [¹⁹² *The Star* 20 April 1992]

In April 1992 a member of the executive committee (MEC) for roads for the Transvaal, Mr Ahmed Arbee, announced that the Transvaal Provincial Administration was closing all but four of its road construction units because of lack of funds. A number of additional traffic officers' posts had, however, been approved, which would help reduce the high accident rate and combat vehicle overloading.¹⁹³ [¹⁹³

Ibid¹] The MEC for road repairs for Natal, Mr Peter Miller, said in the same month that insufficient funds for maintenance, let alone improvement, had led to great deterioration in Natal's road network. The 1992/93 allocation to the Natal Provincial Administration for roads represented 45% in real terms of the amount allocated for road maintenance and construction in 1980/81, he said, while annual traffic on tarred roads had increased by 70% over the same period. Mr Miller said that only R1m had been made available for road repairs in 1992/93 while R18m was actually required.¹⁹⁴ [¹⁹⁴ *Business Day* 9 April 1992]

Taxi industry

A director of Transportation Research and Consultancy, Mr Klaas van Zyl, noted that the taxi industry had gained passengers from the state-subsidised train and bus industries during the period 1987 to 1991. In 1987 the bus and train industries claimed 29% and 21% of the market share of African commuters respectively, while 14% of commuters used cars and 7% walked. By 1991 the bus industry's share of the African commuter market had declined to 22%, while that of the train industry had dropped to 15%. Twelve percent of African commuters used cars and 9% walked in 1991. Over the same period the taxi industry had increased its share of the market from 29% to 42%. However, the figure for taxi commuters was down 2% from its market share of 44% in 1990.¹⁹⁵ [¹⁹⁵ Information supplied by a director of Transportation Research and Consultancy, Mr K van Zyl, 15 June 1992]

A survey conducted by Transportation Research and Consultancy between August and November 1991 in the metropolitan areas of South Africa revealed the following choices of mode of transport:¹⁹⁶ [¹⁹⁶ Van Zyl N J Wand Wilmot C G, 'Guidelines on promoting energy-efficient transport', paper presented at the Annual Transport Convention, Pretoria, June/July 1992]

Modes of transport of metropolitan commuters: 1991^a

Main mode

African

White

Bus

21,5%

3,4%

Car driver

7,0%

77,9%

Car passenger

5,2%

10,4%

Taxi

41,9%

0,2%

Train

14,9%

4,0%

Walk

8,7%

3,4%

Other

0,8%

0,7%

Total

100,0%

100,0%

a

No information was available regarding coloured and Indian commuters.

The study also revealed that the average commuting distance of Africans (21km) was almost twice as long as that of whites (12km).

The Southern Africa Black Taxi Association (Sabta) and the Southern African Long Distance Transport Association (Saldta) were the largest black taxi associations in the country during the period under review. Sabta, which was formed in 1979, claimed to have a membership of 45 000 and to control approximately 58% of the black taxi market in 1991. Saldta claimed to have 28 000 members by November 1991.¹⁹⁷ [¹⁹⁷ *Enterprise* June 1992] Estimates of the number of kombitaxis varied. A private consultant with the Department of Transport, Dr Johan Bosman, estimated that there were no more than 60 000 African kombitaxis. Another consultant with the Department of Transport, Dr J Groenewald, suggested that the figure was 105 000. Mr van Zyl said that the figure was about 50 000 in 1989.¹⁹⁸ [¹⁹⁸ Information supplied by Mr K van Zyl, 15 June 1992]

The *Sowetan* reported in May 1992 that the black taxi industry was experiencing difficulties because of the economic recession. Minibus sales had dropped from an average of 600 to 400 a month between January 1990 and April 1992. The marketing director of Sabta, Mr Cyprian Lebeso, said that minibus sales had dropped to about 80 a month in January and February 1992. He believed that the situation was unlikely to improve until the economy improved and the taxi feuds were brought under control (see also chapter on *Political Developments*)¹⁹⁹ [¹⁹⁹ *Sowetan* 21 May 1992, *Sunday Times* 10 May 1992; *Enterprise* June 1992]

In January 1992 the communications manager of Sabta, Mr Molefe Rapodile, said that there had been an increase in the overall use of black taxis by white people, adding that the biggest increase in the number of white passengers had occurred in 1991. He also noted that an increasing number of taxis were serving the white suburban routes

In January 1992 the South African Taxi Drivers' Union (Satdu) was formed to protect the interests of taxidrivers and to 'turn taxidiving into a reputable profession',²⁰¹ [²⁰¹ *Sowetan* 17 January 1992] Satdu claimed to have a membership of 35 000 in January 1992 and aimed to represent ultimately 1,2m taxidrivers countrywide. The public affairs director of Sabta, Mr Mike Ntlatleng, said that Sabta welcomed the union.²⁰² [²⁰² *Business Day* 17 January 1992] However, signs of tension between Sabta and Satdu appeared in March 1992 when a Satdu organiser, Mr Steven Selane, was assaulted by a taxi owner as he was canvassing for membership of Satdu in Pretoria. Mr Selane claimed that drivers had been told

that they would lose their jobs if they joined the union.²⁰³ [²⁰³ *Sowetan* 10 March 1992]

The minister of transport and of posts and telecommunications, Dr Piet Welgemoed, said in April 1992 that the government was to introduce legislation to reduce road deaths caused by kombitaxis.²⁰⁴ [²⁰⁴ *The Citizen* 22 April 1992] Dr Welgemoed noted that in 1991, 55 682 collisions occurred in which kombitaxis were involved, representing 14% of the total number of accidents. Dr Welgemoed added that 701 people were killed over the same period in kombitaxi collisions (7% of the total number of deaths in road accidents).²⁰⁵ [²⁰⁵ *Hansard* (A) 6 q cols 585-588, 27 March 1992]

The Drive Alive Foundation was founded in April 1992 with the aim of combating the high number of road deaths in the country. The chairman of the foundation, Mr Colin Adcock, said that South Africa had one of the highest rates of road deaths in the world. He said that inadequate laws and poor law enforcement were contributing factors to this phenomenon. Mr Adcock added that the foundation would investigate the proper training of taxidriviers.²⁰⁶ [²⁰⁶ *Sowetan* 9 April 1992]

Research undertaken by the People's Transport 2000 Programme of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research in 1991 revealed the following information about taxidriviers:²⁰⁷ [²⁰⁷ Miller P K, 'Basic driver training for the combitaxi industry', paper presented at the Annual Transport Convention, Pretoria, August 1991]

- thirty-four percent of those surveyed entered the industry as untrained, casual or unemployed labour, while 47% had occupied other driving positions;
- the level of formal education was relatively low: 43% had passed standard 5 or a lower standard, 34% had reached standard 8 and 14% had obtained a matriculation certificate; and
- some 58% of respondents were self-taught drivers or had been taught to drive by family members or friends.

In February 1992 it was reported that a commuter insurance scheme had been introduced by Saldta offering automatic cover to passengers carried by its members. The scheme offered personal accident death cover, disability cover and cover for some hospital expenses. The cost of the policy was to be incorporated in fare prices.²⁰⁸ [²⁰⁸ *Business Day* 26 February 1992]

Bus and rail transport

Bus industry

The director of Associated Automotive Distributors' truck and bus division, Mr Mike Elsbury, said in February 1992 that the bus passenger transport sector would grow in the next two decades because of the anticipated doubling of the black population by 2010. The executive director of the Southern African Bus Operators' Association, Professor Jackie Walters, said in the same month that the lesson to be learned from many African countries which were struggling with obsolete and unreliable transport systems was that it was important to preserve the bus industry in South Africa. Professor Walters believed that the lack of clarity regarding the government's stance on future transport legislation and conditions in the bus industry made its future uncertain. He noted that the bus industry was continuing to shrink in terms of passengers carried, numbers of buses and numbers of drivers. Professor Walters said that the industry was in decline owing to increased car ownership and usage, the growing taxi industry, poor economic conditions and the high costs of running buses.²⁰⁹ [²⁰⁹ *South African Transport* February 1992]

In February 1992 the Central Statistical Service published statistics showing that between November 1990 and November 1991 there was a decline in the number of passenger buses (down 3,6%), the number of revenue-earning kilometres travelled (down 22%) and the number of people employed in the bus industry (down 4,5%).²¹⁰ [²¹⁰ *The Citizen* 12 February 1992]

Professor Walters maintained that the bus industry did not support the current transport passenger policy of deregulation, adding that the bus industry favoured selected privatisation with continued subsidies. In 1992 an estimated 2,5m blacks commuted daily in the urban areas and 24% of these travelled by bus. Of these commuters, about 80% spend more than the Department of Transport's recommended expenditure on transport. The department recommended that no more than 5% to 10% of income be spent on commuting costs.²¹¹ [²¹¹ *South African Transport* February 1992]

The government allocated R1.2bn for bus and train subsidies during the 1992/93 financial year. The subsidy for bus passengers was reduced from R645m in 1991/92 to R641m in 1992/93.²¹² [²¹² *Daily Dispatch* 19 March 1992]

The bus services of several Reef municipalities (including those of Benoni, Edenvale, Kempton Park, Lenasia, Nigel and Roodeport) were terminated in 1991 owing to increased running costs and decreased demand. The Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber subsequently called for a centralised body to run bus services for the towns around Johannesburg.²¹³ [²¹³ *Business Day* 6 January 1992]

Rail transport

In response to a number of massacres on trains the South African Rail Commuter Corporation (SARCC) instigated a five-year plan to tighten security at stations nationwide (see *1991/92 Survey* p372 and see chapter on *Political Developments*). In February 1992 the SARCC announced that security upgrading at 370 railway stations would be completed by March 1993. ie two years ahead of schedule. The security plan included installing lighting and the establishment of access control points and temporary police bases at every railway station in the country.²¹⁴ [²¹⁴ Ibid 13 February 1992] The managing director of the SARCC, Mr Kobus Nel, announced in 'March 1992 that the corporation was to invest R12m in upgrade 11 Soweto railway stations. The investment was part of a larger project to upgrade a number of stations on the Reef. Mr Nel added that statistics showed that by March 1992 there had been at least three attacks on train commuters every week (see also chapter on *Political Developments*)²¹⁵ [²¹⁵ Ibid 5 March 1992] In June 1992 the minister of transport and of posts and telecommunications, Dr Piet Welgemoed, said that R83m had been budgeted for security on trains and at stations for 1992/93. He added that a further R45m had been budgeted for ensuring the security of commuter services by the South African Police over the same period.²¹⁶ [²¹⁶ Ibid 12 June 1992]

In February 1992 the Johannesburg City Council announced that it had decided to support proposals made by a consortium appointed by the Department of Transport for a light rail transit (LRT) system for Johannesburg. The executive director of planning for the council, Mr Ian Symon, said that by 1997 the first stage of the system could be implemented: a line from the Johannesburg central business district (CBD) to Alexandra and a distribution line within the CBD. Funding for the first phase of the system, which was to cost between R500m and R700m, was to be sought from the Department of Transport, the Transvaal Provincial Administration, the Central Witwatersrand Regional Services Council and the private sector. Mr Symon said that he believed that the LRT system was the answer to Johannesburg's traffic congestion problems. The chairman of the council management committee, Mr Ian Davidson, said that one aim of the project was to encourage the residential settlement and revitalisation of the CBD.²¹⁷ [²¹⁷ *Business Day, The Star* 26 February 1992] He emphasised that the public would be involved in every stage of the project.

In the same month, however, the Southern Africa Black Taxi Association (Sabta) claimed that neither it nor its members had been consulted by the city council regarding its plans. In response, Mr Davidson said that the bus and taxi industry would not be 'shouldered out into the cold' and that the LRT system would assist 'where the existing road-based passenger transportation system was not functioning efficiently'.²¹⁸ [²¹⁸ *South African Transport* February 1992] The public affairs manager of Sabta, Mr Cyprian Lebese, said in May 1992 that Sabta rejected the proposed LRT system as a costly, technologically intensive venture.²¹⁹ [²¹⁹ *Business Day* 18 May 1992]

The Masstran action group (MAG), which represented some residents of the north-eastern suburbs of Johannesburg, claimed in May 1992 that their property values had fallen since the publication of the proposals in 1991. It was reported that 83 stands would be appropriated in a small section of Louis

Botha Avenue alone if the LRT system was to be built along that road. The chairman of MAG, Mr Michael Letellier, said that ratepayers had not been consulted about the Masstran proposals.²²⁰ [²²⁰ *Financial Mail* 6 March 1992, *The Star* 13 May 1992]₁ Mr Conrad Berge, the secretary of the Johannesburg metropolitan action group, a ratepayer watchdog body, said that the LRT system was unacceptable in the current economic climate. He added that the system was a 'nice idea in principle' but he believed that the country's priorities were health, education and housing.²²¹ [²²¹ *The Star* 28 February 1992 *Business Day* 14 April, 27 May 1992]₁

Key Projections

- The De Loor task group said that some 75% of the population (or 33m people) would be urbanised by 2000.
- In 1992 the Urban Foundation estimated that the number of people living in metropolitan areas would more than double by 2010, to 23,6m.
- The De Loor task group suggested that 198 000 houses needed to be built each year for the next ten years to eliminate the housing backlog.
- Eskom said in 1992 that it planned to supply electricity to 164 000 new households a year until 1996.
- The Development Bank of Southern Africa estimated that it would cost R15,6bn to bring water supply and sanitation provision to all South Africans to an acceptable level by 2000.

POPULATION

Key Points

- According to the Urban Foundation (UF), there were 39,4m people living in South Africa (including the ten homelands) in 1992.
- The UF said that the average population growth rate between 1991 and 1992 was 2,4%.
- The Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging region, which constituted 2,1% of South Africa's surface area, accommodated 24% of its population in 1991.
- Calculations based on figures provided by the Development Bank of Southern Africa showed that in 1992 the average population density was 32 people per square kilometre. In the homelands the average density was 101 people per square kilometre and in the nonhomelands are 21 people per square

kilometre.

- The population of South Africa (including the ten homelands) increased at 3% a year in the 1970s, but only 2,6% a year in the 1980s.
- According to the president of the English Academy of Southern Africa, Professor Elwyn Jenkins, of the 11 different languages with official status, Zulu was the most widely spoken and Afrikaans the most widely understood

Population Statistics

Census

Census results were unavailable at the time of writing.

Population size

A report published by the United States Bureau of the Census in 1991 estimated that in that year South Africa (including the ten homelands) had a population of 40 601 000.¹ [¹ *Daily Dispatch* 3 May 1992] This figure had been calculated using available census and other demographic information.² [² Telephonic interview with a spokesman of the United States Bureau of the Census, 12 August 1992] According to the Urban Foundation (UF), there were 39 381 000 people living in South Africa in 1992. The table below gives a breakdown of the UF estimates of the population in each province and homeland in 1992:³ [³ Urban Foundation, *Population Trends: Demographic Projections Model*, 1990]

Total population of South Africa: 1992

African

Coloured

Indian

White

Total

Non-homeland area

Cape province

2 408 500

2 813 600

39 400

1 349 500

6 611 000

Natal

1 095 600

115 000

805 000

625 400

2 641 000

Orange Free State

1 726 700

71 800

—

332 200

2 130 700

Transvaal

7 397 200

325 900

154 500

2 800 000

10 677 600

Sub-total

12 628 000

3 326 300

998 900

5 107 100

22 060 300

'Independent' homelands

Bophuthatswana

2 492 400

10 000

500

6 000

2 508 900

Ciskei

865 200

4 100

900

2 900

873 100

Transkei

3 503 200

7 400

2 900

7 000

3 520 500

Venda

566 900

100

400

800

568 200

Sub-total

7 427 700

21 600

4 700

16 700

7 470 700

Non-independent homelands

Gazankulu

619 800

200

—

900

620 900

KaNgwane

509 700

1 100

—

500

511 300

KwaNdebele

539 500

200

—

—

539 700

KwaZulu

5 369 900

3 300

3 500

2 100

5 378 800

Lebowa

2 329 900

1 000

200

1 800

2 332 900

QwaQwa

465 100

500

—

800

466 400

Sub-total

9 833 900

6 300

3 700

6 100

9 850 000

Total

29 889 600

3 354 200

1 007 300

5 129 900

39 381 000

Some 44% of the total population lived in the ten homelands (which constituted 14% of the total surface area of South Africa). Some 58% of the African population lived in the homelands, together with less than 1% of the coloured, Indian an

Regional breakdown

According to the UF, in 1992 the majority of the coloured population (63%) lived in the western Cape and the majority of the Indian population (80%) in Natal. Forty-one percent of the white population lived in the Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging region.

The only region in which Africans did not constitute the majority of the population was the western Cape where they constituted 20% of the total population. In the northern Transvaal they accounted for 97% of the population.

The following table gives a regional breakdown of the population of South Africa (including the ten homelands) in 1992. The regions are defined by the UF and are similar to the development regions defined by the Development Bank of Southern Africa.⁵ [5 Urban Foundation, *Population Trends*]

Population breakdown by region: 1992

Region

African

Coloured

Indian

White

Total

Eastern Cape

2 208 700

419 200

14 700

388 100

3 030 700

Eastern Transvaal

1 705 800

24 600

11 000

313 700

2 055 100

Natal

6 465 500

118 300

808 500

627 500

8 019 800

Northern Cape

732 500

298 500

2 100

118 300

1 151 400

Northern Transvaal

3 882 200

6 000

3 600

123 400

4 015 200

Orange Free State

2 280 700

72 700

—

333 400

2 686 800

Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging

6 835 700

268 300

134 800

2 121 300

9 360 100

Transkei

3 503 200

7 400

2 900

7 000

3 520 500

Western Cape

732 700

2 102 400

23 500

846 200

3 704 800

Western Transvaal

1 542 600

36 800

6 200

251 000

1 836 600

Total

29 889 600

3 354 200

1 007 300

5 129 900

3

Urban/rural distribution

According to the Urban Foundation, the urban/rural population distribution in 1992 was as follows:⁶ [6
Ibid]

Urban/rural population distribution: 1992

African

Coloured

Indian

White

Total

Non-homeland area

Metropolitan^a

7 271 800

2 023 700

855 600

3 658 200

13 809 300

Urban^b

2 004 700

800 500

105 400

1 078 700

3 989 300

Rural^c

3 351 500

502 100

37 900

370 200

4 261 700

Sub-total

12 628 800

3 326 300

998 900

5 107 100

22 060 300

Homelands

Metropolitan^a

4 734 500

4 600

3 600

1 700

4 744 400

Urban^b

1 181 600

5 900

800

6 500

1 194 800

Dense settlements^d

2 365 500

—
—
—
2 365 500
Rural^c
8 980 000
17 400
4 000
14 600
9 016 000
Sub-total
17 261 600
27 900
8 400
22 800
17 320 700
Total
29 889 600
3 354 200
1 007 300

5 129 900

39 381 000

a

Metropolitan areas comprise Bloemfontein, Cape Town, Durban, East London, the Orange Free State goldfields, Pietermaritzburg, Port Elizabeth, Pretoria and the Witwatersrand. Parts of these areas fall into the homelands.

b

Urban areas are defined as cities and towns not regarded as metropolitan, eg Kimberley, Rustenburg.

c

Rural areas have relatively low population densities and relatively high proportions of income derived from agriculture.

d

Dense settlements are peri-urban areas in the homelands where people do not derive significant income from

Language

According to the president of the English Academy of Southern Africa, Professor Elwyn Jenkins, of the 11 languages with official status, Zulu was the most widely spoken and Afrikaans the most widely understood. Home languages in South Africa (including the ten homelands) were as follows:⁷ [⁷ *Fast Facts no 3, 1992*]

Home languages: 1990

Language

Number of speakers

Proportion of population^a

Zulu

8 541 173

21,6%

Xhosa

6 891 358

17,4%

Afrikaans

6 188 981

15,7%

Tswana

3 601 609

9,1%

North Sotho

3 437 971

8,7%

English

3 432 042

8,7%

South Sotho

2 652 590

6,7%

Tsonga

1 349 022

3,4%

Swazi

926 094

2,3%

Ndebele

799 216

2,0%

Venda

763 247

1,9%

Other languages

942 697

2,4%

Total^b

39 526 000

100%

a

Figures may not add up owing to rounding.

b

Population figures are HSRC estim

Population growth

The Development Bank of Southern Africa said that between 1970 and 1992 the population had increased at a high although declining rate. In 1970 the de facto population of South Africa (including the ten homelands) was less than 22m, but it increased at more than 3% per year to reach almost 30m by the end of the 1970s. During the 1980s the average annual growth rate was slightly lower, at 2,6%.⁸ [⁸ DBSA, *South Africa: An Inter-regional Profile*]

The average population growth rate between 1991 and 1992 was 2,4%. The growth rate of the African population during this period was 2,8%; the coloured population, 1,7%; the Indian population, 1,5%; and the white population, 0,8%.

A study by the United States Bureau of the Census, which was published in 1992, showed that South Africa was the only country in sub-Saharan Africa with an annual birth rate of less than 35 per 1 000 people. The average for Africa was 45 per 1000 people, while the world average was 26 per 1 000 people.⁹ [⁹ *Daily Dispatch* 3 April 1992]

The bureau predicted that in the year 2000 the population of South Africa (including the ten homelands) would be about 51m and that by 2010 it would be more than 66m.¹⁰ [¹⁰ *Ibid* 3 May 1992] The most recent predictions by the Urban Foundation, made in 1990, were that by 2000 the population would be approximately 44m and by 2010 it would be 53m.¹¹ [¹¹ *Fast Facts* no 4, 1991]

The Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging (PWV) area, which constituted only 2,1% of the surface area of the country, accommodated 24% of the population in 1992. A spokesman for the Transvaal Provincial Administration said that the population of the region was expected to double by 2010.¹² [¹² *Eastern Province Herald* 23 September 1991] The deputy minister of regional development, Mr André Fourie, said in May 1992 that 60% of the growth of the population in the PWV would be in the low-income group, which was dependent largely on informal housing (see also chapter on *Housing and Urbanisation*)¹³ [¹³ *The Citizen* 19 May 1992]

During the period under review a number of people and organisations identified population growth as one of the most serious problems facing South Africa. The *Report of the Three Committees of the President's Council on a National Environmental Management System*, which was published in 1991, said that population growth posed the most serious threat to the environment because of the pressure

placed on natural resources and increased waste and pollution (see also chapter on *Environment*).¹⁴ [14 President's Council, *Report of the Three Committees of the President's Council on a National Environmental Management System*, Cape Town, 1991]

The Department of the Environment said in March 1992 that South Africa was becoming poorer and its ability to meet the need for housing, education and jobs was being eroded. The department added that the population growth rate had outstripped the economic growth rate for many years.¹⁵ [15 *Argus* 5 March 1992]

The director of the Institute of Futures Research at the University of Stellenbosch, Professor Philip Spies, said in May 1992 that although there had been no real increase in the number of people employed in the formal economy since 1988, the number of economically active people had increased by 2,2m. Of this number, 80% were Africans (see also chapter on *Employment*).¹⁶ [16 *Die Burger* 30 May 1992.]

The Foundation for Research Development (FRD) said that the government's family planning programme had been a total failure in rural areas and that it had little or no credibility among the African population. The FRD said that less than 26% of Africans were aware that the programme existed. The FRD recommended that contraceptive services, sex education and counselling should become readily available to everyone and that sterilisation be offered by every hospital. It said that ensuring a norm of two children per family should be a priority.¹⁷ [17 *Sowetan* 25 March 1992]

However, a social anthropologist at the Centre for Health Policy at the University of the Witwatersrand, Ms Barbara Klugman, argued that nowhere in the world had the mass provision of contraceptives led to a decline in the population growth rate unless it was also accompanied by an improvement in the position of women in society and in the overall standard of living. She said that it was not population numbers that threatened South Africa, but lack of security and unequal access to resources brought about by discriminatory practices.¹⁸ [18 Klugman B, 'Victims or Villains? Overpopulation and Environmental Degradation', in Cock J and Koch E, *Going Green: People, Politics and the Environment in South Africa*, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1991]

Population density

The average population density of South Africa (including the ten homelands) in 1992 was 32 people per square kilometre. In the homelands the average population density was 101 people per square kilometre and in the non-homeland area there were 21 people per square kilometre. The following table gives a breakdown of population densities in the provinces and the homelands:¹⁹ [19 Calculations based on figures provided in: DBSA, *South Africa.' An Inter-regional Profile*, Urban Foundation, *Population Trends*]

Population density: 1992

Surface area (km²)

Population density

Non-homeland area

Cape province

642 467

10,3

Natal

55 407

47,7

Orange Free State

126 077

16,9

Transvaal

224 705

47,5

'Independent' homelands

Bophuthatswana

40 011

62,7

Ciskei

8 100

107,8

Transkei

43 654

80,6

Venda

6 807

83,4

Non-independent homelands

Gazankulu

7 484

83,0

KaNgwane

3 917

130,5

KwaNdebele

2 208

244,4

KwaZulu

36 074

149,1

Lebowa

22 137

105,4

QwaQwa

1 040

448,5

Tota

Life expectancy and infant mortality

In 1992 average life expectancy at birth in South Africa (including the ten homelands) was 64 years. Africans had a life expectancy of 63 years, as did coloured people. Indians had a life expectancy of 67 years and whites a life expectancy of 73 years. The average life expectancy in developing countries was 62 years and in developed countries 74 years.²⁰ [²⁰ *Sunday Times* 10 May 1992]

According to the United States Bureau of the Census, South Africa's infant mortality rate was 51 per 1 000 live births in 1991, which was the second lowest in sub-Saharan Africa. Botswana had the lowest infant mortality rate in this region—43 per 1 000 live births. This compared with an average infant mortality rate in Africa of 104 per 1000 live births and a world average of 65 per 1 000 live births.²¹ [²¹ *Daily Dispatch* 3 April 1992]

A study conducted by Dr Alan Flisher for the Centre for Epidemiological Research in Southern Africa showed that between 1985 and 1986 the mortality rate in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands) for coloured people between the ages of 15 and 19 years was 189 per 100 000 people, and for Indians and whites in the same age group it was 116 per 100 000 people and 106 per 100 000 people respectively. No figures were given for African mortality rates in this age group because the data were unreliable. The comparable figure in the United States was 81 per 100 000 people. Dr Flisher said that the most important external cause of death of Indian and white adolescents was road accidents, while assault was the most important external cause of death of African and coloured teenagers ²² [²² *Cape Times* 20 May 1992]

Emigration and Immigration

In 1991, 12 379 immigrants settled in South Africa, most of whom had emigrated from Europe, followed by Asia and Africa.²³ [²³ *The Sunday Star* 16 February 1992] The following table compares emigration from, and immigration to, South Africa at five-year intervals between 1951 and 1991:²⁴ [²⁴ 1991/92 *Survey* p7; Central Statistical Service (CSS), *Tourism and Migration—March 1992*, Statistical News Release, P0351, 25 June 1992]

Emigration and immigration: 1951–1991

<i>Year</i>
Emigration
Immigration
Net gain (loss)
1951
15 546
15 890
344
1956
13 031
15 238
2 207
1961
15 046

16 373

1 327

1966

10 289

48 051

37 762

1971

8 407

35 845

27 438

1976

15 641

46 239

30 598

1981

8 791

41 542

32 751

1986

13 711

6 994

(6 717)

1991

4 256

12 379

8 123

Between 1950 and 1991 there were six years in which South Africa had a net loss of people due to emigration. There were net losses of 1 293 people in 1950, 2 900 in 1960, 1 178 in 1977, 2 017 in 1978, 6 717 in 1986 and 3 221 in 1987.²⁵ [25 1991792 *Survey* pp7-8] In the early 1980s a recruitment policy by the government and the private sector to offset the perceived 'brain drain' of the late 1970s caused the net gain through immigration to rise to more than 30 000 in both 1981 and 1982. According to the national director of the Immigration Information Centre, Dr Riaan Badenhorst, immigration had not again reached the levels recorded in 1981 and 1982 because of the 'severe recession in South Africa'.²⁶ [26 *The Weekly Mail* 21 February 1992]

In 1991 the ratio of economically active immigrants to non-economically active immigrants was 0,95:1. A total of 6 040 immigrants was economically active and 6 339 were not economically active, being either children, 'housekeepers', labour disabled (unable to work because of their disability), students or pensioners. Similarly, in 1991, 2 008 emigrants were economically active and 2 248 were not economically

A spokeswoman for the African National Congress (ANC), Ms Gill Marcus, said in February 1992 that the ANC was opposed to the government's policy of recruiting skilled workers from foreign countries and said that the focus should be on upgrading the 'massive unemployed pool' in South Africa. The information officer of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), Mr Neil Coleman, added that the government and the private sector used skilled immigrants in order to avoid the responsibility of upgrading the skills of South Africans. However, Dr Badenhorst said that the ANC and Cosatu were incorrect in believing that immigrants took jobs away from local people who needed them and added that over the previous ten years 40 small companies started by immigrants had created 3 000 jobs.²⁸ [28 *The Weekly Mail* 21 February 1992]

The 'brain drain'

The Central Statistical Service provided the following figures for the emigration and immigration of various professional people in 1981, 1986 and 1991:²⁹ [²⁹ 1991/92 *Survey* pp8-9; CSS, *Tourism and Migration - March 1992*, P0351]

Emigration and immigration of skilled people: 1981-1991

Emigrants

Immigrants

Net gain (loss)

Accountants

1981

128

297

169

1986

288

49

(239)

1991

70

105

35

Engineers

1981

263

1 350

1 087

1986

449

238

(211)

1991

210

105

(105)

Medical practitioners

1981

60

167

107

1986

97

57

(40)

1991

21

218

197

In the period 1985 to 1990 there was a net loss of 444 accountants through emigration, with losses occurring in each year from 1985 to 1989. In the same period there was a net gain of 369 engineers, with net losses of 211 and 75 occurring in 1986 and 1987 respectively. Between 1985 and 1990 there was a net gain of 132 medical practitioners, with net losses of 40,46 and eight medical practitioners occurring in 1986,1987 and 1988 respectively. In 1991 there was a net gain of 1 031 professional and semi-professional people and people in technical occupations, as well as a net gain of 561 people in managerial, executive and administrative occupations (see also chapter on *Emp*

Repatriation

It was reported in February 1992 that the actual number of immigrants to South Africa exceeded the official figures given by the government. Significant numbers of Bulgarian, Mozambican, Romanian, Russian and Zairean refugees were reported to be living illegally in South Africa.³¹ [³¹ *The Weekly Mail* 21 February 1992]

The director of Operation Hunger, Mrs Ina Periman, said in May 1992 that refugee camps in Gazankulu and KaNgwane were growing rapidly with the influx of between 500 and 1 000 people from other countries in Africa every month. Mr Phillip Rucassier, a fieldworker for Medians Sans Frontieres (Doctors without Frontiers), which provided medical services at Komatipoort (eastern Transvaal), said in the same month that his organisation fed about 25 000 refugees daily and estimated that there were about 60 000 refugees in the area.³² [³² *The Star* 20 May 1992]

In 1991 the Department of Home Affairs repatriated a total of 61 384 people. The department said that the majority of those repatriated had entered the country illegally, while some had entered legally and stayed beyond the expiry date of their temporary residence permits. The following table gives a breakdown of the number of people repatriated in 1991 and the countries to which they were repatriated:³³ [³³ Information supplied by the Department of Home Affairs, February 1992]

Repatriation of illegal immigrants:1991

Country

Number repatriated

Angola

1

Australia

1

Botswana

604

China (People's Republic)

1

Ghana

7

Greece

1

Kenya

2

Lesotho

4 440

Malawi

177

Mozambique

47 074

New Zealand

1

Portugal

1

Swaziland

1 868

Taiwan

1

Tanzania

15

United Kingdom

2

Zaire

13

Zambia

1

Zimbabwe

7

Deportations

In 1991 a total of 253 people were deported from 'South Africa', mainly as a result of their conviction for serious criminal acts. The following table gives a breakdown of the number of people who were deported in 1991 and the countries and homelands to which they were deported:³⁴ [³⁴ Information supplied by the Department of Home Affairs, February 1992]

Deportation in 1991

Country

Austria

1

Botswana

5

Lesotho

37

Luxembourg

1

Malawi

2

Mozambique

18

Swaziland

7

United Kingdom

1

Zimbabwe

4

Homeland

Bophuthatswana

3

Ciskei

20

Transkei

152

Venda

2

Total

253

Key Projections

- According to the Urban Foundation, the population of South Africa was expected to reach 44m by the year 2000 and 53m by 2010.
- The population of the Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging region was expected to double between 1992 and 2010.
- According to the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the population of South Africa is increasing at a high though

HEALTH AND WELFARE

Key Points

- Expenditure on AIDS increased from R5,4m in 1991/92 to R20,9m in 1992/93.
- In 1990 about 24% of all South Africans were covered by medical aid schemes, according to the registrar of medical aid schemes.
- The number of doctors registered with the South African Medical and Dental Council increased from 20 942 in 1989 to 24 619 in 1991.
- There were 140 460 nurses in South Africa in 1991, according to the South African Nursing Council.
- Some 2 314 doctors were granted permission to practise in South Africa between April 1990 and June 1992.
- Infant mortality rates per 1000 live births in 1990 were as follows: Africans, 52,8; coloured people, 28; Indians, 13,5; and whites, 7,3.
- In 1990 infant mortality rates in South African cities ranged from 10,2 in Durban to 41,3 in Port Elizabeth.
- In 1991 there were 7 003 beds in provincial hospitals and 641 beds in white own affairs hospitals which were not utilised.
- In 1991 ten white own affairs hospitals admitted only white patients.
- By 30 June 1992, 1316 cases of AIDS had been reported in South Africa (including the ten homelands).
- The prevalence rate of tuberculosis per 100 000 people increased from 463 in 1985 to 590 in 1990, ie by 27%.
- According to the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), in 1990/91, 4m people in South Africa (including the ten homelands) received welfare payments totalling R4,43bn.
- Calculated on a per capita basis, welfare payments in 1990/91 were as follows: Africans, R100; coloured people, R246; and Indians and whites, R200.

- According to the HSRC, 300 000 people in South Africa may be unaware of their right to receive welfare grants.
- In March 1992 the ratio of white to African pensions was reduced from 1,35:1 to 1,18:1. The government undertook to equalise all pensions from March 1993.
- According to the deputy minister of national health, Mr Fanus Schoeman, there were approximately 2,5m disabled people in South Africa.
- Reported cases of child rape increased from 1707 in 1988 to 2 915 in 1991, ie by 71%.

Health

Policy

The director general of national health and population development, Dr Coen Slabber, said in an interview with *Critical Health* in November 1991 that the priority of his department was the expansion of primary health care (PHC) services, which would, inter alia, involve the building of 180 clinics in deprived areas. He saw major obstacles to achievement of effective PHC as being the shortage of funds, resistance from the medical profession to PHC and rapid urbanisation, which put pressure on existing facilities.¹ [¹ *Critical Health* November 1991]

Dr Slabber said that his department was 'adamant' that there should be no racial discrimination in health services, and that equity should be one of the principles on which the health services were based. He reiterated that segregation of hospitals on the basis of race was unacceptable, although 'separating people, if they so wish, on a cultural basis, is fine'. Dr Slabber emphasised that individuals should be required to pay for medical care, although care should not be withheld if the individual had no funds.² [² *Ibid*]

In February 1992 the minister of national health, Dr Rina Venter, said in reply to a question in Parliament that her department had developed a model for restructuring the health services. The plan involved:³ [³ *Hansard* (A) 2 q cols 26-28,4 February 1992]

- devolving primary health care services to local authorities;
- granting maximum autonomy to academic hospitals;
- transferring academic hospitals from the provincial administrations to the Department of National

Health and Population Development; and

- evolving plans for a new health system.

Earlier, in January 1991, Dr Venter put forward plans which she said would reduce the costs of health care. Her proposals argued that:⁴ [⁴ *Business Day, The Natal Mercury* 10 January 1992]

- pharmacists should be granted the discretion to dispense schedule three and four drugs without a doctor's prescription;
- pharmacists should be given greater freedom to substitute generic medicines for more expensive brand names;
- patients should be responsible for part payment of medicines;
- single-exit prices on sales by pharmaceutical manufacturers should be introduced, to prevent manufacturers giving an unfair advantage to some pharmacists by selling medicines more cheaply to them;
- pharmacists should be given more discretion to treat minor ailments usually seen by a doctor; and
- restrictions which prevent the importation of medicines already manufactured in South Africa should be removed.

Dr Venter said that she would convene a meeting of key players in the health sector to consider her proposals for reducing costs and to discuss restructuring health services.

The executive director of the Representative Association of Medical Aid Schemes, Mr Rob Speedie, said that he welcomed Dr Venter's invitation and that his organisation would be keen to participate in discussions. Her suggestions also met with a positive response from the Medical Association of South Africa and the National Medical and Dental Association, both of which had several months previously called for Dr Venter's resignation.⁵ [⁵ *Business Day* 10 January 1992]

However, the African National Congress (ANC) criticised Dr Venter for 'acting unilaterally in her initiative to bring down the cost of medical care'. It called for Dr Venter to place a moratorium on her department's efforts to restructure the health system and to accept the right of other organisations to participate in restructuring. The ANC said that high medical costs were only a symptom of a system 'which has been constructed to protect the interests of the white minority and big business', and claimed

that apartheid in hospitals remained in place.⁶ [⁶ Ibid 13 January 1992]

The executive director of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association of South Africa, Mr John Toerien, criticised Dr Venter, saying that a 'piecemeal approach' to the crisis in health care would not provide the needed solutions. He called for a 'health Codesa', with parliamentary and extraparliamentary groups as well as health professionals involved in planning a new health-care strategy for South Africa.⁷

[⁷ *The Citizen* 13 February 1992]

However, despite criticism of Dr Venter, the forum on reducing health care costs, which was convened by the Department of National Health and Population Development in March 1992, was well attended.⁸

[⁸ *Financial Mail* 6 March 1992]

In May 1992 the deputy minister of national health, Mr Fanus Schoeman, said that the government favoured restructuring health services along regional lines. He proposed a central government department to formulate national health policy, with a single authority responsible for the delivery of health services within each region. Local authorities would then be responsible for primary health services.⁹ [⁹ *Business Day* 12 May 1992]

Alternative proposals

The **African National Congress** (ANC) said in its draft policy guidelines in April 1992 that it proposed the creation of a comprehensive and integrated national health service. Furthermore, it said that:¹⁰ [¹⁰ African National Congress, *ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa*, draft document for discussion, 27 April 1992]

- responsibility for health care should be divided between national, regional and local authorities;
- health education and community involvement in hygiene should be given high priority;
- the health service should take a leading role in co-ordinating sanitation, water supply and housing;
- there should be free and equal access to essential health care for all;
- the public health sector should be strengthened and made accountable to the communities it served;
- there should be active co-operation between the public and private health sectors; and
- affirmative action needed to be taken to ensure more African and women doctors were trained.

The **Conservative Party** said that it favoured the ‘necessary emphasis being placed on preventive and decentralised community health services’ while ‘avoiding the total socialisation of these services’.

The draft health policy document of the **Inkatha Freedom Party** (IFP) stated that ‘the IFP recognises the crucial need for the future government to provide health care facilities for all South Africans ... In an attempt to maintain the essential health care facilities needed in this country in the face of limited funding, these services must be directed into activities deemed more appropriate to the needs of the majority, rather than a rigid adherence to standards dictated by the first world’.

The **Pan-Africanist Congress** (PAC) said that it regarded the present health system as a colonial one which served the interests of whites, while neglecting those of blacks. A spokesman for the PAC said that the organisation was looking into the possibility of developing a democratic community-based health care system which was ‘decentralised and de-bureaucratized’.

The **South African Communist Party** stated in its draft health policy that the existing health care system had its roots in capitalism and colonialism, and that these ‘foundation stones’ needed to be broken, otherwise health care in South Africa would remain unchanged. The document stated further that health care was a basic human right, that health care provision was the responsibility of the state and that health care should be provided free of charge.¹¹ [¹¹ *Critical Health* November 1991]

Legislation

The **Nursing Amendment Act**, which was promulgated in March 1992, sought to make various amendments to the Nursing Act of 1978. In particular, the amendment act abolished representation based on race on the South African Nursing Council. It also empowered the council to impose a fine not exceeding R2 000 on any nurse found guilty of improper or disgraceful conduct. Furthermore, the amendment act removed the legal prohibition on strikes by nurses which had existed in the principal act. Although nurses who went on strike would no longer be subject to criminal prosecution, they could still be subjected to disciplinary action by the South African Nursing Council.¹² [¹² Nursing Amendment Bill, B20-92(GA)]

The **Medical, Dental and Supplementary Health Service Professions Bill** similarly removed the legal prohibition on doctors, dentists and psychologists going on strike, although they would still be liable to disciplinary action by the South African Medical and Dental Council.¹³ [¹³ Medical, Dental and Supplementary Health Service Professions Amendment Bill, B27B-92(GA)]

The **Medical Schemes Amendment Bill**, which sought to amend the Medical Schemes Act of 1967,

was gazetted in June 1991 (see *1991/92 Survey* p 118). The bill sought to:¹⁴ [¹⁴ *Financial Mail* 6 December 1991]

- abolish compulsory direct payment by medical aid schemes to suppliers of medical services;
- abolish minimum and maximum scales of benefits, which would mean that medical aid schemes would no longer be compelled to guarantee payments for services or to pay minimum amounts for particular services;
- require all medical aid schemes to become members of the Representative Association of Medical Schemes (Rams); and
- allow for the establishment of health maintenance organisations (HMOs), which would provide health services to members in return for a monthly premium. Any excess of income over expenditure would be distributed to health care professionals and shareholders in the HMOs.

The bill was supported by Rams, which said that deregulation would cut the costs of health care and allow medical aid schemes to be more innovative in the services they offered. It added that the current fee-for-service system led to the overuse of health-care services and financial abuse of the system by doctors. The association said that the proposed legislation would allow greater competition in the supply of medical care and hence reduce costs for the consumer.¹⁵ [¹⁵ *The Star* 5 December 1991]

However, the bill received widespread criticism from members of the medical profession. The Medical Association of South Africa, the National Medical and Dental Association (Namda) and the Dispensing Family Practitioners' Association (DFFA) rejected the bill as 'a desperate measure to save the imperilled medical schemes industry'.¹⁶ [¹⁶ *Sowetan* 2 December 1991]

In a joint statement, Namda and the DFFA said that the passing of the bill would result in the introduction of HMOs which would be reluctant to take on chronically ill or disabled patients. They argued that these patients would be 'forced' on to the 'already overburdened public health services, .. placing greater demands on state services to pick up the health needs of those likely to be jettisoned by the new-look medical schemes'. The two organisations said that the bill had been drawn up without adequate consultation and called on the government to declare a 'moratorium on all legislation which seeks to restructure the South African health sector by stealth'.¹⁷ [¹⁷ *Ibid*; *The Star* 10, 11 December 1991]

The Medical Schemes Amendment Bill was tabled again in Parliament in May 1992, with an additional clause which would allow married women to become members of a medical aid scheme in their own right.¹⁸ [¹⁸ *Business Day* 22 May 1992]

Finance

Expenditure on health is controlled by the Department of National Health and Population Development; the own affairs administrations for coloured people, Indians and whites; the four provincial administrations and the authorities of the ten homelands. More than half of all expenditure takes place at provincial level, for which no racial breakdown is available.

The minister of finance, Mr Barend du Plessis, announced in March 1992 that the government was to spend R9,93bn on health services in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands) in the 1992/93 financial year, which represented an increase of 22% on expenditure in the previous financial year. (Figures for expenditure are not comparable to figures given in the 1991/92 *Survey*, which excluded capital expenditure.)

Expenditure on health services in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands) in 1991/92 and 1992/93 was as follows:¹⁹ [19 McIntyre D, *Commentary on the 1992/93 Health Budget*, University of Cape Town, 1992; estimates of expenditure for the 1991/92 financial year for the 'independent' homelands]

Health expenditure in South Africa: 1991/92–1992/93

1991/92

1992/93

Increase (decrease)

R

R

Central government

Department of National Health and Population Development

571 882 000

1 110 078 000

94%

House of Assembly

518 371 000

702 422 000

36%

House of Delegates

36 127 000

54 341 000

50%

House of Representative

174 952 00

207 468 000

19%

Provinces

Cape province

1 916 909 000

2 145 609 000

12%

Natal

943 819 00

1 186 415 000

26%

Orange Free State

554 180 000

668 309 000

21%

Transvaal

2 450 190 00

2 858 464 000

17%

Homelands

'Independent'

902 014 303

N/A

N/A

Non-independent

964 906 000

988 234 000

2%

Walvis Bay

7 034 000

6 577 000

(6%)

Total

9 040 384 303

9 927 917 000

N/A

N/A–Not available

The director of the Centre for Health Policy at the University of the Witwatersrand, Mr Cedric de Beer, said that he welcomed the increase in health spending in the 1992/93 budget, but that what was important was how funds were targeted. He added that the planned transfer of primary health care services to local authorities should take place with the proviso that local authorities should not be expected to carry all the costs of health care.²⁰ [²⁰ *The Star* 19 March 1992]

The head of the health secretariat of the African National Congress, Dr Ralph Mgijima, said in response to the 1992/93 health budget that allocations seemed to be ‘broadly appropriate’. However, he questioned the ability of the health departments to deliver services in an effective and

Commenting on the 1992/93 budget, a researcher in the Department of Community Health at the University of Cape Town, Ms Diane McIntyre, said that it was noteworthy that there were significant increases in the health expenditure of the own affairs administrations at a time when a decreasing role for these departments would have been expected. Ms McIntyre also highlighted the real increases in the allocations to three of the provincial health services (Natal, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal) while the Cape was confronted with a decrease in real terms in its allocation.²² [²² McIntyre D, *Commentary’ on the 1992/93 Budget*]

Commenting on the allocation of funds to the Department of National Health and Population Development, Ms McIntyre said that:

- the most significant increase in the department’s allocation was an amount of R440m for the nutrition development programme (see *Malnutrition* below). In the previous financial year R220m had been allocated to this programme, but it had not been included in the department’s budget;
- if the amount of R440m was deducted from the department’s budget, the increase in the department

vote was 15%, and not 94%;

- the nearly four-fold increase in expenditure on the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) (from R5,4m in 1991/92 to R20,9m in 1992/93) was to be welcomed. However, Ms McIntyre cautioned that the allocation could be insufficient in view of the seriousness of the AIDS epidemic; and
- despite the government's claim that it was prioritising primary health care, the allocation for primary health care had increased by only 15% between 1991/92 and 1992/93, and constituted only 5% of total health expenditure.

Ms McIntyre pointed out that if the R440m allocated to the nutrition development programme was excluded from health expenditure, the increase in health spending would be 17%, and not 22%, as Mr du Plessis had suggested. This increase did not constitute a significant increase in real terms.

Introducing her budget vote in Parliament in April 1992, the minister of national health, Dr Rina Venter, said that South Africans could no longer afford to be ill. She pointed out that the amounts paid by medical aid schemes to private hospitals had risen by 55% between 1989 and 1990. Dr Venter said that South Africans were among the highest claimants for health services in the world. She suggested that there would have to be a revision of 'established interests and consumer patterns' if the survival of the private health sector was to be ensured ²³ [²³ *The Star* 29 April 1992]

Provincial health budgets

While the allocations for provincial health services in Natal, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal increased by 26%, 21% and 17% respectively between 1991/92 and 1992/93, the allocation for health services in the Cape province increased by only 12% over the same period. This meant that the Cape was the only province to show a real decrease in expenditure between 1991/92 and 1992/93.

Despite the increase in the allocation to health services in Natal, the member of the executive council (MEC) of Natal for health services, Mr Peter Miller, said that there was a shortfall in funds for the province. He pointed out that Natal received only R191 per capita for health services, as against R355 for the Cape, R246 for the Orange Free State and R217 for the Transvaal. Mr Miller indicated that because of limited funding Addington Hospital (Durban) might have to turn away 52 000 outpatients at specialist level and deny 4 800 patients admission in 1992. He added that Addington Hospital could be forced to close 112 beds and the RK Khan Hospital (also in Durban) compelled to close another 145 beds. ²⁴ [²⁴ *The Natal Mercury* 8 April 1992]

In April 1992 the member of the executive council of the Transvaal for health services, Mr Fanie Ferreira, said that all four provinces had decided to announce a simultaneous increase from 1 May of

12% in hospital tariffs. He also said that all ambulance tariffs in rural areas were to drop by approximately half.²⁵ [²⁵ *Business Day* 9 April 1992]

Homelands budget

The ten homelands administration made the following allocation for spending on health in the 1990/91 and 1991/92 financial year:²⁶ [²⁶ Estimates of expenditure for Bophuthatswana, the Ciskei, Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa, QwaQwa, the Transkei and Venda for the 1990/91 and 1991/92 financial years]

Health expenditure in the homelands:1990/91–1991/92

1990/91

1991/92

Increase

R

R

Bophuthatswana

147 836 630

224 023 740

28%

Ciskei

158 863 000

223 000 000

40%

Gazankulu

88 365 200

127 705 700

45%

KaNgwane

49 736 656

62 619 206

26%

KwaNdebele

8 314 000

8 820 000

6%

KwaZulu

345 656 493

460 840 000

33%

Lebowa

157 034 197

259 500 214

65%

QwaQwa

30 450 000

43 330 000

42%

Transkei

307 944 000

380 816 000

24%

Venda

52 992 545

74 174 563

40%

Total

1 374 195 721

1 864 8

Medical aid schemes

The 1991 annual report of the registrar of medical schemes provided the following figures regarding membership of medical aid schemes by race, as at 31 December 1990:²⁷ [27 Report of the registrar of medical schemes to the central council for medical schemes for the year ending 31 December 1991]

Membership of medical aid schemes: 31 December 1990

Members

Dependants

Beneficiaries

African

472 833

969 092

1 441 925

Coloured

374 068

590 145

964 213

Indian

135 432

193 211

328 643

White

1 393 407

2 059 786

3 453 193

Total

2 375 740

3 812 234

Between 1989 and 1990 membership of registered medical aid schemes grew as follows: Africans, 5%; coloured people, 3%; Indians, 5%; and whites, 0,02%.

The report of the registrar of medical schemes added that a further 1092 000 people were believed to belong to medical aid schemes which were not required to register with the registrar. It said that about 24% of the total population enjoyed some form of health-care cover in 1990.

The registrar said in his report for 1991 that during the year the following requirements had been introduced for the registration of new medical aid schemes:

- a minimum of 2 500 members;
- a cash deposit of R1m on or before the date of registration; and
- a financial guarantee of a further R1m issued by a recognised financial institution.

In October 1991 the managing director of Medscheme, Mr Les Hollis, said that medical aid fraud and abuse cost the industry about R240m a year, and probably accounted for 5% of annual medical aid scheme costs. He added that it took on average six months to detect a fraudulent claim.²⁸ [²⁸ *Business Day* 28 October 1991]

In August 1992 the marketing director of Affiliated Medical Administrators, Mr Ray Welham, said that about 25% of medical aid contributions were wasted on fraud and overutilisation of medical services, costing the medical aid schemes R1bn a year.²⁹ [²⁹ *The Star* 10 August 1992]

In October 1992 the Representative Association of Medical Aid Schemes announced average increases of 16% in its scales of benefits. The increases, which were to take effect on 1 January 1992, followed an 8% increase in scales of benefits in September 1991 to compensate for the introduction of value added tax (VAT).³⁰ [³⁰ *Sowetan* 15 October 1991]

In November 1991 it was disclosed that during 1990 nine medical aid schemes had been declared insolvent and a further 88 had incurred financial losses.³¹ [³¹ *Business Day* 27 November 1992] Three medical aid schemes were declared insolvent during 1991.³² [³² *Ibid* 5 May 1992]

The chairman of Medicaid, Mr Leon Lewis, said in December 1991 that changes in South Africa's medical aid industry could compel employers to take a 'radically new look' at the provision of health care benefits to workers. He pointed out that medical costs were escalating by 25% a year. If the current

rate of health care escalation continues, the burden of costs as a percentage of total payroll will double in less than ten years.’ Mr Lewis believed that an aging population and the resulting increase in the number of pensioners on medical aid schemes were placing a burden on active employees, as traditionally medical aid cover had been provided for pensioners at significantly subsidised rates. He argued that younger employees would find medical aid scheme membership increasingly unattractive unless subsidies of pensioners were reduced.³³ [³³ *The Natal Mercury* 30 December 1991]

A researcher at the Centre for Health Policy at the University of the Witwatersrand, Dr Max Price, said that the medical aid schemes had failed to provide medical care for the majority of South Africans. He pointed in particular to the fact that only 5% of Africans were beneficiaries of such schemes. Dr Price argued that medical aid schemes should be replaced by a compulsory national health insurance scheme to be run by the state. Subscription fees for all employed people should be proportional to individual earnings, he said. Dr Price added that the contributions of the informal sector and the unemployed should be covered by cross-subsidisation and tax revenue. He envisaged that such a scheme would be able to provide equitable health care to all South Africans.³⁴ [³⁴ *The Star* 22 October 1991, *Financial Mail* 8 November 1991]

Medical personnel

According to the South African Medical and Dental Council (SAMDC) and the South African Pharmacy Council, the following numbers of dentists, doctors and pharmacist were registered with the councils in 1989, 1990 and 1991 (figures exclude the ‘independent’ homelands):³⁵ [³⁵ Figures provided by the South African Medical and Dental Council and the South African Pharmacy Council, 30 June 1992]

Registered dentists, doctors and pharmacists: 1989–1991

Year

Dentists

Doctors

Pharmacists

1989

3 581

20 942

8 545

1990

3 775

23 139

8 794

1991

3 944

24 619

9 058

The minister of health services and welfare (white own affairs), Dr Rina Venter, said in reply to a question in Parliament in March 1992 that the following number of posts had not been filled in hospitals falling under the white own affairs administration as at 28 February 1992:³⁶ ^{[36} *Hansard (A) 6 q col 556, 25*
March 1992.]

Unfilled posts in white own affairs hospitals: 28 February 1992

Province

Doctors

Nurses

Support staff

Cape province

12

93

72

Natal

—

—

—

Orange Free State

4

20

32

Transvaal

95

715

109

Total

111

Doctors

In October 1991 the SAMDC reinstated Dr Benjamin Tucker on the medical register. Dr Tucker had been struck from the medical roll in 1985 after a disciplinary committee of the SAMDC had found him guilty of disgraceful conduct in his treatment of a black consciousness leader, Mr Steve Biko, who died in detention in 1977 (see 1986 *Survey* Part 2 p784).³⁷ [³⁷ *The Star* 16 October 1992]

In South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands) the ratio of the population to doctors improved between 1970 and 1991 from 1663:1 to 1562:1. However, these figures conceal the maldistribution of

medical personnel, with the largest numbers in urban and metropolitan areas and considerable shortages of doctors in rural areas, particularly in the homelands.

A letter by Drs P Jaques and R de Swardt to the *South African Medical Journal* in March 1992 pointed to the shortage of doctors in Gazankulu and Venda. Some 46% of official posts for doctors in Gazankulu were unfilled and 30% of posts were filled by foreign doctors. Furthermore, 35% of doctors in government posts in Gazankulu had less than two years' experience. In Venda only 15% of official posts were unfilled, but 62% of posts were filled by foreign doctors and 47% of doctors in Venda had less than two years' experience. Drs Jaques and de Swardt suggested that rural medical practice be accepted as a special discipline at training institutions and that efforts be made to create a career structure for rural medical posts which was 'at least as attractive as that of urban specialist practice'.³⁸ [³⁸ *South African Medical Journal*, vol 81 no 6, 21 March 1992]

Hundreds of doctors were reported to have entered South Africa after the SAMDC abolished examination requirements for foreign doctors in April 1990. Between April 1990 and June 1992, 2 314 foreign doctors had been granted limited registration to practise in South Africa, including 710 doctors from eastern Europe, 365 from India and 183 from Pakistan. However, in January 1992, after complaints that immigrant doctors did not meet local standards and that they were taking jobs away from local doctors and from returning exiles, examination requirements were reinstated. It was reported that when examination requirements for immigrant doctors were reintroduced, 50% of those who wrote the examination failed it.³⁹ [³⁹ *The Weekly Mail* 21 February 1992, *Cape Times* 31 July 1992]

The minister of home affairs, Mr Eli Louw, said in reply to a question in Parliament in April 1992 that the following numbers of doctors had emigrated from, and immigrated to, South Africa during 1989, 1990 and 1991:⁴⁰ [⁴⁰ *Hansard* (D) 11 q cols 837-838, 28 April 1992]

Doctors emigrating from and immigrating to South Africa: 1989-1991

Year

Emigrants

Immigrants

1989

36

69

1990

30

135

1991

23

229

In the same month the minister of national health, Dr Rina Venter, said that the Cabinet had decided that planning regarding three new academic hospitals—in Durban, Pretoria and at the Medical University of Southern Africa (Medunsa) near Pretoria—would be suspended owing to lack of funds. She added that a task group had been appointed to look at the question of medical training facilities. The group comprised the director general of national health and population development, representatives of the provincial administrations, deans of the faculties of medicine at the universities and members of the KwaZulu Department of Health. Its brief was

- to determine whether present training facilities could be upgraded;
- to determine whether additional facilities were needed;
- to examine the possibility of employing alternative training facilities in Durban; and
- to determine the manpower and financial implications of these recommendations.

Speaking in the KwaZulu legislative assembly in mid 1992, the KwaZulu minister of health, Dr B S Ngubane, said that KwaZulu had had less difficulty in obtaining medical personnel to staff its hospitals after the SAMDC had relaxed regulations concerning the registration of doctors who had qualified in foreign countries. He remarked that his department had been faced with a ‘flood of enquiries’ from doctors in eastern Europe and from Burma. As a result his department had been able to appoint doctors to all vacant posts in the homeland. Nevertheless, Dr Ngubane said, overseas training was highly specialised and did not prepare doctors adequately for working in rural conditions.⁴² [42 Policy speech of the KwaZulu minister of health, Dr B S Ngubane, to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, 1992]

Nurses

The South African Nursing Council provided the following figures for the total number of nurses of all race groups in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands) in 1991. A racial breakdown was not available.⁴³ [43 Figures provided by the South African Nursing Council, 1 July 1992]

Nurses in South Africa: 1991

Registered nurses

67 894

Enrolled nurses and midwives

28 047

Nursing assistants

44 519

Total

140 460

The number of nurses in 1991 represented a decline of 5% on the number registered in 1990. As the South African population was growing at a rate of 2,4% a year, the number of nurses needed to grow at the same rate if the population/nurse ratio was to be maintained. The decline in the number of nurses thus represented a worsening of this ratio.

The Nursing Amendment Act was promulgated in March 1992 (see also *Legislation* above). It abolished representation on the South African Nursing Council based on race. The amendment act also removed a restriction in the principal act which had made strikes by nurses illegal. Strikes by nurses would no longer be liable to criminal prosecution; instead they would be subject to disciplinary action by the council

In the same month the South African Nursing Council found five nurses at the Tygerberg Hospital (Cape Town) guilty of disgraceful conduct arising from the death of a post-operative patient in 1988. The five nurses were reported to have been working in an understaffed ward which was 130% full. One of the nurses, Miss Bernice Appel, who had been in charge of the ward in question, had been qualified for only 15 months at the time of the death, and had been responsible for three other wards. The manager of nursing services at Tygerberg Hospital, Miss Lilian White, said that in terms of understaffing many

wards at the hospital had been even worse off.⁴⁵ [⁴⁵ *The Citizen* 4 March 1992]

In May 1992 it was reported that Transvaal provincial hospitals were experiencing a severe shortage of nurses. Of 33 787 nursing posts in the province, only 29 771 posts were filled, leaving 4 016 (or 12% of posts) vacant. The Transvaal Provincial Administration said that more than 800 nursing staff had resigned from the province's employ in 1991, compared to about 300 in 1990. The problem was believed to have been aggravated by a decline of 10% in 1991 in the number of student nurses registering for training in the Transvaal.⁴⁶ [⁴⁶ *The Star* 6 May 1992]

The South African Nursing Association (Sana) said that nurses were leaving public-sector hospitals 'in droves' for the more lucrative private sector. It attributed this trend to poor overtime allowances and to bad working conditions and inferior equipment in the public sector. Sana called on the government to improve pay and working conditions for nurses. A spokesman for the National Education, Health and Allied Workers' Union (Nehawu), Mr Phillip Dexter, described conditions in provincial hospitals as 'intolerable', especially as in his view the government was cutting back on services.⁴⁷ [⁴⁷ *Ibid*]

Also in May, Dr Venter gave the following figures for the number of nurses who were employed in hospitals in each province in 1991, and the number who resigned during the year:⁴⁸ [⁴⁸ *Hansard* (A) 18 q cols 1151-1152, 26 May 1992]

Nurses employed and resignations: 1991

No employed

No of resignations

Cape

7 941

555

Natal

4 707

499

Orange Free State

3 531

327

Transvaal

11 185

1 229

Total

27 364

2

Traditional healers

The Centre for Health Policy at the University of the Witwatersrand suggested in January 1992 that traditional healers be given some form of official recognition by the formal health services. The centre said that although no exact figures were available, there were probably more traditional healers than doctors and nurses in South Africa, and they were consulted by some 80% of the African population. The Health Act of 1974 constrained healers not registered with the SAMDC from practising any act pertaining to the medical profession. However, traditional healers continued to practise and were generally not harassed by the medical profession.⁴⁹ [49 Centre for Health Policy, *Traditional Healers in South Africa: A Proposal*, University of the Wit-watersrand, January 1992]

The Centre for Health Policy argued that traditional healers would continue to provide services even if antagonistic policies towards them were adopted. It said that if they were recognised formally mechanisms could be set up to register and control them. Training and practice standards would have to be set up from within the framework of traditional healing to eliminate ‘undesirable health practices’.

The centre maintained that traditional and modern health services should run parallel to each other. Traditional healers could thereby be encouraged to engage in primary health care practices such as the oral rehydration of children and nutrition programmes. The advantage of utilising traditional healers, especially in rural areas, was believed to be their accessibility and acceptability to local communities.

A spokesman for the South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers’ Union, Mr William Dichaba, said in January 1992 that traditional healers were a vital issue for his union’s members. He

added that companies were coming under increased pressure from unions to recognise traditional forms of medicine. Mr Dichaba said that some companies had already accepted the legitimacy of healers and were experimenting with granting sick leave prescribed by them.⁵⁰ [⁵⁰ *Business Day* 27 January 1992]

In February 1992, after negotiations with the union, the University of Pretoria agreed to grant sick leave to employees on presentation of a certificate from a traditional healer.⁵¹ [⁵¹ *The Citizen* 21 February 1992]

The South African Traditional Healers' Council was reported in the same month to have 250 000 members (see *Health Organisations* below).

Other health workers

In June 1992 Nehawu demanded that hospital workers be granted a minimum monthly salary of R724, an area allowance in certain urban areas of R75 a month, an across-the-board salary increase of 15,3%, six months' paid maternity leave and a 40-hour working week. In response to the union's demands, the Commission for Administration offered a minimum wage of R708 and an across-the-board increase of 9,2%. Nehawu turned down this offer and called on hospital workers to go on strike.⁵² [⁵² *The Star* 19, 24 June 1992]

The subsequent strike involved 5 000 workers at 21 hospitals in the Cape, 600 workers at two hospitals in the Orange Free State and 12 000 workers at 18 hospitals in the Transvaal. Figures were not available for the number of workers at hospitals in Natal who took part in the strike, but the strike received least support in that province.⁵³ [⁵³ *The Citizen* 24, 26 June 1992, 1, 29, 30 July 1992; *The Argus* 24 June 1992; *The Star* 15 July 1992; *Business Day* 23 June 1992, 9 July 1992]

At the end of June 1992 more than 7 000 general assistants at hospitals in the Transvaal were dismissed. Some 500 workers were re-employed, but the remainder were replaced by new applicants for their jobs. The Transvaal Provincial Administration subsequently held talks with representatives of Nehawu regarding the possibility of reinstating the dismissed workers, but the discussions ended without an agreement on this issue being reached. However, in August 1992 it was reported that the Cape Provincial Administration (CPA) had reached agreement with Nehawu about striking hospital workers in the Cape province returning to work. The CPA said that it would not take disciplinary steps against any worker or dismiss any worker who had taken part in the strike, and it would make representations to the Commission for Administration for mediation to resolve the dispute underlying the strike.⁵⁴ [⁵⁴ *The Citizen* 13 August 1992]

Between June and August 1992 there were numerous reports of intimidation and attacks of hospital

workers who had not joined the strike. There were also reports of attacks on striking workers, particularly of workers involved in marches and demonstrations (see also chapter on *Labour Relations*).

Health indicators

The minister of national health, Dr Rina Venter, said in Parliament in April 1992 that the infant mortality rate per 1 000 live births for South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands) in 1990 was as follows: Africans, 52,8; coloured people, 28; Indians, 13,5; and whites, 7,3. The infant mortality rates for Africans according to area were as follows: non-homeland area, 50; non-independent homelands, 54,4; and 'independent' homelands, 59,8.⁵⁵ [⁵⁵ *The Star* 9 April 1992]

Figures for infant mortality rates for all races for various South African cities in 1990 were as follows: Durban, 10,2; Johannesburg, 13,6; Pretoria, 15,5; Cape Town, 16,9; Soweto, 26,1; Bloemfontein (Orange Free State), 30,4; and Port Elizabeth (eastern Cape), 41,3.⁵⁶ [⁵⁶ *Eastern Province Herald* 10 March 1992]

Health indicators for 1989 for the various regions, as provided by the Development Bank of Southern Africa, were as follows:

Health indicators by development region: 1989

Developments region

HosDoctors per 1 000 population^b

Nurses per 1 000 population^c

TreA (western Cape)

5,7

1,3

6,9

0,1

B (northern Cape/ western Transvaal)

3,8

0,3

4,1

0,2

non-homeland area

4,5

0,4

4,1

0,2

Bophuthatswana

2,2

0,0

4,1

0,1

C (Orange Free State)

3,6

0,4

3,7

0,1

non-homeland area

3,7

0,5

3,8

0,1

Bophuthatswana

5,7

0,2

5,8

0,2

QwaQwa

2,8

0,1

2,8

0,1

D (eastern Cape)

4,1

0,4

3,9

0,1

non-homeland area

6,0

0,7

5,8

0,1

Ciskei

4,2

0,4

3,3

0,1

Transkei

2,2

0,1

2,2

0,1

E (Natal)

4,0

0,5

4,6

0,1

non-homeland area

8,7

1,3

11,0

0,1

KwaZulu

2,0

0,1

1,7

0,0

Transkei

2,1

0,1

2,3

0,1

Health indicators by development region: 1989 (continued)

Developments region

Hospital beds per

1 Doctors per 1 000 population^b

Nurses per 1 000 population^c

Treatment points per

1 F (eastern Transvaal)

2,8

0,3

3,1

0,1

non homeland area

3,1

0,3

3,7

0,1

KaNgwane

1,8

0,1

1,5

0,1

G (northern Transvaal)

2,6

0,1

3,8

0,1

non-homeland area

3,8

0,7

15,4

0,1

Gazankulu

3,1

0,1

4,2

0,1

Lebowa

2,1

0,0

1,9

0,2

Venda

2,8

0,1

2,1

0,1

H (PWV^e)

4,0

0,9

4,7

0,1

non-homeland

4,6

1,1

5,6

0,0

Bophuthatswana

0,7

0,1

2,0

0,1

KwaNdebele

0,05

0,0

0,4

0,1

J (western Transvaal)

4,6

0,3

3,7

0,1

non-homeland area

5,4

0,4

3,7

0,1

Bophuthatswana

3,5

0,1

3,6

0,1

South Africa^f

4,0

0,6

4,5

0,1

a

Excluding beds at mental and dental institutions

b

Including doctors in private practice

c

Including registered nurses, enrolled nurses and nursing assistants

d

Includes hospitals, health centres and clinics, but excludes mobile clinics

e

Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging

f

Includes all ten homelands

Life expectancy at birth for the various race groups in South Africa in various years from 1950 to 1987 was as follows:⁵⁷ [57 Department of National Health and Population Development, *Health Trends in South Africa*, 1992]

Life expectancy at birth in years: 1950–1987

African

Coloured

Indian

White

1950

45

46

55

67

1960

N/A

52

58

68

1970

51

52

61

68

1980

55

58

65

70

1985

62

62

67

71

1987

63

63

67

73

N/A - Not available

Health services

Family planning

In its annual report for 1991 the Department of National Health and Population Development said that there were 60 196 family planning clinics in South Africa (excluding the ‘independent’ homelands). This figure represented 8 223 more clinics than in 1990. The period 1 April 1990 to 31 March 1991 saw an increase of 6% in clinic attendance compared with the same period in 1989/90.⁵⁸ [58 Department of National Health and Population Development, 1991, annual report]

The department said that it aimed to reduce the total fertility rate (ie the average number of children per woman) to 2,1 by the year 2010. It provided the following figures for the total fertility rates for different race groups in South Africa (including the ten homelands) between 1986 and 1990:

Total fertility rate: 1986–1990

African

Asian

Coloured

White

1986

5,2

2,8

3,6

2,1

1987

5,1

2,5

3,2

2,0

1988

5,0

2,4

3,0

1,8

1989

4,9

2,3

2,9

1,7

1990

4,7

2,3

2,8

1,7

In March 1992 the government announced that from 1 April pharmacists would be able to provide contraceptive pills directly to women without requiring doctors' prescriptions. The contraceptives would be provided on the basis that:⁵⁹ [⁵⁹ *The Weekly Mail* 6 March 1992]

- pharmacists dispensing contraceptive pills would have to attend a course in family planning run by the Department of National Health and Population Development;
- they would be required to take a medical history from each woman requiring contraception;
- each woman would be required to furnish evidence that she had had an annual check-up, including a pap smear; and
- the cost of contraceptive pills would be borne by the state, although pharmacists would be entitled to charge a fee for dispensing them.

In 1991 a total of 981 legal abortions were performed in South Africa, 46 of which followed incidents of rape or incest

Hospitals

The minister of national health, Dr Rina Venter, provided figures in Parliament in February and April 1992 regarding beds in hospitals which were not utilised in 1991:⁶¹ [⁶¹ *Hansard* (A) 3 q cols 70-73, 12 February 1992; *Hansard* (A) 11 q cols 826-829, 27 April 1992]

Unutilised hospital beds: 1991

Provincial hospitals

White own affairs hospitals

Cape province

5 443

6

Natal

462

10

Orange Free State

237

12

Transvaal

861

613

Total

7 003

641

The reasons given for the underutilisation of hospital facilities included a shortage of funds and a shortage of nursing staff (see *Finance* and *Medical Personnel* above).

There were numerous reports during the period under review of deteriorating conditions at government hospitals owing to shortages of funds. In March 1992 some doctors at Hillbrow Hospital (Johannesburg) said that they were each seeing as many as 50 patients a day. They said that stationery and drug

shortages were commonplace and that they had been told to cut down on the number of tests they performed on patients. It was alleged that the Transvaal Provincial Administration had shown a 'complete lack of interest' in Hillbrow Hospital. It was also reported that teaching hospitals such as the Hillbrow Hospital were being used for basic curative services in the absence of conveniently placed primary health care services in rapidly growing urban areas.⁶² [⁶² *The Weekly Mail* 27 March 1992]

In April 1992 the Johannesburg Hospital was alleged to be referring sick people and women in labour to other hospitals because of an acute shortage of beds. The chief superintendent of the hospital, Dr J Botha, said that its budget would have to be doubled to enable the hospital to open all its available wards. Potential patients were urged not to report to the Johannesburg Hospital without giving prior notice.⁶³ [⁶³ *Business Day* 9 April 1992]

A report by the Critical Care Society of Southern Africa in the same month said that as many as 20% of the beds in intensive care units (ICUs) in hospitals in South Africa had been closed owing to a shortage of trained staff. The president of the society, Dr Dick Burrows, warned that a crisis point had been reached where critically ill patients had to be turned away from ICUs.⁶⁴ [⁶⁴ *The Star* 21 April 1992]

In May 1992 the African National Congress Women's League appealed to Dr Venter to improve hospital services at Khayelitsha (western Cape). The league said that the day hospital in Khayelitsha was staffed, by only seven doctors and yet it served a population of half a million. Patients were reported to be queueing at the hospital from 4,30am in order to see a doctor and 'at least a hundred a day' were being turned away. The league claimed that women in labour were compelled to share beds with other women at the hospital. Patients with serious injuries were said to have to find their own way to other hospitals because the ambulance service was so inadequate

Desegregation of hospitals

Dr Venter had announced in May 1990 that provincial hospitals were to be opened to all races (see *1989/90 Survey* pp387–388). However, white own affairs hospitals continued to admit mainly white patients (80% of patient intake in 1991 being white). In 1991 the occupancy rates at white own affairs hospitals varied as follows: in the Cape, from 19% to 104%; in Natal, from 36% to 93%; in the Orange Free State, from 8% to 62%; and in the Transvaal, from 20% to 104%.⁶⁶ [⁶⁶ *Hansard* (A) 3 q cols 70-72, 12 February 1992]

In August 1991 the South African Chamber of Business published a report entitled *The Health Care Crisis in South Africa*. The report said that racial segregation was still being encountered in the public health sector. It maintained that Dr Venter's statement in 1990 regarding the desegregation of hospitals had left too many loopholes to ensure real integration. Most superintendents [of hospitals] say they have not received written instructions from provincial authorities and refuse to desegregate their hospitals

until they receive such instructions'. The study urged the government to create a single health department to ensure equal treatment for all.⁶⁷ [⁶⁷ *The Star* 10 September 1992]

Dr Venter said in reply to a question in Parliament in February 1992 that the number of patients of different race groups admitted to hospitals under the control of the white own affairs administration in 1991 was as follows:⁶⁸ [⁶⁸ *Hansard* (A) 3 q cols 71-76, 12 February 1992]

Patients admitted to white own affairs hospitals: 1991

African

Asian

Coloured

White

Cape province

3 900

256

2 700

22 581

Natal

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Orange Free State

70

5

1

12 317

Transvaal

19 537

1 150

4 168

93 997

Total

23 507

1 411

6 869

128 895

Dr Venter revealed earlier in Parliament that ten white own affairs hospitals had admitted white patients only in 1991 (in comparison to 22 in 1990). One of these hospitals was in the Cape, three were in the Orange Free State and six were in the Transvaal.

Primary health care

In its annual report for 1991 the Department of National Health and Population Development said that in 1991 it had paid R176m to local authorities to provide primary health care (PHC). It also spent R3m on the erection of 14 clinic buildings, the extension of another nine clinic buildings and the purchase of three mobile clinics. During the year the department had also received an allocation of R39m from the government from the sale of strategic oil reserves. The funds were used to erect eight prefabricated clinics in underdeveloped areas and to provide 20 mobile clinics for PHC.⁷⁰ [70 Department of National

Health and Population Development, 1991 annual report₁**Diseases**

The number of cases of some specific notifiable diseases in South Africa (excluding the ‘independent’ homelands) in 1990 and 1991 was as follows:⁷¹ [⁷¹ *Hansard* (A) 7 q cols 590-592, 30 March 1992; Department of National Health and Population Development, *Health Trends in South Africa*, 1992₁

Notifiable diseases: 1990–1991*Disease*

1990

1991^a**Cholera**

1

2

Diphtheria

34

12

Leprosy

41

21

Malaria

6 822

4 342

Measles

10 622

2 088^c

Meningococcal infection

926

696

Poliomyelitis

5

1

Trachoma

325

—

Tuberculosis^b

80 318

67 056

Typhoid fever

2 146

1 116

Viral hepatitis

2 639

2 420

a

Including only notifications for 1919 made by 23 March 1992

b

Figures for 1990 include the Transkei.

c

The drop in the number of cases of measles can be ascribed partly to the measles immunisation campaign and partly to the fact that notifications for 1991 are incomplete.

The number of reported deaths from these notifiable diseases in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands) in 1989,1990 and 1991 was as follows:

Reported deaths from notifiable diseases: 1989 and 1990

Disease

1989

1990^a

1991^a

Cholera

3

—

—

Diphtheria

4

1

3

Leprosy

15

—

—

Malaria

36

35

19

Measles

808

55

29

Meningococcal infection

104

85

77

Poliomyelitis

5

—

Trachoma

Tuberculosis

6 511

2 384

1 979

Typhoid fever

132

29

29

Viral hepatitis

63

64

58

a

Noti

Acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS)

Policy

In the 1992/93 financial year the government budgeted to spend R20,9m on AIDS, in comparison with an allocation of R5,4m in 1991/92.

In November 1991 the South African Defence Force (SADF) announced that it had introduced testing for AIDS of recruits to the Permanent Force. The director of the South African Medical Services in the SADF, Brigadier Tristan Dippenaar, said that such tests formed part of a battery of medical tests.⁷² [⁷² *The Citizen* 7 November 1991]

In January 1992 the AIDS unit of the Department of National Health and Population Development announced that an 'AIDS and lifestyle' education package for secondary schools would be made available to all education departments within the next month. The package was described as consisting of 'factual information on AIDS, including the modes of transmission and prevention. It is, in particular, aimed at providing the adolescent with the necessary life skills, enabling them to make appropriate and responsible decisions regarding behaviour in interpersonal and sexual relationships'.⁷³ [⁷³ Information supplied by the Department of National Health and Population Development, 29 January 1992]

The AIDS unit also said that it was developing a training package for health care workers and social workers. In addition, it was conducting a nationwide 'knowledge, attitudes and beliefs survey' about AIDS. The results of the survey were to be used to structure future education programmes according to the needs of particular target groups. The AIDS unit said people with low literacy skills and those living in informal settlements needed to be especially targeted for AIDS education, and radio and 'other unorthodox methods' would be used to reach them.⁷⁴ [⁷⁴ Information supplied by the Department of National Health and Population Development, 29 January 1992]

The minister of justice, Mr Kobie Coetsee, said in March 1992 that the South African Law Commission had been requested to investigate all aspects of the law regarding AIDS. The issues to be investigated included the rights of people with AIDS, the rights of health workers, the role of AIDS testing, security of information about individuals' human immune-deficiency virus (HIV) status, employment rights and abortion.⁷⁵ [⁷⁵ *Business Day* 6 March 1992] In August the commission called for submissions from the public regarding changes to laws affecting AIDS.⁷⁶ [⁷⁶ *The Citizen* 28 August 1992]

In April 1992 the Department of National Health and Population Development said that it had recommended to the Cabinet that ex-gratia payments should be made to individuals who had become infected with HIV through untested or untreated blood. The department pointed out that prior to 1985 there had been no means of testing blood for HIV, and that some 80 people had become infected with HIV through receiving blood transfusions and other forms of blood products. It said that people who had become infected with HIV through blood products would be paid from a special fund. However, the

department said that the payments did not mean that the government was admitting liability for the HIV infection.⁷⁷ [⁷⁷ Ibid 2 April 1992]

The Medical Association of South Africa announced in June 1992 that it was to present recommendations to the South African Medical and Dental Council regarding an ethical code of conduct for doctors in the treatment of AIDS. In terms of the recommendations, doctors would not be entitled to refuse to treat a person who was HIV positive, nor would doctors be entitled to insist that patients undergo HIV tests. It was also recommended that doctors be compelled to inform the sexual partners of a patient who was infected with HIV of the patient's condition.⁷⁸ [⁷⁸ Ibid 26 June 1992]

In the same month it was reported that the Department of National Health and Population Development had ordered an investigation by a chief magistrate, Mr Peet Wessels, into all aspects of the department's AIDS unit following the discovery of 'irregularities' in running of the unit. The department issued a statement saying that staff members of the AIDS unit had lodged complaints against the acting head of the unit, Dr Manda Holmshaw. Dr Holmshaw said, however, that she and her deputy, Dr Wilson Carswell, had complained that the deputy director general of national health and population development, Dr Hans Steyn, had attempted to misapply funds amounting to millions of rands which had been earmarked for AIDS prevention (see *1991/92 Survey* p 129). They also accused Dr Steyn of showing a serious lack of judgement in handling the claims of haemophiliacs who had been infected with AIDS through blood transfusions. Drs Holmshaw and Carswell added that they believed that there had been dereliction of duty in the management of the AIDS unit and that their 'expert advice' on critical aspects of AIDS prevention had been ignored. These allegations were denied by Dr Steyn.⁷⁹ [⁷⁹ Ibid 8 June 1992]

In July 1992 it was reported that Dr Holmshaw had been suspended from her position. The AIDS unit was made a subdirectorate of the health promotions directorate, and a nursing sister, Ms Natalie Stockton, was appointed to head the unit. Ms Stockton was reported to have admitted to having little direct experience of AIDS.⁸⁰ [⁸⁰ *Sunday Times* 5 July 1992]

The director of the National Council of Child and Family Welfare, Dr Keith Heiman, criticised Dr Holmshaw's suspension, saying that she was a clinical psychologist who had had extensive experience in AIDS education. He claimed that the programme headed by Ms Stockton was 'totally useless'. Dr Heiman added, 'With 400 people a day being infected by AIDS in South Africa, we do not have time to waste on bureaucracy. The government does not know how to handle the pandemic.'⁸¹ [⁸¹ Ibid]

In August 1992 the Medical Research Council published a draft AIDS charter setting out the rights and duties of people who were affected by the disease. The draft charter suggested that:⁸² [⁸² *Business Day, The Citizen* 20 August 1992]

- segregation or quarantine of people with AIDS was unacceptable;
- people with AIDS or HIV infection had the right to confidentiality regarding their health status;
- testing for HIV should occur only after free and informed consent had been obtained;
- public education should be provided to eliminate discrimination against people with AIDS;
- testing for HIV infection should not be a basis for refusing to employ any person, nor for terminating employment; and
- people with AIDS or HIV infection had the duty to ensure that they did not pass on the virus to others.

In the same month the government announced that it would be convening a meeting in October 1992 with 32 organisations to develop a joint policy on AIDS. The meeting was to be constituted as the National AIDS Convention of South Africa (Nacosa). The organisations which were to attend the meeting included the African National Congress (ANC), the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the National Council of Trade Unions, the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the South African Council of Churches and the South African Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs. Nacosa was expected to provide a national strategy for combating AIDS. It was said that the convention would replace the government's AIDS unit as a policymaking body for AIDS.⁸³ ^{[83} *The Star* 27 August 1992.]

The head of the health secretariat of the ANC and chairman of the steering committee to convene Nacosa, Dr Ralph Mgijima, said that the AIDS epidemic could not be 'put on hold' until an interim government was formed. That is why, with AIDS, the ANC has decided to make an exception to its rule about not negotiating with the government ... until the constitutional deadlock is resolved' (see also chapter on *Constitutional Change*).

Statistics

The Department of National Health and Population Development provided the following information regarding the number of AIDS cases reported in South Africa (including the ten homelands) from 1982 to 30 June 1992:

AIDS cases reported in South Africa: 1982–1992

Year

No of reported cases

No of reported deaths

Fatality rate

1982

2

2

100%

1983

4

3

75%

1984

8

8

100%

1985

8

8

100%

1986

24

23

96%

1987

40

33

83%

1988

91

56

62%

1989

175

97

55%

1990

318

88

28%

1991

436

102

23%

1992^a

210

26

12%

Total

1 316

446

34%

a

Cases reported by 3

The department supplied the following breakdown of AIDS cases up to 30 June 1992 according to method of transmission, race and sex:

AIDS cases according to method of transmission, race and sex: 1982–1992

Homo/bisexual

Heterosexual

Haemophiliac

Other blood transfusion

IVDU^a

Paediatric

Total

African

M^b

3

313

3

4

1

99

423

F^c

0

336

0

0

0

82

418

U^d

0

6

0

0

0

4

10

Coloured

M^b

21

13

1

1

0

0

36

F^c

0

12

0

1

0

0

13

Indian

M^b

4

1

0

0

0

0

5

F^c

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

White

M^b

361

14

13

12

1

0

401

F^c

0

4

0

4

0

0

8

U^d

0

1

0

1

0

0

2

Total

M^b

389

341

17

17

2

99

865

F^c

0

352

0

5

0

82

439

U^d

0

7

0

1

0

4

12

Grand total

389

700

17

23

2

185

1 316

a

Intravenous drug user

c

Female

b

Male

d

Sex unknown

Statistics provided by the Department of National Health and Population Development showed that the reported number of cases of AIDS contracted by white homosexual men had increased from 26 in 1987 to 59 in 1988 and 84 in 1989, and then declined to 76 in 1990 and 60 in 1991. In contrast, the number of cases of AIDS among African heterosexual men and women had steadily increased from six in 1987 to 14 in 1988, 49 in 1989, 146 in 1990 and 272 in 1991. The number of cases of African infants with AIDS had also risen from none in 1987 to three in 1988, 14 in 1989, 71 in 1990 and 78 in 1991.

By 30 June 1992, 50% of AIDS cases were heterosexual African men and women, 27% homosexual white men and 14% African infants.

The 1990 annual report of the Transkei's Department of Health said that two cases of HIV infection had been reported in the homeland in 1987, 11 in 1988, eight in 1989 and 36 in 1990. Up to the end of 1990 four cases of AIDS had been reported in the Transkei, of whom three had died.⁸⁴ [⁸⁴ Transkei Department of Health, annual report for the period 1 January 1990 to 31 December 1990]

In April 1992 the rate of HIV infection of women attending antenatal clinics in various provinces was as follows: Cape, 0,37%; Natal, 2,87%; Orange Free State, 1,49%; and the Transvaal, 1,11%. The infection rate in Natal was said to have doubled in six months. According to the Department of National Health and Population Development, the infection rate in KwaZulu and northern Natal could be

A report published by the Medical Research Council in December 1991 claimed that fewer than 20% of cases of AIDS in South Africa were being reported.⁸⁶ [⁸⁶ *The Citizen* 20 December 1992]

The director of the Bloemfontein HIV Clinic, Dr Mark Hendricks, said in June 1992 that reporting of AIDS cases was incomplete. He added that the figures given by the government were a 'drop in the ocean' compared to the total number of cases of HIV infection. Dr Hendricks pointed out that AIDS was not a notifiable disease, and so AIDS researchers were dependent on the 'goodwill' of doctors for ensuring that cases were reported. He claimed that the AIDS education campaign had failed and that the

public was still largely unaware of the extent of the disease.⁸⁷ [⁸⁷ *Daily Dispatch* 26 June 1992]

Major developments

In October 1991 the Child Health Unit at the University of Cape Town held a conference to discuss the effect of AIDS on children. It was reported that about 14% of cases of AIDS involved small children who acquired the disease from their mothers. The children were not expected to live beyond their fifth birthdays. The co-ordinator of the AIDS research programme of the Medical Research Council, Dr Malcolm Steinberg, said that if people did not change their sexual behaviour to avoid contracting AIDS, there were likely to be 31 000 children orphaned as a result of AIDS by the year 2010. Among the issues raised at the conference were the care of AIDS orphans, accommodation for families with HIV-positive children and the lack of sympathy in the community for people with AIDS.⁸⁸ [⁸⁸ *Sowetan* 30 October 1991]

In the same month the *South African Medical Journal* published a study of urban African mothers' knowledge of sexual behaviour and AIDS. The survey comprised a sample of 122 African mothers with at least one teenage child and who were living in Lamontville, a township near Durban. It found that all the respondents had heard of AIDS and 98% knew that using a condom could prevent the spread of AIDS. Two thirds of the women thought that doctors were able to cure AIDS. Although all of the mothers were worried about AIDS, none of them had spoken to their children about the disease. The researchers of the study commented that it was disturbing that although all the women knew of AIDS, none felt able to talk to their children about it. The researchers concluded that AIDS intervention strategies needed not only to teach about AIDS, but also to provide communication skills to mothers so that they could talk to their children about sexual issues.⁸⁹ [⁸⁹ *South African Medical Journal*, vol 80 no 10,5 October 1991]

An obstetrics consultant at Baragwanath Hospital (Soweto), Dr James McIntyre, said in November 1991 that HIV-infected women who discovered that they were pregnant should be offered the option of abortion. He remarked that abortion in South Africa was legal when there was a risk of serious illness for the unborn child. This appeared to fit the case of HIV-infected mothers, Dr McIntyre said. He added that such terminations of pregnancy were already taking place.⁹⁰ [⁹⁰ *Business Day* 26 November 1991]

A survey of high school pupils of all races in the greater Cape Town area, which was published in December 1991, found that 30% of boys and 25% of girls in standard 10 had already engaged in sexual intercourse. The study noted that 'the majority of heterosexual intercourse is not safe in terms of unwanted pregnancies and the spread of sexually transmitted diseases such as AIDS'. It added that 'sex counselling at South African schools, regardless of race, is significantly out of pace with levels of sexual activity among school pupils'.⁹¹ [⁹¹ *Sowetan* 23 December 1991]

In March 1992 the Society for AIDS Families and Orphans (Safe) was formed to address the needs of

children who were orphaned by AIDS. The director of Safe, Ms Claire Fleming, said that there were already children in 200 families in Soweto who faced being orphaned. She added that there were as many as 20 000 women in Soweto who were HIV positive. Ms Fleming said that Safo would raise funds to support families which had been affected by AIDS and publicise the effects of the epidemic on women and children.⁹² [⁹² *Business Day* 30 March 1992]

The AIDS unit of the Department of National Health and Population Development said in May 1992 that one in every 66 mothers in South Africa was currently infected with HIV. It estimated that 100 infected babies were born each week. Current welfare structures, which were able to deal with 300 new orphans a year, would be overwhelmed by the number of AIDS orphans needing care, the unit said.⁹³ [⁹³ *Cape Times* 6 May 1992]

In the same month members of the Southern Africa Black Taxi Association were reported to be involved in an AIDS education campaign sponsored by the Department of National Health and Population Development. The campaign initially involved 200 kombitaxis in the Transvaal and Natal. Drivers were to be given free pamphlets and condoms to distribute to their passengers.⁹⁴ [⁹⁴ *Business Day* 26 May 1992]

Also in May, it was reported that an unnamed accountant had applied to the Industrial Court for reinstatement after he had been fired when he was found to be HIV positive. The accountant claimed that he had been fired after he had divulged to his employers. Mast Video Training, that he had been infected with HIV. Mr Stephen Dallamore, the managing director of Mast Video Training's parent company. Mast Holdings, denied that the dismissal had 'anything to do with AIDS' and said that the accountant had been guilty of financial irregularities. The case was said to be the first legal challenge in South Africa regarding the dismissal of a person infected with HIV.⁹⁵ [⁹⁵ *Cape Times I* May 1992]

Projections

A report, entitled 'Changing Health in South Africa' and published in December 1991 by the Medical Research Council, said that by the year 2000 there could be 4m people in South Africa infected with HIV, 250 000 cases of AIDS and 200 000 people could have died of the disease. It said that by 2005 the cost of AIDS in terms of additional health expenditure could be between 34% and 75% of the health budget in that year, depending on the costs of hospitalisation.⁹⁶ [⁹⁶ *The Citizen* 20 December 1991, *Business Day* 20 August 1992]

The director of the Centre for Health Policy at the University of the Witwatersrand, Mr Cedric de Beer, said in December 1991 that political violence, the price of gold and the success of negotiations were all likely to have as great, or greater, an effect on the economic future of South Africa as AIDS. He pointed out that there were many myths circulating about the devastating effects of AIDS on the country, which led to doomsday scenarios. Mr de Beer said the AIDS epidemic in South Africa was likely to have the

following effects:⁹⁷ [⁹⁷ *The Star* 2 December 1991]

- the doubling time of the disease (ie the length of time required for the number of cases to double) would increase from less than a year in 1991 to three years in 1995;
- even if there was no change in sexual behaviour, the epidemic would reach a plateau by 2010;
- however, once a 'significant' number of people began to die of AIDS, changes in sexual behaviour were likely to occur. The plateau was thus likely to occur by 2005, when about 18% of the population would be infected; and
- the population would at no stage be reduced in absolute terms by deaths from AIDS. Instead, it would grow more slowly. Mr de Beer estimated that by 2005 the population of South Africa (including the ten homelands) would be 53m.

According to a report published by the Department of National Health and Population Development in June 1992, about 750 000 South Africans would be infected with HIV by 1994. Dr Carswell said that 'if effective interventions do not take place timeously in South Africa, the AIDS pandemic in this country will follow the same pattern as in other African countries such as Uganda, where one in four of all young adults are currently infected'.⁹⁸ [⁹⁸ *Daily Dispatch* 30 June 1992]

Diarrhoea

The Johannesburg City Health Department announced in July 1992 that it was launching a campaign to reduce the high incidence of children dying of acute diarrhoea. The director of community health, Dr Eric Buch, said that each year thousands of children in South Africa died of diarrhoea. 'Almost three quarters of these deaths are due to dehydration which can be prevented by the application of a very simple and cheap remedy.' He added that a campaign in Johannesburg would encourage the use of oral rehydration therapy through the distribution of posters, pamphlets and the education of mothers who visited health clinics.⁹⁹ [⁹⁹ *Sowetan* 31 July 1992]

Malnutrition

The extent of malnutrition in South Africa was highlighted by the chairman of the Independent Development Trust (IDT), Mr Jan Steyn, who said in April 1992 that, although South Africa was a net exporter of food, 31% of rural pre-school children had been found to be underweight owing to poor nutrition. He added that the most basic needs for food and safe shelter were not being met by a large proportion of the African population. He mentioned that an IDT official had found that many pensioners

in Khayelitsha (Cape Town) were existing on only three cooked meals a week.¹⁰⁰ [¹⁰⁰ *Cape Times* 8 April 1992]

In February 1992 the minister of national health, Dr Rina Venter, said that an emergency scheme would be activated to feed farmers and their farmworkers who were going hungry as a result of the drought (see also chapter on *Land and Agriculture*). The chairman of the National Maize Producers' Organisation, Mr Kerneels Claassen, said that about 100 000 African farmworkers, each with as many as nine dependants, could be made destitute as a result of widespread crop failure.¹⁰¹ [¹⁰¹ *The Star* 7 February 1992]

In June 1992 Dr Venter revealed that in terms of the social relief scheme for farmers and farmworkers, farmers were to apply to the government for assistance for themselves and their farmworkers. Individuals who were granted assistance were entitled to the following grants per month : R40 per adult, R35 per child under one year of age, R25 per child between one and ten years of age and R40 per child over ten years of age. She revealed that by 8 June 1992 some R2,5m of the R20m allocated to the scheme had been paid out.¹⁰² [¹⁰² *Hansard* (A) 22 q cols 1522-1523, 19 June 1992]

In February 1992 the executive director of Operation Hunger, Mrs Ina Periman, said that her organisation had written to Dr Venter's office in December 1990, complaining that the government had set up bureaucratic procedures which had led to it being 'unacceptably slow' in allocating funds from the nutritional development programme (see *1991/92 Survey* p137). Mrs Periman said that her organisation had not yet had a reply. She accused the government of 'reinventing the wheel' in its manner of allocating funds. Mrs Periman claimed that of 108 organisations in the eastern Cape which had applied for food aid, only eight had received funds from the government. A spokesman for a relief agency in Pretoria, Werk en Oorleef, said that the government had been slow in supplying the relevant forms to his organisation to apply for aid.¹⁰³ [¹⁰³ *Business Day* 13 February 1992]

Dr Venter said in reply to the criticism from Operation Hunger that she 'could not understand the organisation's attitude'. She claimed that an official of her department had contacted Mrs Periman in January to advise her of 'shortcomings in her application'. Dr Venter added that Operation Hunger had written to the minister asking for funds and not to the department as it should have done. She also accused Mrs Periman of using public pressure to obtain funds from her department.¹⁰⁴ [¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*]

Dr Venter added subsequently that her department had established regional committees to 'investigate and evaluate the infrastructure and credibility of non-government organisations that apply for funding'. Recommendations were then forwarded to the department's head office for final approval and payment. Funds were also made available to the authorities of the ten homelands provided that these authorities assumed full responsibility for monitoring the use of funds. Dr Venter said that this lengthy procedure had become necessary because of the 'misapplication of funds by a non-government organisation',

which she did not name.¹⁰⁵ [¹⁰⁵ *Hansard* (A) 19 q cols 1250-1252, 3 June 1992] A day after the controversy about delays in payments from the nutritional development programme was made public, it was reported that Operation Hunger had been given permission to request aid from the programme on a national basis.¹⁰⁶ [¹⁰⁶ *Business Day* 14 February 1992]

In May 1992 the director of Operation Hunger in the northern Transvaal, Mr Johann Rissik, criticised the distribution of food aid in Lebowa. He described the homeland authorities as 'incompetent' and said that food intended for the poor was piling up in storerooms and going to waste because of a lack of transport and infrastructure to distribute it. His allegations were denied by the Lebowa authorities.¹⁰⁷ [¹⁰⁷ *The Star* 20 May 1992]

In its 1992/93 budget the government allocated R440m to its nutritional development programme in comparison with an allocation of R220m in the previous financial year. Dr Venter said in reply to a question in Parliament in June 1992 that by 20 May 1992 the government had spent R125m of its 1991/92 allocation and R15m of its 1992/93 allocation.¹⁰⁸ [¹⁰⁸ *Hansard* (A) 19 q cols 1250-1252, 3 June 1992] Later in the month she said that in terms of the programme, organisations which applied for funding would receive an allocation of between R20 and R30 per person being fed. Dr Venter added that the programme was regarded as a 'supplementary scheme' to provide a third of the person's energy and protein need.¹⁰⁹ [¹⁰⁹ *Hansard* (A) 22 q cols 1521-1524, 19 June 1992]

Operation Hunger said in June 1992 that by the end of the year some 2,5m people could be starving owing to the effects of the drought, crop failure and widespread retrenchments and unemployment. Mrs Periman said that 1,8m people were already receiving nutritional assistance from her organisation. She reported that the government had recently allocated R10m over a three-month period to Operation Hunger, but that it spent R9m a month on its food budget alone.¹¹⁰ [¹¹⁰ *The Star* 22 June 1992]

In August 1992 the executive director of the Consultative Forum on Drought Relief, Mr Len Abrams, said that the drought had already led to severe water shortages in large areas of the northern Transvaal, including Lebowa and Venda. He said. If the promised spring rains fail to break the drought or drilling operations fail to discover new water supplies, a full-scale migration from the rural areas to the cities seems inevitable.' Mr Abrams believed that as a result of malnutrition as many as 2,5m people could leave their rural homes and seek food and employment in the larger metropolitan areas. He forecast 'total chaos' if such mass migration occurred.¹¹¹ [¹¹¹ *Ibid* 10 August 1992]

Measles

The number of cases of measles in 1991 was as follows: Africans, 1 791; coloured people, 129; Indians,

25; and whites, 143.¹¹² [¹¹² *Cape Times* 3 April 1992]

In August 1992, 40 cases of measles were reported to the Johannesburg City Health Department. The incidence of the disease was believed to be far higher than in previous years, when 50 cases had been reported in the course of an entire year. Bloerfontein (Orange Free State), Port Elizabeth (eastern Cape), Pretoria and Springs (east Rand) were also reported to have a higher than usual incidence of the disease.¹¹³ [¹¹³ *The Star* 20 August 1992]

In the same month the Department of National Health and Population Development announced that its measles immunisation programme, which had begun in March 1990 (see *1991/92 Survey* pp137–138), was to use lower doses of measles vaccine than had previously been administered. The dosage previously used was reported to have impaired children's ability to survive other serious infections.¹¹⁴ [¹¹⁴ *The Citizen* 1 August 1992]

Poliomyelitis

The Department of National Health and Population Development announced in November 1991 that no cases of poliomyelitis (polio) had been reported in South Africa during the previous 11 months, and that 1991 was expected to be the first year in which the country was free of the disease. However, two cases of polio were reported in December 1991.

Writing in the *South African Medical Journal* in August 1992, Dr Barry Schoub of the National Institute for Virology said that only 69% of South Africans and 60% of Africans in the country had been vaccinated against polio. Furthermore, vaccination rates in some areas were much lower, for example only 43% of individuals in Botshabelo (Orange Free State) had received their third dose of the vaccine. Dr Schoub argued that polio epidemics had occurred in countries with vaccination rates exceeding 80%. He said that South Africa was thus particularly vulnerable to 'a substantial outbreak from imported or locally circulating wild-type virus'. Dr Schoub urged the government to reinstate national vaccination days for polio and other diseases.¹¹⁵ [¹¹⁵ *South African Medical Journal*, vol 82 no 2, August 1992, pp71-72]

Tuberculosis

Dr Venter provided the following figures in Parliament in April 1992 for the number of notified new cases of tuberculosis (TB) in 1990 and 1991 in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands):¹¹⁶ [¹¹⁶ *Cape Times* 3 April 1992]

New cases of Tuberculosis: 1990 and 1991

1990

1991

Increase (decrease)

African

45 777

47 233

3%

Coloured

17 706

18 554

5%

Indian

538

521

(3%)

White

844

748

(11%)

Total

64 865

67 056

3%

The South African National Tuberculosis Association said in November 1991 that the total TB case load had increased from 88 268 in 1985 to 124 635 in 1990, ie by 41% over a period of five years. The largest number of new cases in 1990 were in the western Cape (34%) and the next largest in the Orange Free State (21%). The estimated prevalence rate per 100 000 people increased from 463 in 1985 to 590 in 199

It was reported in January 1992 that the incidence of TB in the western Cape had been rising more sharply than in the rest of the country for five years. The incidence of TB in the western Cape was said to be three times higher than the national average. The head of the urbanisation research programme of the Medical Research Council, Dr John Seager, said that urbanisation inevitably led to overcrowding, which increased the likelihood of TB infection. He acknowledged that while urbanisation occurred all over South Africa, the increase in the TB rate was highest in the western Cape. 'The increase probably relates to socio-economic conditions and may reflect conditions of 15 years,' he added.¹¹⁸ [¹¹⁸ *The Argus* 25 January 1992, *The Citizen* 9 April 1992]

Earlier, in September 1991, the Independent Development Trust allocated R6m to the Community Health Association of South Africa for TB intervention projects in the western Cape.¹¹⁹ [¹¹⁹ *The Citizen* 27 September 1991]

A report in the *South African Medical Journal* in August 1992 said that the fact that most TB patients discontinued treatment after a few weeks (rather than continuing for 12 to 18 months) meant that new drug-resistant forms of TB were developing in South Africa. 'Drug resistance of the evolving TB strains is likely to precipitate increased morbidity and mortality and test our health services on an unprecedented scale,' the article said. It added that the weakened immune systems of people with AIDS made them particularly vulnerable to TB and could lead to a rapid increase in the number of cases of TB.¹²⁰ [¹²⁰ *South African Medical Journal*, vol 82 no 2, August 1992]

In July 1992 it was reported that 3% of TB patients admitted to the Brooklyn Chest Hospital in Cape Town were infected with the human immuno-deficiency virus.¹²¹ [¹²¹ *Cape Times* 6 July 1992]

Occupational health

See chapter on *Labour Relations*.

Pollution and health

In February 1992, 15 children had to receive medical treatment after they had received serious chemical burns from scavenging at a refuse dump in Alexandra (Johannesburg). The children were believed to have come into contact with Xylol, a chemical which is used to strip paint and which can cause human respiratory failure, cancer and toxic dementia. According to the children, a number of men had dumped containers of Xylol at the dump site and had told the group of children, who were playing nearby, that they could help themselves to the 'paint'. The children had subsequently played with the containers of Xylol and incurred chemical burns. It was reported that there was no control over illegal dumping at the Alexandra refuse site.¹²² [¹²² *The Star* 6 February 1992]

In a paper presented at an Eskom conference in April 1992, an Eskom scientist, Dr Colin Turner, said that Soweto's air pollution levels exceeded international guidelines for a quarter of the year. He reported that the main pollutant was fine particulate mass (FPM), which was a product of burning coal. On some days the level of FPM in Soweto was so high that it went off the scale of pollution measuring instruments. Although 'township smoke has the greatest impact on the immediate environment of the township itself, it is nevertheless transported by wind to surrounding areas', Dr Turner said. He argued that the control of pollutants, especially of FPM, warranted 'urgent attention', and that the provision of cheap electricity to replace coal combustion in all South Africa's townships was the ideal solution (see also chapters on *Environment* and *Housing and Urbanisation*).¹²³ [¹²³ *Business Day* 28 April 1992]

In May 1992 it was reported that unacceptable levels of air pollution in Cape Town posed a health threat to people with respiratory conditions and that it had led to an increase in the number of people attending city hospitals. The levels of nitrogen oxide in the air were reported to have exceeded international limits four times in the previous month. In addition, photochemical smog was reported to have occurred over Cape Town during April.¹²⁴ [¹²⁴ *Cape Times* 21 May 1992]

A number of South African rivers were reported to be so polluted that their use for recreational purposes would pose a health hazard. It was reported in October 1991 that the Umgeni and Umsindusi rivers, which drained into the Indian Ocean near Durban, had become severely polluted by informal settlements, chicken farms and cattle feed lots along their lower reaches. The estuary at the mouth of the Umgeni River had become a 'cesspool with dangerously high levels of faecal pollution'. The Rand Water Board warned in August 1992 that the Klip River and the Rietspruit (both near Johannesburg) had been contaminated from overflowing sewage works. In consequence, the board said, neither river should be used by swimmers or watersport enthusiasts.¹²⁵ [¹²⁵ *Sunday Tribune* 27 October 1991, *Business Day* 3 August 1992]

¹ See also chapter on *The Environment*.

Health organisations

The **Medical Association of South Africa** (Masa) was established in 1927 to represent the interests of the medical profession. In 1992 it had more than 12 700 members (or 60% of doctors practising in South Africa). Masa says that its mission is to work ‘towards the ideal of an affordable, nonracial, comprehensive, effective, unitary health system, to which all have the right of equitable access’, and to ‘influence the shaping of health policy to meet the needs and expectations of the community’. The organisation also embraces 47 special interest groups, which cater for the specific interests of various medical disciplines. In 1991 and 1992 Masa issued public statements supporting the desegregation of hospitals, calling for more adequate dispute resolution mechanisms at hospitals and suggesting reform of the health services.¹²⁶ [¹²⁶ Information supplied by the Medical Association of South Africa, 16 September 1992]

The **National Education, Health and Allied Workers’ Union** (Nehawu) is the public-service affiliate of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (see also chapter on *Labour Relations*). Nehawu was founded in 1987 and its membership grew from 9197 in that year to more than 40 000 in 1991. It was unclear how many of its members were employed in health services rather than in the educational sector. In June 1992 Nehawu called on hospital workers to go on strike after the government refused to accede to its demands. Some 18 000 workers took part in the subsequent strike (see *Other Health Workers* above).

The **South African Nursing Association** is a statutory body, membership of which is compulsory for all nurses in South Africa (excluding the ‘independent’ homelands). In May 1992 the association announced that it would be holding a referendum among nurses to decide whether it should continue to be a statutory body with membership compulsory for all nurses. The referendum had yet not been held at the time of writing. Its membership stood at 140 000 in 1992.¹²⁷ [¹²⁷ *South* 23 May 1992]

In July 1992 the South African Health and Social Services Organisation (SAHSSO) was formed from the amalgamation of a number of left-wing health and welfare organisations, including the Health Workers’ Society, the National Medical and Dental Association, the Organisation for Appropriate Social Services in South Africa, the Overseas Medical Graduates’ Society and the South African Health Workers’ Congress. SAHSSO had an initial membership of 5 000 people, including community workers, dentists, doctors, nurses, psychologists and social workers. In a press statement the new organisation said that its aims were to address the urgent task of democratising health and welfare, and undoing the disastrous effects of apartheid on these services. The publicity secretary of SAHSSO, Dr Aslam Dadoo, said that SAHSSO saw itself as ‘an independent organ of civil society which will seek to empower our communities in the health and social service sector through the establishment of a nonracial, nonsexist and a democratic national health service in the country’.¹²⁸ [¹²⁸ *The Star* 20 July 1992]

The **South African Traditional Healers' Council** was reported in February 1992 to comprise 140 constituent organisations and to represent 250 000 healers throughout southern Africa. The secretary general of the council was Mr Pip Erasmus, a retired military intelligence officer. *The Weekly Mail* alleged that the council had been established in 1986 as a front organisation of the South African Defence Force and as a bulwark against 'radicalism' in the African community. However, Mr Erasmus denied this allegation and said that he had no ongoing links with the SADF.¹²⁹ [¹²⁹ *Business Day* 5 February 1992, *The Weekly Mail* 21 February 1992]

Welfare

Policy

In a document entitled *Points of Departure in Developing a New Social Welfare Dispensation for the RSA* and published in January 1992, the Department of National Health and Population Development outlined its proposal for a new welfare system (see *1991/92 Survey* pp 145–146). The document made the following recommendations:¹³⁰ [¹³⁰ Department of National Health and Population Development, *Working Document: Points of Departure in Developing a New Social Welfare Dispensation for the RSA*, January 1992]

- that all welfare legislation be incorporated into several umbrella acts;
- that the central government increase its allocation to social welfare services from 1,6% of gross domestic product (GDP) to 3,2% of GDP;
- that full parity in respect of social grants paid to different race groups be introduced by 1 April 1996;
- that a social security system be introduced as part of a comprehensive strategy to combat poverty;
- that there be a more equal distribution of welfare funds in terms of need and priority;
- that funds generated in any particular community for welfare purposes be used within that community; and
- that mechanisms be developed to ensure 'optimal financial support' from the private sector.

Welfare organisations overwhelmingly rejected the proposals made in the document, saying that they resuscitated proposals first made by the government in 1985, which had been rejected then (see *1991/92 Survey* p 146).

The African National Congress (ANC) said in its draft proposals for a social welfare policy in April 1992 that the state should assume the major responsibility for the provision of welfare services. It argued for a single ministry of social welfare which would: ¹³¹ [131 African National Congress, *ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa*, 27 April 1992]

- have a direct interest in the ‘evolution of realistic economic policies’;
- use a developmental approach to empower communities rather than a crisis management approach;
- distribute welfare services equitably;
- seek to redress past imbalances via a policy of affirmative action for rural communities, blacks and women; and
- provide a ‘social safety net through which no single citizen should fair.

In January 1992 it was reported that the government had distributed only R15m of the R220m set aside in the poverty relief programme established in August 1991 to counter the effects of the introduction of value added tax. The funds had allegedly been paid to only 14 welfare organisations and two non-profit agencies. A spokeswoman for the ANC, Ms Gill Marcus, said that the poverty relief funds were not only financially inadequate, but their distribution was being hampered by bureaucratic procedures. ¹³² [132 *Business Day* 20 January 1992]

The Department of National Health and Population Development said in reply that it had been inundated with applications for poverty relief and that delays in payments had been caused by an instruction from the Department of Finance that someone in each organisation allocated funds had to be identified as being responsible for spending funds. ¹³³ [133 *Business Day* 20,23 January 1992]

Legislation

The **Social Assistance Bill** was published in February 1992. The bill sought to amalgamate all legislation relating to social assistance payments into one act and to provide a uniform pension system for all South Africans. It also sought to gradually increase by regulation the age at which women qualified for old-age pensions until it matched the age of eligibility for men, ie 65 years. ¹³⁴ [134 *Hansard* (Joint sitting) 5 cols 2415-2420, 19 March 1992]

However, the bill faced widespread criticism. Twenty organisations in Natal, including the Black Sash,

the Democratic Party and welfare organisations, said in a press statement that the bill was designed to limit old-age and disability payments, and specifically to exclude citizens of the 'independent' homelands from eligibility for pensions. They argued that the bill would remove a person's legal right to a pension by giving the director general of national health and population development discretion over payment of pensions. 'The arbitrary allocation of funds lends itself to corruption and discriminatory use at the hands of officials, providing no security for the aged or disabled,' the organisations said.¹³⁵ [¹³⁵ *The Citizen* 19 February 1992]

The African National Congress (ANC) said in response to the bill that although the present system of social pensions was far from perfect, it had been accepted that there was a legally enforceable right to such pensions. It is both surprising and unacceptable for the present regime to take away, by legislative device, one of the few rights enjoyed by the disadvantaged and economically vulnerable section of our society,' the ANC said. The organisation called for the withdrawal of the bill.¹³⁶ [¹³⁶ *Business Day* 12 February 1992]

The minister of national health, Dr Rina Venter, said in response to criticism of the bill that it would be amended to make citizens of the 'independent' homelands eligible for social assistance. She also said that any person who satisfied the prescribed conditions for social assistance would be eligible for such a grant. At the time of writing the bill had not yet been passed by Parliament.¹³⁷ [¹³⁷ *Hansard* (Joint sitting) 5 cols 2415-2420, 19 March 1992]

The **Prevention and Treatment of Drug Dependency Bill** was published in February 1992. The bill sought to establish a drug advisory board, which would advise the minister of national health on matters relating to the abuse of drugs. It also aimed to make provision for the establishment of programmes for the prevention and treatment of drug addiction.¹³⁸ [¹³⁸ *Prevention and Treatment of Drug Dependency Bill, B22B-92(GA)*]

Finance

According to the South African Institute of Race Relations, in the 1992/93 financial year the government allocated 35% of the total budget to social services, in comparison to 40% in 1991/92 and 41% in 1990/91 (see also chapter on *The Economy*). The largest part of the homeland budgets is allocated to social services. For example, in 1990/91 (the latest year for which figures are available) social spending comprised the following proportions of total expenditure: Gazankulu, 70%; Lebowa, 71%; and QwaQwa, 68%.¹³⁹ [¹³⁹ *Fast Facts Six*, 1992]

The following amounts were allocated to welfare services (including pensions) in South Africa

(including the ten homelands) in the 1991/92 financial year: 140 [140 Initial estimates of expenditure for 1991/92 for the central government, three own affairs administrations, four provinces and ten homelands]

Total welfare expenditure: 1991/92

R

Proportion of total budget

African

4 034 432 685

62%

Coloured

977 275 000

15%

Indian

260 493 000

4%

White

1 221 558 000

18%

Total

6 493 758 685

100%

a

Proportions may not add up to total, owing to rounding.

The following table gives a breakdown of African welfare expenditure (including pensions) in South Africa (including the ten homelands) in 1991/92:¹⁴¹ [141 Initial estimates of expenditure for 1991/92 for the central government, four provinces and the ten homelands]

African welfare expenditure: 1991/90

Homelands^a

R

Bophuthatswana

196 907 112

Ciskei

179 989 000

Gazankulu

97 344 300

KaNgwane

66 244 041

KwaNdebele

39 423 000

KwaZulu

809 840 000

Lebowa

294 801 464

QwaQwa

51 210 000

Transkei

680 069 000

Venda

127 330 768

Homelands sub-total

2 543 158 685

Provinces

Cape province

365 612 000

Natal

209 697 000

Orange Free State

235 175 000

Transvaal

676 748 000

Provinces sub-total

1 487 232 000

Department of Planning and Provincial Affairs

4 042 000

Total

4 034 432 685

a

Welfare services in most homelands are administered in conjunction with health services, and the exact figure with regard to certain items of welfare expenditure (eg total administrative costs) could not be ascertained separately fr

A survey by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), which was published in August 1992, said that in the 1990/91 financial year 4m people in South Africa (including the ten homelands) had received welfare payments totalling R4,43bn (in comparison with R1,9bn in 1987/88). Calculated on a per capita basis, Africans received R100; coloured people, R246; and Indians and whites, R200. The HSRC said that of the 3,9m people who benefited from welfare grants, 2,6m received pensions and 830 000 disability grants. It believed that an additional 300 000 people would be added to this total if all those eligible for pensions were aware of their rights.¹⁴² [¹⁴² *The Citizen* 25 August 1992]

The Independent Development Trust (IDT) announced in September 1991 that it planned to spend R120m on community services in the welfare sector (out of a total expenditure of R520m on health, welfare and rural projects). The IDT said that it would fund services which would allow voluntary workers under the supervision of professional social workers to provide welfare services to the elderly, cancer patients and those who needed to be visited in their homes. The funds were to be spent over a number of years.¹⁴³ [¹⁴³ *Sowetan* 26 September 1991]

Welfare personnel

In September 1991 Concerned Social Workers, the Society for Social Workers and the South African Black Social Workers' Association (Sabswa) announced a joint campaign for a 60% across-the-board salary increase. (The three organisations represented about 7 000 social workers, or more than 80% of the profession.) The campaign called for state subsidisation of social work training and for the state to bear the full costs of the 60% pay increase demanded.¹⁴⁴ [¹⁴⁴ *Business Day, The Star* 18 September 1991]

The director of the Johannesburg Child Welfare Society, Dr Adele Thomas, said at a press conference held to announce the start of the campaign, that social workers' salaries were not market related. She indicated that salaries paid to social workers in commerce and industry were in some cases double those paid in the welfare field. Despite long hours, social workers in welfare organisations often had to

moonlight to augment their incomes. It was also pointed out at the press conference that South African social workers often had caseloads of 40 families at a time, and that in some instances they were dealing with up to 120 families.¹⁴⁵ [¹⁴⁵ *Business Day* 18 September 1991]

In March 1992 about 150 social workers staged a picket in Johannesburg. An organiser of the picket, Ms Sue Rubenstein, said, 'We aim to send a strong message to the minister [of national health] about the state of social services in this country and the need to budget properly for this critical service in the new South Africa.' The national president of the Sabswa, Ms Anne Letsebe, said, 'Apart from our own situation, we are also concerned about racially based social pensions and grants which are still totally inadequate.' She indicated that it was unacceptable for the government to put off introducing full racial parity in social grants until 1995, when social workers had already lobbied for some 12 years for parity (see also *Social pensions* below).¹⁴⁶ [¹⁴⁶ *The Citizen, Sowetan* 13 March 1992]

Welfare services

Social pensions

The following amounts were allocated for all social pensions in the homelands in the 1991/92 financial year:¹⁴⁷ [¹⁴⁷ Information obtained from the initial estimates of expenditure of the ten homelands for the 1991/92 financial year]

Homeland social pensions: 1991/92

R

Bophuthatswana^a

187 737 000

Ciskei^b

176 095 000

Gazankulu^c

95 597 000

KaNgwane

N/A

KwaNdebele^a

38 707 000

KwaZulu^a

761 371 132

Lebowa^c

290 000 000

QwaQwa^a

42 360 000

Transkei^c

678 000 000

Venda^d

124 459 980

Total

2 394 327 112

a

Excludes ex-gratia payments and administrative costs

b

Includes assistance to indigents but excludes administrative costs

c

Includes ex-gratia payments but excludes administrative costs

d

Includes administrative costs

N/A - Not available

The official document *Points of Departure in Developing a New Social Welfare Dispensation for the RSA* proposed that social pensions be equalised by 1996 (see *Policy* above). The minister of finance, Mr Barend du Plessis, said in his budget speech in March 1992 that the limited manoeuvrability in the 1992/93 budget meant that pensions could not be equalised yet. However, he undertook to ensure full parity for all social assistance allowances in the 1993/94 budget.¹⁴⁸ [¹⁴⁸ *The Star* 21 March 1992]

In its 1992/93 budget the government allowed for an increase of 10% in its social assistance allowances for all races, and allocated R165m 'to achieve parity between races in allocations to welfare organisations for services in old-age homes and children's homes'.¹⁴⁹ [¹⁴⁹ *Business Day* 19 March 1992]

The amount allocated to achieve parity seemed inadequate in view of the fact that in the 1990/91 budget 91% of expenditure on the elderly outside the homelands (excluding pensions) had been al

The African National Congress said that the continued racial differentiation in the payment of pensions was 'outrageous'. In a press statement the organisation said, 'We feel that the additional R2bn it would have cost to reach parity at existing white levels would make a significant contribution to the alleviation of poverty in the country. We call for an urgent rethink on this issue.'¹⁵⁰ [¹⁵⁰ *The Star* 19 March 1992]

In May 1992 a researcher at the University of Natal, Ms Francie Lund, emphasised the importance of pensions in their contribution to household income in the homelands. A study of households in KwaZulu found that pensions contributed 32% of all household incomes. In Gazankulu half of all those earning a steady income were found to be pensioners. Ms Lund commented. In all studies, pensions competed with migrant remittances for first place as source of income.' She added that 'pensions represent a substantial inter-generational transfer of income, from the older to the younger. It is also likely that, with increased unemployment, the pension system also represents a transfer from the elderly to the unemployed'.¹⁵¹ [¹⁵¹ *Finance Week* 7 May 1992]

Old-age pensions

In March 1992 Mr du Plessis announced that monthly old-age pensions would be increased from 1 April as follows: Africans, from R225 to R293; coloured people and Indians, from R263 to R318; and whites,

from R304 to R345. The gap between white and African pensions was thereby narrowed from 1,35:1 to 1,18:1.¹⁵² [¹⁵² *The Citizen* 21 March 1992]

The commission of inquiry into the appropriation of the Lebowa Revenue Fund and alleged mismanagement in Lebowa, which was appointed in May 1989 (see *1989/90 Survey* p782), heard in February 1992 that the Lebowa administration had lost millions of rands as a result of inefficiency in the payment of old-age pensions. An investigator reported to the commission that a sample of 1,6% of pensioners' files had revealed that R133 252 had been paid out in the names of pensioners who had died. On the basis of this sample, it was believed that about R8,3m had been lost in this way. The commission also heard that because of duplication of identity documents, some pensioners had received two pensions, one each from the Lebowa and South African administrations.¹⁵³ [¹⁵³ *Sowetan* 25 February 1992]

In reply to a question in Parliament in March 1992, the minister of national health, Dr Rina Venter, said that the payment of pensions to 2 131 Africans in Natal and 3 383 Africans in the Transvaal had been suspended owing to discrepancies between their old and new identity documents.¹⁵⁴ [¹⁵⁴ *Hansard* (A) 5 q cols 414-416, 18 March 1992]

In April 1992 it was announced that as many as 20 000 pensioners in the Cape had had their pensions stopped because of the need to 'review' payments. A spokesman for the Cape Provincial Administration (CPA) said that the CPA was compelled by law to have pensions reviewed annually in order to determine if beneficiaries still qualified for grants. 'Out of the limited resources we have, we must make sure that those who no longer depended on pensions should have the grants suspended to make way for those who desperately need pensions.' he said.¹⁵⁵ [¹⁵⁵ *Daily Dispatch, Eastern Province Herald* 3 April 1992]

In May 1992 the Transvaal Provincial Administration (TPA) threatened to discipline those of its employees who had not informed pensioners that they had to report for annual reviews to prove that they were still alive. A spokesman for the TPA admitted that in at least one instance letters warning of upcoming reviews and dated August had been received by beneficiaries only in March of the following year. It was also reported that pensioners who had received payments for years had been refused payment by officials because of discrepancies in their new identity documents and that they had been told to go and look for work.¹⁵⁶ [¹⁵⁶ *The Star* 16 December 1991, *Business Day* 15 May 1992]

The Legal Resources Centre in Johannesburg subsequently threatened to take court action in order to compel the TPA to recommence payments to pensioners whose payments had been stopped because of incorrect identification documents or because pensioners had not reported for annual review procedures. The centre said that the provincial administrations were not legally entitled to stop payment of pensions without evidence of incorrect payment. In May 1992 the TPA was reported to have agreed to resume payments to all such cases.¹⁵⁷ [¹⁵⁷ *The Star* 15,20 May 1992]

Also in May 1992, the minister of local government and national housing and of public works, Mr Leon Wessels, said in Parliament that a 24-hour toll-free telephone service would be introduced for African social pensioners to air grievances about pensions. Mrs Carole Charlewood MP (Democratic Party) said in reply that the current pension payout system resulted in chaos, deprivation, illness and even death for the elderly and disabled. She pointed out that there had been regular reports of elderly Africans collapsing at pension payout points, having walked all day and sat up all night to get into the following day's queue. Mr Brian Goodall MP (DP) suggested that more use should be made of non-governmental agencies in the payment of pensions.¹⁵⁸ [¹⁵⁸ *The Citizen* 21 May 1992]

Other services for the aged

The following amounts were allocated to welfare services for the aged (excluding pensions) in the 1991/92 financial year:¹⁵⁹ [¹⁵⁹ Initial estimates of expenditure for the 1991/92 Financial year of the three own affairs administrations and the four provinces]

Welfare budgets for the aged (excluding pensions): 1991/92

R

African^a:

Cape province

224 000

Natal

400 000

Orange Free State

180 000

Transvaal

651 000

Coloured

19 187 000

Indian

1 224 000

White

272 413 000

Total

294 279 000

a

Excludes the ten ho

Dr Venter said in reply to a question in Parliament in March 1992 that her department was not in charge of any old-age homes, but that it allocated funds to various private welfare organisations which rendered services to the elderly. She indicated that while she was in favour of services which did not discriminate on the basis of race, the government did not refuse to pay subsidies to organisations which provided racially discriminatory services to the elderly. Dr Venter reiterated that a community was entitled to 'provide its own services according to its own culture and wishes'.¹⁶⁰ [¹⁶⁰ *Hansard* (A) 5 q cols 459-460, 18 March 1992]

In June 1992, in reply to a question in Parliament, Dr Venter said that no new old-age homes were to be built by the government in 1992/93 owing to a shortage of funds.¹⁶¹ [¹⁶¹ *The Citizen* 9 June 1992]

Services for alcoholics and drug addicts

The following amounts were allocated to rehabilitation services for alcoholics and drug addicts in the 1991/92 financial year:¹⁶² [¹⁶² Initial estimates of expenditure for the 1991/92 financial year of the three own affairs administrations and the four provinces]

Rehabilitation budgets: 1991/92

R

African^a:

Cape province^b

4 000

Natal

N/A

Orange Free State

173 000

Transvaal

1 250 000

Coloured

5 509 000

Indian

2 130 000

White

15 865 000

Total

24 931 000

a

Excludes the ten homelands

b

Amount allocated for rehabilitation in the Cape may exceed given figure as grants to welfare organisations are unspecified

N/A - Not available

In October 1991 the deputy minister of national health, Mr Fanus Schoeman, said that a study of white high school pupils in standards 8 to 10 had found that 55% of pupils abused alcohol, and that 4% of standard 8 pupils and 6% of standard 10 pupils had smoked dagga. He remarked that what was 'of grave concern' was the increasing incidence of the abuse of legal drugs such as over-the-counter medicines and solvents. Some 8% of pupils in the study were found to have experimented with s

According to the United Nations International Narcotics Control Bureau, South Africans are the world's worst abusers of mandrax, consuming more of the drug than the United States and Canada combined. In the six-month period ending on 30 June 1991 the South African Police were reported to have confiscated more than 1m mandrax tablets and arrested 1 303 people for dealing in the drug. Most mandrax tablets smuggled into the country were believed to be manufactured in India. The selling price in South Africa was as much as twenty times the cost of manufacture.¹⁶⁴ [¹⁶⁴ *The Weekly Mail* 15 November 1991]

The minister of defence, Mr Roelf Meyer, said in reply to a question in Parliament in March 1992 that during 1990, 739 members of the South African Defence Force (SADF) were identified as drug addicts. He said that the most common addictions were to alcohol, dagga and mandrax. Mr Meyer added that 717 addicts had received treatment within the SADF and the remaining 22 had been admitted to government institutions.¹⁶⁵ [¹⁶⁵ *Hansard* (A) 5 q cols 393-394, 17 March 1992]

A counsellor at the Cape Town Drug Counselling Centre, Ms Cathy Rogers, said that drug users did not come from any single social stratum, but that the lack of recreational facilities in poorer areas, coupled with socio-economic deprivation and the use of drugs by members of gangs, aggravated drug use in such communities. She argued that dagga was often a 'gateway' drug, leading to the use of heavier drugs. Ms Rogers said that 75% of the people counselled at the centre for drug abuse were under 30 years of age and a quarter were teenagers. About 26% used dagga alone, 64% used dagga and mandrax together, and 10% used other drugs.¹⁶⁶ [¹⁶⁶ *South* 27 February 1992]

A spokesman for the South African Association of Retail Pharmacists, Mr David Bayever, said in May 1992 that drug addiction among housewives and children was growing at an alarming rate. He pointed out that 28% of patients at a major rehabilitation centre in the Transvaal were housewives and 5% were children between 10 and 14 years of age.¹⁶⁷ [¹⁶⁷ *Business Day* 21 May 1992]

In August 1992 the delegates at a conference in Pretoria on managing crime agreed to recommend to the government that the use of 'soft' drugs such as dagga should be legalised and that there should be more

focus on fighting the use of 'hard' drugs.¹⁶⁸ [¹⁶⁸ *The Citizen* 7 August 1992]

Services for children

The following amounts were allocated to child welfare in the 1991/92 financial year:¹⁶⁹ [¹⁶⁹ Initial estimates of expenditure for the 1991/92 financial year for the three own affairs administrations and the four provinces]

Child welfare budgets^a: 1991/92

R

African^b:

Cape province

45 808 000

Natal

9 446 300

Orange Free State

17 480 000

Transvaal

28 800 000

Coloured

287 439 000

Indian

63 932 000

White

147 920 000

Total

600 825 300

a

Includes grants for child allowances, single-care allowances and foster-care allowances

b

Excludes the ten h

According to a report by the South African Society for the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect, which was published in March 1992, almost all aspects of services dealing with abused and neglected children in the greater Johannesburg area were in urgent need of upgrading. The report said that there was no specialised programme for child abuse in Soweto and no accurate figures for cases of child abuse in the area. It identified the following inadequacies in child abuse services in greater Johannesburg:¹⁷⁰
[¹⁷⁰ *The Star* 2 March 1992]

- the uncovering of abuse was not matched by the necessary facilities for assessment and treatment;
- there was no uniform system for collecting data on child abuse;
- there was a scarcity of treatment possibilities for the perpetrators of abuse;
- staff dealing with abuse often lacked intensive specialist training;
- very few people were dealing with cases of child abuse; and
- residential and foster care for children removed from abusive homes was in short supply.

The South African Police reported in May 1992 that cases of child rape were on the increase. Reported cases had increased from 1707 cases in 1988, to 2 133 in 1989, 2 613 in 1990 and 2 915 in 1991. Cases of incest, sodomy and indecent assault on children had also increased steadily over the same period. The police said that the increase in the number of reported cases of child sexual abuse could be partly ascribed to the fact that more members of the public were prepared to report such incidents than

previously.¹⁷¹ [¹⁷¹ *The Citizen* 7 May 1992]

In May 1992 the western Cape branch of the child protection unit of the police reported that in the last six months of 1991 the unit had received 1250 complaints regarding the sexual abuse of children. These figures included 292 cases of girls under 14 years of age being raped and 68 cases of children under 14 years of age being sodomised.¹⁷² [¹⁷² *Ibid* 6 May 1992]

The minister of national health, Dr Rina Venter, said in Parliament in February 1992 that the following numbers of places were available to children of different races in places of safety in May 1991:¹⁷³ [¹⁷³ *The Citizen* 11 February 1992]

Accommodation in places of safety for children: May 1991

Places available

Children accommodated

African

1 645

1 188

Coloured

715

610

Indian

200

84

White

505

447

Total

3 065

2

In May 1992 Dr Venter gave the following figures in Parliament for the number of children who could be accommodated in children's homes in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands), with the number who were accommodated in brackets: Africans, 1 639 (1 459); coloured children, 2 648 (2 229); Indians, 403 (378) and whites, 6 449 (5 234).¹⁷⁴ [¹⁷⁴ *Hansard* (A) 18 q cols 1147-1148, 26 May 1992]

In March 1992 the minister of justice, Mr Kobie Coetsee, announced that family advocates had been appointed in Bloernfontein, Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Pretoria. Such family advocates would undertake investigations into court cases involving the welfare of children, including custody, guardianship and divorced parents' access to children.¹⁷⁵ [¹⁷⁵ *The Citizen* 27 March 1992]

Although the Child Care Act of 1983 had been amended in June 1991 to allow parents to adopt a child of a different race (see *1991/92 Survey* pp 148–149), there were few transracial adoptions during the period under review. The manager of the adoptions department of the Johannesburg Child Welfare Society, Mrs Marionka Manias, said that she hoped that transracial adoptions would be only a small part of other organisation's activities. She suggested that the black community was against such adoptions and that it was calling for a better long-term solution to the problem. 'We are working very hard to recruit black adoptive parents but we have to empower the black community to adopt, and that probably means financially subsidised adoption,' Mrs Manias said.¹⁷⁶ [¹⁷⁶ *The Star* 3 June 1992]

The director of the Johannesburg Child Welfare Society, Dr Adele Thomas, said earlier that there were about 400 black children on the Reef alone awaiting adoption, but that her organisation placed only six to eight children monthly.¹⁷⁷ [¹⁷⁷ *Ibid* 30 October 1991]

An article in *Facts and Reports* in November 1991 warned that the ongoing violence in Natal was brutalising children beyond the point of rehabilitation. The education projects unit of the University of Natal reported that a survey of 244 African school children in six towns in Natal had shown that more than 80% of the respondents had seen classmates being killed. A researcher for the unit, Mr Blade Nzimande, said that the death of classmates had a devastating psychological effect on children.¹⁷⁸ [¹⁷⁸ *Facts and Reports* 15 November 1991]

A member of the child health unit of the University of Cape Town, Dr David Harrison, who had returned from KwaZulu, argued that the value of human life had become meaningless in a world which forced children to kill or be killed. 'I don't know whether children who have witnessed or participated in such brutality can ever be rehabilitated completely,' he said. Dr Harrison said that physical attacks on children were common and that many children had consequently fled to urban areas. He cited a sudden increase in the number of street children in Durban and Port Shepstone (Natal south coast) as evidence of this trends.¹⁷⁹ [¹⁷⁹ Ibid]

Services for disabled people

The following amounts were allocated to welfare services for disabled people in the 1991/92 financial year:¹⁸⁰ [¹⁸⁰ Initial estimates of expenditure for the 1991/92 financial year for the four provinces and the three own affairs administrations]

Budgets for the disabled:^a 1991/92

R

African^b:

Cape province

463 000

Natal

500 000

Orange Free State

560 000

Transvaal

5 310 000

Coloured

4 756 000

Indian

4 255 000

White

29 764 000

Total

45 608 000

a

Excluding maintenance grants

b

Excluding the ten homelands

The deputy minister of national health, Mr Fanus Schoeman, said in October 1991 that there were about 2,5m disabled people of all races in South Africa. He suggested that the number of disabled people was increasing owing to increased life expectancy, improved social conditions, better medical care of the disabled and urbanisation.¹⁸¹ [¹⁸¹ *The Citizen* 31 October 1991]

The public relations officer of the National Council for the Physically Disabled in South Africa, Ms Chareen Grobler, said in December 1991 that there was no legislation in South Africa to ensure that public facilities were accessible to the disabled. After a tour of Johannesburg with a paraplegic, Mr Neville Cohen, they described the city as ‘hostile, but slowly becoming user-friendly to the disabled’. Mr Cohen said that if buildings were properly designed, little additional cost was involved in providing facilities for the disabled. He said that there was no reason for ignorance about the needs of the disabled and argued that the disabled did not want ‘anything special’ but merely asked for the same access to facilities as everyone

Services for returning exiles

It was reported in September 1991 that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had drawn up a budget totalling R80m to repatriate about 30 000 exiles to South Africa (see *1991/92 Survey* pp160–161 and chapter on *Political Developments*). The head of the repatriation department of

the African National Congress (ANC), Mr Jackie Selebi, said that the process of exiles' applying to the South African government for indemnity from prosecution on their return to South Africa was drawing to a close. He said that 9 000 of the ANC's estimated 20 000 exiles had already submitted applications for indemnity, and that there had been few problems in most cases.¹⁸³ [¹⁸³ *Business Day* 22 October 1991]

Returning adult exiles were entitled to cash payments from the UNHCR of R4 250 spread over a six-month period. These payments were intended to cover the cost of food, accommodation and other basic requirements. Once-off grants were also available for the purchase of household goods and for primary and secondary education. The UNHCR said that depending on the need and availability of funds, further assistance could also be provided for vulnerable groups such as the chronically ill, the disabled and the elderly.¹⁸⁴ [¹⁸⁴ *The Weekly Mail* 27 March 1992]

Amounts given by foreign governments during the period under review to assist in the repatriation of exiles included a grant of R3,7m in September 1991 from the Canadian government to the UNHCR to assist in the repatriation of exiles and the resettlement of political prisoners, and a grant of R10m from the Italian government to build a community centre in Soweto to house returning exiles.¹⁸⁵ [¹⁸⁵ *Business Day* 4 November 1991]

In September 1991 representatives of the ANC, the Azanian People's Organisation and the UNHCR met business leaders in Johannesburg to discuss the job needs of returning exiles and freed political prisoners.¹⁸⁶ [¹⁸⁶ *Ibid* 19 September 1992]

In December 1991 it was announced that returned exiles living in Pretoria had formed an organisation called the returnee project working committee to help returnees solve problems with education, housing and employment.¹⁸⁷ [¹⁸⁷ *Sowetan* 5 December 1991]

In the same month the minister of justice, Mr Kobie Coetsee, said that leaders of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) had held talks with the government about the granting of indemnity to PAC exiles in order to facilitate their return to South Africa.¹⁸⁸ [¹⁸⁸ *Business Day* 2 December 1991]

In February 1992 the UNHCR said that it hoped to have repatriated nearly all South African exiles who wished to return to the country by April. Initial estimates of the number of exiles who would return had been between 30 000 and 40 000, but the UNHCR believed that the actual number would be between 15 000 and 20 000.¹⁸⁹ [¹⁸⁹ *Ibid* 28 January 1991]

It was reported in March 1992 that the national co-ordinating committee for the repatriation of South African exiles (NCCR) had established links with a number of private sector training centres to provide skills training for returnees. The centres were to provide courses in areas such as bricklaying, business

management, carpentry, computer science, construction, electricity, mechanics, plumbing and welding. The NCCR also provided limited counselling for returnees. The national co-ordinator of the NCCR, Mr Moss Chikane, said that his organisation had been able to employ some exiles. Others had been able to find work in trade unions, universities and non-government organisations. He added that very few had been able to find employment in the private sector.¹⁹⁰ [¹⁹⁰ *The Weekly Mail* 27 March 1992]

In May 1992 a repatriation co-ordinator for the ANC, Mr J Dumane, said that many highly qualified returning exiles were frustrated that their qualifications, which had been obtained in other countries, were not recognised by South African companies. He said that more than 13 000 exiles had already returned to South Africa. Some 30% of these people were skilled and another 10% were semi-skilled. Returning exiles were keen to undergo training but the number placed in training institutions so far was 'a drop in the ocean', Mr Dumane said. He believed that some exiles had returned to other countries because they had been unable to settle and find jobs in South Africa.¹⁹¹ [¹⁹¹ *Business Day* 4 May 1992]

In July 1992 the information officer for the NCCR, Mr Mbulelo Musi, argued that returned exiles had had to contend with police harassment, including interrogation and detention. He said that many returnees who had gone back to the Vaal Triangle (southern Transvaal) had been displaced by the violence there, and had become 'internal refugees'. Mr Musi said that at least 13 returned exiles had died in political violence since February 1992.¹⁹² [¹⁹² *Sowetan* 27 July 1992]

The UNHCR announced in August 1992 that it was to provide funds to the NCCR to set up a development fund in co-operation with the Small Business Development Corporation. The development fund would initially have R12m available to provide loans of as much as R6 000 each to returning exiles to start their own small businesses. The scheme was expected to create an initial 2 000 small business enterprises, with the intention of further allocations of funds to create another 12 000 small businesses.¹⁹³ [¹⁹³ *The Star* 11 August 1992]

Stokvels

Research conducted by Markinor in November 1991 found that 28% of Africans in the metropolitan areas (or 1,3m people) were members of stokvels (see also chapter on *Business*). Stokvel members tended to be female and older than 35 years, and 25% of stokvel members belonged to two or more stokvels. The survey also found that stokvel members were equally distributed among the different income groups.¹⁹⁴ [¹⁹⁴ Information supplied by the president of the National Stokvels Association of South Africa, Mr Andrew Lukhele, April 1992]

The president of the National Stokvels' Association of South Africa, Mr Andrew Lukhele, said in May 1992 that there were believed to be about 800 000 stokvels countrywide. The monthly cash flow of

stokvels was believed to total R200m. ¹⁹⁵ [¹⁹⁵ *Sunday Times* 10 May 1992]

The Markinor report found that 1,1m people in metropolitan areas were members of stokvels which paid for funeral expenses. Some 210 000 people were members of stokvels which addressed a range of personal problems, including financial assistance with the purchase of housing, education, the establishment of small businesses and the welfare of women.

LABOUR RELATIONS

Key Points

- In March 1922 the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) launched a mass action campaign in support of its demands for political and economic power sharing. The campaign culminated in a two-day general strike on 3 and 4 August, involving an estimated 2,5m to 4m people on the first day.
- In May 1992 several of the country's largest trade unions formed a unit trust, the Community Growth Fund, which would invest workers' pensions and provident fund monies in companies which complied with the unions' social responsibility criteria.
- Amendments to the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) and the Unemployment Insurance Act in July 1992 brought farmworkers under the acts' provisions for the first time. The acts were to come into effect on a date specified by the state president.
- In August 1992 the minister of manpower, Mr Leon Wessels, said that the National Manpower Commission would be restructured) to comprise one third business, one third labour and one third government representatives.
- After months of negotiations between business, labour and the government, a tripartite national economic forum was established in October to discuss a future economic policy for South Africa.
- In November Mr Wessels announced that amendments would be made to the Labour Relations Act and the Wage Act in 1993 to bring farmworkers under their ambit. Domestic workers would be brought under the BCEA.
- In 1991, the latest date for which figures were available, there were 192 trade unions covering 2,7m members, comprising 24% of the economically active population.
- Cosatu remained the largest union federation with an estimated 1,2m members.
- According to Andrew Levy and Associates, the average level of wage settlement on payroll for 1992

was 12,6% as against the average level of claim of 56,4%.

- Preliminary statistics published by the Department of Manpower in September 1992 showed that in the first six months of 1992 there was a total of 169 strikes, involving more than 43 000 workers and a loss of 339 000 mandays.

Policy and Legislation

Policy

National Manpower Commission

In August 1992 the minister of manpower, Mr Leon Wessels, announced that the National Manpower Commission (NMC) would be restructured. The commission's restructuring had been one of the items of the Laboria Minute signed in September 1990 by the government, unions and business. In October 1992 the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) withdrew from the commission because of 'failed attempts to restructure [the commission] to deal with broad economic issues rather than just labour-related ones' (see *1991/92 Survey* pp274–276).

The restructured commission would comprise one third government representatives, one third representatives of business and one third labour representatives. The chairman of the commission, Dr Frans Barker, said that the immediate issues on the commission's agenda included the consolidation of the Labour Relations Act (LRA) of 1956, discussion on whether the courts or legislation should clarify disputes around retrenchments and dismissals, the question of affirmative action and the improvement of productivity. He said the most controversial matter was the issue of independent members of the commission and how they should be dealt with. The commission working group had not been able to reach consensus on this, he said. Cosatu's preconditions for participating included the department being bound by majority decisions, public sector parties being represented and decisions arising out of consensus in the commission being put directly to Parliament, whether or not the minister of manpower supported them.¹ [¹ *Business Day, The Star* 28 August 1992] The National Council of Trade Unions welcomed the move to make the commission more representative and democratic, but opposed its advisory status. It said that agreements reached in the NMC should be binding on all parties.

In September 1992 Cosatu said that it would seek a meeting with the minister of manpower to discuss the problems it had with the new structure of the commission before taking a decision on whether to participate in it or not. It was concerned about the role of 'experts' and their voting status.² [² *Business Day* 8 September 1992]

In April 1992 the commission's recommendations to ease regulations on micro-businesses were

gazetted. Micro-businesses were defined as those businesses which were owner-managed, had five or fewer workers and a turnover in 1990 of no more than R250 000. The proposals were endorsed both by business representatives on the NMC and Cosatu while it was still an NMC member. The changes were for the most part minor and technical. Its main recommendations were as follows:

- the introduction of a simplified statutory disputes procedure for micro-companies. It suggested in the first instance that small businesses should be encouraged to resolve differences by discussion. If this failed, referral to an industrial council (IC) or conciliation board (CB) or arbitration or mediation should be compulsory before a strike or industrial court action was launched. The LRA should be amended to provide for mediation as an alternative to an IC or CB. In the case of disputes over dismissals, the parties should be able to choose between the industrial court or the proposed small labour court;
- the inclusion of a simplified procedure for exemptions from industrial council agreements, as well as a clause in all agreements inviting firms to seek exemption from provisions ‘restricting entrepreneurial initiative and/or employment opportunities’;
- the appointment of a Department of Manpower ‘facilitator’ to monitor exemptions, investigate restrictions on small enterprises and keep the definition of ‘micro-business’ under constant review; and
- the drafting and distribution of guidelines to small companies on such matters as disputes procedures.

The NMC agreed that all labour statutes should continue to apply to small businesses while recommending changes to the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act of 1983, the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1966 and the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1941 to ease red tape. It also recommended the drafting of guidelines for exemptions under the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1983, taking into account the nature, size and age of a firm, and whether employer/employee agreements were in force.³ [³ *The Weekly Mail* 24 April 1992]

International Labour Organisation proposals on labour matters

In February 1992 an International Labour Organisation (ILO) fact-finding and conciliation commission visited South Africa to investigate whether the country’s labour laws conformed with international standards. The three-member commission comprised the high commissioner for Barbados in London, Sir William Douglas; Mr Justice Kirby of New South Wales in Australia; and Mr Justice Lallah, the chief justice of Mauritius. The delegation also investigated complaints lodged by Cosatu with the ILO after the 1988 amendments to the LRA which sparked off mass protest and work stayaways in South Africa. At a press briefing before the commission’s arrival, Cosatu said that through the commission the federation hoped to secure certain public commitments, as well as a time frame for their implementation.

In its report, published in May 1992, in which it sought to identify areas in labour law that were

incompatible with the 'well-established body of jurisprudence developed by the ILO over the past 70 years', the ILO commission said that South African labour laws still needed wide-ranging reform, but cited the government's awareness of that fact as a hopeful sign. The rights to form a trade union and to collective bargaining were 'vital attributes of a free society', the commission's report said. These were among the basic freedoms that had been 'diminished or lost altogether' under the apartheid system. The report urged the government to push 'vigorously' for reforms to the LRA, which should include ensuring the independence of trade unions, the right to strike and collective bargaining rules. It noted that reforms had begun under the state president, Mr F W de Klerk, but said that further 'changes should ensure that basic civil liberties are provided by law and guaranteed in practice in a democratic society'. It also said that the 'anti-union violence' which had prevailed was totally unacceptable and demanded that the government bring the perpetrators to trial.

The report urged South Africa to join the key ILO conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining. In their recommendations the commissioners said that unions and employer organisations should be open to all races, and that farm labourers and domestic workers should be granted trade union rights. The report also recommended the entrenchment of the right to strike and picket and the amendment of homeland and public sector legislation to bring it into line with a reformed LRA. On the right to strike the report recommended:

- simplification of pre-strike procedural requirements and amendment of provisions relating to strike ballots (so that a union would not be required to have an absolute majority of members' votes in order to strike);
- removal of criminal sanctions for peaceful strike action;
- protection of workers against dismissal for legitimate strike action;
- narrowing of the definition of essential services to allow workers in, for instance, local authorities to go on strike; and
- provision of effective arbitration for all essential service workers who were unable to strike.

The report also recommended that organisational rights and facilities be guaranteed to unions, including access to employers' premises (especially where workers lived on the premises) and space for union meetings and business.⁴ [⁴ *The Citizen* 29 January 1992, 30 May 1992; *Business Day* 6 June 1992]

In June 1992 the annual meeting of the ILO was attended for the first time since the early 1980s by three employer delegates of the working committee which aimed to set up one employer body, which would in future include the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Foundation for African Business and Consumer Services. South Africa's membership of the ILO was terminated in 1964 because of apartheid. It was reported that South Africa's readmission to the ILO was

dependent on the establishment of an interim government or a government of national conciliation in South Africa, as well as the formation of a single employer body. The three delegates were Mr Bokkie Botha, general manager: human resources, of AECI; Mr Johann Liebenberg, senior general manager: external relations, of the Chamber of Mines of South Africa; and Mr Andr  Lamprecht, general manager: group human resources, of Barlow Rand. The South African delegation was invited to take part by the International Organisation of Employers which represents employer interests in the ILO.⁵ [⁵ *Sunday Times* 5 July 1992]

Legislation

In January 1992 the **Minerals Act**, passed in 1991, came into force. The **Nursing Amendment Act** was promulgated in March 1992. The act removed the legal prohibition on strikes by nurses which had existed in the principal act. Although nurses who went on strike would no longer be subject to criminal prosecution, they could still be subjected to disciplinary action by the South African Nursing Council. **The Medical, Dental and Supplementary Health Service Professions Bill** similarly removed the legal prohibition on doctors, dentists and psychologists going on strike, although they would still be liable to disciplinary action by the South African Medical and Dental Council.⁶ [⁶ Nursing Amendment Bill, B20-92 (GA), Medical, Dental and Supplementary Health Service Professions Amendment Bill, B27B-92(GA)]

In May 1992 the government announced that the **Machinery and Occupational Safety Act** of 1983 was to be revised to cover workers' health as well as their safety. The minister of manpower, Mr Piet Marais, said that the 1983 act had served its purpose. Much had changed over the last nine years, and it was time to make significant adjustments to safety and health in the workplace. **The Draft Bill on Occupational Safety and Health**, published in the *Government Gazette* on 11 May 1992, provides for the establishment of a national safety and health council, which will advise the minister with regard to matters relating to health and safety. Among its functions is the formulation and publication of standards and the promotion of education and training to assist employers and employees to maintain occupational safety and health. The bill places certain legal duties on employers regarding the safety and health of employees. It provides that every employer with more than 50 persons in his employ shall prepare and maintain a written statement of his general policy with respect to the safety and health at work of his employees. Employers and self-employed persons are also obliged to conduct their undertakings in such a way so as to ensure that people other than their employees are also not exposed to health and safety risks. Employers are also obliged to keep safety representatives informed of actions taken to ensure the occupational health of employees. These actions shall include, where necessary, the implementation of an occupational hygiene programme, biological monitoring of employees and the subjection of employees to medical surveillance.

In a new clause, the employer has to take steps to protect employees 'as far as is reasonably practical' from violence where this is 'reasonably foreseeable' or where circumstances develop which make it 'reasonably foreseeable'. This includes the identification and assessment of probable risks and the

employees most likely to be exposed to these, and an action plan which provides for measures necessary to protect such employees.

Each employer who has more than 20 employees in his employ at any workplace must within three months of the act coming into force designate safety and health representatives for his workplace. He has to consult his employees in 'good faith' regarding the arrangements for the nomination or election of such representatives who have to be full-time employees. Among the duties of such representatives are the investigation of potential hazards in the workplace and the causes of incidents, the investigation of complaints relating to health and safety, the making of representations to the employer or safety and health committees or an inspector arising from his investigations, and the attending of meetings of safety, and health committees. In terms of the act the employer must establish health and safety committees where there are two or more safety and health representatives. The number of employer representatives on such committees shall not be more than the number of safety and health representatives. A committee must, inter alia, make representations to the employer or an inspector regarding any matter affecting the safety or health of persons at the workplace. The act provides for criminal sanctions in cases where the provisions of the act have been contravened. On conviction a person contravening the act shall be liable to a maximum fine of R50 000 or a maximum sentence of 12 months in jail or to both such fine and sentence.

Comments on the draft had to be submitted to the director general of manpower within 90 days of its publication.

The director for Group Legal Consultants, Mr Mike Kruger, said that nearly 15 000 employers had been prosecuted under the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act and that this figure could increase when the bill was enacted. He said that insurers were concerned about the number of prosecutions and the possibility of increased payouts in the future. While he welcomed the protection the bill gave to workers in potentially dangerous situations, the requirement that employers protect staff against 'foreseeable violence from any source' was so wide open to interpretation that it was inevitable that employers would face an inquiry.⁷ [⁷ *Business Day* 7 September 1992]

In July 1992 the **Basic Conditions of Employment Amendment Act** and the **Unemployment Insurance Amendment Act**, providing for the extension of the principal acts to farmworkers, were passed. They were to come into operation on a date to be specified by the state president (see *Bargaining on recognition* below).

The **Public Service Labour Relations Bill** was published in September 1992. One of the bill's most significant clauses is the prohibition on striking by public servants rendering important services. In terms of the bill labour differences in the sector will be settled by arbitration, while officials, except those representing the public services as an employer, will have the right to join a union or association of their choice. The Congress of South African Trade Unions criticised the concept of 'important services' as being vague and said it opposed the attempt to deprive workers of their rights on that basis.⁸ [⁸ *Ibid* 15

September 1992⁹] The minister for administration and tourism, Dr Org Marais, said that broad consensus had been reached on the content of the bill. He said, 'Although no one is denying that public servants have a claim to employee rights, these rights should be exercised in such a way so as not to jeopardise the needs of the community.' The general manager of the Public Servants' Association (PSA), Mr Hans Olivier, said that the draft bill would completely change the style and method of negotiation to which the PSA management had been accustomed. 'Briefly, it means that members themselves will become much more closely involved in the entire process,' he said.⁹ [⁹ *The Citizen* 15 September 1992]

Trade Unions

Statistics

The number of registered trade unions and federations of trade unions for the years 1987 to 1991 is given below:¹⁰ [¹⁰ *Hansard* 16 qco 1 1050, 18 May 1992]

Registered trade unions: 1987-1991

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

Racially exclusive

White

41

40

32

29

37

Asian and coloured

29

26

17

16

11

African

29

28

23

20

17

Mixed unions

127

Asian, coloured, white

11

6

7

6

N/A

African, Asian, coloured

15

19

32

18

N/A

African and white

5

6

4

4

N/A

All races

55

62

66

58

N/A

Unspecified

20

22

31

47

N/A

Total

205

209

212

198

192

Membership

1,9m

2,0m

2,1m

2,4m

2,7m

Federations

11

10

10

10

7

N/A - Not available

Members of trade unions comprised 24% of the economically active pop

Groupings

Congress of South African Trade Unions

For the stand of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) on economic issues and politics see below.

At the time of writing Cosatu had 1,2m members in 14 affiliates. The largest affiliate was the National Union of Mineworkers which had 257 969 members, followed closely by the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa with 220 000 members.¹¹ [¹¹ Information obtained from Congress of South African Trade Unions, September 1992]

In January 1992 Cosatu appointed a new executive committee for the northern Transvaal. This followed the suspension of the entire old executive in November 1991 because of irregularities arising out of the use of signing powers.¹² [¹² *The Weekly Mail* 24 January 1992]

A study of Cosatu shopstewards published in 1992 (based on interviews with 863 shopstewards out of 25 000 countrywide) showed that they were found to be mainly male, in their mid-30s with some high school education. Although speaking Zulu, Xhosa or Sotho at home, the average shopsteward considered himself to be a South African and did not see himself in ethnic terms. He preferred reading in English. He was a Christian and attended church regularly with his family, whom he hardly ever saw because the 'struggle' consumed his time. He owned a radio and television and used them often. He had been working for his company for more than eight years as a semi-skilled worker and earned less than R250 a week before overtime. He held radical views, believing that worker committees should run factories and that nationalisation was necessary to redress the inequalities of the past. He would vote for the African National Congress but believed that Cosatu was the best guardian of worker interests. He had regularly participated in stayaways against capitalism and apartheid called by Cosatu.¹³ [¹³ Pityana S and Orkin M (eds), *Beyond the Factory Floor - A Survey of Cosatu Shop-stewards*, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1992]

In September 1992 a new weekly programme on labour issues was launched, to be broadcast on 11 radio stations of the South African Broadcasting Corporation and sponsored by Cosatu. Cosatu said that it was sponsoring the programme 'not only as a service to our members, but as a service to all workers'.¹⁴ [¹⁴ *The Citizen* 16 September 1992]

In May 1992 Cosatu and the National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu) postponed a workers' summit on trade union unity pending further sectoral meetings between the two federations' respective affiliates. It was further decided that a proposed declaration of workers' rights which could be included in a future constitution should be discussed with unions outside the Cosatu/Nactu told.¹⁵ [¹⁵ *Business Day* 27 May 1992.] A statement signed jointly by Cosatu and Nactu said. The postponement is firstly informed by our commitment to establish one federation in one country, and secondly we believe that discussions on workers' rights should reach millions of workers in order to have a broadly representative document.'¹⁶ [¹⁶ *Izwilethu* June 1992]

A further meeting scheduled for June 1992 was also postponed. Cosatu cited lack of adequate preparation, funding and the failure of the United Front of Democratic Independent Unions of South Africa (Ufitusa) to respond to an invitation to attend. Ufitusa, however, cited the 'interference of Cosatu in the internal affairs of Nactu' as a reason why the meeting was postponed.¹⁷ [¹⁷ Untitled pressclip undated]

Federation of South African Labour Unions

The Federation of South African Labour Unions had 13 affiliates with a total of 220 000 members. In March 1992 it changed its name from the Federation of Salaried Staff Associations of South Africa as it was felt that this name indicated that it was interested only in white-collar workers when in reality it did not specify membership. According to its constitution, membership was open to all trade unions and staff associations. Its membership had increased substantially from the 45 000 members recorded in 1984. Part of the reason was attributed to a realisation by white-collar workers that their lack of organisation had led to an erosion in their wages when compared to the gains made by unionised hourly paid workers who had achieved substantial improvements in wages and conditions of work. Although 75% of its membership comprised white workers, this was due to historical factors and not official policy, the organisation now being open to workers of all races, it said.

The federation was represented on the Economic Advisory Council of the State President, the National Manpower Commission, the National Productivity Institute, the National Training Board, the Rules Board for the Industrial Court, the South African National Consumer Union and the Unemployment Insurance Board.¹⁸ [¹⁸ Information provided by the Federation of South African Labour Unions, 10 September 1992]

National Council of Trade Unions

At the time of writing the National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu) had 23 affiliates and a membership of 250 000. In February 1992 it reduced its regional offices from 21 to 11 to cut expenditure, increase accountability of organisers, stop wastage of resources and reduce dependence on foreign funding which would be cut in two years' time, said the union's general secretary, Mr Cunningham Ngcukana. He said that rationalisation would make Nactu compatible with Cosatu's regional structures and increase solidarity and co-ordination with Cosatu. It also planned to reduce its affiliates from 23 to 14 industrial unions and set down March 1992 as the cut-off date for this process. He said that if this did not happen recalcitrant unions might be expelled. Mr Ngcukana denied that the federation was in a financial crisis.¹⁹ [19 *Business Day* 26 February 1992] The federation was working on merging the metal sector, the public service, services and transport sectors, while the construction union was undergoing a process of reconstruction.²⁰ [20 *South African Labour Bulletin* March/April 1992]

During the period under review the federation introduced a tertiary education course for organisers, administrators and national leadership to be funded by overseas donors. Commenting on the development, Mr Ngcukana said that unionists in the democratic trade union movement were largely activists. 'Their orientation on collective bargaining at the factory level and to some extent at industrial council level is not that impressive. This is because they do not have the necessary skills, such as having analyses of company financial statements, economic notions about the company, the industry and the general economy and the impact at micro-macro level of the state of the economy.'²¹ [21 *Ibid*]

In an interview in the *South African Labour Bulletin*, Mr Ngcukana said that at the beginning of 1992 Nactu had held a seminar for organisers attended by 60 regional organisers in order to assess worker control and democracy within the federation. The seminar assessed affiliates' structures and it was decided to reorganise these and integrate the educational and organisational functions.²² [22 *Ibid*]

In an interview in August 1992 Mr Ngcukana said that fragmented trade unions were 'not good for the future. The history of the working class the world over is that where we have communities that have experienced oppression through dictatorship, you find fragmented trade union movements. There is also the experience in Africa of trade unions linked to the liberation struggle with the liberation movement turning its back on the trade unions'. An example, he said, was what had happened to the National Union of Namibian Workers in Namibia. After independence it had required the involvement of international trade unions to get the new government to pass labour legislation. In South Africa it was important to be involved in the national liberation struggle but at the same time it was important to secure organisational independence, he added. He said that the following were the objectives of Nactu in a new South Africa:

- to broaden its organisational base;

- to ensure internal democracy within trade unions;
- to produce a leadership that would be able to carry trade union movements beyond the era of apartheid;
- to improve organisational skills; and
- to improve bargaining skills.²³ [²³ *Sowetan* 17 August 1992]

It was reported in June 1992 that four Nactu affiliates had decided to merge to form the Municipality, Education, State, Health and Allied Workers' Union which would have 21 000 paid-up members.²⁴ [²⁴ *New Nation* 15 June 1992]

For information on the proposed workers' summit between Cosatu and Nactu see section on *Cosatu* above.

South African Confederation of Labour

The South African Confederation of Labour had five affiliates with an estimated 59 000 members. It was an all-white organisation. No further information was obtainable from the confederation.²⁵ [²⁵ Information supplied by South African Confederation of Labour, September 1992]

Trade unions and the economy

Restructuring of the economy

During the period under review the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) voiced its dissatisfaction over lack of progress in the establishment of a tripartite forum of labour, business and the government to discuss the restructuring of the economy. In May 1991 Cosatu formulated a broad platform of demands for discussion with employers and the government (see *1991/92 Survey* pp282–283). In September 1991 Cosatu complained about the lack of progress in talks with government and business on restructuring. In November of that year the minister of manpower, Mr Eli Louw, said that he had sent invitations to Cosatu and business to discuss the establishment of an economic forum.

In January 1992 labour and business met to discuss the establishment of an economic forum. Represented at the meeting were Cosatu, the National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu) and the Federation of South African Labour Unions (Fedsal). Employers were represented by the Afrikaanse

Handelsinstituut (AHI), the Chamber of Mines of South Africa, the Foundation for African Business and Consumer Services (Fabcos), the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the South African Chamber of Business (Sacob), the South African Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs, and the Steel and Engineering Industries' Federation of South Africa. The Consultative Business Movement acted as secretariat. At the meeting differences emerged on a number of issues, including the scope and the status of the forum. Cosatu proposed that there should be a decision-making body which should:

- involve a governing authority;
- focus on immediate economic problems faced by workers;
- develop an 'appropriate industrial policy' that created wealth; and
- have binding authority in matters of economic policy.

This binding authority would operate at different levels—some decisions would require legislation, such as the extension of farmworkers' rights, and some would simply require agreement between employers and trade unions. Business did not present a common front on all issues, but was inclined to favour an advisory role for the forum, believing that it would be difficult to reconcile an authoritative economic policy-making body with the sovereignty of Parliament.

In February 1992 Cosatu said that if the government insisted on excluding major players in the economy from decision making, the government would plunge the country into confrontation and jeopardise the negotiating process. Cosatu was responding to a statement by the minister of manpower, Mr Piet Marais, who, commenting on the forum, which the government had been invited to join, said that an economic forum established for political reasons would fail.²⁶ [²⁶ *Business Day* 14 February 1992]

Calls for an immediate suspension of the government's unilateral restructuring of the economy, for the establishment of a national economic negotiating forum, and the restructuring of the National Manpower Commission, were made by Cosatu in March 1992 at a news conference called to announce a four-month programme of action by the federation in support of a variety of political and economic demands.²⁷ [²⁷ *Ibid* 9 March 1992]

At the conclusion of its economic policy conference in the same month, Cosatu said that challenging the government's unilateral restructuring of the economy would be one of the issues to be placed at the top of the federation's economic agenda.

Commenting on the government's views on a social contract between business, labour and the government, the new minister for economic co-ordination, Mr Derek Keys, said in his maiden speech in

Parliament in January 1992, In all the examples of superior economic growth achieved by other countries (Sweden in the 1930s, Germany and Japan post war, Korea in the 1960s) there is one common factor, the golden triangle: business, labour and the state, joined in a consensus carefully and consciously aimed at economic growth. I am watching every attempt to develop areas of business/labour consensus with interest.²⁸ [²⁸ *Financial Mail* 27 March 1992]

However, in March Mr Keys was reported as arguing that the time was not yet right for an economic forum. The government was not representative of the entire community, while Cosatu and Nactu, although powerful, represented only a small section of South Africa's workforce and organisations like Sacob had mandate problems. He said that business and the labour movement should meet to discover areas of agreement and points of conflict. When a transitional government was in place, the forum could be set up. In reply, Cosatu said that it would be able to go along with Mr Keys's argument, but for the fact that the government was involved currently in 'unilaterally restructuring the economy'. The restructuring, it argued, was aimed at restricting a future democratic government's ability to address economic backlogs and benefiting the National Party's support base. The federation based its arguments on:

- the government's shifting an increasingly larger share of the tax burden on to individuals;
- the negotiating of tariff agreements with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which would bind a future government;
- the privatisation of state forests which it believed would result in an increase in building costs;
- the government's arranging of foreign loans at high interest rates and then ploughing R2bn of surplus borrowing into the public service pension fund; and
- the manner in which value added tax (VAT) had been introduced.

Commenting in March 1992 on what issues the forum should investigate, the general secretary of Nactu, Mr Cunningham Ngcukana, said that it should deal with specific economic issues such as taxation, job creation, job training, investment codes and investment policy on trade and tariffs. He said that it should not deal with ideological issues as there were differences in what kind of economy the different parties would want. Nactu would want a socialist economy, business a free market economy and others a mixed economy and there would be no progress. He said that the forum should not be related to the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) as Nactu did not believe that economic issues should be tied to political issues at the moment.²⁹ [²⁹ *South African Labour Bulletin*, March/April 1992]

The general secretary of Cosatu, Mr Jay Naidoo, said that if such a forum was set up, Cosatu would have 'to deliver' and was quite prepared to have issues such as productivity and labour stability featured high

on the agenda of the forum. He said that a general strike planned for April had been postponed while the union movement assessed progress, at Codesa and whether Mr Keys had any suggestions for getting his cabinet colleagues to agree to an economic forum.³⁰ [³⁰ *Sunday Times* 5 April 1992]

On 22 April 1992 the cabinet decided at the request of Mr Keys that a senior group of government economic ministers and deputy ministers should meet business and labour on the issue of the economic forum.

The decision was reached after a delegation of business and labour had met the minister on 1 April and had handed to him an agreement drawn up jointly by the two parties on what an economic forum should be and the scope of its tasks.³¹ [³¹ *Business Day* 11 May 1992]

Speaking during his budget vote in May 1992, Mr Keys said that the government would meet labour and business on the economic forum but had not yet decided on whether to take part or not. He said that he would do everything in his power to encourage and facilitate a healthier relationship between labour and management and make the state accessible to both parties. He said that management had struggled to adapt to labour's more militant mode and this and general business conditions over the past few years had resulted in demotivation.³² [³² *Ibid* 18 May 1992]

At a meeting in Cape Town in the same month, labour, business and the government agreed on joint consultations to try to reach consensus on restructuring the economy and addressing economic problems. Mr Keys was accompanied by his special adviser, Mr Japie Jacobs, while labour was represented by Cosatu, Fedsal and Nactu. Business was represented by the AHI, the Chamber of Mines of South Africa, Fabcos, the South African Agricultural Union, Sacob, and the South African Federation of Civil Engineering Councils. A subcommittee of the three parties was set up to chart the next stage in the process. Mr Naidoo said the meeting was 'good and positive', while it was reported that Mr Keys approved of the joint proposals worked out between business and labour on the forum. The delegations agreed that the joint labour and business proposals for setting up an economic forum and its agenda were still under discussion and that the government would draft certain other proposals.³³ [³³ *Ibid* 19 May 1992]

The government nominated three representatives to sit on a joint subcommittee with labour and business which would investigate how to expedite the process of establishing the forum and report to the cabinet. In response to the meeting labour hinted at a softer line on threatened mass action around its economic demands, due to be debated at a worker summit of Cosatu, Nactu and non-aligned bodies the following week.³⁴ [³⁴ *The Weekly Mail* 22 May 1992]

At a conference in May 1992, the secretary general of the African National Congress (ANC), Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, said that trade unions would demand increased worker participation in individual enterprises as part of their struggle for economic democracy. They would want to play a greater role in the restructuring of the economy and in the strategic planning of companies. 'One of the greatest challenges in overturning apartheid is to combine the move to political democracy with the creation of a

path towards economic democracy,' he said. The government's intervention would be needed for the redistribution of wealth, the alleviation of poverty and the protection of the unemployed, and domestic and farm workers who could not bargain collectively. He cited four areas in which workers could build a measure of economic democracy through collective bargaining: training and affirmative action, greater disclosure of information, participation in planning, and the investment of workers' savings and retirement funds. The new Community Growth Fund (see below) was a first step in workers having a say over how their savings were invested.³⁵ [³⁵ *Business Day* 6 May 1992]

At the beginning of July 1992, announcing the holding of a general strike in August, Mr Naidoo mentioned as one of the federation's points of dissatisfaction its view that Mr Keys had reneged on an agreement to halt the unilateral restructuring of the economy and his 'high-handed' attitude in dealing with the VAT co-ordinating committee's demands for lower food prices and a VAT exemption on basic foodstuffs. Economic negotiations, including those on the national economic forum, would be broken off and mass action intensified unless speedy progress was made, he said.³⁶ [³⁶ *Ibid* 2 July 1991]

In August 1992 it was announced that the forum would hold its first plenary session in September. Cosatu said that the restructuring of the economy should happen only as a result of agreement in the forum. It said that it would fight at the forum for ways to reverse the damage already done as a result of such restructuring, such as the unilateral imposition of VAT. It claimed that the forum was a victory for workers who had struggled to persuade the government that it could not restructure the economy without negotiating with the labour movement.³⁷ [³⁷ *Ibid* 20 August 1992]

In September 1992 Cosatu accused the government of seriously damaging prospects for constructive consultation on economic matters when it deferred a decision to participate in the forum. Giving his reasons for deferring the decision, Mr Keys said that it was owing to Cosatu's campaigns for mass action and a pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) boycott. He said that the government had not closed its doors on the forum but was waiting until it was convinced that all parties were pursuing economic growth as a primary aim subject to the law. I should like to emphasise that the arrangements I have already made to ensure that the labour/ business nexus has direct access to the government's decision-making mechanism, and that my two deputy ministers and my special adviser are available in a facilitating role if required, are unaffected by this deferment,' he added. He also said that assurances he had given earlier in the month about avoiding unilateral restructuring and seeking participation in policy making also remained 'of full force and effect'.³⁸ [³⁸ *The Citizen* 17 September 1992, *Business Day* 18 September 1992]

Cosatu said that the government wanted to proceed with unilateral economic restructuring without being fettered by socio-economic negotiating forums. It said that all outstanding issues had been resolved between the parties to the forum and a date—2 October—set for its launch. It called the decision a 'flagrant breach of an agreement' reached with Mr Keys at a meeting of the three parties the previous week. However, minutes of that meeting indicated that Mr Keys had said that consensus on the forum was conditional on a positive response from the cabinet. At the meeting Mr Keys had said a forum

plenary session was ‘one of the most difficult issues’ for him to sell to his constituency.³⁹ [³⁹ *The Citizen* 17 September 1992, *Business Day* 18 September 1992]

Employer representatives at the meeting argued that Cosatu’s position on mass action and PAYE should not prevent the forum from starting its work. The director of industrial relations at the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, Mr Bobby Godsell, said, however, that business was opposed ‘to these actions which if pursued by Cosatu will influence the ability of business to continue talking in the forum’.⁴⁰ [⁴⁰ *Business Day* 18 September 1992]

Also in September, business and labour urged the government to avoid presenting its integrated normative economic model—which Mr Keys had said would be ready by the end of November—as a fait accompli. The chairman and managing director of Rand Mines, Mr John Hall, said that while business understood the time constraints on the government regarding its economic model, employers had been frustrated by ‘pseudo-consultation’ in the past. A spokesman for Cosatu, Mr Jayendra Naidoo, said that it was difficult to consider documents from a party which was already firmly committed to those documents. He said that labour and business were keen to see all proposals, before they were fine-tuned, on the table at a plenary session of the economic forum.⁴¹ [⁴¹ *Ibid* 21 September 1992]

In March 1992, in an article looking at the restructuring of the economy, the Economic Trends Group—a project with links with Cosatu—isolated a number of issues which had to be examined. These included:

- a serious questioning of the degree of protection and the tariffs policy;
- ownership structures and the lack of competition within sectors;
- the criteria used by government institutions for the support of particular industries;
- the absence of a coherent policy for human resource development;
- the disregard for environmental considerations;
- managerial behaviour which was characterised by short-term profitability and a lack of vision; and
- the adversarial industrial relationships governing labour relations.

It said that the experiences of countries such as Australia, Canada and Sweden indicated that restructuring was an inevitable response to global challenges. It also showed that it was only in reaching some kind of strategic accommodation between labour, the state, and capital that unions would be able

to extract what potential benefits the reorganisation of manufacturing production offered. It said that the restructuring programmes of the International Monetary Fund and other international institutions were predicated on the lowering of the real wage through devaluation and the lowering of the social wage through cuts in government expenditure. The basis of restructuring identified by the group rested on new and different production techniques. One objective of the group was to re-establish increased competitiveness and productivity and a second to extend and consolidate the organisational capacity of the trade unions in the factory and at industrial council level. The achievement of these objectives relied on the ability of those two actors to negotiate a 'restructuring accord'. The underlying assumption of such an accord was that with greater industrial economic democracy, production and productivity would be increased. The implications for labour were a greater involvement in individual workplace issues as well as macro-economic issues, including wages, taxation, the social wage and price restraint, unemployment, child care, education and training, health care and other social development.⁴² [42 Ibid 30 March 1992]

Redistribution and nationalisation

Outlining its economic policy after a three-day meeting at the end of March 1992, Cosatu said that it would continue to strive for a democratic, socialist society as 'the means of truly meeting the aspirations of our people'. Stating that redistribution was essential to growth, Cosatu said that a redistribution of resources and power could be implemented by 'a process of state intervention combining nationalisation, anti-trust legislation and other forms of legislative intervention, including price control'.⁴³ [43 *The Citizen, Business Day* 31 March 1992]

Redistribution, which should involve reducing the importance of luxury goods production, should be led by the state and financed by redirecting existing investment, restructuring corporate tax in order to increase the amount of tax collected, introducing progressive taxes such as land and wealth taxes, and increasing the level of savings, both institutional and personal. The beneficiation of the country's considerable mineral resources was also a key element to achieving an overall growth path, the federation stated. Redistribution would also need a political economy that would lead to a decisive and strong state based on majority support. Cosatu would therefore campaign for a constituent assembly in which employees' rights were represented. It would oppose federalism, forced coalition governments and 'multi-presidencies', and support a multi-party democracy.⁴⁴ [44 Ibid]

The federation said that the key objective of nationalisation would be for full socialisation and to create a society based on need rather than on profit. However, not all industries should be nationalised. Prevent policy should be selective, with objectives related to a growth path. The objective of providing basic goods and services would require that the following fell under state control: education, Eskom, health, Iscor, municipal services, the Post Office, Telkom, public transport, roads, state forests and water. Other industries, such as mining and the financial sectors, might have to be strategically nationalised to stimulate economic growth, strengthen workers' economic control and enlarge resources available to a

democratic state. But this would happen after a process of consultation and negotiation. Compensation for nationalised industries would be subject to negotiation.⁴⁵ [⁴⁵ Ibid]

Cosatu also called for a programme of land reform.

The responsibilities of industry should include creating jobs and achieving full employment, paying living wages, 'producing high quality goods and services at affordable prices, developing human resources, creating environmentally sustainable policies, and ensuring that trade contributed to full employment'. This would necessitate labour-intensive production, maximising the potential for the beneficiation of natural resources, ensuring sustainable growth and stopping the outflow of capital.⁴⁶ [⁴⁶ Ibid]

Cosatu said that unemployment should be addressed through public works schemes, including a special programme for unemployed youth. These would have to be negotiated with Cosatu and funded through the state and a special tax on business.⁴⁷ [⁴⁷ Ibid]

Legislation should also be passed to break up conglomerates and monopolies, where necessary, in order to ensure economic efficiency and growth and to reduce their economic power. Steps should also be taken to increase employees' power and participation in all aspects of political and economic life. As public ownership was a more desirable form of ownership, Cosatu said that co-operative and collective ownership should be encouraged by appropriate legislation and support programmes.⁴⁸ [⁴⁸ Ibid]

Elaborating on the workings of the African National Congress/ Cosatu/South African Communist Party alliance on economic issues, Mr Jay Naidoo said in April 1992 that the alliance partners were attempting to develop common propositions on the economy. Their view was that no single party could dictate to the others what their policy should be. There were going to be differences of emphasis. However, the key proposition within the alliance, and one on which there was consensus, was that basic social services should remain in public hands. The consensus was that a democratic state—not acting on its own or in a dictatorial manner—was perfectly entitled, where it saw large sections of the population being disadvantaged by monopolistic practices, to intervene either by setting up competing institutions or by nationalising. 'The ANC will agree with many issues in our proposals, and there are those that they will obviously disagree with. We are not demanding that they agree with us on everything. But certainly on the major propositions about the growth path, and how we are going to meet the needs of the people, those we will fight to have accepted,' he said.⁴⁹ [⁴⁹ *Weekend Argus* 4 April 1992]

The national budget

In a statement in March 1992, Cosatu criticised the national budget as 'mean and misleading' saying that it would 'do little for social and economic progress', and the minister of finance, Mr Barend du Plessis,

for refusing to participate in ‘any democratic process of discussion of socio-economic issues’. The budget announcement was marked by countrywide protest by Cosatu and its alliance members. They called on the government to stop the unilateral restructuring of the economy, to stop support for major capital projects until these had been discussed with the labour movement and to negotiate an effective poverty relief programme. The statement said that the budget ‘does nothing to relieve more than two million people who are starving in this country. It does not control or lower food prices’. Food prices, it said, would increase because the minister had removed the zero-rating on basic foodstuffs. The increase in the price of petrol, it said, would have a spiralling effect on other prices and aggravate poverty.⁵⁰ [⁵⁰ *New Nation* 20 March 1992]

In September 1992, responding to reports by the Central Statistical Service that the food price index increase for July 1992 was 30,4% higher than for July 1991, and the highest in ten years, a national organising secretary for the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa and convener of the VAT co-ordinating committee (VCC), Dr Bemie Fanaroff, said that the government and the private sector had to start paying attention to consumer anger at the escalating food prices. He dismissed claims by the chairman of Pick ’n Pay, Mr Raymond Ackerman, that the food inflation rate of chain stores, excluding VAT, was 15%.⁵¹ [⁵¹ *The Star* 1 September 1992]

In the same month Cosatu rejected an invitation to give its views on the budget to the parliamentary joint committee on finance, saying that it was an insult to expect it to take part in a ‘whitewashing exercise’. It said, ‘For the government to ask Cosatu, which has such a major interest in the budget, to give its views after the budget has been presented is not only insulting, but vindicates our view that the government has been deliberately engaged in unilateral decision making in the socio-economic arena.’ The statement asked what Cosatu was expected to say to the committee when the concerns which it had raised by its members over the last year had been ‘blatantly ignored in the budget’. It said that the invitation had been sent on 19 March, the day after the budget had been presented to Parliament.⁵² [⁵² *The Citizen* 25 March 1992]

Value added tax and food prices

During the period under review trade unions continued to call on the government to lift value added tax (VAT) on essential foods and services. In 1991, as a result of protests over VAT, the minister of finance reduced the VAT rate and zero rated a further number of basic foodstuffs. At the time, however, he said that this would apply for six months only, ending 30 March 1992.⁵³ [⁵³ *Business Day* 30 March 1992]

The VCC held a series of public hearings on VAT in February 1992. Nactu’s general secretary, Mr Cunningham Ngcukana, said that workers would demand higher wages to offset the impact of VAT. Decreased disposable income together with inflationary food costs would lead to heightened industrial action. Mr Naidoo said that the government’s intransigence in response to calls for negotiations on VAT

had led its members to consider escalating the campaign to include an attack on the entire tax system.⁵⁴ [54 Ibid 17 February 1992]

The lifting of VAT on essential food and services formed one of the ten demands made by Cosatu when announcing its programme of mass action in early March 1992.⁵⁵ [55 *The Weekly Mail* 1.3 March 1992]

In the same month Nactu withdrew from the anti-VAT campaign organised by the ANC/Cosatu/SACP alliance saying that the alliance's unilateral action was based on demands not canvassed with Nactu's Witwatersrand region and that attempts by the region to reach an agreement with the alliance on the demands had failed. However, it said that it hoped that the working relationship on other issues would continue.⁵⁶ [56 *The Citizen* 19 March 1992] At the end of March Mr du Plessis announced that the government would extend the temporary rating on eight basic foodstuffs. Dr Fanaroff said that while the VCC welcomed the move it 'did not go far enough' in two respects. Firstly, the crisis of poverty and starvation in the country would not be properly addressed until a poverty relief programme had been established. Secondly, the government should consult broadly on budgetary measures such as VAT and the stabilisation of food prices. Responding to the government's move, Mr Naidoo said that he rejected the government's argument that a uniform VAT rate led to a better tax system as an excuse for laziness on the part of the Department of Finance'. Quoting the example of Germany, he said there the government felt it necessary to have a low VAT rate for foodstuffs and a higher rate for everything else (see also the chapter on the *Economy*).⁵⁷ [57 *Sunday Times* 5 April 1992]

The drought

In May 1992 Cosatu announced that it was to launch a campaign to address what it said was the government's poor response to the drought in rural areas and the homelands. It said that the R1bn government allocation for drought relief would go mainly to help white farmers. 'Of the amount allocated for drought relief, a measly two percent has been allocated to farmworkers (less than R20 per farm worker). This doesn't even take into account the millions facing famine conditions in the bantustans,' said the federation. It said that it would embark on a six-point programme. This would involve, inter alia:

- sending a senior delegation of Cosatu leadership to investigate the drought in rural areas and to discuss with community leaders an approach to addressing the crisis;
- helping to ensure that all those concerned with assisting the victims of drought would be co-ordinated and that any governmental or international resources would be directed to the people who needed them;
- ensuring that affected communities were directly involved in planning and administering drought relief;

- launching a campaign in factories and workplaces around the country to collect money for those affected by the drought;
- negotiating the question of effective drought relief, public works and other programmes in the national economic negotiation forum; and
- demanding that no farmworkers or other workers were retrenched as a result of the drought.⁵⁸ [⁵⁸ *The Citizen* 11 May 1992]

In June 1992 a spokesman for the South African Agricultural Union (SAAU), Mr Kobus Visser, said that farmworkers would have to submit applications for funds through their employers. He added that there was no mechanism to monitor distribution and therefore it would be difficult to establish whether farmworkers had received their share of the package. He said that the SAAU had laid down strict rules to ensure that workers were not denied the aid.⁵⁹ [⁵⁹ *New Nation* 4 June 1992]

Unemployment

In July 1992 the whites-only South African Iron, Steel and Allied Industries Union started a collective for jobless members. The intention was that unemployed members build their own housing units and produce basic foodstuffs to sustain themselves and to market surpluses. Vocational training in terms of the Manpower Training Amendment Act of 1990 was to form an integral part of the project. The unemployed would themselves manage the settlement and provide an infrastructure. Eventually other white trade unions would be invited to join the effort. The union's executive called on members to contribute financially towards a fund to buy land for accommodation. The union said that it had found employment for 500 people in its efforts to counter the effects of black worker stayaways. More than 5 000 registrations had been made.⁶⁰ [⁶⁰ *The Citizen* 1 July 1992]

Community Growth Fund

In May 1992 several of the country's biggest trade unions formed a unit trust—the Community Growth Fund (CGF)—which would invest workers' pension and provident funds in companies with strong capital and earnings growth which complied with the unions' social responsibility criteria. The participating unions included the Construction and Allied Workers' Union; the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM); the Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers' Union; and the Transport and General Workers' Union, all affiliates of Cosatu, and Nactu's Metal and Electrical Workers' Union of South Africa; National Union of Food, Wine, Spirits and Allied Workers; and Transport and Allied Workers' Union. The fund was to be managed and administered by Syfrets. The first chair of the joint

union-Syfrets board controlling the fund would be Professor Anthony Asher of the Department of Actuarial Science at the University of the Witwatersrand.⁶¹ [⁶¹ *Business Day* 5 May 1992]

According to a spokesman for the NUM, Mr Monoko Nchwe, the aim of the fund would be to ‘marry high returns with socially responsible investments’. Members’ pension contributions would be carefully protected and the fund would not be used to influence the outcome of day-to-day labour disputes. The social criteria included active support for job-creation projects, recognition of trade unions, fair levels of pay, affirmative action programmes and the promotion of health and safety. Companies privatised after the scheme came on line would not qualify for investment, nor would companies which manufactured arms, polluted the environment or had offshore investments with little benefit for South African workers. Mr Nchwe said that there was no blacklist of companies. The unions had devised a point system to measure companies’ social responsibility, and investment decisions would be influenced by the number of points the company had. Mr Ian Hamilton, a representative of Syfrets, said that the company had matched its choice of potential investors with the unions’ choice and had found that they fitted almost perfectly. Socially irresponsible companies were usually unfavourable investments in any event.⁶² [⁶² *Ibid*]

The first contribution to the fund was made by the secretary general of the ANC, Mr Cyril Ramaphosa. He called on all provident and pension funds to invest in the fund, and said that workers were no longer spectators in the economy, but active participants in determining their own economic destiny. Syfrets would invest R2m in the fund initially.⁶³ [⁶³ *Ibid*] In May Times Media transferred R1m from its pension fund to the CGF. The company’s managing director, Mr Stephen Mulholland, said that the involvement in markets was ‘a highly significant departure in the affairs of a trade union, which would now be exposed to the need for investments to perform’.⁶⁴ [⁶⁴ *Ibid* 6 May 1992]

Not all Cosatu’s and Nactu’s affiliates supported the fund. Among Cosatu’s affiliates, the Chemical Workers’ Industrial Union, the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa and the South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers’ Union refused to endorse the fund, while Nactu’s largest affiliate, the South African Chemical Workers’ Union, also objected to it. Some unionists argued that the fund’s launch was premature, others accused the NUM—one of the trust’s biggest proponents—of going ahead with the fund when other investment options were still being considered. The assistant general secretary of Nactu, Mr Mahlomola Skosana, said that the CGF was premature. It uses the economy to tame black people and favours the employed over the unemployed,’ he said. He added that it was problematic because only individual members of the provident funds benefited from the profits of the fund and suggested that a percentage of the profits go to unions. Commenting on the accusation that the Labour Research Service (LRS), which had designed the fund, and the NUM had pushed through the initiative, the director of the LRS, Mr Gordon Young, said, ‘There is a lot of competition in the financial market. When you move you have to move fast.’ He also added that if unions wished to beat inflation, they had no choice but to invest on the stock market.⁶⁵ [⁶⁵ *The Weekly Mail* 26 June 1992]

Trade unions and politics

The referendum

In March 1992 the executive council of the 40 000-strong South African Iron, Steel and Allied Industries Union called on its members to vote 'no' in the referendum on 17 March to determine whether the white electorate was in favour of reform. It said that in a secret ballot the council members had overwhelmingly opted for a 'no' vote. It cited as reasons for its decision, the government's unsympathetic attitude towards white workers and their unions especially with regard to labour legislation changes in 1991 and concessions the government had made to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), the National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu) and the South African Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs (Saccola). It criticised the government's tacit approval of affirmative action programmes which 'openly and directly discriminate against white workers'. It also criticised the government for allowing 'foreign workers to deprive white workers of job opportunities'. It added that the government was negating white culture by opening residential areas and holiday resorts to all races and that it was apparently unable to act against the organisers of mass strikes and stayaways.⁶⁶ [⁶⁶ *The Citizen* 3 March 1992]

Reacting to the 'yes' majority vote in the referendum, the all-white Mineworkers' Union (MWU) said it would lead to an even further erosion of white workers' rights. It also said that it was investigating allegations by members that they had been intimidated into voting 'yes' by management.⁶⁷ [⁶⁷ *Ibid* 19 March 1992]

Commenting on the result of the referendum, the general secretary of Cosatu, Mr Jay Naidoo, said that the overwhelming mandate given by the white electorate to the negotiations process taking place at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa), despite the 'racist character of the referendum', had laid the basis for a rapid advance in the transition to democracy. With the unambiguous vote from the white electorate, there was now no excuse for the government 'to drag its heels, inside or outside Codesa', he said. Mr Naidoo added that from Cosatu's perspective this meant two things: firstly, it would intensify its campaign for a sovereign interim government to be set up by June and for the parties to have agreed to the holding of democratic elections for a constitutional assembly by the end of 1992. Secondly, it expected the government to abandon its refusal to negotiate socio-economic issues and to enter into forums with the major players in areas such as housing, development, education and health.⁶⁸ [⁶⁸ *Sowetan* 26 March 1992]

Power sharing

Participation at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa

In January 1992 Cosatu decided to apply to attend Codesa in terms of a congress resolution passed in

1991. In a statement it said, ‘Cosatu has a legitimate right to be part of Codesa as the force representing the majority of workers in the country.’ It said that its application did not make applications from a host of other non-political organisations legitimate. The move was not popular with all its affiliates, and the National Union of Mineworkers opposed it on the grounds that Cosatu was not a political organisation. It said that if Cosatu wanted issues addressed at Codesa it should do so through its allies, the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP).⁶⁹ [⁶⁹ *Business Day* 28 January 1992] However, according to the assistant general secretary of Cosatu, Mr Sam Shilowa, because of the government’s intransigence over its participation, the federation decided not to apply. Cosatu later changed its position and continued to bid for participation.⁷⁰ [⁷⁰ *New Nations* May 1992]

Cosatu’s negotiations co-ordinator, Mr Jayendra Naidoo, said that the federation had negotiated with the SACP to have four people participating at Codesa through the SACP in three of the working groups while it was waiting for its application to join Codesa to be considered. Cosatu also had joint meetings from time to time with the ANC and received reports and discussed strategies. The political task force of Cosatu processed all information coming out of Codesa and then reported to Cosatu’s executive committee. The organisation had confined itself to a set of ‘eight basic bottom-line positions which were the ultimate mandate and directive to the people participating in joint forums with the ANC and in the working groups’. He said, however, that it was an imperfect process as things moved at a rapid pace. The political task force met once a week to evaluate progress and to attempt to give a meaningful input into the process.⁷¹ [⁷¹ *South African Labour Bulletin* May/June 1992]

In an interview in April 1992, Mr Jay Naidoo said that the issue of power sharing was for a constituent assembly to decide. However, Cosatu was not opposed to power sharing in principle if it was done in the context of agreements on the basis of common policy platforms. What it was opposed to was forced coalitions. ‘We’re not even opposed to “sunset clauses”—but we say this must be debated in the constituent assembly. There is no political party that has been through democratic, nonracial elections because we’ve never had one in this country. How do we know who the leaders are going to be?’ he said.⁷² [⁷² *Weekend Arpts* 4 April 1992]

In an article in the *Sunday Times* in July 1992 a national organising secretary of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa), Dr Bernie Fanaroff, said that Cosatu’s demands to resolve the political logjam were not unreasonable. He said that it was faced by a government which insisted on:

- an interim government which included the ANC to give credibility but in which the National Party (NP) retained all the power;
- entrenching that government for many years;
- writing most of the new constitution- at Codesa, which was ‘packed with non-representative and

unpopular parties’;

- constructing a decision-making process for the ‘constitution-making body’ which guaranteed a blocking vote for the NP and its allies; and
- retrenching regional autonomy so that ‘its cronies can at least hope to hold on to their jobs’.

He said that Cosatu believed that:

- negotiations should have a clear time frame, in particular, the state president, Mr F W de Klerk, should go by December 1992;
- principles (on power sharing) should be agreed first in public, mandated negotiations;
- details could then be worked out but again should be open to public scrutiny; and
- the people should be involved so that the end product was credible and legitimate.

He said that Cosatu members had become increasingly unhappy with a Codesa process which was inaccessible, hard to understand and very difficult to influence.⁷³ [⁷³ *Sunday Times* 12 July 1992]

Cosatu’s mass action campaign

In March 1992 Cosatu, after its executive meeting, launched a programme of mass action in support of its demands for an interim assembly by the end of June, elections for a constituent assembly by the end of the year and a democratic constitution in place by 1993, the immediate reincorporation of the homelands into South Africa, a unitary state without excessive regional decentralisation, the release of political prisoners, and an end to ‘vigilante and state-sponsored violence’. Economic demands included an immediate suspension of the unilateral restructuring of the economy by the government, the establishment of a national economic forum (see *Trade unions and the economy* above), the restructuring of the National Manpower Commission, the permanent removal of value added tax (VAT) from basic foodstuffs and services, a moratorium on food price increases, and an immediate change to the pension laws. The four-month programme of action included a people’s referendum on budget day (18 March) with marches and picketing, rallies on Sharpeville Day (31 March) and May Day (1 May), an alliance summit with the ANC and the SACP in April to discuss progress at Codesa, and a workers’ summit with other labour organisations at the end of May to decide on further mass action if the demands had not been met. The federation also announced that it would embark on a general strike if its demands were not met.⁷⁴ [⁷⁴ *Business Day* 9 March 1992, *The Weekly Mail* 13 March 1992]

Announcing the programme, Mr Jay Naidoo said, 'We want to warn the present government and the Conservative Party [CP] that any attempt on their side to delay the democratisation process is going to be met with mass resistance on an unprecedented scale.' He said that there was no difference between Mr de Klerk and the leader of the CP, Dr Andries Treumicht, and that the negotiation process did not depend on the outcome of the referendum (held on 17 March to test the response of whites to the reform process). Through its proposed mass action the federation aimed to take Codesa to the streets, by linking negotiations with a popular base.⁷⁵ [⁷⁵ *Business Day* 9 March 1992, *The Weekly Mail* 13 March 1992]

Throughout March and April members of Cosatu affiliates held lunchtime demonstrations. They also staged a march to Parliament on budget day on 18 March.

After the failure of Codesa II in May 1992, Cosatu announced that a programme of mass action 'on an unprecedented scale' would be implemented from mid-July if its demands relating to political negotiations, government corruption and covert security operations were not met by the end of June 1992. Mr Jay Naidoo said that the programme had been discussed with the ANC and the SACP. He said that Cosatu demanded that Codesa rapidly prepare the ground for the establishment of an interim government by the end of June and the election of a constituent assembly by the end of the year. The assembly had to have the power to approve a new constitution by a two-thirds majority. A senate should have no role in constitution making. Cosatu was opposed to the drafting of a new interim constitution. It believed that the assembly could replace the tricameral Parliament through a few minor amendments to the existing constitution.

Cosatu's demands on corruption included a call for an independent inquiry, under the auspices of the proposed transitional executive council, into corruption at all levels of government; the dismissal and, where appropriate, prosecution of officials and ministers involved; and the seizure of personal assets of those implicated, so that the state could be repaid. On alleged death squads and other covert operations, Cosatu demanded a multi-party inquiry into security operations with access to all state security council minutes; the dismissal and prosecution of all individuals, including senior officers and politicians, found to be implicated in wrongdoing; the freezing of all covert operations; and a role for international monitoring of security force operations. In addition, the R5bn 'set aside in the budget for covert operations' should be used to compensate victims of violence, to finance economic reconstruction and to supply drought relief, he said.⁷⁶ [⁷⁶ *Business Day* 27 May 1992, *The Weekly Mail* 29 May 1992]

In addition to marches, demonstrations, factory occupations, and boycotts, the programme would include a work stayaway or general strike of not less than three days. Mr Naidoo said that mass action would be used as an alternative to Codesa. He said, 'Codesa is fast reaching the end of its lifespan. We will not allow the process to go beyond Codesa III.'⁷⁷ [⁷⁷ *Business Day* 27 May 1992, *The Weekly Mail* 29 May 1992]

Nactu said in May 1992 that it would not join Cosatu in campaigning for the above demands. A

spokesman for Nactu, Mr Mudini Maivha, said that his federation and Cosatu had agreed to launch a mass action campaign to end the government's unilateral restructuring of the economy, and in support of the extension of trade union rights to farm, domestic and public sector workers and for a constituent assembly. However, the council would not take part in campaigns which were directly or indirectly related to Codesa negotiations. 'We do not support Codesa and the demand for an interim government,' he said. He said that Nactu would campaign only for the establishment of a constituent assembly and 'issues which directly affect workers'. If Cosatu wanted to campaign for other issues, it could do so alone.⁷⁸ [⁷⁸ *Business Day* 29 May 1992]

In mid June 1992 the ANC/Cosatu/SACP alliance spelt out a four-phase mass action campaign. The first phase would begin on 16 June 1992 (Soweto Day) with protests and would continue with sit-ins, rallies and boycotts. A key element would be the occupation of government buildings. If the government did not accede to the demand for an interim government, the second phase, comprising nationally co-ordinated campaigns, would be implemented. Phase three, which would begin in August, would be characterised by a general strike. Phase four, dubbed 'exitgate', was when the government was supposed to exit from power.⁷⁹ [⁷⁹ *Ibid* 15 June 1992]

Mr Shilowa appealed to businessmen to close their offices and factories on the days of mass action. A South African Chamber of Business (Sacob) spokesman, Mr Gerrie Bezuidenhout, said that given the economic climate it was unlikely that any businesses would close on days of mass action. He said that the responsibility for any possible economic and human cost arising from the mass action campaign lies squarely with Cosatu'. There were alternatives to stayaways and a general strike, such as petitions, he said, adding that Sacob was prepared to hold discussions with Cosatu. The chairman of the Inkatha Youth Brigade, Mr Musa Zondi, called on supporters to make the campaign fail by not taking part. He said that his organisation was opposed to the programme as it would damage Codesa negotiations, cripple the economy and give rise to large-scale violence.⁸⁰ [⁸⁰ *Ibid*]

It was reported in June that many unionised workers had moved ahead of Cosatu's mass action plans and held phase two action during phase one. Many of the actions, such as a march by metalworkers, had been initiated at local level, effectively outside of the control of Cosatu leadership.⁸¹ [⁸¹ *Business Day* 30 June 1992]

The Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce and Industry said it had established a monitoring body to assess the effect on business of the stayaway on 16 June, the first day of the mass action programme. Sacob warned of the 'potential economic and human costs which could flow from the action'. It estimated that the overall economic losses at stake in a total standstill could reach R1,2bn. However, a spokesman for Sacob said that many industrial companies had already begun negotiating with their labour forces to recognise 16 June as a paid holiday. A precise count of losses owing to stayaways on that day would therefore not be possible. It said that a general strike would cause a loss of earnings and fewer jobs at a time when workers could least afford it. Sacob called on the main players at Codesa 'to

spare no effort to resolve the present political deadlock'.⁸² [⁸² *The Star* 16 June 1992]

Commenting on the first day of mass action, the minister of law and order, Mr Hernus Kriel, said that he did not believe that it had succeeded; it had been 'a futile exercise in blackmail'. He said that many had stayed away from work for other reasons, including the fact that many saw 16 June as a public holiday. He said that the government remained opposed to mass action because negotiations were continuing. The ANC estimated a 90% to 95% response on 16 June, which was a 'solid vote' for the installation of an interim government. Mr Kriel said, however, that the success or failure of the mass action should be judged by the number of people who attended mass action rallies—80 000 by police estimates.⁸³ [⁸³ *Ibid* 8 June 1991]

A new company calling itself 'Strikebusters' with a Pretoria post box address offered to organise scab labour for businesses that had been affected by strikes. The company, which called on job-seekers to join the 'national anti-strike force', promised to place people in permanent and part-time positions at construction sites and at factories, garages, hospitals, hotels, offices and supermarkets. Applicants had to pay a R25 joining fee.⁸⁴ [⁸⁴ *Sowetan* 19 June 1992]

Phase two of the campaign began on 1 July with a stayaway in Cape Town to back Cosatu's living wage march. On the same day Mr Naidoo announced that a national general strike in support of its demands would begin on 3 August. No consensus could be reached at the meeting of Cosatu delegates at its living wage conference on the duration of the strike. Some argued for a strike of four days, others for a week and still others for an indefinite general strike. Employers had three options, according to Mr Jay Naidoo: 'They can either stand in the way with disciplinary action and victimisation, or they can stand out of the way by adopting a no-work no-pay policy', or they could join Cosatu in campaigning for peace and democracy.⁸⁵ [⁸⁵ *Business Day, The Citizen* 2 July 1992]

Reacting to the announcement, employers warned that those who participated in strikes would face disciplinary action. At a meeting with Cosatu, representatives of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, Sacob and the Steel and Engineering Industries' Federation of South Africa said that mass action would result in further closures and retrenchments, a downward spiral in the economy from which it would be difficult to restore growth, a negative impact on local and overseas business and confidence, and increased potential for violence.⁸⁶ [⁸⁶ *The Citizen* 9 July 1992]

During July Saccola and Cosatu held a series of meetings in an attempt to draw up a document for joint submission to the government on how to speed up the transition to democracy as a means of averting the strike. A draft document drawn up by the parties expressed concern at the breakdown in negotiations, rising violence, and economic hardship and set out practical steps to be taken on poverty, conflict mediation and political transition. It suggested that stumbling blocks in the transition process could be overcome within a short-term time frame of, for example, six months. It also held out the possibility that

business and labour could jointly convene ‘assemblies for peace, economic reconstruction and progress to democracy’ on 3 August. The document proposed that the support ‘of all our members and the broader public’ should be sought.⁸⁷ [⁸⁷ *The Star* 13 July 1992]

However, the two parties failed to reach a final agreement. Cosatu wanted Saccola to agree to a proposed 24-hour voluntary shutdown of businesses on 3 August with workers being paid for the day, in exchange for it calling off its general strike programme. Saccola was unable to get a mandate from its members for a total shutdown. It said that it wanted employers and unions to decide together at local and regional levels on how to mark the day. It believed that the decision by its members should be voluntary and could range from shutting down and paying workers to a ‘no-work no-pay no-discipline’ approach where there was no shutdown. Saccola felt that there was no chance of a total shutdown and also wanted guarantees from Cosatu that it would undertake not to damage the economy in any mass action and to abide by the decisions of the international panel reporting to the Goldstone commission. It also ruled out that employers outside its ranks, including the public sector, could be asked to support the day. Saccola was also concerned that no party political speeches be made at any rallies on 3 August—including all speakers refraining from attacking the government.⁸⁸ [⁸⁸ *Business Day* 23 July 1992]

Following the breakdown of the talks, Cosatu confirmed that the general strike would take the form of a national stayaway on 3 and 4 August, with the occupation of city centres and strategic points on 5 August. The vice chairman of Saccola, Mr Johann Liebenberg, said that employers would continue to support and promote the principles laid down in the document and would continue to try to minimise damage to the economy. However, Cosatu ruled out the possibility of companies making direct agreements with its affiliates to avoid strike action at their premises.⁸⁹ [⁸⁹ *Business Day, The Star* 24 July 1992] The Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, Shell and the South African Breweries’ beer division were among the companies which favoured the shutdown.⁹⁰ [⁹⁰ *The Citizen* 24 July 1992]

Following the breakdown in the agreement, Sacob issued guidelines to chambers of commerce and industry and businesses planning disciplinary action against workers who went on strike. A Cosatu spokesman, Mr Neil Coleman, described the guidelines as ‘foolhardy in the extreme. They will create a cycle of conflict between business and workers which can only spark off further strike action’, he said. Mr Naidoo said that government had persuaded leading businessmen not to support the accord. He said that the government wanted to keep labour and business out of political negotiations because it was trying to prolong the talks and the unions would insist on time frames and binding agreements. Mr Liebenberg denied that there had been secret government intervention in the talks, but confirmed that Saccola had held two discussions with the minister of constitutional development, Mr Roelf Meyer, and a third with his deputy, Dr Tertius Delpont. Mr Meyer denied that the government had prescribed to Saccola what action it should take, but confirmed that the government was opposed to public sector involvement in a nationwide shutdown.⁹¹ [⁹¹ *Business Day* 27 July 1992]

Saccola said that the deal had not fallen through because of a political impasse but because of economic problems associated with mass action.

At its annual general conference on 19 July 1992 the Inkatha Freedom Party resolved to call on all its members to withdraw membership fees from Cosatu's affiliates in light of the federation's mass action campaign. It said that Cosatu appeared no longer to be serving the interests of workers but had become a tool to achieve the ANC/SACP alliance's political agenda. The conference further resolved to call on employer organisations to reject any attempt by the alliance to make them party to 'economic sabotage' as a means of political protest.⁹² [⁹² *The Citizen* 20 July 1992]

The MWU rejected the peace pact between Cosatu and Saccola saying that the days were gone when other parties took decisions for white workers. The general secretary of the MWU, Mr Peet Ungerer, said that Saccola would be declaring war if it sided with the alliance in bringing about a black majority government. He said, 'The days are past that white unions will allow Cosatu and employers to take decisions on behalf of white workers. The MWU is disappointed at Saccola's denial of the loyalty of white workers by entering into an agreement with Cosatu that will seriously disadvantage white workers.' White workers had kept the economy going during more than 5 000 strikes since 1983, he said.⁹³ [⁹³ *Ibid* 21 July 1992]

Cosatu claimed that 4m people stayed away on the first day of the strike, representing about 90% of formal sector employees. However, organised industry disputed these figures on the basis that the mining, agricultural and public sectors, which together form half of the country's workforce, were virtually untouched by the strike. An economist for Sacob, Mr Keith Lockwood, said, 'Consider the fact that there are officially 5,3m people employed in the formal sector and as these sectors were unaffected, at the most only 2,5m people could have taken part.' According to a director of Econometrix, Mr Tony Twine, because mining, agriculture and the public sector, which account for 55% of gross domestic product, were mostly untouched, damage to the economy was minimal. He estimated that the two days' strike amounted to R900m in lost production, almost equal to the R930m lost on a public holiday when the entire economy shuts down.⁹⁴ [⁹⁴ *The Weekly Mail* 7 August 1992]

In August 1992 the ANC/Cosatu/SACP alliance held a tripartite summit to assess the strengths and weaknesses of its mass action campaign. It said that the alliance's objective in the present period was to 'reactivate and consolidate our own forces in action' and in so doing 'to alter the balance of forces to ensure the speedy achievement of our main demands—a constituent assembly, an interim government and serious measures to end the political violence'. It pointed out that there had been more negotiations during this period than in any other in South Africa's history, giving as examples the Cosatu/Saccola negotiations prior to the 3 August strike and the negotiations with business on the shop floor by the president of the ANC, Mr Nelson Mandela, to minimise dismissals, as well as progress towards the establishment of a national economic negotiating forum. It mentioned as part four of the mass action campaign action against dismissals and the reinstatement of the health workers dismissed during the protracted health strike (see chapter on *Health and Welfare*). It said that the campaign had to be

broadened into a wider struggle against the government's general dismantling of public health services. Other phase four campaigns mentioned were those for the democratisation of the South African Broadcasting Corporation; for free political activity, the main targets being Bophuthatswana, the Ciskei and KwaZulu: a boycott against the pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) tax system; campaigns against corruption and murder and food prices, and for increased drought relief and the release of political prisoners.⁹⁵ [⁹⁵ *South African Labour Bulletin* September/October 1992, pp31-35]

In September 1992, after holding a campaigns conference, Cosatu announced that it would shortly embark on the PAYE campaign to coincide with the fourth phase of the alliance's mass action campaign. In terms of the campaign Cosatu gave employers until 1 October to respond to demands to stop deducting PAYE from workers' salaries and November as the date for workers to stop paying tax to the government. The money, said Mr Shilowa, should be placed in a multiparty controlled fund for a democratic government. Responding to the demand, business said that it was not prepared to break the law by complying with it. Under the Income Tax Act of 1991, failure by an employer to hand tax deductions to the government constituted theft and the employer would be liable to a jail sentence or fine if found guilty. An economist for Sacob, Mr Ben van Rensburg, asked, 'Does Cosatu expect employers willingly to become criminals? We won't commit criminal acts on their behalf.' The government responded by refusing to participate in the economic forum with business and labour, due to be launched in October (see *Restructuring of the economy* above).⁹⁶ [⁹⁶ *The Weekly Mail* 18 September 1992]

Responding to the announcement of the campaign, a spokesman for the Department of Inland Revenue said that the commissioner for inland revenue was obliged to prosecute or penalise employers who defaulted in terms of the Income Tax Act. Penalties faced by employers who submitted to Cosatu demands that they join the tax revolt included a 10% surcharge on the tax withheld. There was also a criminal sanction of a R400 fine or a prison sentence of six months or both for each individual non-payment.⁹⁷ [⁹⁷ *Business Day* 17 September 1992]

At the same campaigns conference, Cosatu confirmed that it would conduct a campaign against those companies which had fired or disciplined workers during the August general strike and other strikes during the year and those companies doing business with hospitals which had dismissed workers. It released a list of 50 companies which would be the target of its campaign, which would include the occupation of company premises, consumer boycotts, publicity, blacking actions and international solidarity. It decided in particular to target the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa (Anglo) whose subsidiaries had fired several thousand striking members of Numsa during the metal strike of August. Cosatu said that a national shopstewards council involving all Anglo companies would be called to discuss action against the corporation. A Cosatu delegation was to meet Anglo to discuss the question of reinstatement and the corporation's attitude to the right to strike.⁹⁸ [⁹⁸ *The Weekly Mail* 18 September 1992]

⁹⁹ [⁹⁹ *Business Day* 15 September 1992]

Cosatu would also target companies implicated in attacks against Cosatu members, among them Sasol and Gold Fields of South Africa.

Businesses strongly criticised Cosatu's campaign against them for dismissing workers involved in mass action or during the hospital strike. Angle's director of industrial relations, Mr Bobby Godsell, said that the focus—not only in labour relations but also in the process of political transition—should be on the source of conflict. The Cosatu/Saccola talks had been unsuccessful in achieving this, but the discussions had resulted in a draft charter for peace and democracy. Anglo recommended the resumption of these talks as the 'best way to prevent the South African economy from turning into a political battleground'. The corporation said that it would 'be happy to meet Cosatu to attempt to find constructive solutions to the present conflicts' as nothing positive could be achieved by attacks on individuals or organisations.¹⁰⁰ [100 Ibid 14 September 1992]

The conference further decided to hold a regional stayaway in the eastern Cape to coincide with the funeral in the Ciskei of victims of the Bisho massacre (see chapter on *Political Developments*), a march to the electrified fence on the Mozambique border, a week of marches and other protests from 11 October to demand the release of political prisoners, and an attempt to prevent the sitting of Parliament on 12 October 1992 by mounting largescale occupations and blockades of towns and cities.¹⁰¹ [101 Ibid 15 September 1992]

Trade union independence

The results of a Human Sciences Research Council survey, published in May 1992, showed that there was overwhelming support among blacks for trade unions to have a strong influence on government. Ninety-one percent of SACP supporters and 43% of Inkatha supporters believed that this should happen.¹⁰² [102 Ibid 13 May 1992]

Future of the African National Congress/Congress of South African Trade Unions/South African Communist Party alliance

Outlining the future of the ANC/Cosatu/SACP alliance, the assistant general secretary of Cosatu, Mr Sam Shilowa, said that the alliance would continue to exist under an interim government or a constituent assembly. In this situation the alliance would remain in place as a pressure group. However, once a new government was in power, and assuming that this was the ANC, there would be a review of the alliance, but it was not necessarily the case that the relations between them would be terminated. He said that Cosatu should not act as a 'conveyor belt' for any political party. It should build up a second layer of leadership to replace those who decided to hold political office as they would be asked to vacate their seats in the federation. Regarding socialism, the federation said that as Cosatu's stated objective was socialism, a closer relationship would develop between those striving for this ideal. However, this did not mean that when the ANC was in power Cosatu and the SACP would 'club together against it'. The federation would, however, ensure that an ANC government took on issues in a way that would allow

for 'forward movement towards its stated goal'.¹⁰³ [¹⁰³ *New Nation* 8 May 1992]

Trade unions and socio-economic issues

Education

At the third annual conference of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) in May 1992, the union's president, Mr James Motlatsi, proposed that hostels in the mining industry should be turned into evening colleges where workers learned to read and write and undertake advanced study. He said that black miners would be involved in managing the industry in a post-apartheid South Africa but it could take a decade or so to produce the necessary skills. Because miners would be too tired to study after a day underground, he said that the union should pressure employers for a few hours paid educational leave a week. The Chamber of Mines must agree to provide the rooms, teaching aids and other facilities and pay the instructors,' he said. 'We will provide the instructors, syllabi and encourage workers to become involved.' Nineteen NUM members were studying a variety of management subjects at Cuban universities. Mr Motlatsi also said that the union could bear the cost of an education college to provide comprehensive organisational skills training.¹⁰⁴ [¹⁰⁴ *The Weekly Mail* 7 May 1992]

In September 1992 the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) said that the low productivity rate could be addressed only through a government-backed literacy programme for the country's functionally illiterate adults. A spokeswoman for Cosatu, Ms Rachmat Omar, said that it was estimated that 45% of the economically active population was illiterate and 25% semi-literate, leaving a mere 30% fully functional. She said that the state should set up a training fund assisted by employers who should be offered tax exemptions.¹⁰⁵ [¹⁰⁵ *The Star* 24 September 1992]

Health and safety

Safety on the mines came under the spotlight during the period under review. Figures published in Parliament by the minister of mineral and energy affairs, Mr George Bartlett, showed that in 1991, 461 miners had been killed on gold mines, 42 on coal mines and 101 on other mines, while 7 571 miners had been injured on gold mines, 361 on coal mines and 1 171 on other mines. This meant that an average of about two workers were killed and eight injured every day of the year.¹⁰⁶ [¹⁰⁶ *Business Day* 15 March 1991]

The Minerals Act of 1991 which contained provisions regarding the safety and health of workers on the mines was implemented at the beginning of 1992 (see *1991/92 Survey* pp302).

Particular attention was focused on the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa (Anglo) after two accidents at its Western Deep Levels and Elandsrand mines (both on the west Rand) in early February

1992 in which a total of 12 miners were killed and 18 injured in rockbursts. A further accident later in the month in which two miners were killed in a rockburst at Elandsrand brought the death toll at Anglo mines since the beginning of the year to 23 and those injured to 26.¹⁰⁷ [¹⁰⁷ *The Citizen* 19 February 1992]

The NUM said that 300 miners had died at Western Deep Levels in the last ten years. According to Anglo, the fatality rate at the mine had deteriorated between 1986 and 1988 but there had been a 40% improvement since then. The accident rate had not improved.¹⁰⁸ [¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*] Statistics showed a substantial decline in the fatality rate and the reportable accident rate at Elandsrand since 1986, it said. Anglo announced that Western Deep Levels would halt production for one day at a cost of R1,2m for a safety seminar involving the mines' 6 000 workers.¹⁰⁹ [¹⁰⁹ *Business Day* 17 February 1992]

Anglo rejected the need for a specific commission of inquiry into safety on the mines demanded by the NUM but said that it would consider an industry-wide commission of inquiry which would provide the legislative framework for health and safety on all mines.

In the same month the executive committee of the Chamber of Mines of South Africa agreed to accept proposals by the NUM for an independent inquiry into laws affecting mine safety. The proposals arose from the proceedings of working groups established at the mining summit in June 1991 (see *1991/92 Survey* p302).¹¹⁰ [¹¹⁰ *Ibid* 14 February 1992]

At its health and safety conference in February 1992 the NUM announced that it would embark on a campaign for the repeal of the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act of 1973 and a revision of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1941. The union objected to racial bias in the occupational diseases act and to planned amendments to scrap compensation for tuberculosis because of its link with the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). Regarding compensation, it said that payments should be made easier and more accessible and that workers should be able to make direct representations to the workmen's compensation commissioner. It also resolved to campaign for amendments to the Minerals Act. Its resolution on accidents called for work stoppages for every death, union representation at inquiries and commemoration services at the workplace 'during and after working hours, to mobilise, educate, recruit and agitate the workers'. It resolved further that:

- campaigns over dust, noise, chemicals, radiation and racial discrimination at mine hospitals would be planned;
- the training period for underground and surface workers be extended by two weeks;
- repatriation of workers on medical grounds be replaced by the rehabilitation, retraining and employment of disabled or ill mineworkers; and
- Cosatu, the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party develop an

AIDS policy.¹¹¹ [¹¹¹ *The Weekly Mail* 21 March 1991]

In April 1992 the chamber agreed to the NUM's proposal for an independent judicial enquiry into health and safety on the mines. However, the assistant general secretary of the NUM, Mr Marcel Golding, said that the union was concerned about the commission's narrow terms of reference. The chamber's proposal envisaged a commission, manned by a single judge, which would focus on health and safety legislation. He said that the chamber's main interest seemed to be the Minerals Act but the NUM also wanted the enforcement of safety laws and issues such as inadequate compensation investigated. Of particular concern was the statutory race discrimination in the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act. He said that the NUM had modified its proposal of a state/union/employer mining commission, which would keep industry policy, specifically in relation to downscaling, under review. The chamber had rejected the concept as being 'authoritarian and interventionist'. The NUM had proposed a nonstatutory body with a charter of rights and obligations and an independent secretariat.¹¹² [¹¹² *Ibid* 3 April 1992]

In April 1992 the NUM attended a Miners' International Federation (MIF) conference on health and safety which was attended by 77 organisations from 71 countries. The MIF intended increasing pressure on the International Labour Organisation to adopt a convention of occupational health and safety. This would force national legislation to include detailed criteria on the organisation and layout of the workplace, working procedures and machinery used. Workers should be given the right to participate in the design of their own working situation, the MIF said. The MIF also envisaged the formation of health and safety committees which would guarantee effective worker participation. Their area of jurisdiction should include company health services, living conditions and the environmental effects of the mining and processing operations. One of the most important demands was for workers to have the right to stop work when there was reasonable justification to believe that 'the situation presents imminent danger to life or health, or when safety regulations are not being adhered to'. It also wanted the convention to lay down the minimum wage for employment underground and on the surface, as well as the maximum number of working hours a day and the amount of paid leave to be granted to workers.¹¹³ [¹¹³ *New Nation* 30 April 1992]

In October 1992 it was announced that the safety in mines research advisory committee, established in May, would impose a levy on the mining industry for every worker killed or injured. Another levy would apply to each worker employed. The levies collected would be used for research into the promotion of health and safety. Four subcommittees—gold/platinum, coal, other mines and generic—had been formed. Levies would depend on the frequency and severity of accidents and on the number of workers at the mine. Initial payments for the generic fund, where about R1,5m would be raised (about R3,75 a miner) were due in the following quarter. Payments for the other sections would come from injuries calculated on total days lost. A miner's death would be equivalent to 6 000 days' absence from work. A spokesman for Anglo's gold and uranium division said that the responsibility for mine safety should rest with the individual mine managements. The government mining engineer, Mr Jan Raath, said

that he was unable to give the exact amounts the mines would be liable for as each case would differ.¹¹⁴
 [114 *Business Day* 1 October 1992]

An industrial court ruling in April 1992 laid down that it was an unfair labour practice to dismiss an employee suffering from AIDS on diagnosis. The court found that an employer should investigate ‘the extent to which the employee is unable to perform his former duties’. The employee was entitled to take part in the investigation to the extent necessary to protect his interests. The case might require ‘further medical investigation and opinion and/or the employee being asked to perform his former tasks to demonstrate his ability or lack of ability’. The employer had to consult the employee to find out whether he was capable of performing his duties or whether they could be adapted so that he could continue to work, either alone or with reasonable assistance. If the employee could not continue with his duties the employer had to find out whether alternative work was available in the organisation.¹¹⁵ [115 *Sunday Times* 11 May 1992]

In May 1992 the National Education, Health and Allied Workers’ Union, a Cosatu affiliate, said that it was involved in the Progressive Health Forum, which included bodies such as the ANC and the National Medical and Dental Association. A policy for a future health system in South Africa was being discussed at the forum. The union’s assistant general secretary, Mr Neal Thobejane, said that the state should take responsibility for the health of people, especially the young, old and unemployed. It saw the increase in the tariffs at hospitals by 12% as part of the commercialisation of health services which was putting health out of the reach of most people.

In October 1992 the NUM and Gengold agreed on a settlement of R2,6m as compensation for families of the 1986 Kinross gold mine disaster in which 177 people died and 228 were injured (see 1986 *Survey* p285). According to the president of the NUM, Mr James Motlatsi, the money would go into two separate trust funds—R1,4m to a fund for 40 families already identified and R1m to a fund for the remaining families. The trusts would be managed jointly by Kinross and the NUM for the benefit of the families of the deceased. The R2,6m was in addition to the standard compensation of 36 times the monthly salary of each miner killed paid to his dependants. He said that the NUM had been unable to trace the families of 132 of the workers because Gengold and the labour ministries of the neighbouring countries had not co-operated with the union. Families would be entitled to claim lump sum payments from the funds. The union was paid R200 000 of the settlement to cover its costs. Families of five white miners who died in the accident had been paid out in a separate agreement with the company as they were not NUM members, he added. The miners had died or were injured when a fire broke out underground on 16 September 1986 and burning polyurethane released poison gases into a tunnel.¹¹⁶ [116 *Business Day*, *The Citizen* 2 October 1992]

Pension and provident funds

It was reported in February 1992 that 20 major employers in the retail industry were negotiating a

national provident fund with the 100 000-strong South African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers' Union (Saccawu). The talks were the result of a Saccawu initiative to involve the entire industry in setting up a fund. The employers who grouped together in a Participating Employers' Association included Ackermans, the Beares Group, Clicks, CNA/Gallo, Edgars Stores, Foschini, Game Discount World, Metro Cash 'n Carry, Morkels, OK Bazaars, Pick 'n Pay Retailers, SA Druggists and Shoprite/Checkers.

Other retail employers had withdrawn from the talks. The major problems were whether to make membership of the fund compulsory and whether to merge existing funds into the new national fund. The employers were adamant that membership should be voluntary and that the new fund should run parallel with existing ones. The union argued that Saccawu members should join the fund and that existing funds should be amalgamated into the national fund. The companies involved employed about 90 000 people.¹¹⁷ [¹¹⁷ *Business Day* 13 February 1992]

Action involving trade unions

Initiatives to end violence

Goldstone commission

In April 1992 the committee of inquiry into the violence during November 1991 at the President Steyn gold mine in Welkom (Orange Free State) (established under the auspices of the Goldstone commission) published its report on violence at the mine in which 86 people were killed and 403 injured during a stayaway over value added tax. The commission recommended that:

- the legitimacy of democratic activity at mine hostels should be negotiated by management and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) to prevent a repeat of the incident;
- the control of meetings be negotiated between the NUM and management;
- suitably qualified people conduct disciplinary hearings and management review existing training to ensure that an appropriate quality and standard of decisions and disciplinary hearing be achieved;
- an ombudsman acceptable to both parties be considered to deal with complaints and facilitate agreements;
- negotiations between the NUM and management be finalised urgently to alleviate tensions at the mine's hostel; and
- negotiations on a code of conduct for stayaways be completed as a matter of urgency.

In its findings the committee said that violence between Sotho and Xhosa workers on 3 November 1991 had flowed from an incident when a group of militant NUM members prevented a group of Sotho workers from working and forced them back to their rooms and a second incident when two Sotho workers were injured. Violence from 8–11 November was found to be a spill-over from the earlier incidents. The committee found that further violence on 24 and 25 November was a revenge attack organised by a criminal gang of Sothos known as the ‘Russians’ from the nearby township, in collaboration with Sotho workers on the mine. The committee said that while the stayaway had provided the *casus belli*, violence had not occurred at other mines where there was also a stayaway call. It found that the NUM had been in an ambivalent position—’it was a keen proponent of the stayaway (as it was entitled to be) and was also the messenger of the stand taken by management, namely that workers should be free to go to work. This difficult position was compounded by the position taken by the NUM, namely that the stayaway call was a Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions] call and not an NUM call and that it could therefore not act independently. A vacuum in the line of responsibility ensued’.¹¹⁸ *Report of the inquiry conducted by the committee of inquiry into the violence at the President Steyn gold mine in Welkorn during 1991*, Cape Town 28 February 1992₁

Anglo American Corporation of South Africa/National Union of Mineworkers’ code of conduct

In June 1992 the NUM and the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa (Anglo) signed a code of conduct aimed at ensuring peace on the mines. The code had taken four years to reach completion, the idea first being mooted after the mineworkers’ strike in 1987 which was marked by violence (see *1987/88 Survey* pp678–684). Many of its provisions had already become common practice on some mines during the four years. The provisions of the code included:

- the right to picket and to peaceful assembly;
- the right to freedom of association and to human dignity and equality;
- safer mines;
- full disclosure of relevant information;
- a positive programme of job and skills development which would redress past imbalances; and
- hostels no longer divided along ethnic lines.

In the code Anglo accepted ‘management’s fundamental responsibility for the management and maintenance of good order in the hostels’. The code also provided that workers would be allowed to meet freely, that mines would make meeting places available and that ‘traditional and cultural

expression in the form of singing and dancing' be allowed. The union had to control meetings and ensure that 'behaviour which could incite violence does not occur'. The union committed itself to ensure that miners would not use derogatory language and behaviour, would not carry weapons and would not wear party political insignia (for example, T-shirts and badges) at the workplace.¹¹⁹ [¹¹⁹ *Business Day* 14 September 1992]

Also in September, the African National Congress (ANC), Cosatu, the Civic Associations of Southern Transvaal (Cast), the South African Communist Party (SACP), the South African Rail and Commuter Corporation and the police agreed to meet within three weeks to plan a strategy to end train violence.¹²⁰ [¹²⁰ *Ibid*]

Attacks against unionists

In January 1992 the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa) said that there had been a systematic campaign of terror against its officials, following a string of shootings and threats on the Reef. It said that two of its officials in Springs had received death threats (in September and November 1991 respectively), one had been fired on in his car (in December 1991) which had been hit several times, and one had been shot dead in KwaThema (in July 1991). One of the callers had said that the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging would 'get' the unionist.¹²¹ [¹²¹ *The Weekly Mail* 3 January 1992]

In February 1992 Cosatu said that a hit squad was trying to assassinate the general secretary of Numsa, Mr Moses Mayekiso, who was also a leader of the ANC, Cast and the SACP. It said that he had been shadowed for the previous three months by groups of up to six people who, according to the federation, had 'stepped up' attempts to kill him. Cosatu said. 'It's the government which created these sinister killers and it is to the government that these killers are ultimately accountable.' The federation said that the police had been informed and had promised to investigate the issue fully.¹²² [¹²² *Business Day* 14 February 1992]

In June 1992 the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions found that South Africa was the least safe place in Africa to carry out union activities. In its annual review it said that 47 trade unionists had been murdered between March 1991 and March 1992. It said that most of the murders could be attributed to right-wing death squads. Union sources quoted in the survey stated that the highly organised nature of the violence and professionalism shown by the killers suggested the existence of a 'third force', including elements of the police and security forces.¹²³ [¹²³ *Ibid* 23 June 1992] There was no reply from the police and security forces to this allegation.

In August 1992 Numsa said that its officials and members had been under attack since early in the year, particularly once it had become clear that wage negotiations with metal employers would lead to a strike

(see *Strike-related Violence* below). It reported that in the Pretoria/ Witwatersrand/Vereeniging (PWV) region ‘no less than 12 officials’ had been threatened in their vehicles (that is, had been shot at, collided into and forced off the road). It also reported that since the beginning of May, 21 union officials and members had been killed, and an unspecified number attacked. It said that groups of armed vigilantes had threatened strikers outside a number of factories and that some members had been threatened with death if they continued to belong to the union. In some instances these vigilantes were identified as belonging to the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The union also said that Numsa members were being harassed by the police. At a meeting with a police delegation from the PWV in August it was agreed that the following would be observed:

- that workers had the right to strike;
- that a strike was a matter between workers and their employers;
- that the police should protect all citizens irrespective of class or race; and
- that communication at grass-roots level should be between shopstewards and officers in command.

However, the union reported that despite this agreement two major problems remained: that is, the inability of the police to deal with vigilantes and their unwillingness to ‘weed out’ criminal elements.

Numsa also said that a number of employers had physically threatened workers on strike.¹²⁴ [¹²⁴ Press releases from National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, 13, 19 August 1992]

Inter-union violence

It was reported in July 1992 that conflict on the shop floor between members of Cosatu’s affiliates and the United Workers’ Union of South Africa (Uwusa), which is linked to the IFP, had led to the death of more than 20 workers during 1992. Factories which were affected by the conflict included the Langeberg Co-op (Boksburg), Mooi River Textiles (near Bruntville, Natal), Denver Metal Works (Johannesburg), National Plumbers and Builders Supply (Johannesburg), and the Escourt Bacon Co-operative (Heidelberg, Natal). The inter-union conflict at Mooi River Textiles (Mooitex) led to the factory closing for three weeks in June 1992. Mooitex management said that violence at the factory had begun when Uwusa began organising there in 1991. Up until then, Cosatu’s South African Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union had been the majority union at the factory, but had since been superseded by Uwusa.¹²⁵ [¹²⁵ *The Weekly Mail* 24 July 1992, *New Nation* 31 July 1992]

Conflict between the unions also spilled over into the hostels. In August 1992 Numsa reported that its members in hostels on the Witwatersrand were being threatened with death unless they resigned from the union and joined Uwusa, according to a national organising secretary of Numsa, Dr Bernie Fanaroff.

Workers had been threatened at the Denver, George Goch, Jeppe, Kwesine and Wattville hostels.¹²⁶ [126
Business Day 7 August 1992]¹ No comment from Uwusa could be obtained on these claims.

Strike-related violence

During the period under review violence was a feature of many strikes, particularly the major ones, such as the health workers' strike at health institutions in the Cape province, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal; the media workers' strike at the South African Broadcasting Corporation; the countrywide metalworkers' strike; miners' strikes; and the motor workers' strike at Toyota. Employers and the police said that striking workers had attacked non-striking workers, their families and replacement labour, the attacks in some instances leading to death of the victims. Unionists complained of police harassment and attacks, some fatal, against them by unknown assailants, non-striking workers and company security. However, owing to the incompleteness of the information available it is not possible to give accurate figures on these attacks.

The health strike in particular, which began in June 1992 and ended in September 1992, was characterised by violence. Strike-related violence was reported to have claimed the lives of 12 people, including non-striking workers, members of their families and union officials. Five Soweto clinics were reported as having been firebombed and many homes were extensively damaged in attacks relating to the dispute.¹²⁷ [127 *The Star* 22 September, *Business Day* 24 September 1992]² Strikers were reported to have removed non-strikers from their work stations, threatened people delivering medical supplies, prevented student nurses from attending classes, damaged property, and intimidated and assaulted nurses for continuing to work.¹²⁸ [128 *The Weekly Mail, The Citizen* 12 June 1992]

In July 1992 two senior officials of the National Education, Health and Allied Workers' Union (Nehawu), the union involved in the strike, denied before the Goldstone commission that an intimidatory pamphlet purported to have been published by the union's Pietersburg (northern Transvaal) branch had emanated from the union. The commission's chairman, Mr Justice Richard Goldstone, said that the pamphlet contained unambiguous threats to take the lives of workers who had not participated in the hospital strike. The union's general secretary, Mr Phillip Dexter, told the commission that the content of the pamphlet was contrary to Nehawu's policy and that they dissociated themselves from it.¹²⁹ [129 *Sowetan* 23 July 1992]

Throughout the strike Nehawu dissociated itself from the acts of intimidation, saying that they did not form part of its policies.¹³⁰ [130 *The Citizen* 3 July 1992]

In September 1992 the Transvaal Provincial Association and Nehawu issued a joint statement condemning an attack on the home of the chief matron of Baragwanath Hospital (Soweto) on the eve of

settlement of the strike.¹³¹ [¹³¹ *Daily Dispatch* 24 September 1992]

A separate statement by Nehawu and Cosatu said that the strike had been characterised by an ‘unprecedented amount of violence which all parties sincerely regret’. The statement called on ‘all persons to refrain from violence which can only undermine the negotiation process and subvert the spirit of reconciliation which currently exists’.¹³² [¹³² *Ibid*]

Violence was also a notable feature of the nationwide metalworkers’ strike held during August 1992. The director of the Steel and Engineering Industries’ Federation of South Africa (Seifsa), Mr Brian Angus, said in August that non-strikers had been intimidated and workers in some factories had told their employers that they would join the strike unless they received protection.

Regarding allegations of intimidation, Dr Fanaroff said that Numsa had instructed members that while it was permissible to speak to strike-breakers, they had to desist from barring them from the factories. It was reported that the police told workers at many factories to stand 100 metres from the gates and arrested those not complying with this.¹³³ [¹³³ *The Weekly Mail* 21 August 1992]

Dr Fanaroff said that there had been an ‘extensive campaign of intimidation and murder’ against union members and organisers and said that several people had been Killed, the attacks peaking during the ballot preceding the strike (see *Attacks against unionists* above). Strikers in Germiston (east Rand) also marched to the police station in protest against what they said was harassment by the police. Police said that they had used teargas to disperse strikers taking part in illegal demonstrations in the Germiston industrial area.¹³⁴ [¹³⁴ *The Citizen* 8 August 1992]

Court cases

In March 1992 Mr Justice R van Schalkwyk in the Witwatersrand Local Division of the Supreme Court gave three Numsa unionists leave to appeal against their conviction on a charge of kidnapping a security police man in August 1990 (see *1991/92 survey* pp299–300). The unionists were the general secretary of Cosatu, Mr Jay Naidoo; the assistant general secretary of Cosatu, Mr Sydney Mufamadi; and the general secretary of Numsa, Mr Moses Mayekiso. The judge set aside their conviction of assault after finding that the state had not proved that they were present or involved in the assault on the policeman while he was at the Cosatu offices. He upheld the conviction of all three on the kidnapping charge, rejecting submission on behalf of the accused that they did not have ‘guilty minds’ at the time of the offence.¹³⁵ [¹³⁵ *Sowetan* 25 March 1992, *Business Day* 25 March 1992]

In April 1992 five members of Numsa employed at Haggie Rand (east Rand) were found guilty on various counts of murder and attempted murder for taking part in armed attacks against co-workers who

refused to join an illegal strike in 1989. Five employees were murdered and nine others wounded between November 1989 and April 1990 in incidents relating to the strike. Mr Justice B du Plessis found that the five men who were convicted had been members of, or intimately involved with, a workers' representative group known as the 'committee of ten'. The judge said that there was no doubt that the attacks were planned and carried out by the committee. The men were Messrs Malan Khumalo, Samuel Malepo, Jeffery Mtshali, Richard Ngobeni and Malvert Ngubane.¹³⁶ [¹³⁶ *Business Day I* April 1992] In statements given to the police the men described how they had singled out workers who had refused to strike and temporary workers hired during the strike and had then petrol-bombed their houses and shot them. During the trial the men claimed that the statements had been made as a result of torture by the police and were therefore not admissible as evidence. This was rejected by the judge.

In early August 1992 the Witwatersrand Local Division of the Supreme Court dismissed an application by Seifsa to have a strike by about 80 000 workers in the metal industry, which began on 3 August and which affected about 790 workplaces, declared illegal on the grounds that Seifsa did not have legal standing to represent individual members. Seifsa said that Numsa, which had called the strike, originally claimed to have had 147 000 members covered by the industrial council agreement, but revised this to 116 000 to suit the ballot percentage. It held that even then only slightly over 50% of the 116 000 had voted in favour of the strike.¹³⁷ [¹³⁷ *The Weekly Mail* 14 August 1992]

Later in the same month the Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court ruled that the strike, then in its fourth week, was illegal. Granting an interim interdict in favour of Seifsa, which had brought the motion, Mr Justice J F Myburgh said that on the papers before him Seifsa had proved a number of irregularities concerning the strike ballot. Judge Myburgh said that Numsa could not show that a majority of its members had voted in favour of the strike action—it could in fact not accurately show how many members it had. It was clear that non-members had voted in the strike ballot and that their votes had been counted and included in the outcome. He said that it appeared that in a substantial number of cases the ballot had not been secret. Ballot papers had also been handed out in batches and no steps had been taken to ensure that members had not voted more than once.

Commenting on the ruling, Dr Fanaroff said that future talks on the restructuring of the engineering and metal industries and the newly launched national economic negotiating forum would have to be reviewed in the light of 'apartheid laws which used technical points to undermine legitimate collective bargaining'. He said that the judgement effectively meant that no Cosatu union could hold a legal strike in terms of the Labour Relations Act of 1956 as the implications of the judgement were that every union should have an up-to-date list of its members with their identification numbers. Numsa would ask Cosatu for a campaign to have the law changed, he added. He accused Seifsa of relying on technicalities to break a democratic decision by Numsa members. He said that Numsa had already written to Seifsa saying that the strike had been broken by mass dismissals because of the judgement and that there would be no room to build on the fruitful discussions which had already taken place about the future of the industry. Numsa would urge Cosatu to reconsider participating in discussions with the South African Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs on a joint labour/business charter and in the national

economic forum. Mr Angus said that the judgement had nothing to do with the restructuring of the industry or the economic forum. ¹³⁸ [¹³⁸ *Business Day, The Citizen*, The Star 26 August 1992]

Numsa also raised the question of how Seifsa had come to be in possession of internal Numsa reports which it had used in its application. Seifsa denied that it had used spies or telephone taps to obtain the information but said that it had received reports of the pending strike from shopstewards. ¹³⁹ [¹³⁹ *New Nation* 21 August 1992]

In September 1992 Cosatu's executive committee decided to investigate the possibility of bringing private prosecutions against all those implicated in death-squad activities, including members of the military. ¹⁴⁰ [¹⁴⁰ *Ibid* 11 September 1992]

Collective Bargaining

Bargaining forums

In September 1992 the South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union (Saccawu) declared a dispute with employers in the retail and catering sectors when only 15 out of 200 employers turned up at a meeting called by the union to discuss the setting up of a national industrial council structure for the industry. All major employers, except CNA/Gallo, ignored the union's request to attend the meeting. Saccawu's general secretary, Mr Papi Kganare, said that their absence had clearly been co-ordinated. Two previous meetings to discuss the issue which had been called by the union earlier in the year had been poorly attended.

According to reports, employers felt that the union was trying to bludgeon them into an industrial council without taking cognisance of the complexities of the industry. Employers said that by declaring a dispute with all employers the union was positioning itself for a national strike. However, Mr Kganare said that the union would be responding to every company that had taken a position on the issue to try to find ground for consensus. ¹⁴¹ [¹⁴¹ *Business Day* 16 September 1992]

Giving reasons why employers were opposed to the establishment of an industrial council for the industry, the executive director of the Federated Hospitality Association of South Africa, Mr Peter Hearfield, said that while there might be beneficial aspects to an industry forum, it was difficult for the industry to go that route. Most employers tended to be small entrepreneurs who liked to make their own decisions rather than having an employer body to do so for them. 'You cannot expect the small hotelier in the Drakensberg to pay the same [wage] rates as a big hotel in central Johannesburg.' ¹⁴² [¹⁴² *The Weekly Mail* 11 September 1992]

In October employers pushed for the holding of three separate meetings in the retail, commercial and catering sections respectively, at which the union would be told that the declaration of the dispute was premature as a condition for discussing the union's demands.¹⁴³ [¹⁴³ Ibid 2 October 1992]

In the same month the Chemical Workers' Industrial Union held a meeting with employers in the industry for the first time ever at national level to discuss its demand for countrywide centralised bargaining. The meeting took place four months after the union had launched its campaign for such bargaining. According to the union, a total of 64 companies from all sectors of the chemical industry attended the meeting. However, major companies such as BP SA, Caltex Oil, Sasol, Sentrachem. Shell SA and South African Petroleum Refineries did not attend. The union demanded that a centralised bargaining forum be set up in the industry in two phases. In phase one a centralised forum should be set up immediately to negotiate the details of an industrial council, which should be established in the second phase. Such a forum should work towards bringing all employers and trade unions operating in the industry into the forum. It should also address the issue of retrenchments.¹⁴⁴ [¹⁴⁴ *New Nation* 4 September 1992]

In September 1992 Eskom announced that it and ten trade unions had set up an arena to forestall crises and give all sections of the workforce a chance to influence decision making. Eskom's human resources director, Mr George Undeque, said that it had succeeded in establishing an 'alternative, non-adversarial process of discussion and consultation'. The arena would not replace normal union-management negotiations, but would run in tandem with them, he said. He said further, 'The alternative process is aimed at the establishment of appropriate participative mechanisms to allow for meaningful trade union input and influence before final decisions are made.' Joint task groups would deal with issues such as unions having 'meaningful influence' over decisions in the company, the use of the arena to achieve long-term viability for the organisation, the training and development of Eskom employees and accommodation and related matters. The unions represented 75% of Eskom's workforce, and included Cosatu's two biggest affiliates, the National Union of Mineworkers and the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, as well as the Electricity Workers' Union; the South African Iron, Steel and Allied Industries Union; the South African Electrical Workers' Association; and the Mineworkers' Union.¹⁴⁵ [¹⁴⁵ *Business Day* 11 September 1992]

Bargaining on recognition

Domestic service

In March 1992 the director general of manpower, Mr Joel Fourie, said that the department's draftsmen would first have to complete drawing up the proposed legislation for farmworkers. He said that the practical as well as financial and personnel implications of the implementation of domestic workers' legislation had to be researched and planned. He pointed out that the department would have to register

1,2m more employees (see *1991/92 Survey* pp308–309).

In November 1992 the minister of manpower said that from 1993 domestic workers would be included under legislation to protect workers (see *Synopsis and Update*).

Education

In September 1992 the government agreed to recognise the South African Democratic Teachers' Union after two years of discussion between the 50 000-strong union and education authorities. The union had threatened a nationwide strike if its appeal for recognition was rejected (see chapter on *Education*).¹⁴⁶

[¹⁴⁶ Ibid 4 September 1992]

Farming

The question of the inclusion of farmworkers under various statutes governing the protection of workers continued to be controversial during the period under review. In 1991 two draft bills, amending respectively the Unemployment Insurance Act (UIA) of 1966 and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) of 1983 were tabled in Parliament (see *1991/92 Survey* pp310–313). Neither was passed during the 1991 parliamentary session. In March 1992 the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) voiced its opposition to reports that the minister of manpower had agreed to delay amendments to the acts following pressure from the South African Agricultural Union (SAAU). The SAAU had also been a party to the National Manpower Commission (NMC) deliberations which had resulted in the commission recommending the extension of various labour statues to include farmworkers. The deputy director of the SAAU, Mr Kobus Kleynhans, said that the union would push for 'an agriculture-friendly act', incorporating the principles of the BCEA, the Labour Relations Act (LRA) of 1956, the UIA, and the Wage Act of 1957, and would put the proposal to Cosatu in March.

Responding to Mr Kleynhans, Cosatu said, 'SAAU was part of all negotiations which led to the NMC recommending the extension of the BCEA, LRA, UIA and Wage Act. The SAAU itself endorses the extension of the BCEA and the UIA.' Cosatu added that it was disturbing that the agricultural union wanted to renege on its undertakings. It also accused the government of 'folding its arms and doing nothing'. It was reported that the SAAU had backtracked because of pressure from its conservative affiliates in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. According to Mr Kleynhans, the two provinces had voted against the extension of the legislation at their congresses. He said that the agricultural union had problems with working hours and dispute-settling mechanisms proposed by the NMC. It was also against a minimum wage in agriculture.¹⁴⁷ [¹⁴⁷ *The Weekly Mail* 5 March 1992]

In April 1992 about 100 people, led by the Food and Allied Workers' Union (Fawu), the Cosatu affiliate organising farmworkers, marched to Parliament to demand that the BCEA and the UIA be enacted immediately and that the LRA and the Wage Act be extended to farmworkers. Fawu has about 26 000

farmworkers as members. Speaking at a press conference in Cape Town before the march, Fawu's assistant general secretary, Mr Mike Madlala, said that the absence of legislative protection for workers and unions in the agricultural sector had been the reason for the union's failure to make any progress in organising in the sector. The union needed power before it could gain concessions for farmworkers but was hamstrung by not having the right to build that power. Trespass laws had prevented union organisers from visiting farms, and thus Cosatu and Fawu had called for the repeal of that act and that organisers be allowed free access to farms. Attempting to bridge the gap between farm and city, Fawu had concentrated on organising on company farms where it already had a presence, he said.¹⁴⁸ [¹⁴⁸ *The Citizen, Sowetan* 24 April 1992]

In June 1992 the BCEA was again presented to Parliament. Explaining the move, the director general of manpower, Mr Joel Fourie, said, 'The government undertook to put this bill through Parliament this session and the session is coming to an end. If this opportunity is not used, the bill may not be debated during this session because of the workload on Parliament.' The SAAU voiced its dissatisfaction over the step and appealed to the minister to hold back the bill, saying that the organisation, Cosatu and the Department of Manpower were 'in the process of fruitful negotiations' as to the best way of converting the legal principles applicable to agriculture into legislation. Cosatu welcomed the move, and both it and the government said that the passage of the bill should not impede the three-way talks being held.¹⁴⁹ [¹⁴⁹ *The Citizen* 3 June 1992, *The Weekly Mail* 5 June 1992]

The extension of labour legislation to farm and domestic workers was one of the recommendations of the fact-finding mission of the International Labour Organisation which visited the country in February (see *Policy* above).¹⁵⁰ [¹⁵⁰ *Eastern Province Herald* 6 June 1992]

Speaking at the annual congress of the Transvaal Agricultural Union in September 1992, the chairman of its general affairs committee, Mr P Roets, said that unions saw the industry as the last obstacle in their aim to control all black labour and to satisfy their political aspirations. Black unions had already started agitating for a minimum wage of R750 a month, which would escalate. He said that the wage demands could make it possible for farmers to employ whites. Farmers who did so said that it was more profitable. Mr Roets added that the standpoint of organised agriculture on labour legislation was based on the uniqueness of the industry and this had to be acknowledged. It must not be just a law written for commerce and industry with a few amendments,' he said. Agriculture could not afford to learn the costly lesson experienced by many undertakings since labour legislation had been 'normalised' in commerce and industry. He said that between 1980 and 1990, 17 087m mandays had been lost because of strikes, most of which were unlawful. He said that it was not strange, therefore, that South Africa's productivity was the lowest in the world. At the same time the labour costs in the manufacturing industry were among the highest in the world.¹⁵¹ [¹⁵¹ *Business Day* 4 September 1992]

Amendments to the BCEA and the UIA were gazetted in July and would come into operation on a date to be specified by the state president.

The amendments to the BCEA allow, inter alia, for the extension of ordinary working hours of a farmworker provided that an agreement is signed to this effect by the employer and the farmworker. The extended period cannot be for more than four months out of every 12 months, and the extended hours may not total more than four a week. The ordinary working hours of the farmworker must be reduced by a corresponding number of hours during a period of the same duration as that during which the extended hours are in force in the same 12-month period. If the employer fails to compensate the farmworker in this way, he will have to pay him an amount for the extended hours worked at the rate of one-and-a-third times his wage. The worker, however, cannot be made to work longer than ten hours per day.

The act also sets out rates for Sunday work specifically for farmworkers. With regard to notice periods, both the employer and the employee are required to give a month's notice of termination of employment. If the employer terminates the farmworker's contract early, the worker may remain in his accommodation for the period he would have been entitled to it in terms of his contract or for 30 days, whichever is the longer. He will also be able to keep his livestock on the land for that period. He may also tend to his standing crops and harvest and remove them within a reasonable period of time after they have become ready for harvesting, unless the employer pays the farmworker an amount for such crops agreed upon by them.¹⁵² [¹⁵² *Government Gazette*, no 14094, 3 July 1992]

In October 1992 the SAAU sent its own proposals to the government after talks with Cosatu on the issue of labour legislation for farmworkers had broken down. Mr Kleynhans said that Cosatu was opposed to organised agriculture's view that farmworkers should be the subject of separate legislation. Cosatu refused to continue with the negotiations until the BCEA had been implemented. In the light of this the SAAU had decided to make proposals to the minister directly, said Mr Kleynhans.¹⁵³ [¹⁵³ *Business Day* 6 October 1992]

In November the minister announced that in 1993 the LRA and Wage Act would be extended to include farmworkers (see *Synopsis and Update*).

Mining

Impala Platinum Mine

In August 1992, in a breakthrough for trade unionism in Bophuthatswana, a structure of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) was recognised at the Impala Platinum Mine. According to an agreement between the mine and the union, the union would be recognised as a 'central council', an in house forum, as a way of circumventing the homeland's restrictions on 'foreign unions' from operating in the territory. In a change of strategy earlier in 1992 the NUM had decided to apply for registration under the homeland's Industrial Conciliation Act of 1984 as a way of breaking the recognition impasse. Until then management had refused to recognise the union, arguing that this was contrary to the homeland's law. About 26 000 of the 48 000 employees on the mine were members of the NUM. Conflict over the

recognition issue was estimated to have cost the mine over R100m in lost production, while 30 lives were lost in clashes between union and non-union members and NUM members and mine security. The council was to consist of shaft representatives and shaft and shopstewards. Two NUM officials would be called on to participate in its deliberations as and when required. The council would bargain on wages and conditions of employment, as well as negotiating procedural and other agreements. The agreement also allowed the council to negotiate issues on which agreement had not been reached at mine level between mine management and workers.¹⁵⁴ [¹⁵⁴ *The Weekly Mail* 2S August 1992]

De Beers Consolidated Mine

In August 1992 De Beers Consolidated Mine threatened to terminate the recognition agreement with the NUM and dismissed workers for staying away on 3 and 4 August in the general strike (see *Trade Unions and politics* above). The NUM said that the company had ‘declared war’ on the union.¹⁵⁵ [¹⁵⁵ *The Citizen* 28 August 1992]

Bargaining on retrenchments

During the period under review industry and commerce continued to retrench workers as a result of the continuing economic recession. While in some industries retrenchments eased off during 1992, in others they continued to increase. The chief statistician of the Chamber of Mines of South Africa, Mr John Winson, said in July 1992 that about 5 600 miners had lost their jobs in the first five months of 1992, and he estimated that a further 8 000 to 10 000 workers would be retrenched by the end of the year. However, this was down on the 34 000 job losses in mining in 1991, he said. Conversely, the executive director of the Steel and Engineering Industries’ Federation of South Africa, Mr Brian Angus, said that at 13 800 during the first five months of this year, retrenchments were up 27% on the same period in 1991. He said that nearly 91 000 people had been retrenched in the steel and engineering industries between 1989 and May 1992. The assistant director of the National Association of Automobile Manufacturers of South Africa, Mr Costa Pierides, said in July that employment levels in the motor industry had fluctuated around the 37 000-mark because of the moratorium on retrenchments in the industry.¹⁵⁶ [¹⁵⁶ *Business Day* 13 July 1992]

Overall job losses in the non-agricultural sector in the 12 months ending March 1992 amounted to 80 607, a decline of 1,6%. Of these, losses in the mining and quarrying industry were 31 070 or 4,8%. In the non-primary sector job losses amounted to 49 537 or 1,1%.¹⁵⁷ [¹⁵⁷ *Ibid* 28 August 1992]

Unions continued with their initiatives to reach agreement with employers on retrenchments.

In January 1992 a judgement in the industrial court compelled Checkers to negotiate all store closures

with the South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union (Saccawu). The ruling was made after Saccawu had launched an urgent application to prevent Checkers from retrenching 34 workers. The union said that Checkers had undertaken not to retrench any workers after it had been bought out by Pepkor in November 1991. However, Checkers' management said that workers were going to be retrenched due to rationalisation long before the buy-out. According to its agreement with the union everything had been done properly, management said.¹⁵⁸ [¹⁵⁸ *The Weekly Mail* 31 January 1992]

In May 1992 the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) submitted to Rand Mines a detailed memorandum containing a set of 'tax-neutral' proposals it wanted to be put to the government to save jobs at the marginal Harmony gold mine (Orange Free State) after the mine had announced that it would retrench 8 000 workers. The head of the NUM's bargaining unit, Mr Martin Nicol, said that the union was not seeking limitless state funds to save a declining mine. What it wanted was assistance for 'a limited adjustment period'. The NUM hoped that instead of the sudden loss of 8 000 jobs, the state would aid a slowing down of this process. This would allow management and the union time to carry out specific tasks, such as a retraining programme, 'which would mitigate the effects of the retrenchments on individuals and on the region'. Mr Nicol said that the union's proposals were based on submissions it had made to the mining summit in June 1991 on short-term measures to alleviate the industry's crisis.

The NUM's argument that short-term relief could be granted without any net cost to the fiscus relied on the 'knock-on' effect of a mine's substantial downscaling. Although a mine operating at a loss did not pay tax, the NUM said that its operations benefited state coffers in five important respects: employees' income taxes, direct taxes such as value added tax (VAT), regional services councils' levies on the wage bill, mining lease taxes, and taxes paid by the mines' suppliers and their employees. The NUM's calculations for 1990 estimated that the tax generated by a mine making no profit was worth R4 912/kg of gold produced. Hence, the union argued, a subsidy of that order would be rational and justified. Mr Nicol said that the figure for Harmony would be a little lower, but still substantial and certainly sufficient to allow for a more gradual downscaling of operations. The union suggested that such a short-term scheme would permit the maintenance of a significant number of jobs, at the mine and by suppliers; the maintenance of economies of scale by suppliers in the electricity, food and engineering sectors; and prevent a sudden decline in an important source of foreign exchange earnings. The union believed that a special case could be made for the Harmony mine because the regional economy of Virginia depended largely on the mine.¹⁵⁹ [¹⁵⁹ *Business Day* 11 May 1992]

The NUM's proposal led to a series of meetings between the union and the interdepartmental committee for state assistance to the mining industry, the government mining engineer and the minister of mineral and energy affairs, Mr George Bartlett, during June 1992 after the union and the Harmony gold mine had jointly called a meeting with the minister to discuss the crisis. In July 1992 the NUM proposed to the minister that a new committee of inquiry to revise the recommendations of the Marais committee of 1989 on the mining industry be established. The Marais committee's recommendations are the basis for current state policy on marginal mines. However, this suggestion was rejected by the government, and Mr Bartlett stated in a letter to the union that the issues the union sought to address were already

adequately catered for in the aims and objectives of the four working groups established on 3 June 1991 by the steering committee of the miningsummit (see *1991/92 Survey* pp314–315) and that a new committee would duplicate that work. The union expressed its disappointment with the decision pointing out that the Marais committee had met at a time when the gold price was at a ten-year high, that it had not anticipated mine closures until after the turn of the century, that it had not directed its attention to the process of downscaling that preceded most mine closures, and that it had anticipated a loss of 77 000 jobs, half of the number that had been lost in reality after only one mine closure. In its memorandum to the minister, the NUM pointed out that downscaling was a much more significant process than outright mine closures. It also said that the summit process had become hopelessly ‘bogged down’ and had not produced anything to challenge or redirect state policy on the gold mining industry at a time when thousands of workers were losing their jobs.¹⁶⁰ [160 National Union of Mineworkers memorandum on the need for state assistance to the gold mining industry, August 1992]

In an attempt to keep the mine working, the union and Harmony management signed a historic wage deal in August (see *Bargaining on wages* below). However, later in August 1992 the mine’s managing director, Mr Karl Eick, said that unless workers and the government agreed to a radical survival plan the mine would have to close. This was because, despite the deal, the mine had failed to break even in May, June or July. In addition the gold price had fallen to R929 an ounce in the last week of August, its lowest level for many months. However, Mr Eick reported that productivity was good, the mine exceeding production targets of 470 000 tonnes of ore a month by reaching 500 000 tonnes in July. Management told the NUM and the Council of Mining Unions (CMU) that workers would have to accept pay cuts or support a new mining plan for the mine to survive. This plan involved a proposal to blast underground for 30 days a month which would be in breach of existing mining regulations. These allowed blasting on only six days a week, and not on Sunday. If workers accepted the plan, the mine would ask Mr Bartlett to allow the mine to work a seven-day week. Mr Eick said that this would enable Harmony to reorganise its mining plan and exploit higher grade ore on a continuous basis. It was not designed to make employees work longer hours. Mr Nicol reiterated calls for the government to provide financial assistance for Harmony. He said that it was unlikely that the government would agree to a change in mining regulations. The NUM believed that it was up to the government to provide financial assistance to Harmony, revising its approach to supporting marginal gold mines. ‘Workers have been prepared to make sacrifices at Harmony. Now it’s the turn of the government,’ he said.¹⁶¹ [161 *Business Day* 28,31 August 1992]

The CMU and the whites-only Mineworkers’ Union (MWU) rejected the rescue plan on the grounds that they would not do cleaning work on Sundays but only tramming. They proposed that workers should increase the number of shifts worked in a six-day week. The NUM, the Underground Officials’ Association and the South African Technical Officials’ Association agreed to support the plan. However, the NUM’s go-ahead was conditional on the understanding that it would not involve wage cuts, retrenchments or increases in working hours. The union had given its support on the basis that the plan was a temporary one ‘for this crisis period’. If the plan was not successful by 19 October 1992 workers and management would meet again. The NUM said that mine management had agreed to join

the NUM's campaign to change government policy on marginal mines and to allow union participation in planning meetings.¹⁶² [¹⁶² Ibid 15, 16 September 1992] In September the minister granted the mine permission to undertake drilling, blasting and cleaning operations on Sundays.

In the same month Rand Mines declared a dispute with the CMU on the grounds that the council had reneged on an agreement to do Sunday cleaning work. The general secretary of the MWU, Mr Peet Ungerer, said, however, that both parties had signed an agreement a few days before in which there was no mention of cleaning on Sundays. He said that the council and its members were prepared to do tramming work on Sundays and had presented the mine with a plan involving extra shift work six days a week. His members had made enough sacrifices at Harmony, he said, accepting below inflation wage increases and working extra shifts.¹⁶³ [¹⁶³ Ibid 22 September 1992]

At the beginning of October 1992, the mine introduced its plan even though management and the CMU had not resolved their dispute. A spokesman for the mine said that Harmony aimed to produce an extra 300kg of gold a year at no extra cost.¹⁶⁴ [¹⁶⁴ Ibid 2 October 1992]

In March 1992 the NUM called on Eskom to shelve its restructuring plans—which it said would lead to a cut in the workforce from 67 000 to 33 000—and to link any such exercise to the economic forum negotiations between the Congress of South African Trade Unions and big business (see *Trade unions and the economy* above). The union accused Eskom of unilaterally adopting measures to make workers redundant. Eskom's human resources director, Mr George Lindeque, said that he had made full representations to the NUM about the company's restructuring plans. The organisation followed a policy of no forced retrenchments and also offered retirement options and redeployment within Eskom.¹⁶⁵ [¹⁶⁵ *The Weekly Mail* 6 March 1992]

In July Eskom, the NUM, the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa) and the Electricity Workers' Union reached an agreement on restructuring. According to Eskom, the organisation and the unions had agreed to the formation of an Eskom/trade union summit where various issues, including restructuring, would be discussed. In the agreement Eskom undertook not to retrench any employees until the management of surplus staff had been discussed in the summit or a prior agreement had been reached. The corporation said that it would consider applications for voluntary retrenchment and use of voluntary retraining and redeployment strategies to deal with surplus staff. Eskom undertook, where surpluses arose, to communicate to affected groups the options open to them. It said that the unions had undertaken not to discourage their members from engaging in such discussions. However, Eskom said that it had not agreed to suspend the closure of certain power stations or its restructuring programme.¹⁶⁶ [¹⁶⁶ *The Citizen* 31 July 1992]

A moratorium on retrenchments was one of the demands of workers in the metal, motor, and tyre and rubber sectors who went on strike for various periods in July 1992. The settlement in the tyre workers' strike included an agreement by employers to extend the watershed moratorium on retrenchments agreed on in 1991 to June 1993.¹⁶⁷ [¹⁶⁷ *The Star* 12 August 1992]

In the motor industry employers proposed a voluntary retrenchment package. Numsa argued, however, that as employers would select suitable candidates for redundancy, it could not be regarded as voluntary.¹⁶⁸ [¹⁶⁸ *The Weekly Mail* 10 July 1992] Commenting on Numsa's demands, the union's chief negotiator, Mr Les Kettledas, said, 'We believe that workers should not be the ones to pay for the state of the economy. We are concerned about the rising level of unemployment because it brings about many social problems. Our view is that when retrenchments take place they are a cost-cutting measure by employers. We believe that employers instead should look at alternatives to retrenchments and have committed ourselves to discuss with them the long-term growth and viability of the industries concerned.' According to the chairman of the employer caucus in the wage talks, Mr David Kirby, director of human resources at BMW South Africa, employers felt in the circumstances that layoffs were essential to controlling costs in a situation of declining output. 'Our view is that if we reduce manpower, we would be able to give the people who remain full employment and that the moratorium agreement was a short-term offer. The difficulty lies in sustaining such an agreement in the long term, especially if you cannot foresee what will happen in the industry in a period of four to six months,' he said.¹⁶⁹ [¹⁶⁹ *The Star* 25 May 1992]

The settlement in the motor industry contained a provision whereby unions would be fully consulted before retrenchments occurred. The agreement provided for the establishment of a joint fund to be used for the support and retraining of retrenched workers.¹⁷⁰ [¹⁷⁰ *Financial Mail* 12 June 1992] Employers would contribute 10c an hour per worker to the fund. Other sources of funding—including assistance from the Unemployment Insurance and National Training boards—would be pursued. Retrenched workers would have the option of entering the fund on full pay for 15 working days. In this period they would receive individual counselling and information on such matters as employment possibilities, training requirements and financial problems. They could then enter the training activities of the fund for 12 weeks again on full pay. Training would be appropriate to the industry and the needs of the worker. Participants in the fund would have preference for re-employment in the industry. If re-employed, they would have all periods of continuous service in the industry recognised for benefits. Other proposals were that employers finance full-time training in industrial or production engineering for union-nominated workers, a minimum industry wage of R6,60 an hour and severance pay ranging from 20 days (less than two years' service) to 120 days (ten years' service or more).¹⁷¹ [¹⁷¹ *Business Day* 20 August 1992]

An agreement that a moratorium on retrenchments would also remain in effect until June 1993 was a feature of the wage agreement between Transnet and unions in July.¹⁷² [¹⁷² *The Citizen* 7 July 1992]

A moratorium on retrenchments was also one of the demands made by the South African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers' Union in its wage negotiations with employers.

It was reported in July that the South African Iron, Steel and Allied Industries Union and the MWU had begun finding work for retrenched members. The steel union was planning to set up a private employment company which would be run entirely by jobless people as well as 'several collective associations'. The unions reported that they had placed 3 000 workers in a three-week period.¹⁷³ [¹⁷³ Ibid 10 July 1992]

Bargaining on wages

According to Andrew Levy and Associates, the average level of wage settlement on payroll for 1992 was 12,6% as against the average level of claim of 56,4%. The average time required to settle was 88 days. The highest average increase was in the retail and distributive sector at 16,2%, followed by 15,4% in the manufacturing and printing sectors. The next highest average increases were in the automobile sector—15,1%, and paper and packaging at 15%. Average percentage increases were highest in the Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging region (15,3%), followed by the western Cape (15%). The lowest increases were in the western Transvaal region (12,3%).

According to the consultancy, benchmarks were set in a number of industrial sectors. Settlements above 16% were significant in terms of prevailing food prices and the inflation rate, it said. Consistent with this trend was the 16,6% settlement between the South African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers' Union and Pick 'n Pay, which contained an across-the-board increase of R185 and brought the minimum wage to R900 a month. It said that another settlement in 1992 that exceeded the inflation rate was reached in negotiations between the Transport and General Workers' Union and the National Contract Cleaners' Association in Natal with increases ranging between 18% and 28%. However, negotiations were off a very low base and the minimum wage in Natal for this sector is now R610 a month. A further increase above the inflation rate was recorded at Pep Textile Industries in the eastern Cape, where the company and the South African Clothing and Textile Workers' Union (Sactwu) settled for 17% following a strike in response to management's offer of 10,8%. The consultancy found, however, that on average wage settlements were well below the inflation rate.

It found that wage-related industrial action for the first half of 1992 had dropped from an average of 52,6% in 1991 to 18,9%. It said, 'Statistics clearly show that unions increasingly favour the go-slow, with an increase from 21,9% to 33%, as a means of pressure on employers. Overtime bans at 26,3% are also a favourite pressure tactic. Work stoppages also show an increase, from 9% to 13,5%, while the incidence of strike action has decreased from 37,4% to 27%. The incidence of unprocedural work stoppages seems to reinforce the suspicion that union officials are having some difficulty in installing realism in the minds of the workers during the 1992 wage bargaining round.'

Clothing and textiles

Sactwu placed novel proposals on the table with employers in 1992. In addition to a demand for a 20%

across-the-board pay rise, the union's productivity proposals for annual negotiations included:

- a multi-skilling incentive of up to 10% of the wage. A multi-skilled worker would get a 5% incentive irrespective of whether he/she used his/her various skills. This was to encourage employers to use the skills. A worker utilising his/her varied skills would get the full 10%;
- the establishment of a national productivity council for the industry which would be a joint union/ employer body to promote productivity; and
- the ratio of qualified to unqualified workers should not exceed 1:3, as an incentive for employers to encourage skills training.

It also recommended:

- extending agreements to include white-collar workers (5% of Sactwu members); and
- extending union rights (such as access to closed-shop agreements) to all industry employers. This would further entrench Sactwu as the industry's sole union. Only work conditions and wages were extended to all in the industry via the main agreements reached at industrial councils.

According to the assistant general secretary of the union, Mr Ebrahim Patel, the industry could either become competitive by suppressing wage hikes or by promoting skills. 'To gain competitive advantage, where we produce quality garments at relatively low cost in a relatively short time, is our primary objective. To boost production and skills is more valuable than to reduce wage levels. It is the only way to sustainable growth.' Reacting to the proposals, the industrial relations expert at Seardel, Mr Johann Baard, argued that to become competitive the emphasis should fall on wage restraint, flexibility in employment conditions and hours and management training. 'Sactwu is using productivity as a means of getting more money rather than offering it as a means of boosting efficiency in real terms. There is no trade-off. Multi-skilling is necessary, not a bonus as Sactwu thinks.'¹⁷⁴ [¹⁷⁴ *Finance Week* 30 April 1992]

While the above were not features of the final agreement for the industry, there were important advances. Employers agreed to join the union in making representations to the Bophuthatswana administration around recognition of the union. This would mean that employers there would not be able to exploit the low-wage advantage over employers outside the homeland. Another feature was the extension of the closed shop to employers who were not members of any of the employer associations currently negotiating at industrial council level. This would help bring a large number of the remaining 6% of workers employed in numerous small factories into Sactwu and would further serve to standardise wages and working conditions in the industry. It was also agreed to extend the industrial council to cover new, highly paid categories of work in the Transvaal. According to the union, an estimated 94% of workers in the industry were organised by the union. The union won a 14% to 15% wage increase and

attributed this relatively high increase to the level of unionisation in the sector.¹⁷⁵ [¹⁷⁵ *New Nation I* August 1992]

Metal

In annual wage negotiations in the metal industry the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa) demanded wage increases of between 20% and 42,6% and an across-the-board increase of 25%. Employers initially offered 6,4%. After hard bargaining 11 of the 12 unions accepted a 9,1% pay increase, but this was rejected by Numsa which called a strike in support of its final demand for a 9,5% increase. About 80 000 of its members went on strike for a period of four weeks in August, about 3 000 of them being dismissed as a result of the action. The strike cost an estimated R880m in lost production. According to an economist at the Steel and Engineering Industries' Federation of South Africa (Seifsa), Mr Michael Macdonald, workers lost R110m in wages, comprising approximately 9% of their annual wages.¹⁷⁶ [¹⁷⁶ *The Weekly Mail* 28 August 1992]

Seifsa's revised wage offer of a 9,1% increase was dependent on union acceptance of a clause that protected employers against compulsory plant-level bargaining. Numsa shunned the first meeting between unionists and the employers concerned with finalising the clause. Motivating Numsa's opposition to the clause, the union's chief negotiator, Mr Les Kettleidas, said that it protected employers only, with no reciprocal security for workers against arbitrary changes to service conditions. He also said that a settlement depended on the reinstatement of the 3 000 workers fired during the strike. A spokesman for the Metal and Electrical Workers' Union of South Africa, Mr Zithulele Cindi, said that his union accepted Seifsa's offer in principle but had reservations about the rider limiting union rights on wage bargaining. 'Where workers already have the right to factory-level bargaining this should remain. The clause must not be permanent.'¹⁷⁷ [¹⁷⁷ *Business Day* 25 September 1992]

Mining

In 1992 an arbitration ruling clarified the basis upon which bonuses would be determined in the mining industry. In terms of the scheme, mines calculated a profit to revenue (PR) ratio by expressing profits as a percentage of total revenue. Mines which achieved a PR ratio of more than 5% would pay bonuses to their employees. Conflict broke out between the Chamber of Mines of South Africa (the chamber) and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) over whether mines could deduct royalties paid to landowners from total revenue before calculating the PR ratio. The NUM argued that unlike capital expenditure (capex) and interest, which were specifically referred to as deductible items in the agreement, royalties were not. The arbitrator ruled that it was 'clearly not contemplated by the parties' that interest and capex only would be deductible and that if they were a part of costs there was no reason to refer to them specifically in the agreement. The NUM said that royalties were 'not a normal cost and that they are a distribution of the profit of the mine to a special and privileged group of stakeholders'.

The effect of the ruling would be to exclude the majority of mines from the performance bonus scheme based on the 1991/92 wage agreement reached between the NUM and the chamber.¹⁷⁸ [¹⁷⁸ *New Nation* 8 May 1992]

The wage agreement reached in July 1992 between the NUM and the chamber allowed for low basic wages but for an innovative arrangement to share 20% of the profits with workers. The agreement provided for a 5% wage increase in respect of mining houses participating in bonus schemes, and 6% for those not participating in the schemes. The mining houses which chose not to participate were Anglo Vaal and Gold Fields of South Africa. Provision was also made in the agreement for representation of the NUM on the board of directors of the Rand Mutual Association, the workmen's compensation insurer of the mining industry. The NUM's demand for an agency shop (see *Closed shop* below) was rejected by the chamber.

However, coal mine employers and the NUM failed to reach agreement and the NUM declared a dispute with these employers.¹⁷⁹ [¹⁷⁹ *The Citizen* 17 July 1992] The dispute was settled in August by a conciliation board. The wage settlement varied between 7,5% and 15,1% according to mining house.¹⁸⁰ [¹⁸⁰ *The Star* 14 August 1992] During the dispute the NUM accused the chamber of renegeing on an undertaking made two years previously to move towards a single wage structure for the coal sector.¹⁸¹ [¹⁸¹ *New Nation* 12 June 1992]

The signing of the wage agreement on the gold mines was held up by differences between the NUM and the chamber over the proposed profit-sharing scheme. The NUM proposed that 20% of a 'profit pool' be shared with workers every month and that this be negotiated at mining house level. Although the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa (Anglo), Genmin and Rand Mines had agreed in principle, the NUM was reluctant to sign the agreement until finality had been reached on how the profit sharing would work. An NUM spokesman said that the union did not want a repeat of the 1991 situation where differences arose at mining house level on the implementation of a performance bonus scheme finalised at chamber level. He said that Genmin's offer had been rejected as it was so low that only two Genmin mines would pay anything in the first three months of implementation. Also, Genmin wanted to share profits only where they were greater than in 1991 and once the mine had achieved a profit increase of at least 5%.¹⁸² [¹⁸² *Business Day* 2 September 1992]

At the end of the month the NUM and Anglo reached agreement on the details of the profit-sharing scheme for the corporation's gold mines. The scheme would also apply to members of the Council of Mining Unions and the three officials' associations. In terms of the agreement 5% of planned post-capex profits of each of the four participating mines, up to a level equal to the average quarterly profit for the period July 1991 to June 1992, would be distributed to the respective workforces. Twenty percent of any profits above that level would be distributed. However, a cap equal to 25% of pensionable earnings

would apply. The four mines were Freegold (Orange Free State), Western Deep Levels (west Rand), Elandsrand (west Rand) and Vaal Reefs. The profit-share payments would be made in a lump sum every three months after quarterly results were announced. The first payment would be made in October 1992 based on the figures for the September 1992 quarter. According to the NUM, assuming September's results were identical to June's, workers at Elandsrand would receive payments equal to an average 2,6% of earnings, those at Freegold 1,2%. Vaal Reefs 1,7% and at Western Deep Levels 0,5%. The monthly wages at the mines varied between about R1 040 and R1 300. It was agreed that 25% of the profit-sharing pool or a minimum of R25 per person, whichever was higher, be divided equally among the workforce. Amounts above that would be distributed in proportion to pensionable earnings. Rules for monitoring the scheme were still to be finalised but would include regular monthly meetings for shaftstewards and other employee representatives, and a training programme to help workers to understand the financial issues involved.¹⁸³ [¹⁸³ Ibid 30 September 1992]

In August 1992 the NUM and Harmony gold mine (Welkom, Orange Free State) signed what the union described as a 'pathbreaking agreement' aimed at preserving jobs and laying the basis for 'union and management co-operation in securing the survival of the mine'. Among its unusual features were wage increases substantially below those applying elsewhere in the industry, the first finalised profit-sharing scheme in 1992, and an agreement to minimise the effects on the mine of political stayaways. It also provided that the introduction of new work practices and new technology would require agreement between the union and management. It required negotiation of enhanced skills training to improve efficiency and formalised the mine's acceptance of an agency shop system. In terms of the agency shop agreement non-NUM members would have to contribute 1% of their pay to a collective bargaining fund. Half of this fund would be paid to the union for services provided by the union in negotiations with Harmony management, while the balance would be administered by management to finance the training of shopstewards and meet mediation expenses. The agreement was aimed at eliminating 'freeriders'—who benefit from union-negotiated deals without paying union dues. In terms of the agreement employees received a R30 across-the-board increase (below 2,5% on average). In addition, 20% of after-capex profit would be paid to the workers as bonuses. While the mine recognised the right of workers to express political aspirations, the union agreed to negotiate with management how this should occur in practice. The agreement stated that new work and technology should not be introduced in a manner that compromised health and safety standards and caused job losses. The mine agreed to negotiate where possible broad-based skills training courses, an adult education programme, paid time off for approved training courses and improved pay for improved skills. The human resources executive of Rand Mines, Mr Richard de Villiers, said that the agreement reflected 'a constructive attempt by both parties to accommodate each others' interests in the context of securing the mine's survival'. The NUM said that it took both parties 'into areas in which union/management co-operation has never before been tried'. The NUM represented 85% of the mine's 14 000 wage-paid employees.¹⁸⁴ [¹⁸⁴ Ibid 17 August 1992; *The Weekly Mail* 14 August 1992]

Public sector

Public sector employees received an average 9,2% across-the-board increase and a minimum wage of R708.50 (from R537) a month after the Commission for Administration settled with five of the 11 public service employee organisations representing 260 000 of the sector's 800 000 employees. The remaining six employee organisations withdrew from the pay talks. Among them was the National Education, Health and Allied Workers' Union which on 18 May called on its workers to go on strike in support of its demands for a minimum wage of R724 a month plus a 15,3% increase across the board, an area allowance of R75 a month, six months' paid maternity leave and a 40-hour working week. The union also demanded that workers be given permanent status with accompanying benefits. The Transvaal Provincial Administration (TPA) said that general assistants were appointed as temporary workers in terms of the Public Service Act of 1984 but did receive various benefits such as pension fund membership, voluntary medical aid benefits and participation in a housing scheme under certain conditions.

The strike finally involved 5 000 workers at 21 hospitals in the Cape, 600 workers at two hospitals in the Orange Free State and 12 000 workers at 18 hospitals in the Transvaal. Workers at hospitals in Natal also went on strike. About 7 000 of the striking workers were dismissed in the Transvaal, but in terms of the agreement between the union and the TPA reached at the end of September 1992 only 5 000 would be taken back immediately.¹⁸⁵ [¹⁸⁵ *The Star* 1 October 1992]

Bargaining in the homelands

In February 1992 the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), in a major policy switch, formally applied to the **Bophuthatswana** authorities for permission to operate in the homeland in terms of the territory's Industrial Conciliation Act of 1984. The act stipulates that unions wanting recognition had to have their head offices in the homeland. The decision represented a departure from the union's previous stance of not applying for such recognition on the grounds that this would imply recognition of the homeland administration. The assistant general secretary of the NUM, Mr Marcel Golding, said, 'It's a tactical Shift in response to practical problems. Workers are joining us in large numbers and there's extensive repression—workers have been killed and hundreds have been detained.' While some companies had recognised affiliates of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) at their Bophuthatswana operations (for instance. Premier Milling and The South African Breweries), others, such as the Genmin-managed Impala Platinum, the homeland's largest employer, had refused to recognise the union because it claimed that it would be a breach of the homeland's law to do so.¹⁸⁶ [¹⁸⁶ *The Weekly Mail* 7 March 1992]

In June 1992 the homeland's minister of manpower, Mr Simon Seodi, said in his budget speech that homeland workers would be 'throwing money down the drain' if they joined Cosatu. He said that the federation would not be able to represent workers in the homeland as it was foreign (in terms of the new Industrial Relations Act not yet implemented—see below) and should 'at all times be treated as such'.¹⁸⁷ [¹⁸⁷ *Ibid* 19 June 1992]

In September 1992 the Bophuthatswana authorities postponed the implementation of the new Industrial Relations Act which was passed in September 1991. If implemented the act would bar South African unions from operating in the territory. It would also preclude anyone convicted of crimes under the homeland's security laws from being a union official or employee, severely restrict the right to strike and give the minister of manpower wide powers to determine the constitutions of unions and prevent their registration. Prior to the postponement three South African companies with extensive interests in the homeland—AECI, Automotive Glass and The South African Breweries—called on the homeland administration not to implement the legislation. They also called on all employers in Bophuthatswana to support multilateral talks to avoid the conflict which they believed would be caused by the law. Other major employers, including BMW, Blue Ribbon Bakeries and Impala Platinum were unwilling to sign the statement, although they agreed with it in principle, for fear of antagonising the homeland's authorities which had previously deported middle-management staff from South African companies for dealing with Cosatu affiliates. Premier also voiced its dissatisfaction with the law on the grounds that it interfered with the basic freedom of association and of assembly. Also employers and employees would be able to negotiate only if the government granted permission and the administration could revoke such permission. This would be an obstruction of the right to collective bargaining. Opposition was based on the belief that the proposed law breached the constitution's freedom of association clause and that it was contrary to conventions of the International Labour Organisation.

Cosatu asked for a meeting with the minister of foreign affairs, Mr Pik Botha, to discuss the law's implications. According to Cosatu, the minister agreed to meet the federation if the homeland insisted on implementing the law. Mr Seodi said that the implementation of the act had been postponed indefinitely as the administration was considering 'additional' input made by unions and employers at various seminars.¹⁸⁸ [188 *Business Day* 2,3 September 1992; *The Star* 3 September 1992]

Cosatu laid down that the following principles should be included in a new labour law:

- conciliation procedures that were able to accommodate all genuine disputes. These procedures should also be simple and allow for quick and effective resolution of disputes and should not be open to technical objections;
- an independent, accessible and credible industrial court, which should have flexible jurisdiction over unfair labour practices;
- an effective right to strike and lockout as measures of last resort in collective bargaining disputes; and
- the inclusion of domestic, farm and public sector workers in the labour relations system.

On the question of the registration of unions, Cosatu said that the act should set out simple procedures to make this possible. As the act currently stood, the registrar of manpower had wide discretionary powers

to decide whether a union should be certified or not.¹⁸⁹ [¹⁸⁹ *New Nation* 11 September 1992]

In March 1992 **KwaNdebele** passed the KwaNdebele Labour Relations Act, which embodied elements of South Africa's 1988 controversial Labour Relations Amendment Act. The South African law was overturned by amendments in 1991. In 1991 Cosatu sat on the homeland's labour advisory council where it believed that it had negotiated legislation in line with the current South African Labour Relations Act.¹⁹⁰ [¹⁹⁰ *The Weekly Mail* 6 March 1992]

In May 1992 it was reported that **KwaZulu's** minister of the interior, Mr Steven Sithebe, had drawn up a form in which 1 950 workers dismissed during a strike at Iscor's Dumacol Colliery in northern Natal in March were required to state that they were intimidated into striking. The form had to be signed in the presence of a commissioner of oaths and was a prerequisite for getting their jobs back. According to the company, 'Mr Sithebe of KwaZulu proposed the drafting of these affidavits as a mitigating circumstance and Iscor agreed to take this into account when considering re-employment of workers.' However, it said that 'neither the management of Dumacol nor Iscor had a part in drawing up or getting any employee to sign these affidavits'. The general secretary of the NUM, Mr Kgalema Motlanthe, appealed to Mr Sithebe 'to stop meddling in the dispute between mineworkers and Iscor's Dumacol colliery'.¹⁹¹ [¹⁹¹ *Ibid* 5 May 1992]

Closed shop

In June the Chamber of Mines of South Africa (the chamber) formally notified the Council of Mining Unions and three officials' associations that it planned to negotiate the end of the closed-shop agreement which had operated in the industry for the past 50 years. The agreement applied to whites only. The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) interpreted the move as an attempt to block its own proposal for the introduction of an agency system between itself and the chamber. In an agency shop non-union members are not compelled to join a union against their will, but are obliged to pay a reduced subscription in acknowledgement of the fact that they enjoy superior employment conditions owing to union collective bargaining efforts.

A spokesman for the chamber, Mr Peter Bunkell, said that the industry believed that both agency and closed-shop agreements were impediments to the principles of free association and free choice. He also confirmed that the industry was 'not keen to enter into an agency shop agreement' with the NUM and had informed the union of this. The chamber's plan to abolish the closed shop coincided with moves by the Mineworkers' Union (MWU) to call for its abolition. The MWU hoped that it would gain membership from such a development. This was because a supplementary agreement, the 'allocation of occupations' agreement, allocated each white mine employee to a particular union depending on his occupation. The MWU believed that its militant, right-wing policies would attract new members currently affiliated to other unions once a free choice was available. The union's general secretary, Mr Peet Ungerer, believed that the MWU would double its membership of 9 000. According to the head of

the NUM's bargaining unit, Mr Martin Nicol, the chamber's opposition was based less on principle than on concern that an agency shop system would strengthen the union financially.¹⁹² [¹⁹² *Business Day* 9 June 1992]

Role of shopstewards

Management's right to promote shopstewards to salaried supervisory positions was raised by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) at an industrial relations seminar in July 1992. Cosatu objected to such promotions without prior union consultation on the grounds that management was trying to co-opt shopstewards and blunt the militancy of unions' frontline leaders. In addition, some unionists argued that through this process unions were in danger of losing the cream of their shopfloor management, on whose training they had spent time and money. Unionists held that union consultation was not to frustrate the career opportunities of shopstewards, but to ensure that unions did not lose their services. According to the general secretary of the Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers' Union, Mr Siphon Kubheka, 'If a person is promoted to a managerial position, this doesn't mean that he can't be a trade union member. What is essential is that he must be able to respond to the calls made by the union.' He isolated Nampak and PG Bison as two companies which were restructuring their industrial relations around greater worker involvement in day-to-day operations. The management consultant to both companies, Mr Christo Nel, explained, 'The lines are blurring between wage-earning and salaried staff. If you are calling for workplace democracy you are calling for greater equalisation of opportunities and that means promotion of wage earners.' Shopstewards, he added, were the logical first choice because of their capabilities and qualities of leadership. He saw no problem in negotiating promotions in principle but 'not each and every individual promotion can be practically negotiated'.¹⁹³ [¹⁹³ *Finance Week* 9 July 1992]

Dispute-settling mechanisms

Industrial court decisions of note

In June 1992 the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, handing down a ruling in a dispute between the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa) and Macsteel, found that a concerted refusal by employees to work voluntary overtime as a pressure tactic constituted an unfair labour practice. The dispute between Macsteel and Numsa dated back four years when the company obtained an interim interdict in the industrial court preventing employees from imposing a collective overtime ban while in the midst of wage negotiations. Most employees went back to work but when the industrial court suspended the interdict on its return day most of the company's Numsa members refused to work overtime. The matter went to trial and the industrial court found that it was a legitimate industrial relations pressure tactic for union members to ban voluntary, non-contractual overtime, without notice to the employer, to enhance their collective bargaining power. The decision was reversed by the labour

appeal court which took the view that the overtime ban constituted a deviation from the proper purposes of collective bargaining. It was unfair because it effectively pre-empted wage talks.

The issue then went to the Appellate Division where the union's lawyers argued that it could never be unfair for employees to refuse to work overtime, regardless of the motive for such refusal, since they were under no contractual obligation to do so. Thus they were free to refuse to work overtime whatever the reason and whether they did so individually, collectively or simultaneously. Factors taken into account by the Appellate Division were:

- the overtime ban was instituted during the course of wage negotiations;
- there was no suggestion that Macsteel was not bargaining in good faith;
- overtime had been done for some years to the mutual advantage of the company and employees who wanted to work overtime;
- the union knew that a ban on this overtime would seriously disrupt production and cause substantial losses for the company;
- the ban was instituted without the declaration of deadlock in negotiations and without notice to the company; and
- the union disingenuously denied any knowledge of the overtime ban.

However, the court left open the question of the circumstances in which an overtime ban could be imposed.¹⁹⁴ [¹⁹⁴ *Financial Mail* 5 June 1992]

Anglo American Corporation of South Africa/National Union of Mineworkers' agreement

In June 1992 the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) signed an agreement to establish an in-house dispute-resolution mechanism for dismissals and other labour disputes. This would bypass the courts, would not require lawyers' services (or fees) and would provide for quick relief. Within ten days of a miner's dismissal he would be granted a hearing before a regional dismissal review committee, which would consist of equal numbers of union and management representatives. This would apply only to NUM members.¹⁹⁵ [¹⁹⁵ *The Weekly Mail* 26 June 1992]

Strikes

The total number of strikes for the years 1982–1991, the workers involved, and mandays and wages lost are given below:

Strikes: 1982–1991

Year

No of strikes^a

Total workers involved

Total mandays lost

Total wages lost

1982

394

141 571

365 337

4 544 362

1983

336

64 469

124 596

1 697 610

1984

469

181 942

379 712

5 174 798

1985

389

239 816

678 273

8 184 985

1986

793

424 340

1 308 958

23 166 278

1987

1 148

591 421

5 825 231

14 058 102

1988

1 025

161 679

914 388

23 879 287

1989

942

197 504

1 511 499

N/A

1990

855

341 097

2 729 844

N/A

1991

600

172 096

1 339 333

N/A

a

Including work stoppages, but excluding political stayaways. Figures also exclude public-sector strikes.

N/A - Not available

Strikes 1982–1990: Racial breakdown^a

Workers involved

Year

African

Asian

Coloured

White

1982

112 481

1 170

17 920

—

1983

61 331

1 712

1 415

—

1984

174 897

1 725

5 304

11

1985

225 045

1 879

12 883

16

1986

400 775

1 366

13 944

255

1987

572 706

2 266

16 359

90

1988

138 653

6 308

16 573

145

1989

163 757

6 605

25 969

1 446

1990

292 480

9 0981

36 530

2 989

a

Racial breakdown no

Preliminary statistics published by the Department of Manpower in September 1992 showed that in the first six months of 1992 there was a total of 169 strikes, involving more than 43 000 workers and a loss of 339 000 mandays. Workers had lost an estimated R18,5m in wages as a result of strike action. Most strikes (56,8%) were a result of wage disputes over conditions of employment. The figures excluded absenteeism because of political stayaways, or strikes in the agricultural, public and other sectors not covered by the Labour Relations Act of 1956.¹⁹⁶ [¹⁹⁶ *TheStar* 29 September 1992]

Estimates by Andrew Levy and Associates published in September 1992 said that strikes during the first nine months of 1992 had led to a loss of 3,1m mandays, higher than the 2m mandays lost in the same period in 1991. A major contributory factor was protracted strikes by Cosatu's health and metal affiliates (see *Bargaining on wages* above). Wage disputes were the dominant trigger in the strikes, accounting for 76,3% of all walkouts. The 1991 figure was 62,7%. The manufacturing and metal sectors accounted for 43,4% of industrial action, followed by the public service (14,1%), food sector (4,7%) and the retail

sector (4,4%). The metal strike, involving at least 60 000 members of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa), contributed 900 000 mandays to the overall figure, strikes in the auto assembly industry accounted for 21,2% of all industrial action, and the strike by hospital workers in the Transvaal added 247 500 mandays lost by the time strikers were dismissed. The most active unions in terms of mandays lost were Numsa (61,8%), the National Education, Health and Allied Workers' Union (Nehawu) (13%), the South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union (Saccawu) (4,6%), the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) (3%), the Chemical Workers' Industrial Union (CWIU) (2,9%) and the Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers' Union (2,7%). The unions responsible for the most strikes were Saccawu (15%), the Food and Allied Workers' Union (12%), Numsa (11%), the CWIU (11%), the NUM (10,8%), and Nehawu (8%).¹⁹⁷ [¹⁹⁷ *The Citizen* 1 October 1992]

LAND AND AGRICULTURE

Key Points

- The deputy minister for land affairs, Mr Johan Scheepers, said that a system of private freehold ownership within the context of a market economy formed the basis of the government's land policy.
- The African National Congress said that there was an urgent need for land reform and redistribution, which should, however, be accompanied by measures to ensure that land was productively used.
- In the non-homeland area of South Africa there were 15,4ha of farmland per person and in the homelands there were 1,7ha of farmland per person.
- A total of R1bn was allocated for financial assistance to farmers in the 1992/93 financial year.
- According to the *Financial Mail*, only about 40 000 white farmers (out of a total of 67 000) could be regarded as farming on viable units or as being primarily dependent on farming for a living.
- According to the head of the Department of Agricultural Extension and Rural Development at the University of Fort Hare, Professor Timothy Bembridge, there were approximately 1,3m small farmers in South Africa in 1992. It was estimated by the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) that 2% of these farmed commercially.
- Homeland drought committee reports submitted to the DBSA said that at least 300 villages in Gazankulu, Lebowa and Venda were reliant on water tankers for water.
- The DBSA said in August 1992 that 70 000 farmworkers in the northern Transvaal had lost their jobs as a result of the drought. The bank estimated that a total of 100 000 farmworkers nationwide could lose their jobs because of the drought.

- The managing director of Unifruco, Mr Louis Kriel, said that the deciduous fruit industry would produce record crops in 1992, and that volumes would be 10% higher than in 1991.
- In 1991 agriculture contributed R 12,5m to gross domestic product (GDP), or 47% of total GDP.
- The South African Agricultural Union estimated that 1,1m Africans were employed on farms in 1992. About 5m people were dependent on agriculture and related industries for a livelihood.
- In 1991 imports of agricultural products amounted to R2,37bn (4,9% of total imports) and agricultural exports amounted to R5,45bn (8,2% of the value of total exports).

Land

Current allocation of land

The total area of South Africa (including the ten homelands) is 119,6m hectares. In 1992 the non-homeland area constituted 86% of the total area (102,3m hectares) and the homeland area 14% (17,3m hectares). Land allocation was as follows:¹ [¹ *Fast Facts* no 8, August 1992]

Land allocation: 1992

Non-homeland area

Homeland area

Area (ha)

102 272 323

17 257 064

Proportion of farmland

81%

93%

Proportion potentially arable

16%

12%

Proportion conservation area

10%

2%

Proportion other (eg urban)

9%

5%

Rural population

4 261 700

9 016 000

Farmland per head (ha)

15,4

1,7

Arable land per head (ha)

3,7

0,2

While almost 16m hectares of the non-homeland area were potentially arable, 11,6m hectares were used for crops or for forestry. The remaining farmland was used for grazing. In the homelands there was the potential for grazing on 12,3m hectares and for forestry on 0,8m he

Population densities

See chapter on *Population*.

Policy

Before the promulgation of the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act of 1991 and the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act of 1991 (see *1991/92 Survey* pp385–386), African freehold tenure of all rural land was limited to approximately 164 communities in the non-homeland area. All other African rural land tenure was either quitrent (individual permanent lease) or in terms of a ‘permission to occupy’ and was restricted to the homelands and South African Development Trust land, with the government and homeland administrations being the owners of the land. Quitrent tenure in the homelands occurred only in the Ciskei and the Transkei and was limited to less than 5% of the land there.³ [³ *Ibid*]

Such government-controlled tenure allowed limited scope for the transfer and development of land. However, on land where government control measures had not been effective, informal communal tenure systems had developed. Modern systems retained basic elements of the ethic that land was to be used for the benefit of the community in determining what was acceptable, but allowed for land transfer and exchange to occur.⁴ [⁴ Cross C, *Draft Tenure Report: World Bank Agriculture Mission to South Africa*, unpublished, 1992]

The Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act converted all quitrent tenure in the non-homeland area to freehold title. The ten homelands were considering adopting the legislation, but had not done so by the middle of 1992.⁵ [⁵ *Fast Facts* no 8, August 1992]

Government policy

The government’s policy on land reform was laid out in the *White Paper on Land Reform*, published in March 1991 (see *1991/92 Survey* pp381–385). It was reiterated in July 1992 by the deputy minister for land affairs, Mr Johan Scheepers. He said that a system of private freehold ownership within the context of a market-orientated economy was integral to the government’s land policy. Mr Scheepers added that the government accepted that the removal of racially based restrictions on land ownership and market forces alone would not redress the imbalances caused by apartheid and it realised that much of the black population could not afford to buy land. For this reason, he said, the government would make support measures and assistance programmes available to all South Africans with merit being the only criterion for assistance. He added that the government would also develop new support measures, although he did not specify their nature.⁶ [⁶ *RSA Policy Review* July 1992]

The government rejected any form of affirmative action, including that advocated by the African National Congress (ANC) (see below). Mr Scheepers said that past discrimination was not the only cause of inequality, and that 'cultural and economic realities' had also played a part. He feared that if these factors were not resolved, the government would be committed to affirmative action forever.⁷ [7 Ibid]

Mr Scheepers emphasised further that although freehold tenure was advocated by the government, communal tenure could be retained with the option of converting it to individual freehold should the occupants wish to do so. He said that ownership claims based on birthright had to be proved before they could be formalised as land rights. No provision was made for the protection of labour tenants' access to their property and the nominal landowner was free to dispose of the property as he or she wished. Mr Scheepers said, however, that there were no longer any obstacles to parties entering into legal contracts with regard to land utilisation.⁸ [8 Ibid]

With regard to the restitution of land from which people had been removed because of apartheid legislation, Mr Scheepers said that the government would consider restoring only land which was still in the possession of the state and which had not been developed or allocated for a specific purpose. He said that the Advisory Commission on Land Allocation had been set up in November 1991 to identify such land and to advise the government on how best to allocate it (see *Reallocation of land* below). He added that claims that fell beyond these specifications could best be dealt with through development assistance programmes aimed at helping indigent people to gain access to land.⁹ [9 Ibid]

Alternative views

The *ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa*, which were adopted at the organisation's national conference in May 1992, stated that there was an urgent need for a programme of land reform and redistribution which should nevertheless take into account the need to maintain food production. The ANC said that a policy of affirmative action should be adopted and that redistribution of land was essential to address the problems of landlessness and land hunger. The organisation said that the state should play a key role in the acquisition and allocation of land. Redistribution should, however, be accompanied by measures to ensure that land was productively used. It said that the state should have the power to acquire land in a number of ways, including expropriation in accordance with principles laid down in a bill of rights. Expropriation should occur only if it was in the public interest, which would include achievement of the objectives of the constitution. It should be accompanied by just compensation determined by establishing an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected and not based solely on the market value of the property. Disputes regarding compensation should be referred to an independent tribunal.

The ANC proposed that measures such as land taxes and legislation imposing a ceiling on land and farm ownership should also be used to ensure that land was freed for redistribution. Vacant, unused and underutilised land suitable for residential and agricultural purposes, as well as land held for speculation,

land which was being degraded, land which was ‘hopelessly indebted’ and land acquired through ‘nepotism and corruption’ should all be made available for redistribution.¹⁰ [10 African National Congress, *ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa*, May 1992]

The ANC said that it would introduce a land claims court, through which competing claims to land could be resolved. The law would lay down clear criteria for land claims and priority would be given to victims of forced removal who, wherever possible, would have returned to them land taken from them under apartheid policies. Former labour tenants and share croppers and their families, who had a long association with particular pieces of land, would have protected rights of occupation and use. No one would be evicted from land they occupied unless a tribunal or court had considered the availability of alternative accommodation.¹¹ [11 *Ibid*]

The ANC also said that diverse forms of tenure should be recognised and protected subject to the principle that women should have the same rights as men in all land-related issues. It said that diverse forms of tenure should not prejudice people’s access to credit.¹² [12 *Ibid*]

By August 1992 the ANC had not yet formulated a comprehensive land tenure policy. However, in a paper submitted for discussion, a researcher for the ANC, Ms Catherine Cross, said that tenure reform should rest on the underlying assumption among Africans that land had communal welfare functions as well as economic subsistence value. She proposed two categories of farm:

- medium- to full-scale holdings which would be dedicated to economic production; and
- small, peasant-sector holdings intended to serve residential, subsistence and semi-commercial purposes.

Within this framework Ms Cross proposed 12 different tenure models. These included individual tenure on large commercial farms; community land trust farming, with the land bought and managed by a trust established by its occupants; farm villages, in which farm labourers who did not want to lay claim to land would be entitled to obtain tenure; and communal farming under community control.¹³ [13 Cross C, *Draft Tenure Report*, Telephonic interview with Ms Catherine Cross, 20 August 1992]

The Conservative Party (CP) said in August 1992 that it believed in private ownership of land and was opposed to collective land ownership. The CP rejected any form of affirmative action in redistributing farming land and said that expropriation of land for any purpose would have to be undertaken carefully. It said that a healthy judicial system should be able to handle land disputes effectively and that it was, therefore, opposed to the establishment of specialised land courts. The CP added that the imposition of a land tax did not form part of its policy.¹⁴ [14 Mr Andries Bruwer, chief spokesman on agriculture for the

Conservative Party, speech delivered at the congress of the Orange Free State Farmers' Union, 18 and 19 August 1992.]

The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) said that every development strategy, including rural development, should have employment creation as its ultimate objective. Although the party's land policy had not been finalised by the time of writing, the IFP said that the issues of efficiency (how to use the land most productively) and equity (how to provide the greatest benefit to the greatest number of people) would have to be addressed.¹⁵ [15 Communication from the spokesman on land for the Inkatha Freedom Party, Mr Errol Goetsch, 25 September 1992.]

The IFP said that a new system of land ownership would have to be considered, particularly in view of the dichotomy which existed between the 'high input, high output, highly subsidised, highly capitalised, commercial sector of first world agribusiness and the low input, low output, financially and infrastructurally marginalised subsistence sector of third world homesteads'.¹⁶ [16 Communication from Mr Errol Goetsch.] A new land policy would have to bridge the gap between the first and third worlds and yet protect the homeland areas from the interests of large business.¹⁷ [17 Communication from Mr Errol Goetsch.]

The IFP envisaged a mixed economy in which the final land dispensation would 'express a commitment to private property', with the emphasis on smaller farms.¹⁸ [18 Communication from Mr Errol Goetsch.]

Legislation

The Rural Development Bill, which had drawn severe criticism from extra-parliamentary groups (see *1991/92 Survey* pp386–388), was withdrawn in November 1991. No alternative legislation was proposed.¹⁹ [19 *The Star* 12 November 1991; Interview with an official of the Department of Regional and Land Affairs, 15 January 1992.]

In terms of the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act of 1991, the Department of Development Aid and the South African Development Trust (SADT) were disbanded with effect from 1 April 1992. Staff, functions and assets were transferred to the Department of Regional and Land Affairs, the homeland administrations and the provincial administrations. The SADT had been the organisation through which land earmarked for homeland consolidation was channelled and the Department of Development Aid had been responsible for African affairs in rural areas. Of the land administered by the department and the SADT, 3m hectares were transferred to the homeland administrations and 1,2m hectares were transferred to the Department of Regional and Land Affairs.²⁰ [20 *Business Day* 1 April 1992,

Financial Mail 3 April 1992]

Finance

The Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa (Land Bank) provided loans to purchase land under the following conditions:²¹ [²¹ *Fast Facts* no S, 1992]

- the buyer had to contribute at least 30% of the purchase price;
- the bank would provide a sum not exceeding the total agricultural value of the farm (which was usually less than the purchase price);
- the interest rate for buyers who were currently farming was 17% per year and repayment was over a 25-year period; and
- the interest rate for buyers who were not farmers but who intended to farm full-time within two years was 19,5%, with repayment also over 25 years.

The Agricultural Credit Board provided loans to buy land to people who had proven farming skills, but who were unable to obtain a loan from the Land Bank. Loans were usually limited to a maximum of R350 000, the interest rate charged was 8% and repayment took place over a 20- to 25-year period.²² [²² *Ibid*]

In 1992 the commercial banks had no financial packages that catered for emerging farmers who did not have substantial collateral or funds. Interest rates for farming loans were negotiable, but none was below the prime lending rate and the period of repayment was between 20 and 25 years. A spokesman for Standard Bank said that the bank was investigating how best to provide finance to the emerging farmer.²³ [²³ *Ibid*]

The agricultural corporations in the ten homelands each had different loan policies and financial packages. Purchase and sale of land on a freehold basis had been introduced only in 1991 and some of the corporations did not finance the purchase of land. For example, the Lebowa Development Corporation provided loans to finance the purchase of equipment, seed, livestock and other materials, but not to purchase land. Interest rates for first-time loans were 13% and increased to prime rate if there was a default in repayment resulting from poor farming techniques. The Rural Development Corporation of the KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation provided loans for the purchase of land, at an interest rate of 17% and with repayment over 25 years.²⁴ [²⁴ *Ibid*]

Availability of land

In the homeland and non-homeland areas relatively little land set aside for agricultural purposes was not being used in 1992. In addition, unused cropping land was heavily stocked in both areas. It was unclear how much land the government owned. The *White Paper on Land Reform*, which was published in March 1991 (see *1991/92 Survey* pp381–385), said that the South African Development Trust (SADT) owned 1,2m hectares of land outside the homelands. According to the Department of Regional and Land Affairs, all of this land, except for 210 525ha which were leased to white farmers, was being occupied rent free by African ‘tribes and individuals’.²⁵ [²⁵ Ibid] The department said that leases on land which was being leased were valid until 31 December 1992 and that where the land was being cultivated for crops the leases were to be extended on a month-by-month basis until the crops had been harvested.

The chairman of the Advisory Commission on Land Allocation, Mr Justice Tvan Reenen, said that the SADT land was not the only government-owned land which could be developed. He said that unused land owned by the South African Defence Force and other government departments was also being investigated by the commission. Although the commission had not received reliable figures. Judge van Reenen estimated that in total about 1m hectares of land were available for settlement and reallocation.²⁶ [²⁶ Ibid]

Land disputes

In November 1991, 19 communities which had made representations to the government about the composition of the Advisory Commission on Land Allocation rejected the commission and decided that they would not make any submissions to it. The group later expanded to include 31 communities. In February 1992 representatives of all 31 communities met and decided to work with the commission on condition that:²⁷ [²⁷ *AFRA newsletter* no 15, May 1992]

- the commission accept communities being represented by their lawyers, land affairs experts and service structures;
- all government files and information on such communities’ claims be made available to the communities and their advisers;
- the commission make all its findings and hearings open to the public
- land restoration not be subject to any conditions except that justice be seen to be done and past wrongs be redressed; and
- if the commission delayed its activities, the communities would take other steps to get back their land.

The 31 communities comprised people living at Macleantown, Mfengu and Thornhill (all eastern Cape); Bojelakgomo, Gathlose, Kono, Madibogopane, Majeng, Metsemantsi, Schmitsdrift and Skuifontein (all northern Cape); Elandskloof (western Cape); Alcockspruit, AmaHlubi, Barneysfield, Charlestown, Cremen, Koenisberg, Roosboom, Vryheid, Wasbank and Weenen (all Natal); Herschel (Orange Free State); and Bakubung, Bapalane, Barolong, Doornkop, Goedgevonden, Magokgoane, Mampuru and Mogopa (all Transvaal).²⁸ [²⁸ Information supplied by Mr Jean du Plessis of the Association for Rural Advancement, 25 August 1992]

In July 1992 the Mfengu community decided to resettle 50 families on land near Humansdorp (eastern Cape) which was held in trust for them by the Moravian church. In 1977 the community had been removed from more than 8 000ha of land which had been given to it 130 years previously by the British government. According to an attorney at the Legal Resources Centre in Port Elizabeth, Mr Kobus Pienaar, the compensation received was 'a negligible amount of about R200 000 for their houses, sheds, churches and schools'.²⁹ [²⁹ *Sash* January 1992] Mr Pienaar said that between 1983 and 1987, the land had been sold in 19 lots to white farmers for R1,3m, a quarter of its market value. Only 1 946ha which had not been sold were still vested in the state in 1992.³⁰ [³⁰ *Ibid*] According to the co-ordinator of the Tsitsikama Exile Association, Mr Mashwabada Msizi, the government had agreed to the return of the land to the Mfengu community in March 1992, but there had been many delays in implementing this decision.³¹ [³¹ *New Nation* 10 July 1992]

Mr Andries Radebe, who was one of 100 farmers who had been removed from their farms in Cremen in 1977, initiated an action in the Natal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court in Pietermaritzburg in July 1992 to test the legality of his removal. The land had lain fallow for 11 years before being sold to a white cattle farmer. Mr Radebe said that he made numerous approaches to the government for the restoration of his land, but had met with no success. At the time of writing the court was still to hear the case.³² [³² *The Natal Witness* 23 July 1992, *Sunday Times* 16 August 1992]

The head of the Advisory Commission on Land Allocation, Mr Justice T van Reenen, said in March 1992 that it was his perception that the government was accelerating the sale of state-owned land in terms of its privatisation policy. Earlier in the same month Judge van Reenen had recommended that a public auction of farmland claimed by the AmaHlubi community be halted. The sale was subsequently frozen by the minister of regional and land affairs, Mr Jacob de Villiers. In November 1991 there had been an earlier attempt to sell the land which had been stopped by public protest.³³ [³³ *Sunday Times* 15 March 1992]

In June 1992 the deputy minister for land affairs, Mr Johan Scheepers, said that in the light of claims for land restoration by victims of racial property laws, government departments wanting to sell their land would be obliged to obtain the approval of an inter-departmental committee which was to be set up. He

added, 'State-owned land can no longer, as was the case in the past, simply be alienated for whatever purpose.'³⁴ [³⁴ *neStar* 23 June 1992]

However, in the same month government officials of the Department of Agricultural Development persuaded the registrar of deeds in Kimberley (northern Cape) to expedite the transfer of public land to six white farmers without informing him that the Majeng community was also laying claim to the land and that it was the subject of an inquiry by the Advisory Commission on Land Allocation. The Majeng community had been removed from land near Barkly West (northern Cape) between 1969 and 1975. Before the sale of the land it had been leased to white farmers as grazing land. According to a lawyer at Deneys Reitz (a legal firm in Johannesburg), Ms Kate Owen, who was representing the community, the deeds registration process was expedited by the department when it learned that the community's lawyers had become aware of the proposed sale, and they had waived a condition of sale which required the farmers to consolidate their existing land with the newly acquired land before registration.³⁵ [³⁵ *Land Update no* 11, January 1992; *Sunday Times W* July 1992; Interview with a lawyer at Deneys Reitz, Ms Kate Owen, 25 August 1992]

The sale was to be contested in the Supreme Court. Ms Owen said that an undertaking had been secured from the government and from the farmers to whom the land had been sold that the land would be left unused until such time as a court had made a decision about it. However, because the transfer had been legally effected, months of litigation were expected before a decision would be reached.³⁶ [³⁶ Interview with Ms Kate Owen, 25 August 1992]

The government refused to comment on the matter at the time of writing as the case was sub-judice.³⁷ [³⁷ Interview with a spokesman for the Department of Agriculture, 30 August 1992]

Furthermore, in August 1992, the Thornhill community, which consisted of 18 000 members, had to intervene through the Advisory Commission on Land Allocation to stop the sale by the Department of Public Works of 4 125ha of land claimed by the community. White farmers in the area were reported to be alarmed by the indefinite delay of the sale, believing that commercial and communal farmers could not coexist. The community had been removed in 1975 and 1976 and had settled in an area which later formed part of the Ciskei. The Thornhill group and other communities in the eastern Cape had also made representation to the commission about a further 12 000ha near Queenstown (eastern Cape).³⁸ [³⁸ *Sunday Times* 16 August 1992]

Appeals to the commission for intervention in land disputes were not limited to the black population. In August 1992 it was reported that a white farmer, Mr Jannie Ballot, who had been told to vacate land which he was leasing from the Department of Development Aid so that it could be incorporated into QwaQwa, had appealed to the commission to intervene. Mr Ballot's land and that of other farmers in the area (a total of 2 500ha) had been expropriated by the government in 1986 for incorporation into

QwaQwa. Mr Ballot had remained on his land and had leased it back from the department. In December 1991 the land was handed over to the QwaQwa administration for incorporation into a national park.³⁹ [39 Ibid]

In July 1992 the commission heard representation from the KwaZulu administration, the South African Paper and Pulp Industry and the Richmond Farmers' Association who wanted to develop 22 000ha of land in the Natal Midlands. The land to be developed included an area known as 'Compensation' which had been settled ten years previously by people who had been removed from land in the Impendle district. It had since been developed to include houses, roads and a school. Development of this area would have meant that the people living in 'Compensation' would have had to be moved. However, at the time of writing the commission had not heard representation from the community concerned.⁴⁰ [40 *The Natal Witness* 30 July 1992]

Removals

It was reported in January 1992 that a growing number of farmers were starting to evict labour tenants in reaction to the lifting of the ban on the African National Congress (ANC) and announcements that reparation would be considered for those who were dispossessed. Members of the Driefontein community (eastern Transvaal) said that farmers in the area had stepped up evictions from land which had been bought by the ANC in 1912. Eighty people had been evicted in recent months in this area.⁴¹ [41 *New Nation* 17 January 1992, *Financial Mail* 24 January 1992] The Legal Resources Centre in Johannesburg said that between February 1990 and July 1991 it had taken legal action on behalf of 70 families who had been threatened with eviction.⁴² [42 *Financial Mail* 24 January 1992] The Association for Rural Advancement was also involved with a number of communities in Natal who were about to be evicted.⁴³ [43 *AFRA Newsletter*, July 1992]

In July 1992 the National Land Committee (NLC) called for a moratorium on the eviction of labour tenants and farmworkers. In a memorandum to Mr de Villiers the NLC asked for a stay on all criminal proceedings which would result in eviction.⁴⁴ [44 *Ibid*] According to the Legal Resources Centre, evictions had 'devastating social consequences' in that tenants faced the loss of their family homes, their fields, security and their accumulated wealth.⁴⁵ [45 *Financial Mail* 24 January 1992] The *Farmer's Weekly* urged restraint, saying that most tenants had at least a moral right to be allowed to stay and also to be given security of tenure.⁴⁶ [46 *AFRA Newsletter*, July 1992]

The head of the land commission of the ANC, Mr Derek Hanekom, argued that until interim measures were put in place, people with strong claims to the land would still fall victim to apartheid. He said that further evictions would only compound the 'mess' that had already been created by forced removals.⁴⁷

[⁴⁷ *Financial Mail* 24 January 1992]

Reoccupation of land

In August 1992 the Goedgevonden community was awaiting the outcome of an appeal lodged in June 1991 against its eviction from land in the western Transvaal which it had reoccupied in April 1991. (In 1978 the community had been removed from the land which it had been farming since 1947, to land which was later incorporated into Bophuthatswana—see *1991/92 Survey* p392.)⁴⁸ [⁴⁸ *Sash* January 1992] Negotiations took place between the Legal Resources Centre in Pretoria, which represented the community, and officials of the departments of Agricultural Development and Regional and Land Affairs. However, no agreement regarding the resettlement of the community had been reached at the time of writing.⁴⁹ [⁴⁹ *The Weekly Mail* 10 January 1992; Interview with Mr Geoff Budlender of the Legal Resources Centre in Johannesburg, 24 August 1992]

Reallocation of land

In terms of provisions made in the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act of 1991, the Advisory Commission on Land Allocation was established in November 1991. The commission's main objectives were:⁵⁰ [⁵⁰ *The Citizen* 15 November 1991]

- to identify any government-owned land which had not been developed or allocated for a particular purpose;
- to identify rural land which could be bought by the government for agricultural settlement;
- to consider planning and development of this land, whether for residential or agricultural purposes, in order to enable the greatest number of people to live on it and to enjoy a reasonable standard of living; and
- to consider claims made by individuals and communities for ownership of land and to advise the government on the allocation of such land.

In August 1991, prior to the establishment of the commission, representatives of 19 communities which had been subjected to forced removals said that the commission was inadequate in that it had advisory powers only and it had no jurisdiction in the homelands, into which many of the removed communities had been incorporated (see *Land disputes* above). The communities' representatives added that much of the land from which communities had been removed had been sold to white farmers. They argued that

such farmers should be compensated fairly and the land returned to its rightful owners.⁵¹ [⁵¹ *The Star* 16 September 1991]

The head of research and development for the National Maize Producers' Organisation, Dr Kitie Clus, argued in October 1991 that the government did not have the credibility to handle land disputes. He said that communities' rights to land should be decided in court. A representative of the National Land Committee (NLC), Ms Joanne Yawitch, maintained that a land court would have several advantages over the commission. She said it would be perceived to be open and fair, it would operate according to clearly established criteria and procedures, and it would have the power to make decisions and ensure that they were enforced.⁵² [⁵² *Sowetan* 3 October 1991]

The NLC criticised the composition of the commission, saying that its members were not representative of the removed communities. The NLC said that none of the five people whose names it had suggested for inclusion in the commission had been included. The minister of regional and land affairs, Mr Jacob de Villiers, replied that the members of the commission had not been appointed to represent any particular group, but to provide impartial decisions on the issues facing them.⁵³ [⁵³ *The Citizen* 1 November 1991]

The vice chairman of the commission, Professor Nick Olivier, said that one of the major problems which the commission would have to address was the issue of compensation. He said that because white farmers who had bought land from the South African Development Trust had acted bona fide in purchasing it, to deprive them of their land without proper consultation and compensation would compound the injustices done. Professor Olivier added that returning land to dispossessed communities without providing adequate financial and other assistance to enable such communities to use the land productively would also be unsatisfactory.⁵⁴ [⁵⁴ *Reality* March/April 1992]

Professor Olivier said that the commission would have to examine methods of assisting African farmers to develop agricultural skills and to market their produce. In his view the need to identify land for urban and peri-urban settlements was of equal importance. The issue of communal tenure should also be addressed, Professor Olivier said.⁵⁵ [⁵⁵ *Ibid*]

Agriculture

Policy

Government policy

The government summarised its agricultural policy in the *White Paper on Land Reform*, which was tabled in March 1991 (see *1991/92 Survey* pp393–394). It said that the country's future agricultural development should not depend on the expansion of farms, but rather on the more productive use of land. It recognised the importance of part-time and tenant farmers, but sought to promote financially sound owner and occupant farmers. It said that farming should be market oriented and that aid would be given only to farmers who implemented sound farming practices.⁵⁶ [⁵⁶ *1991/92 Survey* pp392-394]

Alternative views

The agricultural policy of the African National Congress (ANC) was outlined in a document entitled *ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa*, which was published in May 1992. It said that agriculture was characterised by gross maldistribution of land and other resources in favour of whites who used inappropriate agricultural practices and were inefficient and dependent on state subsidies. The document said that the agricultural sector should be restructured to 'serve the majority of South Africa's people' and to contribute effectively to economic growth. The ANC said that it believed that the system of agricultural subsidies had intensified the concentration of land ownership in the hands of a few. It argued that state subsidies should rather be used to support new farmers and to promote efficient and sustainable agricultural systems.

The document suggested that a restructuring of agriculture should facilitate a move away from an exclusive reliance on large-scale single-crop agriculture to a more diversified combination of agricultural production systems, including family farms, small-scale farms and co-operative farming systems. It said that credit facilities, marketing, training and other services should be extended to black and women farmers who had previously been denied access to these resources. The ANC argued that links between agricultural credit, marketing, commercial co-operatives, the Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa and the South African Agricultural Union had caused hidden monopolies. It said that such links would have to be broken so as to enable new farmers to enter the sector.⁵⁷ [⁵⁷ African National Congress, *ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa*, May 1992]

The ANC also said that affirmative action in the allocation of resources would be required to redress imbalances in the provision of social services and physical infrastructure in rural areas. The rural development policy of the ANC aimed to improve the productive capacity and standard of living of these areas by promoting activities such as agro-industry and sustainable job-creation programmes.⁵⁸ [⁵⁸ *Ibid*]

The chief spokesman on agriculture for the Conservative Party (CP), Mr Andries Bruwer, provided details of the agricultural policy of the CP at a conference of the Orange Free State Agricultural Union in Bloemfontein in August 1992. He said national economic recovery could occur only if agriculture recovered. The CP believed that South Africa should be self-reliant with respect to the production of staple foodstuffs. Agriculture was seen as being of strategic importance. Mr Bruwer said that the CP

supported a free market system in which private initiative was encouraged, ‘unhealthy monopolies’ were curbed and state interference was kept to a minimum. He said, however, that the state had a role to play in keeping production costs low and in providing protection from unreasonable international competition. The CP saw the white population as the most important entrepreneurs and said that white depopulation of the rural areas should be stemmed by providing community development programmes and the necessary infrastructure.⁵⁹ [59 Mr Andries Bruwer, speech delivered at the congress of the Orange Free State Farmers’ Union, 18 and 19 August 1992]

Mr Jacobus Beyers MP (CP) said earlier, in May 1992, that a creative plan was needed to get back on to the land those farmers who had lost their farms through circumstances beyond their control. He urged the government to provide an assistance scheme to return farmers to the land. Mr Beyers said that they should be ‘provided with the means of production over a period of three years in order to utilise land on a lease basis with an option to buy the land in three years’ time’.⁶⁰ [60 *Hansard* (A) 14 cols 7622-7623, 12 May 1992]

The dean of the Department of Agriculture at the University of Pretoria, Professor Johan van Zyl, said in June 1992 that there were five lessons that South Africa could learn from experiences in Zimbabwe:⁶¹ [61 *Farmer’s Weekly* 26 June 1992]

- South African planners should abandon the belief that it was difficult to motivate communal farmers to increase productivity. Experience in Zimbabwe had shown that farmers responded well to economic incentives and new technologies, provided that they were given access to land, technology, transport and markets;
- the institutional base of communal farming should be strengthened by developing a modern faculty of agriculture, a national extension system (a system of agricultural education) and a national research system. These institutions would take between ten and 20 years to have a noticeable effect on agriculture;
- credit agencies which had served large-scale farmers did not adapt easily to serving small-scale farmers as well. Group lending provided a viable alternative;
- the communal livestock sector was difficult to reform. However, because much of South Africa’s land was suitable for cattle and small grazing animals, it was important for researchers to develop technologies for this sector; and
- foreign aid should not be used to pay routine salaries and recurrent costs in agricultural development as dependence on these funds led to loss of control over the planning process and difficulty in resisting ‘well-intentioned but ultimately poisoned gifts from donors’.

In an article published in May 1992, the late chairman of the Development Bank of Southern Africa, Dr Simon Brand, said that positive measures would be required of the government to assist those people who had agricultural land restored to them. He said that this would entail such measures as:⁶² [62 Dr Simon Brand, 'What role should government play in agriculture in a new South Africa?', *Development Southern Africa*, vol 9 no 2, May 1992]

- the disposal of land which was owned by the state in ways that created access for new entrants to agriculture;
- the determination of new criteria for the subdivision of agricultural land to allow orderly access for small farmers;
- the evolution of new and more adequate tenancy and partnership arrangements that would allow effective access to commercial farming, but not necessarily depend on changes in land ownership;
- the adaptation of traditional land tenure systems that would be consistent with the productive use of agricultural land in areas of historical African occupation; and
- bringing labour legislation in agriculture into line with that in the rest of the economy.

Dr Brand said that to ensure productive use of land on a sustainable basis, the government would have to provide support in the form of off-farm rural infrastructure, extension services and research. He added that in the bridging phase the government would also have to play a role in providing access to credit, product markets and input provision systems, although in the long term these would best be handled by the private sector.⁶³ [63 Ibid]

The president of the Orange Free State Agricultural Union, Dr Pieter Gous, said that the union regarded private land ownership as non-negotiable. It rejected central decision making and regarded the profit-motive as the driving force in economic decision making. Dr Gous said that farmers who produced food should be 'kept happy'. He warned that white farmers might stop producing food if they were deprived of their land and if their lifestyles deteriorated.⁶⁴ [64 *The Citizen* 19 August 1992]

The South African Agricultural Union (SAAU) said that it should be consulted before any policies on land were formulated. The SAAU maintained that land reform should be conducted in such a way that agricultural production was not affected negatively. It said that the maintenance of high potential land for agricultural purposes should remain the highest priority and that claims to agricultural land for purposes other than agriculture should be considered carefully.⁶⁵ [65 *Farmer's Weekly* 2 October 1992]

The SAAU believed that market forces should dictate the exchange of land and that the present communal tenure system should not be extended. It was opposed to redistribution of land through nationalisation and confiscation.⁶⁶ [⁶⁶ *Ibid*]

Structure of agriculture

Production levels

Most sectors in agriculture, with the exception of the deciduous fruit industry in the western Cape, showed a drop in production between 1991 and 1992 as a result of the drought (see *Drought* below). The 1991/92 sugar crop yielded approximately 2,3m tonnes of sugar, which was the second highest yield in the history of the industry in South Africa. However, the executive director of the Cane Growers' Association, Mr Rex Hudson, estimated that as a result of the drought, the 1992/93 crop would yield only 1,5m tonnes. The South African Sugar Association said that the drought would cost the country about 750 000 tonnes in lost exports, worth between R450m and R500m.⁶⁷ [⁶⁷ *Business Day* 12 March 1992; *The Citizen* 23 July, 19 August 1992]

In May 1992 the national crop estimate committee made the following estimates of crop yields in the 1990/91 and 1991/92 financial years:⁶⁸ [⁶⁸ South African Reserve Bank, *Quarterly Bulletin*, June 1992]

Production estimates of summer crops

Crop

1990/91 Tonnes (000)

1991/92 Tonnes (000)

Increase (decrease)

Dry beans

100

27

(73%)

Grain sorghum

240

95

(60%)

Groundnuts

78

81

4%

Soya beans

126

68

(46%)

Sunflower seeds

589

173

(71%)

White maize

3 180

985

(69%)

Yellow maize

4 016

1 448

(64%)

Wool production was expected to drop from 102m kilogrammes in 1991 to 77,7m kilogrammes in 1992, ie by 24%. (This was the lowest volume since 1924 when 73,7m kilogrammes were produced.) The Wool Board said in June 1992 that the drought would continue to influence wool production in South Africa for the next two years and forecast a total clip of 73,5m kilogrammes in 1993.⁶⁹ [⁶⁹ *Daily Dispatch* 4 June 1992, *Business Day* 2 May 1992]

In March 1992 the Cotton Board estimated that the cotton crop for 1992/92 would be 187 460 bales, compared with an expected consumption of 340 000 bales. The board said that if the dry weather continued an even smaller crop was likely. In 1990/91, 250 000 bales were produced, which was a 23% decline on production in 1989/90.⁷⁰ [⁷⁰ *Business Day* 4 March 1992]

The Banana Board said in 1992 that the six banana producing areas in South Africa had received far less rain than the average recorded in a normal year. In September 1992 the board estimated that there would be a 22% drop in production in the 1992/93 financial year (from 209,3m kilogrammes in 1991/92 to 163,1m kilogrammes in 1992/93).⁷¹ [⁷¹ Interview with a spokesman for the Banana Board, Mr Johan Maritz, 28 September 1992]

Maize production was also severely affected by the drought. In April 1992 the Department of Agriculture estimated that the total maize crop in 1992 would be 2,4m tonnes, compared with the previous year's crop of 7,8m tonnes, representing a decline of 69%. The white maize yield was expected to be 985 000 tonnes (compared to a yield of 3,8m tonnes in 1991) with an expected local demand of 3,3m tonnes in 1992. The following table shows estimated maize production in the major maize producing regions in 1991 and

Maize crop: 1991 and 1992

Region

1991 (tonnes)

1992 (tonnes)

Northern Cape

409 000

126 000

Eastern Orange Free State

699 000

132 000

Northern Orange Free State

1 200 000

415 000

Southern Orange Free State

118 000

35 000

PWV^a

755 000

282 000

Eastern Transvaal

2 000 000

868 000

Western Transvaal

2 300 000

314 000

a

Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging

The Maize Board said that apart from the drought, the slump in maize production was also attributable to the withdrawal of government subsidies from the industry and the government's scheme of converting cropping land to pasturage. The minister of agriculture, Dr Kraai van Niekerk, said that subsidies had been withdrawn because they had had a disruptive influence on the economy and there were better ways of helping needy people than subsidising bread and maize. He added that a total of 930 000ha of low-potential cropping land was to be converted to pasturage so that more appropriate and sustainable farming could be conducted on such land.⁷³ [⁷³ *RSA Policy Review* June 1992]

In August 1992 the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) said that all of the dryland crops in Gazankulu and Venda had failed as a result of the drought.⁷⁴ [⁷⁴ *Business Day* 17 August 1992]

The managing director of Unifruco, Mr Louis Kriel, said that the deciduous fruit industry had produced record crops in 1992, and that volumes were 10% higher than in 1991. The volume of grapes harvested had increased by 15% between 1991 and

Share of gross domestic product

In 1991 agriculture contributed R12,5m to gross domestic product (GDP), or 4,7% of the total. The following table shows the contribution of agriculture to GDP from 1981 to 1991:⁷⁶ [⁷⁶ South African Reserve Bank, *Quarterly Bulletin*, June 1992]

Contribution of agriculture to GDP: 1981–1991

Year

Agricultural value (Rm)

Total GDP (Rm)

Proportion of GDP

1981

4 706

66 265

7,1%

1982

4 649

73 877

6,3%

1983

4 150

84 409

4,9%

1984

5 252

98 284

5,3%

1985

6 526

112 448

5,8%

1986

7 242

129 487

5,6%

1987

9 430

149 931

6,3%

1988

11 560

178 077

6,5%

1989

12 649

207 716

6,1%

1990

12 272

236 460

5,2%

1991

12 495

267

According to the South African Reserve Bank, although the contribution of agriculture to GDP was small and declining, it played an important role in the creation of wealth in South Africa, particularly in the rural areas. The bank said that the agricultural sector also affected the economy in indirect ways as a result of its 'forward linkages with other sectors' as a supplier of raw materials and its 'backward linkages' as a purchaser of products and services from other sectors.⁷⁷ [⁷⁷ *Finance Week* 2 July 1992] It added that the agricultural multiplier (the total impact of changes in the production of the agricultural sector on the other sectors of the economy) was estimated to be 1,6. This meant that for every R1m of agricultural production, additional output amounting to R600 000 was generated in other sectors of the economy as a result.⁷⁸ [⁷⁸ South African Reserve Bank, *Quarterly Bulletin*, June 1992]

The bank said that the share of agricultural production in total GDP had at times been severely affected by poor weather conditions and added that the drought in 1992 and the expected poor harvest would lead to a further drop in the contribution of agriculture to GDP and cause a lower-than-expected economic growth rate. It estimated in June 1992 that the gross value added to GDP by agriculture in 1992 would decline by 14%. The estimate was based on the summer crop estimates for 1991/92, the assumption that winter grain crops would have a normal harvest and the cost of importing approximately 4,6m tonnes of maize at about R500 a tonne. The bank said that if the agricultural contribution were to decline by 14% total GDP would decline by 1,8%.⁷⁹ [⁷⁹ *Finance Week* 2 July 1992]

Share of jobs

It was estimated in April 1992 that some 5m people were directly and indirectly reliant on agriculture for employment.⁸⁰ [⁸⁰ *Financial Mail* 2 April 1992] The DBSA estimated that there were 753 300 people formally employed in agriculture, fishing and forestry in 1991. This compared with employment in these sectors of 761 200 in 1990 and 832 200 in 1985. Between 1985 and 1991 there had, therefore, been a decline of 9,5% in formal employment in these sectors. In 1985 and 1990 employment in agriculture according to development region was estimated to be as follows:⁸¹ [⁸¹ Communication from a spokesman for the centre for information analysis of the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), Mr David Viljoen, 1 July 1992]

Agricultural employment by region: 1985 and 1990^a

Region

1985

1990

A (Western Cape)

103 084

94 289

B (Northern Cape)

43 647

39 923

C (Orange Free State)

96 964

88 691

D (Eastern Cape)

91 917

84 075

E (Natal)

184 232

168 514

F (Eastern Transvaal)

98 153

89 779

G (Northern Transvaal)

91 081

83 969

H (PWV)^b

65 592

59 996

J (Western Transvaal)

56 810

51 964

Total

831 480

761 200

a

Includes the homelands or part of homelands in each region

b

Pretoria/Witwatersrand/V

The DBSA said that in 1991 a total of 573 000 Africans, 106 400 coloured people, 3 700 Indians and 70 200 whites were formally employed in agriculture. Agriculture provided 9,6% of employment in the formal economy.⁸² [⁸² Communication from Mr David Viljoen, 1 July 1992]

The South African Agricultural Union (SAAU) estimated in February 1992 that a total of 1,1m Africans were employed on farms (including those in informal employment). The SAAU said that on average each worker supported another five people.⁸³ [⁸³ *Financial Mail* 21 February 1992] An economist at Boland Bank, Mr Louis Fourie, said that agriculture was a major potential employer as an additional 67 people were employed for each extra output of R1m, compared, for example, with 20 people per R1m extra

output in the construction industry.⁸⁴ [⁸⁴ *Cape Times* 19 July 1992]

Share of imports and exports

In 1991 imports of agricultural products amounted to R2,37bn (or 4,9% of the value of total imports). The value of exports in that year amounted to R5,45bn (or 8,2% of the value of total exports). The following table shows the value of agricultural exports and imports from 1981 to 1991:⁸⁵ [⁸⁵ Communication from the Department of Agriculture, 22 September 1992]

Value of agricultural exports and imports: 1981–1991

<i>Year</i>
Exports (Rm)
Proportion of total exports
Imports (Rm)
Proportion of total imports
1981
2 046
11,2%
676
3,7%
1982
2 063
10,7%
685

3,7%

1983

1 728

8,3%

1 074

6,6%

1984

1 842

7,2%

1 682

7,7%

1985

2 382

6,5%

1 298

5,7%

1986

3 025

7,3%

1 473

5,5%

1987

3 193

7,5%

1 511

5,3%

1988

3 761

7,6%

2 014

5,1%

1989

5 712

9,7%

2 000

4,5%

1990

5 296

8,7%

2 127

4,8%

1991

5 449

8,2%

2 365

4,9%

The reserve bank reported that in ‘normal times’ the country was largely self-sufficient with regard to food production and that a large proportion of its agricultural production was exported. The bank said that the average share of agricultural products as a proportion of imports had amounted to 2% between 1970 and 1991. During periods of drought, however, South Africa was often compelled to import substantial quantities of agricultural products.⁸⁶ [⁸⁶ *Finance Week* 2 July 1992]

In 1991 wool constituted the largest proportion of agricultural exports (15,3%), followed by deciduous fruit and table grapes (14,6%). Rice constituted the biggest proportion of agricultural imports (13,7%), followed by wheat (10%). The following tables give a breakdown of the most important agricultural imports and exports

Most important agricultural imports: 1991

Product

Proportion

Rice

13,7%

Wheat

10,0%

Vegetable oils

6,8%

Oil seeds

2,9%

Maize^a

2,5%

Coffee

2,0%

Tea

1,4%

Dry beans

0,2%

a

Includes related products

Most important agricultural exports: 1991

Product

Proportion

Wool

15,3

Deciduous fruit^a

14,6

Preserved fruit^b

11,6

Sugar

11,3

Citrus

8,4

Hides and skins

3,3

Maize^c

3,3

Wheat^c

1,6

Groundnuts

0,9

a

Includes table grapes

b

Includes jams

c

Includes related products

The minister of agriculture, Dr Kraai van Niekerk, said in June 1992 that as a result of the drop in the production of maize, about 4,6m tonnes of maize would be imported at the government's expense up

until April 1993 at a cost of about R1,8bn. He said that this figure represented about 70% of local demand. In addition, the Maize Board had imported 100 000 tonnes of maize in April 1992.⁸⁸ [⁸⁸ *RSA Policy Review* June 1992] In April 1992 Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, which were all suffering from the drought, announced that they were to establish a co-ordinating mechanism to facilitate the speedy distribution of food relief. It was estimated that more than 10m tonnes of maize had to be imported to meet the region's requirements. The Zambian minister of foreign affairs, Mr Vernon Mwangi, said that to distribute the grain effectively the transport system of the region would have to be rationalised.⁸⁹ [⁸⁹ *Business Day* 20 February, 23 May 1992] The first shipment of maize arrived in the in the same month. A spokesman for Spoornet, Mr Jacques Pienaar, said in April and May 1992 Spoornet had unloaded 265 000 tonnes of maize for local consumption and 1,7m tonnes for re-export to ne

The managing director of Unifruco, Mr Louis Kriel, said that in the year ending September 1991 gross earnings from the export of fresh deciduous fruit had increased by 8,2% to R1,4bn. He said that in the same period export volumes had risen by 4% (to 35m cartons) and that Unifruco had 40% of the European Community fruit market. Mr Kriel said that the total fruit industry, comprising deciduous, citrus and subtropical fruit, had earned R3,4bn on export markets in 1991.⁹¹ [⁹¹ *Business Day* 21 April 1992, *Financial Mail* 17 April 1992]

Share of land

According to the DBSA, 80,5% (981 683 square kilometres) of the land in South Africa (including all ten homelands) was natural veld, 12,6% (154 219 square kilometres) was used for dryland crop farming and irrigation farming, 2,5% (30 136 square kilometres) contained planted pasture, 2,2% (26 841 square kilometres) was used for forestry and just over 2,2% (27 330 square kilometres) was used for other purposes (for example urban settlement). The following table gives a breakdown by region of land use in South Africa:⁹² [⁹² DBSA, *Southern Africa: An Inter-regional Profile*, Midrand, 1992]

Regional land use pattern in South Africa: 1992^a

Region^b

Proportion under crops

Proportion pasture

Proportion veld

Proportion forestry

Proportion other

A (Western Cape)

9,0%

3,5%

83,1%

2,0%

2,4%

B (Northern Cape)

2,4%

1,2%

95,8%

0,3%

0,4%

C (Orange Free State)

29,2%

4,8%

64,6%

0,2%

1,2%

D (Eastern Cape)

5,2%

1,9%

90,2%

1,0%

1,8%

E (Natal)

13,9%

2,2%

69,0%

8,3%

6,7%

F (Eastern Transvaal)

22,8%

3,3%

60,6%

9,4%

3,9%

G (Northern Transvaal)

11,8%

0,8%

82,0%

2,4%

2,9%

H (PWV)^c

36,4%

3,4%

55,7%

0,1%

4,4%

J (Western Transvaal)

33,2%

2,7%

62,8%

0,2%

1,1%

Total

12,6%

2,5%

80,5%

2,2%

2,2%

a

Proportion may not add up owing to rounding

b

Includes the homelands and parts of homelands in each region

c

Pretoria/Witwatersrand/

Finance

In 1991/92 and 1992/93 the following amounts were allocated to agriculture in the budgets of the central government and the ten homelands. At the time of writing the budgets for 1992/93 of some of the homelands were unavailable.⁹³ [⁹³ Various estimates of revenue and expenditure for 1991/92 and 1992/93]

Agricultural budgets: 1991/92–1992/93^a

R

R

Department of Agriculture

253 770 000

452 579 000

House of Assembly

673 948 000

629 780 000

House of Delegates

3 502 000

4 309 000

House of Representatives

39 195 000

64 257 000

Homelands

Bophuthatswana

213 641 700

271 399 200

Ciskei^b

60 108 000

99 188 000

Gazankulu

47 517 200

64 752 900

KaNgwane^b

34 235 800

36 134 600

KwaNdebele^c

22 692 000

N/A

KwaZulu

90 773 900

N/A

Lebowa^c

185 074 500

221 721 800

QwaQwa

19 155 000

21 475 000

Transkei

145 402 000

N/A

Venda

53 437 600

N/A

Total

1 842 452 700

N/A

a

Initial estimates of expenditure

b

Includes forestry

c

Includes expenditure on the environment

N

Farmers and farmworkers

According to an agricultural census conducted by the Central Statistical Service, in 1987 there were 67 000 white commercial farmers in South Africa. More recent statistics were not available. This compared with the following figures obtained from the agricultural censuses conducted in previous years: 64 430 farmers in 1981, 59 960 in 1983, 65 880 in 1985, 64 890 in 1986 and 65 170 in 1987.⁹⁴ [⁹⁴ Interview with a spokesman for the Department of Agriculture, Mr Meyer, 23 September 1992] According to the *Financial Mail*, only about 40 000 of these farmers could be regarded as farming on viable units or as being primarily dependent on farming for a living.⁹⁵ [⁹⁵ *Finance Week* 2 April 1992]

The Department of Agriculture said that in 1990 there was a total of 284 incorporated agricultural co-operatives with a membership of 253 000 and a turnover of R22,7bn. The number of co-operative members exceeded the number of farmers, because farmers often belonged to more than one co-operative.⁹⁶ [⁹⁶ Department of Agriculture, *Annual Report, J April 1990 - 31 March 1991*, 1992]

The head of the Department of Agricultural Extension and Rural Development at the University of Fort Hare, Professor Timothy Bembridge, said that the total small-scale farming sector comprised approximately 1,3m households. The Development Bank of Southern Africa estimated that 2% of all African farmers farmed commercially and a further 3% sold some of what they grew. The minister of agriculture, Dr Kraai van Niekerk, said that there were 1 700 African commercial farmers in the non-homeland area and a further 50 000 in the homelands.⁹⁷ [⁹⁷ *Fast Facts* no 8, August 1992; Bembridge T J, Technology transfer in small-scale dryland crop production: future challenges', *Development Southern Africa*, November 1991]

There were approximately 40 000 small cane growers in Natal in 1992 and the South African Sugar

Association estimated that this number would grow by 10 000 in that year. The average size of the farms was 2,5ha and farmers were able to earn a supplementary income of between R2 000 and R3 000 a year. Total income was about R1,4bn a year. Small farmers produced 11% of the total sugar cane crop and had an average yield on dry land of 30 tonnes a hectare. This was half of the average yield per hectare of the quota farmers (private commercial farmers and estates owned by sugar milling companies). The *Farmer's Weekly* estimated that between 4 000 and 6 000 of the small cane growers were 'bona fide' farmers who capably farmed land up to four times larger than the average and augmented their earnings by contracting to other growers. Apart from low productivity, problems faced by the small cane growers were the lack of established organisational structures, a lack of agricultural expertise and the difficulty of communication among 40 000 growers.⁹⁸ [⁹⁸ *Financial Mail* 7 February, 17 April 1992; *Farmer's Weekly* 1 May 1992; *Engineering News* 24 July 1992]

Professor Bembridge said that during the 1988/89 season the average maize yield per hectare in two villages in the Tsolo and Libodi areas of the Transkei had been 414kg, which was considerably lower than the target yield of 2 000kg. He said that approximately 70% of the farmers did not meet their annual household grain requirement of 175kg a hectare.⁹⁹ [⁹⁹ Bembridge T J, Technology transfer in small-scale dryland crop production']

According to the Urban Foundation, commercial agriculture was given low priority in African rural areas. A survey conducted in the homelands in 1987 revealed the following:¹⁰⁰ [¹⁰⁰ *Fast Facts* no 8, August 1992]

- some 0,2% of households were market-oriented farmers who made a living out of farming;
- 13% were small-scale landowners who showed some interest in improved production levels, sold some of their crops and livestock, but did not produce enough food to feed their families;
- some 56% were small-scale landowners whose production was less than subsistence levels and who sold neither crops nor livestock; and
- 31% of households owned no arable land or large stock.

Constraints on agriculture

Drought

South Africa, together with Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe, experienced severe drought in 1992. The drought in the Transvaal and the northern parts of the Orange Free State was reported to be the worst in these areas since 1921.¹⁰¹ [¹⁰¹ *The Citizen* 27 May 1992] The Department of

Meteorology at the University of the Witwatersrand said that weather patterns followed 18-year cycles, with nine dry years followed by nine wet years. However, a low pressure cell in the Pacific Ocean, named El Nino, had caused weather changes worldwide and an interruption of this pattern.¹⁰² [¹⁰² *Business Day* 25 June 1992]

The following table shows average rainfall figures in South Africa from 1980 to 1992:¹⁰³ [¹⁰³ *Finance Week* 2 May 1992]

Average rainfall in South Africa: 1980–1992

Year Average rainfall (mm)

1980–81

635

1981–82

489

1982–83

394

1983–84

586

1984–85

542

1985–86

535

1986–87

501

1987–88

816

1988–89

647

1989–90

547

1990–91

562

1991–92^a

438

a

Estimate

The deputy director of the Climatology Research Group at the University of the Witwatersrand, Dr Janette Lindesay, said in August 1992 that preliminary indications were that there would be normal rainfall in 1993. She warned, however, that even if the weather reverted to normal for the remaining three years of the wet cycle, farmers would have little time to repair the damage before the onset of the next cycle of low rainfall in the mid 1990s.¹⁰⁴ [¹⁰⁴ *Farmer's Weekly* 14 August 1992]

Operation Hunger reported in July 1992 that apart from hunger and thirst threatening rural communities, the drought could cause a lack of water in rivers and lead to epidemics of fatal diseases such as cholera and dysentery.¹⁰⁵ [¹⁰⁵ *Operation Hunger News* July 1992]

It was reported in August 1992 that in Venda about 7 000 people were relying on fewer than two litres of water a day, compared with the 15 litres per person per day which was considered sufficient to maintain basic health and hygiene and 25 litres considered adequate for a normal existence.¹⁰⁶ [¹⁰⁶ *Business Day* 18 August 1992]

Homeland drought committee reports submitted to the Development Bank

of Southern Africa (DBSA) said that at least 300 villages in Gazankulu, Lebowa and Venda were dependent on water tankers for water. The reports also said that 11% of children under the age of five years in Venda were malnourished and nutritional diseases in Gazankulu had increased by 337% since June 1991. According to a senior project leader at the DBSA, Mr Hannes Sauermann, the situation was aggravated by the presence of about 200 000 refugees who had recently fled from Mozambique into Gazankulu, Lebowa and Venda in search of food and water.¹⁰⁷ [¹⁰⁷ Ibid 17 August 1992]

Most crop yields declined as a result of the drought (see *Production levels* above). A spokesman for the Department of Water Affairs, Dr Hym Ebedes, said in July 1992 that there was no grazing left in the northern Transvaal, that artificial feed supplies were dwindling and that animals in search of food were trampling top soil and raising the possibility of severe erosion when the rainy season began.¹⁰⁸ [¹⁰⁸ *Operation Hunger News* July 1992]

By August 1992 the drought was reported to have cost Venda R11m. A further R11m had been allocated by the homeland administration to find water, R1,2m for food relief and R150 000 for subsidised fodder for the national cattle herd.¹⁰⁹ [¹⁰⁹ *Sowetan* 27 August 1992]

However, there was some debate about whether farming methods had aggravated the effects of the drought. *New Ground* observed that in 1989, 1990 and 1991, as well as in the early 1980s. South Africa had also experienced drought and that between 1955 and 1985, 27% of the country was drought stricken for at least 15 years. According to a meteorologist at the Department of Agriculture, Dr Johann Erasmus, drought was a man-made construct and resulted from people trying to compel the land to produce more than it was capable of producing. He said that farmers geared themselves for the 'bumper years' instead of the dry ones and added that if one farmed within the limits of the land 'drought' would not be experienced.¹¹⁰ [¹¹⁰ *New Ground* Winter 1992]

A group of foreign disaster relief engineers from a number of different countries, including Great Britain, accused the government of inefficiency and said that the intensity of the effects of the drought in the northern Transvaal was to a large extent the result of poor infrastructure and the incompetence of the homeland administrations.¹¹¹ [¹¹¹ Information supplied by Operation Hunger, 30 October 1992]

Loss of jobs

In August 1992 the minister of agriculture, Dr Kraai van Niekerk, estimated that up to 69 000 jobs in agriculture and related industries were threatened as a result of the drought. Earlier, in June 1992, the South African Reserve Bank said that 50 000 jobs would be lost in the agricultural sector and a further 20 000 jobs in related sectors. The reserve bank said that this would affect the lives of 250 000 people who would have to find an alternative source of livelihood unless special assistance was made available to farmers.¹¹² [¹¹² *Business Day* 12 August 1992, *The Star* 26 June 1992]

However, the DBSA reported that

70 000 farmworkers in the northern Transvaal alone had already been dismissed from their jobs as a result of the drought and estimated that a total of 100 000 farm labourers could lose their jobs countrywide as a result of the drought.¹¹³ [¹¹³ *Business Day* 17 August 1992]

Drought aid

The general manager of the National Maize Producers' Organisation (Nampo), Mr Giel van Zyl, said in April 1992 that at least 40% of maize farmers had lost their creditworthiness and that they would be dependent on state funds to plant and grow the 1992/93 crop.¹¹⁴ [¹¹⁴ *Ibid* 11 April 1992]

In May 1992 the government announced that in addition to R350m included in the agricultural budget for drought relief, it had allocated R3,8bn for financial assistance to farmers. Although the total amount of R4,2bn was termed 'drought relief', Dr van Niekerk said that it included an amount of R2,4bn which the state was committed to pay as a result of loan guarantees to agricultural co-operatives. This meant that R1,7bn was available solely for drought aid. Dr van Niekerk said that approximately R1bn would be paid out in the current financial year.¹¹⁵ [¹¹⁵ *RSA Policy Review* June 1992, *Financial Mail* 15 May 1992]

According to the deputy director of financial assistance in the Department of Agriculture, Mr Dirk Henrico, the funds to be allocated in 1992 were to be apportioned in the following way:¹¹⁶ [¹¹⁶ *Interview* with the deputy director of Financial assistance in the department of agriculture, Mr Dirk Henrico, 18 September 1992]

Allocation of agricultural aid funds: 1992

Purpose

Amount (Rm)

Debt obligations to co-operatives

250

Interest subsidies on new production credit

198

Payment of fixed cost of grain storage

173

Aid to non-independent homelands

130

Debt consolidation

50

Amalgamation of co-operatives

45

Rebates on transport of cattle feed

30

Unallocated reserve fund

16,4

Prevention of sequestration of farmers

15

Aid to wool industry

15

Interest subsidies on long-term loans

10

Drilling of boreholes

6

Retaining jobs of full-time farmworkers

5

Phasing out and relocation of farmers

3,6

Aid to mohair industry

2,5

Aid to meat industry

2,5

Training of farmworkers

1

Total

953

Dr van Niekerk said that the first priority for drought aid was to keep as many farmers as possible on their farms. In this way farmworkers' jobs would be maintained. He said that local committees consisting of government and community representatives would identify where lay-offs were inevitable and the number of people involved and render aid on an individual basis. An amount of R5m had been allocated for this purpose.¹¹⁷ [¹¹⁷ *RSA Policy Review*, June 1992]

Dr van Niekerk added that merit and free market principles would increasingly be used as criteria for granting relief. He said that once the government had paid R2,4bn to co-operatives to cover farmers' debts incurred over a number of years, the government would intervene again only if 'disaster occurred'. Dr van Niekerk added that otherwise agricultural finance would be left to private financia

It was estimated by Nampo that between 20 000 and 25 000 grain farmers would receive aid from the government.¹¹⁹ [¹¹⁹ *Business Day* 15 July 1992] in August 1992 Dr van Niekerk said that since April more than R150m had been paid out in drought aid. He said that R55m had been paid out to cover interest subsidies on debt, R40m for debt consolidation, R27m for interest subsidies on production credit and R25m for relief to stock farmers.¹²⁰ [¹²⁰ *Ibid* 14 August 1992]

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced in June 1992 that it would give South Africa access to credit of R2,8bn from a special fund which covered losses on grain exports or increased costs on grain imports. South Africa had a balance of payments surplus and was, therefore, not eligible for normal IMF

finance.¹²¹ [¹²¹ *Sunday Times* 21 June 1992]

In August 1992 the European Community (EC) donated R2,6m to the Water Supply Task Force (a joint government and private sector initiative aimed at supplying water to parts of the northern Transvaal). A spokesman for the Department of Agriculture, Mr Frans Loots, said that the donation was significant in that it was the first international donation in many years to an agency involving the government. The convener of the task force, Mr Len Abrams, welcomed the donation, but said that it was ironic that international aid had to be used while South African drought relief money remained inaccessible to the task force.¹²² [¹²² *Business Day* 19 August 1992]

The Independent Development Trust (IDT) earmarked R100m for short- and medium-term projects to relieve distress and poverty in drought-affected areas. A spokesman for the IDT said in June 1992 that the trust aimed to establish a national drought relief and development programme incorporating all agencies and networks already involved in relief..¹²³ [¹²³ *Ibid* 1 June 1992]

The Sugar Association of South Africa announced in July 1992 that it had allocated R250 000 to subsidise the distribution by sugar growers and millers of about 30m litres of water to drought-stricken rural communities in Natal.¹²⁴ [¹²⁴ *Ibid* 21 July 1992]

Debt and sequestrations

Although farmers' gross income increased by 260% between 1980 and 1992 (from R5,9bn to R21bn), net income increased by only 140% (from R2,2bn to R5,5bn).¹²⁵ [¹²⁵ *Rapport* 2 August 1992] Input costs were rising faster than farmers' incomes, accounting to a large extent for farmers' tight financial circumstances. The deputy director of the directorate of economic trends of the Department of Agriculture, Mr Neville Vigne, said that whereas the producer price index had increased by 203% between 1980 and 1992, the agricultural supplies index had increased by almost 313% over the same period. He said that crop farmers had experienced the greatest financial difficulties, because the producer price index for their goods had increased by only 189%. Mr Vigne said that the extent of farmers' financial plight was highlighted when one took into account that the consumer price index had increased by nearly 353% over this period.¹²⁶ [¹²⁶ *Ibid*]

The following table indicates debts owed by farmers between 1979 and 1991:¹²⁷ [¹²⁷ *Financial Mail* 21 January 1992]

Debts owed by farmers: 1979–1991

Creditors

YeaLand Bank (Rm)

ComAgricultural co-operatives (Rm)

Department of Agriculture (Rm)

1979

550

600

654

158

1980

633

650

867

173

1981

734

1 011

1 130

201

1982

926

1 475

1 368

228

1983

1 044

1 939

1 780

272

1984

1 646

2 553

2 234

392

1985

2 136

3 009

2 754

522

1986

2 533

3 550

3 081

642

1987

2 743

3 433

3 224

730

1988

2 849

3 506

3 412

870

1989

3 030

4 142

3 507

968

1990

3 310

4 858

3 780

1 009

1991

3 508

5 277

N/A

1 087

Debts owed by farmers: 1979–1991 (continued)

Creditors

YeaPrivate person (Rm)

Other financial institutions(Rm)

Other dept (Rm)

Total^a (Rm)

1979

450

466

106

2 984

1980

531

550

121

3 525

1981

591

745

141

4 553

1982

634

734

174

5 538

1983

640

840

180

6 694

1984

695

964

198

8 683

1985

747

992

226

10 386

1986

837

1 259

245

12 146

1987

933

1 450

257

12 770

1988

945

1 500

276

13 357

1989

1 008

1 500

295

14 450

1990

1 076

1 300

313

15 646

1991

1 160

920

335

N/A

a

Figures may not add up owing to rounding

N/A - Not available

The chairman of the South African Co-operative Council, Mr Charles van Veijeren, said in May 1992 that agricultural debt could exceed R20bn by the end of the year. He said that poor economic growth, unbridled inflation and the rigid interest rate were placing a great strain on farmers.¹²⁸ [¹²⁸ *Business Day* 14 May 1992]

In 1992 interest repayments on loans to the agricultural sector amounted to R2,7bn a year. According to a spokesman for the South African Agricultural Union (SAAU), this figure constituted 36% of net farming income, compared with 18% in 1980/81. About half of the debt was in the form of short-term loans from commercial banks and co-operatives.¹²⁹ [¹²⁹ *Ibid* 22 January 1992] It was estimated that the carry-over debt (debt unpaid in the previous year that is carried over to the following year) of farmers at 33 co-operatives amounted to R375 a hectare.¹³⁰ [¹³⁰ *RSA Policy Review* June 1992]

An economist at Boland Bank, Mr Louis Fourie, said that the total short-term component of agricultural debt had increased from 35% in 1975 to 55% in 1991.¹³¹ [¹³¹ *Cape Times* 10 July 1992] He said that in 1975 farmers had been able to pay off their average debt with about 1,4 years of farming income. The drought in 1983/84 had increased this period to 7,1 years. The ratio had subsequently improved, but Mr Fourie said that high interest rates, inflation and the drought of 1992 would cause the average period required to pay off farming debts to increase to five years.¹³² [¹³² *Ibid*]

The general manager of the National Maize Producers' Organisation, Mr Giel van Zyl, said in April 1992 that 40% of the summer grain producers were threatened with bankruptcy in 1992. He added that the whole agricultural sector would collapse if it was not given government assistance.¹³³ [¹³³ *Business Day* 27 April 1992]

The *Financial Mail* said in the same month that farmers in the areas most seriously affected by the drought would lose between a half and two thirds of their gross incomes. In recent months expenditure on farm inputs and labour had taken up 50% of gross income, and interest payments another 14%, which meant that the average farmer in the drought areas would be unable to repay any seasonal debt.¹³⁴ [¹³⁴ *Financial Mail* 2 April 1992]

In 1991 the Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa (Land Bank) was forced to auction 267 farms, more than double the number sold in 1990 (128). A spokesman for the SAAU, Mr Koos du Toit, said in May 1992 that since 1985, 3 000 farmers had been forced into bankruptcy.¹³⁵ [¹³⁵ *Business Day* 7 May 1992] At the beginning of 1992 the Department of Agriculture, in co-operation with the Land Bank,

allocated R15m to postpone the sequestration of about 700 farmers until they could receive aid from the government's drought relief funds. The bank's investigations showed that a further 7 000 farmers could be sequestrated in 1992 as a result of the drought.¹³⁶ [¹³⁶ *RSA Policy Review* June 1992]

Rural depopulation

It was reported that between 1982 and 1992 the population of the rural area of the Rustenburg district (central Transvaal) had declined from 72 000 people to 50 000, while the population of the district's towns had shown an increase from 32 000 to 52 000 over the same period. In 1992, 33% of the total population of South Africa (including the ten homelands) lived in rural areas (see also chapter on *Population*). The Urban Foundation predicted that the rural population would show a marginal increase between 1992 and the year 2000, but would constitute only 25% of the total population at the turn of the century.¹³⁷ [¹³⁷ *The Star* 28 January 1992; 1991/92 *Survey* p5]

The SAAU said in January 1992 that one of the primary causes of migration from the rural areas was an underdeveloped infrastructure which was deteriorating rapidly. It pointed out that rural areas were becoming increasingly unattractive to work in.¹³⁸ [¹³⁸ *The Star* 28 January 1992]

It was predicted that the drought would increase rural depopulation. A senior project leader at the DBSA, Mr Hannes Sauermann, said that if drought aid did not succeed, as much as 25% of the population of the northern Transvaal would migrate to the Pretoria/Witwatersrand/ Vereeniging area as a result of lack of water.¹³⁹ [¹³⁹ Telephonic interview with a senior project leader at the DBSA, Mr Hannes Sauermann, 28 September 1992]

Control boards

In 1992 there were 22 agricultural control boards operating in terms of the Marketing Act of 1968. The act allowed for four types of control boards:¹⁴⁰ [¹⁴⁰ *Business Day* 17 June 1992, *Financial Mail* 19 June 1992]

- a single-channel fixed-price scheme under which producers were required to sell to, or through, the marketing board, with the board setting the price payable to producers;
- a system under which the board not only set a price, but also bought excess produce at guaranteed price levels;
- a single-channel pool scheme under which producers sold through the board, which usually made an advance payment on receipt of the produce, disposed of it collectively on the open market and paid the

producers their earnings less the cost of operating the pool; and

- a scheme which empowered a board to permit sales of its products only in accordance with a written contract. The board was empowered to set minimum prices as well as prices for product grades.

During the period under review agricultural control boards came under much criticism. In February 1992 a number of organisations, including First National Bank, the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Small Business Development Corporation and the Urban Foundation, submitted a report to the government which claimed that the Meat Board was forcing up the price of red meat. It called for the state president to sign a proclamation which would exempt the meat industry from approximately 1 000 laws which, according to the group, were strangling the industry. A spokeswoman for the Consumer Council, Ms Ina Wilken, said that meat prices had shown a 30% year-on-year increase in November and December 1991 and in January 1992.¹⁴¹ [¹⁴¹ *Financial Mail* 6 March 1992]

The Organisation of Livestock Producers (OLP) suggested that meat producers be allowed to opt out of the Meat Board's meat scheme. Although the general manager of the board, Mr Pieter Coetzee, had announced in March 1992 that the meat industry would be deregulated, the chairman of the OLP, Mr Nils Ditmer, responded in the same month by saying that the suggested deregulation would not change the situation. He argued that many of the existing problems would be maintained, such as the floor price system, compulsory levies paid by producers to the board's stabilisation fund, the compulsory use of meat agents, and the precise grading, inspection, and strict hygienic and loading conditions at rural abattoirs which kept costs high and reduced competition.¹⁴² [¹⁴² *Ibid*] Mr Ditmer said that meat producers had to pay levies to eight different organisations which amounted to R4 419 on every R25 000 worth of beef and that some of the levies overlapped and were, therefore, unnecessary.¹⁴³ [¹⁴³ *Business Day* 12 June 1992]

In the same month the South African Chamber of Business (Sacob) blamed what it termed 'intrusions into the food industry by statutory marketing organisations' for price increases. Sacob said that this factor had promoted a high degree of concentration in the food processing industry and discouraged competition.¹⁴⁴ [¹⁴⁴ *The Star* 27 February 1992]

In June 1992 the Board of Tariffs and Trade (BTT) published a report recommending that agricultural control boards no longer be allowed to set prices. This recommendation was the result of a ten-month investigation into food price increases. The report said that boards added about 1,5% to food prices. The BTT said that agriculture should be deregulated from central government to municipal level, that consumers should be permitted to buy food directly from producers and that health and hygiene rules were inappropriately stringent for South African conditions. The BTT also recommended that food products be allowed to be exported and imported more freely.¹⁴⁵ [¹⁴⁵ *Business Day* 12 June 1992]

The minister of agriculture, Dr Kraai van Niekerk, criticised the report, saying that it was inadequate and that he took issue with the emphasis on the contribution of marketing boards to rising food prices. He said that concentration in the food processing and distribution sectors also played a major role and that the report had not taken fully into account the impact of the drought and value added tax (VAT). Dr van Niekerk said that the producer's share of the final price of agricultural products was 45% and that the marketing boards could not be held responsible for the remaining 55%, which was what was added to the price of agricultural products by the private sector. He argued that the rising prices of bread and cheese subsequent to the lifting of the controls of the Marketing Act on these products, showed that in fact marketing boards kept prices low. Dr van Niekerk said that a policy committee representing a broad spectrum of interested parties would be established to devise a marketing strategy for agricultural products and look at the future role of marketing boards. He also referred the report back to the BTT for further investigation.¹⁴⁶ [¹⁴⁶ Ibid 18 June 1992]

The director of the SAAU, Mr Piet Swart, welcomed the minister's decisions. He said that stripping the marketing boards of their statutory powers would lead to chaos in the collection and distribution of basic foods.¹⁴⁷ [¹⁴⁷ Ibid 19 June 1992]

However, a member of the state president's Economic Advisory Council, Mr Naudé Bremer, said, 'The control board system in South Africa is a product of Fabian socialism which has now proven to be as unsuccessful in producing proper economic results as the communist system of the old Soviet Union.' He said that the boards should be done away with. Mr Bremer maintained that allowing farmers to negotiate freely on the open market would give them the economic power they were looking for.¹⁴⁸ [¹⁴⁸ *Financial Mail* 19 June 1992]

The chairman of Pick 'n Pay, Mr Raymond Ackerman, said that agricultural boards should not apply local fixed prices to imported goods, but should rather allow retailers to import food at the lowest possible price when there were shortages. He said, however, that he did not think that the boards were solely responsible for food price increases and he felt that some boards were necessary to keep farmers on the land.¹⁴⁹ [¹⁴⁹ *Business Day* 17 June 1992]

In defence of the single-channel marketing system of the Maize Board, the chairman of the board, Mr Jan Schabort, said that although it provided a product monopoly, it did not provide a market monopoly. This, he argued, was an important distinction. Mr Schabort said that it was not true to say that the Maize Board could operate effectively only if it was fully exposed to foreign competition because international maize prices were not the product of free market forces. He pointed out that many of the major exporters, including the United States of America, benefited from large government subsidies.¹⁵⁰ [¹⁵⁰ Ibid 14 July 1992]

Promotion and development of agriculture

The head of the Department of Agricultural Extension and Rural Development at the University of Fort Hare. Professor Timothy Bembridge, said that although the commercial farming sector enjoyed strong support from agricultural research and development organisations, the small-scale farming sector had been largely neglected in this regard. He said that because dryland crop farming covered 90% of arable land in the homelands, it was vital for future socio-economic development that appropriate technology be developed and transferred to these regions. Professor Bembridge added that owing to the differences in environment and resources, technology development for commercial farmers was often inappropriate for small-scale farmers.¹⁵¹ [¹⁵¹ Bembridge T J, Technology transfer in small-scale dryland crop production’]

The acting director of policy analysis of the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), Dr Nick Vink, said that assistance to small farmers in the form of capital and management skills programmes, had often failed because farmers being given assistance had not been able to become owners of the land they farmed and so they did not have to make decisions about how to farm the land or bear responsibility for the consequences. As a result, Dr Vink said, they ended up as little more than labourers under the auspices of the organisations providing capital and management advice and not as farmers.¹⁵² [¹⁵² *Enterprise* March 1992]

For this reason the DBSA, in devising its small-farmer support programme, had concentrated on supporting the small farmers’ basic skills by providing infrastructure, extension services, research and access to markets. Dr Vink said that at the end of the 1990/91 financial year 30 000 farmers were being reached through the programme.¹⁵³ [¹⁵³ *Ibid*]

In 1992 the Small Grower Development Trust was established with the help of the South African Sugar Association. The trust aimed to raise R70m. The period over which the funds were to be raised was unspecified. The vice chairman of the trust, Mr Wilson Luthuli, said that the trust would facilitate the development of small cane growers through effective grassroots administration in a similar way to farmers’ associations.¹⁵⁴ [¹⁵⁴ *Farmer’s Weekly* 1 May 1992]

The sugar association decided in July 1992 to allocate R20m to the trust over the next five years. This was half the amount to be gained from an agreement reached with the United States government to pay South African sugar producers US\$0,21 a pound compared with the world market price of US\$0,096 a pound.¹⁵⁵ [¹⁵⁵ *Business Day* 17 July 1992]

The forestry industry was involved in a number of woodlot programmes. Sappi, Mondi and HL & H Mining Timber were involved in projects in Natal and the eastern Transvaal. The South African Wattle Growers’ Union was assisting about 800 farmers in KwaZulu with technical information. In the northern Transvaal, the Northern Transvaal Woodlots Working Group was formed in 1986 to facilitate the growth of fuelwood so as not to deplete indigenous trees and vegetation.¹⁵⁶ [¹⁵⁶ Van der Watt T, ‘Forestry industry’s woodlots programme’, *Development Southern Africa*, vol 8 no 4, November 1991]

Agricultural organisations

There were provincial agricultural unions in the eastern Cape, the western Cape, Natal, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, to which farmers' unions and other agricultural organisations were affiliated, and which represented the interests of commercial agriculture in each of these regions. The provincial unions were affiliated to the South African Agricultural Union (SAAU), which aimed to 'attain an optimum economic and social dispensation for agricultural producers within the South African community'.¹⁵⁷ [¹⁵⁷ Communication from the public relations officer of the South African Agricultural Union, Mr August du Preez, 13 October 1992]

The SAAU operated a number of special advisory committees dealing with such matters as agricultural education and training, fertilisers, manpower affairs, soil conservation and transport. It had also established liaison committees with organisations such as the Department of Transport and the South African Bureau of Standards, whose activities had implications for agriculture.¹⁵⁸ [¹⁵⁸ Communication from Mr August du Preez, 13 October 1992]

The SAAU and the provincial unions represented predominantly the interests of white farmers. However, in 1991 the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry established the National African Farmers' Union (Nafu) to represent the interests of the African farmer. In October 1992 Nafu had 11 000 members. Its members ranged from small garden farmers to larger commercial farmers. Nafu aimed to 'promote the interests of the disadvantaged farming constituency by lobbying for access to support services', to facilitate the provision of training and to enable women to participate fully in farming activities.¹⁵⁹ [¹⁵⁹ Communication from Mr Steve Mokoena of the National African Farmers' Union, 12 October 1992]

Key Projections

- The Wool Board said that drought conditions would continue to influence wool production for the next two years and it forecast a total clip of 73,5m kilogrammes in 1993.
- According to the deputy director of the Climatology Research Group at the University of the Witwatersrand, Dr Janette Lindesay, preliminary indications were that there would be normal rainfall in 1993.
- Dr Lindesay said, however, that even if the weather cycle reverted to normal, farmers would not have enough time to recover from the drought before the next dry cycle in three years' time.
- The chairman of the South African Co-operative Council, Mr Charles van Veijeren, said that agricultural debt could exceed R20bn by the end of 1992, compared with debt of R16bn at the end of 1990.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Key Points

- By January 1992 South Africa had established new foreign missions or upgraded its missions in 20 countries.
- The state president, Mr F W de Klerk, obtained the support of 68% of white voters in a referendum in March 1992 on whether or not to continue the process of negotiations.
- The Department of Development Aid (which had been investigated by the Commission for Administration) and the South African Development Trust were disbanded in March and April 1992 respectively.
- The minister of local government and national housing and of public works, Mr Leon Wessels, said in March 1992 that race-based municipal elections would be abolished and that the development of a new system of local government was receiving attention.
- The President's Council proposed in April 1992 that political parties be prohibited from encouraging racial hatred or violence between groups and individuals and that political interest groups that encouraged racial hatred or propagated it should be prohibited from registering as political parties.
- The minister of correctional services, Mr Adriaan Vlok, said in March 1992 that nearly 12% of the 47 349 prisoners released on parole in 1991 had been rearrested or were being sought by police.
- Mr Wessels told Parliament in June 1992 that rent and service charges owing to African local authorities had increased from R1,12bn in December 1990 to R1,58bn in March 1992. Some 79% of this amount was owed in townships in the Transvaal.
- According to the South African Institute of Race Relations, there were 2 706 deaths from political violence in 1991, which represented a 27% decrease on deaths recorded in 1990. However, the provisional figures of deaths in the first 11 months of 1992 (2911) represented an increase of 15% on the comparable period in 1991 (2 536).

Government Initiatives

The state president, Mr F W de Klerk, issued a special proclamation on 28 February 1992 for what he termed 'the last exclusively white referendum'. In terms of the proclamation all white South Africans over the age of 18 years were to be allowed to vote in the referendum on presentation of an identity

document. The referendum was to be held on 17 March 1992.¹ [¹ *The Citizen* 29 February 1992] White voters were asked, 'Do you support the continuation of the reform process which the state president began on 2 February 1990 and which is aimed at a new constitution through negotiation?'

Mr de Klerk stated that if he received a majority of support from white voters in the referendum he would conclude that he had received a mandate to enter into binding agreements at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) and that he would resign if he lost the referendum (see also chapter on *Constitutional Change*). 'We are at the crossroads. It is very important that every voter gets the opportunity to express himself,' he said.² [² *The Star* 29 February 1992]

Although it disagreed with the wording of the referendum question the Democratic Party (DP) decided to support a 'yes' vote. The chairman of the national council of the DP, Mr David Gant, explained that his party would run 'its own distinctive campaign totally independent of the National Party' and in favour of a 'yes' vote. He said further, 'A "yes" vote would be the most vital signal in South Africa's history ever sent to the rest of the world and would create a climate of mutual respect and confidence within South Africa itself.' Mr Gant stressed the DP's view that the referendum was not about the 'dismal track record of the government', but about a mandate to negotiate a better dispensation and a 'democratic process towards a new constitution'.³ [³ *The Citizen* 29 February 1992]

The Conservative Party (CP), the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging and the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) declared that they would campaign for a 'no' vote in the referendum. The CP said that it saw the referendum as an opportunity to stop what it claimed was an alliance of the National Party (NP), the African National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions from bringing a black government into power in the country.⁴ [⁴ *Ibid* 26 February 1992]

Many members of the business community, including the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, and the media, decided to campaign for a 'yes' vote in support of the state president.⁵ [⁵ *Sowetan* 26 February 1992, *Business Day* 27 February 1992]

The country was divided into 15 referendum regions for the purpose of counting referendum votes. The number of 'yes' votes, 'no' votes and spoilt papers recorded in each region was as follows:

Results of March 1992 referendum

Regional counting centre

'Yes' votes

'No' votes

Spoilt papers

Proportion 'yes' votes

Beaufort West

18 941

11 798

71

62%

Bloemfontein

58 066

41 017

167

59%

Cape Town

355 527

63 325

769

85%

Durban

204 371

35 975

436

85%

East London

66 675

18 498

198

78%

George

40 075

21 211

98

65%

Germiston

164 025

86 844

464

65%

Johannesburg

324 686

89 957

860

78%

Kimberley

33 504

27 993

74

55%

Kroonstad

54 531

51 279

176

52%

Pietermaritzburg

66 500

21 023

119

76%

Pietersburg

37 612

49 720

227

43%

Port Elizabeth

87 216

29 909

157

76%

Pretoria

287 720

213 825

790

57%

Roodepoort

124 737

113 145

536

52%

Total

1 924 186

875 619

5 142

69%

Mr de Klerk said that the result of the referendum was a ‘landslide for the cause of peace and justice in this country’ and added, ‘Today will be written up in history as one of the most important fundamental turning points in the history of South Africa. Today we have closed the book on apartheid.’⁶ [⁶ *Facts and Reports* 20 March 1992] He explained further that the white electorate had reached out to all South Africans and laid the foundations for prosperity and peace and that ‘today a deed was done which carries a powerful message of reconciliation, a powerful reaching out for justice’.

Commenting on the result, the leader of the CP, Dr Andries Treurnicht, said that ‘the struggle for freedom and survival’ would continue. ‘The “yes” vote will now have to pay its bill. They [ie whites] have voted for power sharing. They will now find out what it means to lose power and to have no power of your own to protect your own freedom.’⁷ [⁷ *Ibid*]

The president of the ANC, Mr Nelson Mandela, said that the result had been ‘a source of great relief across the country’ and that it had endorsed the position of ‘the majority of black South Africans whose voices could not be heard’.⁸ [⁸ *Ibid*]

The Pickard commission, which had been established in February 1991 to inquire into the activities of the Department of Development Aid, reported in May 1992 that there had been widespread irregularities in the running of the department which had resulted in th

At the end of March 1992 the government disbanded the Department of Development Aid in what the minister of regional and land affairs, Mr Jacob de Villiers, described as a move towards ‘more equitable government services’. The South African Development Trust was disbanded at the end of April. Employees who had worked for the Department of Development Aid were transferred to other government departments.¹⁰ [¹⁰ *The Citizen, The Star* 29 January 1992]

The minister of local government and national housing and of public works, Mr Leon Wessels, told a congress of the United Municipal Executive in Cape Town in March 1992 that race-based municipal elections would be abolished by 1994. He said that he expected nonracial elections to be held in that year. Mr Wessels explained that the development of a new system of local government was receiving attention and that all parties involved in local government would be consulted. He said that the government proposed that experts on local government be given an opportunity to make proposals to negotiating forums created to discuss local government. Mr Wessels added that the government was committed to the principle of ‘one city, one tax base’ (see also chapter on *Constitutional Change*).¹¹ [¹¹

Business Day 20 March 1992.]

In April 1992 the President's Council (PC) proposed a code of political conduct for political parties which would prohibit single-race parties from operating in South Africa. Its report on an ethical code of conduct for political parties stated, 'Political parties should be prohibited from encouraging racial hatred or violence between groups and individuals. Political interest groups that in any way encourage racial hatred between population groups or that emphasise, propagate or formulate in policy the furtherance of one population group at the cost of another should be prohibited from registering as political parties.'

The chairman of the constitutional affairs committee of the PC, Mr J H Heyns, told a media conference that in terms of the report's recommendations only registered parties would be allowed to participate in elections and that parties could register only if they were open to all races. The HNP condemned the proposal, saying it was 'forced racial integration'. Mr Gant said that the DP had 'difficulty with the report as the party seeking support for it [ie the NP] had violated most of the norms and guidelines' it contained.¹² [¹² *The Citizen* 23 April 1992.]

The minister of justice, Mr Kobie Coetsee, said at the beginning of May 1992 that the ban on foreign funding of political parties would be lifted in an effort to level the political playing field' before a general election. The lifting of the ban would extend until six months after an election under a new constitution, he added.¹³ [¹³ *The Star* 1 May 1992.]

See also chapters on *Constitutional Change* and *Security*.

Negotiations

See chapter on *Constitutional Change*.

Releases

In March 1992 the minister of correctional services, Mr Adriaan Vlok, told Parliament that nearly 12% of the 47 349 people who had been released on parole in 1991 had been rearrested or were being sought by the police (see also chapter on *Security*).¹⁴ [¹⁴ *Ibid* 23 March 1992.] Those released included common criminals and political offenders.

In March 1992 two members of Umkhonto we Sizwe, Messrs Mthetheleli Mncube and Mzondeleli Nondula, who had been sentenced to death, were granted clemency and their sentences commuted to life imprisonment. The two men had been sentenced to death in 1988 in Messina (northern Transvaal). Mr Nondula had been found guilty of the deaths of six members of the de Nysschen and van Eck families who had been killed in a landmine explosion in December 1985, while Mr Mncube's death sentence had

arisen from the death in a landmine explosion of a commercial driver and Mr Mncube's killing of two policemen while attempting to escape from custody.¹⁵ [¹⁵ *Ibid* 25 March 1992] The two men were released in October 1992 as part of a further amnesty for political prisoners (see below).

According to the Human Rights Commission (HRC), about 400 individuals deemed to be political prisoners on the basis of trial reports were still in jail in May 1992. This was more than a year after the agreed deadline for the release of political prisoners (see *1991/92 Survey* p456).

Arguing that the amnesty in 1991 (see *1991/92 Survey* pp65–66) had resulted in the release of more than 60 000 prisoners and that these releases had been intended to blur the distinction between convicted criminals and political prisoners, the HRC said that of 400 political prisoners, 169 were jointly audited by it and the Department of Correctional Services as candidates for release under the *Pretoria Minute*. 'Unfortunately the audit process was unilaterally and summarily suspended by the department in 1991, when still incomplete,' the HRC said.¹⁶ [¹⁶ *Business Day* 19 May 1992]

Reacting to the claim by the HRC, a spokesman for the Department of Correctional Services said, 'All prisoners who committed political offences before 8 October 1990 and who qualified for release in terms of the South African guidelines for defining political offences have been released.'¹⁷ [¹⁷ *Ibid*]

In September 1992 the government announced the release of more than 160 prisoners in terms of an agreement with the African National Congress (ANC). Those released included Messrs Mncube and Nondula (see above) and Mr Robert McBride, an ANC member who had planted a car-bomb at a Durban bar in June 1986 which had killed three people and injured 69 (see *1986 Survey* Part 2 p531). Mr Barend Strydom, who had shot dead seven blacks in Pretoria in November 1988, was also released (see *1988/89 Survey* p618).¹⁸ [¹⁸ *The Weekly Mail* 2 October 1992]

Foreign relations

By mid-January 1992 South African missions had been established or upgraded in 20 foreign countries.¹⁹ [¹⁹ *The Star* 15 January 1992] During the period under review the Department of Foreign Affairs embarked on a programme of streamlining existing overstuffed embassies and establishing new missions in countries where there had previously been no South African representation. Consular missions in Blantyre (Malawi), Glasgow (Scotland), Houston (United States) and Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) were to be closed because, the Department of Foreign Affairs said, 'with new missions being opened and limited funds, the department has to look at the desirability of maintaining existing missions'.²⁰ [²⁰ *The Citizen* 8 January, *The Star* 15 January 1992]

South Africa established new missions in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Kenya, Madagascar,

Morocco, Namibia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda and Turkey.²¹ [²¹ *The Star* 15 January 1992] The South African consulate in Tokyo (Japan) was upgraded to an embassy in mid-January 1992.²² [²² *Ibid* 13 January 1992, *The Citizen* 16 January 1992]

The state president, Mr F W de Klerk, left in January 1992 for a six-nation tour of western and eastern Europe which incorporated official state visits to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. He stopped first in London where he met the British prime minister, Mr John Major. Mr de Klerk then proceeded to a meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos (Switzerland), where he addressed a gathering of business and political leaders, together with the president of the African National Congress, Mr Nelson Mandela, and the president of the Inkatha Freedom Party, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi.²³ [²³ *Business Day* 29 January 1992, 3 February 1992]

In his address to the World Economic Forum, Mr de Klerk said, 'Join us, trust us, invest in us. We have no choice but to succeed. South Africa, through all the difficult times it has lived, has laid the foundations from which we can and will grow. We have the skills, the commitment and the determination for South Africa to fulfil its great potential as never before.' However, in his speech Mr Mandela urged business and political leaders not to lift remaining sanctions against South Africa until an interim government had been installed in the country.²⁴ [²⁴ *The Citizen* 3 February 1992]

Chief Buthelezi told the business leaders that he and his party saw South Africa as 'the future development gateway to the whole of southern Africa'. He added that South Africa provided a unique set of circumstances which could bridge the gap between the first world and the third world with regard to the reduction of poverty.²⁵ [²⁵ Speech by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Switzerland, 2 February 1992]

During the trip to Europe the South African delegation signed trade deals worth millions of rands with Czechoslovakia.²⁶ [²⁶ *The Citizen* 13 February 1992] A trade mission agreement between South Africa and Zambia was also signed during February.²⁷ [²⁷ *Business Day* 14 February 1992] In the same month a four-man delegation from Kenya's Investment Promotion Centre and Export Processing Zone Authority visited South Africa to establish trade contacts and broaden economic co-operation between the two countries.²⁸ [²⁸ *Ibid* 17 February 1992]

At the end of February 1992 the foreign minister of the Russian Federation, Mr Andrei Kozyrev, arrived in Johannesburg to establish diplomatic ties with South Africa.²⁹ [²⁹ *The Citizen, The Star* 28 February 1992]

In June 1992 Mr de Klerk visited Japan, Russia and Singapore. Mr de Klerk signed a trade agreement

with the Russian president, Mr Boris Yeltsin, in terms of which Russia would import goods such as clothing, toiletries and food products at low prices from South Africa.³⁰ [³⁰ *The Star* 2 June 1992]

After spending a day in Russia, Mr de Klerk travelled to Tokyo, where he held talks with the Japanese prime minister, Mr Kiichi Miyazawa, and representatives of the federation of economic organisations of Japan, the Keidanren Kaikan. The meeting with the Keidanren Kaikan was reported to be the most important item on Mr de Klerk's agenda during his visit to Japan as it involved persuading the Japanese to invest in South Africa.³¹ [³¹ *Business Day, The Star* 4 June 1992] Although Mr de Klerk was well received by the Japanese, it was reported that the question of Japanese businesses investing in South Africa would remain 'on hold' until there was greater certainty regarding political change in South Africa.³² [³² *Business Day* 4 June 1992]

Civil service reform

The minister for administration and tourism, Dr Org Marais, said in April 1992 in the House of Representatives that the public service was being handicapped by an increasing shortage of resources which prevented it from carrying out state functions effectively. He remarked that rapid population growth meant that heavy demands were being made on the resources of the country for the provision of social services such as health care and education. Dr Marais added that these growing needs could not be satisfied fully during recent years because of the state of the economy. This situation, together with the shortage of skilled manpower, was at present exerting great pressure on the public service.³³ [³³ *Hansard* (R) 11 cols 5585-5586, 28 April 1992]

Dr Marais added that a policy of 'enablement' was being followed to allow all members of the community to compete for posts in the public service on merit. A provisional amount of R2,49bn had been made available for the purpose of improving conditions of service in the public service during the 1992/93 financial year.³⁴ [³⁴ *Hansard* (R) 11 cols 5590-5594, 28 April 1992]

Mr Roger Burrows MP (Democratic Party) said that Dr Marais had not addressed what had become a key issue for South Africa, that is setting out clearly the National Party policy on the public service in a new South Africa. He said that Dr Marais had touched on aspects which could be debated, but 'we really need a comprehensive plan of what the public service will be like, what size it will be, what departments we should be looking at and what determinations we need to make in the public service'.³⁵ [³⁵ *Hansard* (A) 11 col 5600, 28 April 1992]

In June 1992 the minister of correctional services, Mr Adriaan Vlok, criticised a section of the Correctional Services Act of 1959 which made provision for the mandatory retirement of women from

the prison services when they married. Speaking in Parliament in June 1992 during a debate on the Correctional Services Amendment Bill, he said that the government was committed to eliminating all forms of discrimination, including racial and sexual discrimination.³⁶ [³⁶ *The Citizen* 3 June 1992]

Non-government Initiatives, Protests and Methods

Campaigns against African local authorities

Following the announcement by the government in March 1992 that racially based municipal elections would be suspended pending the establishment of an interim government, the Civic Associations of Southern Transvaal (Cast) called on the government to abolish all black local authorities, including management committees in coloured and Indian areas.³⁷ [³⁷ *Indicator* 25 March 1992]

The president of Cast, Mr Moses Mayekiso, said that the government should not only dissolve local authorities but that it should also allow white local authorities to take over the administration of black townships in the interim. 'We do not want a vacuum in administration. National developments should be mirrored locally and a national interim local administration should be put in place when an interim government is established,' Mr Mayekiso added.³⁸ [³⁸ *Ibid*]

After the Atteridgeville Town Council (Pretoria) experienced recurring administrative problems in the collection of rent and service charges, the administration of the township was taken over by the Pretoria City Council in April 1992. The leader of the National Party in the city council, Dr Pieter Smith, said that Atteridgeville was part and parcel of Pretoria, and that every cent invested in the African township would ensure a safer Pretoria.³⁹ [³⁹ *The Citizen* 29 April 1992]

In May 1992 the offices of the Dobsonville Town Council (west Rand) were damaged when township residents attacked them with petrol bombs, causing damage estimated at R2m. Nobody was injured in the attack and no arrests were made by the police, who dispersed the crowd of about 200 residents with teargas. The attack was said to be a protest to demand an end to unrest in the township.⁴⁰ [⁴⁰ *The Star, Sowetan* 11 May 1992]

Also in May, the Transvaal Provincial Administration appointed a Democratic Party city councillor for Sandton, Mr Andr  Jacobs, to administer Alexandra (Johannesburg) after administration of the township had come to a virtual standstill owing to recurrent political violence. Mr Jacobs said that so many Alexandra councillors had resigned that the remaining councillors no longer constituted a quorum, which meant that the council could not function.⁴¹ [⁴¹ *Business Day* 13 May 1992]

The minister of local government and national housing and of public works, Mr Leon Wessels, said in

reply to a question in Parliament in June 1992 that outstanding rent and service charges owed to African local authorities in the four provinces had increased from R1,12bn in December 1990 to R1,58bn in March 1992. He added that the reasons for non-payment included the inability of people to pay for services because of widespread unemployment, the rent boycott campaign and residents' refusal to pay owing to the poor quality of services provided by many African local authorities (see also chapter on *Housing and Urbanisation* and *Rent and bond boycotts* below).⁴² [⁴² *The Citizen* 4 June 1992]

Land reoccupation

See chapter on *Land and Agriculture*.

School protests and disruptions

In January 1992 teaching at more than ten schools, most of them situated on the Reef, was totally disrupted by protests. The Tiyelalani Secondary School at Soshanguve (north of Pretoria) was closed because of continued disruptions, while the Eketsang Secondary School in Katlehong (east Rand) was closed after police dispersed a crowd of children who were stoning the school. The principal of the J Kekana Secondary School in Mamelodi (Pretoria), Mr J Motau, was hospitalised after pupils stabbed him in the back and the school was subsequently closed. The Wallmansthal Secondary School, also in Pretoria, was gutted as a result of school unrest.⁴³ [⁴³ *Eastern Province Herald* 18 January 1992; *Sowetan* 21,23 January 1992]

Also in January, classes and the enrolment of pupils were suspended indefinitely at the KwaDukathole Comprehensive School in Katlehong because pupils armed with 'an assortment of weapons' had been interfering with the admission procedure and were intimidating teachers. The regional director of education and training of the highveld region, Mr J H Booysen, said that pupil intimidation had been going on for two weeks subsequent to the reopening of schools on 8 January 1992. Outlining factors which had led to the closure of the school, Mr Booysen said that pupils whose school reports were being withheld until they had returned school books issued to them in 1991 had demanded their reports. Some pupils had accosted a woman teacher and tried to take from her the reports she was carrying, resulting in a scuffle. The white staff members of the school were subsequently threatened with violence, making it necessary to withdraw them from the school.⁴⁴ [⁴⁴ *The Star* 23 January 1992]

In the same month the regional liaison officer of the Johannesburg region of the Department of Education and Training (DET), Mr Solomon Moshokoa, announced the indefinite closure of Morutathuto Primary School in Meadowlands (Soweto) because of disruptions. Mr Moshokoa said that there was no learning taking place because of a power struggle between parents. 'One group of parents wanted the principal to be expelled, while another wanted her to remain in charge,' he said.⁴⁵ [⁴⁵ *Sowetan*]

24 January 1992¹

Three white school teachers at the Fumana High School in Katlehong stayed away from the school in January after they were attacked by about 50 pupils throwing stones. Earlier, the pupils had assaulted the principal of another high school in the same neighbourhood.⁴⁶ [⁴⁶ *The Citizen* 25 January 1992] Pupils at the Sizwakele Secondary School at Secunda (eastern Transvaal) stopped teachers from enrolling pupils and took over the enrolment of pupils themselves, while classes at the Ntombizodwa High School (Katlehong) were disrupted when a group of pupils chased the principal away.⁴⁷ [⁴⁷ *Sowetan* 29 January 1992]

In March 1992, 69 white teachers at the Kathorus College of Education (Katlehong) were withdrawn from the college after the white principal, Mr Schalk Dippenaar, was set alight in an attack by a group of youths. The college was placed under police protection after the attack. Mr Dippenaar subsequently died and the college was closed.⁴⁸ [⁴⁸ *The Citizen* 31 January 1992, *Business Day* 2 March 1992]

Early in February 1992 students at the Soweto College of Education boycotted classes and demanded that 12 students who had failed their first-year courses be readmitted. A spokesman for the students' representative council, Miss Theresa Matlala, said that classes would be boycotted 'until our demands are met'.⁴⁹ [⁴⁹ *Sowetan* 3 February 1992] In the same month three other colleges of education—at KwaThema (east Rand), Fort Beaufort (eastern Cape) and Setotolwane (Lebowa)—also had their classes disrupted.⁵⁰ [⁵⁰ *Ibid* 19 February 1992]

Later in February classes were disrupted at Diepdale High School in Soweto when a group of armed pupils, who demanded that fellow pupils who had failed at the end of 1991 be promoted, stormed the school looking for the principal. The attack resulted in teachers and the rest of the student body running away.⁵¹ [⁵¹ *Ibid* 18 February 1992] In the same month teachers at the Tladi Technical High School in Soweto told a meeting, convened at the school by the Soweto education co-ordinating committee, that the Congress of South African Students (Cosas) was contributing to the collapse of effective teaching and learning at the school.⁵² [⁵² *Ibid* 24 February 1992]

Also in February, more than 500 pupils in Thamagane (Lebowa) were left stranded when teachers walked out of the local school after the school principal, Mr Lazarus Mokgawa, had been expelled by villagers for allegedly bailing to present a financial statement regarding a pupils' trip to Johannesburg in 1989. Mr Mokgawa was not only supported by his own staff but also by the 13 teachers at the nearby Morotse Combined Primary School who staged a walk-out from their school.⁵³ [⁵³ *Ibid*]

The DET suspended indefinitely classes at the Transvaal College of Education in Soshanguve early in March 1992 after several students had embarked on a 'series of class boycotts'. The chairman of the

college council, Mr Job Schoeman, said that students had continued with boycotts despite the ‘intensive attention’ given by the authorities to their demands.⁵⁴ [⁵⁴ Ibid 5 March 1992]

The ten teachers at Enkolweni Primary School in Dobsonville (Soweto) staged a chalkdown early in March 1992 to demand that the school authorities review the appointment of a colleague as principal of the school. The teachers said that the newly appointed principal was ‘not fit for the post because he did not attend classes regularly but sat in the staff room studying for his degree’.⁵⁵ [⁵⁵ Ibid 10 March 1992]

In April 1992, 15 teachers from the Mandlenkosi Secondary School near KwaMashu (Durban) decided not to return to the school after they said that the leader of the local branch of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), Mr Mandia Shabalala, and some of his ‘followers’ on the school committee had threatened and intimidated them. About 1 000 pupils were affected by the absence of the teachers.⁵⁶ [⁵⁶ Echo 10 April 1992]

Also in April, the Cape College of Education at Fort Beaufort was closed after students refused to sign a list of conditions outlawing political activity on the campus,⁵⁷ [⁵⁷ *The Weekly Mail* 30 April 1992] while about 700 pupils from schools in Alexandra (Johannesburg) and Soweto participated in a protest march organised by Cosas in Johannesburg and missed a day of their schooling.⁵⁸ [⁵⁸ *The Citizen* 1 May 1992]

In May 1992, 28 teachers at the Rethusegile Secondary School at Hartebeesfontein (central Transvaal) went on strike in protest against late payment of their monthly salaries. The striking teachers said on 5 May that they had not received their April salaries and that a liaison officer for the DET, Mr Geoff Makwakwa, had said that cheques had been posted to the school on 27 April. A thousand children were affected by the strike.⁵⁹ [⁵⁹ *Sowetan* 6 May 1992]

For two days in May 1992 hundreds of schools were disrupted as a result of marches and strikes organised by the South African Democratic Teachers’ Union (Sadtu), demanding, inter alia, recognition of the union. A total of 66 African secondary schools and 282 primary schools on the Reef were disrupted by the protest, while more than 1000 teachers abandoned their classes to march from District Six to Parliament in Cape Town (see also chapter on *Education*).⁶⁰ [⁶⁰ *The Citizen* 22 May 1992]

Thousands of pupils and members of Sadtu in major centres throughout the country stayed away from school in August 1992 to join ‘mass action’ protest marches even though the organisers of the mass action campaign, the African National Congress, had urged teachers and pupils to continue at their schools instead of participating in the marches.⁶¹ [⁶¹ *Sowetan* 6 August 1992]

Return of exiles

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said at the end of 1991 that it would begin shortly bringing back to South Africa an estimated 30 000 exiles at the rate of more than two planeloads a week. The public information officer for the UNHCR, Mr Michael Keats, said that the repatriation programme, which was expected to last about six months and to cost R80m, was well under way, with about 2 000 exiles already registered with the organisation. He added that 600 of the 2 000 registered exiles, mainly students, had already been brought home and that a further 6 000 exiles had already returned home unassisted.⁶² [⁶² *Business Day* 30 January 1992]

In January 1992, 107 political exiles from Tanzania flew into Durban on the first flight for refugees returning to South Africa under the auspices of the UNHCR.⁶³ [⁶³ *The Natal Mercury* 10 January 1992] In the same month another 122 exiles landed in East London (eastern Cape) and 136 exiles were brought from Botswana to Johannesburg.⁶⁴ [⁶⁴ *The Citizen* 14 January 1992] According to Mr Keats, more than 1300 people had been cleared to return to South Africa and were awaiting flights, mostly from Tanzania, but also from Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe.⁶⁵ [⁶⁵ *The Natal Mercury* 10 January 1992]

Mr Keats said that the names of 4 000 exiles had been forwarded to the South African government by 25 January 1992 for indemnity from prosecution and that 3 506 of them had been cleared. He added that a further 82 cases had not been forwarded to the South African authorities as additional information was being sought about them.⁶⁶ [⁶⁶ *Ibid*, *The Citizen* 14 January]

The director general of home affairs, Mr Piet Colyn, said in the same month that 5 863 exiles had returned to South Africa before the involvement of the UNHCR. He added that more exiles were expected to register with the Department of Home Affairs but that he was not expecting the final number to be larger than 15 000.⁶⁷ [⁶⁷ *Business Day* 28 January 1992]

The head of the UNHCR mission in South Africa, Mr Kallu Kalumiya, said in February 1992 that 14 exiles had died in Tanzania while on their way to catch a flight to South Africa. The bus in which they were travelling had collided with a truck about 200km from Dar-es-Salaam and no exiles had survived the accident.⁶⁸ [⁶⁸ *The Star* 7 February 1992]

A spokesman for the employment and training section of the repatriation committee of the African National Congress (ANC), Mr Mzwandile Booi, said in January 1992 that it was difficult to find employment and accommodation for the hundreds of exiles who had returned home. One of the major problems was the 'racist attitudes and political prejudices' of white people in industry against exiles, he said. Mr Booi said that what was needed to solve the problem was affirmative action supported by a democratically elected government.⁶⁹ [⁶⁹ *Ibid* 16 January 1992]

The national co-ordinator for the national co-ordinating committee for the repatriation of South African exiles (NCCR), Mr Moss Chikane, said that his organisation was also experiencing difficulties placing professionally qualified returnees. He reported that some returning exiles had been told by prospective employers that they could not be employed unless they were registered with South African professional organisations. Exiles who could not find jobs included architects, doctors, engineers, geologists, journalists, lawyers, nurses and pharmacists.⁷⁰ [⁷⁰ Ibid]

Mr Chikane added, 'The unskilled are facing a more serious problem. They have to compete with millions of other unemployed people.' He said that his organisation would be starting a training programme at Charndor (west Rand), and the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa had offered to provide a similar training scheme which would involve unskilled, skilled and professional people.⁷¹ [⁷¹ Ibid]

A spokeswoman for the ANC, Ms Gill Marcus, said in February 1992 that her organisation was arranging for the government to grant passports to exiles who returned with United Nations travel documents. She added that many returnees had no other identity documents. Commenting on reports that some returning ANC members had had difficulty in obtaining financial support from the organisation, Ms Marcus said that occasions arose when the ANC experienced 'cash flow problems' and that payments to returning exiles who were members of the ANC could not be made from funds intended for other ANC activities. The exile repatriation programme was made more difficult by the fact that exiles were returning to a difficult environment, she said. Ms Marcus stressed that it was not the duty of just the ANC to look after returning exiles, but South African society as a whole should shoulder its responsibility for returnees.⁷² [⁷² *Business Day* 12 February 1992]

The Premier Milling Company and the National Soccer League donated R130 000 to the NCCR in February 1992. Accepting the donation on behalf of the co-ordinating committee, Mr Chikane said that the donation would go a long way towards improving the work of the organisation.⁷³ [⁷³ *The Citizen* 25 February 1992]

The Indemnity Act of 1990 was extended in May 1992 for another year with the approval of the three houses of Parliament. Introducing the motion to extend indemnity, the minister of justice, Mr Kobie Coetsee, said that 9 754 applications for amnesty or indemnity had been received, mainly from returning exiles, and that only 226 of these applications were still awaiting decisions by the indemnity committee.⁷⁴ [⁷⁴ *The Star* 8 May 1992]

Stayaways

Commemorative days

The president of the African National Congress (ANC), Mr Nelson Mandela, addressed a crowd of 18 000 people assembled in the Khayelitsha rugby stadium (western Cape) on 21 March 1992 to commemorate the fatal shooting of 69 residents of Sharpeville (southern Transvaal) on the same day in 1960. Mr Mandela said that there was a fear among whites that they would lose their jobs and pensions if the organisation came into power. He added, ‘There is no such intention. The ANC will have to retire some senior civil servants, but it will ensure that they receive their pensions.’ Mr Mandela emphasised that the organisation would certainly democratise the security and civil services, as it would not tolerate a situation in which they were controlled by a minority that had been trained to defend apartheid. However, nobody would lose his or her pension as a result of early retirement.⁷⁵ [⁷⁵ Ibid 23 March 1992]

At another Sharpeville Day commemoration gathering in Paarl (western Cape), Mr Mandela made a plea for black unity, urging the Azanian People’s Organisation (Azapo) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) to join forces with his organisation at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa).⁷⁶ [⁷⁶ Ibid]

In Vereeniging (southern Transvaal) on the same day, three ANC leaders—Messrs Cyril Ramaphosa, Walter Sisulu and Oliver Tambo—and the general secretary of the South African Communist Party, Mr Chris Hani, as well as the secretary general of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), Mr Jay Naidoo, addressed about 10 000 people who attended a commemoration service. Mr Tambo told the rally that the Sharpeville shootings had given force to the fight against apartheid, while Mr Sisulu appealed to ‘all political groups’ which had not joined Codesa to do so.⁷⁷ [⁷⁷ Ibid]

Speaking at a commemoration rally on the same day in Sharpeville, the president of the PAC, Mr Clarence Makwetu, accused Codesa of undermining the decisions of the patriotic front, saying that the front had agreed in 1991 that no single party would confront the government unilaterally (see *1991/92 Survey* p46). The chairman of the Transkei Military Council, Major General Bantu Holomisa, spoke on the same day at a rally in Uitenhage (eastern Cape).⁷⁸ [⁷⁸ Ibid]

Numerous rallies were held in many parts of the country on 16 June 1992 to commemorate Soweto Day. Services were held at Atteridgeville (Pretoria), Daveyton (east Rand), Durban, East London (eastern Cape), Paarl, Port Elizabeth, Soshanguve (north of Pretoria) and Soweto. The ANC launched its mass action campaign ‘to force the government to give way to democracy’ on the same day (see chapter on *Constitutional Change*).⁷⁹ [⁷⁹ Ibid 17 June 1992]

The Soweto Day commemoration resulted in thousands of workers, particularly on the Reef, staying away from work. However, the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce and Industry said that although 90% of workers on the Reef had stayed away, about 25% of employees had not turned up for work because of industrial agreements making 16 June a public holiday.⁸⁰ [⁸⁰ Ibid]

Other stayaways

In March 1992 residents of Noordgesig, a coloured township near Johannesburg, staged a stayaway in protest against threats by the Johannesburg City Council to evict tenants who had failed to pay rent and service charges. According to a spokesman for the Noordgesig Civic Association, Mr Mike Fetane, the threats from the council followed a decision by residents to embark on a rent and electricity charge boycott because of 'inadequate infrastructure, services and electricity' in the area. He said that there were many structural defects in houses in Noordgesig and that some families had received electricity accounts in excess of R1 000 a month. In addition to participating in the stayaway, protesting residents delivered a letter to the local councillor, Miss Cathy Seefort, demanding her resignation from the management committee.⁸¹ [⁸¹ *Sowetan* 12 March 1992]

Also in March 1992, political organisations in Alexandra (Johannesburg) held a stayaway in the township to 'force local police' to assist in ending political violence in the area (see also *Political Conflict* below). An official of the Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging region of the ANC, Mr Ronnie Mamoepa, said that the stayaway was called after a magistrate refused to grant permission to the ANC, Azapo and the PAC to hold a march in the township. He added that the march had been intended to demand the presence of more police patrols, the establishment of a mobile police station near the Madala hostel (where violence had started) and that 'strangers' who had occupied houses adjacent to the hostel after families had fled in the wake of violence should be evicted.⁸² [⁸² *The Citizen* 26 March 1992]

A stayaway was organised by the ANC and Cosatu in Nelspruit (eastern Transvaal) in March 1992 to coincide with the funeral of Mr Andries Sithole, a gardener who had been killed in a bomb explosion at the house of a local school principal, Mr Con Booyens (see *Sabotage* below). A spokesman for the Nelspruit region of the ANC, Mr Jackson Mthembu, said that the stayaway was the first protest action in the area against 'violence, terrorism and racism' in the eastern Transvaal. Mr Mthembu said that he was convinced that the planting of the bomb at Mr Booyens' house was the work of 'right-wing terrorists'. He added that the ANC called on the right wing to 'stop their terrorist actions and join negotiations for a peaceful South Africa'.⁸³ [⁸³ *Ibid* 24 March 1992]

In May 1992 police fired teargas to disperse about 5 000 residents of Imbali and Edendale (both in Natal) who were attempting to march on the Pietermaritzburg magistrate's court during a stayaway organised in support of 26 members of the ANC Women's League who had been charged with trespassing. The women had staged a sit-in the previous day at a local police station to demand the removal of riot police, the KwaZulu Police and 32 Battalion soldiers from Imbali (see also chapter on *Security*).⁸⁴ [⁸⁴ *Ibid* 6 May 1992]

Some residents said that the police and soldiers favoured the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and supported its members in attacks on ANC targets. A member of the central committee of the IFP, Mr David

Ntombela, said that people were being intimidated and forced to take part in the stayaway and threatened that he would become involved in mass mobilisation of the community to restore peace and security.⁸⁵ [85 Ibid 7 May 1992]

The week-long stayaway was called off after the Pietermaritzburg area had been declared an unrest area. Organisers of the stayaway requested that the Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation (the Goldstone commission) investigate the conduct of the security forces in the area (see chapter on *Security*).⁸⁶ [86 *The Star* 11 May 1992]

Boycotts

Sports boycott

In January 1992 the assistant coach to the South African national soccer team, Mr Stanley ‘Screamer’ Tshabalala, welcomed the recommendation by the African Football Confederation that South Africa be readmitted to the international soccer fold. Mr Tshabalala said, ‘It has taken a long time, but it was worth the waiting. We are back in business at last.’ The confederation had made its recommendation to the Federation of International Football Associations (Fifa) at a meeting in Dakar (Senegal) earlier in the same month. The general secretary of the South African Football Association, Mr Solomon ‘Sticks’ Morewa, said, ‘Fifa has always said that it would abide by the confederation’s decision. But it is clear that Fifa would be more than happy to readmit South Africa because of the political changes in our country and the reunification of football on nonracial grounds.’⁸⁷ [87 *The Citizen* 11 January 1992]

The Springbok emblem, the South African flag and the national anthem were not used when the South African cricket team played in the World Cup series in Australia in February 1992. Instead of using the South African flag, the cricketers used the banner of the United Cricket Board of South Africa. The team manager, Mr Alan Jordan, explained that the squad neither sang the national anthem nor used the Springbok emblem and the South African flag because they realised the ‘sensitivity’ around the use of these symbols at this time in South Africa’s history. He said that the decision not to use them was taken by the executive of the United Cricket Board of South Africa.⁸⁸ [88 Ibid 17 February 1992]

Mr Jordan said that the issue of the Springbok symbol, flag and anthem had been discussed in talks to unify cricket bodies in South Africa prior to the board’s readmission to the International Cricket Conference in London in July 1991. ‘The short tour to India, our readmission to the World Cup and future tours by India, Pakistan and West Indies would not be possible if the issues were not resolved by all parties. We decided [that] the use of a Springbok emblem will stand over until a later stage when more united sporting bodies have emerged and an emblem acceptable to all people has been introduced,’ Mr Jordan reported.⁸⁹ [89 Ibid]

In February 1992 the international secretary of the Halt All Racist Tours (Hart), Mr John Minto, demanded that the South African national cricket team which was touring Australia and New Zealand should sign an anti-apartheid pledge. The African National Congress (ANC) spokesman on sport, Mr Steve Tshwete, told Mr Minto that the South African team competing in the World Cup series had been selected on merit and that it enjoyed the full support and approval of all the people of South Africa. Mr Tshwete said that he had pointed out to Mr Minto that ‘we in South Africa are busy with a process of rebuilding and nobody can point a finger at the selectors for not including more black or coloured players in the squad ... As far as South Africa is concerned, organisations such as Hart have lost their purpose and right to exist’.⁹⁰ [⁹⁰ *Business Day* 28 February, *The Citizen* 29 February 1992]

The pledge which Mr Minto wished the South Africans to sign stated: ‘(1) We abhor apartheid as a crime against humanity; (2) We give our total commitment to a democratic, nonracial South Africa based on one person, one vote and votes of equal value; and (3) We deplore and condemn Mr de Klerk’s attempt to write a veto into the new constitution.’

The chairman of the Transkei Military Council, Major General Bantu Holomisa, said in June 1992 that South Africa’s participation at the Olympic Games in Barcelona (Spain) should be suspended in the light of the deadlock in constitutional negotiations. Gen Holomisa added that the tours to South Africa by the New Zealand rugby team and a cricket team from India should also be suspended.⁹¹ [⁹¹ *The Citizen*, *Sowetan* 8 June 1992]

Early in July 1992 the ANC gave the go-ahead for South Africa’s participation in international sport, including the Olympic Games, a tour by the Crystal Palace Football Club (England) and a tour by the Cameroon soccer team, as well as tours by the Australian and New Zealand rugby teams.⁹² [⁹² *The Citizen* 2 July 1992]

However, the ANC warned that its decision would be constantly reviewed and would depend on the government’s actions ‘on the crucial questions of peace and democracy’. Mr Tshwete said. If there is no progress in this regard, the ANC and other democratic organisations will consider a halt to all tours.’ The ANC required sports bodies to voice their unqualified support for a democratically elected constitution-making body and linked them to its condemnation of violence, particularly the Boipatong massacre (see *Political Conflict* below).⁹³ [⁹³ *Ibid*]

South African rugby chiefs rejected suggestions by the ANC and the National Olympic and Sports Congress that South African rugby players should wear ‘peace and democracy’ armbands during the tours in mid 1992 by the Australian and New Zealand teams. This drew an angry reaction from Mr Tshwete, who said that the president of the Transvaal Rugby Union, Mr Louis Luyt, was ‘arrogant’.⁹⁴ [⁹⁴ *Saturday Star* 4 July 1992]

Mr Luyt accused the ANC of bringing politics into sport, adding that he would

rather leave rugby than be dictated to by politicians.⁹⁵ [⁹⁵ *The Star* 6 July 1992]

On 15 August 1992, prior to a match between the South African and New Zealand rugby teams at Ellis Park (Johannesburg), it was reported that spectators had sung the South African national anthem. The ANC said that the singing of the national anthem was in violation of an agreement between the ANC and Mr Luyt that the rugby tour would go ahead on condition that the South African anthem was not sung and that the crowd was asked to observe a minute's silence before each match 'for freedom and democracy' and to honour those who had died at Boipatong (southern Transvaal) in June 1992 (see *Political Conflict* below). An ANC spokesman, Mr Saki Macozoma, warned that the ANC would 'urgently review' its position on further rugby tours.⁹⁶ [⁹⁶ *Ibid* 18 August 1992] Mr Luyt subsequently admitted that he had ordered the South African anthem to be played at the Ellis Park match. However, he denied that he had broken an agreement with the ANC. Mr Luyt argued that spectators should be allowed to sing the anthem if they chose to do so.⁹⁷ [⁹⁷ *The Citizen, Sowetan* 18 August 1992]

Rent and bond boycotts

According to the minister of local government and national housing and of public works, Mr Leon Wessels, by April 1992 an amount of R1,58bn was owed to African local authorities countrywide as a consequence of rent and service boycotts (in comparison with R1,12bn at the end of 1990). In April 1992 the amount owed in the Cape province was R134m; in Natal, R7m; in the Orange Free State, R69m; and in the Transvaal, R1,25bn. Mr Wessels said that although there was a political motivation for the rent and service boycotts, large-scale unemployment made it difficult for many Africans to pay for services. He added that 'bad' administration by African local authorities affected the quality of services rendered in the townships.⁹⁸ [⁹⁸ *Hansard* (A) 6 q cols 504-511, 24 March 1992; (A) 19 q cols 1232- 1234, 3 June 1992]

It was reported in January 1992 that although boycotts of service charges had been lifted in most African townships in the Transvaal, water and electricity payments in many townships remained poor. A spokesman for the Civic Associations of Southern Transvaal, Mr Dan Mofokeng, said that township residents were dissatisfied with white local authorities providing electricity to neighbouring African townships. He added that negotiations were taking place to ensure that Eskom supplied electricity directly to African townships.⁹⁹ [⁹⁹ *The Star* 27 January 1992]

Agreement was reached in January 1992 between the Soweto Civic Association (SCA), the Diepmeadow City Council, the Dobsonville Town Council, the Soweto City Council and the Transvaal Provincial Administration, whereby the three councils were to upgrade their provision of services and improve the administration of greater Soweto. In return residents agreed to improve payments for services consumed. The tariff for services was set at R55 for January and was due to increase by R10

every three months until October 1992.¹⁰⁰ [¹⁰⁰ *Sowetan* 31 January 1992, *The Star* 21 March 1992]

In April 1992 the chairman of the SCA, Mr Isaac Mogase, announced that the rent and service boycott would be resumed. The boycott was called in response to the perceived failure of the three councils of greater Soweto to deliver services of an improved quality, and ongoing public allegations of corruption and mismanagement in the councils. Mr Mogase said that the boycott would be suspended when all African councillors in greater Soweto had been removed from office, the Johannesburg City Council had taken over the financial administration of greater Soweto and township violence had ended.¹⁰¹ [¹⁰¹ *The Star* 3 April 1992]

A spokesman for the Soweto City Council, Mr Mojalefa Moseki, said in the same month that improvements in the provision of services had already occurred.¹⁰² [¹⁰² *Ibid*] However, the chairman of the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber (CWMC), Dr Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert, acknowledged that the three councils had not met the conditions of service specified in the January agreement as the councils lacked the expertise to do so. He pointed out that residents had also failed to pay service tariffs. Only 30% of the residents of greater Soweto were paying service charges in March 1992, in comparison with 60% in December 1991.¹⁰³ [¹⁰³ *Ibid*]

In April 1992 Eskom took over the supply of electricity from the Dobsonville and Soweto councils because of poor maintenance of installations and erratic administration of accounts. The SCA called on residents to continue to pay for electricity during the April 1992 service charges boycott.¹⁰⁴ [¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*]

In June 1992 the CWMC established a committee to negotiate the end of the boycott and discuss the more efficient supply of services to greater Soweto. The Johannesburg City Council also committed itself to taking over the administration of services to Diepmeadow and Soweto, while the Roodepoort City Council was to administer the provision of services to Dobsonville (see also chapter on *Constitutional Change*).¹⁰⁵ [¹⁰⁵ *Business Day* 11 June 1992]

Residents of Boipatong, Bophelong, Sebokeng and Sharpeville (all in the southern Transvaal) embarked on a service-charge boycott following the Boipatong massacre in June 1992 in which 39 people were killed (see *Political Conflict* below). An urban affairs consultant and a former chairman of the Johannesburg Central Business District Association, Mr Nigel Mandy, said that tariff payments for June in these townships had declined to less than 20% of the amount owed. He added that an outbreak of cholera was imminent in the region following the vandalism of municipal water mains and sewers.¹⁰⁶ [¹⁰⁶ *Ibid* 28 July 1992]

The president of the South African National Civic Organisation (Sanco), Mr Moses Mayekiso, said in April 1992 that his organisation would not accept an offer by the Cape Provincial Administration to

freeze rent arrears. Mr Mayekiso said that arrears should be written off altogether. He warned that mass action would follow if residents were evicted for failing to pay rent and service charges.¹⁰⁷ [¹⁰⁷ *New Nation* 30 April 1992]

The publicity secretary of the Mangaung Civic Organisation (Bloernfontein, Orange Free State), Mr Sam Mohata, said in February 1992 that his organisation would oppose attempts by the Mangaung Town Council to sell the houses of rent defaulters to new owners in an attempt to recover R24m in rent and service charge arrears which had accumulated over the previous three years. It was reported in the same month that the Mangaung Town Council had attempted to break the rent boycott by issuing summonses instructing non-paying residents to report to the Batho police station, where residents were threatened with legal action if they failed to pay.¹⁰⁸ [¹⁰⁸ *Ibid* 14 February 1992]

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (world bank) estimated that by the end of 1991 some 170 000 African families living in townships had mortgage bonds on their homes amounting to between R6bn and R8bn.¹⁰⁹ [¹⁰⁹ *Work in Progress* August 1992]

The senior general manager of First National Bank and the president of the Association of Mortgage Lenders, Mr Norman Axten, said in July 1992 that political instability in African townships and threats of bond boycotts had made investors and construction companies reluctant to become involved in the lower end of the housing market despite funds being available.¹¹⁰ [¹¹⁰ *Business Day* 6 July 1991]

The director of the Association of Mortgage Lenders, Mr Martin Milburn-Pyle, said that while he was not aware of any formal bond boycotts in the country as at July 1992, the threat of such boycotts was sufficient to frighten off financial institutions.¹¹¹ [¹¹¹ Information supplied by the director of the Association of Mortgage Lenders, Mr M Milburn-Pyle. 4 August 1992] It was reported in August 1992 that 30% of the estimated 170 000 African families with housing mortgage bonds had stopped paying instalments on their bonds.¹¹² [¹¹² *Work in Process* August 1992] In the same month it was reported that the resale of houses in African townships after repossession from borrowers who had defaulted had become increasingly difficult, as many vacated homes were either heavily vandalised or labelled as 'no-go' properties for prospective buyers. A common warning that a house had been repossessed and should not be resold was allegedly a tyre placed on the roof of the house.¹¹³ [¹¹³ *Business Day* 3 August 1992]

In July 1992 Sanco called for a national bond boycott to begin the following month. Mr Mayekiso said that the boycott would be called off if certain demands were met, which included: greater sensitivity on the part of lending institutions to blacks, as housing bonds were regarded as generally inaccessible to blacks; the disbanding of racially defined local authorities; and pressure to be placed on the government by financial institutions for an interim government and a constituent assembly by the end of 1992.¹¹⁴ [¹¹⁴]

Ibid 7, 27 July 1992]

The call for the bond boycott was publicly condemned by a range of private sector bodies, including the Association of Mortgage Lenders, the South African Housing Trust and the Urban Foundation, and political organisations, including the ANC, the Inkatha Freedom Party and the Pan-Africanist Congress.¹¹⁵ [115 Ibid 8 July 1992, *Sowetan* 28 July 1992] It was reported that a number of banks and building societies had responded to the call for the bond boycott by freezing the allocation of new mortgage bonds to African townships.¹¹⁶ [116 *Sunday Star* 26 July 1992] In response to the criticism of Sanco, Mr Mayekiso said that other organisations were ‘out of touch’ with people who were unable to obtain mortgage bonds.¹¹⁷ [117 *Sowetan* 29 July 1992] He added that financial institutions involved in bond freezes would be the target of mass action.¹¹⁸ [118 *Sunday Star* 26 July 1992]

Consumer boycotts

No consumer boycotts were reported between January and June 1992.

In July 1992 the Broad Forum, consisting of an alliance of community-based organisations in the Vaal Triangle (southern Transvaal), called for an intensification of the consumer boycott of white-owned businesses in the area following the massacre at Boipatong in June 1992 (see also *Political Conflict* below). However, Indian-owned businesses were exempted from the boycott. The demands of the Broad Forum included:¹¹⁹ [119 *The Citizen, The Star* 7 July 1992]

- the closure and demolition of the KwaMadala hostel in Boipatong;
- the arrest and prosecution of all people implicated in violence;
- the withdrawal of all security forces from the Vaal Triangle townships;
- the financial compensation by Iscor (which had managed the KwaMadala hostel) of Boipatong residents who had suffered losses in the Boipatong massacre; and
- the clarification by OK Bazaars, Premier Milling and Blue Ribbon Bakeries of the reasons for the material support given to the KwaMadala hostel residents by the delivery of food to hostel residents the day after the massacre.

Business people in the area were said to view the boycott as senseless because it affected ‘apolitical business people and innocent consumers’. The chairman of the Vereeniging Sakekamer, Mr Hennie

Olberts, said later in July 1992 that smaller businesses were worst affected by the consumer boycott but added that the boycotters were suffering too.¹²⁰ [¹²⁰ *Business Day* 10 July 1992]

According to a statement published in *The Weekly Mail* by The Premier Group later in July 1992, Premier food parcels which had been sold to a welfare organisation were delivered to the hostel by that organisation and not by Premier Milling and Blue Ribbon Bakeries. The Premier Group said that it had met the parties concerned and the boycott against it had subsequently been suspended.¹²¹ [¹²¹ *The Weekly Mail* 31 July 1992]

A Soweto consumer boycott committee announced in July 1992 that residents of some Soweto and Dobsonville townships were to start a boycott of shops in Roodepoort (west Rand) and neighbouring towns in the same month. The main purpose of the boycott was reported to be to put pressure on business people to discuss the problem of violence with the government. Further demands included the closure of the Siphwe and Mzimhlophe hostels in Soweto, the immediate release of members of the committee who were in detention and the withdrawal of criminal charges against committee members.¹²² [¹²² *The Star* 14 July 1992] The boycott was suspended at the end of September after the local business community and the police agreed that the hostels would be fenced off.¹²³ [¹²³ *The Citizen* 24 September 1992]

In July 1992 the Kokstad Civic Association (southern Natal) called on residents of Bhongweni township to start a selective consumer boycott of Kokstad businesses in order to force the town council to address the housing shortage in the area. Shops belonging to Kokstad town councillors or those directly connected with the council were targeted in the boycott. However, the association said that if within a month of the commencement of the boycott no progress had been made in addressing the housing shortage, the consumer boycott could be extended to include all businesses in the area.¹²⁴ [¹²⁴ *Echo* 16 July 1992]

The boycott, however, did not occur as the demands of the association were met.¹²⁵ [¹²⁵ Telephonic interview with Mr Shabir Moosa, Kokstad Civic Association, 27 October 1992]

Also in July, the eastern Cape region of the ANC called for a boycott of three English-language newspapers, the *Eastern Province Herald*, the *Evening Post* and the *Weekend Post*. The local ANC branch demanded an end to the newspapers' practising 'continuous ANC-bashing' in their reporting, restructuring of the newspapers, and an effort to redress gender and racial imbalances in the employment and promotion of staff.¹²⁶ [¹²⁶ *The Weekly Mail* 31 July 1992] The national office of the ANC condemned the public burning of copies of the newspapers which occurred in Port Elizabeth prior to the commencement of the boycott. The general secretary of the ANC, Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, said that the

ANC would always seek to ensure the safety of journalists and their right to publish views and events 'as they occurred'.¹²⁷ [¹²⁷ *Business Day* 31 July 1992] The ANC did issue a statement, however, that while newspaper editors had the right to print what they wanted, consumers had the right not to buy the product.¹²⁸ [¹²⁸ *The Star* 31 July 1992]

The chairman of the Campaign for Open Media, Mr Raymond Louw, said that the boycott contradicted the ANC's commitment to freedom of speech.¹²⁹ [¹²⁹ *The Weekly Mail* 31 July 1992] The boycott of the *Evening Post* and the *Weekend Post* was lifted at the end of August 1992 after discussions between the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), and the editor of these papers, Mr Neville Woudberg. It was agreed that in future there would be a single edition of the *Evening Post*, that it would cover all activities (including activities in rural areas and those of different sectors of society) and that the newspaper would create a weekly column to cover political views of different political parties.¹³⁰ [¹³⁰ *The Citizen, Sowetan* 27 August 1992]

In August 1992 the ANC/Cosatu/SACP alliance called for a consumer boycott in the eastern Transvaal from 24 August 1992 in order to obtain the reinstatement of 300 employees of various companies who had been dismissed after the national stayaway earlier in the month. The boycott was to continue until the workers were reinstated, food prices were lowered, the South African Broadcasting Corporation was democratised, the Mozambique border fence was de-electrified, dismissed hospital workers were reinstated, all charges emanating from the previous mass action campaign were withdrawn, and police and soldiers involved in political killings were suspended.¹³¹ [¹³¹ *The Citizen* 20 August 1992] The boycott was suspended in September to allow for 'meaningful negotiations' between the ANC/Cosatu/SACP alliance and the companies involved in the dismissal of workers.¹³² [¹³² *Sowetan* 23 September 1992]

A boycott of Barberton and Witbank (both in the eastern Transvaal) was reported to have started two weeks previously and according to the chambers of commerce of these two towns, it had affected businesses severely. The secretary of the ANC's eastern Transvaal region, Mr Joe Nkuna, said later in August that the boycott had been especially effective in Nelspruit. According to the president of the Nelspruit Chamber of Commerce, Mr Auke Keyser, the consumer boycott would serve only to aggravate unemployment in the area.¹³³ [¹³³ *The Citizen* 25 August 1992]

Homelands

Demands for reincorporation

In May 1992 residents of GaRankuwa and Mabopane (both in **Bophuthatswana**) held a one-day stayaway in protest against the Bophuthatswana administration's refusal to agree to the reincorporation

of the territory into South Africa and its refusal to rejoin the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) (see also chapter on *Constitutional Change*). The stayaway, organised by the Congress of South African Trade Unions, was reported by industries in Rosslyn (Pretoria) to have had the support of 100% of workers there.¹³⁴ [¹³⁴ *Ibid*]

During the stayaway four members of the African National Congress were allegedly arrested and police used teargas to disperse people marching on the GaRankuwa police station. Five women were briefly detained when they allegedly stopped taxis in Mabopane and forced commuters to join the stayaway which, according to the police and business leaders, was largely ineffective' in that area.¹³⁵ [¹³⁵ *The Star* 12 May 1992]

The chairman of the **Ciskei** Military Council, Brigadier Joshua 'Oupa' Gqozo, said in May 1992, 'I firmly believe that reincorporation [into South Africa] or an interim government now is like entering a dark tunnel. You get in and think there is peace and safety. But people mug you and you are not seen again.' He also said that he would be angry if the Ciskei administration disbanded and elections were held for a federal government, and he stood for election but was not chosen.¹³⁶ [¹³⁶ *South* 9 May 1992]

In April 1992 the Ciskei administration announced that it no longer considered a referendum to be necessary 'to test the will of the people' on the question of the reincorporation of the territory into South Africa. In a policy document submitted to Codesa, the Ciskei administration said that it wished to reiterate its commitment to the concept of reincorporation into a democratic united South Africa. It added, however, 'reincorporation of Ciskei into a new South Africa can take place only when the new South Africa has taken shape and the people of the Ciskei know what they are going to rejoin and know that in doing so they will be better off than they have been in the past'.¹³⁷ [¹³⁷ *Daily Dispatch* 24 April 1992]

The **Transkei** administration said in February 1992 that it would hold a referendum under the auspices of Codesa on reincorporation of the territory into South Africa.¹³⁸ [¹³⁸ *Eastern Province Herald* 12 February 1992]

However, the chairman of the Transkei Military Council, Major General Bantu Holomisa, said in April that the issue of such a referendum had been overtaken by events and was therefore no longer necessary. Gen Holomisa said that because the Transkei authorities had participated fully in all Codesa working groups, a meeting of his administration and the territory's paramount chiefs and dignitaries had decided that a referendum to test the views of Transkei on reincorporation was no longer necessary.¹³⁹ [¹³⁹ *Daily Dispatch, The Citizen, Sowetan*, 14 April 1992]

Homeland administrations and negotiations

See chapter on *Constitutional Change*.

Political developments in particular homelands

Bophuthatswana

In February 1992 the Bophuthatswana administration reiterated its refusal to sign the declaration of intent at Codesa and said that participation of representatives of the administration in the operation and functioning of Codesa did not imply that it had consented to the declaration. The administration had previously refused to agree to the declaration at Codesa's launch in December 1991 in order to 'protect its sovereignty' and said that it reserved the right to dissociate itself from the decisions of Codesa where they affected the 'independent' homeland.¹⁴⁰ [¹⁴⁰ *The Citizen* 25 February 1992]

In March 1992 the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) were prevented from establishing branches at Stinkwater and Mabopane respectively. A spokesman for the ANC Women's League, Ms Joan Fubbs, said that about 100 women were arrested by Bophuthatswana police at Stinkwater prior to the launch of a branch there, while the chairman of the Mabopane branch of the PAC, Mr Elliot Mahlangu, said that the launch of the branch was cancelled after the homeland's security forces disrupted his organisation's meeting.¹⁴¹ [¹⁴¹ *Sunday Star* 8 March 1992]

Opening his homeland's parliament in April 1992, the president of Bophuthatswana, Chief Lucas Mangope, said that Bophuthatswana wanted to continue as an 'autonomous country' and that it would consider reincorporation into South Africa only if a new constitution offered the homeland a better deal than it already had, adding that such a decision would be left to the Batswana people.¹⁴² [¹⁴² *Business Day* 29 April 1992]

The Mmabatho Supreme Court issued an order in May 1992 restraining the ANC from holding meetings in the homeland. The order, issued by Mr Justice J A M Khumalo in concurrence with Mr Justice H N Hendler, followed an urgent application by the ANC in which the organisation applied for the Bophuthatswana minister of law and order, Chief Mangope, to be compelled to grant it permission to hold meetings in the territory. The head of the foreign affairs department of the ANC, Mr Thabo Mbeki, made the application after the ANC had been refused permission to hold meetings in the Odi district of Bophuthatswana.¹⁴³ [¹⁴³ *Sowetan* 6 May 1992]

In June 1992 the Bophuthatswana deputy minister of law and order, Mr Amon Segoe, claimed that the ANC planned to topple the administration of the homeland through violence and mass action. Mr Segoe said further that the ANC planned to march to the administration's consulates in South Africa and occupy them by force. He stressed that information available to the administration indicated that the

ANC would boycott products to and from the homeland as well as companies dealing with its administration.¹⁴⁴ [¹⁴⁴ Ibid 25 June 1992]

Mr Segoe was reacting to a report in which the leader of the South African Communist Party, Mr Chris Hani, was quoted as saying we are going to tackle [President Lucas] Mangope with peaceful marches, and protests'.¹⁴⁵ [¹⁴⁵ *Sunday Times* 16 August 1992]

Ciskei

The chairman of the Ciskei Military Council, Brigadier Joshua 'Oupa' Gqozo, told the media in February 1992 that most of the homeland administrations at Codesa, including the Ciskei, wanted 'some form of self-rule within a federal system and not Codesa's proposed unitary stater'.¹⁴⁶ [¹⁴⁶ *The Citizen* 6 February 1992]

In March 1992 the Ciskei administration signed the *National Peace Accord*. This occurred after the administration had withdrawn from a conflict resolution committee in 1991 as a result of conflict with the ANC over an alleged plot by the ANC to overthrow the military council.¹⁴⁷ [¹⁴⁷ Ibid 5 March 1992]

In the same month the Ciskei administration denied allegations by the ANC that its officials were using the headman system to undermine the authority of tribal chiefs in the territory. The ANC public secretary for the Border region of the ANC, Miss Marion Sparg, said that the undermining of chiefs was the 'major reason' for the ANC's political campaigns against the homeland administration.¹⁴⁸ [¹⁴⁸ *Daily Dispatch* 28 March 1992]

On 7 September 1992, 29 supporters of the ANC were killed and 200 others injured outside Bisho when members of the Ciskei Defence Force (CDF) opened fire on a crowd marching to the homeland's capital to protest against alleged political repression in the homeland. The state president, Mr F W de Klerk, subsequently blamed 'ANC mass action' for the bloodshed, while the ANC itself laid the blame for the killings on the South African government.

Commenting on the massacre Mr de Klerk said, 'I did not start that mass action, the ANC did. The whole situation could have been avoided if the ANC adhered to the guidelines of the Goldstone commission and the ruling of the court'.¹⁴⁹ [¹⁴⁹ *Business Day* 8 September 1992]

The Goldstone commission, which investigated the deaths at Bisho, said in a report which was published in late September 1992 that the shooting was 'morally and legally indefensible and deserving of the strongest censure'. It criticised the organisers of the march for acting in bad faith by not informing the

National Peace Secretariat representatives at the scene that they intended to break the conditions set for the march by the Ciskei authorities by leaving the Bisho stadium. The commission also called on the leadership to 'publicly censure' an ANC leader, Mr Ronnie Kasrils, and other ANC officials for leading the demonstrators out of the Bisho stadium and 'thereby knowingly or negligently exposing them to the danger of death or injury'. However, the commission stressed that its criticism of the organisers of the march could in no way excuse the conduct of the Ciskei soldiers. It added that 'continued and prolonged' firing, even after the crowd turned and fled, was 'quite unjustified and unlawful'.¹⁵⁰ [¹⁵⁰ *The Star* 30 September 1992]

The Goldstone commission recommended that:

- the attorney general of the Ciskei recommend that criminal charges be brought against those responsible for the shootings;
- the officers commanding the CDF conduct an inquiry into the training and discipline of their members;
- the homeland authorities 'declare themselves willing to tolerate and facilitate reasonable and negotiated public demonstrations in the areas under their control';
- those in control of any area of South Africa 'tolerate and allow complete freedom of expression and of peaceful assembly'; and
- the leaders of all organisations which used 'forms of mass public demonstrations do so only as a peaceful means to popularise political policies'. It said that they should 'immediately and publicly abandon any political action calculated to result in conflict and violence'.

The Ciskei authorities rejected the Goldstone commission's report. The South African government praised Mr Justice Richard Goldstone for the speed with which his investigation was conducted and emphasised the 'important role which the commission can play in providing an objective evaluation of the causes of violence'. The ANC welcomed the findings of the report. However, it rejected the commission's recommendation that Mr Kasrils and other leaders who had led demonstrators out of the Bisho stadium be censured. The ANC said that its national executive committee took 'collective responsibility' for the decision to march out of the stadium. It added that future mass action would be conducted within the framework of the *National Peace Accord* and the recommendations of the Goldstone commission.¹⁵¹ [¹⁵¹ *Ibid* 1 October 1992]

A commission was also appointed by the Ciskei authorities under the chief justice of the Ciskei, Mr Justice B Pickard, to investigate the Bisho deaths. In his report Judge Pickard said that the leaders of the march had led the crowd towards the guns of CDF members like lambs to the slaughter'. He added that 'it seems ... that a large amount of the blame for what occurred on this fateful day should be laid at the

doors of the ANC leadership'. Judge Pickard said that soldiers who had fired at the group of demonstrators led by Mr Kasrils may well have been justified in firing some shots'. He said, however, 'The conclusion is inescapable that the shooting on the southern and eastern sides of the stadium should never have occurred, that matters got entirely out of hand, and that the soldiers overreacted considerably.'¹⁵² [¹⁵² *The Citizen* 2 October 1992]

The ANC rejected Judge Pickard's report 'without consideration or qualification'. However, his findings were welcomed by the Ciskei authorities.¹⁵³ [¹⁵³ *Business Day* 2 October 1992]

Gazankulu

In March 1992 the chief minister of Gazankulu, Professor Hudson Ntsanwisi, said that he believed that widening the base of democracy could best be achieved through the implementation of strong regional government in which decision making was devolved or decentralised to the lowest level capable of dealing with it (see also chapter on *Constitutional Change*).¹⁵⁴ [¹⁵⁴ *Barometer* March 1992]

Intervention by the South African government in June 1992 was reported to have prevented a 'threatened war' between the Gazankulu and Lebowa authorities in a dispute over their boundaries. Following negotiations by the deputy minister of law and order, Mr Johan Scheepers, with the two chief ministers (Professor Ntsanwisi and the chief minister of Lebowa, Mr Nelson Ramodike, both of whom were signatories of the *National Peace Accord*), a judicial commission of inquiry into the border dispute was appointed by the South African government under a former chief justice, Mr Justice P J Rabie.¹⁵⁵ [¹⁵⁵ *The Citizen* 10 June 1992]

The commission's task was to investigate and make recommendations to the two homeland administrations, tribal authorities, traditional leaders and the people of Gazankulu and Lebowa regarding the boundaries of the respective areas over which the legislative assemblies and tribal authorities should have jurisdiction.¹⁵⁶ [¹⁵⁶ *Ibid* 10 June 1992] The commission had not yet drawn up a report at the time of writing.

KaNgwane

In May 1992 the Inyandza National Movement of KaNgwane rejected the idea of a federal system of government. The president of the organisation and chief minister of KaNgwane, Mr Caiphus Zitha, said, 'We are for a strong central government which will be able to address the inequalities created by apartheid.'¹⁵⁷ [¹⁵⁷ *New Nation* 22 May 1992] Mr Zitha added that although the Inyandza National Movement believed strongly in negotiations, the organisation would consider taking other action if

negotiations failed.¹⁵⁸ [¹⁵⁸ Ibid]

In June 1992 the Conservative Party (CP) made a formal complaint to the South African auditor general, Mr Peter Wronsley, about the purchase of three white-owned farms near Nelspruit (eastern Transvaal)—Broedershoek, Broedersvrede and Goedehoop—for incorporation into KaNgwane. Mr Schalk Pienaar MP (CP) said that the KaNgwane authorities had bought the land with the consent of the minister of regional and land affairs, Mr Jacob de Villiers, and that funds for the purchase had been obtained by means of a bank loan guaranteed by the South African government. The farms were reported to have been bought for the extension of KaNyamazane, the capital of KaNgwane.¹⁵⁹ [¹⁵⁹ *The Citizen* 4 June 1992]

In reaction to the complaint by the CP, Mr de Villiers declared that the South African government had not acted irregularly, saying that ‘no unauthorised expenditure’ was involved and that the purchase had taken place after consultation between the KaNgwane administration and the government.¹⁶⁰ [¹⁶⁰ Ibid 6 June 1992]

In July 1992 the prime minister of Swaziland, Mr Obed Dlamini, said that he would open talks for the ‘return’ of KaNgwane to Swaziland once a new government was in place. He claimed that KaNgwane was a part of Swaziland. In reply Mr Zitha pointed out that a South African judicial commission set up in 1983 to investigate Swazi claims to KaNgwane had rejected them. Instead he invited Swaziland to incorporate itself into South Africa.¹⁶¹ [¹⁶¹ Ibid 25 July 1992]

KwaNdebele

In January 1992 the KwaNdebele administration appointed a former South African police officer, Lieutenant Gregory Rockman, to its police force. (Lt Rockman had been dismissed from the South African Police (SAP) in March 1990 after criticising the riot police for their handling of unrest in the western Cape—see *1989/90 Survey* p192. Subsequently, in July 1991, he had applied to KwaNdebele for employment.) The homeland’s minister of law and order, Mr Steve Mabona, said that the appointment of Lt Rockman and four other commissioned black policemen was aimed at improving the image of the police force.¹⁶² [¹⁶² *The Star* 16 January 1992]

The Commission of Inquiry into the 1986 Unrest and Alleged Mismanagement in KwaNdebele, headed by Mr Justice Benjamin Parsons, was appointed in 1989 to investigate the unrest which had erupted in 1986 when citizens of KwaNdebele had rejected plans for the homeland to become independent (see *1986 Survey Part 2* pp682–692) and to investigate alleged mismanagement of funds by the homeland administration. During 1991 and 1992 the commission heard evidence regarding the unrest and the alleged mismanagement of funds before being adjourned until 10 August 1992.¹⁶³ [¹⁶³ *Sowetan* 19 June 1992]

KwaZulu

The chief minister of KwaZulu and the leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, said in an address to the KwaZulu legislative assembly in March 1992 that the KwaZulu administration desired devolution of power in a new constitution. 'We want a constitution in which it will be totally impossible for any political party ever to amass the kind of monolithic powers which successive National Party governments built around themselves. We want the people to have more control over political parties and over the government and we want to bring government closer to the people to make this possible. We also want all political power subjected to the constitution and the supervision of the political process,' he added (see also chapter on *Constitutional Change*).¹⁶⁴ [¹⁶⁴ Policy speech by Chief Buthelezi, fourth session of the fifth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1992]

It was reported that the KwaZulu administration, together with the administrations of Bophuthatswana and the Ciskei, wanted the new regional boundaries within South Africa to be formalised and constituted before the setting up of an interim government. In addition, these administrations wanted negotiations within their territories to be concluded prior to negotiations at a national level, in order to ensure a federal system.¹⁶⁵ [¹⁶⁵ *Sowetan* 11 May 1992]

A clandestine syndicate, described by the SAP as sophisticated and well organised and operating within both the KwaZulu administration and the KwaZulu Police, was brought to light in April 1992. The exposure of the syndicate occurred after two stolen cheques, each worth R650 000 and belonging to the KwaZulu administration, were cashed by a man at a bank in Dundee (northern Natal). The man used false identification documents to persuade bank staff to cash an initial cheque on 13 April, but immediately after a second transaction on the following day, police were alerted by the bank.¹⁶⁶ [¹⁶⁶ *The Citizen* 22 April 1992]

The SAP subsequently arrested nine men and women and charged them with defrauding the KwaZulu administration of R1,3m. According to the SAP, those arrested included low-ranking employees of the KwaZulu Department of Justice and of the Department of Finance, as well as two KwaZulu police constables. A police spokesman, Captain Jan Calitz, said that R850 000 of the stolen money had been recovered. He added, 'There is no doubt that this was a widespread conspiracy involving employees of several departments within the KwaZulu administration. If we had not acted as soon as we did, all the money would have been lost.'¹⁶⁷ [¹⁶⁷ *Ibid*]

Traditional leaders in KwaZulu petitioned representatives of the management committee of Codesa in May 1992 to protest against the exclusion of the Zulu king, King Goodwill Zwelithini, from Codesa and to demand his inclusion. One of the traditional leaders, Chief N Ngubane, said that Zulus, represented by their king, had to be present at talks which affected the boundaries of their homeland and their future in

South Africa (see also chapter on *Constitutional Change*).¹⁶⁸ [¹⁶⁸ Ibid 16 May 1992]

Lebowa

In March 1992 the chief minister of Lebowa and the leader of the United People's Front (UPF), Mr Nelson Ramodike, said in response to questions from the South African Institute of Race Relations that he supported the idea of regionalism 'in as far as it would bring the government closer to the people'. To that end, he added, the UPF favoured a unitary state for South Africa with the provision of regional structures through which government services could be distributed equitably throughout the country (see chapter on *Constitutional Change*).

In June 1992 the South African government intervened to prevent a threatened war between the Gazankulu and Lebowa administrations in a dispute over their boundaries. The government subsequently appointed a judicial commission to investigate the dispute about boundaries (see also *Gazankulu* above).¹⁶⁹ [¹⁶⁹ Ibid 10 June 1992]

QwaQwa

The chief minister of QwaQwa, Chief Kenneth Mopeli, said in March 1992 that the people of QwaQwa were 'staunch supporters of a federal form of government for South Africa because of its diversity of cultures, languages and religions'. He added that a constitution which did not address these community rights would not survive the political and constitutional storms that were bound to plague the country (see also chapter on *Constitutional Change*).¹⁷⁰ [¹⁷⁰ Barometer March 1992]

In April 1992 the QwaQwa administration was faced with a crisis when its minister of agriculture and forestry, Chief Motebang Mota, who was also the representative of the Batlokoa tribe in the cabinet, resigned. QwaQwa's media officer, Mr Pieter van Zyl, said that in terms of the homeland's constitution there had to be two chiefs in the cabinet—one from the Bakwena tribe and the other from the Batlokoa tribe. Mr van Zyl, while acknowledging that the resignation had led to a political crisis in the homeland, denied that the administration would have to disband.¹⁷¹ [¹⁷¹ *Sowetan* 16 April 1992]

Transkei

A meeting in April 1992 in Urntata (Transkei), which was attended by about 500 delegates, agreed that the Transkei should be reincorporated into South Africa immediately after an interim government had been established. This decision meant the abandonment of the long-held idea of the homeland authorities that a referendum should be held to test public opinion in the Transkei on the issue of reincorporation. During the meeting, which was attended by representatives of more than 50 organisations ranging from

farmers' unions to football associations, speakers said that the issue of a referendum had been overtaken by events because the Transkei administration now participated fully in Codesa and that to pursue the issue would be 'a waste of time'.¹⁷² [¹⁷² *Daily Dispatch* 14 April 1992]

In May 1992, following the collapse of Codesa II, the chairman of the Transkei Military Council, Major General Bantu Holomisa, urged the South African government and the ANC to hold a 'summit meeting' to iron out their differences. Gen Holomisa stressed that if the two parties failed to reach an agreement at the summit meeting, the 'international community' should be called in to mediate.¹⁷³ [¹⁷³ *The Citizen* 29 May 1992]

Speaking after the Boipatong massacre in June 1992 (see *Political Conflict* below), Gen Holomisa said that it was 'morally unwise to continue to negotiate with the South African government and its surrogates' and he called on African leaders to withdraw from negotiations with the government.¹⁷⁴ [¹⁷⁴ *Ibid* 22 June 1992]

Venda

In March 1992 the chairman of the Venda Council of National Unity, Brigadier Gabriel Ramushwana, said in response to questions from the Institute that the homeland did not constitute an economically viable country and that he favoured its reincorporation into South Africa. In his view, Brig Ramushwana added, Gazankulu, Lebowa, the Soutpansberg district and Venda should constitute one geographic region with a single regional government as part of the new South Africa (see also chapter on *Constitutional Change*).

Paramilitary Units

In January 1992 the armed wing of the Pan-Africanist Congress, the Azanian People's Liberation Army (Apla), claimed responsibility for the killing of six policemen over the previous three months. Apla threatened to set up a legal private army to 'defend the masses from state-sponsored violence'. In the same month the leader of the Boerestaat Party, Mr Robert van Tender, called on the Boer Republican Army to engage in guerrilla attacks against the government to signal that the 'boer volk resistance struggle is on now that our access to democratic negotiations has been closed by the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa)'.¹⁷⁵ [¹⁷⁵ *The Weekly Mail* 3 January 1992]

The office of the minister of law and order issued a list in January 1992 of right-wing armies which it said were a menace to state security. The list comprised the Afrikaner Monarchist Movement, Blanke Veiligheid, Blanke Weerstandsbeweging, Boer Republican Army, Boere Kommando, Foundation for Survival and Freedom, Ku Klux Klan, Orde Boervolk, Pretoria Boere Kommando, Volksleer,

Wenkommando and Wit Wolwe.¹⁷⁶ [¹⁷⁶ *Sunday Star* 5 January 1992]

The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) paraded several hundred members of its paramilitary units—the Wenkommando, the Witkruisarende and the Ystergarde—at a rally in Klerksdorp (western Transvaal) in May 1992. Masked members of the equestrian unit of the Ystergarde also demonstrated their horsemanship during the rally. Addressing the rally the AWB leader, Mr Eugene TerreBlanche, said that the AWB did not want war, but that it would fight if the government did not provide land for a boer homeland and if the boer nation was ‘delivered up to a communist government’.¹⁷⁷ [¹⁷⁷ *The Citizen* 30 May 1992]

In June 1992 the Western Goals Institute, which was headed by Mr Clive Derby-Lewis, a member of the Conservative Party, announced that it was offering ‘self-defence training’ to white people in South Africa to enable them to ‘protect themselves’ from ‘the ANC [African National Congress] terrorist onslaught’. Mr Derby-Lewis explained that the training would be under his own direction and that it would be conducted by professional soldiers who had served with the South African Defence Force (SADF), the former Rhodesian army and Britain’s Special Air Services. (The Western Goals Institute claimed to be devoted to protecting the ‘western way of life’ and to have offices in London and Krugersdorp (west Rand).)¹⁷⁸ [¹⁷⁸ *Ibid* 2 June 1992]

In July 1992 Mr TerreBlanche called on members of the South African Police (SAP) and the SADF to join the AWB. Speaking to about 700 supporters of the AWB in the Pretoria city hall, Mr TerreBlanche said that the SAP and the SADF were being used as political pawns. He added, To our friends in the SAP and the SADF we say: the time has come to pack your bags, to listen to your conscience. We don’t want to make war against the SADF and the SAP. But if you become political mercenaries, we will meet you at the other end of the battle lines.’¹⁷⁹ [¹⁷⁹ *The Star* 15 July 1992]

The minister of law and order, Mr Hernus Kriel, said in June 1992 that the ANC had established 85 self-defence units and that police had taken no steps against such units.¹⁸⁰ [¹⁸⁰ *The Citizen* 18 June 1992] In the same month the ANC denied that some members of its military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, were receiving military training in India in the guise of being members of the Transkei Defence Force, but confirmed that ANC members were receiving training in various unspecified countries.¹⁸¹ [¹⁸¹ *Business Day* 18 June 1992]

In July 1992 the general secretary of the South African Communist Party (SACP), Mr Chris Hani, called on Umkhonto we Sizwe to teach black people how to defend themselves, saying that the government and its allies were counteracting mass action with violence. Speaking at a rally in Pietermaritzburg (Natal), Mr Hani said that the withdrawal from Codesa by the ANC/Congress of South African Trade Unions/SACP alliance was his ‘happiest day’ since 1990 and that Codesa had been destroying the

liberation movement.¹⁸² [¹⁸² *The Citizen* 27 July 1992]

The Media

In January 1992 the African National Congress (ANC) published a document outlining its draft media policy. The document said that there should be no political censorship but insisted on affirmative action to ensure an 'equitable distribution of media resources'. It called for a constitutionally guaranteed free flow of information subject to the right of privacy and the repeal of all censorship laws. The draft charter stressed that it would be wrong to advocate the establishment of bodies which would determine what society should and should not read, hear or watch, but said that a simple declaration on media freedom was also not enough. 'It has to be underpinned by an equitable distribution of media resources, development programmes and a deliberate effort to engender the culture of open debate.'¹⁸³ [¹⁸³ *Business Day, The Star* 14 January 1992]

The document criticised the print media, the government's Communications Service (formerly the Bureau for Information) and the South African film industry, and called for a reconstitution of the board of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). It said that the SABC, which had been 'serving the political interests of the National Party (NP)', should be placed under multiparty control long before elections for a democratic government took place.

The ANC said in the draft charter that the 'democratisation of the media' was needed. 'Diversity of ownership of the media production and distribution facilities should be ensured,' it argued, with the media taking account of the diversity of communities in respect of geography, language and interests. Affirmative action should be implemented to provide financial, technical and other resources to deprived sectors of society.¹⁸⁴ [¹⁸⁴ *Ibid*] The ANC also proposed that journalists should be protected by law from having to disclose their sources of information and insisted that media institutions should provide facilities for the training of media workers.¹⁸⁵ [¹⁸⁵ *Ibid*]

The minister of posts and telecommunications and of transport, Mr Piet Welgemoed, said in Parliament in February 1992 that an impartial, permanent body to regulate the telecommunications industry and control the use of the spectrum of radio frequencies was needed. He added that foreign and South African consultants, who had been appointed in 1991 to advise the government on the regulation of the industry, had submitted their report. He declared that it was clear that an impartial body with a permanent administrative and professional infrastructure would be necessary to control the media.¹⁸⁶ [¹⁸⁶ *Business Day* 27 February 1992]

In March 1992 the minister of home affairs, Mr Gene Louw, said that legislation would be formulated later in the year regarding the SABC. He said that the government had decided to establish a 'neutral

regulatory commission' for all telecommunications and that the proposed legislation would 'not directly affect the SABC's management, but will introduce negotiated standards, norms and codes' that would govern all broadcasters.¹⁸⁷ [¹⁸⁷ *Sowetan, The Star* 3 March 1992]

A spokesman for the ANC, Mr Saki Macozoma, responded to Mr Louw's announcement by saying that the government could not make any meaningful change to the SABC while its present management remained intact.¹⁸⁸ [¹⁸⁸ *Ibid*] He said that he was perturbed by the statement that the legislation would be passed 'after due consultation with all interested parties' because there was no clarity on exactly who these 'interested parties' were. Mr Macozoma argued that they could be merely the parties in the tricameral Parliament. An even greater problem, he added, was the refusal by the government to accept that the problem with the SABC was in its management structure. He declared that the management had been appointed by the government to use the SABC to further the purposes of the NP.¹⁸⁹ [¹⁸⁹ *Ibid*]

Business Day commented in an editorial that the government's 'affection for independent broadcasting is increasing as it faces a loss of power', saying that the government had 'abused the SABC and fears the ANC will do the same, and yet it shrinks from steps which would prevent control by either'.¹⁹⁰ [¹⁹⁰ *Business Day* 4 March 1992]

The minister of justice, Mr Kobie Coetsee, said that the government did not regard the restructuring of the board or management of the SABC as practical or necessary to ensure neutral broadcasting. He pointed out that the remaining term of office of the present board—until March 1993—was relatively short and that a different method of appointing a new board as part of the negotiation process seemed to be the advisable route to take. Mr Coetsee said that the government supported the view that the SABC should be independent and neutral, and that it believed that the SABC was already as 'independent and neutral' as any public broadcasting organisation could be. However, he said, he supported the idea of a tribunal for complaint, saying that it appeared to be a suitable body to deal with disagreements.¹⁹¹ [¹⁹¹ *The Citizen* 25 March 1992]

In March 1992 a new institute for advanced journalism, designed to upgrade the standard of both print and broadcasting journalism in South Africa, was formed by an independent board of directors in association with the University of the Witwatersrand. A former editor of the *Rand Daily Mail*, Mr Allister Sparks, was appointed to run the institute. Mr Sparks said that its aim would be to develop a 'rich mixture' of teaching and research programmes and that its academic programme would be organised around four broad areas of study: reporting and editing, graphics and design, media management and media ethics.¹⁹² [¹⁹² *The Star* 6 March 1992]

In July 1992 about 250 people burnt copies of the *Eastern Province Herald* and *Evening Post* newspapers outside Newspaper House in central Port Elizabeth during a boycott of three local newspapers which had been organised by the local branch of the ANC. The chairman of the Campaign

for Open Media, Mr Raymond Louw, said that the boycott contradicted the ANC's stated commitment to freedom of speech (see *Consumer boycotts* above).¹⁹³ [193 *The Citizen* 30 July 1992]

Political Conflict

According to the South African Institute of Race Relations, there were 2 706 deaths from political violence in 1991, which represented a 27% decrease on deaths recorded in 1990. However, the provisional figures for deaths in the first 11 months of 1992 (2 911) represented an increase of 15% on the comparable period in 1991 (2 536).

Statistics compiled by the Institute of political fatalities in South Africa (including the ten homelands) in 1991 and the first 11 months of 1992, and the average daily fatality rate for each month, were as follows:

Political fatalities in South Africa: 1991 and 1992^a

1991

1992

Month

Total

Average daily rate

Total

Average daily rate

January

187

6,0

139

4,5

February

129

4,6

238

8,2

March

351

11,3

348

11,2

April

270

9,0

300

10,0

May

318

10,3

219^b

7,1

June

150

5,0

309^b

10,3

July

164

5,3

259^b

8,4

August

184

6,0

331^b

10,7

September

282

9,4

293^b

9,8

October

218

7,0

229^b

7,5

November

283

9,4

246^b

8,2

December

170

5,5

N/A

N/A

Total

2 706

7,4

N/A

N/A

a

Figures represent an average of minimum and maximum fatality figures. Minimum totals are derived solely from police and/or press reports, whereas maximum totals include figures from sources other than police and press clippings, for example, various monitoring groups. It is not always certain whether a fatality report is unrest-related. Police spokesmen say that the difference between their fatality figures and those of other agencies can be explained by the fact that the police have a legal procedure which they have to follow regarding unrest fatalities. This involves documentation as well as photographs of each body found.

b

These figures are preliminary, as reports from some monitoring agencies had not been received at the time of writing.

N/A

Sabotage

Two powerful bomb explosions, said by police to be the work of professionals, extensively damaged the Lyttelton post office (Pretoria) and the Krugersdorp post office (west Rand) within an hour of each other early in January 1992.¹⁹⁴ [¹⁹⁴ *The Star* 2 January 1992] A day later another bomb blast rocked the Lowveld High School in Nelspruit (eastern Transvaal), causing damage estimated at R2m.¹⁹⁵ [¹⁹⁵ *The Citizen* 3 January 1992]

The Boer Republican Army, the private army of the Boerestaat Party, was reported in the same month to have claimed responsibility for the bombings in 1991 of the magistrate's court at Sabie (eastern Transvaal), an electricity sub-station in the Orange Free State, the offices of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) in Pretoria, a multiracial school in Klerksdorp (western Transvaal) and the multiracial Lichtenburg Technical College (western Transvaal).¹⁹⁶ [¹⁹⁶ *The Weekly Mail* 3 January 1992] A fire at the offices of the Receiver of Revenue in Boksburg (east Rand) was reported as having been started by members of the Wit Wolwe.¹⁹⁷ [¹⁹⁷ *The Citizen* 4 January 1992]

Also in January 1992, police arrested four men, including a senior official of the Mineworkers' Union (MWU), Mr Andries Kriel, in connection with a spate of blasts at a school in Melkrievier (northern Transvaal), three other schools in the Transvaal and the Krugersdorp and Lyttelton post offices, bringing the number of people held in connection with the blasts to seven.¹⁹⁸ [¹⁹⁸ *Business Day, The Citizen* 16 January 1992]

The four men—Messrs Dirk Hattingh, Petrus Judeel, Kriel and Andries Odendaal—were granted bail of R3 500 each when they subsequently appeared before a magistrate, Mr J Johnstone, in the Pretoria regional court.¹⁹⁹ [¹⁹⁹ *The Citizen* 24 January 1992]

In March 1992 a gardener, Mr Andries Sithole, died and a domestic worker, Mrs Sophie Mashaba, suffered an arm injury when the second of two bombs in two days exploded at the house of the headmaster of the Nelspruit High School (eastern Transvaal). Mr Sithole's dismembered body was found later behind an outside room and it was believed by police that the bomb had been planted under a caravan in a carport.²⁰⁰ [²⁰⁰ *The Star* 17 March 1992]

After a limpet mine explosion at the Rand Easter Show in Johannesburg in April 1992 the Wit Wolwe paramilitary unit issued a statement saying that the incident showed that the 'boere will not rest before their right to self-determination is recognised'. The statement said further, 'Black terror was a huge headache ... terror by whites will make it look like a picnic'.²⁰¹ [²⁰¹ *The Natal Witness* 6 April 1992]

In May 1992 Mr Koos Botha MP (Conservative Party) admitted publicly that he had planted the dynamite which had blown up the Hiliview High School in Pretoria in 1991 in reaction to government plans to allow school children whose parents were members of the African National Congress (ANC) and who were returning from exile to use the school.²⁰² [²⁰² *The Citizen* 4 May 1992]

Mr Botha said that the CP had reacted strongly to the plans to hand over the school to the ANC. 'I think a climate had been created in the CP which influenced me to blow up the school,' he said. He explained further that he had watched the school for several nights before he planted and detonated 15kg of dynamite which he had obtained from a member of the MWU.²⁰³ [²⁰³ *Ibid*]

In July 1992 Messrs Botha, Hattingh, Judeel, Kriel and Odendaal were charged in the Pretoria Regional Court with four counts of terrorism. These were the bombing of the Hiliview High School, of Cosatu House in Pretoria in December 1991 and of the Krugersdorp and Verwoerdburg post offices in January 1992.

Attacks on persons

Attacks on blacks by whites

In January 1992 a group of white residents of Elandsfontein, about 30km south of Johannesburg, allegedly attacked 60-year-old Mr Molatu Lebeta because his female 'kaffir' dog had mated with their dog. Mr Lebeta, who was struck with a pickhandle across the groin and lower abdomen, died in the

Baragwanath Hospital (Soweto) about 24 hours after the attack.²⁰⁴ [²⁰⁴ *The Star* 13 January 1992]

In the same month police arrested a white man who went on a shooting spree in the streets of Kriel (eastern Transvaal) in which he fatally shot an African man. An African woman was wounded in the attack.²⁰⁵ [²⁰⁵ *Ibid* 27 January 1992] Also in January, another white man, Mr Cornelius Petrus de Vaal, attacked Africans in the streets of Middelburg (eastern Transvaal), killing one person and wounding six others. Mr de Vaal was later critically wounded in an exchange of gunfire with the police.²⁰⁶ [²⁰⁶ *Business Day, The Citizen, The Star* 30 January 1992]

In February 1992 a resident of Diepkloof (Soweto), Mr Herman Masigo, said that he had been assaulted together with a friend he had gone to visit at a farm near Krugersdorp (west Rand). Mr Masigo said that he and his friend had been walking to the Krugersdorp railway station when they had been attacked by several men on motorcycles. He added that because of their attire (khaki shirts and trousers with red-and-white insignia on their shoulders) he suspected that the attackers had been members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB).²⁰⁷ [²⁰⁷ *Sowetan* 5 February 1992]

Three residents of Vanderbijlpark (southern Transvaal), including a youth, were arrested in February 1992 in connection with the murder in the town earlier in the month of Mr John Mashinini. Mr Mashinini die after he and three other people, including his sister, were attacked and assaulted with chains and golf clubs. Miss Sanna Hluphi Mashinini and Mr Ben Kamfer were admitted to the Sebokeng Hospital following the attack which, police said, appeared to have been unprovoked.²⁰⁸ [²⁰⁸ *The Star* 27 February 1992]

In April 1992 a leader of the Dobsonville Civic Association, Mr Zacharia Moruledi, was assaulted by a group of white men who broke down the door of his shack in Dobsonville (Soweto) and told him that they were policemen and that they wanted AK-47 rifles from him. Mr Moruledi said that the men later took him to the nearby Doornkop Cemetery where they continued assaulting him when he denied knowing the addresses of other members of the civic association.²⁰⁹ [²⁰⁹ *City Press* 12 April 1992]

In the same month four white men stabbed a 40-year-old African man to death and slightly wounded his female companion on the corner of Southampton and Point Roads in Durban. The liaison officer for the Natal police, Major C J Marais, said that the man had sustained numerous wounds in the attack and that the woman had been treated for shock and minor wounds at Addington Hospital.²¹⁰ [²¹⁰ *The Citizen* 13 April 1992]

A Germiston fireman, Mr Hugo Amos Kotze, was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment in the Witwatersrand Provincial Division of the Supreme Court in Johannesburg in May 1992 after he had

been found guilty of fatally shooting a drunk driver, Mr Hendson Mgidlana, in June 1991. Five years of the 12-year sentence were suspended. In sentencing him, Mr Justice Z Sutej said that Mr Kotze had had no reasonable grounds for shooting Mr Mgidlana and that his actions were ‘totally unacceptable for a man who works for an institution that protects lives’.²¹¹ [²¹¹ Ibid 26 May 1992]

In June 1992 five members of the AWB—Messrs Hendrik Boshoff, Johan Nagel, Barend Terblanche, Philip Terblanche and Christoffel Wolfaardt—were convicted in the Pietersburg regional court (northern Transvaal) on charges of public violence. The men had been part of a group of 15 people who had used sticks and sjamboks to attack children from Venda who were on a Sunday school outing at the municipal park in Louis Trichardt (northern Transvaal) in November 1990. The men were each fined R3 000 or 18 months’ imprisonment suspended for five years. Cases against four other people were withdrawn in an earlier hearing, while six others were acquitted at the end of the trial.²¹² [²¹² *Sowetan* 10 June 1992]

A female African teacher was injured when five white men wearing AWB uniforms attacked a group of teachers and students in Braamfontein (Johannesburg) in the same month. The group, which included teachers of the Department of Education and Training, was returning from a seminar on teaching English when it was stopped by AWB members at the corner of Simmonds and Ameshoff Streets. The injured woman said that four teenagers, who were armed with batons and shotguns, had surrounded the seminar group and that the youths, who had spoken in Afrikaans, had attacked it when the teachers had replied in English.²¹³ [²¹³ *The Star* 11 June 1992]

Also in June, three white men in AWB uniforms allegedly used a police van to abduct an African taxidriver, Mr Frans Molokwane, from the Pretoria city centre and to take him to an unidentified mortuary where he was allegedly assaulted. Police said later that they had arrested a policeman in connection with the incident.²¹⁴ [²¹⁴ *City Press* 14 June 1992]

Attacks on whites by blacks

In January 1992 a white plumber, Mr Jacob Beukes, was shot five times by two men while repairing drains in Katlehong (east Rand). Mr Beukes, who was robbed of his own firearm, was wounded in the neck and lower back.²¹⁵ [²¹⁵ *The Star* 29 January 1992]

Teaching at the Kathorus College of Education in Katlehong was suspended towards the end of January 1992 after the teacher, Mr Schalk Dippenaar, was beaten and set alight by a group of youths.²¹⁶ [²¹⁶ *Business Day* 30 January 1992] Mr Dippenaar subsequently died and the college was closed, with all 69 white teachers in Katlehong and Tokoza (east Rand) being withdrawn from teaching in these townships because of further threats of attacks on white teachers.²¹⁷ [²¹⁷ *Business Day, The Citizen* 7 February 1992]

A resident of Zastron (Orange Free State), Mr Fanie Smit, was killed in March 1992 when he and three colleagues—Messrs Andrew Franzen, Deon Martin and Ben Maliehe—were shot at while driving near the Orange Free State/Transkei boundary. Mr Smit's colleagues were injured in the attack and police said that the gunmen fled into the Transkei.²¹⁸ [²¹⁸ *The Citizen, The Star* 19 March 1992]

A resident of Germiston (east Rand), Mr Francois Pretorius, his five-year-old son, Devon, and a friend, Miss Marinda Nel, died when their car was attacked and set alight on the road between Vosloorus and Zonkizizwe (east Rand) in May 1992. Police said that the three people, whose charred bodies were found in their bullet-riddled car, had left a party in Boksburg and that they might have lost their way prior to being attacked.²¹⁹ [²¹⁹ *The star* 11 May 1992]

In the same month, a resident of Vereeniging (southern Transvaal), Mr Paul Piater, was wounded in the head and right hand when gunmen opened fire on him with an AK-47 rifle at Sharpeville. Another man, Mr Gerhardus Ackerman, was wounded in the chest and left cheek when a gunman shot at him while he was reading an electricity meter in Emzinoni near Bethal (eastern Transvaal) in the same month.²²⁰ [²²⁰ *The Citizen* 13 May 1992]

Also in May, a postmaster, Mr Jacobus Nel, was shot dead while he and a woman friend, Mrs Francina Foster, were sitting talking in his car at the Centenary Dam in Knigtersdorp. A spokesman for the west Rand police said that the gunman took the watches of Mrs Foster and Mr Nel before running away ²²¹ [²²¹ *Ibid* 15 May 1992]

Attacks on policemen and soldiers

Five policemen were murdered within the first three days of 1992. Two were shot dead in an ambush while on patrol in Dobsonville, two were killed on New Year's Day in Katlehong and the fifth was killed, also on New Year's Day, in Soweto. All five policemen were shot with AK-47 rifles.²²² [²²² *Sunday Star* 5 January 1992]

By the middle of January 1992 three more policemen were reported to have been killed.²²³ [²²³ *The Citizen* 18 January 1992]

The military wing of the Pan-Africanist Congress, the Azanian People's Liberation Army (Apla), claimed responsibility for an attack in Katlehong in February 1992 which left three municipal policemen dead and four others seriously injured. The claim was made to the press by a telephone caller who said he was a commander of Apla called Carlos Zimbiri.²²⁴ [²²⁴ *Ibid* 18 February 1992]

Apla also claimed responsibility for an attack at the end of February on the Moroka police station

(Soweto), in which three policemen were wounded. A spokesman for the Soweto police, Capt Govindsamy Mariemuthoo, said that the gunmen had opened fire from a car on police officers manning the gate at the police station. AK-47 rifles and Scorpion machine pistols were reported to have been used in the attack.²²⁵ [225 Ibid 22 February 1992]

In March 1992 a member of the riot police. Constable Thandokuhle Ndawonde, was shot dead at point-blank range in Mariannhill (Natal) In the same month gunmen stormed a satellite police station near Vereeniging, killing a single police officer²²⁶ [226 *The Natal Witness* 11 March 1992] In another incident in March three policemen, identified only as Sergeant B R Pheta, Constable Madala and Constable Buthelezi, were seriously wounded when gunmen opened fire on their vehicle while they were investigating a case at Nxamalala township near Pietennaritzburg (Natal).²²⁷ [227 Ibid 20 March 1992]

A spokesman for the Witwatersrand police. Captain Eugene Oppennan, said at the end of March 1992 that Warrant Officer M G Nximalo of the uniform branch in Tokoza had been shot dead with an AK-47 rifle after being called to the Phola Park shack settlement. An unidentified caller had telephoned the local police station and had said that WO Nxumalo was being held hostage, but no demands had been made for his release. Capt Oppennan said that the internal stability unit had then 'saturated Phola Park and found WO Nxumalo's vehicle abandoned in the camp'. The policeman's bullet-riddled body was subsequently found in an open field near the shack settlement.²²⁸ [228 *Business Day* 31 March 1992]

In April 1992 two policemen. Constables Lourens Oosthuizen and Herman Joubert. were attacked at Bethlehem (Orange Free State). Constable Oosthuizen died and Constable Joubert was injured in the attack.²²⁹ [229 *Sowetan* 9 April 1992] In another incident in April, three policemen, Sergeant C B Plaatj'ies, Constable B R Matanjana and Constable G Tibini, were wounded by gunmen in Khayelitsha (western Cape) while patrolling a section of the township.²³⁰ [230 *The Citizen* 1 April 1992]

During the second weekend in April 1992 seven policemen were attacked in separate incidents. Four policemen were killed and six others injured in separate incidents on the Reef and in Durban during the following weekend (the Easter weekend).²³¹ [231 *The Citizen, The Star* 21 April 1992]

In May 1992 Detective Constable Alfred Moloatse died instantly after being shot in the face by three attackers in Sharpeville.²³² [232 *The star* 14 May 1992] Constables C F Landman and H le Roux were injured in the same month when a hand grenade was thrown under their Casspir patrol vehicle in Umlazi (Natal).²³³ [233 *The Citizen* 27 May 1992] Also in May, two policemen. Constables M M Mhlongo and M M Ngaza, were murdered by a mob outside the Glebelands hostel near Umlazi while on foot patrol.²³⁴ [234 Ibid 26 May 1992]

In June 1992 police headquarters in Pretoria announced that since the beginning of the year 39 policemen had died in incidents while on duty and 54 had been killed off-duty, bringing the total number of policemen killed since the beginning of the year to 93.²³⁵ [²³⁵ Ibid 23 June 1992]

In the same month the Chesterville police station (Durban) was attacked by gunmen who buried petrol bombs and fired shots at the building.²³⁶ [²³⁶ *The Natal Mercury* 1 July 1992]

In July 1992 two houses in Sebokeng (southern Transvaal) belonging to policemen were burned down and Detective Constable Philemon Ramakgapola was shot dead at Katlehong.²³⁷ [²³⁷ *The Natal Witness* 4 July 1992] Later in July, gunmen shot dead a policeman and critically wounded another when they fired with AK-47 and R-5 rifles at a marked police car in the township.

In July a telephone caller to the South African Press Association claimed to be a commander of Apia called Carlos Zimbiri and said that his 'students' had been responsible for the deaths of policemen in Durban, Kagiso, Katlehong, Soweto, Tokoza and the Vaal Triangle (southern Transvaal) over previous weeks. Mr Zimbiri said that he had been 'ordered back to South Africa from Dar-es-Salaam [Tanzania] three months ago to take over the high command'. He said that he had been instructed by Apia to 'educate students in arms and in war' and that some of these 'students' had been responsible for the deaths of policemen.²³⁸ [²³⁸ *The Citizen* 27 July 1992]

A police spokesman, Captain Burgei van Rooyen, said at the end of July 1992 that at least 122 policemen had died since the beginning of the year in violence and that efforts were being made to help policemen increase security at their homes.²³⁹ [²³⁹ *Business Day* 27 July 1992]

Attacks on councillors and other members of executive bodies

In May 1992 the offices of the Dobsonville City Council (west Rand) were extensively damaged when the building was stormed under cover of darkness and petrol-bombed by a group of people.²⁴⁰ [²⁴⁰ *The Star* 11 May 1992] Later a group calling itself Youth for Revolution claimed responsibility for the arson attack and threatened that it would assassinate councillors, policemen and soldiers.²⁴¹ [²⁴¹ *The Citizen* 12 May 1992]

In May 1992 the homes of two members of the Ennerdale (Johannesburg) local development committee, Mr Brian van Rooyen and Ms Elizabeth van der Plank, were fired at with shotguns. A police spokesman, Captain Henriette Bester, said that after firing shots through the windows of Mr van Rooyen's home the

gunmen attacked Mrs van der Plank's home 20 minutes later.²⁴² [²⁴² Ibid 26 May 1992]

Attacks on members of legislature

In February 1992 a member of the KwaZulu legislative assembly and of the Inkatha Freedom Party, Mr Winnington Sabelo, was shot dead in his shop at Umlazi. It was reported that Mr Sabelo had been working in his shop at about 6.30pm when a man had walked in and asked for cigarettes. The man had subsequently taken out a firearm and fired three shots, hitting Mr Sabelo, who collapsed and died.²⁴³ [²⁴³ *City Press* 9 February 1992]

Conflict between political groups

Conflict involving the African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party

Natal violence

The *Financial Mail* said in January 1992 that the violence in Natal, involving mainly supporters of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), had changed little between the end of 1990 and the end of 1991 despite the signing of the *National Peace Accord* on 14 September 1991 (see also chapter on *Security*). It said further that the potential for the violence in the province to escalate should not be underestimated 'as more whites become drawn into it'.²⁴⁴ [²⁴⁴ *Financial Mail* 10 January 1992]

In mid-January 1992 the Richmond branch of the IFP suspended peace talks with the ANC after the killing of one of its members. A spokesman for the IFP and the head of the IFP's unit for the study of violence, Mr Kim Hodgson, said that ANC supporters had lured three IFP members into an ambush at Ndaleni (southern Natal), which he said was an ANC stronghold, by assuring the men that they would be safe because of peace agreements. As they entered the township the three men were attacked and one was stabbed to death, while the others escaped.²⁴⁵ [²⁴⁵ *The Star* 17 January 1992]

A number of attacks occurred later in January. In the Natal Midlands traditional weapons and stones were used in attacks which left one person dead and two others seriously wounded. The major flashpoint was reported to be at Mooi River, where an IFP supporter was stoned by an angry mob and was admitted later to the Escourt Hospital for treatment. At Bruntville (Mooi River) an IFP supporter, Mr Kenneth Mazibuko, was stoned by a group of men who surrounded him in the street.²⁴⁶ [²⁴⁶ *The Natal Witness* 21 January 1992]

¹ Also in January, two people—Messrs Sibonakaliso Mlaba and Jabulani Susani—were shot dead in Pietermaritzburg (Natal). Mr Ambrose Dlamini, who was with Mr Susani when they were

attacked by a gunman, escaped with injuries. At Ntabamhlophe township (Escourt) Mr Medigini Vilakazi was speared to death, while Mr N Ngubane was shot dead outside his home at Eston (Pietermaritzburg). Police said that Mr Ngubane had been shot in the head and back with an AK-47 rifle.²⁴⁷ [²⁴⁷ Ibid]

In the same month Mr Hodgson accused the ANC of attacking the children of IFP members at school in 'a campaign to eliminate the IFP', saying that a group of well-known ANC comrades had opened fire on four pupils, all of them children of IFP members, at Fundokuhle High School at Imbali (Pietermaritzburg).²⁴⁸ [²⁴⁸ *The Citizen* 24 January 1992]

According to a spokesman for the KwaZulu Police, Lieutenant Colonel M L Khanyile, eight people died in violence at Umlazi (Durban) early in February 1992. The southern Natal region of the ANC issued a statement soon after the incident, saying that five people had died, ten had been injured and 300 homes had been set alight when a group of heavily armed men, allegedly led by KwaZulu policemen, had attacked a local informal settlement. However, Col Khanyile denied that there was any truth in the 'ANC version of the clash' and added, 'KwaZulu police responded to reports that there was fighting between two groups at the squatter camp, and went to investigate. They were shot at and returned for reinforcements. By the time they got back the groups had dispersed. They found eight bodies.'²⁴⁹ [²⁴⁹ Ibid 3 February 1992]

Speaking at a meeting in Empangeni (Natal north coast) in February 1992 to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the founding of the ANC, the leader of the South African Communist Party and chief of staff of Umkhonto we Sizwe, Mr Chris Hanu, said that the IFP had prevented the ANC from entering townships in northern Natal. He made this statement after an ANC delegation had been prevented from entering Enseleni township (northern Natal). 'The ANC is unbanned everywhere else but in northern Natal where it is banned by the police and Inkatha. Here we're still illegal,' Mr Hanu told 2 000 people who packed the Empangeni town hall.²⁵⁰ [²⁵⁰ Ibid]

Early in February 1992 the Black Sash repression monitoring group said that at least 91 people had died in violence in Natal in January. The group said that 42 people had been killed on the Natal south coast, while 23 people had died in violence in northern Natal and 26 in the Natal Midlands.²⁵¹ [²⁵¹ Ibid 5 February 1992]

Also in February, a meeting between farmers, members of the business community, IFP officials and some IFP supporters was held in Ixopo (southern Natal). IFP members were reported to have taken the opportunity to inform businessmen and farmers about the aims of the IFP. Mr Hodgson explained that members of the farming and business community had a vested interest in trying to understand the conflict. An ANC official, Mr Reggie Hadebe, said that he had heard that the meeting was intended to cement the alliance between the IFP and whites in the area. However, the IFP described the alleged

alliance as 'blatantly ridiculous',²⁵² [²⁵² *The Natal Witness* 13 February 1992]

At the end of February 1992 more than 3 000 IFP supporters armed with sharpened sticks, spears and other weapons marched through the Durban city centre in defiance of a government ban on dangerous weapons. A request by Lieutenant Colonel Johannes van Wyk to the leader of the IFP in Lindelani, Mr Thomas Shabalala, to ask the marchers to leave their dangerous weapons at Curries Fountain stadium under police protection was greeted with disapproval by the crowd.²⁵³ [²⁵³ *City Press* 1 March 1992]

In March 1992, 13 people died in clashes between the ANC and the IFP in a single weekend in Natal. Eight of these deaths occurred at the Zamani shack settlement (Durban) and five in Mpumalanga (Pietermaritzburg).²⁵⁴ [²⁵⁴ *Sowetan* 10 March 1992]

In March 1992 the president of the ANC, Mr Nelson Mandela, was reported to have received death threats from IFP members after it was announced that he would visit the University of Zululand at the end of March 1992. The university authorities subsequently declared a temporary ban on public meetings at the Empangeni campus.²⁵⁵ [²⁵⁵ *Business Day* 1 April 1992] Mr Mandela subsequently called off his visit.

In April 1992 the first white to be appointed as an urban representative of the KwaZulu administration, Mr Philip Powell, his bodyguard, Mr Philane Zuma, and Mr Michael Mkhize were fired at in Imbali (Pietermaritzburg). A police spokesman, Lieutenant Henry Budhram, said that the three men were wounded in the attack and later admitted to Grey's Hospital (Pietermaritzburg).²⁵⁶ [²⁵⁶ *The Citizen* 7 April 1992]

According to a South African Police (SAP) spokesman, Captain Bala Naidoo, in May 1992 the SAP seized a large arms cache and arrested a KwaZulu policeman, who was alleged to be a warlord, at Umlazi. Capt Naidoo said that after police had received a complaint from a resident they had obtained a search warrant from a magistrate and subsequently gone to the house of the KwaZulu policeman, where they found the arms cached.²⁵⁷ [²⁵⁷ *Ibid* 15 May 1992]

In July 1992 five men were killed and two women wounded at Murchison (Natal south coast) when the minibus in which they were travelling was ambushed. A member of an unrest monitoring group in Port Shepstone, Mr Selvan Chetty, said that the occupants of the minibus were shot at as they were leaving the home of the mother of an ANC organiser.²⁵⁸ [²⁵⁸ *The Natal Mercury* 6 May 1992]

The IFP said in the same month that the continued attacks on its members in the Natal Midlands were a serious hindrance to the attainment of peace in the region. Mr Hodgson said that 12 IFP members had recently been killed and many more wounded in the Pietermaritzburg area and that those killed included

the chairman of the Nomganga branch of the IFP, Mr Mvimbezeli Mchunu, and the organiser of the branch, Mr Dumazile Thusi.²⁵⁹ [²⁵⁹ *The Citizen* 8 July 1992]

Later in July, one person was killed and several others were wounded when IFP supporters from the unit 17 hostel in Umlazi attacked ANC supporters on their way to Durban, where the ANC was to stage a protest march. A potentially bloody confrontation between 400 armed IFP supporters and a crowd of ANC supporters which was preparing to march to the Durban city hall was subsequently averted when police formed a human wall, preventing the two groups from coming into contact with each other.²⁶⁰ [²⁶⁰ *City Press* 26 July 1992]

Reef violence

In February 1992, 12 people—six of them IFP supporters—were killed within a period of 24 hours in violent incidents in townships in the Transvaal. According to the police, the IFP supporters died when gunmen fired with AK-47 rifles at the minibus in which they were travelling in Katlehong (east Rand).²⁶¹ [²⁶¹ *Sowetan* 26 February, *The Citizen* 27 February 1992] The youth organiser of the IFP in the Transvaal, Mr Themba Khoza, accused the ANC of having murdered the occupants of the minibus. However, the chairman of the Tokoza branch of the ANC, Mr Duma Nkosi, claimed that residents of the Phola Park shack settlement had shot at the vehicle in retaliation for its occupants opening fire on pedestrians in the ‘vicinity of the Angus railway station.’²⁶² [²⁶² *The Star* 27 February 1992]

Dr Tim Wilson, the director of the Alexandra Health Centre and University Clinic (Johannesburg), said on 10 March 1992 that 125 people had been treated at the clinic for injuries sustained in political violence in the township since the beginning of the month. Dr Wilson said that 27 people had been treated for gunshot wounds and 98 for stab and hack wounds.²⁶³ [²⁶³ *Sowetan* 10 March 1992] The violence had involved, inter alia, clashes between ANC and IFP informal settlers.

Also in early March, clashes between the IFP and other groups in Sharpeville (southern Transvaal) and townships on the Reef left ten people dead. In Sharpeville four people were killed and a house in which members of the IFP were holding a funeral service was gutted after it was petrolbombed and set alight.²⁶⁴ [²⁶⁴ *Sunday Star*, *Sunday Times* 8 March 1992]

In the same month violence erupted in Alexandra when members of the IFP, armed with spears, sharpened sticks and automatic rifles, marched to the local cemetery to bury one of their colleagues. A spokesman for the Alexandra Civic Association, Mr Obed Bapela, said that the IFP mourners danced and taunted residents along the route to the cemetery. Gunfire subsequently erupted as the mourners were about to enter the cemetery.²⁶⁵ [²⁶⁵ *Sunday Times* 8 March 1992]

At the beginning of April 1992, 15 people died and 30 were wounded when fighting broke out in Alexandra. A member of the IFP central committee, Mr Musa Myeni, blamed the ANC for the killings, saying that the organisation was 'bent on destroying the Zulus', while an ANC spokesman, Mr Saki Macozoma, claimed that the IFP was 'fighting to delay voting for a multiracial interim government' and that lots of violence makes it difficult to hold an election'.²⁶⁶ [²⁶⁶ *Vrye Weekblad* 3 April 1992]

Later in April, the town clerk of Alexandra, Mr William Khumalo, said that the civic administration of the township had been brought to a virtual standstill by the feud between the ANC and the IFP. Mr Khumalo added that mosi of the council's offices had been 'taken over' by families displaced by the violence in the township.²⁶⁷ [²⁶⁷ *Business Day* 22 April 1992]

A spokesman for the Witwatersrand police. Lieutenant Wikus Weber, said in mid-May 1992 that seven people had been killed and 15 seriously wounded in one weekend in unrest-related township violence on the Reef. Among those killed was the chairman of the Alexandra branch of the IFP, Mr Simon Nxumalo. Lt Weber reported that the police had subsequently established a strong presence in Alexandra. Also in May, three people were killed and six wounded when an unidentified gunman opened fire on a group of people in Sebokeng (southern Transvaal), while police found four bodies with bullet wounds in Meadowlands (Soweto).²⁶⁸ [²⁶⁸ *The Star* 18 May 1992]

Later in May, three people were killed and two were injured when a minibus was ambushed in Alexandra, according to a police spokesman. Captain Eugene Opperman.²⁶⁹ [²⁶⁹ *The Citizen* 22 May 1992]

In June 1992 six people were shot dead in an attack on a shebeen in Vosloorus (east Rand). Township residents reported that two men dressed in long overcoats had entered a house where a stokvel party was being held and fired at revellers with AK-47 rifles.²⁷⁰ [²⁷⁰ *Sowetan* 22 June 1992] In the same month police reported seven deaths in political violence in Katlehong, including that of a man whose body was found on the railway line between Katlehong and Southside.²⁷¹ [²⁷¹ *The Star* 22 June 1992]

Conflict between the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress

In June 1992 it was reported that a supporter of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), Mr Mzwandile Tolbali, had been kidnapped at a sportsfield in Langa (Cape Town) by four men and a woman who were allegedly members of the ANC. A police spokesman. Major Gys Boonzaaier, said that Mr Tolbali had been kidnapped at a taxi rank at a sportsfield and taken to the house of woman who was allegedly an ANC supporter and who had returned from exile. An argument had subsequently ensued between Mr Tolbali and the woman about differences between the ANC and the PAC, and Mr Tolbali was accused of being a 'sell-out'. Maj Boonzaaier said that strips of plastic were then wrapped around Mr Tolbali's waist and wrist and set alight. When he tried to escape a shot was fired at him, hitting him in his right

hand. Mr Tolbali was then dragged to the railway station at Langa where he managed to break free and run to the nearby police station. Police took Mr Tolbali to the Groote Schuur Hospital for treatment.²⁷²

[²⁷² *The Citizen* 20 June 1992]

Other types of conflict

Hostel residents vs householders

In February 1992 eight people were killed, 17 others injured and 12 houses set alight during clashes between hostel residents and householders in Meadowlands (Soweto). A spokesman for the ANC said that the hostel residents went on a rampage after a hostel resident's burial.²⁷³ [²⁷³ *Business Day, Sowetan*

¹⁰ February 1992] Three of the 17 injured subsequently died in Baragwanath Hospital (Soweto).²⁷⁴ [²⁷⁴

The Citizen 11 February 1992] Two days later three people were shot dead at the Orlando railway station (Soweto) when residents of the Nancefield hostel attacked householders.²⁷⁵ [²⁷⁵ *The Star* 21 February 1992]

In the same month four men were shot dead and three others wounded when residents of KwaMadala hostel near Sharpeville (southern Transvaal) attacked a local shebeen. On the same day occupants of the Mzimhlophe hostel (Soweto) hurled a hand grenade at a group attending a funeral vigil, killing a householder, Mrs Esther Ndlovu, and injuring 11 other mourners in the attack.²⁷⁶ [²⁷⁶ *City Press* 23 February 1992]

A spokesman for the Soweto police, Captain Govindsamy Mariemuthoo, said later in February that two men who had visited the Meadowlands hostel had been hacked to death by householders after leaving the hostel. He added that it appeared that householders had mistaken the two men for hostel residents.

They had been attacked in a kombitaxi several kilometres away from the hostel.²⁷⁷ [²⁷⁷ *The Citizen* 25 February 1992]

In March 1992 the body of a high school student, Mr Vuyisile Ndlazi, was found in a mealie field near the Meadowlands hostel after he had been abducted by hostel residents while on the way to school.²⁷⁸

[²⁷⁸ *Sowetan* 3 March 1992]

On 27 April 1992 a 12-member delegation, consisting of members of the Alexandra (Johannesburg) branches of the ANC, the ANC Youth League, the Congress of South African Students, the South African Democratic Teachers' Union and the South African Communist Party, met the minister of law and order, Mr Hemus Kriel. A spokesman for the delegation, Mr Paul Mashatile, said that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the ongoing violence in Alexandra and to ask the minister to declare

‘Beirut’—the area between First and Sixth avenues which had been worst affected by the protracted violence—a ‘disaster area’. Mr Mashatile said that 60 people had died in the area since 7 March 1992, 585 people had been injured and about 10 000 displaced from their homes. Mr Kriel explained that certain forms of aid, including financial assistance to rebuild homes, would be made available to families in the area once it had been declared a ‘disaster area’.²⁷⁹ [²⁷⁹ *The Star* 28 April 1992]

In September 1992 the state president, Mr F W de Klerk, acceded to the request that ‘Beirut’ be declared a ‘disaster’ area, but stipulated that applications for aid should be made individually to his office. However, the condition that applications be made on an individual basis was rejected by Alexandra residents, who said it would make the receipt of aid difficult.²⁸⁰ [²⁸⁰ *Business Day* 15 September 1992]

In May 1992 families living near the Dobsonville hostel (west Rand) fled from their homes, claiming they had obtained no protection from the police when hostel residents had attacked them. It was reported that the deserted homes, which were separated from the hostel by a street, were pockmarked with bullet holes and had broken doors and windows. The houses were standing empty and looted, while a nearby school had also been closed because of the ongoing violence.²⁸¹ [²⁸¹ *City Press* 3 May 1992]

Foreign diplomats, including representatives of Australia, Canada, Sweden and the United Kingdom, visited Alexandra in April 1992 in order to assess the plight of refugees who had fled from their houses in the vicinity of the hostels, allegedly because of attacks by hostel residents. The diplomats visited the Eastbank community hall, where 60 refugee families were being accommodated, and the Alexandra Town Council’s offices, to which another 110 families had fled.²⁸² [²⁸² *The Star* 23 April 1992]

Twelve residents of the Madala hostel in Alexandra were arrested at the end of April after police had uncovered a ‘firearms factory’ and seized an assortment of firearms and homemade weapons during a predawn raid on the hostel. A liaison officer for the Witwatersrand police, Colonel Frans Malherbe, said that the firearms seized during the raid included two AK-4 rifles, six pistols, three revolvers, a shotgun, zipguns and a flare-gun as well as a 9mm Walther revolver (of police issue, which had been stolen in KwaThema, east Rand), a telescope, a pair of police combat boots and a Rhodesian-style camouflage police uniform.²⁸³ [²⁸³ *The Citizen* 1 May 1992]

In May 1992 two men were shot dead and a woman stoned and burnt to death near the Meadowlands hostel during fighting between householders and hostel residents. The woman was reported to have been living at the hostel.²⁸⁴ [²⁸⁴ *Sowetan* 22 May 1992] Two men died later in the same month when a group preparing to leave the Meadowlands hostel for a funeral were ambushed by householders armed with hand grenades and firearms.²⁸⁵ [²⁸⁵ *The Citizen* 1 June 1992]

Hostel residents vs shack dwellers

On 17 June 1992, 15 people, most of them women and children, were killed and many more injured when a group of about 200 men from the KwaMadala hostel in Vanderbijlpark (southern Transvaal) allegedly went on a rampage at a nearby shack settlement in Boipatong.²⁸⁶ [²⁸⁶ *The Star* 18 June 1992] A week later, the death toll in the violence had risen to 48, with some of the injured having died in hospital.²⁸⁷ [²⁸⁷ *Sowetan* 24 June 1992] After the massacre police raided the hostel, which was reported to be a stronghold of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and seized a ‘variety of weapons’, including spears, homemade pangas and sharpened poles, but found no firearms.²⁸⁸ [²⁸⁸ *The Citizen* 19 June 1992]

Although the residents of the KwaMadala hostel were confined to the hostel after the massacre to ‘assist the police’ with their investigation into the incident, the restriction was lifted a week later. A police officer, Major Ray Harrald, said that the restriction on hostel residents had been lifted because hostel leaders had been co-operative and a large number of the residents had been ‘questioned and cleared of suspicion’ of involvement in the massacre.²⁸⁹ [²⁸⁹ *Ibid* 24 June 1992]

However, by the end of June 75 residents of KwaMadala hostel had been arrested by the police in connection with the Boipatong massacre. The commissioner of police, General Johan van der Merwe, said that a breakthrough had come after many hours of investigation and that the investigation had been greatly assisted by the ‘whole-hearted cooperation of the KwaMadala hostel leadership’. Gen van der Merwe said further, ‘No evidence can be found to substantiate allegations that police were involved in the massacre.’²⁹⁰ [²⁹⁰ *Sowetan* 1 July 1992]

In the wake of the Boipatong massacre township residents in the Vaal Triangle (southern Transvaal) demanded the demolition of the KwaMadala hostel and that Iscor, the company which owned the hostel, should pay for damages to homes and for funerals for the dead. The ANC suspended its participation in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) in protest against the deaths on 17 June at Boipatong.²⁹¹ [²⁹¹ *Business Day, The Citizen* 24 June 1992]

The president of the ANC, Mr Nelson Mandela, subsequently asked the United Nations to ‘find means and ways to normalise the deteriorating situation in South Africa and so try to resume the negotiations which have broken down’.²⁹² [²⁹² *The Citizen* 23 June 1992] Referring to the Boipatong massacre, the secretary general of the ANC, Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, said that the government was pursuing a strategy which embraced negotiation together with ‘systematic covert action, including murder and involving the security forces’.²⁹³ [²⁹³ *Business Day, The Citizen* 24 June 1992]

Mr Ramaphosa demanded that the government should end its campaign of terror against ‘the people and

the democratic movement' by:

- terminating all covert operations, including hit squads;
- disarming, disbanding and confining to barracks all special forces, as well as detachments of foreign soldiers;
- suspending and prosecuting all officers and security force personnel involved in the violence; and
- ensuring that all repression in the non-independent and 'independent' homelands was ended 'forthwith'.²⁹⁴ [²⁹⁴ Ibid]

In July 1992, on its first day of hearings into the Boipatong massacre, police told the Goldstone commission that residents of the KwaMadala hostel were to blame for the killings. Major Christo Davidson said in a submission on behalf of the minister of law and order and the police commissioner that investigations had revealed that about 300 KwaMadala hostel residents had attacked Boipatong houses and residents.²⁹⁵ [²⁹⁵ *Business Day* 3 July 1992]

Mr Justice Richard Goldstone said in July that no evidence had been submitted to the commission which in any way justified allegations of direct complicity in, or planning of, current violence by the state president or any member of the cabinet, or any highly placed officer in the South African Police (SAP) or the South African Defence Force (SADF).²⁹⁶ [²⁹⁶ *The Citizen* 7 July 1992]

The ANC said that a lack of resources and the commission's terms of reference had restricted its ability to get to the bottom of a number of violent incidents, adding that the commission's constraints had convinced the organisation of the need for international monitoring and investigation. 'The commission has, unfortunately, narrowed the issue of state culpability to "direct complicity or planning of the violence". This misses the point. Culpability extends to acts of commission and omission. We find it odd that the commission can make so conclusive a determination without evidence being laid before it,' the ANC stressed (see also chapter on *Constitutional Change*).²⁹⁷ [²⁹⁷ *Business Day, The Citizen* 7 July 1992]

Conflict among exiles

A pamphlet published in April 1992 by a group calling itself the returned exiles' committee listed 269 people allegedly murdered or tortured by the ANC in its detention camps in Angola, Tanzania and Zambia. Two of the listed men—Mr Robert Ndlovu, who was allegedly 'buried alive in 1983', and Mr Reuben Dumane, allegedly last seen in detention in Angola in 1986'—were reported by the *Sunday Star* to be still alive and well. Mr Dumane was reported to be working as an official of the ANC's

repatriation department, while Mr Ndlovu was working as a counsellor for the national co-ordinating committee for the repatriation of South African exiles in Sebokeng (southern Transvaal).²⁹⁸ [²⁹⁸ *Sunday Star* 26 April 1992]

In May 1992 the returned exiles' committee appealed to the president of Angola, Mr Jose Eduardo dos Santos, to allow its members to visit former ANC detention camps in Angola to 'exhume bodies of members who died there and return them to South Africa for a proper Christian burial'.²⁹⁹ [²⁹⁹ *Sowetan* 25 May 1992]

The chairman of the returned exiles' committee, Mr Patrick Hlongwane, said that it was a 'source of great bitterness and pain' to the relatives of victims of ANC torture that their loved ones' had been buried in mass graves without the benefit of proper burial. He added that he had asked the minister of foreign affairs, Mr Roelof (Pik) Botha, to help facilitate the operation and to provide financial support for it. Mr Hlongwane also expressed 'deep concern' that an active member of the returned exiles' committee, Mr Bongani Ntshangase, had been murdered at Msinga (Natal).³⁰⁰ [³⁰⁰ *Ibid*]

Also in May, the leader of the South African Communist Party and former chief of staff of Umkhonto we Sizwe, Mr Chris Hani, admitted that 'excesses' had been committed by the ANC's security department in the organisation's camps in other African countries in an attempt to unmask South African government 'spies'. Mr Hani added, 'The climate, where the regime was destabilising the ANC, killing its leaders and assassinating commanders of Umkhonto we Sizwe, created a situation of suspicion.' He said that some ANC members had in consequence lost a balanced approach to combating the infiltration of the ANC by the 'regime'. He stated that he had intervened in 1984 to prevent the mistreatment of ANC members suspected of being spies, but that some executions had already taken place by then.³⁰¹ [³⁰¹ *The Star* 26 May 1992]

Mr Hlongwane said in August 1992 that some 200 former exiles had undergone 'training' in Israel in order to infiltrate ANC ranks in Durban. 'We are not going to shoot ANC members at random. Our targets will be ANC leaders and cadres who took part in our detention, torture and assault,' he said.³⁰² [³⁰² *The Citizen* 10 August 1992]

The ANC said in response that it would hold the returned exiles' committee accountable for any violent assaults on its leaders and members.³⁰³ [³⁰³ *Ibid* 13 August 1992]

Violence in the transport sector

Attacks on railway commuters

In January 1992 six people were killed and several others injured when armed gangs attacked commuters on trains between Johannesburg and Soweto and threw some of them off the moving trains.

The bodies of the dead, which were inflicted with hack wounds, were found alongside railway lines near the Langlaagte, Riverlea and Westgate stations. Some of the injured were admitted to the J G Strijdom Hospital (Johannesburg). Two priests said subsequently in sworn affidavits that they had seen policemen watching as 20 Africans armed with pangas and axes had boarded a train at Mayfair station. Police said that there was no law under which they could 'disarm 20 men carrying such weapons'.³⁰⁴ [³⁰⁴ *Sowetan, The Star* 23 January 1992]

The commissioner of police. General Johan van der Merwe, said in response to the allegations by the two priests that nobody would be allowed by the police to board trains while in possession of 'any object that could be used as a weapon'. He said that everything possible was being done to protect the lives of innocent train commuters.³⁰⁵ [³⁰⁵ *The Star* 30 January 1992]

Also in January, three people were killed and 20 others hurt in attacks on train commuters on the east Rand. A spokesman for the Witwatersrand police. Captain Eugene Opperman, said that several attacks had occurred between 5pm and 7pm and that ten of the injured had been hurt when they had jumped off moving trains while under attack. Commuters said that the attackers had used sticks and sharpened objects to beat and stab passengers on rush-hour trains.³⁰⁶ [³⁰⁶ *Business Day* 29 January 1992]

In February 1992, in a major operation aimed at the prevention of violence on trains, a force of 100 SADF troops guarded the New Canada railway station (Soweto), while 300 policemen searched for weapons on two Soweto-bound trains. Although police found only two knives, a toy gun and a spearhead concealed in a newspaper, a police spokesman, Colonel Jac de Vries, said that he was satisfied with the operation.³⁰⁷ [³⁰⁷ *The Star* 6 February 1992]

A special report by the Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression, which was published in February 1992, said that 112 commuters had been killed in attacks on trains on the Reef during the 18 months ending on 31 January 1992. The report said that commuters believed that the train attackers were either IFP members or that they were part of a 'third force'.³⁰⁸ [³⁰⁸ *Ibid* 19 February 1992]

In May 1992 Mr Douglas Gibson MP (Democratic Party) said that 232 people had been killed in attacks on trains and another 720 injured since 1990. In the first four months of 1992, he added, 135 people had been killed (at a rate of almost one a day) and 240 injured. Mr Gibson urged Mr Kriel to use the army to protect commuters on the trains.³⁰⁹ [³⁰⁹ *The Citizen* 15 May 1992]

In June 1992 a policeman was hurt when he was thrown from a train during a police raid on the Johannesburg-Soweto railway line in which the police arrested 27 people, seized 39 guns, 361 rounds of ammunition and more than 2 000 'dangerous weapons'.³¹⁰ [³¹⁰ *Business Day* 15 June 1992]

Taxi violence

The taxi war in the western Cape between the Western Cape Black Taxi Association and the Langa/Guguletu/Nyanga Taxi Association continued during the period under review. The conflict had begun in 1989 owing to competition over routes within townships and between townships and Cape Town (see *1991/92 Survey* p367).

The first interim report of the Goldstone commission on violence in the taxi industry examined the taxi war in the western Cape and published its findings in June 1992. The report noted that by March 1992 the conflict had resulted in the deaths of some 66 people and R3,6m worth of damage to property.³¹¹ [³¹¹ First interim report of the Goldstone Commission on violence in the taxi industry, Pretoria, 10 June 1992]

However, it was reported in the press in February and March 1992 that the value of property damaged in taxi violence in the western Cape amounted to R24m and the number of deaths exceeded 100.³¹² [³¹² *Business Day* 19 February, 10 March 1992]

The Goldstone report argued that commercial competition between taxi operators was the root cause of the conflict and that it had been exacerbated by the policy of deregulation pursued by the Local Road Transportation Board (LRTB). Other factors which it said had contributed to the conflict included the different system of 'radius' and 'route' permits, the absence of taxi ranks and rank facilities, a large number of 'pirate' taxi operators, inadequately trained taxidrivers, unsafe vehicles, high interest rates on vehicles and rising operating costs, which had led to overloading and the contravention of traffic laws.

The report suggested that the various statutes regulating public transport (and the taxi industry in particular) required revision. Furthermore, taxi ranks and related facilities needed to be improved and there was an urgent need for training in driving skills.

The report said that the role of the police and their influence on the level of violence in the taxi war had not been fully explored. However, the commission had heard allegations that the police had been lax in enforcing the law and investigating complaints relating to the conflict, and that the police had been actively involved in the violence as a means of destabilising ANC strongholds in particular areas.³¹³ [³¹³ First interim report of the Goldstone Commission on violence in the taxi industry, Pretoria, 10 June 1992]

These views were supported by the western Cape branch of the ANC; the Black Sash; a consultant employed by the Cape Town City Council to investigate the taxi war, Mrs Helen Zille; and a number of residents of KTC (an informal settlement outside Cape Town) who were interviewed by *The Weekly Mail*.³¹⁴ [³¹⁴ *Sash* January, *The Citizen* 17 February, *The Weekly Mail* 21 February, *The Star* 25 March 1992]

The second interim report of the Goldstone commission on taxi violence examined the taxi war in the Midrand area (north of Johannesburg). The report said that the root of the conflict was commercial competition between the Alexandra Taxi Association and the Tembisa United Taxi Association over the provision of taxi services to Ivory Park (a Transvaal Provincial Administration site-and-service scheme

in Midrand, which accommodated some 70 000 people). By June 1992 two people had died and two others had been injured in taxi violence in the area. The report suggested that Ivory Park be recognised as a township and that a police station be established in Olifantsfontein, 2km from Ivory Park.

The committee also heard evidence that the taxi permit system as administered by the LRTB was ineffective and contributed to the violence insofar as the 'radius' permit had led to misunderstandings. The LRTB was also perceived as remote' and unresponsive to local conditions. The report suggested that the existing permit system be revised.

The report noted that the Midrand municipal authorities had established the Midrand Taxi Forum with the support of rival taxi associations and with the aim of resolving the conflict. The report noted that while a ceasefire was in operation in June 1992 it was not yet certain whether the forum would be able to play a valuable role in insuring its continuation. It was recommended, however, that 'the way to peace lay in the hands of the taxidrivers' as opposed to a solution imposed by outsiders.³¹⁵ [³¹⁵ Second interim report of the Goldstone Commission into violence in the taxi industry, Pretoria, 2 July 1992; *Sowetan* 12 June 1992]

Competition between rival taxi associations over routes led to conflict in a number of other areas during the period under review. It was reported in February 1992 that the Dobsonville/Leratong/Roodepoort/Johannesburg Taxi Association and the Witwatersrand African Taxi Association were in conflict over the Dobsonville/Johannesburg route.³¹⁶ [³¹⁶ *Taxi Talk* February 1992]

The Sinamuva Long Distance Taxi Association and the Springs Taxi Association (both east Rand) were reported to have been in conflict since July 1991 over routes, and violence continued during the period under review. It was reported that by March 1992, 27 taxidrivers had been killed on the east Rand.³¹⁷ [³¹⁷ Ibid; *The Star* 1 March 1992, *Sowetan* 9 March 1992] In June 1992 members of the Springs Taxi Association said that white policemen and Springs town councillors owned taxis in the Sinamuva Long Distance Taxi Association and were thus biased in their dealings in the conflict.³¹⁸ [³¹⁸ *Sowetan* 10 June 1992]

It was reported in July 1992 that nine people had been injured and five taxis damaged in feuding over routes between the Peddie Taxi Association and the Uncedo Taxi Association in Peddie (eastern Cape).³¹⁹ [³¹⁹ *The Weekly Mail* 31 July 1992]

In March 1992 it was reported that eight taxidrivers had been killed in a feud among taxi owners affiliated to the QwaQwa Taxi Association and the QwaQwa People's Taxi Association. The feud had started in November 1991 following claims of corruption among office bearers in both taxi associations.³²⁰ [³²⁰ *Sowetan* 9 March 1992] The taxi feud in Nebo (Lebowa), which had started in May

1991, had claimed the lives of over 100 people by May 1992.³²¹ [³²¹ Ibid 19 May 1992]

In June 1992 it was reported that the ongoing taxi war in the northern Transvaal had ended when the Mashashane Taxi Association and the Mashashane United Taxi Association merged to form a single organisation.³²² [³²² *The Star* 16 June 1992]

Government initiatives regarding violence

See chapter on *Security*.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

Key Points

- The African National Congress (ANC) and its allies withdrew from constitutional negotiations in June 1992, thereby causing a breakdown in talks at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa).
- The government held bilateral talks with the Azanian People's Organisation, the Conservative Party (CP) and the Pan-Africanist Congress to discuss conditions under which they would be willing to enter into constitutional negotiations with the government.
- The leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party and the chief minister of KwaZulu, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, declined to attend the plenary session of Codesa II because agreement was not reached on the inclusion of the Zulu king in Codesa.
- Codesa II deadlocked on issues in working group 2 relating mainly to the amendment of the interim constitution.
- Codesa's working group 2 agreed that legislative power during the transitional period should be vested in an interim parliament, consisting of a national assembly and a senate functioning in terms of special majorities and according to principles agreed upon by Codesa.
- The National Party (NP) unveiled a plan in September 1992 to divide South Africa into seven provinces.
- Legislation proposed by the ANC in September 1992 for an interim government allowed for all parties with more than 5% support in the national assembly to nominate cabinet members.

- Enabling legislation allowing for the amalgamation of own affairs departments into general affairs departments was passed in September 1992.
- In September 1992 the Constitution Amendment Bill, which provided for unelected people, including Africans, to become members of the cabinet, was passed.
- The NP became the majority party in the House of Representatives in February 1992.
- In April 1992 five Democratic Party MPs joined the ANC. Although they sat as independents they became the first ANC representatives in Parliament.
- In August 1992 four MPs left the CP and formed a new party, the Afrikaner Volkspartij.

Constitutional Changes

Amendments proposed

In September 1992 the African National Congress published its Transition to Democracy Act 1992', which contained proposed amendments to the South African constitution. The proposal provided for a 400-member national assembly elected according to proportional representation and which would serve as both an interim legislature and a constitution-making body. Decisions would be taken by a two-thirds majority. The proposal defined South Africa in terms of its 1910 boundaries, thus eliminating the homeland boundaries. The provincial administrations would be retained as the only form of regional government in the interim. The proposed act provided for the president to be elected by a simple majority of the national assembly. It also provided for the cabinet to have a multiparty character and to take decisions by a two-thirds majority. In a change from earlier proposals the proposed legislation provided for all parties with more than 5% of the representation in the national assembly to be entitled to nominate cabinet members. Cabinet appointments would be in proportion to the representation of the parties in the national assembly. The proposal also included an interim bill of rights¹ [¹ *Cape Times* 4 September 1992] and provided for a deadlock-breaking mechanism (see *African National Congress* below).

After a cabinet meeting in September the state president, Mr F W de Klerk, revealed that legislation for the possible reincorporation of the 'independent' homelands was being planned. The legislation would provide a legal framework for the reincorporation of the homelands after negotiations to this effect had been finalised.² [² *Beeld* 15 September 1992]

Amendments introduced

The **Registration of Newspapers Amendment Bill** was published on 24 September 1992. The chief legal officer of the Department of Home Affairs, Mr Attie Tredoux, said that the bill would amend the principal act so that provisions in the act which had provided for a government-appointed disciplinary body to which all newspapers had to belong or be deregistered, were repealed. The bill was seen as satisfying one of the requirements of Codesa working group I regarding free political activity (see *Working group I* below). The bill was scheduled to be tabled in the 1993 sitting of Parliament.

The **Constitution Amendment Bill** was also introduced in September 1992 and was subsequently passed during the October session of Parliament. The bill sought to delete those clauses in the constitution which provided that no minister could hold office for longer than 12 months unless he or she became a member of Parliament. The bill was seen as seeking to allow for the appointment of Africans and unelected people to the cabinet.³ [³ *Cape Times* 19 September 1992] The government said, however, that it would not act on this bill until agreement had been reached on the appointment of Africans to the cabinet in negotiations.⁴ [⁴ *The Citizen* 18 September 1992] The Conservative Party served notice of its intention to oppose the bill.

Amendments passed

In September 1992 Mr de Klerk announced that enabling legislation would be introduced to allow for the rationalisation and amalgamation of own affairs departments into general affairs departments, but that political structures would be unaffected. This, he said, would eliminate duplication and allow for the orderly transformation of departments. Mr de Klerk did not say whether such legislation would affect the non-independent homelands. However, he added that it would be discussed with these homeland authorities.⁵ [⁵ *Business Day* 17 September 1992] The National Party was quoted as saying that the plan to merge the departments would probably include the six non-independent homelands and services such as health and education would acquire a more regionally structured form of administration.⁶ [⁶ *Ibid* 15 September 1992] The legislation was passed during the October sitting of Parliament.

The **Filling of Casual Vacancies in Parliament Bill**, which was tabled in September 1992, set out a procedure whereby any future vacancy in Parliament would be filled by a person nominated by the political party which had previously held that seat without it being necessary to hold a byelection. Where the former member was the only representative of his or her party in Parliament or was an independent member, provision would be made to allow the majority party in the house of Parliament concerned to nominate a successor.⁷ [⁷ *The Citizen* 18 September 1992] The bill was passed in the October session of Parliament.

The **General Law Amendment Bill** was introduced in June 1992. The bill sought to suspend those

clauses in the Prohibition of Foreign Financing of Political Parties Act of 1968 which prohibited the receipt of funds by political parties from foreign sources.⁸ [⁸ *Business Day* 19 July 1992] The bill was passed on 15 July 1992.

National Negotiations

On 20 December 1991 negotiations for a new constitution for South Africa were initiated at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa), which was held at the World Trade Centre near Jan Smuts Airport (Johannesburg) (see *1991/92 Survey* ppxiviii-li). Codesa comprised five working groups, a gender advisory committee and a management committee (see *Codesa working groups* below). Eighteen organisations, including the African National Congress (ANC), National Party, four other parliamentary parties, all ten homeland administrations, the Natal Indian Congress, the South African Communist Party, the South African government and the Transvaal Indian Congress, participated in the negotiations process. A number of organisations, notably the Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo), the Conservative Party (CP) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), refused to participate in the forum. Several unsuccessful attempts were made during 1992 to get them involved in deliberations at Codesa. The negotiation process at Codesa eventually broke down in June 1992, after the plenary session of Codesa II, when the ANC and its allies withdrew from the talks in protest against killings at Boipatong (southern Transvaal) on 17 June 1992 (see chapter on *Political Developments*).

The government subsequently held separate bilateral talks with Azapo, the CP and the PAC in an attempt to involve them in constitutional negotiations. Several meetings also took place between the minister of constitutional development, Mr Roelf Meyer, and the secretary general of the ANC, Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, in an attempt to break the impasse in negotiations. This culminated in the 'record of understanding' being signed by the government and the ANC on 26 September 1992 (see *Synopsis and Update*). As a result of the progress the ANC's national executive committee approved the organisation's return to multilateral constitutional negotiations. The organisation added, however, that there would have to be thorough preparation before the resumption of such talks.⁹ [⁹ *Beeld* 1 October 1992]

However, in response to the bilateral agreement the leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, announced his party's withdrawal from negotiations on 27 September 1992 (see *Synopsis and Update*).

Participating parties

African National Congress

Membership

In October 1992 the head of the African National Congress (ANC) organising department, Mr Steve

Tshwete, revealed that the organisation had some 868 000 members.¹⁰ [¹⁰ Telephonic interview with Ms Sue Rabkin of the ANC Organising Department, 30 October 1992]

On 21 April 1992 five former Democratic Party (DP) MPs joined the ANC. They were Messrs Pierre Cronjé, Dave Dalling, Rob Haswell, Jannie Momberg and Jan van Eck (see also *Democratic Party* below). A member of the ANC's national executive, Mr Pallo Jordan, said that the five MPs would serve the ANC in Parliament as independents during the period before the promulgation of a new constitution.¹¹ [¹¹ *The Citizen* 22 April 1992] In June Mr Dalling claimed that several other DP MPs believed that their future also lay with the ANC.¹² [¹² *Business Day* 4 June 1992]

In the same month a member of the southern Natal regional executive committee of the ANC, Mr Roy Padayachee, disclosed that the organisation had set up a task force to develop a strategy to enrol Indians. He claimed that the ANC could boast 7 000 Indian members, but acknowledged that it would face a daunting task in recruiting Indians because the National Party (NP) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) were also attempting to woo the Indian community.¹³ [¹³ *Leadership* 3 April 1992] In June the organisation launched a drive to win Indian support with a rally in Phoenix (Durban) where the president of the ANC, Mr Nelson Mandela, said that Indians had suffered a great deal under apartheid and that the NP now wanted their votes 'after all those crimes'.¹⁴ [¹⁴ *The Citizen* 15 June 1992]

At the end of August 1992 the ANC reported that its mass action campaign had resulted in an increase in its membership. It said that one of the biggest increases in membership had been in northern Natal where the organisation's regional administrator, Mr Bongani Msomi, said the membership had doubled from 5 000 to 10 000.¹⁵ [¹⁵ *Business Day* 31 August 1992] In the eastern Transvaal membership rose from 90 000 at the beginning of July to 135 000 at the end of August, while membership in the western Transvaal increased from 19 000 at the beginning of July to 25 000 at the end of August. In the northern Transvaal ANC membership rose to 45 000 at the end of August. An ANC spokesman for the western Cape region, Mr Vincent Diba, claimed that his branch had registered between 200 and 600 members a day since the beginning of July.¹⁶ [¹⁶ *Ibid*]

Constitutional issues

In February 1992 the ANC's constitutional committee published a discussion document on regionalism which said that the powers of the regions should be written into the constitution but nevertheless remain subject to the authority of the central government.¹⁷ [¹⁷ ANC document, *Ten Proposed Regions for a United South Africa*, February 1992] The organisation said that it favoured the official development regions as a basis for the division of the country. However, it wished the northern Transkei area to be removed from region E (KwaZulu/Natal). In addition, the ANC proposed a tenth region which would include border,

the Ciskei and the Transkei with the northern boundary of the new region coinciding with the 1910 frontier of the Cape province.¹⁸ [18 Telephonic interview with the head of the ANC's Constitutional Committee, Mr Zola Skweyiya, 14 April 1992] The regional boundaries, as well as the regularity of regional elections, would be spelt out in the constitution, the ANC said.

The ANC said that the constitution should define precisely what the tasks of national, regional and local government would be. The organisation envisaged 'concurrent jurisdiction' between the national government and the lower authorities rather than exclusive, differentiated powers. It said that the constitution should also specify how lower-level powers should be brought into accord with those of central government, bearing in mind that in case of conflict national legislation should prevail. The function of the national government would be to decide how best to implement the general laws of the land. Regions would not be able to contradict national policy as expressed in national laws, but would help to shape such policy and have considerable scope in deciding how to implement it.¹⁹ [19 ANC document, *Ten Proposed Regions for a United South Africa*]

The ANC suggested that regionalisation would facilitate the smooth reintegration of the 'independent' homelands into South Africa. The administrative structures and the experience gained from these homeland structures could be subsumed into regional as well as national structures, it said.²⁰ [20 Ibid] However, at its policy conference in June 1992 the organisation decided to shelve this plan and referred the matter to its regional structures for more discussion on the role, powers and demarcation of the regions. The conference agreed that a constituent assembly would take the final decision on the demarcation of the regions.²¹ [21 *Work In Progress* July 1992] At the time of writing the organisation was said to favour a larger number of regions than the ten proposed above.²² [22 *The Star* 14 September 1992]

The ANC said in June 1992 that the proposed constituent assembly should make decisions with a two-thirds majority. This was a change to its final proposals at the plenary session of Codesa II where it had said that decisions should be made by the constituent assembly with a 70% majority. The ANC added that no unelected body should have a veto over legislation passed in the constituent assembly.²³ [23 *Beeld* 1 June 1992]

At its national conference in June 1992 near Johannesburg the ANC rejected federalism and accepted instead the policy of 'one-person one-vote in a unitary state'. It also reaffirmed its acceptance of a three-tiered system of government with national, regional and local government structures elected by proportional representation. A bill of rights and a system of democratic accountability would apply at all levels. Parliament would consist of a national assembly and a senate, with the senate representing the regions. The senate would have the power to review, refer and delay legislation, except for legislation dealing with the budget. The conference said that the president should be chosen by the national assembly and should have both executive and ceremonial powers. He or she would supervise the cabinet

and would act through a prime minister accountable to parliament.²⁴ [²⁴ *Sunday Star* 31 May 1992]

In August 1992, following a meeting with the South African Maritime Research Institute to discuss constitutional issues, the ANC announced that it would be prepared to consider various proposals for a 'volkstaat'. The organisation said, however, it would be prepared to consider these proposals only if they stipulated the following:

- no discrimination on the basis of race or religion in the proposed 'volkstaat';
- no forced removals of people from the 'volkstaat'; and
- the formation of a 'volkstaat' with a viable *economy*.²⁵ [²⁵ *Rapport* 16 August 1992]

At national level the organisation said that it wanted a bicameral parliament in a unitary state and powers devolved from the central legislature to the regions.²⁶ [²⁶ *ANC Policy Guidelines for a New South Africa*, 27 April 1992] (See *1991/92 Survey* pp79–80 for more details of the ANC's constitutional proposals.)

In February 1992 the ANC released a policy document calling for Sesotho, Siswati, Sindebele, Sepedi, Tsonga, Tswana, Venda, Xhosa and Zulu to be given the same official status as Afrikaans and English.²⁷

[²⁷ ANC document, *Language Policy Considerations*, February 1992] The organisation said that this meant that no language could be declared an official language. The state would, however, be empowered to declare official one or more languages in different regions of the country or for a specific purpose such as the language of administration. The ANC said that all these languages should be developed by language agencies, taught at all levels in educational institutions, be available in courts and administrative offices, and be promoted with state assistance. The organisation added that languages that had not had sufficient support during this century would have to be treated affirmatively by the state.²⁸

[²⁸ *Ibid*]

Interim government

In January 1992 the ANC published proposed time frames for political reform, suggesting that an interim government be established by May and that elections for a constituent assembly take place by September.²⁹ [²⁹ *The Citizen* 9 January 1992]

Speaking at a news conference in Oslo (Norway) in May 1992, Mr Mandela said that the view of the ANC was that an interim government should be in place only for as long as it took to complete preparations for free and fair elections. He said that his organisation did not envisage this period lasting

for more than a few months.³⁰ [³⁰ Ibid 20 May 1992] Mr Mandela accused the government of wanting an interim government to draw up an interim constitution that would last forever.³¹ [³¹ Ibid]

Negotiations

On 23 June 1992, following the killing of 48 people at Boipatong (southern Transvaal), the ANC announced its withdrawal from negotiations and said that constitutional talks would remain on hold until a series of demands were met by the government (see also chapter on *Political Developments*).³² [³² *Business Day* 24 June 1992] The demands were for:

- the creation of a sovereign constituent assembly,
- the establishment of an interim government;
- an end to covert operations, including hit-squad activities;
- the disarming of special forces and their confinement to barracks,
- the suspension and prosecution of all officers and security personnel involved in violence;
- an end to repression in the homelands;
- the establishment of an international commission of inquiry into the massacre at Boipatong;
- the release of all political prisoners
- the repeal of all repressive legislation;
- the implementation of a programme to phase out hostels and convert them into family accommodation. The ANC also demanded the installation of fences around hostels, the permanent guarding of hostels and the regular searching of hostels with the participation of a multilateral peace structure; and
- a ban on the carrying of dangerous weapons.

At its policy conference at the end of June 1992 the ANC resolved to give the government 30 days to take action in order to avoid 'an unprecedented mass action campaign'.³³ [³³ Ibid 1 June 1992] (For further details see chapter on *Political Developments*.) Reacting to the threatened mass action, the leader of the IFP and chief minister of KwaZulu, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, said that when the ANC destroyed parts of the economy to exert political pressure it showed that it was 'monstrously cynical' and when it

believed that the government would simply surrender to shows of force then it was being 'childishly naive'.³⁴ [³⁴ *The Citizen* 9 July 1992] The state president, Mr F W de Klerk, said that the ANC's demands were tailored to 'support its programme of mass mobilisation and to justify its termination of the negotiation process'. He said the government's information was that elements within the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) were unhappy with what was being negotiated at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) and had aborted the process. He invited the ANC to discuss its demands with him in bilateral talks.³⁵ [³⁵ *Daily Dispatch* 3 July 1992]

In August 1992 the ANC turned down an invitation to attend a summit called by the government on regionalism and federalism, dubbing it an 'alliance building exercise'. The government denied this allegation and said it was merely a logical follow-up to the discussions it had held with parties at Codesa.³⁶ [³⁶ *Business Day* 28 August 1992]

In September 1992, after his return from a visit to Zambia, Mr Mandela said that he was prepared to meet Mr de Klerk on condition that he gave an undertaking on three key issues. These were the fencing off of hostels, the banning of the public display of dangerous weapons and the release of political prisoners. He added that if Mr de Klerk gave an undertaking in this regard and stipulated a time frame for implementation of these demands his organisation would be prepared to consider such a meeting.³⁷ [³⁷ *The Citizen* 16 September 1992]

After several preparatory meetings between the minister of constitutional development, Mr Roelf Meyer, and the secretary general of the ANC, Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, Mr de Klerk and Mr Mandela met at the end of September 1992 to discuss the ANC's preconditions for the resumption of negotiations.³⁸ [³⁸ *Beeld* 28 September 1992]

Alliances

After a series of calls for the ANC to end its alliance with the SACP, Mr Mandela told a Canadian news conference in April 1992 that the world's governments should support the struggle against apartheid if they wanted the ANC alliance with the SACP to end.³⁹ [³⁹ *Business Day* 8 April 1992] He said that the two organisations had the common goal of destroying racial oppression.⁴⁰ [⁴⁰ *Ibid*]

Democratic Party

Membership

The Democratic Party (DP) said in October 1992 that it did not divulge membership figures.⁴¹ [⁴¹ Interview with the Democratic Party's executive director, Mr James Scife, 1 October 1992]

In April 1992 five DP MPs—Messrs Pierre Cronjé, Dave Dalling, Rob Haswell, Jannie Momberg and Jan van Eck—were suspended from the party's caucus after they had held talks with the leadership of the ANC about the future of the DP, without the knowledge of the DP leadership.⁴² [⁴² *Beeld* 16 April 1992] Later in the same month the five MPs joined the ANC (see *African National Congress* above).⁴³ [⁴³ *The Citizen* 23 April 1992] A member of the national executive of the ANC, Mr Pallo Jordan, said that the five MPs would serve the ANC as independents in Parliament during the period before the approval of a new constitution.⁴⁴ [⁴⁴ *Ibid* 22 April 1992] In June Mr Dalling claimed that several other DP MPs believed that their future lay with the ANC.⁴⁵ [⁴⁵ *Business Day* 4 June 1992]

In May 1992 the DP launched a drive to recruit members of all races. The leader of the DP, Dr Zach de Beer, said that the party had to seek its future with 'the black and brown people of South Africa' and had, therefore, begun to concentrate its recruitment efforts in black areas. A DP recruiting officer claimed that the party had about 1000 members in Soweto.⁴⁶ [⁴⁶ *The Star* 11 May 1992]

Constitutional issues

The DP favoured a federal system with eight to 12 federal states and a bicameral parliament consisting of a national assembly and a senate. The constituent states would be represented in the senate. The two houses would have equal powers, except in respect of appropriation and fiscal issues where the national assembly would have the power to veto objections from the senate. The party called for a directly elected executive president and a cabinet drawn from all parties with more than 10% of the vote and with each party's representation in the cabinet in proportion to its electoral support countrywide (see *1991/92 Survey* pplxxiii-lxxv). However, in October 1992 the DP published revised constitutional proposals calling for the First cabinet to be proportionally representative of all parties with 5% or more support in the national assembly. The party said that this provision should lapse after a period of four years. Amendments to the constitution should require a two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament plus simple majorities in three quarters of the state parliaments, the party suggested. The document argued for ten states based on the nine official development regions, plus a new region comprising most of the Ciskei, the Transkei and Border.⁴⁷ [⁴⁷ *Financial Mail* 9 October 1992]

Alliances

In March 1992 Mr Mike Tarr MP (DP) told Parliament that the time was now right for the creation of a party which could pose an alternative to the ANC. The NP would not be able to do this because of its 'political baggage'. He said that the time had arrived to begin working on a 'political realignment'.

There were millions of voters in South Africa whose home would be in a party slightly to the right of centre and not to the left of centre as the ANC seemed to be, he added.⁴⁸ [⁴⁸ *Hansard* (joint sitting) 6 col 3095, 26 March 1992]

These views were echoed in April 1992 by Mr Tony Leon MP (DP), who proposed that the DP consider the option of creating a new party to be led by Mr de Klerk. He said that it was impossible for the party to consider engaging in any alliance at a national level without tearing the DP apart. Mr Leon predicted that the DP's involvement in the creation of a new party would give the NP a powerful reason to disband. However, Mr Ken Andrew MP (DP) said it was far too early for the DP to be anything but independent.⁴⁹ [⁴⁹ *Sunday Times* 5 April 1992] Another group was said to believe that the DP would best serve its supporters from within the ANC.⁵⁰ [⁵⁰ *Financial Mail* 24 April 1992] The caucus meeting ended inconclusively.

Shortly after this, following the suspension from the party caucus of five DP MPs who favoured an alliance with the ANC (see above), Dr de Beer said that the party would take part in temporary alliances with other political organisations in order to realise specific political goals but that alignments with other political organisations would not be entered into if they sacrificed the independence of the DP.⁵¹ [⁵¹ *Business Day* 21 April 1992]

Inkatha Freedom Party

Membership

At the end of October an information officer for the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), Mr Errol Goetsch, said that the party was not able to supply an accurate figure for its membership. He said that as at the end of October 1992 the party had captured on computer the details of 160 000 people who had renewed their membership subscriptions. He suggested, however, that the IFP had a membership of about 2,2m.⁵² [⁵² Telephonic interview with IFP information officer, Mr Errol Goetsch, 30 October 1992]

In August 1992 the western Cape branch of the IFP was formed and the party's regional chairman, Mr Nicholas Myburgh, claimed that it had 4 000 members.⁵³ [⁵³ *Financial Mail* 7 August 1992]

Constitutional issues

In February 1992 the leader of the IFP in the Transvaal, Mr Musa Myeni, said that his party was considering a proposal to divide South Africa into ten administrative units. While the Transvaal could be divided into four regions. Natal was a composite region and would constitute only one region, he said.⁵⁴ [⁵⁴ *New Nation* 14 February 1992]

The IFP favoured the division of the country into ten regions and said that cultural, economic, linguistic and political factors should play an important part in determining future state boundaries. However, it also said that it accepted the nine development regions as worthy of study and geographic amendment to determine the areas of jurisdiction for second-tier government. Each state would have a state legislature elected by proportional representation. The state executive would be headed by a state premier and a governor. The governor would represent the central government and the state president. The IFP said that the powers of the states should be defined by the constitution and that the tax bases of regional government should be entrenched.

At the national level the party advocated a bicameral parliament consisting of a national assembly and a senate. The regions or states, as well as other interest groups, would be represented in the second house or senate, the party said (see 1991/92 *Survey* pplxxi-lxxiii).

In his opening address to the IFP's annual general conference in July 1992, Chief Buthelezi said that there should be at least a 75% agreement in the new parliament before entrenched clauses in the constitution were removed.⁵⁵ [⁵⁵ *South African Update* June/July 1992] He said that he did not trust the ANC and would not put it in a position where it could change the constitution on its own.

Negotiations

Chief Buthelezi did not attend the second plenary session of Codesa on 15 May 1992—Codesa II—because Codesa had not agreed to the full participation of the Zulu monarch. King Goodwill Zwelithini, in its deliberations. The national chairman of the IFP, Dr Frank Mdlalose, said that Chief Buthelezi felt 'honour bound' to stand by his king and to join Codesa only when it was possible for his king to do so.⁵⁶ [⁵⁶ *The Citizen* 15 May 1992]

Speaking in San Francisco in January 1992, Chief Buthelezi said he opposed early elections involving all South Africans because it would split the country further. He said that there should not be elections in 1992 or 1993 because political parties were not free to campaign in all communities or among all race groups for support.⁵⁷ [⁵⁷ *The Star* 12 February 1992] He reiterated this view in May 1992 when he said that the IFP would see to it that no elections were held while high levels of violence made the politics of intimidation the order of the day.⁵⁸ [⁵⁸ *The Citizen* 25 May 1992]

Speaking at a conference on federalism in Johannesburg in November 1992, a member of the IFP's central committee, Dr Ben Ngubane, said that his party did not support an elected constituent assembly as the vehicle to draw up a new constitution. A party winning an outright majority in such a body could virtually write its own constitution with no regard for other parties, thus making negotiations and the need for compromise superfluous, he argued.⁵⁹ [⁵⁹ Speech by a member of the IFP central committee, Dr Ben

Ngubane, Johannesburg, 3 November 1992]

Alliances

During the referendum campaign in March 1992 (see chapter on *Political Developments*) the Transvaal region of the IFP and the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) were reported to have signed a non-aggression pact. The leader of the AWB, Mr Eugene TerreBlanche, said that the pact meant that his organisation and the IFP would not attack each other and would in future negotiate ‘in a different manner to the negotiations which are taking place [at Codesa]’. Mr Myeni said that he had already discussed the pact with Chief Buthelezi and that he was confident that the IFP would accept it nationally.⁶⁰ [⁶⁰ *The Citizen* 14 March 1992] Chief Buthelezi subsequently denied having any knowledge of IFP discussions about such a pact. He described it as ‘mischief making in a referendum campaign in which the IFP wished to have no part’. Chief Buthelezi distanced himself and the IFP from the pact.⁶¹ [⁶¹ *City Press* 15 March 1992] Mr Myeni later also denied that a pact was signed. The AWB, said, however, that it would honour the pact despite these denials.⁶² [⁶² *The Citizen* 16 March 1992]

In September 1992 Chief Buthelezi held a meeting with the newly formed Afrikaner Volksunie (AVU) (see below) at which he called for the ‘fashioning of a weight’ to counterbalance what he termed the ‘alliance of gunslingers, gangsters, militant lunatics and hard-core communists which infest the ANC, Cosatu and SACP alliance’. He told the AVU that the price Afrikaner nationalism had to pay for any alliance of interests was ‘recognition that all South Africans share a common destiny’. There was a need for an alliance to bridge the gaps between the various occupants of the centre stage, he said.⁶³ [⁶³ *Ibid* 12 September 1992]

Labour Party

Membership

In February 1992, following a number of defections from the Labour Party (LP) to the NP, the LP lost control of the ministers’ council in the House of Representatives when it was defeated by the NP in a no confidence vote. The party was reduced to the status of official opposition in that house.⁶⁴ [⁶⁴ *The Star* 3 February 1992]

As at 1 October 1992 the LP had a membership of some 250 000 people in 300 branches across the country. The party was divided into 11 administrative regions.⁶⁵ [⁶⁵ Telephonic interview with the administrative secretary of the LP, Mr Trevor Potgieter, and the secretary general of the LP, Mr P Samuels, 1 October 1992]

Constitutional issues

The LP favoured a federation of between 15 and 20 nonracial states and a bicameral parliament to be elected on the basis of proportional representation. According to a senior LP member, Mr David Curry, the LP supported regionalism and the entrenchment in the constitution of the functions of the regions. He said that while some areas, such as the Orange Free State, could be regions on their own, 'patch-quilt' territories such as KwaZulu could not be the basis for regions. Mr Curry said that each region would have a regional legislature headed by a president or governor. Elections would be on the basis of proportional representation, with half the deputies being elected on a constituency basis and the other half being elected on a national list.

At national level the LP wanted half the legislature to be elected by the states and the other half to be elected by means of a national list system, thus allowing regions representation in the national legislature. The regions would have the power to decide on education, health, housing and other developmental matters. National powers would include defence, finance, foreign affairs and other matters that could be handled better at national level.⁶⁶ [⁶⁶ Telephonic interview with Mr David Curry MP (LP), 19 May 1992]

Alliances

The leader of the LP, the Rev Allan Hendrickse, said in April 1992 that his party had no intention of joining the ANC and the SACP but added that the LP would 'walk the road with the fellow oppressed'. He added, however, that the LP's place was not with the NP.⁶⁷ [⁶⁷ *Beeld* 27 April 1992] However, shortly after his party's defeat in the Diamant byelection (northern Cape) in June 1992 Mr Hendrickse said that he had no doubt that the LP's future lay with the ANC but that the party still had a role to play in weaning coloured people away from the NP.⁶⁸ [⁶⁸ *The Weekly Mail* 26 June 1992]

In July 1992 the LP was reported to be exploring the possibility of forming a new 'centrist party'. According to Mr Joseph Douglas MP (LP), the party's strategy committee was to conduct exploratory work before presenting various options to the national executive committee of the LP⁶⁹ [⁶⁹ *The Citizen* 27 July 1992]

National Party

Membership

The NP has a policy of not divulging membership figures. As at 16 October 1992 the NP was the majority party in both the House of Assembly and the House of Representatives with 102 and 44 MPs in

each house respectively. It also had five MPs in the House of Delegates.⁷⁰ [⁷⁰ *Hansard* 23, 16 October 1992]

In May 1992 the minister of foreign affairs, Mr Roelof (Pik) Botha, said that the NP's support among coloured people could be projected at 1,6m votes and in the Indian community at between 400 000 and 500 000 votes.⁷¹ [⁷¹ *The Citizen* 11 May 1992] In June he said that the NP was on the brink of becoming the political party with most support in South Africa.⁷² [⁷² *Business Day* 4 June 1992]

In June 1992 the NP announced the start of a major recruitment drive in black areas and said that it intended to hold about 2 500 meetings in these areas before the end of the year. The party said that the basis of the campaign would be a multimedia publicity package in six languages—Afrikaans, English, Northern Sotho, Southern Sotho, Xhosa and Zulu.⁷³ [⁷³ *The Star* 19 June 1992]

At the Orange Free State congress of the NP in August 1992 Mr Botha claimed that the NP could win a majority of support from all South Africans in a one-man one-vote general election. He based this view on the assumption that 3m whites, 1,5m coloured people and 500 000 Indians would vote for the party. He said that these numbers, together with a possible 1m votes for the IFP and support for the NP among Africans, meant that more than half of the expected voters would vote against the ANC.⁷⁴ [⁷⁴ *The Citizen* 3 September 1992]

Constitutional issues

In March 1992, during the referendum campaign, the state president, Mr F W de Klerk, announced the following fundamental requirements in a new constitution:

- the maintenance of standards;
- effective protection of the ownership of private property against arbitrary action by a future government
- a free market economy in a multiparty democracy;
- the prevention of political domination
- a bill of rights and an independent judiciary,
- job and pensions security for state employees;

- impartial security forces;
- maximum devolution of power, strong regional government and a separation of powers;
- limitations on the powers of the state president
- a bicameral parliament;
- elections on the basis of proportional representation: and
- the maintenance of law and order.⁷⁵ [⁷⁵ *Sowetan* 9 March 1992]

Addressing the KwaZulu legislative assembly in June 1992 Mr de Klerk said that his government supported the principle of entrusting as much power as possible to regional governments. Provisions for the areas of jurisdiction of regions should be entrenched, he said. Mr de Klerk added that there was no doubt that the system of traditional leaders would have to be taken into account in the constitution-making process.⁷⁶ [⁷⁶ *The Citizen* 17 June 1992]

At the summit meeting on regionalism and federalism in September 1992 Mr de Klerk's constitutional advisers unveiled a 'draft technical plan' for a strongly federal South Africa with seven autonomous 'provinces' instead of the nine development regions previously favoured by the party. All ten homelands were to be reincorporated.⁷⁷ [⁷⁷ *The Star* 14 September 1992]

The plan called for the central government's powers to be limited to such functions as constitutional planning, defence, foreign affairs and national security, with the remaining functions, including finance, left to the provinces. The provinces would have wide powers to raise taxes. However, financial autonomy would be directly dependent upon the financial ability of the province. Provision would be made for financial 'transfers' from affluent to less affluent regions. The provinces would have their own constitutions drafted within an entrenched framework provided for in the national constitution.⁷⁸ [⁷⁸ *Ibid*]

Each province would have a unicameral legislature with a cabinet chaired by a prime minister and decisions would be taken by a two-thirds majority. The document said that the powers of the regions should be allocated in terms of the national constitution, which should also 'prohibit withdrawal or amendment of regional functions without the consent of regional legislatures'.⁷⁹ [⁷⁹ *New Nation* 17 September 1992]

Interim government

Replying in July 1992 to the ANC's demands the previous month, when it withdrew from constitutional negotiations (see *African National Congress* above), Mr de Klerk revealed the government's modified

plans for an interim government. He called for a bicameral legislature consisting of a national assembly and a senate. The national assembly would be elected by proportional representation according to a party-list system. The senate would be constituted by an equal number of members from each electoral region (based on the nine development regions). Seats in the regions would be allocated in proportion to party support in that region. Previously (see *1991/92 Survey* pxxxvi) the NP had proposed that all parties which commanded support exceeding a certain percentage should have equal representation in the senate. The proposals also provided for the senate to initiate legislation and for all legislation to be passed by both houses. Mr de Klerk said that a transitional constitution would provide for mechanisms for the resolution of differences between the two houses as well as for specific areas in respect of which the powers of the senate could be upgraded or downgraded.⁸⁰ [⁸⁰ *Cape Times* 6 July 1992]

The NP said that agreement would have to be reached regarding the powers, functions and boundaries of regions and regional government prior to the promulgation of the transitional constitution. Proposed amendments by the transitional parliament of the transitional constitution in relation to the boundaries, powers and functions of regions would have to be approved by a majority of the representatives of each electoral region that would be affected.⁸¹ [⁸¹ *Ibid*]

The NP said that it would require a majority of 70% for the replacement or amendment of the transitional constitution while 75% would be required for amendment of the bill of rights. However, the constitution could be amended or replaced only within the framework of general constitutional principles agreed to at Codesa. This was a change to the NP's position at the plenary session of Codesa II, where it had called for a 75% majority for amending matters pertaining to the regions (see also *Working group 2*).

The NP said that if the transitional constitution had not been replaced within three years a general election would have to be held.⁸² [⁸² *Ibid*]

At the end of July 1992 Mr de Klerk said that regional leaders should negotiate with each other and not wait for the central negotiating debate to fulfil their expectations.⁸³ [⁸³ *The Citizen* 1 August 1992] In August he announced that the NP would convene a summit meeting on regionalism and federalism on 7 September and he invited all interested parties to attend. The ANC said, however, that it would not attend as the summit was an attempt by the NP to form 'an axis around the NP proposals against the democratic forces'.⁸⁴ [⁸⁴ *Business Day* 28 August 1992] The NP denied this, saying that it did not expect any alliances to emerge from the summit.⁸⁵ [⁸⁵ *Ibid*] The NP's summit was attended by representatives of Bophuthatswana, the Ciskei, Gazankulu, KwaZulu, QwaQwa, the South African government, the Dikwankwetla Party, the IFP, the NP, the National People's Party, Solidarity and the Ximoko Progressive Party (see *Constitutional issues* above).⁸⁶ [⁸⁶ *The Star* 14 September 1992]

Negotiations

In August 1992, following a breakdown in constitutional negotiations, Mr de Klerk announced that the NP was prepared to take important preparatory steps that would make progress towards constitutional negotiations possible. He added that the NP would try everything to remove the obstacles in the way of negotiations.⁸⁷ [⁸⁷ *Beeld* 21 August 1992] Mr de Klerk said that the differences which had led to the breakdown in Codesa II were certainly not unbridgeable.⁸⁸ [⁸⁸ *The Citizen* 14 August 1992]

Also in August, Mr de Klerk told the Orange Free State congress of the NP that the government had decided to sign four important conventions on women and women's rights. These were the convention on the abolition of all forms of discrimination against women; the convention on the political rights of women; the convention on the agreement to marry, the minimum age for marriage and the registration of marriages; and the convention on the nationality of married women.⁸⁹ [⁸⁹ *Beeld* 18 August 1992] The minister of justice, Mr Kobie Coetsee, also announced that more than 30 clauses in legislation that discriminated against women would be speedily repealed—possibly in the October sitting of Parliament.⁹⁰ [⁹⁰ *Sowetan* 1 September 1992] In its reaction the ANC called this move by the government a 'barefaced and shameful attempt to confuse public opinion' and said it was designed to send false signals to the international community about the government's commitment to fundamental rights and freedoms.⁹¹ [⁹¹ *The Citizen* 28 August 1992] The ANC Women's League, however, applauded the move and said that any constitution designed to remedy discrimination should have as a priority the entrenchment of equal rights for both men and women.⁹² [⁹² *Ibid* 21 August 1992]

At the same congress the NP adopted a new set of principles which scrapped all reference to Christian nationalism. The NP's secretary general, Dr Stoffel van der Merwe, said the term had been abused and had become tainted. The new policy document said that the NP would strive for equal treatment in the use of Afrikaans and English and the adequate promotion of other languages, whether on a countrywide or regional basis. It would also strive for a democracy in which both individuals and groups were effectively protected against possible abuse by the government.⁹³ [⁹³ *Ibid* 3 September 1992]

Alliances

In April an unnamed 'top NP member' was quoted as saying that the party was reassessing its future and that four possibilities were being considered:

- forming a new party to replace the NP, with Mr de Klerk as its leader;
- establishing a new black-oriented party which would then form an alliance with the NP;

- forming alliances with existing parties; and
- retaining the NP in its present form.⁹⁴ [⁹⁴ *Sunday Times* 5 April 1992]

However, Dr van der Merwe denied these reports and said that there was no possibility of the party disbanding and forming a new party.⁹⁵ [⁹⁵ *The Star* 1 April 1992]

National People's Party

Membership

At the end of October 1992 the leader of the National People's Party (NPP), Mr Amichand Rajbansi, said that his party had a membership of 95 000 people—mostly Indians living in Natal.⁹⁶ [⁹⁶ Information supplied by the leader of the NPP, Mr Amichand Rajbansi, 30 October 1992]

Constitutional issues

The NPP favoured a geographic federation with entrenched regional powers but said that other factors such as the 'diversity of South Africa's people', as well as demographic and economic factors, should also be taken into account. It said that while the official nine development regions could well be a basis for such a federation, in order to diminish the possibility of friction subregions should be created to accommodate different communities (such as some of the homelands). The NPP wanted the powers of the regions to be entrenched in the constitution and suggested that changes to the boundaries and certain powers of the regions should not be possible without the agreement of the region concerned.

The NPP said that at national level the regions would be represented on an equal basis (regardless of size) in the lower house or senate. The party suggested that half of the revenue collected by the regions go to a national pool which would then redistribute this to the states on the basis of need.⁹⁷ [⁹⁷ Telephonic interview with the leader of the NPP, Mr Rajbansi, 20 May 1992]

South African Communist Party

Membership

In November 1992 the South African Communist Party (SACP) claimed that the party's membership had increased from 2 200 at its eighth congress in October 1991 to more than 40 000. The SACP expected its membership to exceed 50 000 by the end of 1992.

Negotiations

In June 1992 the secretary general of the SACP, Mr Chris Hani, blamed the deadlock at Codesa on Mr de Klerk and accused him of continuing to cling to the idea of 'white supremacy'. He maintained that the NP's insistence on a 75% majority for drawing up a new constitution was premised on the NP getting 30% of the vote by combining its votes with Chief Buthelezi's supporters and others in order to block the ANC-led alliance from having a clear cut majority.⁹⁸ [⁹⁸ *The Citizen* 15 June 1992]

Alliances

In July 1992, in reaction to suggestions that the ANC and the SACP were moving apart, Mr Hani denied this and added that the SACP felt that it could play a role in an alliance with the ANC in a post-apartheid South Africa. He conceded that there might be a need to separate the two organisations eventually but added that there would always be room for co-operation on a number of issues.⁹⁹ [⁹⁹ *Newsweek* 20 July 1992]

Solidarity

Membership

According to Solidarity's acting secretary, Mr S Mansoor, the party had some 60 000 members at the end of 1991.¹⁰⁰ [¹⁰⁰ Information supplied by the acting secretary of Solidarity, Mr S Mansoor, 11 November 1992]

Constitutional issues

Solidarity favoured a federal system consisting of nine or ten federal states with entrenched powers. While the party believed that a two-thirds majority would be adequate for entrenchment of state powers, it felt that if these powers were given to the regions it would be immaterial whether the proportion required for changes to such powers was as high as 75%. Solidarity rejected the division of states along ethnic lines. The party suggested that the states be afforded representation at national level by allowing half the national legislature to be elected on national lists and the other half to be elected on state lists.¹⁰¹ [¹⁰¹ Telephonic interview with Mr Kisten Moodley MP, Solidarity's representative on Codesa working group 2, 19 May 1992]

Homeland administrations

Bophuthatswana

The president of Bophuthatswana, Chief Lucas Mangope, said in February 1992 that his administration's first choice was to continue as a sovereign state within extended boundaries.¹⁰² [¹⁰² *Beeld* 7 February 1992] He said that Bophuthatswana favoured a confederal arrangement between independent states¹⁰³ [¹⁰³ *Business Day* 27 February 1992] and rejected the concept of a unitary state with only delegated powers allocated to the regions. Chief Mangope added, however, that the option of a federal structure with constitutionally entrenched powers would be considered as 'realistic and obtainable' by Bophuthatswana if it held out the hope of a better future or of a future at least as good as the homeland's present situation.¹⁰⁴ [¹⁰⁴ *Beeld* 7 February 1992]

In March 1992 Chief Mangope suggested that Bophuthatswana, the northern Cape and the western Transvaal could unite in order to bring about a powerful regional government system in the area.¹⁰⁵ [¹⁰⁵ *Ibid* 25 March 1992] At the time of writing Chief Mangope reaffirmed his administration's commitment to confederalism and ruled out the possibility of Bophuthatswana's return to a unitary South Africa with delegated authority.¹⁰⁶ [¹⁰⁶ *Business Day* 5 August 1992]

Ciskei

The Ciskei administration wanted a federation of states with entrenched rights and powers, and boundaries determined by a commission on the basis of cultural, economic, technical and political parameters. Each state would have a bicameral legislature consisting of a lower house elected by proportional representation, and an upper house elected by urban and rural local authorities, with representation of traditional leaders where applicable. Each legislature would be headed by an executive consisting of a governor and secretaries of state (who would head government departments). A senate would represent the different regions at central government level. Senators would be elected by both houses of their particular federal states.¹⁰⁷ [¹⁰⁷ Ciskei administration submission to Codesa working group 2, March 1992]

Gazankulu

The chief minister of Gazankulu, Professor Hudson Ntsanwisi, said in March 1992 that he believed in strong regional government in which decision making was devolved to the lowest level. He concluded that because of the poor record of federalism in its pure form in the third world. South Africa might well end up with a system of strong, decentralised regional government as a first step.¹⁰⁸ [¹⁰⁸ *SA Barometer* March 1992]

KaNgwane

The KaNgwane administration favoured regions with boundaries determined on the basis of economic, geographic, historical and social coherence and taking into account the official nine development regions. Each region would have a unicameral legislative assembly elected by proportional representation. The division of powers between central, regional and local government would be specified in the constitution. Regional governments would be entitled to raise revenue and to legislate on matters devolved to them. KaNgwane envisaged that a senate would represent the different regions at central government level. Senators would be elected by the regional assemblies, each of which would vote for an equal number of senators.¹⁰⁹ [109 KaNgwane administration submission to Codesa working group 2, March 1992]

In May 1992 the leader of the Inyandza National Movement and the chief minister of KaNgwane, Mr Caiphus Zitha, said that his party favoured a strong central government rather than a federal system of government.¹¹⁰ [110 *New Nation* 22 May 1992] Mr Zitha said that although the movement believed strongly in negotiations it would consider taking other action if negotiations failed. He added that any outstanding Codesa work 'should be completed' before the parliamentary session in late 1992.¹¹¹ [111 *Ibid*]

Lebowa

The Lebowa administration advocated a system of regional governments within a unitary state. The structure, powers and functions of regional governments would be entrenched. Regions would be responsible for services such as education, health, land allocation, law and order, licensing, pensions and roads. They would, however, execute these functions within the guidelines of national policy formulated by the central government. Regions would be able to raise revenue from taxation supplemented by allocations from the central government. Lebowa did not regard the present homelands as viable regions and said that the current official development regions could form the basis of the new regional boundaries.¹¹² [112 Reply to questions posed to the chief minister of Lebowa, Mr Nelson Ramodike, 8 April 1992]

In December 1991, in reference to the NP's plan for a multiparty presidency (see *1991/92 Survey* plxxvi), the chief minister of Lebowa, Mr Nelson Ramodike, said that his administration was opposed to a plan which gave equal say to different political parties in the running of the country as such proposals could serve to deny the majority party the power to govern.¹¹³ [113 *The Citizen* 31 December 1992]

QwaQwa

The QwaQwa administration favoured a federal government structure underpinned by a system of regional states, each with its own legislature and executive body exercising constitutionally prescribed and entrenched powers. The federal government would exercise control over matters such as defence,

foreign affairs, interstate trade, the military and security matters. The regions would exercise control over matters such as education, health and housing.¹¹⁴ [¹¹⁴ *Barometer* March 1992]

Transkei

The Transkei administration indicated in March 1992 that it would prefer a decentralised unitary state with regional governments which would have delegated rather than autonomous powers. Such regional authorities would concentrate on matters pertaining to development as well as matters peculiar to each region.

The chairman of the Transkei Military Council, Major General Bantu Holomisa, said that the state president should appoint members of the proposed regional governments. However, he said that another option would be to elect such governments, as was the case in Namibia. The powers of the provincial councils could be adapted for the regions. The Transkei administration felt that the ANC's criteria for arriving at the boundaries for its ten proposed regions were 'sound' and 'cannot be faulted'.¹¹⁵ [¹¹⁵ Speech by the chairman of the Transkei Military Council, Major General Bantu Holomisa, at the University of the Western Cape, 27 March 1992]

Venda

The Venda administration favoured strong regional governments with powers written into the constitution. These should include control of health services, land allocation, licences, the levying of taxes and roads. The Venda administration said that the regions should be based on geographical and economic factors as well as on ethnicity. It did not believe that the Venda homeland would constitute a viable region and therefore favoured Gazankulu, Lebowa and Venda forming part of region G, as demarcated in terms of the official development regions.¹¹⁶ [¹¹⁶ Reply to questions submitted to the head of Venda's Military Council, Brigadier Gabriel Ramushwana, 27 March 1992]

Non-participating parties

Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging

Membership

In May 1992 the leader of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), Mr Eugene TerreBlanche, said that the AWB had received thousands of new applications for membership as a result of the referendum result, 'because people have come to realise that the ballot can no longer help them'.¹¹⁷ [¹¹⁷ *Sunday Star* 9 May 1992] However, membership figures for the AWB were unavailable at the time of writing.

Negotiations

At the end of March 1992 the former secretary general of the AWB, Mr Piet Rudolph, said that Afrikaners advocating an Afrikaner state should put their case at Codesa. He added that he was angry that the AWB had not been at Codesa from its inception.¹¹⁸ [¹¹⁸ *Beeld* 31 March 1992] In its reaction the AWB denied that any of its members intended to participate in Codesa.¹¹⁹ [¹¹⁹ *The Citizen* 25 March 1992]

Azanian People's Organisation

Negotiations

Speaking at a conference in May 1992, the president of the Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo), Mr Pandelani Nefolovhodwe, said that Azapo would not participate in Codesa or in a constituent assembly under conditions in which prior restrictions had been placed upon the constitution it was meant to draw up. He insisted that negotiations should be at a neutral venue and that their purpose should be the transfer of power. This process should, however, be preceded by a patriotic front meeting limited to liberation movements.¹²⁰ [¹²⁰ *Business Day* 2 March 1992] In April Azapo's publicity secretary, Mr Strini Moodley, said that his organisation had no confidence in Codesa and that it had mandated a task force to look into the possibility of an armed struggle.¹²¹ [¹²¹ *Sowetan* 10 April 1992]

However, in June 1992, Mr Moodley told journalists that an official of the Department of Foreign Affairs had held informal discussions with a senior Azapo member and informed him that the government was willing to consider Azapo's conditions for a bilateral meeting. Azapo's central committee subsequently informed the government that Azapo would meet it at a neutral venue outside South Africa under the chairmanship of a neutral mediator for the purposes of discussing how the government would resign to allow for the ushering in of democracy. Mr Moodley added that the organisation had appointed an independent mediator to arrange a meeting.¹²² [¹²² *Ibid* 12 June 1992]

In August 1992 Azapo announced that talks could begin between itself and the government by 12 September. Mr Moodley revealed that Azapo had appointed an Anglican archbishop, the Most Rev Khotso Walter Makhudu, as facilitator of the meeting. He added that the talks would centre on the establishment of a constituent assembly.¹²³ [¹²³ *Ibid* 21 August 1992] However, in September, after the killings at Bisho (Ciskei) (see chapter on *Political Developments*) Azapo sent a letter to the government saying that it was reassessing the holding of talks with the government.¹²⁴ [¹²⁴ *Beeld* 11 September 1992] At the time of writing such talks had not been held.

Earlier, in March 1992, Mr Nefolovhodwe said that Azapo envisaged a transitional authority of limited duration with a clearly defined mandate. Such an arrangement would ensure that the liberation

movements would not be co-opted into supporting apartheid. The international community would participate in the transitional authority, he said. Mr Nefolovhod we added that during stage the security forces should be disarmed and confined to barrack: ¹²⁵ [¹²⁵ *Business Day* 2 March 1992] Elections would have to be supervised by international observers. ¹²⁶ [¹²⁶ *The Star* 5 June 1992]

Alliances

In February 1992 Azapo announced that in an attempt to overthrow the South African government it was planning a liberation front of organisations with a record of ‘non-collaboration’. The deputy president of Azapo, Mr Nchaupe Mokoape, said that the front would be formed by organisations outside of Codesa but that organisations inside Codesa would be eligible for inclusion if they withdrew from Codesa. ¹²⁷ [¹²⁷ *Ibid* 4 February 1992] The organisation reiterated this intention in June after the conclusion of Codesa II. ¹²⁸ [¹²⁸ *The Weekly Mail* 5 June 1992]

Black Consciousness Movement of Azania

Negotiations

The chairman of the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCMA), Mr Mosibudi Mangena, said in March 1992 that his organisation favoured negotiations outside the country which would concern only the holding of democratic elections for a constituent assembly on the basis of ‘one-person one-vote on a common voters’ roll in a unitary state’. Mr Mangena said that such negotiations would have to be held under the auspices of an impartial mediator ¹²⁹ [¹²⁹ *Sowetan* 13 March 1992]

In reaction to calls for the suspension of its armed struggle, the BCMA’s publicity secretary, Mr Vuyisa Quma, said in May 1992 that its armed wing, the Azanian National Liberation Army, would continue with its programme of armed struggle until its objective of liberating black people was achieved. He argued that events at Codesa had indicated that the liberation armies should intensify their campaigns. ¹³⁰ [¹³⁰ *Ibid* 29 May 1992]

Conservative Party

Membership

The Conservative Party (CP) does not divulge membership figures.

In August 1992 five MPs, Messrs Andries Beyers, Chris de Jager, Rosier de Ville, Moolman Mentz, and Cehill Pienaar, resigned from the party after it became clear that the CP’s ‘head council’ would not

endorse policy changes proposed by them (see below for details).¹³¹ [¹³¹ *Business Day* 14 August 1992]

Constitutional issues

In February 1992 Mr Koos van der Merwe MP (CP) advocated a confederation or a federation as the way to solve South Africa's constitutional problems.¹³² [¹³² *Beeld* 28 February 1992] The leader of the CP, Dr Andries Treumicht, said in the same month that his party would not necessarily seek to reintroduce all the old apartheid laws. He added that the ideal for which the CP was striving was a commonwealth of states.¹³³ [¹³³ *Sunday Star* 23 February 1992] However, in March Dr Treumicht said that his party would reintroduce influx control, white education and white group areas.¹³⁴ [¹³⁴ *The Star* 3 March 1992]

In the same month the leader of the CP in the Orange Free State, Mr Cehill Pienaar, said that the CP was looking at a smaller white 'volkstaat' for whites within a confederation of states. However, he added that it was possible that through negotiations with black leaders a 'co-operative, self-determining but loosely knit federation' could result. He added that theoretically a black person who identified with Afrikaner ideals could be part of a white 'volkstaat'. Mr Pienaar said that pockets of white territory across the country could form a cohesive white homeland.¹³⁵ [¹³⁵ *Business Day* 6 March 1992]

After a meeting of the party's 'head council' in June 1992, Dr Treumicht said that the council had decided 'with a maximum degree of agreement' that although it would prefer a geographically continuous Afrikaner homeland, it had accepted that areas that could not be consolidated into one geographic area could still be co-ordinated as one entity. The CP wanted a confederation or commonwealth of states for the various people of South Africa, on a voluntary basis, with political independence in their own states and economic interdependence. Dr Treumicht argued that this would exclude a central government or legislature.¹³⁶ [¹³⁶ *The Citizen* 10 June 1992]

The council adopted the following guidelines regarding the borders of an Afrikaner 'volkstaat':

- not all land that was or had been in the hands of Afrikaners would be able to remain in their hands and thus a 'volkstaat' would have to be smaller;
- there would have to be negotiations and co-operation with the government and the governments 'of other nations' in order to reach agreement on the question of borders;
- African homelands should be excluded from the government's regional divisions;
- areas represented by the CP in Parliament should be recognised as part of the area due to the Afrikaner; and

- the CP could justifiably claim as its own homeland an area greater than the areas it represented in Parliament.¹³⁷ [¹³⁷ *Beeld* 8 June 1992]

At a special general congress on 29 June 1992, five MPs—Messrs Andries Beyers, Chris de Jager, Rosier de Ville, Moolman Mentz and Cehill Pienaar—handed out a document outlining constitutional proposals in direct contradiction of proposals by the party’s ‘head council’ (see above). The five MPs suggested that the country be divided into ten regions with an ‘Afrikaner-dominant’ state in the north with Pretoria as its nucleus.¹³⁸ [¹³⁸ *Business Day* 29 June 1992] An Afrikaans-speaking state would be established in the south of the country for Afrikaners and Afrikaans-speaking coloured people. The other eight states would accommodate other ethnic groups, including a multi-ethnic state which would be dominated by blacks.¹³⁹ [¹³⁹ *The Citizen* 29 June 1992] These differences in opinion led to the five MPs resigning from the CP in August after it became clear that their views would not be accommodated within the party.

In September 1992 new CP constitutional proposals were announced at the NP’s summit on regionalism and federalism. The proposals involved a confederation of states with one of the states, if it so chose, being divided into a federation. One of the independent member states of the confederation would be the CP’s proposed Afrikaner ‘volkstaat’. The federal states would have a federal parliament which would send representatives to a confederal council, along with the various member states of the confederation. The member states as well as the federal parliament would decide which powers to cede to the confederal council and these could be withdrawn from the council at any stage, the CP said.¹⁴⁰ [¹⁴⁰ *Patriot* 11 September 1992]

Negotiations

In February 1992 Dr Treurnicht said that the CP was not prepared to negotiate on the basis of an undivided state as proposed by the Codesa statement of intent. He insisted that the CP would negotiate with other national leaders only on the basis of self-determination.¹⁴¹ [¹⁴¹ *Sunday Star* 23 February 1992]

In March 1992 the CP parliamentary caucus decided unanimously not to take part in Codesa.¹⁴² [¹⁴² *The Citizen* 25 March 1992] In May the party officially accepted the invitation of the deputy minister of constitutional development, Dr Tertius Delport, to have discussions with the NP about their common ideals. The CP declared itself prepared to negotiate with the government in a special forum about the country’s constitutional future.¹⁴³ [¹⁴³ *Patriot* 1 May 1992]

In June 1992 Dr Treurnicht said that the CP would participate in talks once a new forum for negotiations was launched, provided that the self-determination of whites was recognised.¹⁴⁴ [¹⁴⁴ *The Citizen* 1 June 1992] In the same month the CP and the government held their first formal meeting to discuss constitutional issues. A statement issued after the meeting said the talks had been frank and that they had centred on constitutional developments. Further meetings were to be held.¹⁴⁵ [¹⁴⁵ *Business Day* 12 June 1992]

Speaking in Parliament in May 1992, Dr Treurnicht criticised proposals for a transitional government and said that it would amount to an unelected pro-ANC government in favour of a unitary state. This would mean a black majority government in which the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, and the PAC's military wing, the Azanian People's Liberation Army, would play a deciding role in any election.¹⁴⁶ [¹⁴⁶ *Hansard* (joint sitting) 17 col 8798, 20 May 1992]

Alliances

In March the CP entered into a right-wing alliance with 45 other organisations, including the AWB, the Herstigte Nasionale Party and the Boerestaat Party, in order to campaign for a 'no' vote in the whites-only referendum (see also chapter on *Political Developments*).¹⁴⁷ [¹⁴⁷ *The Citizen* 3 March 1992]

Herstigte Nasionale Party

Constitutional issues

The leader of the HNP, Mr Jaap Marais, said in March 1992 that his party sought the return of all apartheid measures, the reinstatement of the state of emergency and an economic policy that would include the freezing of prices.¹⁴⁸ [¹⁴⁸ *Beeld* 8 March 1992] Mr Marais called for a consolidated Afrikaner front so that Afrikaners could plan their political future together more effectively.¹⁴⁹ [¹⁴⁹ *Patriot* 20 March 1992]

In April 1992 he rejected the concept of an interim government on the grounds that it was an excuse for the ANC and the SACP to enter by the political back door as co-rulers of South Africa.¹⁵⁰ [¹⁵⁰ *The Citizen* 25 April 1992]

Pan-Africanist Congress

Membership

In July 1992 the secretary general of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), Mr Benny Alexander, said that the organisation's signed-up membership (excluding the youth and women's wings) exceeded 500 000. He claimed that the organisation had 'won over' at least 800 villages in the far northern Transvaal. The organisation had 20 regional structures and 250 to 300 branches nationwide.¹⁵¹ [¹⁵¹ *The Weekly Mail* 24 July 1992]

Negotiations

In March 1992 the second deputy president of the PAC, Mr Dikgang Moseneke, said that his organisation would participate in elections for a constituent assembly provided that this was a 'genuine process involving every man and woman in the country'.¹⁵² [¹⁵² *The Citizen* 28 March 1992] If it was not the case the PAC would boycott such elections.¹⁵³ [¹⁵³ *Financial Mail* 24 April 1992]

In April 1992, following the PAC's third national congress, the organisation's president, Mr Clarence Makwetu, announced that the PAC had agreed to enter into negotiations regarding a constituent assembly provided that such talks were held at a neutral venue and under a neutral convener.¹⁵⁴ [¹⁵⁴ *Sowetan* 7 April 1992] He also announced that a meeting had been arranged in Nigeria between his organisation and the government under the chairmanship of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Although Mr Makwetu could not specify a date for the meeting he said that it would lay the ground for a summit meeting between himself and the state president, Mr F W de Klerk, to discuss the issue of elections for a constituent assembly.¹⁵⁵ [¹⁵⁵ *The Citizen* 6 April 1992]

The minister of foreign affairs, Mr Pik Botha, said that the government was not prepared to meet the PAC under the chairmanship of the OAU. He added, however, that he was not dismissing the possibility of meeting the organisation in Nigeria. Mr Botha emphasised that any meeting with the PAC in another country would be 'one between South Africans discussing their common future'.¹⁵⁶ [¹⁵⁶ *Beeld* 6 April 1992]

On 10 April 1992 a PAC delegation led by Mr Moseneke held talks with a government delegation led by Mr Botha in Nigeria and agreed to hold further bilateral talks in the future.¹⁵⁷ [¹⁵⁷ *Sowetan* 13 April 1992]

In July 1992 Mr Moseneke said that a new restructured forum, free from the defects of Codesa, should be convened with the purpose of transferring power. The new forum should have three items on its agenda:

- determining the steps to be taken in the formation of a constituent assembly;

- establishing agreement on the creation of a transitional authority; and
- agreeing on the role of the international community.

Mr Moseneke said further that participants in the forum should be parties and organisations supportive of the ‘regime’ on the one hand and representatives of the liberation movements on the other. The forum should be convened by a neutral and independent facilitator.¹⁵⁸ [¹⁵⁸ Ibid 8 July 1992]

On 11 August 1992 the PAC held further talks with the government. The organisation’s publicity secretary, Mr Barney Desai, said that the issues discussed included the venue for a top-level meeting between the two groups, an investigation into violence, the possible role of the United Nations, and the creation of an alternative forum to Codesa.¹⁵⁹ [¹⁵⁹ *The Star* 11 August 1992] According to the PAC’s foreign affairs secretary, Mr Gora Ebrahim, the issues of violence and attacks on security forces were also discussed.¹⁶⁰ [¹⁶⁰ *Sowetan* 21 August 1992]

A further meeting along the same lines was held on 18 August. At a post-meeting press conference the minister of constitutional development, Mr Roelf Meyer, said that agreement had been reached that a new constitution should be drafted by an elected constitution-making body. He said the PAC had indicated that once there was ‘clarity’ that the government had embarked on a peaceful process of negotiation towards an elected constitution-making body the PAC would change its position on the armed struggle.¹⁶¹ [¹⁶¹ *The Citizen* 19 August 1992] Mr Ebrahim said that the meeting had been a ‘preparatory’ one and maintained that the PAC would prefer a neutral venue under a neutral chairman for ‘top-level talks’.¹⁶² [¹⁶² Ibid] He revealed that in addition to the points elucidated by Mr Meyer the following agreements were reached at the meeting:

- the new constitution should be drawn up by an elected constitution-making body;
- a more representative negotiating forum should be established;
- the process for leading to the establishment of the constitution making body should begin soon with voter registration for a nonracial voters’ roll; and
- a meeting at the highest level of leadership between the government and the PAC was desirable as soon as the issues of a neutral venue and a neutral convener were settled.¹⁶³ [¹⁶³ *Sowetan* 21 August 1992]

The Pan-Africanist Youth Organisation subsequently came out in support of negotiations and denounced

a faction within its ranks that had criticised the PAC leadership for entering into these talks.¹⁶⁴ [¹⁶⁴ *The Star* 21 August 1992]

At the time of writing a date and venue had not yet been set for a meeting of the two parties at leadership level. A further meeting between Mr Ebrahim and Mr Meyer failed to produce consensus on the issues of a neutral convener and a neutral venue. However, a further round of talks was mooted by the two groups.¹⁶⁵ [¹⁶⁵ *The Citizen* 25 August 1992]

Alliances

In March 1992 the PAC revealed that plans were under way for it to form a patriotic front with the BCMA. The PAC's foreign affairs representative in Zimbabwe, Mr Raymond Fihia, said that the first patriotic front—which had included the ANC—had broken up because the ANC was negotiating with the government (see 1991/92 *Survey* pp1xix).¹⁶⁶ [¹⁶⁶ *Ibid* 23 March 1992]

Other groups

Afrikaner Volksunie

The five MPs who broke away from the CP in August 1992 (see *Conservative Party* above) formed a new party, the Afrikaner Volksunie (AVU).¹⁶⁷ [¹⁶⁷ *The Star* 31 August 1992] The party said that Pretoria would be the capital of its proposed 'volkstaat', which would include parts of the Transvaal, the Orange Free State and the northern Cape. The AVU said it would strive for the greatest degree of reconciliation of Afrikaners by making provision for the recognition of ethnicity for those who insisted on it and the acceptance of multi-ethnicity in other areas of the country.¹⁶⁸ [¹⁶⁸ *The Citizen* 31 August 1992]

The AVU said that it would like to become involved in the negotiation process and negotiate with the ANC, especially in the shaping of regional government.¹⁶⁹ [¹⁶⁹ *The Star* 31 August 1992] The AVU attended the NP's summit on regionalism and federalism in September 1992, where it said it would opt either for an Afrikaner state or a federal system of government which would accommodate a fully fledged Afrikaner homeland.¹⁷⁰ [¹⁷⁰ *New Nation* 11 September 1992] The party said that it was in favour of joining negotiations as a representative of Afrikaners of all ethnic groups.¹⁷¹ [¹⁷¹ *Business Day* 1 September 1992]

Afrikaner Vryheidstigting

In April 1992 the leader of the Afrikaner Vryheidstigting (Avstig), Professor Carel Boshoff, revealed that his organisation had handed a memorandum to Codesa which it expected to be considered by the constitution-making body that would follow Codesa. The memorandum called for the principle of self-determination for the Afrikaner to be placed on the agenda of the constitution-making body. Professor Boshoff said that Avstig would take part in negotiations in order to establish the borders of such a state. He added that while the wide distribution of Afrikaners made it difficult to claim a distinct piece of land, the western Cape was ‘the cradle of the Afrikaner’ and with this as a basis Avstig would negotiate with other ethnic groups to obtain land.¹⁷² [¹⁷² *The Citizen* 8 April 1992]

Avstig accepted an invitation to attend the NP’s summit on regionalism and federalism in September 1992. Professor Boshoff pointed out, however, that Avstig viewed the federation proposal as ‘insufficient to give substance to the materialising of a “volkstaat” ‘.¹⁷³ [¹⁷³ *Ibid* 4 September 1992]

Boerentia Party of South Africa

In January 1992 the Boerentia Party of South Africa (BPSA) claimed that it had been formed by a number of dissident CP members who had broken away from the CP. The chairman of the BPSA, Mr Bany Nilsson, said the party’s key policies included the abolition of apartheid; a choice of whites only and blacks only, or mixed education; equality before the law; influx control; and voting rights for all, with the proviso that all candidates were white. Mr Nilsson said that his organisation represented a liberal group within the CP. He revealed that the BPSA was in favour of negotiations and that it had made application for membership of Codesa.¹⁷⁴ [¹⁷⁴ *Ibid* 10 January 1992] Membership was, however, not granted to the party.

The leader of the CP, Dr Andries Treurnicht, said subsequently that the CP had not heard of the BPSA or of any other breakaway movement from the CP.¹⁷⁵ [¹⁷⁵ *Ibid*]

Boerestaat Party

In March 1992, following the victory of the ‘yes’ votes in the whites-only referendum, the leader of the Boerestaat Party, Mr Robert van Tender, called on all right-wing elements to join forces and establish a ‘volksraad’ in Pretoria. He said that the Boerestaat Party considered a strategy of ‘passive resistance’ to be the most effective way to display its contempt for the government’s reform initiatives.¹⁷⁶ [¹⁷⁶ *Ibid* 20 March 1992]

Mr van Tender said in April 1992 that it would be racist of the CP to exclude ‘brown Afrikaners’ from an Afrikaner homeland. He argued that ‘Afrikaners’ consisted of three groups: whites, ‘brown Afrikaners’ and the white Cape Dutch.¹⁷⁷ [¹⁷⁷ *Ibid* 3 April 1992] Mr van Tender said his party stood for a ‘boerestaat’, not a white state, and members of other races would not be chased summarily out of this

state. Instead Afrikaners would reinforce their numbers in such a manner—‘like the Jews in Israel’—that political power could not be taken away from them.¹⁷⁸ [¹⁷⁸ Ibid 30 May 1992]

At the end of August 1992 the party accepted an invitation to attend the NT’s summit on regionalism and federalism. Mr van Tunder said he would argue that South Africa was ‘a subcontinent of at least 14 different nations’. His delegation would then call for the dissolution of Codesa and its replacement by a council based on ethnicity. This could result in the country being divided into 14 nations which would be culturally and politically independent but could co-operate on economic matters like the European Community.¹⁷⁹ [¹⁷⁹ *The Star* 1 September 1992]

Obstacles remaining and removed

In May 1992 the minister of law and order, Mr Hemus Kriel, said that negotiations on outstanding matters arising from the *D F Malan Accord* and the *Pretoria Minute* on the ending of the armed struggle and the identification of arms caches had stopped.¹⁸⁰ [¹⁸⁰ *Business Day* 29 May 1992]

In the same month the Department of Justice announced that applications for indemnity from non-prisoners would still be considered by the indemnity board. The decision was discussed in bilateral talks between the government and the African National Congress (ANC) shortly before the Indemnity Act of 1990 was extended to 17 May 1993.¹⁸¹ [¹⁸¹ Ibid 19 May 1992]

On 23 June 1992, following the killing of 48 people at Boipatong (southern Transvaal), the ANC announced its withdrawal from negotiations and said that constitutional talks would remain on hold until a series of demands were met by the government (see also chapter on *Political Developments*).¹⁸² [¹⁸² Ibid 24 June 1992]

The demands were for:

- the creation of a sovereign constituent assembly;
- the establishment of an interim government;
- an end to covert operations, including hit-squad activities;
- the disarming of special forces and their confinement to barracks;
- the suspension and prosecution of all officers and security personnel involved in violence;
- an end to repression in the homelands;

- the establishment of an international commission of inquiry into the massacre at Boipatong;
- the release of all political prisoners;
- the repeal of all repressive legislation;
- the implementation of a programme to phase out hostels and convert them into family accommodation. The ANC also demanded the installation of fences around hostels, the permanent guarding of hostels and the regular searching of hostels with the participation of a multilateral peace structure; and
- a ban on the carrying of dangerous weapons.

In August 1992 the minister of justice, Mr Kobie Coetsee, announced that the government had drafted a general amnesty plan which would cover offenders from all political organisations, including the security forces.¹⁸³ [¹⁸³ *City Press* 16 August 1992]

Reacting to the plan, the publicity secretary of the Pan-Africanist Congress, Mr Bamey Desai, said that granting amnesty to people who had not disclosed their offences defeated the purpose of the exercise. He pointed out that political prisoners indemnified in the previous two years had had to disclose their crimes and said he did not see why the process should be different now that the government was involved.¹⁸⁴ [¹⁸⁴ *Ibid*] The secretary general of the Azanian People's Organisation, Mr Don Nkadimeng, said that his organisation would have difficulty with the granting of amnesty to people who had committed offences in pursuit of oppression.

The ANC also rejected the plan, saying that its 'sudden promotion' by the government was related to 'accumulating evidence of senior ministerial involvement in assassinations and violence'.¹⁸⁵ [¹⁸⁵ *The Citizen* 15 August 1992] The organisation said that a decision on general amnesty could be taken only by an interim government. It would then be granted only to those prepared to come forward with information that would provide an understanding of the past and help put an end to the 'ongoing mayhem'.¹⁸⁶ [¹⁸⁶ *Beeld* 18 August 1992]

In August 1992 the ANC said that the government's failure to abide by its agreements with the organisation on the release of political prisoners was one of the main reasons why the ANC had discontinued talks in that month.¹⁸⁷ [¹⁸⁷ *Business Day* 18 August 1992]

In September 1992, following the signing of a bilateral agreement between the ANC and the government—the 'Record of Understanding'—the ANC declared itself to be in favour of returning to multilateral

constitutional negotiations but added that there would have to be thorough preparation before the resumption of such talks.¹⁸⁸ [188 *Beeld I* October 1992]

Constitutional negotiating forum

Codesa working groups

Working group 1

Working group 1, which was set up at the first meeting of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) in December 1992, was asked to deal with the question of creating a climate for free political participation and to determine the role of the international community. The group was also expected to examine the termination of military means to promote the objectives of political organisations and the neutrality of the state media. A number of agreements were reached in this working group during the first part of 1992.

Working group 1 agreed that, while the release of political prisoners was a priority, the government and the African National Congress (ANC) should pursue their bilateral talks in this regard and report their progress to it. The return of exiles and their families was also referred to the ANC and the government for bilateral discussions.

There was some agreement that all participants in the political process should be free to participate on an equal footing. However, the government and the National Party (NP) expressed reservations on this point until a full resolution dealing with the principles governing free political activity had been debated. No consensus was reached on a definition of the general principles underpinning free political activity.¹⁸⁹ [189 Report of working group 1 to Codesa II, 15 May 1992]

The working group said that it had not discussed separately the termination of military means to promote the objectives of political parties.

Working group 1 agreed with regard to state of emergency legislation that:

- a state of emergency should be called only on the advice of a multiparty interim executive, cabinet or government council once such a body had been instituted;
- the proclamation of a state of emergency and any regulations issued thereunder should be justiciable in a court of law. It would have to be proved that a state of emergency was justified in terms of criteria laid down in the Public Safety Act of 1953, and that the situation justified the powers conferred by regulations made in terms of the state of emergency;

- the provision in the Public Safety Act allowing for the declaration of retrospective states of emergency be repealed; and
- the Public Safety Act should provide for parliamentary control of a state of emergency and certain rights and procedural controls over detention without trial.

Working group 1 agreed with regard to security legislation that special measures would be necessary to deal with the threat of public violence during the transitional period and recommended that a task group be appointed to scrutinise the Internal Security Act of 1982 and other relevant legislation and to remove their emphasis on national security. The working group also recommended that the possibility of enacting an interim bill of rights (against which offending legislation could be tested) be examined.¹⁹⁰ [190 Ibid]

The working group agreed that discriminatory legislation which impeded the creation of a climate for free political activity and legislation which needed to be repealed or amended to support the process of democratisation be repealed or amended as soon as possible. It also agreed that discriminatory legislation arising out of the tricameral parliamentary system would be dealt with in the negotiations process. Discriminatory legislation which needed to be repealed should be dealt with at the relevant stage of the democratisation process, while discriminatory legislation which would infringe upon a bill of rights should be dealt with through procedures created by a new constitution. The working group agreed to constitute a task group to discuss proposals it received regarding discriminatory legislation and make recommendations to Codesa on the amendment or repeal of such legislation.

Working group 1 resolved that all disputes between political parties should be settled peacefully. It defined political intimidation as 'any action or set of actions ... designed by the use of threat or use of force or violence to disrupt or interfere with the legal rights of an individual to, inter alia, the right to freedom of expression or opinion, the right to freedom of association and the right to freedom of movement'.

The working group listed actions that would be considered to be forms of political intimidation. These included murder, violence, intimidation, injury, misrepresentation of any symbol of another political party, and compulsion to join or attend a meeting of a political party. It said that the possession, carrying or display of dangerous weapons or firearms by members of the general public when attending any political gathering was a form of political intimidation.

Working group 1 agreed that an independent body (to be known as the South African Independent Telecommunications Authority or the South African Independent Telecommunications Commission) needed to be established to regulate the telecommunications industry (including the South African Broadcasting Corporation and television services). The principal functions of this body would be to regulate the utilisation of the electromagnetic spectrum, including the allocation of licences and the appointment of a suitable structure to monitor the proper exercise of licence conditions. Members of this

body should not be office bearers of any political organisation or have a vested interest in the film and broadcasting industries. They would be nominated by 'the organs of civil society' and would be responsible to the executive of the proposed interim authority and subsequently to a new parliament, once it was operational.

The powers of the postmaster general in relation to telecommunications should be transferred to this body. Some of the important functions that the working group recommended for this body included:

- ensuring a wide range of telecommunication services throughout the country;
- ensuring fair and effective competition in the provision of these and related services;
- ensuring fair and equitable opportunity to opinion makers to express their views freely;
- ensuring impartial control of all broadcasting by laying down norms and standards for fair access for all political parties to all broadcasting services;
- working out guidelines for the impartiality of news and current affairs programmes;
- taking punitive measures against broadcasters who violated the code of conduct, and suspending or withdrawing licences if licence conditions were not complied with; and
- dealing with complaints from the public and political parties.

Working group 1 agreed to set up such a body as soon as possible. It also agreed that the independent body should lay down standards for licensed broadcasters and these could be included in a code of conduct. The South African government agreed to repeal section 4 (A) and (B) of the Registration of Newspapers Amendment Act of 1982, which related to ministerial powers to cancel the registration of a newspaper (see *Amendments introduced* above).

Regarding the *National Peace Accord*, working group I agreed upon a number of courses of action. These included that a full-time chair-person, officer and employee(s) be appointed to each regional dispute resolution committee (RDRC). In the appointment of members of the special investigation unit provided for in the accord there should be sensitivity regarding the acceptability and credibility of members of the South African Police (SAP). The working group agreed further that the national peace committee (NPC) make special efforts to include representatives of relevant local and tribal authorities in all RDRC and local dispute resolution committee (LDRC) structures.

It was agreed that the RDRCs could make recommendations to the SAP and the police forces of Gazankulu, KwaNdebele, Lebowa and Venda regarding the selection of top police officers for township stations, the appointment of commanding officers and of members of special police investigation units

established in terms of the accord, and where circumstances permitted, determine the nature of security force action in conflict areas.

It was agreed to recommend that the NPC, the RDRCs and the LDRCs take urgent steps to encourage the formation of nonpartisan community-based self-protection groups in terms of the accord. It was also agreed that fines for illegal firearms should be increased and records should be kept of the political affiliations of those arrested in possession of them.

Working group 1 also agreed to the creation of regional monitoring commissions in each RDRC area, with its members drawn from the parties and organisations represented on the RDRC, independent local monitoring agencies and the community. The functions of such commissions would be to monitor compliance by *National Peace Accord* signatories to the code of conduct, their responses to violence, and their compliance with the accord after it had brought to their attention that they had been in violation of the accord. It was also agreed to make recommendations to the NPC to take urgent steps to ensure legal enforceability of the code of conduct. On presentation of the commission's findings transgressors of the accord would be required to respond in writing to the NPC.

Working group 1 agreed that all the security forces should be placed under the control of interim or transitional governmental structures and that mechanisms be found to ensure public accountability of the security forces. There was also agreement that codes of conduct for the security forces and a programme to improve community relations should be implemented. Agreement was not reached on the composition of the security forces.

The working group agreed that the provisions of the Prohibition of Foreign Financing of Political Parties Act of 1968 relating to the receipt of foreign funds by political parties be suspended until six months after a general election in terms of the new constitution. It also agreed that all political parties and organisations should have access without discrimination to public facilities and venues. They should also have the right to have reasonable access to their members, supporters and other people in rural and urban areas, whether on private or public property.

With regard to the role of the international community in the transition process, it was agreed that a task group be set up in relation to the election process to determine the terms of invitation, the responsibilities and other matters concerning foreign observers. The working group also recommended that Codesa invite an independent international mission to South Africa.¹⁹¹ [¹⁹¹ Ibid]

Working group 2

Working group 2, which was established in December 1991, was requested to examine constitutional principles, including whether South Africa should be a unitary state, a geographical federation or a confederation. The report of this group was not part of the general agreement reached at Codesa II because of a number of issues upon which consensus could not be reached.

Working group 2 agreed that during the transitional period legislative power should be vested in an interim parliament consisting of a national assembly and a senate functioning in terms of special majorities and general constitutional principles agreed upon by Codesa. The national assembly would be elected by proportional representation, with half the deputies elected through national lists and the remainder through regional lists. The executive authority would be vested in a multiparty executive and there would be a separation of powers between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. It was agreed that once Codesa had decided on the boundaries, powers, duties and functions of regional governments for the interim period these conditions would be entrenched.

It was also agreed that changes to matters affecting regional government and the distribution of powers between central, regional and local government levels would require a special majority of the regional representatives in the national assembly (in addition to the special majority required in the national assembly). Codesa was to decide upon the size of this majority.¹⁹² [¹⁹² *South African Update*, May 1992] It was further agreed that Codesa should formulate an interim bill of rights which would be entrenched in the constitution.

The working group agreed that a final constitution should be drawn up and adopted by the national assembly while it continued to act as a legislature. Agreement, however, could not be reached on the proportion of votes in the national assembly which would be required for the adoption of the constitution. The ANC threatened on 13 May 1992 to declare Codesa II a failure if working group 2 could not present a consensus report by the start of the plenary session on 15 May 1992.¹⁹³ [¹⁹³ *The Star* 14 May 1992]

The NP argued initially for a majority of 75% for the adoption of a constitution while the ANC wanted a two-thirds majority.¹⁹⁴ [¹⁹⁴ *Ibid* 18 May 1992] There was also disagreement as to the role of the senate in constitution making. After much negotiation the ANC and NP agreed on a majority of 70% for the adoption of the constitution but that the bill of rights would need a majority of 75%. The NP insisted, however, that in the final constitution the senate have 'co-equal legislative capacity' with the national assembly in protecting the constitution and that changes to the boundaries, powers, functions and duties of the regions should require a 75% majority.¹⁹⁵ [¹⁹⁵ *Ibid*] The ANC raised the issue of a deadlock-breaking mechanism. It suggested that if the constitution-making body was to arrive at a deadlock and be able to reach a majority but not a 70% majority, then after six months had elapsed a national referendum would be held with a two-thirds majority being sufficient to approve the new constitution. The ANC pointed out that while a deadlock-breaking mechanism was necessary a referendum was not the only available option.¹⁹⁶ [¹⁹⁶ *The Citizen* 16 May 1992] These differences proved to be irreconcilable before the dissolution of Codesa II in May 1992, resulting in a deadlock in working group 2.

In May 1992 Codesa II decided that its management committee, consisting of two representatives from each participating organisation, would be set the task of speedily resolving all outstanding matters,

including those not resolved in working group 2.¹⁹⁷ [¹⁹⁷ *Sunday Times* 17 May 1992] The committee held its first meeting on 25 May 1992 but did not resolve any of these matters. The committee ceased functioning after the ANC and its allies withdrew from constitutional negotiations in June 1992.¹⁹⁸ [¹⁹⁸ *Business Day* 26 May 1992]

Working group 3

Working group 3, which had been requested to look at transitional arrangements, decided that the transitional period would involve two preliminary stages. During the first stage there would be a need for a multiparty transitional executive structure to function in conjunction with existing legislative and executive structures. This structure would facilitate the transition to a democratic constitution, the 'levelling of the political playing field' and a climate favourable to free political participation and the holding of free and fair elections. The second stage—not discussed by the working group—would cover the period from the holding of elections to the adoption of a new constitution and the installation of a new government.

The working group's plan called for a multiparty transitional executive structure to be constituted in terms of legislation agreed to by Codesa. It would include an overarching council, a transitional executive council (TEC) and six subcouncils. The TEC and the subcouncils would endeavour to take their decisions by consensus but where this could not be achieved a majority of at least 80% would be sufficient. However, if a government, administration or party felt that any adverse impact upon free political participation, free and fair elections or attempts to level the playing field' were outweighed by the need for the majority view to prevail, then the matter could be referred for adjudication to an independent election commission.

Working group 3 said that the TEC would be able to intervene within its terms of reference if any event affected negatively the levelling of the political playing field' or the ensuring of a climate favourable to free political participation. The TEC would also be able to delegate powers to the subcouncils. It was agreed that if the TEC believed that proposed legislation would have an adverse impact upon the maintenance of a climate for free political participation or 'the levelling of the playing field' it could require that such legislation be withdrawn.

However, if the government or administration insisted on the necessity of such legislation then the matter could be referred to the independent election commission. The decisions of the TEC would be binding and would be implemented by all participants, including the government and other administrations. The subcouncil and ministers would exercise their powers in consultation with the TEC or a subcouncil to which this function was delegated. Any disagreements would be referred to the independent election commission.

The TEC would be appointed by the state president on the recommendation of Codesa. It would consist of at least one member from each of the government, administrations and political organisations

participating in Codesa, provided that they committed themselves to comply with and implement the decisions of the TEC. The TEC could recommend to the state president that other groups who were not part of Codesa be included in the TEC. Members of the TEC would be full-time executives with the necessary infrastructure to enable them to carry out their duties.

Working group 3 agreed that for the purposes of the subcouncils that regional governments would include 'independent' homelands which elected to co-operate and work within the transitional executive. Regional governments would be required to identify and implement steps in accordance with democratic political participation. Legislation agreed upon by Codesa would make provision for the subcouncils to be given the powers necessary for them to carry out their tasks effectively within their terms of reference. They would have access to all information (including records of the government and other TEC participants). Subcouncils would be constituted for defence, finance, foreign affairs, law and order, and regional and local government.

The subcouncil for regional and local government would facilitate the process towards a democratic dispensation at regional and local government levels. The subcouncil for finance would identify and take action regarding finance, particularly in the field of governmental and intergovernmental financing. One of the prime purposes of this subcouncil would be to monitor and frustrate any attempt by any governmental body to favour a political party or organisation.

Working group 3 said that the subcouncil responsible for law and order would identify and promote developments to further peace and stability. It would also take steps to identify and take action against developments which could have an adverse impact on peace and stability, the levelling of the political playing field', free political participation or the transition to democracy. It was agreed that the functions of this subgroup would be dependent on decisions taken in working group 1. The subcouncil for defence would similarly take steps to identify and prevent developments in the defence field which could have an adverse impact on peace and stability, the levelling of the political playing field', free political participation or the transition to democracy. The functions of this subcouncil would also be dependent on decisions taken in working group 1. Working group 3 agreed, however, that there would need to be broader discussions on the functioning of the subcouncil for foreign affairs.

The working group said further that the TEC would decide whether or not there was a need for a subcouncil to provide services and information to the independent election commission. Such a subcouncil would not detract from the independence of the commission. The independent election commission would be independent of the TEC and would be responsible for the holding of free and fair elections. It would consist of respected and suitably qualified people drawn from a broad cross-section of the population and appointed by the state president on the recommendation of Codesa. It would have the power to resolve disputes and its functions would be enacted in legislation agreed upon by Codesa.

An independent media commission would also be constituted in accordance with recommendations made by working group 1. Its composition, power and functions would be set out in legislation agreed upon by Codesa.

Working group 3 said that it needed to hold further discussions on the composition of the TEC and the subcouncils, and the composition, powers and functions of the independent election commission and the subcouncil on foreign affairs.¹⁹⁹ [¹⁹⁹ Report of working group 3 to Codesa II, 15 May 1992]

Working group 4

This working group, set up in December 1991, was asked to consider the future of the 'independent' homelands. No delegates in working group 4 had any objection in principle to the reincorporation of the 'independent' homelands. However, the Bophuthatswana administration reserved its position in this regard. The working group agreed that the 'independent' homelands would participate in transitional arrangements proposed by working group 3. The citizens of these homelands would take part in a national election in such a way that their votes would signify support or rejection of reincorporation. South African citizenship would be restored to the citizens of 'independent' homelands immediately after such elections. The Bophuthatswana administration reserved its position formally on all of these agreements.

Eighteen parties agreed that the 'independent' homelands should be reincorporated into South Africa, but the Bophuthatswana administration stated its preference for non-incorporation. The parties were unanimous that reincorporation should occur in such a way that business confidence in these areas was not affected. There should be harmonisation of labour legislation and the tax system of the 'independent' homelands with that applicable in the rest of South Africa.

The working group reported that it had reached 'sufficient consensus' that no further attempts be made to identify new land for incorporation into the 'independent' homelands and that land currently in the hands of the South African Development Trust should remain in the hands of the trust until its dissolution. (The trust was dissolved in April 1992 and the land was allocated to the Department of Regional and Land Affairs. See chapter on *Land and Agriculture*.)²⁰⁰ [²⁰⁰ *The Citizen* 31 March 1992] The Bophuthatswana and Ciskei administrations, as well as the NP and the South African government, expressed reservations in this regard. The Ciskei authorities argued that the moratorium should not apply to the transfer of land to individual communities which had not yet received land promised to them. The South African government and the NP expressed concern about certain legal and contractual obligations regarding land transfers.

There was agreement that the assets and liabilities of the 'independent' homelands should be transferred to the new central government on reincorporation. It was recommended that all structures and functional operations such as education, health and unemployment insurance should continue functioning during the transitional period, until they were replaced by rationalised structures and operations.

Working group 4 agreed that civil servants should retain their existing benefits, salaries and conditions of service and that there should be no retrenchment of workers in the administrations of the 'independent' homelands as a result of reincorporation. The working group agreed that two multiparty

committees be appointed, one to be responsible for the maintenance of business confidence and the retention of existing infrastructure, and the second for sound administration during the period of transition and the civil service. Each committee would comprise nine members with at least one member from each 'independent' homeland on each committee.

Working group 4 also agreed to the establishment of a technical committee to investigate the relationship between South Africa and the 'independent' homelands during the transitional phase, to draw up legislation to give effect to reincorporation, to consider the necessity for legislation and other measures that would 'level the political playing field' and to ensure the harmonisation of legislation.

The working group listed the following outstanding tasks:

- finding strategies to keep citizens of the 'independent' homelands fully informed of developments;
- deciding on time frames for reincorporation;
- determining the exact form of authority in the 'independent' homelands;
- harmonising legislation and taxation;
- terminating agreements and treaties in an orderly way;
- ensuring public accountability of actions taken to ensure reincorporation; and
- identifying specific constitutional, legal and political measures which would have to be taken to effect reincorporation.²⁰¹ [201 Report of working group 4 to Codesa II, 15 May 1992]

Working group 5

Working group 5 had been set up in December 1991 to formulate a working plan which would ensure the speedy implementation of any agreements that had been reached in the other working groups. It reported, however, that it was not possible to attend to the agreements reached in these working groups as they were arrived at too late for working group 5 to attend to them.

The group reached agreement with the daily management committee that there was a need to establish a drafting committee which would ensure that suitably qualified experts would be drawn into the task of drafting legislation arising from agreements reached at Codesa.²⁰² [202 Management committee report: Agreements reached in the working groups and tabling of the gender advisory committee report, 5 May 1992]

Using a law commission draft report working group 5 also examined a list of 68 acts to determine which

contained provisions that were discriminatory on the basis of race or sex and that would require attention. It also agreed that an electoral act would be required for democratic elections and began examining existing electoral acts in preparation for the drafting of a new act for South Africa.²⁰³ [203 Report of working group 5 to Codesa II, 15 May 1992]

Management committee

In April 1992 the management committee agreed to an addendum to its declaration of intent which made it clear that a federal or even a confederal option would be possible for South Africa's future constitution.²⁰⁴ [204 *Beeld* 2 April 1992] The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) (which had refused to sign Codesa's declaration of intent in December 1991 (see *1991/92 Survey* pil) subsequently signed the declaration at the plenary session of Codesa II. At the time of writing, the Bophuthatswana administration was the only participant in Codesa which had not yet signed the declaration of intent. In the same month the management committee rejected an application by the Basotho National Party (Lesotho's ruling party) for observer status at Codesa. The request was apparently motivated by the possibility of Lesotho being incorporated into South Africa.²⁰⁵ [205 *The Star* 2 April 1992]

Also in April 1992, after considering a report submitted by a subcommittee dealing with the question of the Zulu monarch's participation in Codesa, Codesa's management committee reached a decision in principle to allow the Zulu king, King Goodwill Zwelithini, and other traditional leaders to participate in Codesa. The committee agreed further that there should be no difference in the treatment accorded King Goodwill Zwelithini and that shown to other traditional leaders. They would take part on the basis of four delegations—one from each province—each comprising 12 delegates and five advisers. The committee agreed that the Transvaal delegation would comprise an equal number of traditional leaders from Bophuthatswana, Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, Lebowa and Venda.²⁰⁶ [206 *Ibid* 29 April 1992]

The chairman of Codesa's management committee, Mr Pravin Gordhan, said in April 1992 that because of limited time the management committee had been unable to reach a decision on the form of participation of traditional leaders. He added that three options had been mooted: full participation, limited participation on issues that affected them directly, and full participation but being left out of decision-making mechanisms.²⁰⁷ [207 *Ibid*] The chairman of the IFP, Dr Frank Mdlalose, said that the decision taken would not mean much unless the Zulu king was granted full participation and added that nothing less than this would satisfy his party.²⁰⁸ [208 *Ibid*] The issue could not be resolved before the convening of Codesa II, and was still unresolved at the time of writing.

In May 1992 Codesa II mandated the management committee to resolve all outstanding matters which had not been resolved in the working groups. Codesa II suspended the work of all the existing working

groups but gave the management committee the right to reconvene any of the working groups. However, the management committee could summon a third plenary session of Codesa as a matter of urgency, at which it would report on progress achieved in resolving outstanding matters. All agreements reached by the working groups and the management committee would then be adopted. In addition the management committee was given the authority to constitute a mechanism to draft all legislation required as a result of agreements reached at Codesa.²⁰⁹ [²⁰⁹ *Sunday Times* 11 May 1992]

On 21 May 1992 Mr Gordhan said that the management committee would press ahead with agreements reached in working group I dealing with the creation of a free political climate and that it would also seek to implement agreements on a new transitional structure for the South African Broadcasting Corporation and the definition of political intimidation.²¹⁰ [²¹⁰ *Business Day* 21 May 1992]

However, this process broke down in June 1992 when the ANC withdrew from constitutional negotiations after killings at Boipatong (southern Transvaal) on 17 June 1992 (see chapter on *Political Developments*).²¹¹ [²¹¹ *Ibid* 24 June 1992] Mr Gordhan pointed out that only eight of the 19 groups which had originally participated in Codesa had remained after the ANC and its allies had withdrawn.²¹² [²¹² *Ibid*] He said that Codesa had been effectively brought to an end by the ANC's decision to withdraw.²¹³ [²¹³ *The Citizen* 24 June 1992]

Gender advisory committee

In April 1992 Codesa's management committee established a gender advisory committee as a subgroup of the management committee. The committee was composed of women and it was mandated to look into the terms of reference and agreements of the working groups and the management committee and to advise them on the gender implications of these decisions.²¹⁴ [²¹⁴ *Ibid* 1 April 1992] The committee made a number of recommendations, mostly relating to the insertion of references to women in the agreements reached by other working groups. It also called for a commission of inquiry into impediments to the ownership of land by women in South Africa and the 'independent' homelands. The gender committee recommended that working group I include in its definition of political intimidation the coercion of women by men into supporting a particular political stance 'by virtue of their powers'.²¹⁵ [²¹⁵ Report of the Gender Advisory Committee to Codesa II, 15 May 1992]

Initiatives for Nonracial Local Government

Policy

African National Congress

In April 1992 the African National Congress (ANC) published a draft policy document outlining its plans for local government.²¹⁶ [216 ANC draft policy document, *ANCPolicy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa*, 27 April 1992]

The organisation said that local government should bring the process of government closer to the people and involve them actively in decision making and planning processes that affected them. It should play a key role in development and in the equitable distribution of local authority services and it should focus on the disadvantaged.

The ANC rejected the Interim Measures for Local Government Act of 1991 (see *1991/92 Survey* pp83–84) on the basis that it aimed to put the government in control of locally negotiated reform of local government structures. The ANC suggested that local government be included in national negotiations and advocated the negotiation of a national framework for local government. Such a framework would have to conform to the constitutional principles being negotiated at national level. The outcomes of these local government negotiations would then be subject to ratification or amendment at national level.

The ANC outlined the following policy framework:

- all racially based local government structures should be abolished and each city and town unified in a single municipality with a nonracial voters' roll and a single tax base;
- there should be equal votes at local government level for all residents;
- there should be democratic control over local government, including a high degree of accountability;
- meetings of each local council and its subcommittees should be open to all residents and information made freely available on any policy, decision or activity of the council;
- the office of an 'ombudsperson' should be created to investigate allegations of partisanship in the allocation of resources, maladministration and corruption at local government level;
- local government should redress the legacies of apartheid, particularly through urban planning; and
- local government should be effective and efficient, with access to sufficient resources to carry out its functions.

The ANC said that the powers of regional and national government would have to be determined before the powers of local government could be considered. It recommended that these powers be contained in national legislation but added that they could change over time. The present powers allocated to third-tier government, which the ANC said should be the point of departure, included community facilities,

control of land use, parks, planning and growth management, primary health care, the protection of the environment, and roads and public transport.

The ANC said that in large metropolitan areas a two-tiered local government structure could be created. It maintained that metropolitan government would *be* able to address the problems of disparities in service provision, rapid urbanisation, the housing crisis and ineffective city structuring more effectively than local government could. Rural district councils, which should include neighbouring rural areas regardless of race, should co-ordinate the development and servicing of rural areas. A tier below rural district council level could be instituted where settlements were sufficiently developed to require it, the ANC said.²¹⁷ [²¹⁷ *Ibid*]

In June 1992 the ANC's spokesman on local government, Mr Thozamile Botha, said that his organisation would not encourage township residents to pay service bills to joint local authorities formed by 'twinning' white municipalities and their adjoining townships. He revealed that the ANC was concerned that such interim arrangements at local government level could entrench the principle of 'twinning' black and white local authorities. Mr Botha said that the ANC wanted local government structures to be negotiated at national level (see also chapter on *Political Developments*).²¹⁸ [²¹⁸ *Daily Dispatch* 8 June 1992] Mr Botha added that his organisation preferred the list system of proportional representation on a city-wide basis to the ward system because ward elections would follow the racial delineation resulting from residential segregation.²¹⁹ [²¹⁹ *Ibid*]

Conservative Party

In July 1992 the spokesman on local government for the Conservative Party (CP), Mr Pikkie Coetzee, issued a statement urging all CP-controlled towns and cities to enter into negotiations with neighbouring black towns urgently. The party was to send a standard agreement to all CP-controlled councils which would serve as a guideline for the provision of financial, management and other services on an ad-hoc basis to black areas by white councils. The party urged its councillors to enter into negotiations aimed at 'the provision of inter-community services on an agency basis'.²²⁰ [²²⁰ *Beeld* 22 July 1992]

According to the secretary of the general municipal committee of the CP, Mr Paul Fouche, the party's directive on local government arose from changed circumstances in local government and the government's deadline of 1 January 1993 for joint administrations at local government level. He added that the CP was still very strongly opposed to 'the amalgamation of local government administrations in one multiracial local government administration'. This would detract from the autonomy of the councils involved and would lead to blacks ruling over whites, he said.²²¹ [²²¹ *Ibid*]

Democratic Party

The Democratic Party (DP) advocated the following policy for local government:

- a nonracial voters' roll comprising the names of all permanent residents or owners of property;
- a combination of the ward system and proportional representation on a list system; and
- the transformation of African townships (and to some extent, coloured and Indian areas) into 'significant hubs of development'.

The DP recommended the negotiation of new government structures and said that local government and national negotiations should take place simultaneously. The resulting structures should be ratified by a new central government once it had been elected. The DP said that white councils should begin negotiations with neighbouring communities in order to arrive at nonracial local authorities and to subject their policy and financial decisions to consultation with the wider community. The party regarded the Interim Measures for Local Government Act as being flawed since it required the amalgamation of existing racial bodies rather than negotiations between all residents.

In September 1991 the DP published a discussion document on local government. The party recommended that, initially, negotiations for interim local government structures should focus on a broad set of principles within which particular forms of democratic local government could be negotiated. The party recommended that three subcommittees be established at local government level: a constitutional committee, a finance committee and a development committee. The forum for negotiations at local government level should negotiate its own rules for decision making and the outline of the proposed authority could be submitted to the central government for ratification.²²² [222 DP policy document on local government, September 1991]

The DP plan called for two levels of local government:

- metropolitan councils which would administer those services which were currently the responsibility of the regional services councils and take over some of the functions of the provincial authorities. They would also take over some functions of central government such as aspects of school education, hospitals and policing; and
- local authorities, which would continue to administer local planning, recreational and cultural facilities, primary health care and other regulations.

The DP said that the delimitation of metropolitan areas should be negotiated. Non-metropolitan areas (comprising rural areas and their towns) would fall under regional councils. Beneath these councils

would be local authorities such as town boards.²²³ [²²³ Ibid]

National Party

The policy of the National Party (NP), as outlined in its 1992 policy document *Constitutional Proposals for a New South Africa*, is that within the boundaries of every town or city there should be only one nonracial local authority with a single tax base. Elections should be on a ward basis. The party recommended that the franchise be determined by taking into account the interests of property owners, ratepayers and lessees (see also *1991/92 Survey* pp83–84).

The NP said that local government should be democratically elected and autonomous, and vested with legislative, executive and fiscal authority entrenched in the constitution. A local government act arising out of national negotiations should establish the structural framework and broad principles for local government. After negotiation at local level, a formal ‘charter’ should be drawn up for every local authority and promulgated under the local government act to serve as the constitution of that local authority.²²⁴ [²²⁴ NP policy document, *Constitutional Proposals For a New South Africa*, 4 September 1991]

Consideration should be given to half the members of each local council being elected by voters on a voters’ roll comprising the names of all lawful residents, and the other half of the council by voters on a voters’ roll containing the names of property owners, lessees and ratepayers only. Provision should be made for special decision-making procedures such as the requirement of an increased majority for decisions regarding certain circumscribed ‘sensitive matters’.

The NP also recommended the institution of ‘neighbourhood councils’ with jurisdiction over community interests for geographic neighbourhoods within a broad municipal area, where the residents of a neighbourhood chose this. Such councils would be elected by all members of a neighbourhood. Autonomous powers could be granted to these councils over matters such as:

- the regulation of norms and standards for the residential environment;
- the granting of licences and permits for the use of residential property;
- the provision of communal facilities;
- security matters and civil protection;
- the imposition of special levies to pay for specific neighbourhood projects; and
- any other matters that might be delegated to such councils in terms of other legislation, for example education and welfare.

In March 1992 the minister of local government and national housing and of public works, Mr Leon Wessels, announced that racially based municipal elections were to be postponed so that interim arrangements and a final dispensation for local government could be worked out.²²⁵ [²²⁵ *Beeld* 25 March 1992] In the same month he said that the Council for the Co-ordination of Local Government had set 1 January 1993 as a target date for all local authorities to be converted to joint local government administrations. (This date was later changed to 1 July 1993.)²²⁶ [²²⁶ *The Citizen* 28 March 1992] He said that such joint administrations should be established voluntarily through negotiations in terms of the Interim Measures for Local Government Act, but that where this did not happen spontaneously, certain fiscal measures would have to be taken to encourage it.

Mr Wessels added that local government income from nonresidential areas would be divided among local authorities in joint administrations. Regulations to allow for such distribution of funds would be promulgated by the various provincial administrators as from 1 January 1993. Local authorities themselves would have to negotiate the basis of apportionment. However, inter-governmental grants to black local authorities would continue until 30 June 1993. Mr Wessels said that the government would continue with grants to those local authorities which were not economically viable by this date. In cases where the local authority could not decide on a basis for apportionment, an impartial representative commission headed by the minister of finance and the minister of local government and national housing would decide on the basis for the division of such income.²²⁷ [²²⁷ *Beeld* 28 March 1992]

Legislation

The Provincial and Local Authority Affairs Amendment Bill, which was published in June 1992, provided for the provincial administrators to act where local authorities had not progressed satisfactorily with negotiations for local government, as contemplated in the Interim Measures for Local Government Act of 1991. Administrators were empowered to overrule such local authorities, apportion revenue and define the boundaries of councils.²²⁸ [²²⁸ *Argus I* July 1992] The bill had not been passed at the time of writing.

Initiatives

Cape Town

In January 1992 the Cape Town City Council said that a nonracial system of local government for Cape Town could be established within a year. This was prompted by a meeting between the council's executive committee and the Community Forum, a group of broadly based community organisations.

The forum declined to discuss such a proposal ‘until the local government issue has been settled at national level’.²²⁹ [²²⁹ *South* 23 January 1992] According to a research consultant involved in Cape Town’s one-city initiative, Mrs Helen Zille, the council had appointed a task force to research options for metropolitan transition. She said that the task group had published its report and that it was scheduled for circulation in March. She added that the city’s corporate management team was also researching various options for managing the process of transition. Mrs Zille said that in the interim extensive efforts were being made to give community representatives a direct role in shaping policy in areas such as housing, inner city development, planning, sport and recreation and transport.²³⁰ [²³⁰ *The Star* 10 March 1992]

Citrusdal

In March 1992 the Citrusdal (western Cape) Town Council and its coloured management committee voted to dissolve themselves and to be reconstituted as a nonracial local authority in terms of the Interim Measures for Local Government Act. On 12 March 1992 the new council was inaugurated by the administrator of the Cape, Mr Kobus Meiring. The existing councillors were to serve on the new council until the next municipal elections.²³¹ [²³¹ *The Citizen* 13 March 1992] According to Citrusdal’s deputy town clerk, Mr M P Jonker, there were six white councillors and six coloured councillors on the new council. The town was divided into three wards based on the number of erven in each ward. Mr Jonker described one ward as being predominantly white, the second as predominantly coloured and the third as a ‘mixed’ ward. Elections were to be held for a new council consisting of three councillors only at the next general municipal elections. All residents and owners of property in Citrusdal, including Africans, were to be included on the voters’ roll and were to be eligible for election, he added. While Citrusdal’s mayor continued to hold office, elections for a new mayor were scheduled for September 1992.²³² [²³² Telephonic interview with the deputy town clerk of Citrusdal, Mr M Jonker, 7 August 1992] A member of the regional executive committee of the African National Congress (ANC) in the western Cape, Mr Basil Davidson, said that such ‘unilateral restructuring by whites under the Interim Measures for Local Government Act was opportunistic’. He claimed that the change amounted to apartheid restructuring of the town.²³³ [²³³ *South* 14 March 1992]

Durban

In mid 1991 the Civic Forum was formed in Durban to carry forward the campaign for a democratic city. According to the deputy secretary of the Southern Natal Civic Associations, Mr Lechesa Tsenoli, about 70 organisations were members of the Civic Forum. Civic organisations; sectoral organisations in fields such as education, sports, culture and health; and political organisations, including the ANC, the South African Communist Party and the Natal Indian Congress, were represented on the forum.²³⁴ [²³⁴ *Work In Progress* April 1992] There was no further progress in local government negotiations in Durban

during the period under review.

Franschhoek

At the end of September 1992 the town of Franschhoek (western Cape) and the neighbouring coloured township of Groendal were amalgamated in terms of the Interim Measures for Local Government Act. All serving councillors (six from each of the original local authorities) were to serve on the amalgamated council. It was agreed, however, that when a general municipal election was held the new council would have only six councillors—two for each of its three wards. The new council was to be elected on a nonracial voters' roll. Wards were delineated so that approximately one and a half wards fell into the former coloured area while the other one and a half wards fell into the former white area. According to the town clerk, Mr Meyer Siebrits, Franschhoek did not have an African township with a local authority within its boundaries. He said, however, that an unofficial township, Bhakweni, was represented by a committee of three at council meetings but these individuals were not members of the council.

The newly elected mayor of the amalgamated council, Mr Frank Arendse, was the former chairman of the coloured management committee and possibly the first black mayor of an amalgamated local authority.²³⁵ [235 Telephonic interview with the town clerk of Franschhoek, Mr Meyer Siebrits, 1 October 1992]

Germiston

In March 1992 the planned amalgamation of Bedfordview, Germiston, Katlehong and Palm Ridge (all east Rand) was delayed when Bedfordview withdrew from the proposed merger. The new council, which was to have been called the Greater Germiston Council, was due to have been inaugurated on 1 April 1992. The mayor of Bedfordview, Mr John Lewis, said that his council had committed itself to the merger when it was first discussed in 1991. However, the white electorate of Bedfordview had objected strongly to the merger. He added that Bedfordview had withdrawn because 'there was an uncomfortable feeling that the amalgamation was being rushed into and because of the responsibility of inheriting others' debts'.²³⁶ [236 *The Star* 4 March 1992] Mr Lewis said that the council would reconsider its decision when new legislation for local authorities had been promulgated or once there had been sufficient further investigation into the implications of amalgamation. The Bedfordview council indicated that, where possible, it was willing to assist black local authorities financially and administratively, on condition that Bedfordview retained its autonomy.

In reaction to the withdrawal of Bedfordview from the merger, the chairman of Germiston's management committee, Mr Leon Louw, said that Germiston would go on with the amalgamation between itself, Katlehong and Palm Ridge. However, he added that because a new amalgamation agreement would have to be drawn up, amalgamation would be effected at a later date, possibly 1 July.²³⁷ [237 *Ibid*] Mr Louw pointed out later [237 *Ibid*] every town would continue to have its 'own identity and

legal persona' even after amalgamation.²³⁸ [²³⁸ *Beeld I* April 1992]

In March 1992 the branch of the Conservative Party in Germiston launched a petition against the proposed amalgamation of Germiston with Katlehong and Palm Ridge.²³⁹ [²³⁹ *The Star* 24 March 1992] In August the town clerk of Germiston, Mr A W Heyneke, revealed that an agreement between the three local authorities had been forwarded to the administrator for consent in mid-June 1992 but had been sent back and forth continually because of technical problems. He complained that progress with the amalgamation was too slow. The agreement had been drawn up within the parameters of the Interim Measures for Local Government Act and did not require the constituent councils to dissolve. Instead, it provided for the 'amalgamation of the decision-making powers' of the three local authorities. Local authorities would thus have the option of withdrawal, he added.²⁴⁰ [²⁴⁰ Telephonic interview with the town clerk of Germiston, Mr A W Heyneke, 10 August 1992]

Harding

In June a local government negotiation forum established in terms of the Interim Measures for Local Government Act and comprising the Harding (southern Natal) Town Board, the Harding Civic Association (predominantly Indian), the Harding Ratepayers' Association and the Harding Local Affairs Committee (LAC) (coloured), submitted a proposed agreement for the establishment of a new town board to the administrator of Natal. Harding did not have an Indian or an African township, according to its town clerk, Mr A Maynard. He revealed that the agreement made provision for the creation of an interim town board consisting of nine members—three from the white Harding Town Board, two from the coloured LAC and four others to be elected once the agreement was approved by the administrator. All residents and owners of property in Harding would be entitled to vote in the election of the four members, Mr Maynard said.²⁴¹ [²⁴¹ Telephonic interview with the town clerk of Harding, Mr A P Maynard, 10 August 1992] The new town board was proclaimed on 5 October 1992.²⁴² [²⁴² Telephonic interview with the assistant town clerk of Harding, Mr A Warren, 16 October 1992]

Johannesburg/Soweto

The activities of the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber (CWMC) were suspended on 8 April 1992 after the Soweto Civic Association (SCA) reimposed a rent boycott on 1 April 1992 'because of the failure of the three greater Soweto councils to deliver improved levels of service' (see *1991/92 Survey* pp86–87). The SCA declared that it was no longer prepared to negotiate on the issue of services and tariffs with the local authorities of Diepmeadow, Dobsonville and Soweto. As a result the Transvaal Provincial Administration (TPA) insisted that the activities of the chamber be suspended (see also chapters on *Housing and Urbanisation* and *Political Developments*).²⁴³ [²⁴³ Transvaal Provincial Administration, Comments on the actions of the Soweto Civic Association, 2 April 1992]

In an attempt to reactivate the chamber, its chairman, Dr Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert, and the chamber's chief executive officer, Mr Vic Milne, held discussions with all the relevant parties on the urgency of reactivation. Dr Slabbert subsequently drew up a working document which was accepted by the chamber as a basis to resume its activities. The document provided, inter alia, for the transfer of the executive functions for the provision of services to an 'administrator body' consisting of officials of the councils of Diepmeadow, Dobsonville, Johannesburg, Roodepoort and Soweto. It also provided for the Greater Soweto Principal Parties (GSSP)—a negotiation forum for problems concerning the greater Soweto area—to be reactivated and restructured to include representatives of the Johannesburg and Roodepoort city councils and for the GSSP to negotiate policy guidelines for the provision of these services.²⁴⁴ [244 Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber (CWMC) supplementary report, 10 June 1992]

As a result the chamber decided in June 1992 to resume its activities—primarily the negotiation of an integrated system of local government and the resolution of the debt crisis in the greater Soweto area.²⁴⁵ [245 CWMC circular to all members and structures of the chamber, 11 June 1992] At the time of writing, however, no agreement had been reached on the provisions of the working document.²⁴⁶ [246 Ibid]

Kimberley

In July 1992 the four racially defined local government bodies in Kimberley (northern Cape) were dissolved and a single city council set up. A 'caretaker council' was established, comprising 24 members, including 12 members of the former white city council, seven members of the former African town council, four members of the former coloured management committee and one member of the former Indian LAC. Because the new council was to be run along the lines of the former white Kimberley City Council the city's mayor was to continue to perform his ceremonial functions. Policy decisions in the new council were to be taken by a two-thirds majority. The council's first task was to draw up a budget and a single voters' roll in terms of the Cape Municipal Ordinance 20 of 1974, in terms of which the Kimberley City Council had operated. An election would either be held or held over until a general municipal election was announced by the government.²⁴⁷ [247 Telephonic interview with the town clerk of Kimberley, Mr Koenie Nolte, 4 August 1992]

The founding agreement called for the demarcation of wards to occur within six months or for the 12 existing wards to be accepted pending final demarcation. Until a decision had been taken all councillors would be deemed to represent all the people in the municipal area.

Two options were considered for amalgamation. The first was the establishment of a joint authority, in terms of which the existing local government bodies would become dormant legal persons while the joint authority would become the active legal person handling all the assets, liabilities, rights and responsibilities of its constituent bodies as from the date of amalgamation. This would allow participating bodies to withdraw from the joint structure at any future date and resume authority over their own areas.

The second option was the establishment of a single authority, the dissolving of the participating local authorities and the vesting of all assets, liabilities, rights and responsibilities in a single new authority. This would preclude withdrawal of the individual local authorities. The second option was decided on.

The parties agreed to demarcate the new local authority on the basis of 12 wards, each represented by two councillors. The report of the joint technical committee, on which the Kimberley Interim Civic Association (a civic association representing mainly Africans) also served, recommended that in the interim a joint local government committee would be established, on which the council and the association would be represented by equal numbers of representatives, and which would oversee those aspects of local government which affected the areas represented by the association.

Mooi River

On 14 May 1992 the Mooi River Indian LAC was dissolved and its councillors became full members of the Mooi River Town Council (Natal Midlands). This was effected in accordance with the Interim Measures for Local Government Act.²⁴⁸ [²⁴⁸ *The Natal Witness* 14 May 1992] All existing LAC members were absorbed into the Mooi River Town Council, giving it nine white councillors and five Indian councillors. The wards were to be retained until demarcation took place prior to the following general municipal election.²⁴⁹ [²⁴⁹ Telephonic interview with the town clerk of Mooi River, Mr D Macallister, 7 August 1992]

According to Mr Wessel Nel MP (Democratic Party), the changes were not intended to exclude the neighbouring African township of Bruntville from the new structure. He added that it would be difficult to say when the town council would be ready to negotiate the inclusion of the African township because of the unrest in Bruntville.²⁵⁰ [²⁵⁰ *The Natal Witness* 12 February 1992] This was confirmed by Mooi River's town clerk, Mr Doug Macallister, who said that while his council had taken over the administration of Bruntville's Treasury Department it would not be interested in holding amalgamation talks with the township unless the unrest abated. He said that Mooi River had conducted talks with the Natal Provincial Administration from time to time about taking over the administration of Bruntville but that nothing had come of this.²⁵¹ [²⁵¹ Telephonic interview with the town clerk of Mooi River, Mr D Macallister, 7 August 1992]

Port Elizabeth

In September 1992 the chairman of Port Elizabeth's one-city forum, Mr Glenn Goosen, revealed that the forum had become the de facto authority in the city owing to the fact that the Cape Provincial Council (CPA) had agreed to be bound by the forum's decisions and had publicly rejected the Interim Measures

for Local Government Act. (Mr Goosen was also the treasurer of the eastern Cape region of the ANC.) He said that the forum's management committee consisted of representatives of the ANC, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the DP, the National Party (NP), the South African Communist Party and the local municipality. The management committee had identified five key constituencies at the forum, namely business, civic organisations, labour, local government bodies and political organisations. Each constituency had been encouraged to meet separately and to work out proposals for the city. The Port Elizabeth People's Civic Association, the Port Elizabeth Northern Civic Organisation and the all-white Central Executive of Ratepayers had met and drawn up a common proposal for the city which they had presented to the forum. Mr Goosen said that the reaching of consensus at constituency level had ensured avoidance of conflict at steering committee level. The steering committee of the forum adopted a declaration of intent for the forum and a protocol agreement on 4 June 1992 (see *1991/92 Survey* p90).²⁵² [²⁵² *Work in Progress-Reconstruct* September 1992]

Pretoria

The Pretoria City Council and the local authorities of Akasia, Atteridgeville, Eersterus, Laudium, Mamelodi and Verwoerdburg held an informal meeting at the end of February 1992 to decide on the future relationship of the local bodies. An interim steering committee was established to report on the criteria that should determine who should be invited to the founding meeting of a negotiations forum.²⁵³ [²⁵³ *The Star* 28 February 1992] Towards the end of April 1992 the steering committee decided that Soshanguve should also form part of the envisaged new 'super municipality' and that other interested parties, including church, community and cultural organisations, political parties and residents' associations would be approached to take part in the negotiations process.²⁵⁴ [²⁵⁴ *The Citizen* 25 April 1992] The Pretoria City Council also took over the administration of Atteridgeville in terms of the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982 (see also chapter on *Political Developments*). The management committee of Pretoria was also empowered by the administrator of the Transvaal to act as the executive committee for Atteridgeville.²⁵⁵ [²⁵⁵ *Ibid* 29 April 1992]

Stutterheim

The Stutterheim forum (eastern Cape) consisted of various working groups representing the town of Stutterheim as well as neighbouring townships. According to the town clerk of Stutterheim, Mr B P Erasmus, Stutterheim's four African communities were represented largely by civic associations. The Van Rensburg management committee (coloured) and the Stutterheim Town Council (white) were also represented on the forum.²⁵⁶ [²⁵⁶ Telephonic interview with the town clerk of Stutterheim, Mr B P Erasmus, 10 August 1992] Issues of communal importance ranging from the local economy and the creation of jobs to the delivery of services and constitutional matters were discussed in these working groups.²⁵⁷ [²⁵⁷ *Die*

SuidAfrikaan February/ March 1992[]] Mr Erasmus revealed in August 1992 that the council, as well as the forum, had opted for the establishment of a single municipality but because the ANC had found the enabling legislation (the Interim Measures for Local Government Act) unacceptable it had decided to put this plan on the 'back burner'. Instead, it was now aiming at a joint administration where the administration and staff of the councils would be combined without the councils themselves being amalgamated.²⁵⁸ [258 Telephonic interview with the town clerk of Stutterheim, Mr B P Erasmus, 10 August 1992]

THE ECONOMY

Key Points

- Real economic growth in 1991 was -0,6%. Old Mutual forecast a growth rate of -1,5% for 1992.
- According to the minister of agriculture, Dr Kraai van Niekerk, agricultural production losses caused by the drought would reduce gross domestic product (GDP) by about R3bn in 1992/93.
- Real gross domestic fixed investment declined from R25,8bn in 1990 to R23,6bn in 1991 (ie by 8,5%).
- Real GDP per head dropped by 2,7% in both 1990 and 1991.
- The inflation rate for 1991 was 15,3%, compared with 14,4% in 1990. The food price inflation rate increased to 19,6% in 1991, compared with 16,1% in 1990. In October 1992 it was 21,2%.
- Prime overdraft rate was reduced to 19,25% in March 1992, to 18,25% in June 1992, and 17,25% in November 1992.
- Real prime rate was 3,16% in July 1992, the lowest since October 1991 (when it was 2,95%).
- The surplus on the current account of the balance of payments was R7,4bn in 1991, compared with a surplus of R5,8bn in 1990.
- Exports totalled R66,23bn in 1991, an increase of 8,7% on the revised figure of R60,93bn for 1990. Imports increased by 9,5% over the same period.
- Net capital outflow in 1991 was R6bn, compared with R2,9bn in 1990. In the first half of 1992 the net outflow was R1,9bn.
- Total gross gold and other foreign reserves were valued at R9,8bn at the end of 1991, compared with

R7,3bn in 1990.

- The average price of gold on the London market was \$362 per fine ounce in 1991, compared with \$384 in 1990. Amalgamated Banks of South Africa predicted an average of \$346 for 1992.
- The nominal external value of the commercial rand was 36,2 American cents in 1991, compared with 38,6 cents in 1990. Bankorp projected an exchange rate of 33,6 cents for 1992.
- According to the South African Chamber of Business, the business confidence index was 93,2 in 1991, compared with 100 in 1990 (its new base year). In October 1992 the index was 90,1.

Macro-economic picture

Growth rate

According to the Central Statistical Service (CSS), real economic growth as measured by gross domestic product (GDP) at constant 1985 market prices was -0,6% in 1991, compared with a revised figure of -0,5% in 1990. This compared unfavourably with real economic growth rates of 2,3% and 4,2% in 1989 and 1988 respectively.¹ [¹ Central Statistical Service (CSS), *Gross Domestic Product at Constant 1985 Prices - First Quarter 1992*, Statistical News Release, P0441, 14 May 1992]

Real GDP per capita fell by 2,7% in both 1990 and 1991. According to the Department of Finance, the value of agricultural production fell by 15% in 1991, compared with a decline of 7,5% in 1990, while the mining sector also saw a decline of 1,5% in 1991, compared with a decline of 1% in 1990. The value of production in the secondary sector also declined by 2,5% in 1991, with only the tertiary sector growing (by 0,5%).² [² Department of Finance, *Budget Review* 18 March 1992]

The CSS provided the following figures for GDP at constant 1985 market priced 1988, R131 016m; 1989, R134 025m; 1990, R133 409m; and 1991, R132 648m.³ [³ CSS, *Gross Domestic Product at Constant 1985 Prices - First Quarter 1992*, Statistical News Release, P0441, 14 May 1992]

According to figures compiled by the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the ten homelands contributed 5,4% and 8% to the country's GDP in 1985 and 1989 respectively. (These were the latest years for which figures were available.) The following table gives a breakdown of gross geographical product (GGP) in the ten homelands in 1985 and 1989:⁴ [⁴ Development Bank of Southern Africa, *South Africa: An Inter-regional Profile*, 1991]

Gross geographical product of the homelands: 1985 and 1989

1985^a

1989 ^a

Rm

Proportion of total homeland GGP

Rm

Proportion of total homeland GGP

Bophuthatswana

1 357,5

22%

4 420,0

28%

Ciskei

564,0

9%

1 291,9

8%

Gazankulu

269,0

4%

715,9

5%

KaNgwane

122,9

2%

320,1

2%

KwaNdebele

88,3

1%

305,3

2%

KwaZulu

1 293,0

21%

3 426,3

22%

Lebowa

564,8

9%

1 417,0

9%
QwaQwa
130,7
2%
409,0
3%
Transkei
1 426,7
24%
2 783,9
18%
Venda
259,0
4%
688,3
4%
Total ^b
6 075,9
100%
15 777,7

100%

a

Current prices

b

Figures are rounded and may, therefore, not add

In his budget speech in March 1992, the minister of finance, Mr Barend du Plessis, said that a positive real economic growth rate of about 1% was expected in 1992.⁵ [⁵ Mr Barend du Plessis, minister of finance, budget speech, 18 March 1992] However, the effects of the drought led to a re-evaluation of South Africa's growth prospects for the year. The South African Reserve Bank said in June 1992 that the drought and the expected poor harvest of summer crops would not only lead to a further decline in the contribution of agriculture to GDP but also have a direct impact on the growth of the economy (see also chapter on *Land and Agriculture*). The findings of a macro-econometric model of the reserve bank on the effects of the drought were that a decline of 14% in the value added by the agricultural sector to GDP would lower the growth rate of GDP by about 1,8 percentage points. The bank said in June 1992 that the recession had been exacerbated by the serious drought in certain areas, the uncertainties regarding the outcome of political negotiations and the unrest in black townships.⁶ [⁶ South African Reserve Bank, *Quarterly Bulletin* June 1992] According to the minister of agriculture, Dr Kraai van Niekerk, agricultural production losses caused by drought would reduce GDP by about R3bn in 1992/93.⁷ [⁷ *Business Day* 22 June 1992]

The annual economic report of the bank, published in August 1992, said that the current recession (which had lasted for just over three years) was the second longest this century. Only the 1904–1908 recession had lasted longer.⁸ [⁸ *Ibid* 24 August 1992]

The minister of finance, Mr Derek Keys, said in June 1992 that if violence was not drastically reduced it would be 'hard, probably impossible' to come up with any economic scenario realistically offering the prospect of growth.⁹ [⁹ *Hansard* (joint sitting) 20 cols 10679-10680, 10 June 1992]

The chief economist of Old Mutual, Mr David Mohr, forecast a negative growth rate of 1,5% for 1992 and said that South Africa's recession could continue into 1993. The root of the recession, he added, was industrial action, political uncertainty and violence.¹⁰ [¹⁰ *The Natal Witness* 31 July 1992] Econometrix said in August 1992 that it did not expect growth to be much higher than -1% in 1992 even if there were good rains from September onwards.¹¹ [¹¹ *Ecobulletin* 14 August 1992]

Sanlam said in August 1992 that international economic expansion in 1993 could enhance the growth prospects of the South African economy. Other factors which could contribute to a domestic recovery included the continued crumbling of sanctions, better agricultural conditions, a firmer gold price, the rebuilding of low inventories, accelerated government spending, lower inflation and further reductions in interest rates. However, without political peace and stability economic growth (forecast at 2% to 3% in 1993) would be delayed.¹² [¹² *Business Day* 24 August 1992]

According to Mr Keys, the biggest obstacle inhibiting economic growth was uncertainty.¹³ [¹³ *Ibid* 11 May 1992] In June 1992 the governor of the reserve bank, Dr Chris Stals, attributed negative growth for the third consecutive year to the 'harshest drought in decates'.¹⁴ [¹⁴ *Ibid* 17 June 1992] He said that to achieve a growth rate of 4% major structural adjustments would have to be made, including an increase in savings to finance new capital investment projects, an improvement in the capital-output ratio, an increase in labour productivity and a reversal in the net outflow of capital.¹⁵ [¹⁵ *Ibid*] The chief economist of Amalgamated Banks of South Africa. Mr Nick Barnardt, said in May 1992 that he expected the recession to bottom out towards the end of 1992, to be followed by an upswing from early 1993 to late 1995. Mr Barnardt added that the quality of economic management in the early years of a new political dispensation would determine the continuation of economic growth after 1995.¹⁶ [¹⁶ *The Citizen* 6 May 1992]

Employment

According to the reserve bank, employment opportunities deteriorated considerably between the beginning of the economic downswing in 1989 and June 1992 because of the decrease in domestic demand and rationalisation programmes introduced in many industries. Between 1989 and the end of 1991 employment in the formal non-agricultural sector declined by almost 160 000, while the economically active population increased by 300 000 people a year (see also chapter on *Employment*). The bank said that total employment in the non-agricultural sector dropped by 2,1% in 1991, compared with a 0,5% drop in 1990. This decrease occurred mainly in the private sector, in which there was a decrease in formal employment of 3,6% in 1991, compared with a decrease of 0,7% in 1990. Employment in the public sector increased by 1,6% in 1991, compared with an increase of only 0,1% in 1990. The bank attributed this rate of increase to increased numbers employed in the police force, in the education of black children and in the correctional services.¹⁷ [¹⁷ *Quarterly Bulletin* June 1992]

According to the CSS, employment in the construction sector declined by 4% between June 1991 and June 1992 (from 391 000 to 373 600). Over the same period employment in manufacturing declined by 3% (from 1 430 818 to 1 394 419), while employment in trade and hotels dropped by 1% (from 781 600 to 775 000) and in the public sector by 1% (from 1 674 777 to 1 665 298). Only the finance sector

experienced an increase in employment in this period (of 3%).¹⁸ [¹⁸ CSS, *Labour Statistics: Employment and Salaries and Wages*, Statistical News Releases as follows: *Building Societies, Banking Institutions and Insurance Companies: June 1991*, P0262, 4 September 1991; *Mining and Quarrying, Manufacturing, Construction and Electricity: June 1991*, P0242.1,2 September 1991; *Public Sector: June 1991*, P0251, 4 November 1991; *Wholesale, Retail and Motor Trade and Hotels: June 1991*, P0244, 14 November 1991] In the period June 1991 to June 1992,⁶⁹ 868 people lost their jobs in the sectors mentioned above, while 5 441 new jobs were created in the finance sector.

Balance of payments

According to the reserve bank, in 1991 the surplus on the current account of the balance of payments was R7,4bn (2,5% of GDP) compared with R5,8bn in 1990. This was the seventh year in succession in which total exports of goods and services exceeded total imports and the largest surplus since 1984. In the first quarter of 1992 the surplus on the current account decreased to R2bn from the relatively high figure of R3,1bn in the fourth quarter of 1991.¹⁹ [¹⁹ *Quarterly Bulletin* June 1992] The seasonally adjusted and annualised figure for the surplus in the second quarter of 1992 was R6bn.

At the annual general meeting of the reserve bank in August 1992 Dr Stals said that a further decline was expected in the current account surplus in the following 12 months as a result of the low gold price, poor international economic conditions and adverse local climatic conditions.²⁰ [²⁰ Dr Chris Stals, governor of the South African Reserve Bank, address to the ordinary general meeting of shareholders of the South African Reserve Bank, Pretoria 25 August 1992] South Africa's net capital outflow for 1991 was R6bn, compared with a net outflow of R2,6bn in 1990. This increase was attributed to the abolition of preferential rates on forward exchange transactions in September 1990, resulting in less use of foreign trade finance. The 1991 figure represented the largest net capital outflow since 1988 (when it was R6,2bn).²¹ [²¹ *Quarterly Bulletin* March 1992] In the first quarter of 1992 the net outflow declined to R21m.²² [²² *Ibid* June 1992] According to Dr Stals, adverse political developments in the second quarter of 1992 resulted in the total net outflow increasing to R1,9bn in that period.²³ [²³ Dr Chris Stals, address to the ordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the reserve bank, Pretoria 25 August 1992]

South Africa's total gross gold and other foreign reserves were valued at R9,8bn at the end of 1991, compared with R7,3bn in 1990. At the end of July 1992 net gold and foreign reserves amounted to R11,3bn.²⁴ [²⁴ Dr Chris Stals, address to the ordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the reserve bank, Pretoria 25 August 1992]

At the end of the first quarter of 1992 total gross foreign reserves exceeded the value of two months' imports of goods and services for the first time since the first quarter of 1988.²⁵ [²⁵ *Quarterly Bulletin* June 1992]

In his address to the shareholders of the reserve bank in August 1992, Dr Stals said that the bank believed that a 'comfortable level of gold and foreign exchange holdings' for South Africa should be one that was sufficient to cover at least three months' imports of goods and services, which on the basis of the 1991 balance of payments statistics would require a minimum reserve of at least R17bn.²⁶ [²⁶ Dr Chris Stals, address to the ordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the reserve bank, Pretoria 25 August 1992]

According to the Nedbank Economic Unit, the projected surplus on the current account for 1992 of R4,2bn was only slightly larger than the foreign debt obligations falling due in 1992. This, together with pressure from short-term capital outflows, could reduce the possibility of foreign exchange reserves breaching the R10bn mark in 1992, unless there were substantial rollovers of debt, increased access to foreign capital markets and an increase in the foreign financing of import trader.²⁷ [²⁷ Nedbank, *Guide to the Economy*, May 1992]

South Africa's total outstanding foreign debt declined from US\$19,4bn at the end of 1990 to \$18,1bn at the end of 1991. According to the reserve bank, foreign debt as a proportion of exports of goods and services declined from 70% in 1990 to 65% in 1991. The corresponding ratio in developing countries in the western hemisphere was 250% in 1991. South Africa's foreign debt as a ratio of GDP had also been reduced from 43% in August 1985 to 17% at the end of 1991.²⁸ [²⁸ *Quarterly Bulletin* June 1992]

In September 1991 the government floated the first public issue on the international market since the debt standstill in 1985. The issue was valued at DM400m. In January 1992 a 250m European Currency Unit issue was floated. The Department of Finance said in the *Budget Review* in March 1992 that as South Africa was meeting its obligations under various debt agreements with foreign creditors and the country was becoming more accessible for foreign capital, proper foreign debt management was required.²⁹ [²⁹ Department of Finance, *Budget Review* 18 March 1992]

The gold price

The average London gold price in 1991 was US\$362 (R1 000), compared with \$384 (R992) in 1990.³⁰ [³⁰ *Quarterly Bulletin* June 1992] The decline in the average annual dollar price of gold was offset by the depreciation of the rand (from R2,58 to the dollar in 1990 to R2,77 to the dollar in 1991).³¹ [³¹ Chamber

of Mines of South Africa, annual report 1991]

According to Rand Merchant Bank International Futures, the average London gold price up to 7 December 1992 was \$345.³² [³² *Business Day* 26 August 1992] Amalgamated Banks of South Africa predicted in July 1992 that the price of gold would decline to an average of \$346 per fine ounce in 1992, while falling further in the first half of 1993 to \$344.³³ [³³ Amalgamated Banks of South Africa, *Quarterly Economic Monitor* July 1992]

According to the 1991 annual report of the Chamber of Mines of South Africa, if the gold price and gold revenues remained at 1991 levels, the profitability of the gold mining industry would depend increasingly on the ability of the government and the reserve bank to implement effective anti-inflationary policies.³⁴ [³⁴ Chamber of Mines of South Africa, annual report 1991] The annual report of Gold Fields of South Africa, which was published in May 1992, said that the gold price would be influenced by what happened to gold mining and the supply of gold in the Russian Federation, and the demand for gold jewellery, industrial use and investment.³⁵ [³⁵ *The Weekly Mail* 22 May 1992]

Some 12 mines were marginal during 1991 (marginal being where working profit is less than 6% of working revenue). This put at risk 16% of the chamber's labour force and 12% of South Africa's gold production. However, the South African gold mining industry was able to control the escalation of working costs between 1987 and 1991. In 1987 the annual percentage increase in working costs per kilogram of gold produced was 25%, while it had dropped to 1,6% in 1991.³⁶ [³⁶ Chamber of Mines of South Africa, annual report 1991] Nevertheless, there was an increase in 1991 in the cost of producing gold which exceeded the inflation rate as a result of increasing labour costs, the declining grade of ore milled and the high costs associated with deep level mining.³⁷ [³⁷ *Ibid*]

The overall level of production remained relatively steady, decreasing from 605 tonnes of gold in 1990 to 601 tonnes in 1991. South African gold production as a proportion of gold production in the free market economies declined from 35% in 1990 to 34% in 1991. This meant that while gold output in the free market economies increased by 80% (from 988 tonnes in 1981 to 1 782 tonnes in 1991), South Africa's output decreased by 9% (from 658 tonnes in 1981 to 601 tonnes in 1991).³⁸ [³⁸ *Ibid*] According to figures published by the chamber in August 1992, total gold output from January to July 1992 stood at 354 tonnes, 1,7% higher than the 348 tonnes produced in the same period in 1991.³⁹ [³⁹ *Business Day* 18 August 1992]

The deputy governor of the reserve bank, Dr Jaap Meijer, said in June 1992 that the South African gold mining industry should regard itself as a declining industry which would eventually disappear. Because South Africa could not build its future on gold exports which had 'bottomed out', the government had to

decide whether to lend at least temporary assistance to gold mines which were retrenching workers or to view the retrenchments as part of structural adjustment, he *said*.⁴⁰ [⁴⁰ *Ibid* 19 June 1992] The outgoing president of the chamber, Mr Naas Steenkamp, said in June 1992 that while the expansion of manufactured exports would provide much of the basis for future economic growth, it was 'patently invalid' to dismiss the mining industry as a significant generator of wealth in a future South Africa.⁴¹ [⁴¹ *Ibid* 17 June 1992]

Exchange rate

The nominal effective exchange rate of the commercial rand against six major currencies (the British pound, Dutch guilder, German mark, Italian lira, Japanese yen and US dollar) declined by 6,5% during 1991, compared with a decline of 7% during 1990. In 1990 the rand depreciated by 13,2% against the Japanese yen, 6,6% against the US dollar and 5,4% against the German mark.⁴² [⁴² *Quarterly Bulletin* March 1992]

The nominal value of the commercial rand in American cents in 1991 was 36,2, lower than the 1990 average of 38,6 and the 1989 average of 38,1. Bankorp predicted in March 1992 that the rand would decline further to 33,6 cents in 1992, 30,3 cents in 1993 and 29,4 cents in 1994.⁴³ [⁴³ *Bankorp, Econovision*, 1st quarter, 1992] The commercial rand was valued at 34,7 American cents in October 1992.⁴⁴ [⁴⁴ *South African Reserve Bank, Monthly Statistical Release* November 1992]

By the end of 1991 the financial rand had appreciated to 31,5 American cents, its second highest level since the end of 1987 (when it was worth 32,1 cents).⁴⁵ [⁴⁵ *Quarterly Bulletin* June 1992] In October 1992 the financial rand traded at 22,9 cents.⁴⁶ [⁴⁶ *Monthly Statistical Release* November 1992]

The discount on the financial rand reached a record low of 7% against the commercial rand on 19 November 1991.⁴⁷ [⁴⁷ *Quarterly Bulletin* March 1992] At the end of 1991 the discount against the commercial rand was 13,5%, compared with 24,3% at the end of 1990, 28,9% in 1989 and 27,9% in 1988.⁴⁸ [⁴⁸ *Ibid*, June 1992] In September 1992 the discount had risen to 31,3%.⁴⁹ [⁴⁹ *Monthly Statistical Release* October 1992]

Dr Stals said in June 1992 that South Africa would probably retain its dual exchange rate until the end of 1995. He said that the financial rand would be abolished only once foreign investors' confidence had increased.⁵⁰ [⁵⁰ *The Citizen* 3 June 1992]

Dr Stals said in August 1992 that the reserve bank had actively intervened in the foreign exchange market in 1991 to pursue its objective of supporting a relatively stable real exchange rate for the rand. However, he cautioned that in the interest of future economic development South Africa had to remain open to foreign competition. Therefore, he said. South Africa could not rely continually on a depreciation of the exchange rate to provide protection against 'inherent weaknesses in the local production structure'. Dr Stals added that in the short term a depreciation of the value of the currency would only conceal the shortcomings of the system while it would erode the capacity of the economy to meet the needs of the economy in the long term.⁵¹ [⁵¹ Dr Chris Stals, address to the ordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the reserve bank, Pretoria, 25 August 1992]

In August 1992 the chairman of Old Mutual, Mr Mike Levett, called for a devaluation of the currency to stimulate exports. He said that a weaker rand would result in better rand revenues for commodity prices and improve job creation by making marginal mines less marginal.⁵² [⁵² *Business Day* 19 August 1992]

Inflation rate

The average inflation rate for 1991 as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) was 15.3%. in comparison with 14,4% in 1990, 14,7% in 1989 and 12,9% in 1988. The average inflation rates for the lower-, middle-and higher-income groups for 1991 were 15%, 15,8% and 153% respectively. In 1991 the average inflation rate for pensioners was 15.2% The food price inflation rate was 19,6% in 1991, compared with 16,1% in 1990, 10,9% in 1989 and 15,6% in 1988. In December 1991 the year-on-year food inflation rate was 28,3% (see *Food price inflation* below).⁵³ [⁵³ CSS, *Consumer Price Index - December 1991*, Statistical News Release, P0141.1,23 January 1992]

The year-on-year inflation rate for October 1992 was 11,7%, while the food price inflation rate was 21,2% and the index for all items excluding food showed a rate of increase of 9,3%.⁵⁴ [⁵⁴ *Business Day* 23 November 1992] In September the greatest rate of change in food prices in urban areas occurred in respect of the middle-income group (28,2%), while the higher- and lower-income groups experienced increases of 27,2% and 27,3% respectively.⁵⁵ [⁵⁵ CSS, *Consumer Price Index - September 1992*, Statistical News Release, P0141.1,29 October 1992]

Dr Stals said in August 1992 that certain factors had led to a sharp increase in the CPI during the latter part of 1991 and the first part of 1992. These included the introduction of value added tax (VAT) in October 1991 and its further extension to certain foodstuffs in April 1992, the adjustment of the weights used in the consumer basket for purposes of calculating the index and the devastating drought, which had reduced the supply of certain foodstuffs (see also chapter on *Land and Agriculture*).⁵⁶ [⁵⁶ Dr Chris Stals, address to the ordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the reserve bank, Pretoria 25 August 1992]

The annual rate of increase in the production price index (PPI) was 11,4% in 1991, compared with 12% in 1990 and 15,2% in 1989.⁵⁷ [⁵⁷ CSS, *Production Price Index -December 1991*, Statistical News Release, P0142.1, 11 February 1992] The year-on-year increase in the PPI in September 1992 was 8,8%.⁵⁸ [⁵⁸ *Business Day* 17 November 1992]

Dr Stals said in his address to the ordinary general meeting of the reserve bank in August 1992 that inflation remained one of the major contributing factors to the continuous structural weakening of the South African economy as it adversely affected savings, the allocation of resources, the competitiveness of South African producers on world markets and the distribution of wealth and income.⁵⁹ [⁵⁹ Dr Chris Stals, address to the ordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the reserve bank, Pretoria, 25 August 1992]

Food price inflation

In March 1992 the South African Chamber of Business (Sacob) said that food costs had been inflated by low labour productivity, crime (including burglaries at business premises, delivery truck hijackings, shoplifting and pilfering by employees) and transport costs. Furthermore, Sacob argued that government regulations to control the marketing and processing of food products had protected inefficient producers and distributors. The role of trade unions in demanding large wage increases also had to be considered, it said.⁶⁰ [⁶⁰ *The Star* 4 March 1992]

At a conference on food prices in the same month organised by the VAT co-ordinating committee (VCC), the committee decided to meet the government urgently to demand that the present VAT rate be held constant, that the VAT zero rating on basic foodstuffs be maintained and that it be extended to other basic foods. The VCC also decided to bring together agricultural producers, retailers, marketers, agricultural control boards and consumers to identify and remedy the causes of food price hikes. The convener of the VCC and a national organising secretary of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, Dr Bemie Fanaroff, said that escalating food prices were underpinning the high inflation rate. The committee said that cartels and monopolies in the private sector were controlling prices and should take a substantial proportion of the blame for price rises.⁶¹ [⁶¹ *The Citizen* 6 March 1992] It blamed increasing food prices on the imposition of VAT, agricultural boards and conglomerates dominating the food industry.⁶² [⁶² *Business Day* 6 March 1992] Dr Fanaroff said that the VCC wanted the government to use the profit made on wheat imports in 1991, together with the R80m saved on staple food subsidies, to stabilise food prices.⁶³ [⁶³ *The Star* 5 June 1992]

In April 1992 the CSS was criticised for its calculation of the CPI by the chairman of Pick 'n Pay, Mr Raymond Ackerman. He said that while the big supermarkets accounted for a large share of the retail trade, the CSS appeared to place most emphasis in its surveys on small shops and corner cafes. Other

critics suggested that the inflation rate could be 2% to 3% lower than officially recorded. Pick 'n Pay said that while according to the CSS weighting, meat constituted about 33% of the average shopping basket, its customers spent only 8% of their food bill on meat, poultry and processed meat. The CSS said in reply that it surveyed 35 000 store owners regularly, measuring prices on 88 000 items. It said that its techniques were based on international norms and were adjusted from time to time. Supermarkets were given a heavier weighting in its surveys than corner stores were.⁶⁴ [⁶⁴ Ibid 13 April 1992]

A report on food prices, which was published by the Board of Tariffs and Trade in June 1992, said that it was necessary to restructure the entire agricultural sector. It recommended that agriculture be deregulated from central government to municipal level, that customs tariffs be adjusted to encourage healthy competition between local producers and importers, that health and hygiene regulations be relaxed because they were too stringent for a developing country, that consumers be allowed to buy food directly from the producers and that the control board system be reviewed.⁶⁵ [⁶⁵ *The Citizen* 12 June 1992] The report recommended that control boards be stripped of their statutory powers but did not spell out what powers they should have.⁶⁶ [⁶⁶ *Business Day* 12 June 1992] The minister of agriculture, Dr Kraai van Niekerk, said in response that the report was 'inadequate'. He argued that it had not fully taken into account the effect of the drought and VAT on food prices and proper credit had not been given to deregulation in the marketing of agricultural products (see also chapter on *Land and Agriculture*).⁶⁷ [⁶⁷ Ibid 19 June 1992]

In the same month the agricultural adviser of First National Bank, Mr Frans Venter, said that shortages caused by the drought were likely to lead to a doubling of the prices of fruit and vegetables. Mr Venter cited over-packaging as one of the main reasons for high food prices. Furthermore, many basic foodstuffs (including maize, wheat and seed oils) were being imported and were subject to daily currency fluctuations. Higher prices for imported basic foodstuffs had a domino effect on other food products, he said.⁶⁸ [⁶⁸ Ibid 4 June 1992]

In August 1992 representatives of agricultural co-operatives, consumer bodies, control boards, distributors, farmers, manufacturers, retailers and wholesalers met at Midrand (north of Johannesburg) at the first Food Logistics Forum to examine mounting food prices. The forum listed 22 key areas that needed investigation. The delegates agreed that VAT was the chief cause of inflation and that a task force would investigate it and approach the government to negotiate zero rating of basic foodstuffs. Another problem area was found to be the CSS's statistics. The forum had commissioned consultants Louis Heyl and Associates to perform an independent study of three major food retailers. It found that annual food price inflation prior to the implementation of VAT in September 1991 was 15%, with the introduction of VAT having added another six percentage points. The forum agreed to form task forces to investigate other problem areas such as the economic costs of political transition (strikes, shrinkage and falling productivity), the status and function of the marketing boards, retailer/ manufacturer relations, the question of economic concentration, the gap between what farmers were paid for their produce and the price the manufacturer paid, the causes of inflation, the extent to which interest rates

and electricity, water and effluent utilities affected food prices, and the efficiency of the food distribution chain.⁶⁹ [⁶⁹ *Financial Mail* 21 August 1992]

Interest rates

Dr Stals said in January 1992 that reducing interest rates while the inflation rate remained relatively high would bring only short-term relief and that in the long term high inflation would lead to a lower economic growth rate.⁷⁰ [⁷⁰ *The Star* 17 January 1992] According to the deputy governor of the reserve bank, Dr Jaap Meijer, the bank's policy of using high interest rates to bring down inflation had helped to keep the inflation rate from 'getting totally out of hand'.⁷¹ [⁷¹ *The Citizen* 30 January 1992] In February 1992 Dr Stals said that while nominal interest rates might come down slightly one could not expect them to decline to the same low levels that prevailed in many industrial countries where inflation rates were much lower than in South Africa.⁷² [⁷² *Business Day* 19 February 1992]

In March 1992 the reserve bank reduced bank rate by one percentage point (from 17% to 16%). However, Dr Stals warned that this reduction could be justified only on the assumption that inflation would decline during the course of 1992. He added that the bank was willing to abolish the convention of a fixed difference between bank rate and the prime lending rate of three percentage points in order to introduce more flexibility into the system.⁷³ [⁷³ *Quarterly Bulletin* June 1992] The prime overdraft rate of all major banks was reduced to 19,25% following Dr Stals's announcement.⁷⁴ [⁷⁴ *Business Day* 24 March 1992]

In June 1992 the reserve bank announced a further reduction in bank rate of one percentage point (bringing it down to 15%). The prime overdraft rate was reduced to 18,25%. This reduction was expected to reduce the cost of borrowing money by 5,5%.⁷⁵ [⁷⁵ *Ibid* 30 June 1992; *The Star* 30 June 1992] In July 1992 the real prime overdraft rate was 3,16%, the lowest since October 1991 (when it was 2,95%).⁷⁶ [⁷⁶ Information supplied by the reserve bank, 28 September 1992]

The chief economist of Rand Merchant Bank, Dr Rudolf Gouws, said that although it was unlikely to hold any immediate benefit for the consumer, the reduced prime overdraft rate would lay the foundation for an economic recovery in the latter part of 1992 or in early 1993 if the political situation did not deteriorate further.⁷⁷ [⁷⁷ *Business Day* 30 June 1992] A director of Econometrix, Dr Azar Jammine, said that the lowering of bank rate could be expected at best to ease pressure on businesses and consumers that were financially overextended.⁷⁸ [⁷⁸ *The Citizen* 1 July 1992]

Business confidence

The average business confidence index of Sacob was 93,2 in 1991, compared with 100 in 1990, 101,6 in 1989 and 107,4 in 1988. (The new base year for the Sacob index was 1990.) In October 1992 the index was 90,1 compared with 90,2 in September. According to Sacob, the decline in confidence was attributed to the continued political uncertainty, especially the dissatisfaction of other parties after the signing of the Record of Understanding between the government and the African National Congress and evidence that the economic recession was continuing to deepen. Furthermore, potential foreign investors were shying away from investing in South Africa, while domestic investors were waiting for clearer indications of political progress accompanied by sound economic policies. A better agricultural season in 1993 would probably bolster the business mood, Sacob believed. However, Sacob said that business sentiment could be bolstered by the combined effects of lower inflation and a reduction in interest rates.⁷⁹ [79 South African Chamber of Business, *Business Confidence Index*, July 1992, October 1992]

In its monthly survey of confidence levels in the manufacturing sector in July 1992, Sacob found that most industrialists were pessimistic both in the short term and in their outlook for 1993. Most manufacturers surveyed expected to experience reduced sales, and lower production and stock volumes in 1993 and to utilise less of their productive capacity. The Pietermaritzburg (Natal) region was the most optimistic in July 1992 (with 63% of respondents expecting sales to increase in the next 12 months), while the least optimistic region was East London (eastern Cape) (where 58% of the respondents anticipated a decline in sales).⁸⁰ [80 Ibid July 1992]

Sequestrations and liquidations

According to the CSS, 3 970 private individuals and partnerships were declared insolvent in 1991, compared with a revised figure of 3 104 in 1990 (an increase of 28%). Over the period December 1991 to May 1992, 1 980 private individuals and partnerships were declared insolvent (an increase of 16% over the period December 1990 to May 1991).⁸¹ [81 CSS, *Statistics of Liquidations and Insolvencies: June 1992*, Statistical News Release, P0043,3 August 1992]

In 1991, 1 881 companies and close corporations were liquidated, compared with 1 590 in 1990. During the first six months of 1992, 1213 companies and close corporations were liquidated (an increase of 38% over the same period in 1991).⁸² [82 Ibid]

Investment

Gross domestic fixed investment (GDFT) declined from R25,8bn in 1990 to R23,6bn in 1991 at constant

1985 prices (ie by 8,5%). The following table gives a breakdown of GDFI according to type of organisation:⁸³ [⁸³ *Quarterly Bulletin* June 1992]

Gross domestic fixed investment according to organisation: 1990 and 1991 ^a

1990 Rm

1991 Rm

Increase (decrease)

Private business enterprices

16 999

16 093

(5%)

Public authorities

General governement

2 406

2 090

(13%)

Business enterproces ^b

2 120

2 328

10%

Public corporations

4 294

3 135

(27%)

Total

25 819

23 646

(8%)

a

At constant 1985 prices

b

Includes parastatals

Dr Stals said in August 1992 that the ratio of total savings to GDP, which had averaged 24,5% in the 1980s, declined to 19% in 1991 and 18% in the first six months of 1992.⁸⁴ [⁸⁴ Dr Chris Stals, address to the ordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the reserve bank, Pretoria, 25 August 1992] In the reserve bank's *Quarterly Bulletin* this was attributed largely to continued extensive dissaving by the government.⁸⁵ [⁸⁵ *Quarterly Bulletin* June 1992]

The ratio of net personal saving to personal disposable income increased from less than 1% in the third quarter of 1990 to 2,5% in the fourth quarter of 1991 and the first quarter of 1992. However, the reserve bank said that this ratio was still low compared with average ratios of 8,5% and 4% in the 1970s and 1980s respectively.⁸⁶ [⁸⁶ *Ibid*] In 1986 personal savings comprised 5,6% of gross domestic saving, while corporate saving amounted to 24,9% and the dissavings of government were 5% of gross savings. In 1991 personal savings had increased to 7% of gross savings and corporate savings had declined to 21,8%, while government dissaving had increased to 13% of gross domestic saving.⁸⁷ [⁸⁷ *Ibid*]

In July 1992 Dr Stals said that access to foreign finance, whether in the form of World Bank loans or foreign investment, continued to be very important because it would supplement domestic savings, which 'at best' could only sustain a 2% growth

Trade

South African exports (including gold) totalled R66,23bn in 1991, which was an increase of 8,7% on the revised figure of R60,93bn for 1990. Total imports also increased, from R44,13bn in 1990 to R48,34bn in 1991, ie by 9,5%. The total trade surplus in 1991 was R17,89bn or 6,1% higher than the trade surplus in 1991.⁸⁹ [⁸⁹ *MCI Bulletin* 9 March 1992] The chief economist of Nedbank, Mr Edward Osbom, said in January 1992 that the value of imports was rising at a faster rate than that of exports. If figures were adjusted for currency changes over the year, imports increased by 3,2% in 1991, compared with a 2,2% increase in exports.⁹⁰ [⁹⁰ *Financial Mail* 31 January 1992]

South Africa's major trading partner in 1991 was Germany with total trade valued at R11,6bn, followed by the United Kingdom with R10,1bn, Japan with R8,2bn, the United States (US) with R7,5bn and Switzerland with R6.7bn.⁹¹ [⁹¹ *The Executive* June 1992]

The South African Foreign Trade Organisation (Safto) said in March 1992 that it expected South African exports to rise by 18% in nominal terms in 1992 despite the worldwide recession.⁹² [⁹² *The Citizen* 21 March 1992] The executive director of Safto, Dr Wim Holtes, said that this figure represented an export growth rate of 5% in real terms.⁹³ [⁹³ *Ibid* 11 January 1992] The general manager of Safto, Ms Ann Moore, said in February 1992 that an 8% real growth in exports every year was required to achieve 'any sort of economic growth'. Ms Moore added that one of the major problems with achieving this goal was production capacity. Since 1987 there had been very little new investment in production capacity. Ms Moore thought that opportunities for trade with Africa existed, although it was an 'impoverished continent'. About one third of South Africa's manufactured exports had gone to the rest of Africa in recent years, according to Ms Moore.⁹⁴ [⁹⁴ Supplement to the *Financial Mail* 21 February 1992]

A survey compiled in 1992 by the IMD International Management School in Lausanne (Switzerland) and the World Economic Forum, which tried to define the environments most conducive to the domestic or global competitiveness of companies operating in various countries, placed South Africa as eighth most desirable in a list of 14 newly industrialised countries.⁹⁵ [⁹⁵ *The Citizen* 23 June 1992]

The Board of Trade and Industry said in its 1991 annual review that import tariffs should be simplified and lowered, rebates should be phased out and there should be less frequent tariff changes. The board believed that while import replacement should continue to be promoted this should be done simultaneously with a more outward-oriented policy.⁹⁶ [⁹⁶ *Business Day* 28 July 1992]

From January to August 1992 the value of exports rose by 3% in nominal terms compared with the same

period in 1990. However, if unclassified exports (mainly gold and platinum group metals) were excluded the value of exports rose by 15%.⁹⁷ [⁹⁷ Ibid 21 September 1992] An economist at Safto, Mr Bruce Donald, said in September 1992 that exports of metals continued to suffer the adverse effects of weaker precious metal prices during 1992.⁹⁸ [⁹⁸ Ibid] Exports were also affected by the international recession, which pushed down export prices and volumes, especially of commodities.⁹⁹ [⁹⁹ *The Citizen* 19 September 1992]

Hopes of an export-led recovery in 1993 were reduced in the third quarter of 1992. Safto's quarterly export confidence barometer fell to 16 points in the third quarter of 1992, compared with 27 points in the first and second quarters of 1992 and 32 in the fourth quarter of 1991.¹⁰⁰ [¹⁰⁰ *Business Day* 24 August 1992]

The deputy director general of trade and industry, Mr Gerrie Breyll, said in August 1992 that South African industries were not geared to cope with a substantial increase in exports once the global economy began to recover. Mr Breyll said that a survey of 608 manufacturers showed that 43% manufactured only for the local market, while 42% exported less than 10% of their production. According to Mr Breyll, trade with Africa increased from R4,8bn in 1990 to R5,9bn in 1991, trade with the Americas increased from R9,8bn to R13bn, trade with Asia from R19,9bn to R22,8bn and with Europe from R44,4bn to R45,3bn.¹⁰¹ [¹⁰¹ Ibid 1 September 1992]

A senior manager of Safto, Mr Mike Veysie, said in April 1992 that South Africa needed not only financial investment but also the 'active, local involvement of international companies'. He said that foreign companies operating in South Africa faced few restrictions. However, Mr Veysie maintained that South Africa needed to lift trade tariffs to become more competitive.¹⁰² [¹⁰² Ibid 16 April 1992]

Economic sanctions

The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference decided in January 1992 to suspend 'people-to-people' sanctions (which included the lifting of visa restrictions, cultural and scientific boycotts and restrictions on tourism and direct air links) in line with the position adopted by the British Commonwealth in October 1991 (see *1991/92 Survey* pxciv).¹⁰³ [¹⁰³ Ibid 30 January 1992]

In January 1992 Denmark lifted its veto on a decision taken by the European Community (EC) in April 1991 to lift sanctions on the importing of South African gold coins, iron and steel (see *1991/92 Survey* p416). This paved the way for the ratification of the decision by the EC later in the same month.¹⁰⁴ [¹⁰⁴ Ibid 28 January 1992] Ratification permitted EC countries to lift sanctions individually against South Africa.

In February 1992 the United Nations (UN) Commission for Human Rights published a report on human rights in South Africa which commended South Africa for freeing political prisoners, repealing some apartheid laws, unbanning political parties and lifting the state of emergency. The report said, however, that the international community should continue to exert political and economic pressure on South Africa.¹⁰⁵ [¹⁰⁵ *The Citizen* 3 February 1992] Later in the same month the 53-member commission voted in favour of the continuation of sanctions against South Africa, despite opposition from western countries, eastern Europe and Russia.¹⁰⁶ [¹⁰⁶ *Ibid* 29 February 1992]

In the same month the European Parliament passed an emergency resolution that no further sanctions against South Africa should be lifted until agreement had been reached on an interim government. The Parliament also passed a resolution deploring the EC's lifting of the ban on South African gold coins, iron and steel.¹⁰⁷ [¹⁰⁷ *Business Day* 14 February 1992] The German government announced later in February that it was lifting sanctions on South African gold coins, iron and steel in recognition of moves to abolish apartheid and in line with the EC decision the previous month.¹⁰⁸ [¹⁰⁸ *Ibid* 20 February 1992]

Also in February 1992, the president of the US, Mr George Bush, authorised the Export Import Bank to consider requests for loan guarantees from the South African government. This would in effect reduce the cost of importing capital goods from the US.¹⁰⁹ [¹⁰⁹ *The Citizen* 20 February 1992, *The Weekly Mail* 21 February 1992] However, South African companies applying for loans from the bank would have to submit to the US State Department detailed reports of their employment practices and their efforts to compensate for the effects of apartheid.¹¹⁰ [¹¹⁰ *Business Day* 15 May 1992] In the same month the US government also relaxed controls on the sale of computers and software to the South African government, the export of petroleum products and exports to South African nuclear production and utilisation facilities.¹¹¹ [¹¹¹ *The Weekly Mail* 21 February 1992]

The foreign affairs ministry of Nigeria said in March 1992 that the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) needed to adjust its position on sanctions against South Africa. It urged African countries to 'adopt a concerted, pragmatic, gradual and conditional approach' to the lifting of sanctions with a view to giving incentives to the negotiators and the negotiating process.¹¹² [¹¹² *Sowetan* 5 March 1992] In the same month the African Development Bank said that South Africa could soon become the 52nd African member of the bank but that the country had to become a member of the OAU first.¹¹³ [¹¹³ *The Citizen* 30 March 1992]

France lifted its unilateral sanctions on coal imports from South Africa in the same month in order to strengthen bilateral economic ties and to show France's support for the process of creating a democratic nonracial South Africa. According to French officials, the only sanctions still observed by France were

the UN sanctions on arms and oil.¹¹⁴ [¹¹⁴ Ibid 13 March 1992] However, it was believed that the French move would not have any immediate impact on the coal industry in South Africa as capacity constraints at the Richards Bay coal terminal (Natal) made it impossible to increase the level of coal exports significantly.¹¹⁵ [¹¹⁵ *Business Day* 13 March 1992]

The outcome of the March 1992 referendum led to calls by Germany, Portugal and the United Kingdom for the lifting of remaining sanctions against South Africa (see also chapter on *Political Developments*). Portugal, which held the EC presidency in the first six months of 1992, proposed to the EC foreign ministers in Brussels (Belgium) in April 1992 that the EC undertake to:¹¹⁶ [¹¹⁶ *The Star* 31 March 1992]

- take joint action with the UN to lift the oil and nuclear co-operation embargoes;
- dispatch an EC 'troika' consisting of the foreign ministers of the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK on a fact-finding mission to South Africa;
- upgrade the EC's diplomatic representation in South Africa;
- reappoint military attaches; and
- intensify aid programmes to South Africa, especially for housing and health care.

However, the president of the African National Congress (ANC), Mr Nelson Mandela, warned that the referendum results did not justify the early lifting of sanctions as reform was not yet irreversible.¹¹⁷ [¹¹⁷ *Business Day* 20 March 1992] The EC subsequently agreed to lift the EC oil embargo and sanctions on sporting and cultural contacts. The only remaining sanctions were embargoes on the import and export of arms and sensitive goods for the armed forces, and embargoes on military and nuclear co-operation.¹¹⁸ [¹¹⁸ Ibid 7 April 1992] A spokesman for Engen said that the lifting of the EC oil embargo could act as a catalyst for the UN and the Arab League to lift their embargoes.¹¹⁹ [¹¹⁹ Ibid 8 April 1992]

At a meeting of the African Development Bank in Dakar (Senegal) in May 1992 the South African government delegation argued against economic sanctions as South Africa could become a partner in the development of sub-Saharan Africa once all sanctions were lifted. However, the ANC said that sanctions needed to be kept in place until the South African government had set in motion all the machinery for a transitional government.¹²⁰ [¹²⁰ Ibid 13 May 1992]

At the US conference of mayors in Houston (Texas) in June 1992, the mayors of some 900 towns and cities in the US voted to retain sanctions against South Africa following the killings at Boipatong

(southern Transvaal) in the same month (see chapter on *Political Developments*).¹²¹ [¹²¹ *The Star* 25 June 1992]

Monetary policy

The Department of Finance said in March 1992 that the objective of South African monetary policy continued to be the protection of the internal and external value of the rand, which was important for long-term economic growth. The more specific aims of monetary policy were to achieve:¹²² [¹²² Department of Finance, *Budget Review* 18 March 1992]

- a reduction in the inflation rate;
- the strengthening of the country's gold and other foreign reserves;
- a reduction in the rate of growth in credit extension by monetary institutions to the private sector;
- a reduction in the rate of increase in the money supply to within an accepted target range and its maintenance at such levels;
- the maintenance of real positive interest rates; and
- the creation and maintenance of a sound financial infrastructure.

In the same month the governor of the South African Reserve Bank, Dr Chris Stals, said that there was no justification for a general relaxation in monetary policy. He argued that it was important that policy changes not only take into account the short-term cyclical problems of the South African economy but also accommodate the need for longer-term structural adjustment.¹²³ [¹²³ *Quarterly Bulletin* June 1992]

The growth rate in the money supply was 14,8% from the fourth quarter of 1990 to the fourth quarter in 1991, which exceeded the target range of 8%-12% for that period. However, monetary statistics were distorted by the implementation of a new basis for banking statistics with the introduction of the Deposit-taking Institutions Act, which came into effect in February 1991. The growth rate in M3 from the end of February 1991 to the end of February 1992 was 10,8%, which was within the target range for 1991. In March 1992 the reserve bank said that it believed that the present rate of expansion in the money supply of about 10% a year should be retained for 1992. The bank said that this was below the rate of inflation and that the existing downward pressure on inflation through monetary policy would be upheld.¹²⁴ [¹²⁴ *Ibid* March 1992]

The bank announced in March 1992 that the target range for an acceptable rate of growth in the M3 money supply would be 7%-10% from the fourth quarter of 1991 to the fourth quarter of 1992. According to the bank, this was the lowest target range for money supply which had been announced since the bank first set targets in 1986.¹²⁵ [¹²⁵ Ibid June 1992]

Fiscal policy

The fiscal strategy followed by the government since 1990 has focused on the following objectives:¹²⁶ [¹²⁶ Department of Finance, *Budget Review* 18 March 1992]

- increasing the economic growth potential by tax reductions, changes in the tax structure, greater tax effectiveness, more efficient and purposeful state spending, a lower level of state expenditure and the elimination of government dissaving;
- promotion of more equal opportunities through shifts in state expenditure towards socio-economic services and the more effective targeting of assistance to the genuinely needy; and
- promotion of macro-economic stability by reducing the fiscal deficit, the avoidance of money creation in financing, the redemption of public debt and a larger role for public debt management in short-term stabilisation policy.

However, there were various factors which complicated the implementation of this strategy. According to the Department of Finance, these included cyclical factors (including both lower revenue and pressure for higher expenditure), political transition factors which aggravated the fiscal dilemma of rising expectations confronting limited fiscal resources, and uncertainty regarding the nature and stability of a new constitutional dispensation.¹²⁷ [¹²⁷ Ibid]

According to the *Budget Review*, published by the Department of Finance in March 1992, the fiscal problems which beset South Africa were characteristic of other developing countries engaged in sweeping constitutional and economic reforms. The review added that the total tax burden of general government as a proportion of gross domestic product was roughly the same as that in low- or middle-income developing countries, rather than similar to the lower ratios in more comparable high middle-income developing countries. Therefore, the overall tax burden in South Africa was relatively high. The *Budget Review* added that the direct tax burden was 'exceptionally heavy' and, therefore, a reduction in the direct tax burden on individuals was on the fiscal agenda.¹²⁸ [¹²⁸ Ibid]

In his opening address to Parliament in January 1992, the state president, Mr F W de Klerk, said that the long recession with all the social problems it brought had placed heavy demands on the government.

However, if the government was to ensure that the level and composition of state expenditure played a positive role in economic growth, 'additional and relatively drastic structural changes would have to be made'. Mr De Klerk said that for that reason, a 'tight rein' was being kept on budgetary allocations for 1992/93.¹²⁹ [¹²⁹ *Hansard* (joint sitting) 1 cols 47-48, 24 January 1992]

The *Budget Review* said that the continuing unrest in the country prevented the channelling of defence savings into the elimination of socio-economic backlogs. However, the reallocation of funds with the aim of pursuing equal opportunities and the provision of services that the state could afford to provide on an equal basis for all were being examined. The *Budget Review* added that cost effectiveness in the provision of state services would have to be improved substantially if the level of real government expenditure was not to rise faster than the average annual economic growth rate. It was important if South Africa were to make any progress in the medium term that the widest possible consensus was reached on an appropriate fiscal strategy as an integral part of a broader development strategy.¹³⁰ [¹³⁰ Department of Finance, *Budget Review* 18 March 1992]

In August 1992 the minister of state expenditure, Mr Amie Venter, said that because of the reduced level of revenue, drastic steps would have to be taken during the 1992/93 financial year to compel some departments to reduce their budgets so that savings could go to other departments. He said that this was necessary because of the increasing demands on the state for socio-economic spending.¹³¹ [¹³¹ *Business Day* 26 August 1992]

Mini-budget

Mr Venter tabled an Additional Appropriation Bill (or mini-budget) in Parliament in February 1992 to finance the requirements of the central government and the four provinces for the financial year ending 31 March 1992. The mini-budget for 1992 is given below:¹³² [¹³² Additional Appropriation Bill, B68-92]

Mini-budget: 1992

Rm

General affairs

2 386

House of Assembly

207

House of Delegates

61

House of Representatives

287

Cape Provincial Administration

414

Natal Provincial Administration

138

OFS^a Provincial Administration

95

Transvaal Provincial Administration

348

Total

3 936

a

Orange Free State

Mr Venter told Parliament in February 1992 that an amount of R525m was included in the additional appropriation under general affairs for assistance to the administrations of the non-independent homelands. Of this amount R268m was allocated to capital projects from the sale of assets, R70m to address socio-economic backlogs financed from the sale of strategic oil supplies, R35m for social assistance allowances, R81m for health services and the remaining R71m for various other se

In April 1992 the Part Appropriation Acts Abolition Bill was tabled in Parliament with the aim of

abolishing the mini-budget, which funded state spending between the end of the financial year and the passing of the main budget in Parliament.¹³⁴ [¹³⁴ toward (joint sitting) 7 col 3498, 2 April 1992] Mr Venter said that the bill was designed to cut costs and to bring about real savings. The mini-budget would be replaced by a statutory provision based on a financing formula that would allow for the allocation of funds from the treasury to tide the government over until the approval of the main budget. Mr Venter proposed that for the first four months of the new financial year, treasury funds equal to 45% of the previous year's budget be made available.¹³⁵ [¹³⁵ *Business Day* 25 February 1992] The bill was promulgated in June 1992.

The main budget

In January 1992 the president of the African National Congress (ANC), Mr Nelson Mandela, called for a sovereign interim government to determine South Africa's national budget and control its finances.¹³⁶ [¹³⁶ Ibid 9 January 1992] In the same month the minister of finance, Mr Barend du Plessis, rejected calls by the Democratic Party (DP) for the 1992/93 budget to be negotiated at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) and the multiparty economic forum (see below).¹³⁷ [¹³⁷ *The Star* 31 January 1992]

In his budget speech in March 1992 Mr du Plessis said that the 1992/93 budget would continue to seek to alleviate material deprivation while attempting to encourage growth. The theme of the 1991/92 budget, 'Equity through growth and stability' would, therefore, be continued in 1992/93. Nevertheless, Mr du Plessis emphasised that there were no 'quick-fix solutions' to socio-economic disparities. He added that it was clear that the new South Africa demanded greater realism from everyone, including those who in the past had most directly benefited from 'traditional budgets' and those who were to benefit increasingly in the future. Mr du Plessis said that this would involve on the one hand a 'different mix of financing' for public services with the emphasis on the recipient's own contribution according to the standard and type of service required, and on the other hand the acceptance that demands for public services had to comply with criteria for affordability.¹³⁸ [¹³⁸ Mr Barend du Plessis, budget speech, 18 March 1992]

The first print of the estimate of expenditure for 1992/93 amounted to R96,54bn. Furthermore, in 1991/92 a sum of R1,95bn was allocated to special capital expenditure to be financed from the sale of strategic oil and other supplies. Only R809m was spent in 1991/92, with a further R1,1bn to be utilised in 1992/93 and R41m in 1993/94. An additional R500m was to be made available in 1992/93 as development finance for housing and related infrastructure. In the 1992/93 financial year the contingency reserve was scrapped because, according to the *Budget Review*, state departments regarded it as an opportunity to obtain funds for expenditures that were not accommodated in the main appropriation. Instead, the *Budget Review* said, 'targeted reserves' would be created to accommodate, among others, the cost of the drought and the costs involved in the retrenchment of staff.¹³⁹ [¹³⁹

Department of Finance, *Budget Review* 18 March 1992_]

The budgeted allocations of expenditure for the 1991/92 and 1992/93 financial years are given below. At the time of writing no functional classification table had been published.¹⁴⁰ [¹⁴⁰ *Estimate of the Expenditure to be Defrayed from the State Revenue Account During the Financial Year Ending 31 March 1993*, First Print (RP2-1992)_]

The national budget

1991/92 R(000)

1992/93 R(000)

Increase (decrease)

Main appropriations

State president

16 183

21 319

32%

Parliament

71 246

86 583

22%

Foreign affairs

5 025 703

5 797 219

15%

Constitutional development service

14 887

41 211

177%

Water affairs and forestry

376 106

389 016

3%

Public enterprises and privatisation

5 833

7 541

29%

Justice

571 630

777 884

36%

Finance

14 209 204

17 304 658

22%

State expenditure

552 605

603 843

9%

Audit

500

2 410

382%

Administration: House of Assembly

8 430 906

9 067 549

8%

Administration: House of Delegates

1 378 957

1 635 715

19%

Administration: House of Representatives

3 750 788

4 709 600

26%

Correctional services

1 275 845

1 484 041

16%

Home affairs

281 435

288 744

3%

Education and training

3 368 229

4 555 967

35%

Mineral and energy affairs

896 092

687 157

(23%)

Agriculture

306 368

452 579

48%

National health and population development

634 230

1 169 993

84%

Police

4 645 957

5 645 143

22%

Regional and land affairs

17 495 498

20 985 264

20%

National education

299 658

283 878

(5%)

Environment affairs

168 982

207 012

23%

Commission for administration

46 522

53 536

15%

Improvement of conditions of service

3 340 032

2 283 080

(32%)

Transport

1 496 441

1 998 288

34%

Defence

9 187 096

9 704 549

6%

South African communication service

41 595

51 625

24%

Local government and national housing

732 722

979 556

34%

Public works

1 781 003

1 909 750

7%

Manpower

302 063

294 837

(2%)

Trade and industry

1 914 959

3 059 986

(6%)

Central economic advisory service

4 640

4 352

(6%)

Sub-total

82 623 915

96 543 885

17%

The national budget (continued)

1991/92 R(000)

1992/93 R(000)

Increase (decrease)

Standing appropriations from state revenue account

South African Development Trust

50 000

—

—

Sorghum beer research fund

1 200

—

—

Allocations from fuel

levy to Namibia

10 000

13 000

30%

and the 'independent' homelands

140 000

170 000

21%

Allocations from ordinary

levy to BLS^a and 'independent' homelands

6 000

3 500

(42%)

Sub-total

207 200

186 500

(10%)

Grand total

82 831 115

96 730 385

17%

a

Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland

According to the 1992 *Budget Review*, the unexpected length of the economic downswing had a negative impact on tax revenue for 1991/92. Furthermore, some revenue was expected to be forfeited with the implementation of value added tax at 10% rather than at 12% as initially calculated. Tax revenue in March 1992 was estimated to be R1,6bn less than originally budgeted. The revised expenditure level for 1991/92 was R86,4bn while revised revenue was R73,2bn. This resulted in a budget deficit of R13,2bn or 4,3% of GDP, compared with the originally budgeted figure of 3,4%. The budget deficit before borrowing as a proportion of GDP was 2,6% in 1990/91. The budget deficit for 1992/93 was estimated in March 1992 to be 4,5% of GDP (R15,9bn).¹⁴¹ [141 Department of Finance, *Budget Review IS* March 1992]

However, in August 1992 the director general of finance, Mr Gerhard Croeser, said that by the end of the 1992/93 financial year the deficit could be between R19bn and R21bn (or 5,5% of GDP).¹⁴² [142 *Business Day* 27 August 1992] Mr Croeser added that although he was not happy with the size of the deficit, it was acceptable during a downswing. The government could not cut back drastically on its expenditure as this would stop a large flow of funds into the economy which would depress it even further.¹⁴³ [143 *Ibid*] In September 1992, after the release of revenue and spending figures, economists revised their deficit and borrowing projections for the 1992/93 financial year to a deficit of between R22bn and R25bn (or more than 6% of GDP).¹⁴⁴ [144 *Ibid* 21 September 1992]

According to the special economic adviser to the minister of finance, Dr Japie Jacobs, the 1992/93 budget was an expansionary one. This was reflected in the increase in total government spending and the deficit before borrowing. Dr Jacobs said that the budget continued the process of dissaving, an aspect that needed to be redressed in future budgets if South

Alternative views on the budget

At a 'people's budget rally' held in Cape Town on the day of the presentation of the budget in Parliament, the ANC/Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu)/South African Communist Party alliance handed to Parliament a document listing the 'economic demands of the people'.¹⁴⁶ [146 *The Citizen* 19 March 1992]

The ANC said that the 1992/93 budgetary allocations to education, health and housing were 'broadly appropriate'.¹⁴⁷ [147 *Housing in South Africa* April 1992]

The ANC went on to say further that when it was in power and if the economic situation was favourable, the ANC would consider raising government revenue by 1% to 2% of GDP. According to the ANC, this could be achieved by the introduction of a capital gains tax, the rationalisation of current capital transfer

taxes and the amendment of excise duties. A deficit before borrowing of between 3% and 5% of GDP was feasible, the ANC said.¹⁴⁸ [¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*]

Prior to the announcement of the 1992/93 budget, the head of the ANC's department of economic planning, Mr Trevor Manuel, outlined the ANC's proposals for the budget, which included an increase in the allocation to housing to 3,5% of the budget and an increase in primary education expenditure from 47% to 60% of the education allocation, a decline in secondary education expenditure from 33% to 30% and a decline in tertiary education expenditure from 20% to 10%. Mr Manuel also proposed that the defence budget be cut from 4,3% of GDP to about 2%.¹⁴⁹ [¹⁴⁹ *Business Day* 16 March 1992]

Cosatu described the 1992/93 budget as 'mean and misleading'. A statement issued by Cosatu on behalf of the tripartite alliance called on the government to halt unilateral economic restructuring, stop support for major capital projects until these had been discussed with the labour movement and to negotiate an effective poverty relief programme. The statement added that the budget would do little for social and economic progress.¹⁵⁰ [¹⁵⁰ *New Nation* 20 March 1992]

The DP spokesman on finance, Mr Ken Andrew, characterised the 1992/93 budget as a 'bad news' budget. He said that the government was living beyond its means and that it had lost effective control of state expenditure.¹⁵¹ [¹⁵¹ *Business Day* 19 March 1992] Furthermore, the budget was 'disappointing' because there were no specific targets and time-scales to eliminate education, health and housing backlogs. Mr Andrew said that the DP would prefer to eliminate own affairs quadruplication, introduce a state lottery, hold down defence spending and cut the size of the public service. According to Mr Andrew, this would produce additional revenue of up to R3bn.¹⁵² [¹⁵² *Hansard* 6 (joint sitting) col 2893, 25 March 1992]

The president of the Inkatha Freedom Party and chief minister of KwaZulu, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, criticised the budget as 'not visionary enough' in addressing black/white disparities in wealth. However, he welcomed the additional expenditure on education, health and housing. He said that although whites were the main contributors to the treasury, they received only 27 cents of every rand back in terms of social benefits. Chief Buthelezi said that Mr du Plessis could not increase 'dramatically' the taxation burden of the 'haves'.¹⁵³ [¹⁵³ *The Star* 19 March 1992]

A member of the economics committee of the Pan-Africanist Congress, Mr Molefe Mafole, said that the budget would fail to improve the quality of life of blacks in particular. He criticised the government's decision to allocate R1bn in drought aid to farmers while failing to address the allocation of land for farming and housing to those from whom land had been taken.¹⁵⁴ [¹⁵⁴ *Business Day* 20 March 1992]

The managing director of the Small Business Development Corporation, Dr Ben Vosloo, said in March

1992 that the budget ignored the needs of the small- and medium-enterprise sector which provided the bulk of the country's tax revenue. Dr Vosloo believed that the greater the government's investment in this sector, the greater the return in productivity, employment, income and tax receipts.¹⁵⁵ [¹⁵⁵ *The Star* 27 March 1992]

Commenting on the 1992/93 budget, the chief economist of Sanlam, Mr Johan Louw, said that the fiscal injection gained by the economy from the budget was 'medicine' for it, but that an immediate significant improvement in general economic activity would not be forthcoming.¹⁵⁶ [¹⁵⁶ *Ibid* 24 March 1992]

Subsidiary budgets

The main budget provided funds for the own affairs administrations and for all ten homelands. The votes in the 1992/93 main budget for the three own affairs houses were as follows:¹⁵⁷ [¹⁵⁷ Administration: House of Assembly, *Estimate of Revenue and Estimate of Expenditure for the Financial Year Ending 31 March 1993*, RP6-1992; Administration: House of Delegates, *Estimate of Revenue and Estimate of Expenditure for the Financial Year Ending 31 March 1993*, RP12-1992; Administration: House of Representatives, *Estimate of Revenue and Estimate of Expenditure for the Financial Year Ending 31 March 1993*, RP9-1992]

House of Assembly budget^a

1991/92 R(000)

1992/93 R(000)

Increase (decrease)

Chairman of the ministers' council

3 196

3 656

14%

Agricultural development

673 948

629 780

(7%)

Education and culture

5 846 413

6 504 404

11%

Local government, housing and works

378 026

466 895

24%

Budgetary and auxiliary service

50 458

46 693

(7%)

Improvement of condition of service

434 799

292 448

(33%)

Welfare

1 221 558

1 227 928

1%

Health services

512 007

644 137

26%

Total^b

9 120 405

9 815 941

8%

a

Figures for 1991/92 are revised estimates while those for 1992/93 are initial estimates.

b

According to the supplementary estimates of expenditure for the financial year ending 31 March 1993, which were published in June 1992, agricultural development would require an additional R700m, welfare a further R17m and health services a further R22m. This would bring total estimated expenditure to R10,5m, and represent an increase of 7% over the main estimate

House of Delegates budget^a

1991/92 R(000)

1992/93 R(000)

Increase (decrease)

Budgetary and auxiliary services

26 700

32 319

21%

Local government, housing and agriculture

169 710

217 087

28%

Education and culture

893 799

1 045 616

17%

Health services and welfare

293 448

345 953

18%

Improvement of condition of service

75 258

47 790

(36%)

Total^b

1 458 915

1 688 755

16%

a

Figures for 1991/92 are revised estimates while those for 1992/93 are initial estimates.

b

In all the 1992/93 supplementary estimates, health services and welfare were allocated a further R23m, taking total estimated expenditure to R1,7bn.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁹ [159 Administration: House of Delegates *Revised Estimate of Revenue and Supplementary Estimate of Expenditure for the Financial Year Ending 31 March 1993*, RP13-1992]

House of Representatives budget^a

1991/92 R(000)

1992/93 R(000)

Increase (decrease)

Education and culture

2 122 243

2 591 864

22%

Local government, housing and agriculture

380 692

526 319

38%

Health services and welfare

1 183 304

1 497 413

27%

Budgetary and auxiliary services

94 149

128 004

36%

Improvement of condition of service

211 160

137 254

(35%)

Total^b

3 991 548

4 880 854

22%

a

Figures for 1991/92 are revised estimates while those for 1992/93 are initial estimates.

b

In the 1992/93 supplementary estimates of expenditure, health services and welfare were allocated R144m, bringing total estimated expenditure to R5bn.¹⁶⁰

¹⁶⁰ [Administration: House of Representatives, *Revised Estimate of Revenue and Supplementary Estimate of Expenditure, RPIO-1992*]

The revised estimate of expenditure for the ten homelands amounted to R15,65bn in 1990/91. The ten homelands budgeted for total expenditure of R18,92bn in 1991/92, an increase of 21% on expenditure in 1990/91. Homeland spending is financed partly from internally generated revenue and partly by the central government. At the time of writing, the homeland budgets for 1992/93 were not all available. The table below compares the homeland budgets of 1990/

Homeland budgets

1990/91

1991/92

R

R

Increase

Bophuthatswana

3 319 003 737

3 329 344 900

0,3%

Ciskei

1 578 616 000

2 016 000 000

28%

Gazankulu

752 874 000

1 008 000 000

34%

KaNgwane

536 836 781

540 125 021

0,6%

KwaNdebele

353 549 000

421 178 000

19%

KwaZulu

2 819 496 900

3 611 188 000

28%

Lebowa

1 515 278 000

2 335 682 990

54%

QwaQwa

460 985 000

550 690 000

19%

Transkei

3 271 738 000

3 953 223 000

21%

Venda

1 043 304 135

1 158 503 300

11%

Total

15 651 681 553

18 923 935 211

21%

Revenue allocated to the various subsidiary legislatures from the national budget for 1991/92 was as follows:

Grants from central government to various legislatures: 1991/92^a

R

House of Assembly

9 120 405 000

House of Delegates

1 458 915 000

House of Representatives

3 991 548 000

Bophuthatswana

724 000 000

Ciskei

697 000 000

Gazankulu

770 155 000

KaNgwane

422 672 000

KwaNdebele

315 292 000

KwaZulu

2 660 803 000

Lebowa

1 542 880 000

QwaQwa

286 857 000

Transkei

1 368 100 000

Venda

514 884 000

Total

23 873 511 000

a

These figures do not include all transfer payments from the central government to the homeland legislatures. Some of these payments are included in the figures quoted for 'internal revenue' unde

The budget and social equity

A report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) entitled *Economic Policies for a New South Africa*, published in January 1992, highlighted the importance that social spending allocations would have in budgetary policy in the future. The section on social spending policy and the budget concluded that social spending in South Africa had risen to levels that were 'relatively high by international standards'. Therefore, it said, there was limited scope for addressing social problems through raising the share of social spending in the budget. The report suggested a basic re-ordering of priorities within the present social spending budget in order to address social problems adequately without resorting to deficit financing or increased fiscal revenues.¹⁶² [¹⁶² International Monetary Fund (IMF), *Economic Policies for a New South Africa*, January 1992]

The IMF report also attempted to quanta the implications of moving toward equal rates of spending per capita across racial groups in the education, health and welfare sectors while maintaining overall fiscal discipline. It concluded that such a move would entail only limited increases in expenditure on Africans and a substantial decline in expenditure on whites. The report added that redistribution policies alone would not ensure an overall improvement in living standards but would have to be supported by policies aimed at stimulating economic growth.¹⁶³ [¹⁶³ Ibid]

Figures quoted by the IMF in its report indicated that compared to other upper-middle income countries

South Africa allocated more funds to education and health both as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) and as a proportion of the total budget in 1982 and 1987 (the latest year for which comparative figures were available) but lagged behind in spending on social security, welfare and social programmes. Defence expenditure exceeded that of other upper-middle income countries. The table below compares socio-economic and defence spending in South Africa with that of other upper-middle income countries:¹⁶⁴ [164 Ibid]

South Africa and comparative countries: social and defence expenditure in 1982 and 1987

Proportion of GDP

Proportion of budget

South Africa

Other^a

South Africa

Other^a

1982

1987

1982

1987

1982

1987

1982

1987

Education

5,2%

6,3%

3,8%

4,2%

17,7%

18,3%

11,2%

14,1%

Health

2,9%

3,3%

2,5%

2,6%

9,8%

9,8%

6,8%

7,6%

Housing

0,2%

0,8%

0,7%

0,2%

0,7%

1,0%

2,2%

1,0%

Social security and welfare

1,8%

2,1%

7,8%

8,7%

6,2%

6,0%

20,0%

23,0%

Social programmes^b

11,4%

13,9%

12,8%

15,7%

38,7%

39,0%

40,3%

45,7%

Defence

4,2%

4,3%

2,8%

2,3%

14,2%

13,1%

8,7%

8,6%

Total expenditure

29,4%

34,6%

36,9%

34,2%

100,0%

100,0%

100,0%

100,0%

a

Upper-middle income countries include Brazil, Hungary, South Korea, Uruguay and Venezuela

b

Includes social spending, as well as community service and recreation and culture (in South Afri

Expenditure in the 1992/93 budget has not been functionally classified, but the budget speech and the *Budget Review*, published in March 1992, suggest the following breakdown of expenditure on social services: education, R19bn; health, R9,9bn; housing and infrastructure, R2,2bn; and welfare and pensions, R1,7bn.

The deputy minister of finance, Dr Theo Alant, said in August 1992 that the government's reallocation of spending should not be confined to a transfer from economic to socio-economic services but should involve a reshuffle within particular services, for example expenditure in education would have to emphasise job-related training and primary education while health services would need to concentrate more on preventive medicine and primary health care.¹⁶⁵ [¹⁶⁵ *Business Day* 3 August 1992]

An associate professor of political studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, Professor Tom Lodge, said in August 1992 that whatever economic policy a new government in South Africa embraced, it would struggle to find additional revenue to finance social spending as taxes could not be increased any further. He said that savings from reduced defence expenditure and the elimination of duplicate government departments would not amount to very much. Professor Lodge calculated that the total savings from rationalising government into a unified civil service would be about R3bn. Furthermore, he said, the implementation of affirmative action in the civil service while retaining white employees (both actions being 'fair and expedient') pointed to an increase in the number of civil servants in the future.¹⁶⁶ [¹⁶⁶ *Sowetan* 28 August 1992]

Homeland financing

According to their own estimates of revenue, the homelands were to derive the following amounts from their own revenue, loans and the central government in the 1991/92 financial year:¹⁶⁷ [¹⁶⁷ Various homeland estimates of expenditure and revenue for 1991/92]

Estimated sources of homeland revenue: 1991/92

Surplus (deficit)^a

From central government ^b

From loans ^c

R

R

R

Bophuthatswana

53 351 000

724 000 000

199 644 000

Ciskei

—

697 000 000^d

42 000 000

Gazankulu

39 545 000

770 155 000

8 026 500

KaNgwane

(5 855 912)

422 672 000

35 054 000

KwaNdebele

181 000

315 292 000

40 705 000

KwaZulu

66 338 100

2 660 803 000

97 144 900

Lebowa

2 819 712

1 542 880 000

—

QwaQwa

30 000 000

286 857 000

20 000 000

Transkei

N/A

1 368 100 000

—
Venda

(39 300 000)

514 884 000

53 186 800

Total

147 078 900

9 302 643 000

4

Estimated sources of homeland revenue: 1991/92 (continued)

From internal revenue

Total revenue

R

R

Bophuthatswana

2 352 350 000^e

3 329 345 000

Ciskei

1 277 000 000^f

2 016 000 000

Gazankulu

190 273 500

1 088 000 000

KaNgwane

101 766 500

553 636 588

KwaNdebele

65 000 000

421 178 000

KwaZulu

786 902 000

3 611 188 000

Lebowa

400 000 000

1 945 699 712

QwaQwa

228 500 000

565 357 000

Transkei

1 524 414 000

2 892 514 000

Venda

299 884 600

828 655 400 g

Total

7 226 090 600

17 171 573 700

a

Surplus or deficit from 1990/91 financial year

b

The homelands generally include under the category of internal revenue various transfer payments from the central government, so that figures in the column showing revenue from the central government do not in most cases reflect the full amount provided. For example, Bophuthatswana's internal revenue figure includes R814m from customs and excise payments and R15m from monetary agreements, both from the central government (or 35% of internal revenue). The Ciskei's figure includes R267m from customs and excise duties, R9m from monetary agreements, R65m in terms of an agreement on development co-operation with the central government and R31m from industrial incentives. This amounts to 29% of internal revenue. The Transkei's internal revenue figure includes R502m from customs and excise, R20m from compensation payments for industrial incentives and R34m from compensatory payments for the circulation of the rand currency. This comprises 36% of all internal revenue. Venda's internal revenue includes R104m from customs and excise and R5m from monetary agreements with the central government. This makes up 36% of revenue from own resources. Similarly, the non-independent homelands' internal revenue figures include income taxes transferred to them from the central government and general sales tax as an estimate of tax collected from their citizens working outside the homelands: Gazankulu, R149m (78% of total internal revenue); KaNgwane, R72m (71%); KwaNdebele, R29m (45%); KwaZulu, R611m (78%); Lebowa, R326m (82%); and QwaQwa, R200m (88%)

c

Many of these loans are from the Development Bank of Southern Africa.

d

Includes R37m from Fort Hare University

e

Includes R46m from the sale of assets

f

Includes R581m classified as 'financial adjustments' in its estimate of revenue

g

Venda anticipated a deficit of R329 847 900 as at 1 April 1992.

The Department of Development Aid and the South African Development Trust (SADT) were abolished in April 1992 as part of the process of government rationalisation and the disbanding of racially defined departments. The Department of Regional and Land Affairs was constituted to replace them, with the objective of developing 'all communities' and including functions related to physical planning, urbanisation and provincial and regional matters.¹⁶⁸ [¹⁶⁸ *The Citizen* 31 March 1992, *Business Day* 1 April 1992] The new department was also to be the main channel of funding of the non-independent homelands, while the Department of Foreign Affairs would continue to channel central government funds to the four 'independent' homelands.

In 1991/92 a total amount of R16m of SADT funds was spent on projects in the 'independent' homelands.¹⁶⁹ [¹⁶⁹ *Hansard* (A) 6 q cols 513-514, 24 March 1992] Other expenditure incurred by the SADT in 1991/92 included R8m for land consolidation, R207m for urbanisation, R52m for job creation and income generation, and R119m for the rendering of social services.¹⁷⁰ [¹⁷⁰ Department of Development Aid, annual report 1 January 1991 - 31 December 1991]

In 1992/93 the Department of Regional and Land Affairs allocated R937 000 to promote the development of the non-independent homelands 'by means of ethnological and sociological principles' and R8,4bn as assistance to these homelands. The assistance provided by the central government to the administrations of the non-independent homelands in 1992/93 was as follows:¹⁷¹ [¹⁷¹ *Estimate of the Expenditure to be Defrayed from the State Revenue Account During the Financial Year Ending 31 March 1993*, First Print, RP2-1992]

Budgetary assistance to non-independent homelands:^a 1991/92–1992/93

1991/92

1992/93

R

R

Gazankulu

799 347 000

972 949 000

KaNdwane

427 921 000

553 373 000

KwaNdebele

343 887 000

436 751 000

KwaZulu

2 870 138 000

3 796 988 000

Lebowa

1 650 159 000

2 262 192 000

QwaQwa

324 992 000

370 860 000

Development assistance and project aid

11 317 000

9 729 000

Total

6 427 761 000

8 402 842 000

a

This comprises development assistance, grants-in-aid for financing selected projects, manpower assistance, grants not forming a direct charge on the state revenue fund and statutory grants. Of the amount allocated in 1992/93, R3,88bn was allocated to education and R988m was allocated to health in the non-independent homelands.¹⁷²

172 [¹⁷² Ibid]

The Department of Foreign Affairs allocated 85% (R4,93bn) of its total budget in 1992/93 to financing the four 'independent' homelands, compared with a revised estimate of R4,40bn (88%) in 1991/92. The 1992/93 budget allocated R4,10bn for budgetary aid, R15m for project aid, R90m for technical and other assistance (including industrial incentive schemes and job-creation programmes), R643m for tax compensation and R2,9m for the salaries and allowances of seconded judges. In 1992/93 the Department of Finance allocated R142m in foreign transfer payments to Lesotho, Namibia and the 'independent' homelands. An amount of R1,5m was set aside in the state expenditure vote for the co-ordination of financial relations with the 'independent' homelands. In the audit vote, R5,3m was provided for auditing the finances of the non-independent

The following departments allocated funds to the non-independent homelands in 1992/93 for manpower assistance: Agriculture, R11,1m; Commission for Administration, R365 000; Correctional Services, R953 000; Education and Training, R86,1m; Finance, R809 000; Justice, R7,1m; Police, R4,9m; State

Expenditure, R3,2m; Trade and Industry, R90 000; and Water Affairs and Forestry, R 1,1m.

From the figures given above it is estimated that a total amount of R13,6bn (or 14% of the budget) was allocated to the ten homelands in 1992/93.

In February 1992 the minister of foreign affairs, Mr Roelof (Pik) Botha, said in Parliament that in the 1990/91 financial year the government gave guarantees in respect of overdraft facilities to the Ciskei and to Venda to the value of R262m and R200m respectively. No guarantees were given in that period to Bophuthatswana and the Transkei.¹⁷³ [¹⁷³ *Hansard* (A) 4 q cols 309-311, 26 February 1992; cols 347-348, 28 February 1992]

The following table summarises amounts allocated to the 'independent' homelands by various central government departments in the 1991/92 financial year: ¹⁷⁴ [¹⁷⁴ *Hansard* (A) 18 q cols 1139-1144, 25 May 1992]

Estimated payments to 'independent' homelands: 1991/92

Bophuthatswana

Ciskei

Transkei

Venda

Direct financial assistance

Budgetary aid

878 572 200

708 431 700

1 547 370 400

554 337 700

Incentives for industries

23 044 857

28 371 959

18 915 746

6 078 905

Non-recoverable financial assistance

—

201 308

—

337 301

Transfer payments

Tax compensation

116 324 000

64 886 000

307 916 000

20 210 000

Customs union

868 411 000

265 989 000

555 591 000

134 118 000

Common monetary area

17 418 267

9 869 600

36 402 600

5 351 667

Loans (project aid)

33 841 977

9 323 272

8 717 721

1 753 381

Technical and other assistance

Manpower provision

17 631 367

22 998 000

7 602 811

19 081 000

Technical assistance

4 724 325

3 715 448

5 117 930

2 083 820

Salaries of judges

504 280

790 000

790 000

398 000

Total

1 960 472 273

1 114 576 287

2 488 424 308

743 749 774

The Additional Appropriation Bill of 1992 allocated R418m for assistance to the administrations of the non-independent homelands. The SADT received grants-in-aid to the value of R114m in the same bill.¹⁷⁵ [¹⁷⁵ Additional Appropriation Bill, B68-92(GA)]

According to the minister of regional and land affairs, Mr Jacob de Villiers, R283m of the R1bn available from the sale of strategic reserves for capital projects in 1991/92 was made available to the nonindependent homelands. He said, however, that only R6,4m was spent during the 1991/92 fina

The following tables give a detailed breakdown of the budgets of the non-independent homelands in 1991/92:¹⁷⁷ [¹⁷⁷ Various homeland estimates of expenditure for 1990/91 and 1991^92]

Non-independent homeland budget: 1991/92

Gazankulu

KaNgwane

KwaNdebele

R

R

R

Chief minister (and economic affairs)

64 342 000

43 020 787

49 760 000

Interior

51 000 000

8 461 097

9 170 000

Works

139 057 000

60 217 923

109 859 000^a

Education (and culture)

375 000 000

191 743 513

126 414 000

Agriculture (and forestry)

48 000 000

34 344 887

22 692 000^b

Justice

11 280 000

6 312 884

6 270 000

Health (and welfare)

225 050 000

134 407 740

52 302 000

Finance

59 034 000

13 552 806

9 236 000

Law and order

35 237 000

28 911 486

31 500 000

Citizen liaison and information

—

—

3 975 000

Land matters and local government

—

19 151 898

—

Total

1 008 000 000

540 125 021

421 178 000

a

Includes water affairs

b

Includes environmental affairs

Non-independent homeland budget: 1991/92 (continued)

KwaZulu

Lebowa

QwaQwa

R

R

R

Chief minister (and economic affairs)

182 141 000

62 461 021

10 260 000

Interior

24 590 000

36 751 000

49 070 000

Works

585 014 000

120 110 000

175 845 000

Education (and culture)

1 114 731 000

1 037 685 056

149 640 000

Agriculture (and forestry)

94 621 000

185 074 492^b

19 875 000

Justice

24 386 000

29 110 477

3 990 000

Health and welfare

1 271 000 000

554 401 635

52 290 000

Finance

196 076 000

190 745 970

64 290 000

Law and order

118 629 000^a

119 343 339

25 030 000

Ombudsman

—

400 000

Total

3 611 188 000

2 335 682 990

550 690 000

a

Includes prisons

b

Include

The budget of the 'independent' homelands for 1990/91 and 1991/92 are as follow:¹⁷⁸ [178
Bophuthatswana, *Estimate of the Expenditure to be Defrayed from the Revenue Account During the Year Ending 31 March 1992*-, Ciskei, *Estimate of Expenditure to be Defrayed from the Ciskei Revenue Fund During the Year Ending 31 March 1992*, Transkei, *Estimate of Expenditure to be Defrayed from the Transkei Revenue Fund During the Year Ending 31 March 1992*, and Venda, *Estimate of Expenditure to be Defrayed from the Revenue Fund of the Venda Government During the Financial Year Ending March 31,1992*]

Bophuthatswana budget: 1990/91 and 1991/92

1990/91

1991/92

Increase

R

R

(decrease)

President

77 411 896

82 004 144

6%

National assembly

3 452 091

3 805 115

10%

Auditor general

3 446 265

4 968 700

44%

Public service commission

6 129 825

6 457 900

5%

Defence

146 776 652

132 446 300

(10%)

Economic, energy affairs, mines and planning

88 164 365

90 582 644

3%

Finance

253 731 116

222 558 544

(12%)

Education

605 418 710

611 687 960

1%

Foreign affairs

19 679 174

19 554 644

(1%)

Transport

101 273 500

109 407 100

8%

Public works

473 426 282

457 140 260

(3%)

Post and telecommunications

171 600 908

159 928 144

(7%)

Agriculture and natural resources

190 826 542

213 445 052

12%

Local government and housing

147 752 700

151 593 600

3%

Internal affairs

210 650 117

210 218 544

(0,2%)

Justice

22 898 439

15 797 744

(31%)

Police

206 233 076

204 945 708

(1%)

Prisons

29 579 933

30 782 500

4%

Health and social services

226 543 990

233 943 852

3%

Manpower

38 153 365

38 886 944

2%

State affairs and civil aviation

33 692 108

29 607 944

(12%)

Public service and training

—

3 194 900

—

Water affairs

127 554 020

178 318 344

40%

Population development

12 256 242

15 190 952

24%

Governors

6 282 513

7 364 400

17%

Information

4 687 790

5 557 044

19%

Statutory amounts

111 382 128

89 955 917

(19%)

Total

3 319

Ciskei budget: 1990/91 and 1991/92

1990/91

1991/92

Increase

R

R

(decrease)

Council of state

22 540 000

14 454 000

(36%)

Defence force

52 312 000

75 163 000

44%

Auditor general

2 128 000

3 238 000

52%

Education and culture

249 113 000

378 780 000

52%

Agriculture, forestry and rural development

75 924 000

67 498 000

(11%)

Justice and constitutional development

84 194 000

15 733 000

(81%)

Health, welfare and population development

158 863 000

402 127 000

153%

Finance and economic development

162 695 000

287 876 000

77%

Internal affairs and land tenure

16 979 000

17 972 000

6%

Manpower utilisation

7 190 000

8 055 000

12%

Transportation and aviation

32 055 000

33 490 000

4%

Public works

244 362 000

193 817 000

(21%)

Foreign affairs

10 968 000

12 007 000

9%

Post and telecommunications

52 449 000

33 931 000

(35%)

Police^a

—

85 950 000

—

Prisons^a

—

23 377 000

—

Traffic^a

—

3 286 000

—

Commission for administration

—

7 037 000

—

Votes not repeated^b

118 798 000

—

—

Statutory amount

253 046 000

315 209 000

25%

University of Fort Hare

35 000 000

37 000 000

6%

Total

1 578 616 000

2 016 000 000

28%

a

In 1990/91 the justice vote included police, prisons and traffic.

b

This included allocations in 1990/91 of R103m to social welfare and pensions, R11,4m to tourism and aviation and R4,3m to youth affairs, sports and recreation

Transkei budget: 1990/91 and 1991/92

1990/91

1991/92

Increase

R

R

(decrease)

Military council

41 697 000

38 689 000

(7%)

Agriculture and forestry

212 732 000

168 322 000

(21%)

Auditor general

6 565 000

8 705 000

33%

De

Transkei budget: 1990/91 and 1991/92 (continued)

1990/91

1991/92

Increase

R

R

(decrease)

Education

832 132 000

878 713 000

6%

Finance

471 460 000

777 914 000

65%

Foreign affairs and information

10 284 000

13 163 000

28%

Health

307 944 000

380 816 000

24%

Interior

12 913 000

13 613 000

5%

Justice

33 131 000

40 750 000

23%

Local government and land tenure

17 807 000

17 334 000

(3%)

Commerce, industry and tourism

86 112 000

51 311 000

(40%)

Police

100 698 000

127 951 000

27%

Post and telecommunications

65 456 000

72 171 000

10%

Prisons

50 919 000

65 814 000

29%

Public service commission

4 831 000

6 255 000

29%

Transport

91 324 000

85 525 000

(6%)

Works and energy

272 104 000

246 256 000

(9%)

Welfare and pensions

519 417 000

840 182 000

62%

Manpower planning and utilisation

43 132 000

27 963 000

(35%)

Total

3 271 738 000

3 953 223 000

21%

Venda budget: 1991/92^a

R

Office of chairman for national unity

10 058 000

Improvement of conditions of service

1 000

Works

202 902 931

Education and culture

300 146 523

Agriculture and forestry

64 179 723

Justice

6 831 000

Health and welfare

201 505 331

Finance and economic affairs

204 700 000

Foreign affairs and information

4 384 523

Land tenure and local government

15 670 523

Law and order

57 180 925

Commissio

Venda budget: 1991/92^a (continued)

R

Auditor general

2 564 000

Post and telecommunications

24 257 523

Internal affairs and manpower

6 291 440

Defence force

42 961 126

Prisons

8 576 000

Statutory amounts

837 732

Total

1 158 503 000

a

Figure for 1990/91 are not given as budgetary votes for 1990/91 and 1991/92 are not compa

Comments on homeland financing

The South African government announced in January 1992 that it was negotiating agreements with the administrations of the 'independent' homelands to bring their public spending under strict joint control prior to their possible reincorporation into 'South Africa'. The agreements were expected to introduce a degree of fiscal uniformity between the central government and the 'independent' homelands. According to the Department of Foreign Affairs, negotiations were being conducted with Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda to draw up structural adjustment agreements similar to that signed between the central government and the Transkei in September 1991 (see *1991/92 Survey* p436). The agreement with the Transkei was based on the acceptance of the 'need to consult on macro- and sectoral-economic policies, institutional arrangements and fiscal management'. Such agreements would, therefore, stress the development needs of the broader regions rather than of the individual homelands. The 'independent' homelands' budgets would also be placed partly under the control of the central government's departments of Finance and Foreign Affairs.¹⁷⁹ [¹⁷⁹ *Business Day* 23 January 1992]

The Democratic Party spokesman on the homelands, Mr Peter Soal, said in August 1992 that South African taxpayers contributed nearly R14bn in grants to the ten homelands in 1992/93, much of which was spent on salaries and fringe benefits for expanding bureaucracies. According to Mr Soal, the homelands received the following grants in 1992/93: Bophuthatswana, R1,86bn; Ciskei, R1,11bn; Gazankulu, R929m; KaNgwane, R528m; KwaNdebele, R387m; KwaZulu, R3,15bn; Lebowa, R1,91bn; QwaQwa, R355m; Transkei, R2,49bn and Venda, R744m. He believed that reincorporation would meet with resistance from vested interests in the bureaucracies in the homelands.¹⁸⁰ [¹⁸⁰ *Ibid* 1 September 1992]

Working group 4 of Codesa was assigned the task of tackling the issue of the reincorporation of the 'independent' homelands (see also chapter on *Constitutional Change*). A subgroup of the committee was assigned the task of studying the implication of reincorporation for contracts, loans and bilateral and multilateral agreements between the 'independent' homelands and the central government and foreign anies. Also under discussion were tax agreements and customs union accords with the central government.¹⁸¹ [¹⁸¹ *The Star* 19 February 1992]

In February 1992 the Ciskei signed an economic treaty with the central government, which effectively surrendered control of the homeland's finances to the government. However, the minister of finance of

the Ciskei, Mr Andries Pretorius, resigned in April because budgetary restraints were being ignored by the Ciskei leadership.¹⁸² [¹⁸² *The Weekly Mail* 24 April 1992] In May the Ciskei was given a R706m mini-budget by the central government which was to fund its administration until September, by which time it had to get its 'financial house in order'.¹⁸³ [¹⁸³ *Business Day* 26 May 1992]

Controversy arose in March 1992 when the Military Council of Venda decided without consulting its contributors to privatise the civil service pension scheme and to invest all monies in four insurance companies. The South African Democratic Teachers' Union (Sadtu) called a meeting of teachers in March 1992, which resolved that because, in its opinion, the Military Council could not be trusted, it would call on the Venda authorities to pay out all pension funds of Venda teachers by the end of April. A spokesman for the Venda administration said, however, that the decision to privatise pensions was to safeguard the fund. Civil servants would have the right to choose which institutions their money should be invested in.¹⁸⁴ [¹⁸⁴ *Sowetan* 23 March 1992] In August 1992 civil servants in Venda called for a moratorium on the privatisation of the pension fund because, they alleged, the method used to calculate benefits was designed to favour the leadership of the homeland.¹⁸⁵ [¹⁸⁵ *Ibid* 11 August 1992] A planned three-day strike at the end of August 1992 by civil servants in Venda was called off after a delegation consisting of representatives of five trade unions in the homeland agreed with the administration that a commission of inquiry be established to investigate all discrepancies existing in the civil service.¹⁸⁶ [¹⁸⁶ *Ibid* 26 August 1992] Furthermore, the homeland's military ruler, Brigadier Gabriel Ramushwana, agreed to recall all transferred money until the allegation of fraud was resolved.¹⁸⁷ [¹⁸⁷ *Ibid* 1 September 1992]

The minister of finance of Bophuthatswana, Mr Martin van den Berg, criticised the homeland administration in May 1992 for replacing original budget estimates with much higher revised estimates and warned that all bodies receiving funds from the administration would have to 'tighten their belts'. Mr van den Berg said that the added expenditure from revised departmental budgets had reduced the expected income from government stocks by R10 for the 1991/92 financial year.¹⁸⁸ [¹⁸⁸ *Business Day* 6 May 1992]

The Department of Finance announced in September 1992 that the central government and the 'independent' homelands were negotiating with South African banks to avert a major debt crisis arising from about R4bn of short-term debt incurred by the homelands falling due. It was estimated that the total debt of the 'independent' homelands amounted to about R8bn, of which 50% was in the form of overdraft facilities with commercial banks. The balance was believed to be owed to the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA).

As the debts of the homelands were guaranteed by the central government, it was ultimately responsible for them. However, the Department of Finance said in September 1992 that there was no possibility 'whatsoever' of the government taking over these debts. Nedbank estimated in September 1992 that the

'independent' homelands would add 10% to 12% to central government spending if they were incorporated into South Africa. According to Nedbank, the economies of the Ciskei and Venda in particular (where the spending of their administrations comprised 99% and 113% respectively of their GDP) consisted almost entirely of government-related activity.¹⁸⁹ [¹⁸⁹ Ibid 15 September 1992]

Development Bank of Southern Africa

In 1991 loans by the DBSA to support social and economic upliftment were reduced by about 25% because, according to its 1991/92 annual report, underdeveloped communities did not have the skills and structures to handle the funds allocated. However, a development official of the African National Congress, Mr Shaheed Raji, said that the bank's problem was that it was continuing to support 'illegitimate homeland governments and local authorities, while many communities in the rest of the country are crying out for funds'. The vice president of the DBSA, Professor Wiseman Nkuhlu, said that the bank was bound by its articles of establishment to provide funds only through homelands and local government bodies.¹⁹⁰ [¹⁹⁰ Ibid 15 July 1992]

The chief executive of the DBSA, Mr Andr e Grange, said in September 1992 that political uncertainty was making it increasingly difficult for project identification and allocation of funding. Although the future of the bank was unclear, Mr le Grange said that he expected the DBSA to continue to exist in 'some form or another', as development would be a high priority under a new government. The skills and capacity that the DBSA had would be vital for attending to these problems.¹⁹¹ [¹⁹¹ *The Citizen* 15 September 1992]

Taxation

In a submission in January 1992 to the minister of finance, Mr Barend du Plessis, the South African Chamber of Business (Sacob) proposed a reduction in the rates of company income tax and individual income tax as the most effective incentive for investment. Sacob pointed out that there was no allowance in these taxes for the effect of inflation on profits and individual incomes.¹⁹² [¹⁹² *The Star* 21 January 1992]

The *Budget Review*, which was published in March 1992, stated that from an international perspective the overall tax burden in South Africa appeared to be 'relatively high'. Furthermore, the tax burden in South Africa seemed to be increasing, unlike the trend in both low- and middle-income developing countries. The review said that the question of reducing the direct tax burden on the individual was on the fiscal agenda.¹⁹³ [¹⁹³ Department of Finance, *Budget Review IS* March 1992]

Mr du Plessis said in his budget speech in March 1992 that in view of the limited funds available tax relief would be targeted at those who had been most exposed to fiscal drag. He added that as part of the

long-term tax reform programme, a move was being made towards a simpler tax rate structure with fewer and wider income bands.¹⁹⁴ [¹⁹⁴ Mr Barend du Plessis, budget speech, 18 March 1992]

It was estimated that total tax revenue as a proportion of GDP in 1992/93 would be 24%, which was slightly higher than the revised estimate for 1991/92 of 23,9%. Net revenue from individual income tax for 1992/93 was expected to grow by 28% (to R35,64bn). According to the *Budget Review*, total direct taxation as a proportion of GDP was estimated at 13,9% in 1991/92 and 14,1% in 1992/93. The ratio of total indirect taxation to GDP has shown a falling trend since 1989/90, when it was 11,2%, to 9,4% in 1991/92 and 9,5% in 1992/93. The contribution of companies has fallen sharply from 34,8% in 1977/78 to 17,4% in 199/3. In 1977/78 mining companies contributed 10,8% of taxes while their contribution had dropped to 1,6% in 1992/93. However, the contribution of individuals increased from 26,8% in 1977/78 to 40,3% in 1992/93.¹⁹⁵ [¹⁹⁵ Department of Finance, *Budget Review* 18 March 1992]

A report by the International Monetary Fund, entitled *Economic Policies for a New South Africa*, published in January 1992, stated that the share of taxes paid by whites was estimated to have declined from 77% of total taxes paid by individuals in 1975 to 72% in 1987. This was coupled with a ‘dramatic reduction in the share of total social benefits received by whites’, from 56% of the total in 1975 to 35% in 1987. The report said that taking into account both income and corporate taxes, South Africa’s tax rates were not low even by the standards of industrialised countries. The report recommended that state revenue should be increased by improving the efficiency and equity of the tax system, reducing tax expenditure, broadening the tax base and changing the ratio of direct and indirect taxes.¹⁹⁶ [¹⁹⁶ IMF, *Economic Policies for a New South Africa*, January 1992]

A partner in the tax firm Divaris Stein, Mr Michael Stein, said in July 1992 that special tax concessions and tax allowances should be cut as a prelude to ‘deep cuts’ in both corporate and personal income tax rates. Reduced corporate taxes were essential to attract new fixed investment, he said. Mr Stein added that the current rate of corporate tax was being shouldered mainly by smaller companies without access to various complex concessions.¹⁹⁷ [¹⁹⁷ *The Star* 12 July 1992] An adviser to the ANC on tax. Professor Dennis Davis, said in the same month that the ANC was not committed to a capital gains tax but did believe it would increase the legitimacy of the South African tax system. The chairman of the tax advisory committee, Mr Michael Katz, said that a capital gains tax discouraged entrepreneurs from building up capital and the biggest victims of such a tax would be emerging black entrepreneurs.¹⁹⁸ [¹⁹⁸ *Business Day* 22 July 1992]

The information officer of Cosatu, Mr Neil Coleman, said in March 1992 that even if the economy moved on to the ‘high road’ (investment and high economic growth), adjustment of the taxation system would be needed to address enormous inequalities with which the ‘new government would be confronted’. However, he added that taxation used as a ‘blunt redistributive instrument’ without being accompanied by the necessary economic growth would probably vindicate the predictions of the

'harbingers of doom'.¹⁹⁹ [¹⁹⁹ Ibid 6 March 1992]

In September 1992 Cosatu announced that it would begin a boycott of income tax payment in November and that it expected employers to do the same from December. The boycott was seen as forming part of the mass action campaign (see chapter on *Constitutional Change*). Employers were expected to deduct pay-as-you-earn tax from employees' pay packages but pay the tax into a fund for 'peace and democracy' rather than paying it to the government.²⁰⁰ [²⁰⁰ *The Star* 15 September 1992, *Scwetan* 16 September 1992] The National Party claimed that such a plan was nothing less than 'economic terrorism'. The Department of Inland Revenue said that it would be obliged to prosecute or penalise employers who defaulted on income-tax payments.²⁰¹ [²⁰¹ *Business Day* 17 September 1992] In the event, the boycott did not materialise.

Value added tax

A survey of goods and services from July to December 1991 by a group called Vatwatch, which was set up to monitor the introduction of value added tax (VAT), found that average monthly price increases had been 1,5% since the introduction of VAT in October 1991, compared with 2,4% in the months preceding its implementation. However, Vatwatch said that the prices of zero-rated brown bread, maize meal, milk powder, and samp had increased 'appreciably'.²⁰² [²⁰² *The Star* 23 January 1992]

The convener of the VAT co-ordinating committee (VCC) and a national organising secretary of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, Dr Bemie Fanaroff, said in January 1992 that VAT was not working as the government had claimed it would. He said that since the implementation of VAT there had been no large increase in investment or purchases of capital goods and that businesses were finding that VAT would not lower production costs. Furthermore, measures to prevent price abuse were inadequate, as were poverty relief programmes. Dr Fanaroff emphasised that these issues, together with the issue of the zero-rating of basic foods, electricity and medical supplies, and special provisions for small businesses, had to be discussed with the government.²⁰³ [²⁰³ Ibid 30 January 1992]

An opinion poll conducted by the Urban Foundation in February 1992 among members of the Sunnyside Group (a national alliance of some 50 small business associations) showed that the VAT system had caused confusion and dissatisfaction among small businessmen and women. The main reason for dissatisfaction was the high cost of complying with VAT, the complexities of administering the system and the harshness of penalties for non-compliance. According to the survey, half of the respondents believed VAT in its present form would curtail the expansion of small businesses and the informal sector.²⁰⁴ [²⁰⁴ *Business Day* 26 February 1992, *Sowetan* 27 February 1992]

While the rate of VAT was not raised in the March 1992 budget, Mr du Plessis said that the temporary

exemption of certain basic foodstuffs from VAT would not be extended. Under pressure from both the VCC and Sacob (which submitted a letter to Mr du Plessis in March 1992 urging him to postpone the lifting of the zero-rating of certain foodstuffs for another six months) he announced on 31 March 1992 that exemption from VAT would be extended indefinitely on canned pilchards, dried beans (including soya beans), lentils, dried whole mealies, mealie-rice, samp, powdered milk and dairy powder mixtures. (Brown bread and mealie meal had previously been permanently exempted from VAT.) The temporary zero-rating of fresh milk and rice was to be lifted in April 1992.²⁰⁵ [²⁰⁵ *The Star* 27 March 1992, *Sowetan* 1 April 1992] Mr du Plessis said that the treasury would lose R136m a year on the seven items if they were to enjoy permanent exemption from VAT. Including milk and rice in the exemption would cost a further R244m a year.²⁰⁶ [²⁰⁶ *Business Day* 1 April 1992] Mr du Plessis added that the eventual abolition of zero-rating would depend on the results of an investigation into food price increases.²⁰⁷ [²⁰⁷ *The Citizen* 2 April 1992]

The VCC welcomed the announcement on VAT exemptions but said that it was not sufficient to address the problem of poverty and starvation. Dr Fanaroff said the government's action had been in response to pressure. He emphasised that only an adequate poverty relief programme would properly address the problem of poverty (see also chapters on *Employment* and *Health and Welfare*). Sacob said that although the desired goal was that as few foodstuffs as possible be exempted from VAT, current economic circumstances and the consequences for the poor required a flexible approach.²⁰⁸ [²⁰⁸ *Ibid* 1 April 1992]

The intake from VAT from November 1991 to March 1992 was R7,8bn, according to a statement of revenue gazetted in June 1992. This was about R1n higher than had been expected earlier.²⁰⁹ [²⁰⁹ *Financial Mail* 12 June 1992] Figures published by the Central Statistical Service in August 1992 indicated that income from VAT and some outstanding income from general sales tax (GST) fell by 21% between April and June 1992 compared with income from GST in the same period in 1991. The Department of Finance pointed out that VAT had been introduced at a lower rate than GST. However, tax revenue had also been affected by poor economic performance.²¹⁰ [²¹⁰ *The Star* 11 August 1992]

In August 1992 the Food Logistics Forum, which comprised 94 delegates representing agricultural co-operatives, consumer organisations, farmers, manufacturers, marketing boards, retailers and wholesalers, identified VAT as one of the major contributors to the high inflation in food prices (see *Food price inflation* above). The forum decided to approach the government on the possible zero-rating of more basic foodstuffs. It suggested that VAT could be contributing as much as 6% to food price inflation.²¹¹ [²¹¹ *Business Day*. *The Citizen* 14 August 1992]

Later in the same month a member of the forum and the chairman of Pick 'n Pay, Mr Raymond Ackerman, said that the group would lobby for a differentiated scale of VAT rates. It would propose to the minister of finance, Mr Derek Keys, that all food be zero-rated or alternatively that basic foodstuffs

be zero-rated and other food rated at 5%. Furthermore, the forum proposed that basic items such as clothing should be rated at 10% and luxury goods at 20%.²¹² [²¹² *Business Day* 20 August 1992] The chief economist of Econometrix, Dr Azar Jammine, said that multi-rated consumer tax was working well throughout most of Europe. Dr Jammine believed that the introduction of a new system would depend on political pressures and how 'desperate' the government was for additional funds.²¹³ [²¹³ *Ibid* 21 August 1992]

At a meeting with members of the forum in August 1992, Mr Keys expressed concern that the zero-rating of basic foods might not bring about a reduction in food prices. However, he assured the forum that the zero-rating of basic foods would be taken into account when he examined changes to taxation. Both parties agreed that relief programmes for the very poor should be continued and that their efficiency should be improved. Furthermore, a forum task group would be formed to investigate food relief problems as well as alternative means of relief in conjunction with the departments of Agriculture and of National Health and Population Development.²¹⁴ [²¹⁴ *Ibid* 31 August 1992]

Economic policy

Regional economic development

A report published in January 1992 by the Urban Foundation's urbanisation unit under the aegis of the Private Sector Council on Urbanisation (PSC) concluded that South Africa's regional development policy had failed and that it needed to be re-evaluated. The PSC advocated, among others, a 'bottom-up' regional development process that would encourage and assist cities, towns, rural areas and regions to make use of their comparative advantages. The PSC's guidelines for new development policies included maximum utilisation of existing resources, capitalisation on the strength of the business and non-profit sectors, a special focus on the poor and community participation. The PSC recommended:²¹⁵ [²¹⁵ Port Elizabeth Chamber of Commerce, *Infocom* 3 February 1992]

- the implementation of region-specific policies. Financial incentives should be offered not only to the manufacturing sector but also to other sectors such as agriculture and tourism. Local and regional bodies should be empowered and encouraged to initiate their own development policies, and regions with little development potential should be assisted by policies aimed at equalising access to education, health and transport;
- the phasing out of the present system of industrial decentralisation. There should be freedom of movement to areas of employment and free access to land and accommodation;
- the integration of regional and rural development;

- the lifting of restrictions on urban and metropolitan growth;
- the promotion of urban growth and development;
- the phasing out of the policy of deconcentration. A policy which focused on compact cities and maximised the natural agglomeration and economies of scale of metropolitan and urban areas needed to be implemented;
- appropriate pricing policies for public utilities;
- the reassessment of the future location of public investment;
- the decentralisation of the service sector; and
- the development of a comprehensive national development framework which would be nonracial.

In November 1991 the Department of Regional and Land Affairs was established with the objective of enhancing the 'quality of life of all South Africans'. The department said that this would be achieved through the promotion of development at a national and a regional level, the promotion of effective regional government and the establishment of an effective land policy and effective land administration.²¹⁶ [²¹⁶ *Hansard (R)* 11 col 5869,30 April 1992]

According to the minister of regional and land affairs, Mr Jacob de Villiers, the department would focus on the need for:²¹⁷ [²¹⁷ *Hansard (R)* 11 cols 5869-5871, 30 April 1992]

- public participation in development and development planning. Regions would play an important role in identifying particular needs and opportunities as well as taking responsibility for their own development;
- private sector involvement. The government would use its resources to encourage private sector investment and to support the development of lesser-developed communities and regions;
- an integrated approach to development. The provision of education, employment and infrastructure were regarded as interrelated activities;
- the clarification of the relationship between land and development. Access to land was seen as playing a key role in the development of the country; and
- the strengthening of the development capacity of the existing regional authorities until the implementation of a new regional dispensation.

Regional Industrial Development Programme

In March 1992 Mr de Villiers announced that foreign industrialists who wished to invest in South Africa would be considered for a maximum relocation grant of R1m regardless of the location of the industry. This meant that relocation grants would be extended to the Pretoria/ Witwatersrand/Vereeniging and the Durban/Pinetown areas. Mr de Villiers said that the two industrial cores were 'pre-eminently capable' of attracting foreign industrialists, and so the extension of the grant would make a contribution to accelerated industrial growth and increase the number of jobs. The move was welcomed by the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Natal Chamber of Industry. Both had been concerned at their exclusion from the incentives announced in 1991 (see *1991/92 Survey* p443).²¹⁸ [²¹⁸ *Business Day* 10 March 1992]

Foreign industrialists seeking grants would be required to establish a local company or close corporation in which they held a minimum of 35% of the equity. They would also have to indicate the nature of the industry, the technology to be used and the project's viability within the South African economy. Information would also have to be supplied about how successful the enterprise had been internationally, its potential impact on the domestic economy and an evaluation of the business plans from a financial standpoint.²¹⁹ [²¹⁹ *The Citizen* 10 March 1992]

Mr Hennie Bekker MP (National Party) said in April 1992 that the Regional Industrial Development Board had approved 166 projects since its inception in August 1991. Of these 45 were foreign projects. According to Mr Bekker, industries established under the old decentralisation programme employed about 400 000 workers or 30% of total employment in secondary industries.²²⁰ [²²⁰ *Hansard* (R) 11 cols 5898-5900, 30 April 1992]

In the 1992/93 budget R901m was allocated for decentralisation, including R610m committed to decentralisation before the new measures outlined above were introduced. Of the total amount 40% was allocated to the transport rebate (which would be completely phased out by June 1993), 2% to housing subsidies and 48% to the short-term incentive package of rent, interest and wage subsidies.²²¹ [²²¹ *Finance Week* 2 April 1992]

Replying to a question in Parliament in April 1992, Mr de Villiers said that R780m had been paid out in 1990/91 in terms of the Regional Industrial Development Programme. A further R637m was expected to have been paid out in the 1991/92 financial year.²²² [²²² *Hansard* (A) 10 q col 752,22 April 1992]

Alternative economic policy proposals

Not all political parties and business organisations drew up new economic policy proposals in 1992. The organisations listed below are, therefore, those which adjusted or modified their economic programme during 1992.

African National Congress

In April 1992 a member of the economic planning department of the African National Congress (ANC), Mr Tito Mboweni, said that the ANC advocated a ‘mixed economy’ based on the principles of democracy, participation and development. The ANC believed that neither a ‘commandist central planning system’ nor a free-market system would be appropriate in meeting the needs of the country.²²³

[²²³ *Enterprise* April 1992] Mr Mboweni said that while nationalisation was the policy of the ANC, it was never intended to be a ‘holy cow’. He added that the policy of nationalisation was currently being reviewed with regard to the present international climate and the need to generate confidence in the South African economy.²²⁴ [²²⁴ *Ibid*]

At its policy conference in May 1992 the ANC said that companies would be nationalised according to the balance of evidence rather than on set ideological criteria. It added that nationalised companies would be compensated at a ‘just’ rate.²²⁵ [²²⁵ *Business Day* 1 June 1992] The ANC viewed the adoption of anti-monopoly legislation as a mechanism to promote greater efficiency in the private sector.²²⁶ [²²⁶ *Ibid* 10 April 1992] Taxation and the shifting of the tax burden towards corporations was seen by the ANC as an important means of redistribution. Furthermore, the ANC believed that economic growth should take place within a framework of strict fiscal and monetary discipline where the beneficiaries would have to become more productive.²²⁷ [²²⁷ *Financial Mail* 8 May 1992]

Congress of South African Trade Unions

The Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) also promoted the idea of a ‘mixed economy’ which sought to attain ‘growth through redistribution’ by means of strategic state intervention in the economy. The purchase of luxury goods would be discouraged through taxation. Cosatu maintained that industries providing basic goods and services should be under state control. (These included education, Eskom, health, Iscor, the Post Office and Telkom, public transport, roads and state forests.) Cosatu argued that in the mining and financial sectors there should be ‘strategic’ nationalisation to stimulate economic growth and enable working-class control of the direction of the economy. Cosatu planned to finance redistribution by redirecting existing investment, introducing land and wealth taxes, increasing company taxes and increasing the level of savings. At Cosatu’s policy conference in March 1992 the federation promoted the idea of a public works scheme to deal with unemployment which would be financed by the state and a special tax on businesses. An investment code was also promoted which endorsed International Labour Organisation conventions to improve workers’ conditions.²²⁸ [²²⁸ *Work in*

Progress June 1992; *The Weekly Mail* 3 April 1992; information supplied by the information officer of the Congress of South African Trade Unions, Ms Ruth Matotong, 27 May 1992₁

Conservative Party

The Conservative Party (CP) said in June 1992 that it sought to promote free enterprise, with a particular emphasis on private initiative and the establishment of small businesses within a framework of separate economic development. The CP was opposed to the 'socialistic redistribution of wealth between white and non-white people'. It said that it favoured fiscal and monetary discipline and the curtailment of state expenditure. The CP also believed in free trading and protection against 'unreasonable' foreign competition. Regional development, which formed an essential part of the CP's political policy, would be supported by industrial decentralisation and financial measures. The CP was opposed to the formation of monopolies and aimed to protect consumers against exploitation. It was also opposed to state intervention to promote the redistribution of agricultural land.²²⁹ [229 Information supplied by Mr D Nolte MP (CP), 2 June 1992₁

Pan-Africanist Congress

The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) envisaged an economy which would serve the interests of the 'indigenous African people'. The PAC believed that the state had a central role to play in redistributing wealth to this sector of the population. State intervention would be necessary to rectify regional inequalities. Effective local ownership of the country's economic resources was favoured by the PAC, in order to minimise the role and influence of international corporations in the South African economy. The PAC would, however, support foreign investment that pursued social responsibility programmes.²³⁰ [230 *Finance Week* 14 May 1992₁] The organisation believed that economic monopolies should be broken down. Furthermore, it envisaged workers participating in companies' investment and financial decisions. In the PAC's view, the state should not prevent the operation of market forces. The promotion of individual and collective ownership of enterprises by 'indigenous Africans' was also a priority of the PAC.²³¹ [231 Shabalala S, *Economic Emancipation: A Pan-Africanist Congress View*, IDASA occasional paper no 34, 1990₁

National economic forum

For details on the national economic forum, see chapter on *Labour Relations*.

Key Projections

- Amalgamated Banks of South Africa (ABSA) expected the recession to bottom out towards the end of

1992, to be followed by an upswing from early 1993 to late 1995. Sanlam forecast an economic growth rate of 0,6% for 1993. The Standard Bank expected a growth rate of 2% and 2,6% in 1993 and 1994 respectively. The Bureau for Economic Research (BER) at the University of Stellenbosch predicted an average annual economic growth rate of between 2% and 3% in the period 1992–1997.

- The governor of the South African Reserve Bank, Dr Chris Stals, said in July 1992 that access to foreign finance would be very important in the future because it would supplement domestic savings, which at best could sustain only a 2% growth rate.
- The BER expected gross domestic fixed expenditure to increase by 0,5% in 1993, after a decline of 2% in 1992. The BER also forecast that gross domestic fixed investment (GDFI) would reach its 1989 level (22% of GDP) again in 1997. In 1992 GDFI was about 16,5% of GDP.
- According to the South African Foreign Trade Organisation, a real export growth of 8% a year was required to achieve ‘any sort of economic growth’.
- ABSA and the Standard Bank predicted an inflation rate of 12% in 1993. Standard Bank forecast an inflation rate of 13,3% in 1994. ABSA expected a food price inflation rate of 14% in 1993. The rate of increase in the producer price index was expected to be 9,3% in 1993, according to ABSA, while the Standard Bank forecast a rate of increase of between 9% and 10% in 1994.
- ABSA predicted that the gold price would decline to \$344 per fine ounce in the first half of 1993.
- According to Sanlam, the average exchange rate of the rand was expected to be 31,95 American cents in 1993. The Standard Bank expected the rand to be worth 30,95 American cents in 1993 and drop further to 29,23 American cents in 1994.
- ABSA predicted a current account surplus of R3,5bn in 1993 and an increase in gold and foreign reserves of R1,5bn. A current account surplus of over R6bn was forecast by Sanlam for 1993.
- Real prime rate for the second quarter of 1993 would be 5%, according to ABSA.
- Sanlam and Standard Bank expected the prime overdraft rate to be 16% by mid 1993 and Standard Bank expected it to drop to 15% in 1994.

EDUCATION

Key Points

- Expenditure on education in South Africa (excluding the ‘independent’ homelands) was R19,06bn in

1992/93, which represented an increase of 11% on expenditure in 1991/92.

- In 1991/92 per capita expenditure (including capital expenditure) on school pupils by race was as follows: Africans, R1 248; coloured pupils, R2 701; and whites, R4 448. The figure for Indians was not available.
- By the beginning of 1992 a total of 7 923 black pupils had been admitted to previously white schools, while 47 286 places remained vacant at white primary schools and 82 046 places at white secondary schools.
- African pupil enrolment in South Africa (including the ten homelands) increased from 6,7m in 1987 to 8,1m in 1991 (ie by 21%).
- The average number of pupils per classroom at schools administered by the Department of Education and Training (DET) decreased from 55:1 at primary and 43:1 at secondary schools in 1988 to 41:1 at primary and 36:1 at secondary schools in 1991.
- The pass rates in the 1991 matriculation examinations in South Africa (including all the homelands except the Transkei) were as follows: Africans, 41%; coloured pupils, 83%; Indians, 95%; and whites, 96%.
- The number of students taking courses at adult education centres under the DET declined from 104 452 in 1988 to 66 794 in 1991 (ie by 36%).
- African enrolment at technical colleges increased from 6 821 in 1986 to 22 539 in 1992 (an increase of 230%). However, African enrolment still comprised only a quarter of total enrolment at technical colleges in 1992.
- The number of degrees, diplomas and certificates awarded by universities increased from 34 689 in 1985 to 43 970 in 1989 (an increase of 27%), compared to an increase of 87% in the number of diplomas and certificates awarded by technikons over the same period (from 5 461 to 10 226).
- Between 1988 and 1992 student enrolment at technikons increased from 60 232 to 114 071 (ie by 89%) and enrolment at universities increased from 267 608 to 318 965 (ie by 19%).

Broad Policy Matters

Since 1990 the South African government has embarked on a programme of policy reform in education which, in line with national constitutional negotiations, seeks to depoliticise South Africa's educational system. The reform programme aims to remove the stigma of apartheid from education and eliminate the highly fragmented and race-based system of educational provision and allocation of educational

resources (see *1990/91 Survey* pp184–188). Since 1986 the government has also sought to improve the provision of educational facilities and to redress inequalities (see *Finance* below).

During the period under review educational pressure groups continued to proliferate. These groups included unbanned political groups, business and worker organisations, non-governmental educational groups, and a range of parent, teacher and student associations. They were involved in actively initiating changes in the educational system and in formulating their own policy proposals for an alternative system.

However, the control of key educational resources and the determination of policy remained with the government.

During the course of 1991 the government published a number of documents to provide a comprehensive strategy for education and training in a post-apartheid South Africa (see also *1991/92 Survey* p186). These included:

- *Investigation into a National Training Strategy for South Africa*, published by the National Training Board and the Human Sciences Research Council in January 1991;
- *Education Renewal Strategy: Discussion Document* (ERS), published by the Department of National Education in June 1991; and
- *A Curriculum Model for Education in South Africa: Discussion Document* (CM), published by the committee of heads of education departments in November 1991.

The major policy implications of the documents were that:

- race would in future not feature in the structure and provision of education;
- ‘justice’ in educational opportunities should be ensured;
- education should promote national unity and freedom of expression, and allowance should be made for the accommodation of diversity in the form of language, religion and culture;
- one central education authority with regional departments should be established. The ERS document argued for maximum devolution of power to the community and to individual institutions. The *Investigation into a National Training Strategy for South Africa*, which was concerned with the need for an integrated vocational and training system, suggested the possibility of one national department of education and training in order to integrate the formal educational system and the training initiatives of the government and employers;

- responsibility should be shared between authorities at various levels and different stakeholders in the education system, including parents and the organised teaching profession;
- management councils should be established at all schools and greater decision-making and administrative and financial responsibilities devolved to such councils. Consideration should be given to the representation of pupils on management councils of selected secondary schools where the community felt a need for this;
- curriculum changes in the formal schooling system should be implemented in terms of the economic and manpower needs of the country (see *Educational orientation* below). The ERS document argued that the relationship between post-secondary institutions should be altered. This would involve the upgrading of certain university courses and the transfer of certain diploma courses offered at universities to technikons. Some technikon courses could be transferred to upgraded colleges of further education (to be known as edukons). Curricula changes should take account of the diversity of languages and religions in South Africa;
- a new system of certification should be introduced with certification of non-formal education incorporated into a national qualification structure to promote mobility between the formal and non-formal sectors, and between academic and vocational training. Two certification councils within the formal sector had already been established; and
- ‘national training partnerships’ between all sectors involved in vocational education and training should be promoted. Accredited training boards should be extended to all sectors of industry and an association of accredited training boards should be established (see also chapter on *Employment*).

Speaking in May 1992 the state president, Mr F W de Klerk, said that ‘a balance between centralisation and decentralisation in the future educational system’ had to be found. He suggested that the Department of National Education should retain its present functions (that of determining overall policy in certain aspects) but that ‘as many powers and functions as possible be delegated to school communities’ and that a ‘regional tier, possibly within a federal constitutional arrangement, provide education in particular regions under its control’.¹ [¹ *The Star* 19 May 1992]

The minister of education and training, Mr Sam de Beer, reiterated in June 1992 that the government ‘remained committed to moving towards a single, nonracial, non-discriminatory educational system’.² [² *The Citizen* 12 June 1992]

In February 1991 the joint working group on education (JWG) was set up at a meeting between Mr de Klerk and a delegation of educationists and representatives of other mass-based organisations led by the president of the African National Congress (ANC), Mr Nelson Mandela.

Several meetings of the JWG between March and July led to the expectation that a national negotiation forum on education would be constituted. These expectations failed to materialise as relations between some political movements and the government deteriorated during 1992 (see also chapter on *Political Developments*).

In August 1991 the JWG finalised a report setting out guidelines for the effective provision and utilisation of education resources (see *1991/92 Survey* pp 187–188). However, the government maintained that moves towards a single nonracial educational system could be implemented fully only in the context of a new constitutional dispensation. In the absence of joint mechanisms to resolve the education crisis or negotiations for major change to the educational system, discussions in the JWG were seen by some members of the education delegation as fruitless.³ [3 Interview with the head of the education department of the African National Congress (ANC), Mr John Samuel, May 1992]

During 1991 and 1992 the government remained the key actor in determining the pace and nature of educational change. While the documents listed above were presented as part of the ‘agenda for discussion’ in terms of broader constitutional negotiations, the government embarked on a comprehensive programme of reform at all levels of education in line with the proposals contained in these documents. The director general of national education, Dr Johann Garbers, stated in October 1991 that ‘many of the proposed innovations are independent of the framework of the country’s constitution and nothing prevents us from implementing these proposals in the meantime’.⁴ [4 *RSA Policy Review* October 1991, p23]

According to the minister of national education, Mr Louis Pienaar, the finalisation of the ERS proposals had ‘reached an advanced stage’ and comprehensive financing models for education based on an adapted ERS were being prepared.⁵ [5 *Hansard (R)* 11 col 5400, 27 April 1992] Mr Pienaar also indicated that comments on the CM proposals had been received from a wide range of organisations and that a final report on new curricula for school and technical college education would be submitted to the government in due course.⁶ [6 *Ibid*]

During the period under review the government embarked on a programme of desegregation at all levels of education which was accompanied by measures to decentralise decision making to local governing bodies at schools administered by the Department of Education and Culture (House of Assembly). Language policy changes were also implemented at schools administered by the Department of Education and Training (see *Policy* below). In addition, the institutional mechanisms which controlled certification and examination moderation on a national level were to be changed. The Joint Matriculation Board was to be phased out and replaced in 1993 by a Matriculation Board functioning as a subcommittee of the committee of university principals, while the South African Certification Council (Safeert), and the Certification Council for Technikon Education were to assume moderation and certification functions after 1992.⁷ [7 King M and Van den Berg 0, ‘Success or Failure? Examinations and

Assessment', Focus series no 2, Independent Examinations Board, Centaur publications, 1992, ppl2-15]

In the interim examinations were to continue to be conducted by the various racially defined education departments in terms of the National Policy for General Education Affairs Act of 1984. However, Safeert was to issue a common certificate to all students writing the national N3 certificate and national senior certificate examinations at the end of 1992.⁸ [⁸ *Hansard* (R) 19 col 10121,3 June 1992]

In February 1992 the minister of education and culture in the House of Assembly, Mr Piet Marais, announced changes to the models system of schooling implemented during 1991 (see *1991/92 Survey pp184-185*). He said that all status quo (all-white) and state-aided model B schools were to be converted to semi-privatised model C schools with effect from 1 August 1992. Mr Marais said that under the new system the community would accept greater responsibility for the education of its children and that new staffing scales would come into effect at all state-aided model C and status quo schools. This would mean the retrenchment of some 4 000 teachers. According to Mr Marais, a school would not be forced to convert if two thirds of parents disapproved of the change in status (see *Policy* below).⁹ [⁹ Media statement by the minister of education and culture in the House of Assembly, Mr Piet Marais, 28 February 1992]

Various political groups convened a national education conference in March 1992 after the JWG had allegedly failed to make significant progress in bilateral talks with the government. The conference marked a shift in strategy towards greater reliance on mass mobilisation and deepening grassroots campaigns as additional means to pressurise the government into addressing short- and longer-term demands. These included that the provision of adequate educational resources be co-ordinated jointly, that finances be allocated rationally within a unified education system and that the educational system be 'democratised' through the 'effective' participation of parents, teachers and students' associations in the management of educational institutions. The conference also issued a call for the restoration of 'a culture of learning' at schools and formulated a draft code of conduct which set out guidelines for students, teachers and parents within which to conduct campaigning for changes to the educational system. The draft code was to be referred to all constituent groups which participated in the conference for final ratification.¹⁰ [¹⁰ 'Focus on Education: report on proceedings at the Broederstroom conference' in *The Star* 23 March 1992, pp4-5] The conference delegates also called for a moratorium on restructuring and for a national negotiations forum on education to be set up to deal with the educational crisis in the transitional period.¹¹ [¹¹ National Education Conference, discussion documents, March 6-8, 1992]

During the course of 1992 the National Education Policy Initiative (Nepi) released a briefing paper outlining alternative policy options on various aspects of education. (Nepi is a research project commissioned by the National Education Co-ordinating Committee (NECC) in July 1991 to investigate restructuring the educational system.) The briefing paper was discussed during the course of 1992 by all organisations affiliated to the NECC and was to inform debate at a proposed NECC policy conference in July 1993. The NECC also called a National People's Education Convention in October 1992 in order to

relaunch the 'people's education' campaign.¹² [¹² *The Weekly Mail* 18 September 1992] The findings of the Nepi research project were to be published in December 1992.¹³ [¹³ Telephonic interview with Mr B Pule, information officer of the National Education Coordinating Committee (NECC), 15 September 1992]

A document outlining the ANC's proposals on education policy was published after a congress held by the organisation in May 1992 to formulate its policy on various issues. In terms of the proposals an ANC government would provide a minimum of ten years' free and compulsory education, and ensure equal access and the provision of lifelong education and training to all. Students who could not afford to pay for further education would have access to loans and bursaries. The document committed the ANC to developing infrastructure and educational institutions within a unified national education and training system in order to address the needs of early childhood, pre-primary, adult basic and tertiary education.¹⁴ [¹⁴ ANC Policy Congress document 31 May 1992 pp52-59]

The ANC document said that the provision and financing of early childhood educational care would be undertaken by the state, employers and the community. The document stated further that the ANC was committed to 'provide a level of education which is equivalent to a school-leaving certificate'. Employers would carry the major responsibility for providing adult basic education, while the state would ensure education and training of the unemployed. The document argued that a national system of certification should be developed and that flexibility between different levels of the education and training system should be promoted.

The ANC document said that 'effective democratisation' of the education and training system could be achieved by creating a 'balance between the role of the central state and that of regional and local authorities. This should include active participation of organs of civil society in both formal and non-formal education'. Gender discrimination in the educational system would also be addressed. On language policy the ANC argued for access to mother tongue instruction and instruction in a language allowing access to 'all avenues of social, political, economic and educational life'.¹⁵ [¹⁵ *Ibid*, pp54-59]

In January 1992 the Joint Education Trust was launched by business, political and community organisations to improve the quality of teaching, particularly in subjects related to adult basic education, work opportunities and youth development programmes. The trust initially had funds to the value of R500m to spend on these programmes.¹⁶ [¹⁶ *The Weekly Mail* 8 May 1992]

Various other educational initiatives were started during the period under review. Discussions to launch a National Education Task Force (NETF) began in April 1992. The NETF, which was to comprise various development agencies, business groups and political groups in the Africanist/black consciousness movement, indicated that it would convene a series of discussion forums and initiate research and action programmes to address educational issues. In the longer term the task force hoped to facilitate the emergence of a national educational advisory committee to advise and monitor a future

government.¹⁷ [17 Telephonic interview with the National Education Task Force convener, Mr B R Naidoo, 16 September, 1992]

Most participants in the debate on education policy agreed that a co-ordinated national effort was required to address the educational crisis and to lay the foundations for longer-term plans to transform the present educational system. An education policy analyst at the Urban Foundation, Dr Jane Hofmeyr, suggested in May 1992 that a national accord on education—which would establish a code of conduct, prevent further unilateral restructuring of education by the government, set out the rights and obligations of all parties and implement steps to address immediate grievances—could be the starting point for such a process.¹⁸ [18 Hofmeyr J, 'The challenges for policy and practice in South African education', paper delivered at the CTTJ seminar on 'Education Enrichment in South Africa', Volksagen Conference Centre, 26-27 May 1992]

There were, however, fundamental differences between the government's proposals for a future educational system (as outlined in the ERS documents) and those proposed by the ANC, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the NECC. The ANC, Cosatu and the NECC emphasised national planning and national co-ordination with local or regional administrations serving as functional departments within a unified system. The national budget was seen as a key instrument with which to empower disadvantaged groups to transform the educational system to one which was 'open, democratic, nonracial, and non-sexist'.¹⁹ [19 Interview with Mr I Rensburg (general secretary) and Mr B Pule of the NECC, May 1992]

On the other hand, the government and some private sector bodies stressed decentralisation, possibly within a federal system, with consumer-led, market-driven policies in a future educational system. In general state and private sector proposals called for reduced state provisioning for compulsory schooling, and reducing the role of the state in setting up an educational and vocational training system in the non-formal sector.²⁰ [20 Chrisholm L, 'South African Education in the Era of Negotiations' in *SA Review* 6, Ravan Press 1992; p288]

Educational orientation

Africa Confidential said in June 1992, 'South Africa's lack of sufficiently skilled workers, as well as the lack of flexibility and technical capacity in industry will be a major economic constraint for the next decade at least, and is a major disadvantage [in comparison] with the industrialising countries of south-east Asia.'²¹ [21 *Africa Confidential* June 1992]

A number of estimates on the extent of skills shortages have been made. According to an executive director of the Education Foundation, Mr Johan van Zijl, 'estimates indicate that there will be a shortage

of more than 500 000 skilled workers by the year 2000—professional, technical, highly skilled, executive and managerial—and a surplus of 2,4m unskilled workers'.²² [22 Kaplan D, 'Human Resource Implications of the Introduction of New Technology in South Africa', Commonwealth Secretariat, *Human Resource Development for a Post-Apartheid South Africa*, vol 11 part I, September 1991, p5]

The racially skewed nature of skills shortages was noted in the 1991 annual report of the Foundation for Research and Development, which pointed out that 90% of the country's scientific and technological skills were being drawn from the white segment of the population.²³ [23 *The Citizen* 28 November 1991] The growth rate of the white population was 0,8% in 1991, compared with an African growth rate of 2,8% (see chapter on *Population*).

The managing partner of the accountancy firm Arther-Andersen, Mr Sam Abrahams, said in November 1991 that there were only 45 African accountants in the country out of a total accountant population of 13 000. He added that South Africa needed about 200 to 300 new African accountants a year.²⁴ [24 *Business Day* 19 November 1991] In July 1991 it had been reported that a study by the School of Business Leadership at the University of South Africa of the top 21 companies in South Africa found that 2,2% of managers and 1,1% of senior managers were African while 3,3% were Indian and 2,6% coloured.²⁵ [25 *Ibid* 15 July 1991]

Indications were that the shortages in entrepreneurial, commercial, scientific and technological skills would deepen if economic growth rates were to improve. According to the director of the programme for career education at the University of Stellenbosch, Dr Willie Rautenbach, evidence from the Vaal Triangle (southern Transvaal), 'which is the heartland of South African heavy industry, indicates that a 2% annual economic growth rate would spark off a shortage of artisans which would throttle the upswing [in the economy]'.²⁶ [26 Rautenbach W, "The Crucial Role of Technical and Vocational Education in the Restructuring of Education in South Africa' in *McGregors Education Alternatives*, 1992, p359]

Some of the problems which continued to perpetuate a low-skill training system during the period under review were identified in the Educational Renewal Strategy (ERS) and National Training Strategy documents (see *Broad policy matters* above). These included:

- the fragmented vocational training system and the lack of agreement between employers, the state and the unions, and between the formal and non-formal educational systems, regarding vocational and technical training. This resulted in a lack of comparable standards and confusion about the value of qualifications;
- the absence of certification for courses and the lack of a national certification council for private sector training initiatives. Large numbers of students graduated from colleges which provided inadequate

training and diplomas of little value;²⁷ [²⁷ *Enterprise*, September 1992, p54]

- the short-term approach to training of many managers and the lack of long-term human resource planning. The divisional manager of education and training at Standard Bank, Mr Ray Johnson, said that few companies spent more than 2% of total staff costs on training and resource development, while the target should be around 5%.²⁸ [²⁸ *Business Day* 8 April 1992] The poor quality and job-specific nature of training contributed to lack of mobility outside of the specific sector;

- the low levels of literacy and numeracy of the majority of the workforce, which continued to constrain the introduction of new technologies in the workplace. The National Manpower Commission (NMC) estimated in 1991 that 51% of South Africa's economically active population had a level of education below standard 7. The proportion of Africans in this category was 69%. According to the NMC, this situation was unfavourable for the productive utilisation and training of the workforce;²⁹ [²⁹ National Manpower Commission, annual report 1991] and

- the mismatch between what the formal educational system produced and what industries in the future would need. Statistics supplied by the Research Institute for Education Planning in 1990 indicated that at standard 10 level, only 0,4% of African students took technical subjects, 8% took accountancy, 14% took business economics, 16% took physical science and 27% took mathematics.³⁰ [³⁰ Research Institute for Education Planning, *Education and Manpower Development*, 1990, p16]

Statistics supplied by the Department of Education and Culture (House of Representatives) indicated that during 1991, 1,5% of coloured students took technical subjects, 20% took physical science, 37% took mathematics and 99% took commercial subjects at standard 10 level. The Department of Education and Culture (House of Delegates) said that in 1991, 12% of Indian students took technical subjects, 40% took physical science, 69% took mathematics and 92% took commercial subjects at standard 10 level. The chairman of Eskom, Mr John Maree, indicated that only 12% of students at South African universities were studying science or engineering, while 40% of technikon students were studying science or engineering.³¹ [³¹ *Financial Mail* 5 July 1992]

Speaking in March 1992 at a conference organised by the South African Institute of Race Relations, an executive director of the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, Mr Michael O'Dowd, said that while it was clear that more emphasis on technical and vocational education was necessary, 'schools should not be turned into vocational training centres [and] schools should not train people for particular jobs, but should involve making people trainable for a wide variety of jobs'.³² [³² *Spotlight* no 4, August 1992]

The director of the Independent Schools Council, Mr Mark Henning, said at the Central Training Unit

conference held in May 1992 that education and training should develop the following key competencies: language and communication skills; mathematical, scientific and technological understanding; cultural understanding; problem solving; personal and interpersonal skills; creativity; family and household management; and information technology.³³ [³³ Henning M, "The world of work in the year 2000 and the relevance of education for this", paper delivered at a seminar on 'Education Enrichment in South Africa', Volkswagen Conference Centre, 26-27 May 1992, pp3-4]

The Curriculum Model and ERS proposals suggested greater emphasis on vocational streaming within formal schooling by introducing a new subject, 'Economic Education and Technology', and by incorporating vocational streaming within the secondary school system after exit points at standard 5 and standard 7. At these points scholastic tests would identify students who should be directed into (a) generally orientated education up to matriculation and perhaps go on to universities and technikons; (b) vocationally orientated education for students who were to go to universities, technikons or technical colleges, or who were to undergo specific preparation for a career and in-service training; and (c) vocational education, offering job-specific subjects aimed at a career and in-service training.

The ERS also suggested institutional changes at post-secondary level, and in particular the creation of edukons, which would offer academic bridging courses to universities and technikons (see *Broad policy matters* above).

The Education Policy Unit (EPU) at the University of the Witwatersrand criticised the proposals for vocational streaming, saying that the proposed exit points at standard 5 and standard 7 were an 'obvious attempt to regulate the size of the secondary school sector in accordance with national manpower requirements'. The EPU argued that 'creating an elite upper secondary sector' was implied in the government's proposals and that it would limit educational opportunities for black and poor children. According to the EPU, the proposed exit point at standard 5 was 'too low' and 'the state should do all it could to encourage children to remain in school at least up to standard 8'. The EPU also called for a 'fundamental rethink' on the question of access to higher institutions, particularly universities and technikons.³⁴ [³⁴ The Education Renewal Strategy: An Agenda for Negotiations', Discussion Paper, Education Policy Unit, University of the Witwatersrand, February 1992]

Speaking in Parliament in May 1992 the minister of manpower, Mr Piet Marais, said that a task group under the jurisdiction of the National Training Board had been established to serve as a forum where all interest groups could come to a consensus on a national training strategy.³⁵ [³⁵ *Hansard (K)* 12 cols 6380,6 May 1997]

The Congress of South African Trade Unions argued that a massive skills and training programme which benefited the majority of people should be adopted and should include the provision of extended training opportunities for the unemployed (see also chapter on *Labour Relations*).³⁶ [³⁶ Bird A, 'Cosatu unions take initiatives in training' in *South African Labour Bulletin*, July/ August 1992]

Education and employment

See chapter on *Employment*.

Finance

In the 1992/93 financial year expenditure on education in South Africa (excluding the independent homelands) was R19,06m, in comparison with actual expenditure of R17,11bn in 1991/92. Expenditure in 1992/93 represented an increase of 11% on expenditure in 1991/92.³⁷ [³⁷ Figures supplied by Dr D P Visser, Department of National Education, 16 July 1992]

The budgeted expenditure on education in 1992/93 comprised 19,3% of the total budget of R98,83bn and represented 5,4% of gross domestic product (GDP).

According to the *Budget Review*, published by the Department of Finance in March 1992, these figures included supplementary proposals but excluded educational expenditure financed from any additional contributions by parents. They also excluded salary increases for teachers in the 1992/93 financial year, which was an important component of the education budget.³⁸ [³⁸ Department of Finance. *Budget Review* March 1992]

Continuing the trend of the past decade the largest allocation in 1992/93 (R8,5bn) was set aside for African education in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands). Of this amount the Department of Education and Training (DET) received R4,58bn, which represented an increase of 19,2% over the previous budget if extraordinary grants made to the DET in 1991 were taken into account.³⁹ [³⁹ Press statement by the minister of education and training, 31 March 1992]

Allocations for the other race groups were as follows: R2,74bn for coloured education, R1,15bn for Indian education, and R6,65bn for white education. These amounts represented nominal increases of 21%, 22% and 10% respectively over the corresponding amounts in the 1991/92 budget.⁴⁰ [⁴⁰ Preliminary estimates of revenue and expenditure of the houses of Representatives, Delegates and Assembly for 1992/93]

Government expenditure on education in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands in various years from 1985/86 to 1992/93 was as follows:⁴¹ [⁴¹ Figures supplied by Mr T Marais, Department of State Expenditure, 15 July 1992]

Government spending on education

Year

Amount (Rm)

Proportion of total budget

Total budget (Rm)

Education spending as proportion of GDP

1985/86

5 332

16,2%

32 912

4,2%

1988/89

10 264

18,4%

55 927

5,0%

1990/91

15 457

20,9%

73 959

5,7%

1991/92^a

17 110

19,8%

86 388

5,6%

1992/93^b

19 059

19,3%

98 832

5,4%

a

Includes additional and supplementary amounts

b

Revised estimates for 1992/93

Spending on education in 1992/93, at 193% of the total budget and 5,4% of GDP, was comparatively high by international standards. The proportion of the budget spent on education was also significantly higher than that spent on competing sectors such as health (10%), housing (2,2%) and social welfare (2,1%).⁴² [⁴² *Fast Facts* 7, July 1992, p4]

Spending on education increased by an annual average of 4,6% in nominal terms from 1985/86 to 1992/93 whereas economic growth averaged 1,5% during the 1980s and was zero or negative during the early 1990s.⁴³ [⁴³ Van Heerden A, 'Economic and Demographic Trends in the South African Economy' in Commonwealth Secretariat, *Human Resource Development for a Post-Apartheid South Africa*, September 1991]

At the same time demand for education at all levels, particularly among Africans, increased. Enrolment increased annually by 4,3% at schools, 5% at universities and 17% at technikons between 1990 and 1992.⁴⁴ [⁴⁴ *Budget Review*, Department of Finance, March 1992]

Introducing the national education budget vote in April 1992, the minister of national education, Mr Louis Pienaar, said that ‘6% of the GDP must be considered the ceiling for the educational budget of South Africa [excluding the ‘independent’ homelands] if current economic realities are taken into account’.⁴⁵ [⁴⁵ Hansard (R) II col 5402, 27 April] (See also *Estimates of parity costs* below.)

A report by the International Monetary Fund, entitled *Economic Policies for a New South Africa* and published in 1992, concluded that the scope for raising expenditure on education and other social services appeared to be limited if the government was to avoid resorting to deficit financing or to increasing fiscal revenues.⁴⁶ [⁴⁶ *Fast Facts* 7, July 1992, p3]

Allocations of funds to schools, colleges, universities and technikons from 1988/89 to 1992/93 were as follows

Allocations to school, colleges, universities and technikons: 1988/89–1992/93

1988/89 Rm

1989/90 Rm

1990/91 Rm

1991/92 Rm

1992/93 Rm

College and school education ^a

Assembly

3 390

3 788

4 339

4 788

4 795

Delegates

577

673

805

977

1 049

Representatives

1 485

1 844

2 157

2 522

2 631

DET^b

3 330

3 962

6 114

6 570

8 134

Sub-total

8 782

10 267

13 415

14 857

16 609

Universities

1 210

1 426

1 649

1 775

1 898

Technikons

272

335

394

478

552

Total

10 264 ^c

12 028 ^c

15 458 ^c

17 110^c

19 059

a

Including private ordinary schools

b

Including the six non-independent homelands but excluding the 'independent' homelands

c

Revised estimates, including supplementary and additional amounts

Although total state spending in 1992/93 on school and training colleges comprised 87% of the budgeted expenditure on education, a breakdown of spending indicated that a number of areas were relatively underfunded, as shown below.⁴⁸ [48 Preliminary estimates of revenue and expenditure of the houses of Assembly, Delegates and Representatives for 1992/93]

Breakdown of budgeted expenditure on education: 1992/93

African^a R(000)

Coloured R(000)

Indian R(000)

White R(000)

Administration

106 029

172 927

38 669

90 244

Associated & auxiliary

204 332

—

12 962

53 744

Cultural affairs

—

4 664

1 000

29 342

Educational development

30 759

—

—

—

Pre-primary

978

22 009

1 467

94 409

Primary

2 179 080

1 176 695

361 257

1 592 990

Secondary

1 190 485

744 790

403 980

1 527 977

Teacher training

129 360

106 261

1 269

122 057

Technical education

75 221

39 389

14 418

163 982

Adult education

22 788

6 027

238

—

Other school/college^b

307 703

205 790

119 930

959 212

Universities and technikons

309 232

113 316

98 426

1 870 447

Total^c

4 555 967

2 591 868

1 053 616

6 504 404

a

DET budget, excluding all ten homelands

b

Includes spending on special schools, management, and various other services associated with school and college education

c

Excludes funds allocate

In 1992/93 the pre-primary sector received less than 1% of total education funding. Other areas which were underfunded included technical and vocational education (2,7%), teacher training (3,3%) and adult education (0,3%). The Department of Education and Culture (House of Assembly), which had 904 403 students at state schools in 1992, spent almost as much on that sector as the DET with an estimated 2,5m students in 1992.⁴⁹ [49 Department of National Education, Preliminary Education Statistics for 1992] At pre-primary level the Department of Education and Culture (House of Assembly) was allocated 96 times as much as the amount allocated to the DET.

An economist at the University of Cape Town, Dr Pundy Pillay, argued that 'a more efficient use of existing resources will have to be explored if some kind of parity in educational spending is to be achieved. This would require re-organising current levels of state subsidisation at pre-primary, primary and tertiary levels and defining priorities in terms of areas of improvement'. According to Dr Pillay, in the absence of significantly higher economic growth rates the state would have to rely on foreign donor support from institutions such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation and other nongovernmental organisations if educational development was to proceed at an acceptable rate. Another option, he said, was for the state to reduce its funding of higher levels of education and make parents and students accountable for these costs.⁵⁰ [50 Pillay P, 'Financing Educational Transformation' in Unterhalter et al (eds). *Education in a Future South Africa: Policy Issues for Transformation*, Heinemann Publishers, 1991, pp101-102]

The government's policy on educational financing appeared to favour the latter option. Levels of state subsidisation at the tertiary level, notably universities and technikons, fell in real terms by 4,9% between 1988/89 and 1992/93, compelling these institutions to limit growth in student numbers, increase fees and tap other sources of funding at a time when demand for access to these institutions, particularly by black students, was on the increase (see *Technikon and university education* below).

Speaking in Parliament in March 1992, Dr Tersia King MP (National Party) said that the conversion to

model C within the white schooling system would redirect costs to the community while ‘resulting in tremendous savings which could be passed on to underprivileged groups’ (see *Broad policy matters* above).⁵¹ [⁵¹ *Hansard* (A) 7 col 3231,31 March 1992]

Research by the South African Institute of Race Relations in 1991 indicated that state funding of African education had increased by 863% in real terms between 1969/70 and 1991/92, while funding of white education had increased by 54% in real terms over the same period. Real increases in the funding of coloured and Indian education were 311% and 365% respectively.⁵² [⁵² *Fast Facts* 3, April 1991, p2] The ratio of expenditure on African school and college education (outside the ten homelands) to expenditure on white school and college education in 1992/93 was 1,69:1.

Educational expenditure in the ten homelands in 1989/90, 1990/91 and 1991/92 was as follows:⁵³ [⁵³ Estimates of expenditure in the non-independent homelands for 1989/90, 1990/91 and 1991/92; figures for the ‘independent’ homelands supplied by Mr A Mouton of the Development Bank of Southern Africa, 15 July 1992]

Educational expenditure in the homelands: 1989/90–1991/92

1989/90 R(000)

1990/91 R(000)

1991/92 R(000)

Bophuthatswana

539 100

605 419

611 973

Ciskei

230 200

300 400

394 300

Gazankulu

237 073

283 956

N/A

KaNgwane

106 730

205 134

191 207

KwaNdebele

80 091

98 920

126 414

KwaZulu

774 778

933 640

1 114 731

Lebowa

568 337

720 966

1 037 685

QwaQwa

119 715

148 885

149 640

Transkei

624 600

897 200

957 900

Venda

201 100

278 000

300 147

Total

3 481 724

4 472 520

4 883 997

N/A - Not available

Expenditure patterns in education in the various homelands varied greatly. Speaking in Parliament in March 1992, Mr Roger Burrows MP (Democratic Party) noted that in terms of the current formula for distributing funds the KwaZulu Department of Education, with more than 1,7m schoolchildren, was one of the worst funded education departments in South Africa.⁵⁴ [⁵⁴ *Hansard* (A) 7 col 3239,31 March 1992]

A study by the Development Bank of Southern Africa in 1992 indicated that expenditure per pupil in the

Department of Education in KwaZulu was R428 compared to expenditure of R 1248 per African pupil in the non-homel

Per capita expenditure

Per capita expenditure (including capital expenditure) on school pupils by race in 1989/90, 1990/91 and 1991/92 in South Africa (excluding the ten homelands) was as follows:⁵⁶ [56 Figures supplied by Mr Hans Schoeman of the Department of Education and Training, 12 May 1992, and Mrs Wilken of the Department of Education and Culture (House of Assembly), 13 May 1992]

State per capita expenditure on school pupils by race

African R

Coloured R

Indian R

White R

1989/90

929

1 983

2 722

3 561

1990/91

1 194

N/A

3 109

4 103

1991/92

1 248

2 701

N/A

4 448

N/A - Not available

Between 1969 and 1991 the government made significant strides in reducing the gap in per capita expenditure between African and white pupils (from 18:1 in 1969 to 3:1 in 199

Estimates of parity costs

According to an economist at the University of Cape Town, Dr Pundy Pillay, projections of expenditure and growth in pupil numbers suggested that in the short term it was highly unlikely that the economy would be capable of generating growth high enough to enable the state to fund education for all at the current level of expenditure of white education.⁵⁷ [57 Pillay P, 'Financing Educational Transformation in South Africa' in *Education in a Future South Africa: Policy Issues for Transformation*, Heinemann, 1991, p101]

Speaking in Parliament in April 1992 on the budget vote for national education, the minister of national education, Mr Louis Pienaar, presented two possible scenarios on educational financing to the year 2000. He said that assuming an economic growth rate of 3%, retention rates and teacher qualifications in the African sector would continue to improve, and assuming that pupil/teacher ratios in the white sector were extended to all education departments (excluding those of the 'independent' homelands), the government would have to spend as much as 12% of gross domestic product (GDP) on education over the next ten years. Mr Pienaar indicated that state planning was, however, being based on a second 'more realistic scenario', in which educational spending was limited to 6% of GDP and an annual economic growth rate of 1% was assumed. In terms of this second scenario, the state could afford to subsidise fully only the first seven years of schooling over the following decade.⁵⁸ [58 *Hansard W* 11 cols 5402-5403, 27 April 1992]

In July 1992 it was reported that Assessing Policies for Education Excellence (Apex), a computer-based simulation and projection system developed by the Education Foundation and the Research Triangle Institute, had made a number of projections of the educational system in South Africa (including the ten

homelands) in the year 2000. Assuming a constant value of the rand in real terms at 1990 prices and assuming annual growth of 2,5% in the budget, it found that equalising state per capita expenditure at present white levels would consume more than 50% of the entire budget by the year 2000. Per capita expenditure could be equalised at R2 250 per pupil.⁵⁹ [⁵⁹ *The Weekly Mail* 10 July 1992]

A lecturer in the Department of Economics at Rhodes University, Mr Andrew Donaldson, estimated that per capita spending could be equalised at R1 200 at primary school level and R1 720 at high school level if government spending on education increased at a real rate of about 4% a year and if total pupil enrolment increased to 12,4m in the 7-to-18 year age group by the year 2000. The projection assumed universal schooling up to 16 years of age. These projections implied 'substantial reductions in state subsidisation of white, Indian and coloured schooling and moderate increases in per capita spending on African education', Mr Donaldson said.⁶⁰ [⁶⁰ Donaldson A, 'Financing Education' *mMcGregors Educational Alternatives*, p301]

With indications that the tertiary and possibly secondary levels of education will no longer be state funded the question of how to achieve equity at these levels will assume greater significance. Dr Pillay pointed out that while future state policies which prioritise spending on universal pre-primary and primary education may be justified (given historically low levels of investment in the pre-primary and primary sectors), it could also result in the neglect of the secondary sector and large numbers of pupils having access to basic education only. This would deepen further the racial and rural/urban inequalities in education. Dr Pillay said that additional financial measures to compensate disadvantaged groups would have to be considered. He proposed eight possible options for financing education in South Africa. These included user fees, vouchers, loans, tax-credits, graduate taxes, graduate payroll taxes, community financing and donor support.⁶¹ [⁶¹ Pillay P, 'Financing Educational Transformation in South Africa'. pll3-III]

Bursaries and loans

During 1991 the Independent Development Trust (IDT) allocated R25m to technikons and universities in the form of low-interest loans to assist disadvantaged students. Loans to a maximum of R5 600 were granted to 8 378 students, while R3,5m was returned to the IDT for reallocation in 1992. The IDT set aside R24m for loans in 1992.⁶² [⁶² Telephonic interview with a spokesman for the Independent Development Trust, 5 October 1992]

The deputy general secretary of the Kagiso Trust, Mr Achmat Danger, said that R172m of the R245m donated by the European Community in 1992 would be set aside for educational projects. Of this R50m would be allocated to the Kagiso Trust bursary programme.⁶³ [⁶³ *Business Day* 23 April 1992] In 1992 an international fundraising consortium. Interfund, donated R2,2m to the Student Services Centre, a Cape

Town-based trust which administers three bursary programmes for disadvantaged students.⁶⁴ [⁶⁴ Telephonic interview with Interfund, 7 October 1992]

A R17m bursary fund for black students at tertiary level was launched by National Sorghum Breweries during 1992.⁶⁵ [⁶⁵ *Business Day* 26 March 1992] In 1992 the Centre for Social Development at Rhodes University granted 685 bursaries valued at R431 000 to students.⁶⁶ [⁶⁶ *Daily Dispatch* 6 February 1992] The W K Kellog Foundation provided grants valued at R1,7m to the University of Durban-Westville for student bursaries during the same year.⁶⁷ [⁶⁷ *Natal Post* 26 February 1992]

In 1992 the South African Institute of Race Relations received bursary applications from 42 025 students for post-school education. A total of 398 new bursaries were awarded, bringing the total number of students participating in the Institute bursary programme to 1 111. The value of awards made increased from R8,6m in 1991 to R9,7m in 1992.⁶⁸ [⁶⁸ Interview with the bursary director, Mr D H Venter, South African Institute of Race Relations, 5 October 1992]

The Department of Education and Training awarded 8 548 bursaries valued at R9,4m to trainee teachers and 117 bursaries valued at R339 000 to students at technikons during 1992.⁶⁹ [⁶⁹ Information supplied by Mrs du Pisani of the DET, 6 October 1992] In the same year the Department of Education and Culture in the House of Assembly set aside R 16,6m for loans and bursaries for students at teacher training colleges.⁷⁰ [⁷⁰ Information provided by Mrs Wilken of the Department of Education and Culture (House of Assembly), 23 July 1992] The Department of Education and Culture in the House of Delegates allocated 574 bursaries to trainee teachers valued at R1,5m during 1992.⁷¹ [⁷¹ Hansard (D) 7 q col 594, 30 March 1992] The Department of Education and Culture in the House of Representatives allocated R35m to trainee teachers in 1992.⁷² [⁷² Information supplied by Mr C L Pretorius of the Department of Education and Culture (House of Representatives), 13 July 1992]

In terms of an amendment to the Income Tax Act of 1974 which was passed by Parliament in June 1992, tax exemptions were to be restricted where bursaries or scholarships were granted by a company to employees or dependants of employees. In the case of employees the tax exemption would apply only where the bursary was not linked to a reduction in current or future remuneration. In the case of dependants of employees the bursary would be exempt from tax only if the employee earned less than R36 000 a year and would be limited to the first R1 200 of the bursary for each dependant.⁷³ [⁷³ *Saturday Star* 20 June 1992, *Business Day* 11 June 1992]

A survey during 1991 of 165 company-sponsored educational assistance programmes conducted by a

firm of management consultants, International Compensation, found that 57% of the 165 companies surveyed had bursary schemes for employees or dependants of employees. During 1991 bursaries valued at R37m were granted to 6 339 employees or dependants of employees. Some 45% of the companies surveyed had open bursary schemes, ie bursaries available to members of the public. A total of 130 000 applications for bursaries in this category were received, while companies granted 7 374 bursaries to the value of R47m. The majority of company bursaries were granted to students in the engineering (31%), science (25%) and commercial (23%) fields, while fewer bursaries were granted to students studying the arts (6%), medicine (5%), law (4%) and other disciplines.⁷⁴ [74 Telephonic interview with Mr Dave Dickens, director of International Compensation, 5 October 1992]

School Education

Policy

During 1991 three models defining criteria for admission to schools under the Department of Education and Culture (House of Assembly) were implemented (see *1991/92 Survey* p 184). (Schools could also opt to remain all white.) Model A or fully private schools were to receive a state subsidy of 45% of operating costs; model B schools were to remain state schools but the school management council would determine admissions policy, provided that a majority of the students remained white; and model C or state-aided schools were to receive a state subsidy covering teachers' salaries only, which were approximately 83% of operating costs. A two-thirds majority vote by parents was required for a school to adopt one or other of these models. After a campaign by the National Education Co-ordinating Committee (NECC) to occupy underutilised schools, a small number of white schools opened as fully nonracial model D schools at the beginning of 1992.⁷⁵ [75 *Hansard (A) 3 qcol 112*, 17 February 1992]

Responding to a question in Parliament, the minister of education and culture in the House of Assembly, Mr Piet Marais, provided the following breakdown on the models chosen by various white schools in 1991 for implementation in 1992:⁷⁶ [76 *Hansard (A) 3 qcol 111*, 17 February 1992]

Models chosen by white schools: 1991

Status quo

Model A

Model B

Model C

Model D

1 233

1

692

51

6

A further 59 schools were declared model B or model C schools by ministerial discretion after the required proportion of parents in favour of change had not been achieved. By the beginning of 1992 a total of 7 923 black pupils had been admitted to previously white schools, while 47 286 places remained vacant at white primary schools and 82 046 places at white secondary schools.⁷⁷ [⁷⁷ *Hansard* (A) 10 q col 705,21 April 1992]

In February 1992 Mr Marais announced further changes to the models system implemented in 1991. He indicated that all status quo (all white) and state-aided model B schools were to be converted to semi-privatised model C schools with effect from 1 August 1992. According to Mr Marais, a school would not be forced to convert if two thirds of parents disapproved of the change in status.

Mr Marais said that the shift in policy was necessary in view of an expected 17% cut in the budget for white education which would require further rationalisation and the possible retrenchment of 11 000 teachers (see *Teachers* below).⁷⁸ [⁷⁸ *Hansard* (A) 4 col 1708, 27 February 1992] Addressing a meeting of the Natal Education Council in February 1992, he said that 157 more schools would be faced with closure if the conversion to model C was not made.⁷⁹ [⁷⁹ *Business Day* 26 February 1992]

Mr Marais remarked later in Parliament that after having considered a number of options the government had decided that the conversion to semi-privatised status would maintain standards and would make it possible to save approximately 7 000 teaching posts.⁸⁰ [⁸⁰ *Hansard* (A) 4 co\ITOS, 27 February 1992] This is nothing other than confirmation that the National Party [NP] is standing by its standpoint of maximum self-determination for communities. This can be experienced tangibly in the proposed new educational system [which] includes protection of language and culture, community schools with strong community control and mother-tongue education for those who prefer it,' Dr Johannes Swanepoel MP (NP) commented.⁸¹ [⁸¹ *Hansard* (A) 4 Minis, 27 February 1992]

In order to facilitate these changes an amendment to the Education Affairs Act of 1988 was passed in March 1992. The amendment provided for the establishment of joint management councils for more than one school, for the declaration of public schools as state-aided schools (including pre-primary, special and reform schools), the establishment of state-aided schools and the transfer of property to state-aided schools. The amendment contained a 'fall-back clause' which stipulated that immovable property transferred to a state-aided school would revert to the government if in the opinion of the minister the school was not being used for educational purposes. The amendment also removed the need to obtain the minister's consent in order to transfer personnel from public to state-aided schools.⁸² [⁸² Education Affairs Amendment Act No 39 of 1992]

The changes introduced into the 'white' education system were widely criticised. The Conservative Party condemned the new plan as a 'recipe for disaster' and said that it marked 'the beginning of the total collapse of white education'.⁸³ [⁸³ *Hansard (A) 4 col ni8*, 27 February 1992] Mr Roger Burrows MP (Democratic Party) criticised the plan as being 'damage control at its very worst'. He objected to the transfer of government schools to a 'private exclusive group of parents' and rejected the termination of the services of teachers 'at the very time when there is a need for more teachers. Here is an ideal opportunity to use the most valuable assets we have, the qualified human resources to teach all the children of South Africa', Mr Burrows said.⁸⁴ [⁸⁴ *Hansard (A) 4 col niS, The Citizen* 28 February 1992] The president of the Teachers' Association of South Africa, Mr Harold Samuel, said that the decision to retrench teachers was a clear indication that the government was 'still trapped in ethnic thinking'.⁸⁵ [⁸⁵ *The Citizen* 28 February 1992]

The NECC rejected the view that the changes were necessitated by budget constraints. To us it is simply part of the ploy of the NP to erode the powers of a future government and remove the base for one of the fundamental social rights, the provision of free education.' Part of the solution to resolving the crisis, in terms of human and capital resources, lay in unification of the education system, the NECC said. It is tragic and unfortunate that because of the racial policies of this government so many jobs have to go to waste,' it added.⁸⁶ [⁸⁶ Interview with Mr 1 Rensburg and Mr B Pule, May 1992]

A representative of the Pan-Africanist Congress said 'there is no attempt to fully deracialise schools but an attempt at maintaining the status quo by removing the racial connotation. You will have to buy your way into the system'.⁸⁷ [⁸⁷ Interview with Mr M Mphahlele, Pan Africanist Congress education secretariat, 13 May 1992]

In February 1992 an education delegation led by the president of the African National Congress (ANC), Mr Nelson Mandela, met Mr Marais to discuss what the ANC regarded as the government's unilateral restructuring of education. The delegation argued that the conversion of schools to model C would push up fees, thereby allowing only the privileged access to previously white schools. Surveys conducted at schools in the Johannesburg area indicated that fees would increase by between R300 and R1 000 a year

at schools converting to the model C system.⁸⁸ [⁸⁸ *The Star* 6 May 1992, *The Natal Mercury* 8 April 1992]

Speaking in Parliament in March 1992, Mr Marais pointed out that the constitution (in terms of which education was regarded as an own affair) was still in place. He noted that he had no authority to prevent schools from applying the provisions of the constitution to restrict admissions on a racial basis. Mr Marais also said that 'distinctive, autogenous education within a single system' had to remain an option for those who desired it.⁸⁹ [⁸⁹ *Hansard* (A) 5 q col 437, 18 March 1992]

In June 1992 it was reported that 98% of former white schools (or 2 044 out of a total of 2 082 schools) had opted to become model C schools from 1 August 1992. According to Mr Marais, 'parents had not voted on the issue at most schools as the advantages of the new system were self-evident'. The government estimated that about 4 000 teaching posts would be eliminated in terms of new staffing scales which would come into operation with the conversion to model C in August.⁹⁰ [⁹⁰ *Nationalist* June 1992]

Policy changes were also implemented at pre-primary schools to enable them to adopt the model B or model C system.⁹¹ [⁹¹ *Hansard* (A) 10 q col 705, 21 April 1992]

To facilitate the changeover the government announced that state aid, to be determined according to sliding scales, would be available for families unable to afford the compulsory fees levied by management councils at model C schools. An amount of R70m was set aside for this purpose. The government also announced that boarding bursaries would continue to be granted and that transport assistance would continue until the end of 1993.⁹² [⁹² *Nationalist* June 1992]

Mr Marais also said that the government had made provision to continue to pay municipal rates on school buildings for the 1992/93 financial year while negotiations on the payment of rates for future financial years would take place. The Department of Education and Culture (House of Assembly) would also take responsibility for repairing fixed assets which were damaged as a result of natural disasters or other causes over which the school community had no control.⁹³ [⁹³ Press statement by the minister of education and culture (House of Assembly), 28 February 1992]

Early retirement packages were offered to teachers and principals who wished to opt out of the model C system (see *Teachers* below).⁹⁴ [⁹⁴ *The Citizen* 28 April 1992]

The **Education and Training Amendment Act**, gazetted in May 1992, stipulated that the minister of education and training could authorise local school councils, committees or governing boards to admit students of other race groups to African schools controlled by the Department of Education and Training.

Language policy

In terms of an amendment to the Education and Training Act of 1979, which was passed in June 1991

(see *1991/92 Survey* p202) and which was to be implemented from January 1993, parents were to be allowed to choose the medium of instruction (English, Afrikaans or a vernacular language) from sub-standard A upwards. Previously the mother tongue had been the medium of instruction up to standard 3.⁹⁵ [⁹⁵ DET, annual report 1991, p155]

The proposed changes were condemned as ‘reckless’ and ‘irresponsible tinkering’ by the Language Policy Research Group of the National Education Policy Investigation (Nepi).⁹⁶ [⁹⁶ *Weekly Mail* 8 May 1992] Nepi argued that changes to language policy in education should be decided democratically and that decisions should be taken in the light of the availability of funds, well-trained teachers, suitable textbooks and resources in various languages. Nepi said that language policy also needed to counter the dominance of English and Afrikaans which had been promoted by the government, while taking account of the need to improve access to jobs and to promote universal means of communication. It added that the government’s decision to leave the choice of the language of instruction to parents was ‘premature’ and was ‘an attempt to absolve the government of responsibility in this sensitive area of policy planning’.⁹⁷ [⁹⁷ Interview with Mr I Rensburg and Mr B Pule May 1992]

The Department of Education and Culture in the House of Assembly reported that 147 028 pupils at primary and 3 364 pupils at secondary school were taking an African language as a subject in 1990.⁹⁸ [⁹⁸ Information supplied by Mrs R Wilken in the Department of Education and Culture (House of Assembly) on 23 July 1992] Speaking in Parliament the minister for education and culture in the House of Assembly, Mr Piet Marais, said that 1265 trainee teachers were taking an African language as a subject at colleges of education administered by his department in 1991.⁹⁹ [⁹⁹ *Hansard (A) 4 qcol’299,26* February 1992] The departments of Education and Culture in the House of Delegates and in the House of Representatives reported that 165 pupils were taking an African language (Zulu) at Indian schools and 771 pupils were taking an African language (Xhosa) at coloured schools in 1992. There were no trainee teachers taking an African language as a subject in these two departments in 1992.¹⁰⁰ [¹⁰⁰ Information supplied by officials in these departments on 13 and 23 July 1992] Schools administered by the Department of Education and Culture in the House of Delegates also offered optional language courses in Arabic and various Indian languages to 41 935 pupils in 1992.¹⁰¹ [¹⁰¹ Department of Education and Culture (House of Delegates), *Education Highlights* 1992 (Special Edition), p23]

Pre-primary education

Demographic estimates provided by the Urban Foundation in 1990 indicated that there were 6,4m children under six years of age in South Africa (including the ten homelands). As many as 5,3m of these were African children.¹⁰² [¹⁰² Short A, ‘Early Childhood Education’ in *McGregors Education Alternatives*,

p240]

During 1991 a total of 163 502 pupils were enrolled at public ordinary, public special and private pre-primary schools in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands).

Between 1988 and 1992 the number of pre-primary pupils under the Department of Education and Training (DET) fell from 19 546 to 15 171. In the non-independent homelands the opposite trend occurred, with pre-primary pupils increasing from 19 831 to 46 428 pupils between 1988 and 1992.¹⁰³
 [103 DET, annual report 1991, p210]

In 1991 the number of children enrolled at pre-primary schools, including pupils enrolled in bridging module readiness classes, was as follows:¹⁰⁴ [104 DET, annual report 1991; Information supplied by the departments of Education and Culture in the House of Representatives and the House of Delegates; *Hansard* (A) 10 q col 706,21 April 1992, *DNE Preliminary Education Statistics for 1991*]

Total number of children in pre-primary schools^a: 1991

No of pupils

No of schools^b

African

DET

16 670

165

Non-independent homelands

46 428

365

Coloured

7 717

N/A

Indian

13 468

47

White

79 219

534

Total

163 502

N/A

a

Includes public ordinary, public special and private schools and includes pupils enrolled in bridging module readiness classes

b

Excluding classes which may be used in bridging module readiness programmes

DET - Department of Education and Training

N/A - Not available

Estimated expenditure on pre-primary education in 1991/92 and 1992/93 is give

Expenditure on pre-primary education: 1991/92–1992/93

1991/92 R(000)

Proportion of education budget

1992/93 R(000)

Proportion of education budget

Assembly

93 181

1,59%

94 409

1,45%

Delegates

1 475

0,16%

1 467

0,14%

Representatives

16 048

0,76%

22 009

0,84%

DET

969

0,03%

978

0,02%

Total

111 673

0,65%

118 863

0,62%

In April 1992 the minister of education and culture in the House of Assembly, Mr Piet Marais, said that the following subsidies had been allocated to pre-primary schools under his department during 1991: 170 pre-primary schools in the Cape received R19m, 96 pre-primary schools in Natal received R 15,5m, 81 pre-primary schools in the Orange Free State received R8,5m and 187 pre-primary schools in the Transvaal were allocated R6,9m.¹⁰⁶ [¹⁰⁶ *Hansard* (A) 10 q col 706,21 April 1992]

In May 1992 Mr Marais said that the government had no plans to extend or restructure the provision of pre-school facilities. He added that some educational departments had reduced their commitments to the pre-primary sector because sufficient funds for pre-primary education could no longer be provided from the limited funds allocated to compulsory education.¹⁰⁷ [¹⁰⁷ *Hansard* (A) 17 q cols 1081-1082, 20 May 1992]

Mr Roger Burrows MP (Democratic Party) said that although the Education Renewal Strategy (ERS) proposals said that there was a need for a national policy on pre-primary education the document did not address pre-primary education as such (see *Broad policy matters* above). He added that more than 50% of pre-primary teachers in the Natal Education Department had lost their jobs during the previous year because of cut-backs in expenditure on pre-primary education. Mr Andrew Gerber MP (Conservative Party) said that present government policy on pre-primary education was to the detriment of the whole country because it was ‘during this phase of schooling that the best investment in a country’s manpower can be made’.¹⁰⁸ [¹⁰⁸ *Hansard* (A) 17 q cols 1082 -1083, 20 May 1992]

In view of the costs involved in providing more pre-primary schools, the ERS document proposed that particular attention be paid to the possibility of introducing a ‘bridging year’ for five-year-old children into the first seven-year phase of junior primary schooling. Shorter bridging courses were offered by all the departments of education (see *1989/90 Survey* pp805–808

By 1991 the school bridging programme established by the DET in 1988 had been extended to 935 schools (74% of the public primary schools administered by the department). The programme had been intended originally to provide a bridging class which would expose children to a year of pre-primary education. However, financial constraints resulted in the programme being downgraded to a bridging module programme which lasted from three to 12 weeks and formed part of the first year of schooling.¹¹⁰ [110 Short A, 'Early Childhood Education' in *McGregors Education Alternatives*, pp253-255]

The DET reported in 1991 that only 30% of children remained in the bridging programme for longer than 12 weeks. According to the DET, a similar school readiness programme for farm-school children was being developed.¹¹¹ [111 DET, annual report, 1991, p73]

The Department of Education and Culture in the House of Delegates had 155 fully subsidised pre-primary bridging classes in 1991, with an additional 550 classrooms at schools used by community organisations to conduct school readiness classes. Teachers employed by such community organisations received a state subsidy of R3,40 per hour for running such programmes.¹¹² [112 Department of Education and Culture (House of Delegates) annual report, 1991, p34]

According to the National Education Policy Research Initiative (Nepi), the implementation of bridging programmes by departments such as the DET 'may be acceptable as a short-term strategy' but the success of such programmes would be hampered by inadequate teacher training. Nepi said that the limited time spent on bridging programmes would also not be sufficient to redress inadequate early childhood education in disadvantaged communities. It added that bridging programmes made no attempt to address the problem of early childhood education for children younger than five years of age.¹¹³ [113 *National Education Policy Research Initiative Briefing Papers, 1992*]

Nepi criticised government thinking which held that responsibility for education in early childhood should remain with parents and the community. It called for greater state, private sector and community involvement in extending early childhood education to larger sections of disadvantaged communities.¹¹⁴ [114 NEPI Briefing Papers, 1992]

During 1992 the Independent Development Trust (IDT) set up five regional trusts to distribute R70m for the development of pre-primary education programmes which the IDT hoped would eventually reach 250 000 children over the next few years. An amount of R6,4m had been used by September 1992.¹¹⁵ [115 Information provided by the Independent Development Trust, 28 September 1992; *Sowetan* 14 September 1992]

Multiracial government schools

By the end of 1991 a total of 809 white public schools had been opened to pupils of all races in terms of the models system of schooling implemented during the course of that year (see *Policy* above). Parents' voting patterns indicated that the majority of white parents preferred schools to remain racially exclusive, while those who chose racial integration preferred to remain state-funded. A total of 34% of schools became state-funded model B schools, while 2,5% of schools became model A or model C schools. The majority of schools (60% of the total and mainly Afrikaans schools) remained all-white or status quo schools. A small number of schools (2,8% of the total) were declared model B or model C schools by ministerial discretion.¹¹⁶ [¹¹⁶ *Hansard (A) q col 111*, 17 February 1992]

By the end of 1991, 174 previously white schools had closed down owing to declining pupil numbers, while 47 286 and 82 046 places remained vacant at white primary and secondary schools respectively.¹¹⁷ [¹¹⁷ *Hansard (A) 10 q col 705,21* April 1992] Of the schools which closed down during 1991, six subsequently opened as fully nonracial model D schools (see *Policy* above).

Figures supplied by the Department of Education and Culture in the House of Assembly indicated that 7 923 black pupils had enrolled at former white schools by the beginning of 1992. This was 0,9% of the total number of 904 403 pupils enrolled at schools within the department (excluding pre-primary schools). Of the total number of black pupils at these schools African pupils comprised 40%, coloured pupils 43% and Indian pupils 16%.¹¹⁸ [¹¹⁸ Information supplied by Mrs Wilken in the Department of Education and Culture (House of Assembly), 23 July 1992]

By August 1992 the majority of white state schools (2 044 out of a total of 2 082 schools) had become semi-privatised model C schools. State regulations allowed the local school governing committee, in consultation with parents, to decide on admissions criteria at a model C school. The minister of education and culture in the House of Assembly, Mr Piet Marais, indicated in March 1992 that he could not prevent model C schools from applying the provisions of the constitution which allowed for the restriction of admission to schools on a racial basis.¹¹⁹ [¹¹⁹ *Hansard (A) 5 q col 437*, 18 March 1992] White schools with declining student numbers were likely to amalgamate in order to maintain racial exclusivity.¹²⁰ [¹²⁰ Carrim N, *Desegregation in Coloured and Indian schooling*, Education Policy Unit, University of the Witwatersrand]

Since 1985 pupils of other racial groups have been admitted to schools controlled by the departments of Education and Culture in the houses of Delegates and Representatives (see 1986 *Survey*, Part 2 pp421–422). However, integration at Indian and coloured schools increased significantly after February 1990.

The total number of pupils who were not Indian and who were enrolled at schools administered by the Department of Education and Culture in the House of Delegates was 27 508 in 1992, an increase of 2 693% on the enrolment of non-Indian pupils in these schools in 1986. The 1992 figure represented 10% of the total enrolment of 272 162 pupils in Indian schools. The number of African pupils enrolled in

Indian schools increased from 58 in 1986 to 11 274 in 1991 and 21 940 in 1992. The number of coloured pupils enrolled at Indian schools increased from 927 in 1986 to 4 984 in 1991 and 5 526 in 1992.¹²¹ [¹²¹ Department of Education and Culture (House of Delegates), *Education Statistics for 1991 and 1992*, Carrim N, *Desegregation in Coloured and Indian Schooling*, Education Policy Unit, University of the Witwatersrand, 1992, p13]

In 1992 there were 21 252 pupils who were not coloured and who were enrolled at schools administered by the Department of Education and Culture in the House of Representatives. This figure represented 2,4% of the total number of 883 496 students enrolled at pre-primary, primary and secondary schools administered by the department. Integration at coloured schools occurred initially more rapidly than in any other department of education but levelled off between 1990 and 1992. In 1992 there were 1397 Indian and 19 855 African pupils enrolled at coloured schools, which represented an increase of 145% on the 1986 figure of 8 106 pupils of other race groups enrolled at coloured schools.¹²² [¹²² Information supplied by Mr C L Pretorius of the Department of Education and Culture (House of Representatives), 13 July 1992; Carrim N, *Desegregation in Coloured and Indian Schooling*, p24]

During 1992 legislation was passed allowing African schools administered by the Department of Education and Training to enrol students of other race groups for the first time (see *Policy* above).

Private schools

Statistics provided by the Department of National Education indicated that in 1992 there were 111 061 pupils at private schools in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands). This was an increase of 10 774 (10%) on the number of pupils at private schools in 1991.¹²³ [¹²³ Department of National Education, *Education Realities in South Africa 1991*, p13]

During 1992 the total number of pupils in private schools in each department was as follows: there were 66 878 pupils at private schools registered with the Department of Education and Culture in the House of Assembly, 4 576 pupils registered at private schools registered with the Department of Education and Culture (House of Delegates), 3 471 pupils at private schools registered with the Department of Education and Culture (House of Representatives), 27 476 pupils at private schools registered with the Department of Education and Training and 8 660 pupils at private schools in the non-independent homelands.¹²⁴ [¹²⁴ Information supplied by Mr Lombard, Department of National Education, 13 October 1992]

There were 15 645 black pupils at private schools registered with the Department of Education and Culture in the House of Assembly during 1992. An unspecified number of pupils were enrolled at private street academies which had not registered with any educational department.

Stationery and textbooks

Textbooks were supplied free of charge to all schools administered by the Department of Education and Training (DET) for the first time in 1987 (see *1987/88 Survey* pp157–158). During the 1990/91 financial year a critical shortage of textbooks occurred at a number of DET schools and R51m was spent on the supply of textbooks. Of this amount R28m, originally earmarked for capital expenditure and to eliminate backlogs in African education, had to be used to purchase additional textbooks.¹²⁵ [125 Telephonic interview with Mr G Makwakwa of the DET August 1992] During 1991/92 the sum allocated to textbooks and stationery increased to R81m and in 1992/93 an estimated R80m was to be spent on the supply of textbooks and stationery.¹²⁶ [126 DET, annual report 1991, p31]

The DET said in April 1992 that shortages of textbooks were being experienced owing to a number of factors. Large increases in pupil numbers, improved retention rates, the movement of pupils from rural to urban areas and the failure of some pupils to return unused books at the end of the school year were seen as major reasons for the textbook shortage. In the Johannesburg region of the DET more than 800 000 books were delivered to secondary schools during the course of 1991. However, only 400 000 books were returned in time for the 1992 school year.¹²⁷ [127 Press statement by the minister of education and training, Mr Sam de Beer, 24 April 1992]

Compulsory education

In the departments of Education and Culture in the houses of Assembly, Delegates and Representatives education is compulsory for all children between the ages of 7 and 16 years.¹²⁸ [128 Department of National Education, *Education Realities in South Africa*, 1991, p51] The Assessing Policies for Education Excellence computer modelling system developed by the Education Foundation and Triangle Research Institute estimated in 1992 that 1,7m black schoolchildren between the ages of 6 and 17 years (mainly African and including all ten homelands) were not in school. Their figures were extrapolated to include pupils between the ages of 6 and 35 years who had dropped out of the formal schooling system between 1980 and 1990 and a figure of 3,5m school ‘drop-outs’ was obtained.¹²⁹ [129 Information supplied telephonically by Mr Peter Babcock-Walters of the Education Foundation, 18 September 1992]

Overall school statistics

During 1991 a total of 10m pupils were enrolled at primary and secondary schools (excluding special schools) in South Africa (including the ten homelands). Of this number, 8m pupils were enrolled at African schools. The number of pupils enrolled at schools under the House of Assembly was 887 401, while 242 805 pupils were enrolled at schools under the House of Delegates and 856 794 pupils at

schools under the House of Representatives.¹³⁰ [¹³⁰ Information supplied by various education departments and the Research Institute for Education Planning, 27 August 1992]

According to the minister of education and training, Mr Sam de Beer, the 2,4m pupils at primary and secondary schools administered by the DET in 1991 were accommodated in 53 678 classrooms at 2160 public schools, 5 713 farm schools, 129 other state-aided schools and 66 private schools.¹³¹ [¹³¹ DET, *Educational Package for 1992*]

The DET said in October 1991 that additional allocations to African education of R338m (from the R1bn allocated for the upliftment of the black community in 1990) and R212m (to be spread over the 1991/92 and 1992/93 financial years) were to be used to build 5 395 classrooms (comprising 1565 classrooms during 1991, and 3 830 classrooms during 1992 and 1993). In 1988 there was a shortage at DET schools of 4 733 classrooms. The estimated shortage was to be reduced to 4 596 at the end of 1992.¹³² [¹³² Press statement by the minister of education and training, 24 October 1991]

In 1991 there were 289 government schools, 5 814 community schools, 15 state-aided farm schools, nine other state-aided schools and 25 private schools, accommodating 3,4m pupils at primary and secondary schools in the non-independent homelands. Estimates of classroom shortages were difficult to obtain. However, 1992 statistics indicated a shortage of 4 498 classrooms in Gazankulu, 2 780 in KaNgwane and 10 000 in KwaZulu.¹³³ [¹³³ *The Natal Mercury* 14 May 1992, *Sowetait* 16 March 1992; personal communication with officials of the KaNgwane Department of Education, 13 July 1992]

In the 'independent' homelands 2,3m pupils were accommodated in 48 994 classrooms at 3 635 primary, 1 731 combined and 793 secondary schools during 1991.¹³⁴ [¹³⁴ Information supplied by the Research Institute for Education Planning, 27 August 1992]

Farm and rural schools

In 1991 the majority of African pupils at schools administered by the DET and in the non-independent homelands (63% of the total number of African pupils) were enrolled at state-aided farm and rural community schools.¹³⁵ [¹³⁵ DET, annual report, 1991, pp238-9]

In 1991 the majority of schools administered by the DET (71% of the total) were state-aided farm schools. Pupils at farm schools comprised 20% of the total number of pupils enrolled at DET schools, with a further 0,2% of all African pupils enrolled at farm schools in the six non-independent homelands. Some 95% of the schools in the non-independent homelands were community schools.¹³⁶ [¹³⁶ DET, annual report, 1991, pp238-239]

Statistics for 1991 indicated that 486 120 African pupils were enrolled at 5 728 farm schools. Of the total enrolment 97% (or 470 284 pupils) were at primary school. Most pupils (73% of the total) were enrolled in classes below standard 2.¹³⁷ [¹³⁷ DET, annual report 1991 pp235, 263] A number of coloured children, estimated at 142 800 in 1985, also attended farm schools.¹³⁸ [¹³⁸ *McGngors Educational Alternatives*, p208]

In 1991 there were 5 504 primary, 189 intermediate, 11 combined and nine secondary farm schools controlled by the DET, providing a total of 13 218 classrooms. DET farm schools were staffed by 12 142 teachers at primary level and 488 teachers at secondary level respectively. In the non-independent homelands there were 13 primary and two secondary farm schools staffed by 166 teachers at primary level and 13 teachers at secondary level.¹³⁹ [¹³⁹ DET, annual report 1991, pp232, 238] The proportion of teachers employed at farm schools under the DET declined from 23% of all teachers employed in 1988 to 21% in 1991.

Government policy on farm schools has resulted in an uneven spatial distribution of farm schools, contributing to limited access to education in rural areas.¹⁴⁰ [¹⁴⁰ Ardington L, 'Education for All: Spatial Dimensions' in *Indicator SA*, Autumn 1991, pp79-82] The erection and location of farm schools has depended on the initiative of local (white) farmers who receive 75% or 80% of the capital costs of the construction of the school from the DET if the school complies with departmental building specifications. The farmer is able to determine who attends the farm school and the level of education to be provided. If a change in farm ownership occurs the new owner is under no obligation to continue to allow the school to exist. The DET supplies and pays teachers' salaries and also undertakes to maintain buildings and to provide various other educational resources.

Educational resources at farm schools are generally poorer than at public ordinary schools administered by the DET. Mr de Beer said in April 1992 that per capita expenditure (including capital costs) in 1990/91 on African pupils at state-aided farm schools was R647 compared to R1 046 for African pupils at public ordinary schools.¹⁴¹ [¹⁴¹ *Hansard* (A) 10 q cols 763-764, 22 April 1992] Facilities also differed widely, depending on the initiative of the farmer, the input of the relevant educational authority responsible for budgetary allocations and the location of the farm school.

In 1986 a rural task force commissioned by the DET to investigate farm schools concluded that significant structural changes, including the option of buying over farm schools or entering into a long-term lease agreement with farmers was necessary if conditions at farm schools were to be improved. However, neither of these options was implemented during the period under review.¹⁴² [¹⁴² Gordon A, 'Farm Schools: A Bumper Harvest for the 90's' in *Matlhasedi*, December 1991, pp10-13]

Regulations gazetted in April 1992 removed total control of the running of farm schools from farm

owners and devolved control to elected governing bodies comprising representatives of the farm community, notably farmworkers, parents, pupils and farm owners.¹⁴³ [¹⁴³ *Government Gazette* 13945,30 April 1992]

In the period under review the DET began to draw up a national plan to improve the provision of physical facilities at farm schools. Other DET programmes were aimed at improving teaching practices and management skills training for teachers employed at farm schools. A pilot project was also established on the farm Holgat near Coligny (western Transvaal) to monitor the cost effectiveness of curricula changes at farm schools which emphasised more vocational training (agricultural skills training).¹⁴⁴ [¹⁴⁴ *Hansard (R.) 12 co\& 6071,4 May 1992*]

According to the DET annual report for 1991, 600 new classrooms, 200 residential units for teachers, 130 offices and 120 store rooms were erected at farm schools. Many existing schools were renovated during 1991. Facilities for drinking water were also provided at 140 schools.¹⁴⁵ [¹⁴⁵ DET, annual report 1991, p59]

Community schools

A total of 3,2m pupils were enrolled at 5 939 community schools in eight homelands during 1991 (statistics for the Transkei and Bophuthatswana were not available). Community schools are erected on the initiative of the local community but the relevant homeland educational authority subsidises the construction of buildings and provides teachers and equipment. As with farm schools access to schooling and the levels and quality of schooling differ markedly, depending on factors such as the extent of the local community's involvement, the budgetary provisions of the relevant educational department and the location of such schools.

There were 4 240 primary, 59 intermediate, 21 combined and 1 494 secondary community schools staffed by 50 586 primary school teachers and 22 276 secondary school teachers in the non-independent homelands. The majority of pupils (73%) were at primary school.¹⁴⁶ [¹⁴⁶ DET, annual report 1991, pp232, 263]

The number of community schools, and pupils and teachers at such schools in the homelands in 1991 was as follows:

Community schools in the homelands: 1991

No of schools

Proportion of total in homeland

No of pupils

Proportion of total in homeland

No of teachers

Proportion of total in homeland

Bophuthatswana

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Ciskei

44

6%

18 365

7%

549

7%

Gazankulu

444

90%

299 416

88%

7 274

86%

KaNgwane

237

78%

181 129

73%

4 481

71%

KwaNdebele

225

97%

147 087

98%

3 771

97%

KwaZulu

3 076

99%

1 598 316

99%

32 191

98%

Lebowa

1 831

98%

952 864

98%

25 114

98%

QwaQwa

1

0,7%

1 011

0,9%

31

0,9%

Transkei

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Venda

81

12%

25 240

10%

885

12%

N/A - Not

The precarious existence of rural farm and community schools worsened with the drought in 1992 and the deepening economic crisis experienced in the farming sector (see also chapter on *Land and Agriculture*). Political tensions between conservative farmers and the central government, as well as political violence (particularly in the Natal region), also affected attendance and school performance in the rural areas. *Indicator SA* reported in 1991 that an estimated 60 000 children in the areas around Pietermaritzburg (Natal) had had no 'effective schooling since 1987' owing to violence in the region. In 1991, 6 000 to 8 000 refugee children in the area were left without schooling.¹⁴⁷ [¹⁴⁷ *Indicator* .£4, autumn 1991] In March 1992 Mr Ken Margo of the Rural Education Forum said that 95 farm schools had been closed during 1991 leaving more than 10 000 pupils stranded' as the result of economic and political pressures at farm schools.¹⁴⁸ [¹⁴⁸ *New Nation* 13 March 1992]

In September 1992 Operation Hunger reported that more than 200 schools in Venda with 300 students each had applied for food aid. According to Operation Hunger, this pattern was repeated in Bophuthatswana, Gazankulu, Lebowa and the Transkei.¹⁴⁹ [¹⁴⁹ *The Citizen* 3 September 1992]

Special education

In 1991, 39 437 pupils were enrolled at special schools in all education departments in South Africa (including all ten homelands). There were 15 259 white pupils at 90 special schools under the Department of Education and Culture in the House of Assembly, compared with 8 886 African pupils at 59 special schools controlled by the DET and in the non-independent homelands. A further 2 452 pupils (mainly African) were enrolled at special schools in the 'independent' homelands. A total of 5 821 pupils were enrolled at 18 special schools under the Department of Education and Culture in the House of Delegates, while 7019 pupils were enrolled at 60 special schools under the Department of Education and Culture in the House of Representatives.¹⁵⁰ [¹⁵⁰ Department of National Education, *Education Realities in South Africa* 1991, p13]

Double sessions and the platoon system

The following number of African schools, teachers and pupils under the DET and in the non-independent homelands were involved in double sessions (one teacher taking two classes at different times during the day) and the platoon system (two schools using the same premises at different times) during 1991:¹⁵¹ [¹⁵¹ DET, annual report 1991, pp274-275]

Double sessions and the platoon system in African schools: 1991

DET

Non-independent homelands^a

Double sessions

(sub A–sub B)

Number of schools

56

198

Number of teachers

419

843

Number of pupils

21 198

47 515

Platoon system

(sub A—standard 10)

Number of schools

364

92

Number of teachers

7 736

1 527

Number of pupils

339 690

66 498

a

Figures for platoon session in Lebowa, Gazankulu, and KwaNdebele were not complete and are not

Pupils

Pupil enrolment

African pupil enrolment increased from 71% of the total number of pupils enrolled at public ordinary and private schools in 1980 to 80,3% in 1991. White enrolment decreased from 14,2% in 1980 to 8,8% of total enrolment in 1991. Indian enrolment decreased from 3,2% of the total in 1980 to 2,4% in 1991, while coloured enrolment decreased from 11,1% in 1980 to 8,5% in 1991.¹⁵² [¹⁵² 1991792 *Survey* p204; Information supplied by various education departments and the Research Institute for Education Planning, 27 August 1992]

The following table provides a breakdown of African pupil enrolment at primary and secondary level in 1987 and 1991:¹⁵³ [¹⁵³ DET, annual report 1991 p210; RIEP statistics on the 'independent' homelands, 27 August 1992]

African enrolment by level of education in 1987 and 1991

1987

1991

Increase

Department of Education and Training

Primary

1 534 679

1 713 455

12%

Secondary

388 461

647 949

67%

Sub-total

1 923 140

2 361 404

23%

Non-independent homelands

Primary

2 107 761

2 425 547

15%

Secondary

673 455

1 008 059

50%

Sub-total

2 781 216

3 433 606

23%

'Independent' homelands

Primary

1 546 739

1 753 028

13%

Secondary

413 857

552 472

33%

Sub-total

1 960 596

2 305 500

18%

Total

6 664 952

8 100 510

22%

Between 1987 and 1991 the number of African pupils enrolled at schools administered by the Department of Education and Training (DET) and in the ten homelands increased by 1,4m (or at an annual average growth rate of 5% over the four-year period). In 1991 the majority of African pupils (73% of the total) were enrolled at primary level. However, primary enrolment as a proportion of total enrolment declined from 79% in 1987 to 73% in 1991.

Primary and secondary enrolment for the other racial groups was as follows during 1991: there were 513 079 primary and 351 084 secondary pupils in the Department of Education and Culture (House of Assembly), there were 162 753 primary and 93 520 secondary pupils in the Department of Education and Culture (House of Delegates) and 629 137 primary and 226 394 secondary pupils in the Department of Education and Culture (House of Representatives) schools res

The Human Sciences Research Council estimated that the African pupil population could increase to 12,6m by the year 2001 if present pupil growth rates continued.¹⁵⁵ [¹⁵⁵ In Focus, HSRC/RGN, August 1992,

p³] The Research Institute for Education Planning estimated that the African student population could constitute 84% of the total student population by the year 2000.¹⁵⁶ [¹⁵⁶ 1991/92 *Survey* p204]

Pupil/teacher ratios

In March 1992 pupil/teacher ratios at schools under the Department of Education and Culture in the House of Assembly were as follows: Cape, 18:1; Natal, 21:1; Orange Free State, 20:1; and Transvaal, 20:1.¹⁵⁷ [¹⁵⁷ Information supplied by Mrs R Wilken, Department of Education and Culture (House of Assembly), 23 July 1992]

The average pupil/teacher ratios at black primary and secondary schools in the non-homeland area were as follows:¹⁵⁸ [¹⁵⁸ Information supplied by various education departments and RIEP 27 August 1992]

Pupil/teacher ratios in the non-homeland area: 1992

Primary

Secondary

African

41:1

35:1

Coloured

26:1

18,5:1

Indian

N/A

N/A

N/A - Not available

Pupil/teacher ratios in the ten homelands in 1992 were as follows:

Pupil/teacher ratios in the homelands: 1992

Primary

Secondary

Bophuthatswana

32,6:1

30,1:1

Ciskei

38,9:1

32,2:1

Gazankulu

43,0:1

33,7:1

KaNdwane

40,3:1

35,6:1

KwaNdebele

39,9:1

36,7:1

KwaZulu

52,5:1

41,3:1

Lebowa

40,4:1

33,8:1

QwaQwa

33,7:1

31,4:1

Transkei

72,5:1

18,0:1

Venda

Pupil/classroom ratios

The average number of pupils per classroom at schools administered by the DET improved from 55 at primary and 43 at secondary schools in 1988 to 41 at primary and 36 at secondary schools in 1992. A breakdown of pupil/classroom ratios in 1991 in each of the ten homelands is given below.¹⁵⁹ [159 Figures supplied by RIEP, 27 August 1992]

Pupil/classroom ratios in the homelands: 1991

Primary

Secondary

Bophuthatswana

46,5:1

30,5:1

Ciskei

42,1:1

43,4:1

Gazankulu

62,4:1

50,8:1

KaNgwane

65,1:1

59,1:1

KwaNdebele

43,0:1

43,5:1

KwaZulu

56,1:1

51,0:1

Lebowa

53,8:1

59,1:1

QwaQwa

29,7:1

45,5:1

Transkei

70,0:1

25,7:1

Venda

44,2:1

Standard 10 examination results

While only 41% of African matric pupils passed in 1991, 96% of white pupils passed. Coloured and Indian matriculants achieved their highest pass rates yet (83% and 95% respectively).

Matriculation results in 1991 in South Africa (including all the homelands except the Transkei) were as follows:¹⁶⁰ [160 Figures supplied by Ms K McEvelly of the Department of Education and Training, 28 February 1992 and 19 May 1992]

Matriculation examination results: 1991^a

Candidates

Passes

Matriculation exemption

Number

Proportion

Number

Proportion

African

280 918

114 695

41%

30 289

11%

Coloured

22 405

18 557

83%

4 911

22%

Indians

14 258

13 558

95%

7 062

50%

White

65 933

63 504

96%

27 356

42%

Total

383 514

210 314

55%

69 618

33%

a

Figures exclude the results of supplementary examinations

The number of African pupils reaching standard 10 in South Africa (including all the homelands except the Transkei) increased by 93 795 between 1988 and 1991 (from 187 123 candidates in 1988 to 280 918 candidates in 1991). However, the pass rate deteriorated from 57% in 1988 to 36% in 1990 and 41% in 1991. Over the same period white and Indian pass rates remained around 95%, while the coloured pass rate improved from 73% in 1989 to 83% in 1

An analysis of African matriculation results in 1991 indicated that the level at which pupils passed was generally low. Only 20 candidates passed with an overall A aggregate, 1 903 candidates passed with an aggregate above C (60% and higher), while the majority of candidates (87%) passed with an aggregate between 33,5% and 49%.¹⁶² [¹⁶² *Hansard (A) 3 q col 55*, 10 February 1992] The matriculation exemption pass rate declined from 16% in 1988 to 10,8% in 1991.

Standard 10 results in different DET regions and in the homelands were as follows:¹⁶³ [¹⁶³ Figures supplied by Ms K McEvelly of the DET, 27 August 1992]

African standard 10 examination results: 1991

Candidates

Passes

Exemptions

Number

Proportion of total

Number

Proportion of total

Department of Education and Training

Cape

12 697

5 123

40%

1 241

10%

Diamond Field

5 173

2 164

42%

480

9%

Highveld

15 629

5 800

37%

1 314

8%

Johannesburg

12 763

3 942

31%

948

7%

Natal

5 888

2 513

43%

810

14%

Northern Transvaal

12 197

5 329

44%

1 435

12%

Orange Free State

7 235

3 071

42%

785

11%

Orange-Vaal

9 419

3 788

40%

896

10%

Sub-total

81 001

31 730

39%

7 909

10%

Homelands

Bophuthatswana

22 433

14 700

66%

5 413

24%

Ciskei

10 580

5 072

48%

1 104

10%

Gazankulu

17 305

8 369

48%

2 493

14%

KaNgwane

9 808

3 734

38%

820

8%

KwaNdebele

8 410

2 639

31%

505

6%

KwaZulu

44 041

16 674

38%

4 420

10%

Lebowa

66 886

21 459

32%

4 735

7%

QwaQwa

5 561

2 162

39%

443

8%

Venda

14 893

8 156

55%

2 447

16%

Sub-total

199 917

82 965

41%

22 380

11%

Total

280 918

1

While candidates writing under the auspices of the DET obtained an overall pass rate of 39%, those writing in the 'independent' homelands achieved a pass rate of 53%. Within the homelands the highest pass rate was recorded in Bophuthatswana (66%), while KwaNdebele achieved the lowest result (31%). Within the DET the Johannesburg region achieved the lowest results for two years in a row, achieving pass rates of 26% in 1990 and 31% in 1991, while pass rates in the northern Transvaal region dropped from 68% in 1988 to 44% in 1991. These regions were affected by frequent school disturbances in 1990 and 1991. A breakdown of the results by sex indicated that male candidates in general performed better than female candidates, for example, 55% of male pupils and 44% of female pupils passed in 1988. In 1991, 44% of males passed compared to 35% of females.¹⁶⁴ [164 Figures supplied by the DET, 7 August 1992]

African pupils writing as private candidates achieved significantly better results than the national average in South Africa (including all the homelands except the Transkei). For example, the privately run Project Matric Colleges obtained a record pass rate of 87%.¹⁶⁵ [165 *The Natal Mercury* 10 January 1992] Students enrolled with another private project, the Programme for Technological Careers (which runs extra-mural technological orientation programmes in black townships, including mathematics, science and language tuition), achieved a nine-year average pass rate of 79% between 1982 and 1991.¹⁶⁶ [166 *Protec Report 1982-1992*, p7]

The DET reported in August 1992 that the number of African students registering for matriculation examinations at the end of 1992 was 325 000 (an increase of 44 000 on the number of candidates in 1991). However, teacher strikes and class boycotts during 1992 led to predictions that another round of disastrous matriculation results could be expected at the end of 1992. According to the DET, by August 1992 students in Soweto had lost 50% of class attendance and many schools had covered only 20% of the matriculation syllabus.¹⁶⁷ [167 *Business Day* 24 August 1992]

Teachers

Orientation

In 1992 policy debates regarding teacher education in South Africa focused on two issues, ie how to

provide sufficient numbers of qualified teachers in order to reduce racial disparities in pupil/teacher and teacher/classroom ratios and to reduce high drop-out rates, and how to improve the quality of teaching. The latter issue included the question of how to improve the professional qualifications and academic standards of teachers in all departments of education so as to bring them into line with each other.

The Education Renewal Strategy (ERS), which was published in June 1991, made two major recommendations regarding teacher training. It proposed that unqualified teachers with eight or more years' experience be granted senior certificate status to enable them to embark on further studies to upgrade their qualifications. This proposal was seen as addressing a weakness in teacher training programmes, which made no provision for teachers without a matriculation certificate to improve their qualifications at teacher training colleges. In 1991 there were 31 483 African teachers without a matriculation certificate at primary and secondary schools in South Africa (including all ten homelands). These teachers constituted 16% of the total of 199 452 teachers employed by the DET and homeland education departments.¹⁶⁸ [¹⁶⁸ DET, annual report 1991, pp250-251; Figures for the 'independent' homelands supplied by RIEP, 27 August 1992]

A second recommendation of the ERS document was that the South African Council for Education investigate the possibility of a period of intemship for trainee teachers, set national academic standards for teacher training programmes and provide a simplified national qualification structure which would promote greater co-ordination and student mobility between teacher training colleges, technikons and universities. The document also proposed that a national distance teacher training programme be integrated into the recommended qualification structure, which would take account of the practical component of teaching. The ERS report recommended the full utilisation of existing teacher training facilities in order to train sufficient numbers of primary school teachers to ensure compulsory schooling for all (presumably seven years) by the year 2000. The ERS also suggested that the student/lecturer ratio at colleges of education be increased to 25:1.¹⁶⁹ [¹⁶⁹ Department of National Education, *Education Renewal Strategy*, pp40-44]

According to the DET, the recommendations contained in the ERS document were to be considered in 1992, together with the findings of a 1991 task force to investigate various aspects of teacher training. A national programme to rationalise teacher training colleges, including increasing the student/lecturer ratio at the 108 teacher training colleges, was under discussion in all departments of education.¹⁷⁰ [¹⁷⁰ *Hansard* (R) 22 q col 1423, 17 June 1992]

Numbers and qualifications

In 1991 the number of teachers employed at public primary and secondary schools was as follows: 53 379 teachers were employed in the Department of Education and Culture in the House of Assembly¹⁷¹ [¹⁷¹ Information supplied by Mrs Wilken, an official in the Department of Education and Culture (House of

Assembly), 20 August 1992¹⁷¹; 36 549 teachers were employed in the Department of Education and Culture in the House of Representatives¹⁷² [¹⁷² Information supplied by Mr C L Pretorius, an official in the Department of Education and Culture (House of Representatives), 20 August 1992¹⁷¹]; and 191 241 teachers were employed in the DET and the education departments in the ten homelands.¹⁷³ [¹⁷³ DET, annual report 1991, pp250-253; Figures for the 'independent' homelands supplied by RIEP, 25 August 1992¹⁷¹]

Since 1983 the minimum requirement for professionally qualified teacher status has been a matriculation certificate and a minimum of a three-year teacher's diploma (M+3), or a degree course and teacher's diploma, although a number of departments offered a four-year diploma course. Previously, black teachers could obtain teachers' qualifications with a standard 6 or a standard 8 certificate followed by a two- or three-year diploma course at a college of education.¹⁷⁴ [¹⁷⁴ Sieborger R and Kenyon A, Initial Teacher Education' in *McGregors Education Alternatives*, pp146-148¹⁷¹]

There were no unqualified teachers (ie with less than M+3 status) employed in the Department of Education and Culture in the House of Assembly in 1992. There was a total of 225 unqualified teachers at Indian schools at the beginning of 1992.¹⁷⁵ [¹⁷⁵ Information supplied by the Department of Education and Culture (House of Delegates) on 23 July 1992¹⁷¹]

In 1991 teacher qualifications at African schools in South Africa (including all ten homelands) and coloured schools were as follows:¹⁷⁶ [¹⁷⁶ DET annual report 1991, pp250-252; Information supplied by RIEP, 25 August 1992; and information supplied by Mr C L Pretorius in the Department of Education and Culture (House of Representatives), 20 August 1992¹⁷¹]

Teacher qualification in African and coloured schools: 1991^a

African

Coloured

Professionally qualified with

Below std 8

15 033

33

Std 8 or std 9

22 948

5 672

Std 10 + 2 years' teacher training

43 598

2 542

Std 10 + diploma

87 778

17 369

Degree + diploma

12 165

5 700

Technical qualification + diploma

23

83

Unqualified with

Below std 10

5 370

300

Std 10

17 002

695

Degree

1 141

265

Technical qualification

90

176

a

Includes all ten homelands and includes teachers of other race groups employed in these educational

Teacher training

In 1991 there were 75 910 students enrolled at teacher training colleges in South Africa (including all ten homelands). Of the total number enrolled the majority were African (57 567 or 76% of the total), 7 851 were coloured (10% of the total), 1 726 were Indian (2%) and 8 766 (12%) were white.¹⁷⁷ [¹⁷⁷

Department of National Education, *Education Realities in South Africa 1991*, July 1992, p13]

The declining demand for places at white teacher training colleges by white trainees resulted in the closure of five white colleges of education between 1990 and 1992. The Department of Education and Culture in the House of Assembly said in July 1992 that colleges of education administered by the department could accommodate 13 609 trainee teachers, while only 8 930 students were enrolled at the colleges in 1992.¹⁷⁸ [¹⁷⁸ Personal communication with Mrs Wilken in the Department of Education and Culture (House of Assembly) on 23 July 1992]

However, a relatively high demand for places at colleges of education for Africans during the period under review resulted in these colleges admitting students beyond their enrolment capacity. A survey by the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) in 1991 found, for example, that the combined capacity of 31 colleges of education in the homelands was 17 776, while actual enrolment was 23 997, 35% above capacity. The study found that the number of African students at colleges of education had increased by 1 114% between 1960 and 1990, while pupil numbers at primary and secondary schools had increased by 510% and the number of teachers had increased by 666% over the same period.¹⁷⁹ [¹⁷⁹ Orbach E, 'A development perspective on the role and

function of black colleges of education in South Africa' in *Development Southern Africa*, May 1992, pp199-201]

The DBSA study suggested that African colleges of education could be producing an oversupply of trainee teachers in some regions and in some subjects while critical shortages of teachers in other areas and subjects continued to exist. The survey identified Bophuthatswana, the Ciskei, Lebowa, QwaQwa, Venda and the non-homeland area as regions where a surplus of teachers was likely to occur, while areas such as Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele and KwaZulu were likely to experience critical shortages of teachers by the year 2000.¹⁸⁰ [180 Ibid,p203]

The minister of education and training, Mr Sam de Beer, said in Parliament in March 1992 that approximately 70 000 African students had been refused admission to teacher training colleges at the beginning of 1992. He indicated that while there was no shortage of teachers in the DET there was a shortage of posts and of fully qualified teachers to teach certain subjects, such as accountancy, Afrikaans, biology, English, mathematics, physical science and technical subjects.¹⁸¹ [181 *Hansard* (A) 6 q cols 550-551, 25 March 1992]

According to the DBSA, the 'phenomenal' growth in the demand for places at African colleges of education could be explained by the high pupil growth rates in African schools and lower pupil/teacher ratios. However, other factors causing Africans to opt for teaching included limitations on African entry to certain skilled occupations, limited access to other tertiary educational institutions, the low academic requirements for admission and low fees at these colleges.¹⁸² [182 Orbach E, 'A Development perspective on the role and function of black colleges of education in South Africa', pp201-202]

The DBSA pointed out that structural imbalances were worsened by the level at which trainee teachers were preparing to teach and the subjects chosen as areas of specialisation.

Between 1985 and 1989 teachers receiving secondary diplomas at African colleges of education chose as their areas of specialisation languages (45% of all trainees) and other humanities (25%) rather than accountancy (9%), business economics (7%), mathematics (13%), physical science (8%) and technical subjects (3%).¹⁸³ [183 Orbach E, 'A development perspective on the role and function of black colleges of education in South Africa', p206]

According to the DBSA, enrolment patterns indicated that a greater shortage of primary rather than secondary teachers was likely to emerge and that a shortage of teachers in the vocational and technical fields would develop if more emphasis was to be placed on vocational or technical training at secondary level.

Conditions of service and retrenchments

Salaries of male and female teachers were equalised in all education departments on 1 July 1992 when female teachers received a salary adjustment exceeding the 9,9% salary increase for all teachers at schools and colleges of education.¹⁸⁴ [¹⁸⁴ *The Weekly MaU* 26 June 1992]

In terms of legislation passed in July 1992 teachers in all departments of education who were 50 years of age, had been members of the government pension fund and who had at least ten years of continuous service were eligible for early retirement. Teachers who decided to take advantage of the offer were to receive reduced pension benefits, calculated at a 0,4% reduction in gratuity and annuity for each month of retirement taken before the previously applicable retirement age (which varied from one department to another).¹⁸⁵ [¹⁸⁵ *Hansard (IC)* 20 col 10743, 11 June 1992]

The Department of Education and Culture (House of Assembly) indicated that between 1987 and 1991, 3 169 white teachers were retrenched or retired owing to a surplus of teachers in that department. In August 1992 a further 4 000 teachers lost their jobs at white schools as a result of new staffing scales which came into operation with the conversion to the model C system. In September 1992 it was reported that a number of these retrenched teachers were accepting early retirement packages (including pension payouts) and then taking up new posts at other schools. A spokesman for the Department of Education and Culture (House of Assembly), Mr Frans Basson, said that it was legally possible for retrenched teachers to apply for other teaching posts if vacancies existed.¹⁸⁶ [¹⁸⁶ *The Star* 25 September 1992]

Speaking during the budget vote for national education, Mr Clifford Nasson MP (Labour Party) said that the early retirement packages offered to white teachers in terms of the conversion to model C schools should also be made available to teachers in other education departments. He said on average each white teacher who was retired early would receive a gratuity of R81 000 and a monthly pension of about R2 100 for the rest of his or her life. By contrast the Department of Education and Culture in the House of Representatives made a one-off donation of R6m to 12 000 coloured teachers who wished to retire. Each coloured teacher would receive a gratuity of R380.¹⁸⁷ [¹⁸⁷ *The Citizen* 28 April 1992]

In September 1992 it was announced that teachers in the Department of Education and Culture in the House of Representatives would be eligible for early retirement with effect from January 1993 if they had at least ten years of continuous service. The department said that the offer had been extended to all teachers in view of a R94m shortfall in its budget for 1992/93. According to the minister of education and culture in the House of Representatives, Mr Abe Williams, up to 3 200 teachers would be allowed early retirement.¹⁸⁸ [¹⁸⁸ *The Daily Dispatch* 30 September 1992, *The Citizen* 7 October 1992]

Further rationalisation measures in coloured education included a freeze on all new appointments with effect from 1 January 1993, the release of all temporary teachers whose contracts ended in December 1992, the withdrawal of transport allowances for teachers, the cancellation of study leave and long leave, the suspension on the delivery of all new textbooks and handbooks to pupils, the cancellation of subsidies to

special schools and a freeze on all maintenance work at schools. Mr Williams subsequently announced that the proposed rationalisation measures were to be delayed after they had been widely rejected by teacher organisations, including the Cape Teachers' Professional Association, the South African Democratic Teachers' Union (Sadtu), the Teachers' League of South Africa, and the Union of Teachers' Associations of South Africa.¹⁸⁹ [¹⁸⁹ *South* 26 September 1992; Press release by the minister of education and culture (House of Representatives), 15 October 1992]

The minister of education and culture in the House of Delegates, Dr Kisten Rajoo, indicated in March 1992 that in 1991, 2 734 Indian teachers were regarded as 'surplus' teachers. Of this number 509 teachers were granted early retirement in terms of rationalisation measures implemented by the department and a further 22 teachers lost their posts because they were unable to move to other areas.¹⁹⁰ [¹⁹⁰ *Hansard (D)* 7 q col 594,70 *Mardi* 1992]

No statistics on teacher retrenchments were available from other education departments.

During the course of 1992 conflict arose between Sadtu and the black departments of education. The conflict centred on collective bargaining rights and the alleged refusal of various departments of education to grant recognition to Sadtu. However, the focus of the conflict shifted during the year to localised and regional disputes around alleged harassment of Sadtu members, poor conditions of service and continued violence in certain schools (see chapter on *Political Developments*).

In May 1992 Sadtu launched a two-day national protest action campaign to compel the Department of Education and Training (DET) and other education departments to grant recognition to the union.¹⁹¹ [¹⁹¹ *Financial Mail* 29 May 1992] In August a further two school days were lost when Sadtu decided to join the national mass action campaign launched by the African National Congress and its allies. Schools in Soweto and other parts of the Reef lost a full week of schooling as the mass action campaign was linked to demands for the reinstatement of dismissed teachers.

After Sadtu threatened to hold a national strike in August 1992, the DET agreed to recognise the union and dismissed or suspended teachers were reinstated. Negotiations between Sadtu and the DET on grievance procedures and the right to strike were continuing at the time of writing. Sadtu also won recognition from educational authorities in the Transkei and Venda during 1992. Earlier in 1992, the DET granted recognition to two other teacher federations, the National Professional Teachers' Organisation and the Forum of Recognised Teachers' Associations.

Adult education

In 1991, 66 794 students were taking adult education courses at 264 public, private and state-aided centres (including satellite centres) under the DET. The number of students in adult education centres

declined from 104 452 students in 1988 to 66 794 in 1991 (ie by 36%), while the number of centres for adult education declined from 419 in 1988 to 264 by 1991.

In 1991 there were 54 364 students at 708 adult education centres in the non-independent homelands. This represented an increase in enrolment over 1990, when 45 196 students were enrolled at adult education centres. However, student numbers as well as the number of centres providing adult education represented a decline on figures for 1988 (when there were 58 288 students enrolled at 825 centres).¹⁹² [192 DET, annual report 1991, p397; 1991/92 *Survey* p212]

The majority of students at DET-controlled adult education centres (55%) were enrolled for secondary school courses. Most of these were enrolled for matriculation courses, while enrolments for primary and literacy courses were 30% and 15% of the total enrolment respectively. Some 7% of the total enrolment were teachers enrolled for in-service training or teachers wishing to improve their qualifications.¹⁹³ [193 DET, annual report 1991, p113]

Literacy

Estimates of the number of illiterate people in South Africa differed widely, depending on the criteria used. An Integrated Marketing Research survey in 1990 estimated that there were 83m illiterate people in South Africa. This estimate was based on survey findings that 24% of African adults (16 years of age and older) had no schooling, while a further 32% had some primary education only. These groups constituted an estimated 3,5m and 4,8m people respectively.¹⁹⁴ [194 CoetzeeD, Illiteracy in South Africa: Some preventative policies and strategies from a developmental perspective', *Development Southern Africa*, May, 1991, p215; 1991/92 *Survey* p212] Figures supplied by the National Literacy Co-operation (NLC), a national alliance of non-governmental literacy and adult education organisations, put the estimate of illiteracy much higher, at 50% of the South African population (excluding the 'independent' homelands) or 15m people.¹⁹⁵ [195 *New Nation* 31 July 1992]

Given the high drop-out rates at primary school level it appears that illiteracy levels are rising. The government has no plans for developing a nationally co-ordinated literacy scheme. The work of an estimated 108 private-sector and non-governmental organisations involved in literacy and adult basic education continues to be hampered by shortages of funds and other resources. During 1992 an attempt was made to set up a new broader national network of literacy organisations in South Africa. The launch of the South African Association for Literacy and Adult Education in April 1992 was, however, marred by ideological disagreements between participant organisations.¹⁹⁶ [196 De Klerk G, 'Building bridges or building walls', conference report in *Language Projects Review*, May 1992, pp8-10]

The director of projects and planning at the Education Foundation, Mr Silas Zuma, suggested in May

1992 that a national network of community colleges could provide adult basic education and other training opportunities to all those outside the formal system of education.¹⁹⁷ [197 Zurna S, Towards the establishment of community colleges in South Africa - the need, experiences, and progress', Paper delivered to the Education Enrichment Seminar, Volkswagen Conference Centre, 27 May 1992] Community colleges in other countries provided two streams of education—notably an adult schooling programme and two-year feeder courses for further university and technikon education.¹⁹⁸ [198 *Business Day* 27 April 1992]

Technical and Vocational Education and Industrial Training at Secondary and Post-Secondary Level

Technical colleges and industrial training

Enrolment of African students at technical colleges increased from 6 821 in 1986 to 22 539 in 1992 (an increase of 230 %). However, in 1992 African students still comprised only a quarter of the total enrolment at technical colleges. Between 1986 and 1992 the number of coloured students increased from 3 217 to 7 605 (an increase of 136%), while Indian enrolment increased from 6 068 to 6 241 (an increase of 3%). Over the same period the numbers of white students at technical colleges decreased from 55 070 to 53 562 (a 3% decrease). White students still constituted about two thirds of the total enrolment at technical colleges.¹⁹⁹ [199 1991/92 *Survey* p215. Department of National Education *Preliminary Statistics for 1992*, p13]

Student enrolment

Enrolment by all races at technical colleges in 1992 was as follows:²⁰⁰ [200 *Ibid*]

Enrolment at technical colleges, standard 10 and post-standard 10 level: 1992

Training up to std10
Training up to three years post-std 10
Training exceeding three years post-std10

African^a

19 255

3 281

3

Coloured

5 599

1 995

11

Indian

5 343

898

—

White

37 227

15 622

699

Total

67 424

21 796

713

a

African figures exclude the 'independent' homelands

The Department of National Education reported in July 1992 that between 1986 and 1990 the number of certificates and diplomas on a standard 10 or higher level awarded to whites at technical colleges had increased from about 14 400 to 15 400, while those awarded to coloured people had increased from 1 800 to 2 200. Over the same period there was a decline in the number of certificates and diplomas awarded to Africans (from 3 200 to 2 000), while those awarded to Indians also declined (from 700 to 300).²⁰¹ [201 Department of National Education, *Education Realities in South Africa 1991*, July 1992, p40, p43]

The Department of Education and Culture in the House of Assembly said in July 1992 that in 1991, 2 019 African, 1 298 coloured and 378 Indian students were enrolled at technical colleges previously reserved for whites. Figures for 1992 were not available.²⁰² [202 Personal communication with Mrs Wilken of the Department of Education and Culture (House of Assembly), 23 July 1992] There were 1 237 African students enrolled at technical colleges administered by the Department of Education and Culture in the House of Representatives during 1992.²⁰³ [203 Figures supplied by Mr C L Pretorius of the Department of Education and Culture (House of Representatives), 13 July 1992]

The following table provides a breakdown of full-time student enrolment at technical colleges in terms of subject category and race in 1989:²⁰⁴ [204 Department of National Education, *Education in South Africa 1989*, NATED 02-215 .]

Technical college enrolment by subject category and race: 1989

African^a

Coloured

Indian

White

Agriculture

—

—

—

2

Architecture

—

7

—

29

Arts

33

20

239

873

Commerce

3 374

599

261

5 574

Communication

—

210

—

696

Computer science

—

49

114

1 082

Education

—

51

—

4

Engineering

—

362

273

4 441

Health science

—

56

—

30

Home economics

—

148

184

502

Technical college enrolment by subject category and race: 1989 (continued)

African^a

Coloured

Indian

White

Industrial arts

6 482

1 041

407

4 954

Language

—

3

436

1 549

Law

—

41

—

194

Life science

—

387

170

1 414

Mathematics

—

421

217

1 972

Philosophy and theology

—

—

—

7

Physical education

—

—

65

178

Psychology

—

—

—

12

Public administration

—

60

—

5

Social science

—

31

—

481

Total

98 889

3 486

2 366

12 999

a

African figu

The table above indicates that whereas in 1989 white students at technikons took a wide range of subjects, African students were concentrated in the arts, commerce and industrial arts. Female students constituted 37% of total technical college enrolment, or 14 811 out of a total of 39 736. Black female students constituted only 12,4% of the total enrolment, most being concentrated in commercial and business courses.

The National Manpower Commission reported in January 1992 that between 1984 and 1991 the number of people who had acquired artisan status, the number of apprentices on current contracts and the number of newly indentured apprentices had all declined. The number of artisans declined from 11 306m 1984 to 6 978 in 1991 (a decline of 38%), while the number of apprentices on current contract declined from 37 130 in 1984 to 26 714 in 1991 (a decline of 28%). Over the same period the number of newly indentured apprentices declined from 12 661 to 10 758 (a decline of 15%). (See also chapter on *Employment*.)²⁰⁵ [²⁰⁵ National Manpower Commission, annual report 1991, January 1992, p39]

A study by researchers at the South African Labour Development Research Unit, which was published in August 1992, found that white apprentices comprised 72% of all apprentices and over 68% of all artisans. Although the number of African artisans and apprentices increased substantially from 560 apprentices and 4 600 artisans in the 1970s to 7 200 apprentices and 13 500 artisans in the 1980s, the increase remained limited to specific occupational sectors and limited job categories. African apprentices were concentrated in the building and furniture sectors (see chapter on *Employment*). The majority of female apprentices (75% of whom were white in 1992) were being trained as hairdressers, while a negligible proportion of female artisans or apprentices was to be found in the engineering, metal and other industries.²⁰⁶ [²⁰⁶ Lundett P and Kimmie Z, 'Appreatide training and artisan employment: changing numbers, but maintaining job reservation' in *South African Labour Bulletin*, August 1992, pp40-46]

Technikon and university education

The number of degrees, diplomas and certificates awarded by universities increased from 34 689 in 1985 to 43 970 in 1989 (an increase of 27%) compared to an 87% increase in the number of diplomas and certificates awarded by technikons over the same period (from 5 461 to 10 226)²⁰⁷ [²⁰⁷ 1991/1992 *Survey* p217; National Manpower Commission, annual report 1991, p38]

The following table provides a breakdown of student growth at universities and technikons in South Africa (excluding the 'independent' homelands) between 1988 and 1992.²⁰⁸ [²⁰⁸ National Manpower Commission, annual report 1991, p59; Department of National Education, *Preliminary Educational Statistics for 1992*, pp15-16]

Student enrolment at technikons and universities: 1988–1992

Year

Technikons

Universities

1988

60 232

267 608

1989

68 318

286 347

1990

83 424

286 910

1991

104 652

308 172

1992

114 071

318 965

An analysis of student growth rates over the four-year period between 1988 and 1992 indicates a comparatively faster annual average growth rate in student enrolment at technikons (17,3%) than at universities (4,5%). The overall ratio of student enrolment at universities to student enrolment at technikons has decreased from 4,4:1 in 1988 to 2,8:1 in 1992.

A racial breakdown of student growth at technikons and universities over the period 1988 to 1991 is given below:²⁰⁹ [209 National Manpower Commission, annual report 1991, p59]

Student growth at technikons

Year

African

Coloured

Indian

White

1988

6 911

4 447

4 742

44 132

1991^a

24 228

8 946

6 743

64 735

Increase

251%

101%

42%

47%

Student growth at universities

Year

African

Coloured

Indian

White

1988

74 697

18 000

19 639

155 272

1991^a

110 130

19 575

21 035

157 432

Increase

47%

8%

7%

1%

a

Figures for 1991 exclude 15 716 students at universities and 1 070 students at technikons whose racial classification

Although African enrolment at universities and technikons increased substantially between 1988 and 1991, much of this increase was confined to four universities—the University of South Africa, Vista, the University of the North and the University of the Western Cape—which together accounted for 79% of the increase in African enrolment over that period. Although African enrolment figures increased at all technikons, just one technikon (Technikon RSA) accounted for 56% of all African enrolment in 1991.²¹⁰ [210 1988/89 *Survey*, p299; Department of National Education, *Education Realities in South Africa 1991*, p19] (The ratio of African enrolment at universities to African enrolment at technikons was 5:1 in 1992.)

Between 1985 and 1990 the greatest increases in the number of diplomas and certificates awarded by technikons were in agriculture (198% increase), commerce (157%), public administration (155%), computer science (152%) and social science (151%). There were relatively small increases in the number of students graduating in engineering (27%) and the life sciences (24%).

Policy and funding

In the 1992/93 budget R1,43bn was set aside by the Department of Education and Culture in the House of Assembly as subsidies for universities and R434m as subsidies for technikons. Subsidies for black universities totalled R419m, while R104m was set aside as subsidies for technikons in the 1992/93 financial year.²¹¹ [211 Estimator of revenue and expenditure 1992/93]

A survey undertaken by the media office at the University of the Western Cape in 1991 found that while all universities had been compelled to rationalise services as the result of cutbacks in government subsidies, the method of determining state subsidies had resulted in greater shortfalls at universities with higher student growth rates. The subsidy cutbacks were also affecting programmes aimed at assisting financially and educationally disadvantaged (mainly black) students. The survey found that in 1991 the University of the Witwatersrand (19 316 students) had received R 164m, the University of Cape Town (with a student enrolment of 14 393 in 1991) had received R 120m, the University of Natal (13 764 students) had received R113m, the University of Fort Hare (5 726 students) had received R56m, the University of the Western Cape (13 800 students) had received R55m and Rhodes University (4 196 students) had received R37m. In terms of this allocation the subsidy had covered 71% of total costs at the University of Cape Town, 67% of costs at the University of the Witwatersrand, 60% of costs at Rhodes University, but only 46% of costs at the University of the Western Cape.²¹² [212 Information supplied by the University of the Western Cape (UWC) student affairs division, 7 July 1992]

The vice principal of the University of the Witwatersrand, Professor Peter Tyson, said in March 1992 that first year enrolment figures had declined by 12% owing to the continuing recession and higher university fees in 1992. A decline of 4,4% in first year enrolment was also reported at the University of Cape Town, while first year enrolment dropped by 11% at the University of the Western Cape. At the University of Natal first year enrolment grew by 4% in 1992.²¹³ [213 *Business Day* 19 March 1992; UWC student affairs department 15 October 1992]

The vice chancellor of the University of the Witwatersrand, Professor Robert Chariton, noted in his annual report for 1991 that the cost of university education was approaching a level which was beyond the reach of even middle-class families. He indicated that tuition fees had increased by between 20% and 25% in 1991 and that a further increase of 21% in fees would have to be implemented in 1992.²¹⁴ [214 Report of the vice-chancellor, University of the Witwatersrand, 1991, p5] The University of Cape Town increased fees by 20% in 1991 and 21% in 1992, while the University of the Western Cape increased fees by 35% in 1991.²¹⁵ [215 *The Argus* 7 August 1992]

Speaking after a meeting of the Committee of University Principals (CUP) in April 1992, the director of the CUP, Professor Jos Grobbelaar, said that a virtually interest-free government-funded loan scheme was needed to help make university education available to increasing numbers of students who could no

longer afford the fees. Professor Grobbelaar said that the interest rates on loans provided by commercial banks made studying too expensive, while the loan scheme implemented by the Independent Development Trust (IDT) could not meet the need of the large numbers of students needing assistance.²¹⁶ [²¹⁶ *Business Day* 8 April 1992] According to the IDT, four of the more affluent universities, notably the universities of Cape Town, Natal, Rhodes and the Witwatersrand, received R11m of the R25m set aside as allocations for loans for students in 1991.²¹⁷ [²¹⁷ *The Weekly Mail* 31 July 1992] A spokesman for the IDT, Mr Jolyon Nuttall, said that less money was channelled to historically black universities (although the need was greater) because many black institutions did not have the infrastructure to deal with large sums of money and because fees at the more affluent 'white' universities tended to be higher.²¹⁸ [²¹⁸ *Business Day* 19 May 1992]

In February 1992 the University of the Western Cape reported that 2 956 students owed the university approximately R10m in unpaid tuition and residence fees.²¹⁹ [²¹⁹ *The Argus* 26 February 1992] The University of Natal reported that 700 black students owed the university R2,5m in unpaid fees at the beginning of 1992.²²⁰ [²²⁰ *The Natal Mercury* 10 March 1992]

In May 1992 the South African Students' Congress (Sasco) announced a one-day nationwide campaign to oppose cuts in subsidies to universities. According to Sasco, more than 8 000 students were faced with exclusion from university and technikon examinations owing to financial problems experienced in 1992.²²¹ [²²¹ *Business Day* 19 May 1992] The Students' Representative Council at the University of Cape Town reported in September 1992 that a R4m shortfall in the university financial aid scheme, which was the result of subsidy cuts, would result in the number of bursaries awarded to financially disadvantaged students being reduced from 500 to 100 in 1993.²²² [²²² *Cape Times* 29 September 1992]

The director of public affairs at the University of Durban-Westville, Dr Michael Sutcliffe, said in March 1992 that discussions were taking place among the seven universities with campuses or facilities within a 450km radius of Durban on rationalising services and functions. (The seven were: the University of Durban-Westville, the University of Fort Hare, the University of Natal (with campuses in Durban and Pietermaritzburg), the University of South Africa, the University of the Transkei, and the University of Zululand.) This could include sharing computers and libraries, having joint student support programmes and joint distance learning programmes, and rationalising university departments.²²³ [²²³ *Sunday Tribune* 8 March 1993] The University of the Witwatersrand announced in September 1992 that a number of departments could be closed, while course options would be restricted as part of the inter-university rationalisation programme.²²⁴ [²²⁴ *Business Day* 21 September 1992]

Technikons

Student enrolment by race at the various technikons in 1991 was as follows:²²⁵ [225 Department of National Education, *Education Realities in South Africa 1991*, p19]

African

Coloured

Indian

White

Total

Cape

87

753

55

5 782

6 677

Ciskei

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

487

Mangosuthu

1 564

—

—

—

1 564

ML Sultan

1 664

213

3 713

355

5 945

Natal

438

165

292

4 748

5 653

Northern Transvaal

3 316

5

1

26

3 348

Orange Free State

83

53

3

3 438

3 577

Peninsula

1 189

3 136

96

75

4 496

Port Elizabeth

585

448

80

3 054

4 167

Pretoria

249

72

40

11 126

11 487

RSA

13 479

3 889

2 043

24 295

43 706

Setlogelo

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

498

Transkei

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

85

Vaal Triangle

306

16

87

4 725

5 134

Witwatersrand

1 268

196

333

7 111

8 908

Total

24 228

8 946

6 743

64 735

105 722

N/A - Not available

The following table provides, a breakdown by subject category of diplomas and certificates awarded by technicians in 1985 and 1990:²²⁶ [226 National Manpower Commission, annual report *1991*, p60]

Diplomas and certificates awarded by technicians in 1985 and 1990

1985

1990

Agriculture

137

408

Architecture

333

461

Arts

242

494

Commerce

1 014

2 601

Communication

86

220

Computer science

224

564

Education

67

230

Engineering

2 220

2 822

Health science

523

1 174

Home economics

226

462

Industrial

Diplomas and certificates awarded by technikons in 1985 and 1990 (continued)

1985

1990

Law

—

5

Library science

21

63

Life science

397

493

Mathematics

10

30

Philosophy and theology

—

5

Psychology

4

9

Public administration

375

957

Social science

87

218

Total

6 089

Universities

A breakdown of student enrolment by race at universities in 1992 is provided below:²²⁷ [227 Responses received from various universities]

University enrolment by race: 1992

African

Coloured

Indian

White

Total

Bophuthatswana

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

3 762

Cape Town

2 018

1 897

603

10 082

14 600

Durban-Westville

3 706

171

5 328

447

9 652

Fort Hare

5 948

16

9

28

6 001

Medunsa

2 095

25

244

239

2 603

Natal

2 833

291

3 164

8 098

14 386

The North

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

OFS^a

243

379

11

8 555

9 188

Port Elizabeth

279

570

113

4 201

5 163

Potchefstroom

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Pretoria

577

132

61

22 605

23 375

Rand Afrikaans

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Rhodes

681

148

250

3 148

4 227

Stellenbosch

84

865

31

13 512

14 492

Transkei

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

6 084

Unisa

50 292

4 565

10 048

55 080

119 985

Venda

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Vista

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Western Cape

4 314

7 658

411

298

12 681

Witwatersrand

3 260

338

1 932

14 102

19 632

Zululand

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

a

Orange Free State

A breakdown of degrees and diplomas awarded by faculty in 1989 and 1990 is provided below:²²⁸ [228
National Manpower Commission, annual report 1991, p60; Department of National Education, *Education
Realities in South Africa 1991*, p45]

Degrees and diplomas awarded by universities in South Africa: 1989 and 1990

1989

1990

Agriculture

875

620

Architecture

546

642

Arts (visual/performing)

1 064

717

Arts (other)

4 232

4 284

Commerce

6 043

6 511

Communication

335

350

Computer science

829

786

Education

10 981

10 406

Engineering

1 657

1 698

Health science

3 951

3 889

Law

2 445

2 848

Library and museum science

319

343

Mathematics

677

674

Natural sciences

2 229

2 378

Social science

7 736

8 225

Total

43 919

44 371

Key Projections

- Assessing Policies for Education Excellence said in July 1992 that equalising state per capita expenditure on education at present white levels would consume more than 50% of the entire state budget in the year 2000.
- The Human Sciences Research Council said in August 1992 that the African pupil population could increase to 12,6m by 2001.
- According to an executive director of the Education Foundation, Mr Johan van Zijl, in 2000 there will

be a shortage of 500 000 skilled workers (including managers and professional occupations) and a surplus of 2,4m unskilled workers.

- A lecturer in the Department of Economics at Rhodes University, Mr Andrew Donaldson, estimated that per capita spending on education could be equalised at R1 200 at primary school level and R1 720 at high school level if government spending increased at a real rate of 4% a year and if total pupil enrolment increased to 12,4m

APPENDIX: LEGISLATION

See pages

Additional Appropriation Act of 1992

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41, 514

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160

Social Assistance Act of 1992

298, 299

Transport General Amendment Act of 1992

48, 240

Unemployment Insurance Amendment Act of 1992

66, 320, 358, 359

KwaNdebele

Labour Relat

Cooper, C et. al., Race Relations Survey 1992/93, (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations) 1993.