

UNITY MOVEMENT HISTORY SERIES

THREE HUNDRED YEARS

YEARS

by "MINGUNI"



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19/10/93

THREE HUNDRED YEARS

DEDICATION

The re-publication of "THREE HUNDRED YEARS" has been made possible, largely, through the labour and effort of a band of workers. They, unstintingly, gave their evenings and weekends, stretching over months, in order to complete this project. In doing so, they were motivated, solely, by their devotion and commitment to the cause of liberation.

These workers dedicate their time, labour and effort to ROWYN RAJAH, a young cadre of the Unity Movement, who was tragically killed on 12 October 1985.

THANKS

Our sincere thanks to ANN MACDONALD for drawing the illustration which appears on the cover.

FOREWORD

The publication of *“Three Hundred Years”* by the New Era Fellowship (NEF) in 1952 was an event of particular historical significance. In that year, the South African ruling class planned a gigantic tercentenary celebration — the Van Riebeeck Festival. They hoped to draw the non-citizen oppressed into the extravagant nationalistic orgy to mark 300 years of the “White civilisation” in South Africa. Official and academic historians cobbled together histories which simultaneously falsified and glorified the colonisation of South Africa. The willing participation of the oppressed in this tercentenary celebration would, in the eyes of the rulers, have signified an acceptance of their inferior status. Even more importantly, it would have been a measure of the success with which the subjugation of the “non-white” people had been accomplished.

However, for more than a year before 6 April 1952 — when the national orgy was to reach its peak — the Unity Movement campaigned nation-wide to educate the oppressed as to what those 300 years really meant. In the process of rallying the oppressed to boycott the celebrations, the masses were called upon to reaffirm their commitment to the total emancipation of all the oppressed from colonial domination and exploitation. *“Three Hundred Years”*, the history, was a vital document in this total rejection of the rulers’ plan to inveigle the oppressed masses into celebrating with them. It raised the boycott of the tercentenary celebration to a political level that reflected a growing consciousness among the oppressed. It represented a fundamental breakthrough in the historical perceptions of what had happened in those three centuries. It enabled the oppressed to understand the 300-year process by which poverty, misery, race and colour discrimination and exploitation had become their daily lot — something they had no reason to celebrate!

“Three Hundred Years” was the first work of its kind. Exhaustive research in the archives, the public libraries and in the increasing flood of political literature put out by contending political forces in South Africa, formed one basis of *“Mnguni’s”* work. However, both the quality and purpose of the work derive from the use of the methods of *historical materialism* — Marxist historical analysis. *“The Origin and Development of Segregation in South Africa”* (Van Schoor, 1950) and *“The Rôle of the Missionaries in Conquest”* (Nosipho Majeke, 1952) employed the same method of analysis.¹ All these works provided, in some way, a direct reply to the myths and inventions that made up much of the propaganda created to launch the Van Riebeeck Celebrations.

It is a fact that official and academic historians have largely ignored the pioneering work of writers like *“Mnguni”*, *“Majeke”*, W.P. van Schoor, B.M. Kies, I.B. Tabata or even Edward Roux. All these writers were also active participants in the political movements of their time. The claim was made as late as 1986 in Colin Bundy’s essays in *“Remaking the Past”* that the Marxist historical method was an innovation of historians (academic, of course) who emerged in the 1970s — two decades *after* the appearance of *“Mnguni’s”* work.

1. To this list may be added *“The Awakening of a People”* (I.B. Tabata), *“The Contribution of the Non-European Peoples to World Civilisation”* (B.M. Kies), a brilliant synthesis debunking the myth underlying racism and colour theories and *“The Colour Bar in Education”* (E.L. Maurice), a discerning essay on the origins of the myths of “race” and colour prejudices and their influence on education policies in South Africa.

The re-publication of *"Three Hundred Years"* is a necessary corrective to this kind of error.

Falsification and racist idea-systems (ideologies) relating to both pre-colonial and colonial eras in South Africa's history, are consciously and deliberately demolished in *"Mnguni's"* work. Much new evidence of the nature and spread of pre-colonial societies has been uncovered since 1952 by archeologists. This underlines the general picture drawn by *"Mnguni"* in Volume I, a picture which debunks the popular myths accompanying the Great Trek inland and the myths contained in Government White Papers featuring an unpopulated inland no-man's land into which the Voortrekkers moved without destroying any settled, indigenous societies. The titanic clash between the colonial peoples and the colonisers and between labour and capital in the 19th and 20th centuries in Southern Africa is painstakingly depicted in *"Three Hundred Years"*. But the work is not mere narrative. It stems from the pen and intellect of a scholar and active political partisan who identified himself completely with the struggles of the oppressed masses.

"Official" historians may have chosen to conceal the existence of *"Three Hundred Years"*. But they cannot ignore its impact upon generations who drew upon its teachings in strengthening the foundations of a truly *national* liberatory movement. The movement was developing an independent political ideology, its own democratic aims and its own perspectives. Volumes II and III chronicle the processes of land robbery, proletarianisation of forced labour through the growth of the sugar industry, mining, commercial agriculture and industrialisation and the maturing of class formations. Inevitably, the consolidation of resistance in a national movement against the developing system of "colonial fascism" dominates the analysis *"Mnguni"* provides in his closing chapters. Of this resistance he says: *"From being a struggle against the effects of the system of oppression it became more and more a struggle against the very system itself."* And of the Van Riebeeck tercentenary celebrations (which suffered a 95 percent boycott by the oppressed). *"Mnguni"* comments in his final sentence: *"While the rulers celebrated, the sword of Damocles hung over their heads, for those whom they had conquered and held in thrall for 300 years had become metamorphosed into potential liberators."* That story is unfinished. Nonetheless, *"Three Hundred Years"* occupies a singular place in the arsenal of ideas upon which the successful prosecution of the struggles for emancipation must draw. This place is assured by its re-publication, which is both timely and necessary.

To the stream of manufactured history that has continued to flow from English and Afrikaans universities, and even "people's history workshops" has been added several varieties of "ethnic" history from the newer bush colleges. A new *"Three Hundred Years"* is all the more welcome for these reasons.

R.O. DUDLEY
Cape Town
March 1988

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this history is to expose the process of the conquest, dispossession, enslavement, segregation and disfranchisement of the oppressed Non-Europeans of South Africa, in order that the oppressed as a whole will understand better how to transform the status quo into a society worth living for and worth living in.

The present South Africa, the status quo, did not drop from the heavens. It was man-made. It can be transformed by man. In the very process of conquest, expropriation and enslavement, the conquered were metamorphosed into potential liberators, the conquerors were rendered unfit to manage society, and the artificial restraining walls of colour-discrimination balk progress in all walks of life.

To understand these forces of liberation and reaction and the contemporary struggle between the two, we must understand how both came into being. For we cannot know a phenomena without knowing its history.

To know the past is already a step forward in knowing the road to liberation. This study is not academic, but part of the knowledge of liberation. The study of our past should aid us in unburdening ourselves of the decaying monster, the status quo, which grows hungrier with age, more desperate with time, for its main sustenance is the ignorance, unawareness and passivity of its host, the oppressed, and its death knell is the awakening of the people.

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SECTION I.
BEFORE THE EUROPEAN INVASION.

CHAPTER I.

THE !KE.

Long before the coming of the conquistadores from Europe to South Africa this country was peopled and worked by the three main South African tribal or primitive-communal systems: the !Ke, the Khoi-Khoin and the Bantu. These people lived in the same tribal way as did the ancient inhabitants of old England, old India or old China.

The equalitarianism of this tribalism, embracing first everyone and later only the men, was due to backwardness of productive techniques. There had to be equality because one person's labour could not then support both himself and a non-producer. Exploitation was thus impossible, for all were engaged in the struggle with nature, all had to work or die.

In the absence of exploitation, private property was of no material advantage. In the absence of an incentive—to live or gain from the exploitation of another's labour—the very notion of private property could not arise. Technical backwardness hence excluded not only exploitation but also private property. And so the land, the rivers, forests, minerals, the fruits of the earth and, in the early stages of "tribalism", as with the !Ke (Batwa, "Bushmen"), even the animals belonged to the people in common. Equality in ownership sprang out of backwardness, yet ensured the very physical existence of the primitive societies. For since the means of production belonged not to individuals but to all, none died of want in the midst of plenty. The diet of the !Ke—of meat, milk, fruit, nuts and vegetables—their shelters, their "clothes", all these necessities were as free as the air itself. At the same time these prime necessities had to be fought for all the time, with all the energies of all the people. There was literally no time for exploitation.

The major struggle then was between man and his natural environment, not between man and his fellow-man. But in the very evolution of this struggle tribalism had to destroy itself. For as man gained dominion over nature, by improving his implements and methods of production (including his hunting weapons and methods), he thereby began to gain the possibility of dominion first over women and then over his fellow-man. The advanced tools and methods now made it possible for one person to produce enough for himself and a non-producer. As tribalism developed from the !Ke to the Khoi-Khoin and Bantu level, women became exploited and subjected. Communal or group or temporary monogamous families changed into

polygynous families, where many women were able to produce enough surplus to support one male. There is a sexual division of labour. Private property in cattle emerges. The clan or gens has a male line of descent, a male "ancestor". Men form armies to fight for land, for their cattle, their crops. Men form tribal councils and women became "disfranchised". The evolution of tribalism, to the stage where the women were exploited and reduced in status, where tribal equalitarianism meant equality between men, but inferiority for women—this stage had already been reached in the Khoi-Khoi and Bantu tribal societies. At the time of the coming of the Europeans, tribalism was on the threshold of the development from the enslavement of women by men to the enslavement of men by men. This transformation of the struggle against nature into the struggle against women and, later, men themselves was inherent in every tribal society.

Tribalism was neither idyllic nor permanent. It was a prolonged but developing stage in the unfolding of human civilization, a stage back to which no return is possible, imaginable or desirable.

The impact of Europe on Africa immensely accelerated and transformed the self-development of tribalism into slavery and other exploiting societies. The domestic enslavement of women was augmented by the enslavement of the tribe as a whole, both men and women. The European invasion arrested the internal social differentiation of the male section of the tribe and hence of the tribal families, and converted all tribalists into slaves, serfs or wage-workers. Tribalism was destroyed from without, not from within, catastrophically and suddenly, not "peacefully" and gradually.

This tear-soaked, blood-stained process has to be understood, not mourned. The passing of tribalism was inevitable, however devastating the manner of its demise, however brutal the conquerors, however glorious the resistance of the conquered.

GENESIS.

The oldest of the ancient inhabitants of South Africa were the !Ke or Batwa, whom the Europeans called "Bushmen". The early !Ke belonged to the Capsian stone-working peoples of Natal, the Cape, Uganda, Syria, Ceylon, Spain and Italy.¹ They left relics in East London,² in Natal, the Transvaal and Spain. They peopled many lands and the whole of Africa was their home.

They had long forgotten and emerged from the millions of years during which man evolved from the origin of his species, which may have been the Lake Districts of East Africa.³ For, as far back as fifteen million years ago human-like beings were already living in the Transvaal, similar to those early beings of India, Java and China, and the evolution of the ancestors of the human race had already gone on for ages before even that time.⁴ In the Transvaal lie skulls, with brains larger than those of "Bismarck or Sir Walter Scott", which Broome blasted from the bowels of the earth, exclaiming that these were the probable forerunners of the "Bushmen".⁵ Dynamite revealed skulls at Taungs and elsewhere showing that their owners had lived in caves, hunted and used digging tools.⁶ From

1. A. J. H. Goodwin: "Capsian Affinities of S.A. Stone-Age Culture", in S.A. Journal of Science, Vol. 22, Nov. 1925.
2. G. R. Mackay: "Antiquity of Man in S.A." in "Belangrike Historische Dokumenten", by G. M. Theal, Vol. 2, 1896.
3. E. S. Leakey: "Science News", September 1950
4. R. Broome: "The Natives of S.A.", 1923.
5. *Ibid.*
6. R. Broome: "The Missing Link", p. 36, 1950.

such beginnings arose the human race, which reached its manhood through using and making tools. For

“Man, renouncing his bodily faculties, develops his tools, and for this purpose, to have his hands free, adopts the upright gait.”

Millions of years after this primeval development, the !Ke began to weave the fabric of civilization. They recorded for posterity, through their paintings in the Transvaal⁸ and in Spain,⁹ how they spent their lives, how they ensured that the human species would reign supreme for all time. For they were conquerors, subjugators and complete masters of the animal kingdom, these people whom Frobenius extolled as the

“typical hunters of the world, the lovers of freedom and independence”.¹⁰

Through the shrouds of time they moved southwards until they occupied, hunted, gathered food and painted in the southern half of Africa, leaving behind them indelible paintings and engravings which neither time nor man could erase.

AN IRON-AGE PEOPLE.

The great hunters, contrary to the teachings of the Aryans in anthropology, did not merely work with pebble, hand-axe and flake-tools. They went beyond the stone-age and worked with iron in their homeland, Africa.

“the classic land of the iron industry amongst primitive peoples”.¹¹

In changing over from stone to iron tools the Batwa made a fundamental contribution to human culture. He suffered the setback which went along with this switch-over, the temporary regression whilst learning to make and handle new tools. Then, with iron weapons, and weapons were his main tools, he went ahead towards the total conquest of the animals.

With this advance in hunting, due to the development of his weapons, went progress in the use of fire. Unlike some other primitive peoples who could merely keep a fire burning in a “fire-station”, the Batwa could actually kindle fire.¹² Fire and iron helped to forge the wondrous art of the Batwa. They enabled him to extract and work with mineral ores from which the colours were made, vegetable dyes being but a minor source of painting materials.¹³ Fire enabled them to melt fat for the mixing of their colours. Fire gave them burnt sticks with which to draw the outlines of their paintings. Their art reflected their technical development.

Yet this same art also reflected their immense backwardness. Since their art was a form of recording their personal or family history, a form of “writing”, it was a remote

“step towards a real phonetic script”.¹⁴

Yet their art was beautiful, whether impressionistic or naturalistic. But script is “ugly”. The Batwa, Eskimos and Australians painted well, but were more backward than tribes who painted badly, but whose drawings came nearer to “writing”. For, as paintings and drawings

“increase in value as written signs, they deteriorate as natural representations”.¹⁵

This backwardness, however, belonged to pioneers along the human road;

7. Dr. Paul Alberg. Quoted in “The Missing Link”, p. 81.

8. Carpe's Expedition. Daily press, October 1950.

9. I. Schapera: “Some Stylistic Affinities of Bushmen Art”. Lecture on July 9th, 1925.

10. Leo Frobenius: “The Childhood of Man”, p. 131 (1909). Keane Trans.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 446.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 135.

13. *Supra*, ref. 9.

14. *Supra*, ref. 10, p. 103.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 115.

for pioneers are more "backward" than those who follow them and build on their achievements.

SOCIAL ORGANISATION.

On the basis of a development in tools and weapons, the Batwa or !Ke developed as hunters. The hunt was the main activity, and hunting the pivot of social life, mythology and customs.

They were organised into monogamous hunting families, not yet into clans.¹⁶ There was no private property of animals (e.g., the cattle of the Bantu), little division of labour between men and women, no organised armies, and hence practical equality existed between the sexes. The hunting families were grouped into hunting "bands" which were part of an embryonic tribal organisation. However, unlike the Khoi-Khoi and Bantu, there was no central tribal authority. Nor did membership of the "tribe" rest on kinship, as was the case with the Khoi-Khoi; or on allegiance to the king, as was the case with the Bantu. Membership of the "tribe" rested on common respect for a "totem" which was a symbol of and arose out of the hunting existence of these people. Rare or feared or useful or other animals became the symbol of the tribe, and, as in Egypt and North America, could be reincarnated. Thus the old Egyptians used to "worship" the pig or crocodile; and the North American Indians "worshipped" the raven, bear or wolf. So it was with the Batwa hunters. This expressed and perpetuated a very loose "tribal" organisation. This looseness proved fatal when the wars of dispossession came.

"RELIGION".

From the hunt as the mainspring of activity arose a "solar religion":

"The whole system of the sun, moon and stars enters simultaneously and compendiously into their mythology."¹⁷

This "solar worship", however, arose not because the Batwa were harvesters, like the Khoi-Khoi and Bantu, but because they were great travellers, and the sun, moon and stars were their compass, without which they would get lost or perish. They did have "rain-worship",¹⁸ but this arose not out of agriculture but because the rain would bring the rivers, grass and forests to life and an abundant animal life would be available for hunting.

The hunter is an individualist, self-conscious and proud. And so, for the Batwa or !Ke, the Supreme Being was man himself. For it was the man Cagn who made the world, stars, moon, sun and life.¹⁹ It was Cagn, the man, who changed the slayers of his son, Cogaz, into baboons²⁰ and condemned them to live on scorpions and spiders to the end of time. Man, the hunter, the stalker, the slayer of living creatures, was the creator of life, and the centre of the world. He was supreme on his own domain, for it was death to all living creatures, whether animal or human stranger, to roam on the hunting grounds which were his for use, although belonging to the tribe as a whole. Hunting was the pivot of life, including ideas.

RELATIONS WITH OTHER PEOPLES.

Annihilation by the conquistadores could not destroy the !Ke physically. For those who preceded or survived this destruction inter-bred with Khoi-

16. Lord Hailey: "African Survey", p. 831.

17. *Supra*, ref. 10, p. 332.

18. Rev. T. W. Green: "Account of Bushmen Paintings", August 1885.

19. *Supra*, ref. 17, p. 118.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 129.

Khoi, Bantu, Malay slaves and European conquerors.

Batwa blood runs through the veins of Persians, Indians and Arabs whose forefathers traded with the Batwa at Sofala and elsewhere as late as 950 A.D. Batwa blood courses through the "pure" Zulu, amongst whom they lived right up to the 19th century, and who were forbidden by the first Boer Republic of Natal to mix with the Batwa (G. W. Eybers, p. 152). The Batwa are part of the Pondo, Tembu and Xhosa. The Khoi-Khoi inherited not only some of the language traits, but also the stock of the !Ke. The 18th century Boer frontier cattle-farmers enserfed the children of the !Ke whom they slayed, brought forth progeny from these serfs, and then abused the stock of their !Ke "wives" as yellow pigmies. But even the racialistic Broome admits that, before the European conquest of the Batwa, they were

"men and women of quite ordinary size".²¹

The technique, social organisation, language and physical nature of the !Ke were handed on to succeeding peoples, mostly their conquerors. What is known as the "Bushmen", the !Ke, the Batwa, virtually vanished from the face of South Africa. The "Red Indians" of North America were likewise annihilated, both having many similar features in their whole organisation. But, in destruction itself, their whole heritage was transmitted, changed, adapted, built upon and, often in unrecognisable shape, is yet everywhere to be seen even in 20th century South Africa.

21. *Supra*, ref. 4.

CHAPTER II.

THE KHOI-KHOIN AND BANTU.

The other two tribal groups, besides the Batwa, were the Khoi-Khoi, whom the Europeans called the Hottentots, because they could not understand their language, and the Bantu, whom the European Christians called Kaffirs (unbelievers), because these people did not worship "idols, crucifixes", virgin mothers or anthropomorphic gods. Both Khoi-Khoi and Bantu, in spite of certain inner differences, belong to the same historical period: the period of pastoral tribalists, owning the land in common, having domesticated animals and some control over the fruits of the soil.

SOUTHWARD MIGRATIONS.

The Khoi-Khoi and Bantu had reached South Africa as the result of four great southward treks, involving the mass movement of millions of people across thousands of miles, treks which make the Voortrekker "treks", of a few thousand people across a few hundred miles, look like a farcical imitation of the real thing.

Du Bois traces one wave of Khoi-Khoi migration back to 1000 B.C. when Abyssinian pressure on Ethiopia, where Khoi-Khoins lived, drove these people south.²² Even before this, some 500 years before, however, Khoi-Khoi tribalists appear to have been settled far from Ethiopia and to have been in close touch with this land. This is illustrated in a mural on the walls of the temple of Beir el Bahri built by Queen Hetshepsut, and designed by Tuthmosis II. The mural shows an expedition to the legendary gold city of Punt, and on it

"The King and Queen of Punt are represented as of the modern Hottentot type, and the Queen with the characteristic steotapygia".²³ Thus more than 3,500 years ago the Khoi-Khoins had built a stable tribal society with a centralised monarchy. Through the succeeding thousands of years the Khoi-Khoi tribalists trekked southwards, reached South Africa, came in intimate contact with the !Ke, and from about 1000 A.D. herded and traded in this country.

The Bantu pastoralists came south at a later date. They remained for centuries in contact with a variety of superior civilizations, from whom they either fled in the course of time, or with whom they remained.

The first movement seems to have arisen from a clash between the incompatible systems of the Bantu and Sudanese-Negro states.²⁴ The former were tribal, the latter already developed into feudal-like or slave-like monarchies. This clash of two irreconcilable African systems of land tenure and labour relations sent the Bantu moving southwards towards safer pastures for their cattle. This movement may have begun as far back

22. B. Du Bois: "The World and Africa" (1947), p. 166.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 128.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

as 300 A.D., when the first Sudanese Negro state, Ghana, became a dominant force.

The second southward movement of the Bantu was the result of the incompatibility between the tribal Bantu organisation and the slave and commercial system of the conquering Mohamedans from the 7th century onwards. The Mohamedans came along the Zambesi under Said and Suleiman of Oman and reached the "land of Zing" in 695, encountering tribal dwellers en route. The tribalists viewed the intruders as slavers; their trade penetrated and corrupted the tribal economy and morals. The Arabs occupied the East Coast of Africa, and while some Bantu lived with or under them, others once more fled south. Yet others, more north, were enslaved, with the Negroes as fellow-slaves. There were fierce struggles between the enslaved tribalists and the Arab slave-masters. Such a struggle raged from 850 to 883, during which period the "Lord of the Blacks" led a slave revolt and Basra was "sacked". From such enslavement by the Mohamedans the free Bantu trekked:

"We shall probably not be far from the truth if we place the first great southern migration of the Bantu at about this period".²⁵

These treks could not help the Bantu to escape the effects of the Arab invasion of Africa. Nor could the invaders enslave or trade without assimilating features of the Bantu way of life. Thus Swahili, the Bantu language, became the lingua franca of the Indian Ocean trade.²⁶ And, on the other hand, Asian culture penetrated into Bantu culture; there was an intercourse lasting for centuries. This long interaction found expression in the "mysterious" Zimbabwe ruins.

The third great wave of southward movement of the Bantu followed the introduction of slavery by the Christians from Europe, from the 16th century onwards. This slave traffic produced a three-pronged movement from central and east Africa: towards the west moved the Herero and Damara; down the centre came the Barotse and Bawenda; along the East Coast came the Nguni (Tembu, Swazi, Xhosa, pre-Zulu, etc.).²⁷ Behind these groups came the slave-traders from Western Europe and America, running amok across a continent, from whom people fled in millions, leaving behind them the ruins of civilizations which had taken centuries to build. The Portuguese were "dumbfounded" by the civilizations of the interior.²⁸ They found that deep-level goldmining was long known.²⁹ Recently there was discovered the ruins of Kilwa Kisiwani, an African city twice sacked by the Portuguese, who regarded it as one of the most beautiful cities of the world.³⁰ Such cities were as African as they were Arabic, for Africa and the East had already been in contact with each other for 1,000 years before their towns were "discovered" by the Europeans. The Bantu tribal structure was firm and strong by the time of the Portuguese conquest of Mozambique, and was able to stay outside the slave system for some time. In 1730 the Dutch had to give up a slave-recruiting depot, founded in 1721 at Delagoa Bay,³¹ because slavery was repugnant to the tribalists, and the Bantu were strong enough to reject it. Elsewhere, however, the slave traffic drove the Bantu before it towards South Africa, which they entered probably a short while before the ships of Van Riebeeck put into Table Bay in 1652.

25. I. Schapera: "The Bantu-speaking Tribes of S.A." (1936), p. 7.

26. D. Westernman: "Swahili as the Lingua Franca of E. Africa" (1933).

27. C. G. Seligman: "Races of Africa" (1930); I. Schapera: "The Khoisan Peoples of S.A." (1930).

28. R. Michelet: "African Empires and Civilization" (1933).

29. Caton Thompson: "Zimbabwe Culture" (1931).

30. "Cape Argus", 11th November, 1950.

31. V. De Kock: "Those in Bondage", p. 30.

ECONOMIC ORGANISATION.

The Khoi-Khoïn and Bantu tribes had no private property in land. The land belonged to the tribe as a whole. So, too, did all the natural resources, such as water supplies. The land was inalienable and could not be sold by a chief. Thus it was impossible for a Moshoeshoe to sell land to the Wesleyans, or for a Tshaka to sell half of Natal to Farewell. The chief could only grant the use of the land. Even then other members of the tribe could use the granted land. Thus when a group left one tribe, "its" land reverted to the tribe as a whole. The new group joined another tribe by paying "tribute", which was a "citizenship" fee, an "entrance fee" to membership of the tribe. They were then granted the use of land, but any other member of the same tribe could also live on this land. There was no boundary to the land thus granted for use, for this use was not exclusive. Thus a Moroka could not lawfully claim that Moshoeshoe "violated" Thaba 'Nchu's "boundaries", for there were no boundaries to be violated.

On the other hand, strange clans (in the case of the Khoi-Khoïns) or members of a strange tribe or non-tribalists could not use the land or water or forests without the permission of the chief. The Portuguese navigator, Vasco Da Gama, violated such tribal laws, by using water or wood without permission, and was wounded at St. Helena Bay as a result. A similar story lies behind the lawful destruction of Francisco D'Almeida and 65 of his men by Khoi-Khoïns in 1510.

On the land thus possessed and controlled by the tribe, the Khoi-Khoïn and Bantu practised their pastoral arts. The Khoi-Khoïn had long-horned cattle and fat-tailed sheep and were such skilled cattle breeders that the European colonizers were ordered to learn from them how to evolve better breeds. From the skins of their cattle they made leather vessels, drum instruments, clothing, shields and huts. From the horns were made receptacles, from the dung, plaster. The cattle were used as beasts of burden, as means to pay fines and to barter. This, too, was the position with the Bantu herders, who made additional use of their cattle, such as in the "payment" of "lobola" when marrying.

In addition to working with domesticated animals, the central form of economic activity, these tribalists were agriculturalists. In this respect the Bantu surpassed the Khoi-Khoïn, who grew "dacha", wild vegetables and fruit, but did not rotate the use of pasture and arable ground as the Bantu did. The Khoi-Khoïns were, however, harvesters of crops. This was mirrored in their solar religion, which did not rest on an existence as hunting travellers (as was the case with the !Ke) but on their existence as agriculturalists. Thus the solar-sky worship of Eyeru shows that agriculture among the Khoi-Khoïn was very, very old.³² The fact that the Khoi-Khoïns were agriculturalists is shown in the weakness of totemism and the existence of ancestor-worship (a much higher form of "religion"), which was likewise part of the "religion" of the Bantu.

En passant, we know that "historians" and "anthropologists" have tried to paint the Khoi-Khoïns as infinitely inferior to the Bantu, both physically and in their social and economic organisation. The simple fact is that both owned the land in common, both were pastoralists, both had private property in cattle, both were agriculturalists (differing only in degree), both had a developed (agricultural) form of solar-worship, both had ancestor-worship, both had collective labour, both had polygamous families in which

32. L. Frobenius: "The Childhood of Man", p. 380.

women were already made inferior, and both had a centralised tribal authority, with a King or Queen at the head. The Khoi-Khoins were, historically speaking, on the same level as the Bantu.

Labour in herding, farming or industry was collective or for the good of the group. As in the old Indian villages, each Khoi-Khoi or Bantu village was worked on the basis of mutual family obligations.³³ Labour was co-operative. In more advanced tribes there was division of labour, but even specialists in pottery, metal work, leather, etc., had to do their share of collective labour. Production was for collective use, and not for private gain. Even individual property in personal effects, cattle, and individual land rights for residence and cultivation, had to be administered for the common good of the clan (Khoi-Khoi) or triblet (Bantu). At the same time the development of such private property as well as the sexual division of labour and of warfare led to the subjection and inferior status of women in the more advanced tribal organisations.

Trade was done by barter. The Khoi-Khoins were skilled traders with whom the Dutch East India Company often could not cope. This, in fact, accelerated their conquest, for they almost traded themselves right out of their cattle before the Dutch made war on them to take the rest by force. They were thus stripped both by trade and by conquest.

In trade almost anything served as "money"—cattle, beads, arrows, and labour itself (paid for in kind by the "hirer"). Inter-tribal trading covered almost the whole of South Africa, and was said by Khoi-Khoins conversing with Van Riebeeck to stretch at that time from the Cape to Mozambique.

This, then, was the rich and varied economic life of the Khoi-Khoi and Bantu tribalists. Collective labour and mutual obligations towards the common possessors of the inalienable land bound the tribal units tightly together and found expression in centralised tribal authorities, councils of the people, and Kings and Queens.

/ SOCIAL AND "POLITICAL" ORGANISATION.

The unit of the tribe was the polygamous family. In both, though more so with the Bantu, the male was "pater familias" and the woman subjected, reflecting a sexual division of labour in which men controlled the main pursuits, army and implements, and hence the fruits of such pursuits and techniques (e.g. cattle and usufruct of grazing land). With the Khoi-Khoins the families were grouped into clans of common ancestry and the clans were combined to form the tribe as a whole. Kinship formed the common bond. With the Bantu the polygamous family also was the social unit, but families were grouped into triblets rather than clans. The triblets were part of the bigger tribe. Membership of the tribe did not depend on kinship, but on allegiance to the chief of the tribe. Thus any stranger could become a member of the tribe by paying allegiance to its head.

The chief took his policy from the central council, which any man of the tribe could attend. At this "open court" he could cross-question accused persons, act as witness and help in the framing of the judgment and sentence. The whole male population thus ruled the tribe. Under advanced tribalism (i.e. beyond the !Ke stage) women were subjected but treated with the utmost respect. Queens frequently administered the affairs of the tribe. The chieftainship was hereditary in most cases. The hereditary chief, however, was not absolute and had no arbitrary powers.

33. G. P. Lestrade: "The Bantu Speaking Tribes of S.A.", p. 120.

MILITARY ORGANISATION.

Unlike the !Ke, the Khoi-Khoïn and Bantu had a military organisation. A well-formed army did not reflect "barbarism" or backwardness. It reflected development, both of techniques and of a potential to exploit, in accordance with the general development of the tribe:

"Property and organised society must be indicated as the factors that control and determine the conditions of regular warfare."³⁴

Inter-tribal wars sprang from the struggles for pasture land between tribes which were equalitarian internally yet exclusively. Such wars often fused techniques which had previously remained isolated. The same thing happened when tribes united for fear of or in war against foreign European invaders. Armies arose from struggles for land, and in turn often acted as a lever for progress.

Before the Dutch came in touch with the Xhosa from the Cape Province, and before the Portuguese came in touch with the Natal Bantu, during the 18th century, the rules and customs and ethics of war were considerably different from what they were after this impinging of European civilization upon the Bantu civilization.

In these pre-European years it was not usual for tribes to be destroyed or ruined in war. Once the one side had demonstrated its superiority there was peace. "Inferiors" and non-combatants like the aged, women and children were respected. During the wars with the Boers and British the Khoi-Khoïn and the Bantu frequently succoured European women and children, and gave them safe conduct before hostilities. Prisoners of war were not killed but held for ransom, usually in exchange for cattle. Thus Ngounemma, the outstanding Khoi-Khoïn resister of the 1670s, tried to ransom his comrades who were imprisoned on Robben Island.³⁵ Not knowing or understanding the war ethics of the civilized West, he, of course, failed. A man who sought refuge from an enemy with one's tribe could not be handed over. He was safe. It was preferable to go to war with those who demanded him than to betray his trust in his protectors.

These ethics of war corresponded to the entire tribal system of the Khoi-Khoïn and Bantu, with common property, co-operative labour, mutual respect, work for the good of the tribe as a whole, and justice in the open courts of the tribe. When the tribal system was influenced by the approach of the Europeans in the last quarter of the 18th century, these ethics broke down and the Europeans, who were historically responsible for this, shouted: "You savages!"

"RELIGION", LANGUAGE, ART.

The "religion" of the Khoi-Khoïn and Bantu showed that these groups had advanced into stable pastoral and agricultural societies. Totemism, characteristic of hunters like the !Ke, had long left the collective memory when "experts" studied the tribes.³⁶

Ancestor worship had had a long evolution by the time of the European invasions. Ancestor-relic worship had been superseded by ancestor-image worship and this in turn by abstract ancestor worship by the time of conquest. This mirrored the age and development of the tribes, from the time of their real or mythical founding by their "ancestor".

34. *Supra*, ref. 32, p. 494.

35. D.E.I. Co.: "Dagverhaal", 11th January, 1672.

36. I. Schapera and W. M. Eiselen: "Religious Beliefs and Practices".

Solar-religion rested on agriculture, not on hunting.

The priest-doctor had a social function, and was appointed by the tribe through the King. The sorcerer for private gain was, of course, the enemy of the tribe.³⁷

Tribal religion, like military ethics, degenerated only with the advent of the conquerors, who brought with them their "black-magic" (brought by Whites from medieval Europe), miracles,

"holy water, tapers and crucifixes . . . pictures of the saints . . . the image of the Virgin Mary and other holy effigies".³⁸

Ancestor and solar worship, then, degenerated into the worship of Christian idols and superstitious credulity.

The Bantu languages resemble in structure the languages of other tribalists, such as Latin and Greek, being just as backward and advanced. The Khoi-Khoin languages have features found in the !Ke languages, Indo-Chinese languages and Greek. The Khoi-Khoin and Bantu languages interacted on one another for a long time, as each also did with the !Ke languages. This interaction was part of the physical and social contact between these three groups. Khoi-Khoin and Xhosa intermarried freely for a long period. Thus and through social intercourse in general, Khoi-Khoin clan names, individual names, river names, and language sounds became part and parcel of the Xhosa language.³⁹

It is said that "Xhosa" itself means "black man", and was a name given by the !Ke, not taken by the tribe from an ancestor, for such an ancestor did not exist. The names of the Xhosa Kings, Galeka, Rarabe, Hintsa, Ngqika, are of Khoi-Khoin origin. The Xhosa name for the Supreme Being is a Khoi-Khoin word. The Xhosa name for the Khoi-Khoin people is the same as for Xhosa gatherings. Through the language can be traced the mixing of the Khoi-Khoin and Bantu tribal cultures and languages.

From the Khoi-Khoins the Bantu took the musical "gora".⁴⁰ String instruments were made from hunting weapons. Music was a normal part of daily life. The people sang at work, at war, and at rest.

It was this "racially" mixed, developing, tribal society, with its slowly changing relations, techniques, armies, ethics, music, "religion" and art, this rich and complex self-negating tribalism, which the Europeans, on their own admission, destroyed from without:

"We have undermined the clan system right and left and have riddled its defences through and through with the explosive shells of civilization."⁴¹

But the Khoi-Khoin and Bantu, unlike the !Ke, did not

"melt away before the approach of civilization".⁴²

They were conquered, dispossessed and enslaved by force, and their social organisms were swallowed up by the economies of their conquerors. To this process we now turn.

37. D. Kidd: "Kaffir Socialism" (1908), p. 27.

38. *Supra*, ref. 32, p. 188.

39. A. C. Jordan: Lecture in Cape Town, 11th November, 1951.

40. P. R. Kirby: "Musical Practices of Native Races"

41. *Supra*, ref. 37, p. 41.

42. Selborne Memorandum, p. 36.

SECTION II. THE EUROPEAN INVASION.

CHAPTER III. THE RAPE OF AFRICA.

The European infiltration, penetration, conquest, subjugation and enslavement of the tribal organisations in South Africa was a phase in the European conquest of Africa as a whole. This conquest was necessitated not by ill-will or racial malice of Europeans towards Africans, but by the economic, social and political developments inside Europe from the 15th century onwards.

The Mohamedans had been driven out of the Mediterranean, and powerful financial, commercial and, eventually, manufacturing groups were emerging inside the decaying body of European feudalism. The financiers and traders needed silver and gold for usury and trade—so conquistadores were dispatched to the four corners of the world to obtain these and other metals and minerals. But, since the conquerors themselves could not and would not unearth this wealth themselves, it meant they had to conquer the indigenous peoples in order to make them slaves in the mines. The manufacturers needed raw materials to work up into finished articles in their industries—so conquistadores were sent across the oceans to obtain these raw materials. Once again this could be achieved only by conquering and enslaving the indigenous peoples, robbing them of the land, making them take from their former lands the fruits of nature, not for their own use, but for transport to the conquerors' homeland. The manufacturers needed food for their workmen, so colonial tribalists had to become slaves to feed the working people of the metropolitan countries. The manufacturers, financiers and merchants needed luxury goods, so tribalists in distant lands were enslaved to wring from nature her most precious fruits. For these reasons Europe embarked on the conquest of the world outside, where alone lay boundless land and a bountiful supply of the riches Europe needed, where alone lived enough people to win these riches from the earth. And so the whole colonial world was conquered and enslaved by Europe during the 15th to 19th centuries. And it was on the ruins of the colonial world that Europe rose to splendour, global mastery and "Western" civilization. The hands of the dispossessed tribalists of the Americas, of Asia and of Africa built up Western, European, civilization.

Africa made a particularly heavy and notable contribution to "Western" civilization, for it was from Africa that the main supply of slaves came for two continents—the Americas and Africa itself. The slave traffic, traffic in human beings, was the most important and major trade of all. This traffic laid Africa in ruins. The total European slave trade in Africa cost some thirty million lives,⁴³ ruined the tribal and feudal civilizations of the indigenous peoples, and enabled the masters of Europe to live in luxury and democracy.

43. R. Michelet; Du Bois; Stanley: "Darkest Africa", etc.

THE SLAVE TRADE.

The Portuguese and Spanish Empires were the first great slave-trading states, followed by the Dutch, French and British. The Spanish conquest of the American tribalists cost ten million human lives.⁴⁴ Portugal sacked the Persian Gulf, and from 1480, for 50 years, monopolised the Guinea trade in pepper, ivory, gold and slaves. By 1540 Portugal was dragging 10,000 slaves a year out of Africa for work in South America. The French Huguenots and Spanish Catholics continued the ravages of the Portuguese along the West Coast of Africa.

The Dutch wiped out the inhabitants of Banda in order to establish a monopoly in nutmeg.⁴⁵ In 1619 Holland brought the first Negro slaves from Africa to North America, landing them at Jamestown. African hands began to work the sugar and cotton plantations on which Europe, especially England, fed her people and textile machines.

The British, however, were the supreme enslavers. After the 1648 revolution, led by Cromwell, the British Royal African Company shipped 5,000 slaves a year out of Africa. The British Company of Merchants shipped 20,000 Africans a year with its Bristol boats alone during the first nine years of its going into business in human beings. In 1760 there were 146 slave ships, shipping 36,000 slaves annually out of Africa. For the first 100 years of the British slave trade, two million Africans were torn from their homes to slave in foreign lands.⁴⁶ By 1800 500 British slave ships made up over one-third of the British merchant marine; and four-fifths of British imports came from the West Indian plantations which were worked mainly by African slaves.

For each slave landed in America, five died en route. One-quarter of a million Africans perished annually due to the slave traffic. Even Stanley admits that :

"Every pound weight (of ivory) had cost the life of a woman or child . . . for every two tusks a whole village had been destroyed".⁴⁷

At the height of the ivory traffic 30,000 slaves were exported annually from Zanzibar, many being captured ivory porters. 100,000 died on the way to the sea. 75,000 elephants were slaughtered annually at the peak of the traffic and in 1788 London imported 100 tons of ivory. That year the pianos and cutlery of England were stained with the blood of 200,000 Africans and cost the enslavement of 50,000 Africans.

The slave traffic did not mean only the shipping of slaves from the African to the American coasts. It meant also the kidnapping of slaves from the interior of Africa, transporting them overland or by river to the coastal slave-fairs, killing unfit survivors at these fairs before shipping the remainder in chains to the sugar and cotton plantations of other lands.^{48 49 50} The toll of human lives taken by this traffic is shown by a decision of the Dutch East India Company to pay a premium to the captain of a slave vessel for each slave safely landed over and above half of those shipped.⁵¹ From this it is evident that more than half of the slaves usually died on the voyage itself.

44. W. Howitt: "Colonisation and Christianity" (1838).

45. *Ibid.* Also Haws: "Dawn in Africa".

46. B. Du Bois: "The World and Africa", p. 54.

47. H. Stanley: "In Darkest Africa" (1891).

48. A. Falconbridge: "An Account of the Slave Traffic on the Coast of Africa" (1788).

49. W. Blommaert: "Het Invoeren Van de Slavernij".

50. F. L. Barnard: "Cruise in Mozambique Channel" and J. Mathews: "Voyage to Sierra Leone".

51. V. De Kock: "Those in Bondage", p. 28.

This vast and ruinous slave traffic bore down on the inhabitants of Africa. Slavery destroyed not alone tribal societies, but also other African societies which were comparable with the civilization of Europe itself. Foremost of these were the Sudanese Negro States.

THE DESTRUCTION OF ADVANCED AFRICAN STATES.

Before the Europeans brought slavery to South Africa they laid waste other parts of Africa, much more advanced than the societies of the !Ke, Khoi-Khojn and Bantu. South of the Sahara lay mighty Negro states, which fell distraught before the invaders. These Sudanese States were Negro states which had assimilated much of the culture of the Mohamedans. Armattoe says of them:

"Throughout the whole of the Middle Ages, West Africa had a more solid politico-social organisation, attained a higher degree of internal cohesion, and was more conscious of the social function of science, than Europe"⁵²

and Frobenius says:

"What was revealed by the navigators of the 15th to the 17th centuries furnishes an absolute proof that Negro Africa, which extended south of the desert zone of the Sahara, was in full efflorescence, in all the splendour of harmonious and well-formed civilizations—an efflorescence which the European conquistadores annihilated as far as they progressed"⁵³

Some idea of the degree of development of these states may be gained from the following: Ghana, the first of these Sudanese Negro States (300 to 1200), had a capital of 200,000, and worked with cotton, wool, silk, velvet, copper, gold and silver.⁵⁴ Gao (600 to 1600) had mighty cities like Timbuktoo which had two million citizens and was greater than any city of Europe. Mali (1000 to 1600) had a highly developed agriculture, with a capital of 100,000 people. Songhay had a court in Tombuto where, said Africanus, there were

"Doctors, judges, priests and other learned men"⁵⁵

Massina (1600 to 1800) had a developed taxation, army and a State Council composed of lawyers. Bambara (1600 to 1800) had a capital of 30,000, with two-storey buildings, a great market place and busy river-boat traffic.

Senegal (1000 onwards) had, in Futa, a well-formed theocratic state. Dahomey, Ashanti, Ewe, Yoruba (with its capital, Katanga, surrounded by a wall and six miles in diameter), and Benin (with its dreaded army)—these were more recent states, with centralised monarchies and provincial rulers who were like feudal barons.

Hausa had a capital, Kano, the "London of the Sudan", with fine copper, iron and cotton industries. The Congo State (1300 onwards) had a mighty capital, San Salvadore, which was destroyed by the Portuguese. Mosi had a central court, houses of brick and stone, cereals and a rich commerce. It was remarkably homogenous in social structure and one of the last states to fall before the Europeans.

These advanced tribal, slave or feudal states were reduced to ashes by the various European slave powers. In the 17th century the turn of South Africa was to come.

52. Armattoe: "Golden Age of African Civilization" (1946).

53. Frobenius: "History of African Civilization".

54. R. Michelet: "African Empires and Civilization" (1933).

55. *Ibid.*

CHAPTER IV.

THE COMING OF THE DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY

The instrument for the conquest of the inhabitants of South Africa by the commercial powers of Europe was the colonising and slave-trading organisation known as the Dutch East India Company, founded in 1602 to win slaves, raw materials, precious metals, luxuries and markets for the expanding merchants of Holland.

The Dutch were anticipated but not thwarted in the conquest of the Cape by the Portuguese and British, who had touched the shores of South Africa long before the Dutch, but had not colonised the country.

Thus in 1484 Diago Cam planted a cross 60 miles north of Swakopmund to signify Portuguese "protection", but no settlement was formed.

In 1488 the Portuguese Bartholomew Diaz passed the "Cape of Good Hope". He captured Negro women on the West Coast and landed one at Wolfish Bay and "Angra Pequena" to contact the Khoi-Khoin, but did not return to form a colony. In 1497 Vasco Da Gama landed at Saldanha Bay, Mossel Bay and Natal, and clashed with the Khoi-Khoin at Mossel Bay. In 1503 the Portuguese Saldanha "discovered" Table Bay, which, of course, had been discovered ages before by the Khoi-Khoin. In 1510 the Portuguese Viceroy of the East, D'Almeida, landed near Table Bay, and the Khoi-Khoin made world history by wiping out this Caesar of the Orient. The Portuguese found South Africa an unwelcome place, built some forts north of the country on the East and West Coasts, used these as slave-recruiting depots and refreshment stations for their ships going to the East, but failed to colonise the coast of South Africa.

The British likewise did not colonise the land. Seventy years after D'Almeida, Sir Francis Drake rounded the Cape, but this pirate of the Elizabethan merchants did not leave his mark on the country. In 1591 James Lancaster landed at the Cape. In 1620 Shilling and Fitzherbert were stranded at the Cape, reported back, but the English Government made no further move, despite the fact that at this time, 30 years before Cromwell's triumph, the slave-ships of England were already roving the seas and the African coast. At this time England had not yet got a footing in the East, which was being entered by Portugal, France and Holland. Holland was the dominant sea power of the time.

It was Holland which first colonised South Africa. In 1595 Cornelius de Houtman had seen the Cape, but Holland was not yet ready for colonising the place. Holland had but shortly before, in 1579, achieved its national unification in the Union of Utrecht, and Catholics and Protestants were united against the Spanish, whose Empire was then declining. In 1619 Holland began to drag slaves out of Africa towards its North American

colonies. In 1641 the Dutch took Malacca from the Portuguese. The following year Tasman "discovered" Tasmania and New Zealand. The Dutch were building up their vast Indonesian Empire and driving the Portuguese out of the Orient. In 1656 the Portuguese power in Ceylon was broken by the Dutch, and Holland was assured of colonial supremacy in the East Indies, where it had three-quarters of a million square miles of land and millions of Javanese slaves.

Together with the struggle of the merchants of Holland against the declining Portuguese Empire, Holland was engaged in a struggle for the seas, Asia and the Americas with the rapidly rising merchants and manufacturers of England. England drove the Dutch from North America, but Holland held her own in the Far East. In 1651 the British Navigation Act hampered Dutch trade and war was the inevitable result of this inter-mercantile rivalry for the colonial world. In 1652, the date of the Dutch colonisation of the Cape, there was war with England, which ended at Westminster two years later. Only 100 years later did England succeed in dominating Holland.

In the first half of the 17th century, then, Holland was becoming the foremost maritime and colonising country in Europe, defeating the Portuguese and Spanish, and holding England at arm's length. In 1648 Holland's national sovereignty, already established 70 years earlier, was officially acknowledged at the Treaty of Westphalia by the major nations of Western Europe. Strong at home, on the seas and abroad, Holland could now settle down to the systematic exploitation of the East Indies.

JANZ AND PROOT.

But en route to the East Indies lay sunny, rich South Africa, with an abundant vegetation and an unlimited number of potential slaves. In 1648 the "Haarlem" was wrecked in Table Bay. For months Janz and Proot lived with the Khoi-Khoi of the Bay. They reported their findings to the Dutch East India Company, master of the East Indies. They were colony-conscious and were aware of the import of their report. They saw in the Cape more than a refreshment station. They saw in it a slave-colony, and reported primarily and basically on its labour potential. They said that the Khoi-Khoi were rich in domesticated animals, and amenable to barter:

"The Natives, after we had lain there five months, came daily to the Fort which we had thrown up for defence, to trade with perfect amity, and brought cattle and sheep in quantities".⁵⁶

This normal tribal "friendliness" towards stranded strangers turned to hostility only when the Dutch stole the cattle of the Khoi-Khoi.⁵⁷ From this it appears that the first explorers were not only spies, but thieves. Janz and Proot concluded their monumental, shrewd and far-seeing report with the all-significant recommendation that the Company should form a permanent slave colony at the Cape, adding that

"we shall be able in time to employ some of their (the Khoi-Khoi) children as boys and servants".⁵⁸

There can be no doubt that the Cape was settled by the Dutch not as a mere refreshment station, not merely as a half-way house for their ships going to the East, but as a permanent slave-colony.

56. Report of Janz, L. and Proot., N., 26th July, 1649.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 4 (in R. N. Moodie's official "Native Tribes of S.A.").

58. *Ibid.*, p. 4 (Signed Janz and Proot).

The Dutch East India Company considered the report of Janz and Proot, and adopted its main recommendations. They placed Johan Van Riebeeck in charge of the first colonising expedition. Van Riebeeck was hostile to indigenous peoples even before he set sail for the Cape. He declared of the Khoi-Khoi:

"They are by no means to be trusted, but are a savage set".⁵⁹

The Company had selected an official with the outlook and experience of a coloniser. Van Riebeeck had been a junior merchant and "surgeon", with experience of enslaving the Indonesians. He had worked for the Company in Java, Sumatra, China and Japan, from 1639 to 1649, when he was recalled and fined by the directors of the Company for trading on his private account in Batavia.⁶⁰ In semi-disgrace he was suspended and travelled as ship surgeon to Brazil, the West Indies and Greenland. After the Company adopted the report of Proot and Janz, Van Riebeeck applied for the post of commander of the colonising expedition. Two others had previously been offered the post, but had refused. Van Riebeeck was accepted and appointed. On Christmas Eve, 1651, he set sail with the Reiger, Drommedaris and Goede Hoop and landed with 116 men on April 6th, 1652.

He came with clear instructions from the Company, which had drawn up these orders after considering the Janz-Proot report. These instructions, given in March, 1651, ordered the commander to build a fort, to trade with the Khoi-Khoi, to

"reconcile them in time to your customs",⁶¹

in short, to found a permanent Dutch colony at the Cape. This colony was called the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, and Van Riebeeck the Commander of the "Fort of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope". He used his 10-year experience as trafficker and corruptor in Tonkin in China, Nagasaki in Japan, and at the court of the Sultaneess Tadjoeel of Atjeh in North Sumatra to build up, consciously and purposefully, a trading post, prison settlement and slave-colony at the Cape.

His landing personified the beginning of the colonisation of this country by powerful European countries, the beginning of exploitation and oppression which grew and grew for the next 300 years.

At this point, when we are on the threshold of a new epoch in South Africa, the epoch of European domination, it would assist us if we, forthwith, are equipped with a key to South African history, with which many doors will open before us, many "mysteries" at once cleared up.

A "KEY" TO SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY.

The key to the understanding of South Africa after the landing of Van Riebeeck may be summed up in one word: LAND.

Whatever the OBJECT of this or that group of oppressors, land was its MEANS. Thus:

1. In order to establish their fort, trading station and settlement in Table Bay, the Dutch East India Company had first to occupy (in defiance of tribal law) Khoi-Khoi land in this Bay. By illegally converting tribal usufruct to Dutch ownership, the European colonisation was initiated.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

60. N. K. Lock: "Argus", 15th September, 1951, p. 3 of "Supplement"; also D. J. Haantjes: "Verkenner in Koopmansland".

61. Dutch East India Company (D.E.I.C.) Instructions, 25th March, 1651.

2. Immediately after the first mass importation of slaves in 1658, Van Riebeeck launched a land-war in order to build up a slave-society. Slavery was here the purpose, land the means.

3. In order to establish and expand primitive Boer feudalism, a whole series of land wars were launched in the final quarter of the 18th century and later by the various Boer Republics. Feudalism was the aim, land the means.

4. In order to export wines (the major export up to about 1834) the land had first to be taken from the Koi-Khoin in the last half of the 17th century. Wine was the object, land the means.

5. In order to export wool to Leeds, Bradford and other textile towns of England (wool was the main export until about 1880), England embarked urgently on a series of land wars against the Xhosa in the middle of the 19th century. The motive was wool, the means was land.

6. In order to gain the diamondiferous fields of West Griqualand after 1860, England wages a fresh series of land wars. Diamonds were the purpose, land the means to achieve this purpose.

7. In order to obtain a flood of cheap, dependent labour to work on these diamond mines and later the Witwatersrand gold mines, the British simultaneously, on all fronts, opened up the greatest land-war of South Africa from 1877 to 1881, which expropriated and enslaved the Africans of the Transkei, Zululand, Basutoland and Northern Transvaal. Cheap labour was the motive, land was the means.

8. Throughout all the wars, from the coming of the British in 1795, land-wars destroyed or undermined the isolated, exclusive tribal economy, forcibly dissolved its self-sufficiency, and opened the former tribal inhabitants to the British export market. By robbing the tribalists of their land, by thus destroying their economic independence, fresh markets were created for the industrialists of England.

9. After the final land wars, land-laws became the fundamental economic method of colour discrimination, whose main purpose was and remains cheap labour, smoked off the land, to operate mining, industry, transport and agriculture in the interests of the European employers.

Thus, we see that whatever the motive, land was and remains the basic means. Whether the motive was slavery, or feudalism, or wage-slavery, however the motive developed, the constant method (which itself developed with the motive) to realise this evolving motive was LAND WARS or LAND LAWS. This "highest common factor" is a useful key to the history of this country.

After this pause, and with this compass in our hands, we can proceed more confidently into the maze which becomes more and more involved after the landing of Johan Van Riebeeck in April 1652.

SECTION III.

SLAVERY BEGINS.

CHAPTER V.

BARTER WITH THE KHOI-KHOIN.

The problem of who was to do the manual labour in the newly founded colony was the first major question to confront Van Riebeeck. He was faced with three alternatives: (1) To conquer and enslave the "Natives"; (2) or to increase the force of free Dutch labour from Holland; or (3) to import slaves from outside South Africa.

The Dutch found themselves as a "handful against a landful".⁶² There were at least 200,000 Khoi-Khoins at the Cape.⁶³ Their fires rose at night in the valley around Van Riebeeck's fort. Van Riebeeck was mortally afraid of inviting destruction and issued strict orders in April, the very month of his landing, that any Company servant would be severely punished if he

"ill-uses, beats or pushes any of the natives".⁶⁴

Militarily he was not prepared for conquering the Khoi-Khoin. He sought a way of undermining them, of loosening the cohesive bonds of the tribal structure, whilst he built up his military resources. This undermining process took the age-old form of "trade with the natives". This trade was forbidden to the White labourers of the Company, because in this way they might have enriched themselves, left the Company and deprived the Dutch merchants of the only labour force they then had in the Cape. Thus barter with the Khoi-Khoin was made a Company monopoly in April, 1652.⁶⁵ By means of this monopolised barter the Company at one stroke preserved its White labour force, began to "riddle" the Khoi-Khoin tribal economy, and paved the way towards conquest.

This conquest-through-barter process began two days after Van Riebeeck's coming. He met tribal fishermen who could talk a broken English picked up from survivors of English wrecks. He established trading relations with the Saldanha Khoi-Khoin.⁶⁶ He exchanged copper, tobacco and arrack (brandy) for the cattle of the Khoi-Khoin. The tribalists began to lose their "capital" assets. Their cattle began to pass into the hands of the Dutch. Yet Van Riebeeck enviously viewed their vast herds, and exclaimed:

"It is vexatious to see such an immense quantity of cattle".⁶⁷

He estimated 10,000 cattle around the Fort. He thought of seizing the cattle by force, capturing the Khoi-Khoin herders and shipping them to

62. Moodie's Records.

63. *Ibid.*

64. D.E.I.C. Proclamation, 9th April, 1652.

65. *Ibid.*

66. Van Riebeeck Journal, 7 and 8 April, 1652.

67. Van Riebeeck Journal, 18 December, 1652.

India as slaves.⁶⁸ But he needed the Khoi-Khoins as future labourers; and, in any case, he could not yet risk war with them; he therefore abandoned the project.

Very soon the Khoi-Khoins learnt that they were losing their cattle through trade with Van Riebeeck. They were old cattle-traders of the interior and soon became hard bargainers when bartering with the Dutch. The chief of the "Caapman" Khoi-Khoins, "Herry", at first acted as "broker" in these exchanges. He helped the other tribes to get high prices for their cattle, while his own tribe got a corresponding high "commission" out of such deals. In November, 1652, barely six months after landing, Van Riebeeck was no longer able to strip the Khoi-Khoins of their cattle as easily as he did in the first few months. He therefore wrote that Herry

"Incites to mischief".⁶⁹ Further, that Herry was the "chief obstacle" to trade with the "Saldaniers".⁷⁰

This growing Khoi-Khoins resistance to being impoverished through barter forced the Chamber of 17, masters of the Dutch East India Company, to order Van Riebeeck to free some Company servants so that they could explore and themselves breed cattle.⁷¹ Dutch cattle-breeders learnt much from the Khoi-Khoins cattle-breeders. Both the success and the failure of the Dutch in barter with the Khoi-Khoins, the interaction between the two groups, raised husbandry from vegetable farming to cattle-breeding.

The difficulties of "reconciling them in time to your customs" so exasperated Van Riebeeck that, one year after his arrival, he begged the Chamber of 17 to send him away to India, away from the stubborn Khoi-Khoins traders, whom he vilified as

"dull, stupid, lazy, stinking people".⁷²

The Chamber refused, telling him to persevere with trade and cattle-breeding.

His difficulties increased with time, however, and it became clearer and clearer to him that it would take too long to conquer the Khoi-Khoins and make them his chief supply of cheap labour. An incident in Herry's life shows the utter helplessness of Van Riebeeck at this time (1653 to 1655). After acting as go-between and interpreter for over a year, Herry decamped in October, 1653, with "wife, children and cattle".⁷³ He was pursued, but escaped with 42 "Company" cattle to the North. Van Riebeeck was so powerless that he had to issue a proclamation that no revenge was to be taken on Herry.⁷⁴ He ignored an order from the Chamber of 17 to capture Herry and ship him to Batavia as a slave in order to

"teach the Natives a lesson".⁷⁵

Two years later Herry calmly returned and Van Riebeeck had no option but to "pardon" him instantly.⁷⁶ Six months later Van Riebeeck was obliged to invite Herry to dine with him at his table, and to have him served by Dutch Company servants.⁷⁷

Trade with the Khoi-Khoins was a partial failure. Conquest at that time was impossible. Immediate enslavement was out of the question. Van Riebeeck had to turn to the other two alternatives: cheap Dutch labour or imported slave labour.

68. Van Riebeeck Journal, 13 December, 1652.

69. Van Riebeeck Journal, 24 November, 1652.

70. Van Riebeeck Journal, 27 November, 1652.

71. Chamber of 17 Despatch, 30 October, 1655.

72. Despatch Van Riebeeck to Chamber of 17, 14 April, 1653.

73. Van Riebeeck Journal, 18 October, 1653.

74. Proclamation, 21 October, 1653.

75. Despatch, Chamber of 17 to Van Riebeeck, 6 October, 1654.

76. Van Riebeeck Journal, 23 June, 1655.

77. Van Riebeeck Journal, 10 January, 1656.

CHAPTER VI.

THE POLICY OF BLACK SLAVE LABOUR IS ACCEPTED

The Khoi-Khoins could not yet be conquered let alone enslaved. From 1652 to 1658 there were scarcely any slaves at the Cape. By 1657 there were only 12 slaves.⁷⁸ A handful of Khoi-Khoins were engaged as domestic servants, such as Eva, Herry's niece, but even these could freely rejoin their tribes.⁷⁹ The tribes could not be drawn into the economy as cheap labour. Van Riebeeck had to declare in 1657 that

"the natives here are not to be induced to work".⁸⁰

This implied that he had tried to enslave them in spite of the law of Holland which, hypocritically,

"laid down that the aborigines of its colonial possessions should be left undisturbed in their liberty".⁸¹

The bulk of the manual labour was hence performed by Dutch servants of the Company.

The problem of labour now resolved itself into a choice between the importation of more workmen from Holland or the importation of slaves from the East or from the African coasts. This alternative was debated for a long time by the Company, and its commanders and governors at the Cape. The controversy continued even after it had been resolved when slaves were, in fact, imported in 1658.

FREE WHITE LABOUR.

Because of the expense of importing and controlling slaves, and because of frequent slave revolts in the East and later at the Cape, many Company officials considered that it would be more profitable to employ free labour from Holland. But all were agreed that this labour was lazy, inefficient and non-productive. Thus, Van Riebeeck, though an ardent supporter of slavery, complained that the Dutch at the Cape

"preferred like Seigneurs to spank about with the cane in the hand and leave everything to the slaves".⁸²

The Company itself viewed the introduction of slaves with misgivings,

"as our nation is so constituted that as soon as they have the convenience of slaves they become lazy and unwilling to put forth their hands to work".⁸³

Further, the Dutch workers knew the ways of their masters and complained when Van Riebeeck drove and cheated them. He was accused of "exaction and extortion"⁸⁴ and Gerrit Van Harn was sent out to take his place in 1660.

78. V. De Kock: "Those in Bondage".

79. D.E.I.C. Journal, 12 January, 1656.

80. Despatch to Chamber of 17, 5 March, 1657

81. *Supra*, ref. 78, p. 14.

82. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

83. Letter, Council of India to Council of Policy, 13 December, 1658.

84. Despatch from Chamber of 17, 21 August, 1660.

Van Harn died en route, the dismissal was rescinded, so Van Riebeeck remained for a few more years. Also, the Dutch workmen had to be given land as an incentive to work, even before slaves were introduced, and land and work soon proved mutually exclusive.

The Dutch workmen became more and more useless as workers as they got more land and privileges. Wagenaar, who succeeded Van Riebeeck in April, 1662,⁸⁵ was hostile to the Khoi-Khoi and spoke of Ngounema as the "onbeskofte Gonnemma".⁸⁶ But he was even more contemptuous of the Dutch Boers (farmers). He called them

"lazy Boers . . . drunken Boers".⁸⁷

They were not suited for mass labour.

Van Qualbergen, Wagenaar's successor, told the Chamber of 17 in 1668 that

"If the farmers in the Netherlands drank like those here, neither cow nor plough nor harrow would remain on the land".⁸⁸

He tried to forbid the hiring of Khoi-Khoi, partly in order to stimulate the Boers to work with their hands.⁸⁹ He reimposed the ban on trade with the Khoi-Khoi,⁹⁰ partly to strengthen the trading monopoly of the Company, partly to save the "lazy Boers" from being out-traded by the Khoi-Khoi. Already the European "workers" were becoming an economic liability. He compared them with the Khoi-Khoi:—

"The Hottentots have been looked upon as very savage men, without any knowledge, but we greatly suspect this to be a mistake, for, in our opinion, they are very arrogant, equal to our common people in natural understanding and more circumspect."⁹¹

The next commander, Jacob Borghorst, held an equally poor opinion of the Dutch as workers, writing in 1669:

"Same are not ashamed to go about like beggars, or to spend their time in drinking."⁹²

This type of opinion of the Dutch servants and immigrants was a strong reason for importing African and Malayan slaves. On the other hand the importation of slaves strengthened the indolence of these European "common people".

In 1716, nearly 60 years after slaves had already been imported, the discussion was resumed: should they continue with black slaves or import white freemen? The Council of India itself favoured some limitation of slavery

"In order not to let the colonists glide into idleness . . . and make them unaccustomed to labour".⁹³

The Chamber of 17 sent out a questionnaire to the Council of Policy at the Cape.⁹⁴ After full discussion slavery was confirmed as the preferable type of labour. Only one, Pasque de Chavonnes, brother of the Governor, opposed this policy and called for White immigration and free White labour instead of slaves.⁹⁵

85. D.E.I.C. Journal, 2 April, 1662.

86. D.E.I.C. Journal, 19 January, 1663.

87. Memorandum, Z. Wagenaar to Van Qualbergen, 24 September, 1666.

88. Despatch, Van Qualbergen to Chamber of 17, 20 January, 1668.

89. D.E.I.C. Journal, 21 October, 1667.

90. D.E.I.C. Journal, 2 June, 1667.

91. Despatch to Chamber of 17, 20 January, 1668.

92. Despatch from Borghorst to Chamber of 17, 22 March, 1669.

93. Letter from Council of India.

94. Letter, Chamber of 17, 24 June, 1716.

95. Letters, Council of Policy, 1716.

Modern Liberals, like J. H. Hofmeyr, have praised de Chavonnes as an opponent of slavery.⁹⁶ His speeches show that he hated the slaves more than he disliked slavery. Even then, he disliked slavery because it did not, he felt, sufficiently profit the Dutch East India Company. He wanted some limitation of slavery (but not its abolition) because, he said, free labourers were cheaper than slaves: they did not have to be bought or shipped; they did not "steal"; they did not revolt, for he said it had cost much money to prevent

"conspiracies of slaves, running away of slaves".⁹⁷

Free workers were cheaper, too, because they did not have to be supplied by their masters with "clothing, food and control". After showing that free labour was thus cheaper than slave labour, he said that the slaves, in any case, were a "refuse lot"; while Dutch workers were more "tranquil" and he preferred to be served by "his own people". His arguments were defeated in 1716, to the disappointment of his modern Liberal admirers.

De Chavonnes' view was repeated by Baron Gustaf Wilhelm Von Imhoff, Governor-General of India, who passed through the Cape in 1743. He likewise suggested White immigrants to augment or replace Black slaves. He bewailed the accepted policy which had alienated the White population from manual work. He said that the European "skilled worker" at the Cape "does not do as much as a half-trained artisan in Europe. . . It is a burden this Colony cannot bear. . . I believe it would have been far better had we, when this Colony was formed, commenced with Europeans and brought them hither in such numbers that hunger and want would have forced them to work".⁹⁸

He similarly castigated the European farmers:

"Having imported slaves, every common or ordinary European becomes a gentleman. . . . The majority of farmers in the Colony are not farmers in the real sense of the word, but owners of plantations . . . and many of them consider it a shame to work with their own hands".⁹⁹

By this time, however, the policy of cheap, landless, black labour had become entrenched and traditional.

The argument had become academic. Slavery was a long-established fact. The decision to use imported slaves instead of imported freemen was taken in 1657-8. The Company could not conquer, still less disposses, yet less enslave the Khoi-Khoi. Their European workers were no good, in their own opinion. There remained only the third and last alternative: to import slaves from other parts of the world.

BLACK SLAVES.

Repeatedly, but in vain, Van Riebeeck appealed for slaves. Six weeks after landing he asked the Chamber of 17 to send slaves.¹⁰⁰ They refused, for the controversy outlined above had just begun. In 1657 he wrote again. This letter arose because of his inability to cope with Herry and to defeat the Khoi-Khoi.¹⁰¹ Finally, in 1658, his prayers were answered.

On March 28th, 1658, the "Amersfoort" brought 174 slaves from Angola, seized from a rival Portuguese ship. In April, 1658, the "Hasselt" brought

96 J. H. Hofmeyr: "South Africa".

97 Letters, Council of Policy, 1716.

98 Wilhelm Van Gendt. Report to Chamber of 17, 1743.

99 *Ibid.*

100 Letter from Van Riebeeck, 25 May, 1652.

101 Despatch to Chamber of 17, 5 March, 1657.

200 slaves from Popo on the Guinea Coast.¹⁰² Slave ships brought slaves from Madagascar, Bengal, Malabar, Ceylon. Many came at first from West Africa, but the Dutch East India Company had to abandon this source of slaves because it was the exclusive preserve of the Chartered Dutch Company. Ships like the "Voorhout" and "Meermin" plied between Table Bay and Madagascar bringing their human cargo to the Dutch Colony at the Cape. A beginning had been made to solve the "labour problem" of the Dutch East India Company.

But this "labour problem", which had now been decisively resolved was but one-half of the problem. For, of what use was labour without land?

The land and labour problems became inseparable, inter-connected. For the next 2½ centuries a great struggle raged for land. And when the Europeans had taken all the land, after the opening of the diamond and gold mines, they were faced with the opposite of the situation which faced Van Riebeeck: they were faced with a shortage of labour, while he was faced with a shortage of land.

The solving of the labour problem by the Company thus led directly and immediately to the solving of the land problem. The "peaceful" period of barter came to a sudden close, and there began at once the first land wars of South Africa.

102 Van Riebeeck Journal, 1658.

SECTION IV.

THE FIRST WARS OF DISPOSSESSION (1658-1677).

CHAPTER VII.

THE DEFEAT OF "HERRY" (1658-1660).

It is significant that immediately, in fact only three months after the arrival of the first slaves, the first land war of the Dutch against the Khoi-Khoin began. Van Riebeeck immediately became hard. No longer did he pardon Herry, no longer dine with him. Instead he lured Herry with "soeten praatjies" into the Fort in July, 1658, and banished him to Robben Island.¹⁰³ Van Riebeeck now felt strong enough even to ignore the protests of Herry's niece, Eva, who was the commander's "eyes and ears".

Herry's place as "broker" and interpreter was taken by Doman, who became

"a worse pest than ever Herry was to the Company".¹⁰⁴ The tribes led by Herry and Doman were attacked and brought to their knees in June, 1659.¹⁰⁵ Herry and Doman were employed with suspicion and caution by the Dutch till their deaths in 1663, when the Commander Wagenaar commented:

"Both . . . were always considered as very mischievous and malicious men, and as the greatest opponents of the Hon. Company."¹⁰⁶

Herry was regarded as an enemy by the Dutch, rather than as a traitor to his tribe, although Van Riebeeck tried to use him against the Khoi-Khoin. Van Riebeeck was most alarmed when Herry escaped by boat from Robben Island to Saldanha in December, 1659,¹⁰⁷ and was extremely reluctant even to try to use him as a go-between.

EVA.

It was not Herry nor Doman but "the woman Eva" who was the first traitor to the Africans. Eva was the intermediary between Herry's tribe and Van Riebeeck. She introduced Van Riebeeck to the powerful king of the Cochoquas, Oedosoa, her brother-in-law, and to other Khoi-Khoin kings¹⁰⁸ whilst Van Riebeeck was making war on the Table Bay Khoi-Khoin. She applied the divide and rule policy for Van Riebeeck, by trying to get Oedosoa to make a "non-aggression" pact with Van Riebeeck while the latter was at war with Herry and Doman.¹⁰⁹ Eva was sent with presents

103. Van Riebeeck Journal, 3 July, 1658.

104. Despatch to Chamber of 17, 5 March, 1659.

105. Van Riebeeck (D.E.I.C.) Journal, June 1659.

106. Memorandum, Wagenaar to Chamber of 17, 15 April, 1664.

107. D.E.I.C. Journal, 6 March, 1660.

108. Van Riebeeck Diary, November 7, 1658.

109. Van Riebeeck Diary, 20 June, 1659.

to buy the goodwill of Oedosoa.¹¹⁰ She was to ask Oedosoa to provide "men to spy on the Caapmen".¹¹¹ She went to Oedosoa in December, 1658, after the war against the Khoi-Khoi under Herry had begun, to win not only his neutrality and support for Van Riebeeck, but to undermine his tribe by means of Christianity:

"She had been teaching many children to pray night and morning and before and after dinner, and, thanks to Oedosoa, no one now dared to laugh at her as they used to."¹¹²

Eva acted as go-between in the peace negotiations which followed the first war, persuading the Khoi-Khoi to part with cattle for the sake of "peace".¹¹³ Eva tried to prevent the Khoi-Khoi from receiving and joining hands with rebellious and refugee slaves. The slaves and tribalists frequently made common cause against Van Riebeeck. He severely punished slaves who went to the Khoi-Khoi. His policy of divide and rule was thus twofold: to divide the different Khoi-Khoi tribes; and to divide the tribes as a whole from the slaves. In both aspects Eva proved a reliable instrument of the Dutch East India Company. Even her marriage in 1664 to Pieter Van Meerhof was made an occasion to dazzle and awe the Khoi-Khoi. She was given a "merry bridal feast" and her Dutch husband was promoted to surgeon, "in order to encourage the bridegroom". She got wedding gifts and a send-off before going to live on Robben Island.¹¹⁴ Finally her loyalty to the conquerors was rewarded when, after the death of the couple, her children were taken to Mauritius by one, B. Borus, to be brought up as "Europeans".¹¹⁵ But Eva lived and died despised by both Khoi-Khoi and Dutch. Thus her fellow-interpreter, Doman, said of her:

"Behold the advocate of the Hollanders . . . who will finally betray her own people."

On the Dutch side, Goske said, before Eva's burial at the Castle in 1673:

"This drunken swine, this Hottentot pig."

Such was the fate of the first African "Quisling".

WAR ATROCITIES.

While Eva deployed her talents in the service of the Dutch, her people were suffering bitterly. The Dutch attacked the Khoi-Khoi without warning and showed no mercy.

The Dutchmen were organised for a calculated attack on the Khoi-Khoi. The Fort was strengthened and a watch-house built at the mouth of the Salt River¹¹⁶ to observe the movements of the Khoi-Khoi resisters, and to distinguish between "hostile" and "friendly" tribes. The slaves

"were put in irons again as it was found that some wanted to join the Hottentots".¹¹⁷

Prior to this slaves had been unchained to help the Dutch, but many had joined the Khoi-Khoi instead. Eva's work had been well done and the tribes were divided or confused. The preliminary skirmishes of 1658 and the early part of 1659 gave way to larger battles in August, 1659. Dutchmen went out "to look for Hottentots",¹¹⁸ and ruthlessly dealt with small villages.

110. Van Riebeeck Diary, 21 June, 1659.

111. Van Riebeeck Diary, 22 June, 1659.

112. Van Riebeeck Diary, 31 December, 1658.

113. Van Riebeeck Diary, 20 September, 1659.

114. D.E.I.C. Journal, 2 June, 1664.

115. D.E.I.C. Journal, 15 July, 1677.

116. Van Riebeeck Diary, 25 August, 1659.

117. Van Riebeeck Diary, 16 August, 1659.

118. Van Riebeeck Diary, 5 August, 1659.

For instance, they attacked a small Khoi-Khoin settlement of 26 people, "killing two and capturing the Captain who used to be Herry's comrade. We brought back the upper lips of one, and of the Captain, who would not come to the Fort, and it was too difficult to carry him over the mountains".¹¹⁹

They threw the huts and weapons and skins of the destroyed village into the sea from the cliffs. One captured man "fell" down a precipice.¹²⁰ Possibly it was "too difficult to carry him over the mountains".

PEACE TREATY.

In April, 1660, after arms and treachery had laid them low, the tribal leaders, Herry (who returned from Saldanha), Doman, Oedosoa and Ankaisoa, made a dignified peace with their adversaries.¹²¹ Though defeated, they openly accused Van Riebeeck of having waged the war to take from them

"the land which had belonged to them from all ages".¹²²

The Khoi-Khoin clearly regarded the main object of the war as being not cattle, but their land. This was equally openly admitted by Van Riebeeck. He had pretended to wage this war because of the supposed "theft" of 148 cattle and 113 sheep.¹²³ But when he replied, during the peace parleys, to the Khoi-Khoin kings, he gave his real reasons very clearly. He told them that

"They had now lost that land in war and therefore could only expect to be henceforth entirely deprived of it . . . their country had thus fallen to our lot, being justly won in defensive warfare, and . . . it was our intention to retain it".¹²⁴

In this way Van Riebeeck announced the end of the first land war against the Africans.

119. *Ibid.*

120. *Ibid.*

121. D.E.I.C. Journal, 6 April, 1660.

122. *Ibid.*

123. Despatch to Chamber of 17, 16 March, 1660.

124. *Supra*, ref. 121.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE DEFEAT OF NGOUNEMA (1671-1677).

After the first war, Pieter Sterthemius, Commander of the Company's Return Fleet, issued a Memorandum to Van Riebeeck that "the free men should be encouraged and assisted".¹²⁵

The dispossession of the conquered Khoi-Khoin was instantly followed by the beginning of the policy of subsidising the European workers and farmers. The rulers began building a European social bulwark to help dispossess, enslave and oppress the slaves and tribalists. The "common people" were given sheep, cattle and vegetable farms and forbidden to

"suffer any of the savage men of this country to come about their farms or enter their homes".¹²⁶

The indigenous peoples were now forbidden even to set foot on the land which had been taken from them.

THE TREATY POLICY.

Worse was yet in store for them. Van Riebeeck began to prepare for a new war. He began by concluding treaties with various kings, pretending to be friendly, polite and even humble. He made a treaty with Sousoa in 1660, whom he regarded as the

"chief Lord of all the Hottentot race".¹²⁷

He said that

"he wanted to acknowledge Sousoa as his father, and Goeboe for his brother".¹²⁸

and Sousoa duly came to pay his respects and

"to visit his new son".¹²⁹

Under cover of these niceties, however, this "son" was preparing for new conquests. He sent Van Meerhof to Namaqualand to "explore".¹³⁰ In November, 1660, he sent Danckert to report on the tribes north of Table Bay.¹³¹ The detailed information gained from Danckert's spying expedition was handed on by Van Riebeeck to his successor, Wagenaar, in a Memorandum dated May, 1662.¹³² This Memorandum gave detailed accounts of the disposition, armed strength, wealth in land and cattle of the Namaquas, Hancumquas, Cochoquas, Chainoquas and others. It was against the Cochoquas, led by Oedosoa and then by Ngounema, that the next war of dispossession took place. Van Riebeeck's information proved most useful in this war.

125. Memorandum. P. Sterthemius, 12 March, 1660.

126. Order. P. Sterthemius, 13 March, 1660.

127. D.E.I.C. Journal, 21 September, 1660.

128. *Ibid.*

129. D.E.I.C. Journal, 29 September, 1660.

130. D.E.I.C. Journal. P. Meerhof's Expedition to Namaqualand. Diary dating from 30 January, 1661, to 20 February, 1661.

131. Diary of Jan Danckert's Expedition to find "Monomotapa", 12 November, 1660.

132. Van Riebeeck Memorandum to Z. Wagenaar, 5 May, 1662.

To begin with, the Dutch now knew of the tribal feud between the Cochoquas and the Kenuquas and in 1671 they made use of the tactic of divide and rule in order to weaken and attack the Cochoquas,¹³³ whom the Kenuquas had defeated in a battle in September, 1671.¹³⁴ They sent up Cruse¹³⁵ and then Cruythoff¹³⁶ to trade with the victors and "explore" the position of the vanquished. Then, knowing how matters stood, they seized and imprisoned five of the Cochoqua tribesmen¹³⁷ whom Ngounema tried in vain to ransom in exchange for cattle.¹³⁸ In February the five were sentenced from 7 to 15 years on Robben Island.¹³⁹ (In November, 1673, they escaped by boat.) This provocation sparked off a long war between the Dutch and the Cochoquas.

DECLARE WAR.

Dutchmen invaded Ngounema's grasslands and were, according to tribal law, seized.¹⁴⁰ To this "insult" Goske, the commander, replied by declaring war on July, 1673.¹⁴¹ He dispatched an expedition of 36 burghers and 36 soldiers under the command of Cruse, who knew the terrain and situation.

Goske declared war in ominous and arrogant terms; ordering his men "to take such revenge upon him, Gonnema, and all who may with him have raised their hands against our men, that their posterity may retain the impression of fear and may never again offend the Netherlanders".¹⁴²

The troops were promised captured cattle as booty.¹⁴³ Another 18 were added to the commando, so that an army of 90 armed men set out against the Cochoquas. In preliminary brushes four Dutchmen were slain. The commando returned with 800 cattle and 900 sheep which were seized while the tribesmen were away from their herds and were camping in the hills.¹⁴⁴

The battle of July, 1673, was indecisive. The Dutch now began to use one section of the tribalists against another; Blacks to defeat Blacks. Alone the Dutch could not decisively defeat the Cochoqua. But with Khoi-Khoi "collaborator troops" victory was possible.

DUTCH USE AFRICAN TROOPS.

The Dutch used Cuypers, Claas and Schacher as the leaders of their Khoi-Khoi allies.¹⁴⁵ They sent a second commando out in March, 1674. This commando had a significant composition: 50 Dutchmen and 250 Khoi-Khoins.¹⁴⁶ This commando came back with 800 cattle and 4,000 sheep¹⁴⁷ but still failed to defeat Ngounema, despite the use of divide and rule.

A third commando set out in November, 1675,¹⁴⁸ but still Ngounema's troops kept together.

133. D.E.I.C. Dagverhaal, 16 September, 1671.

134. *Ibid.*

135. D.E.I.C. Dagverhaal, 19 September, 1671

136. D.E.I.C. Dagverhaal, 20 November, 1671.

137. D.E.I.C. Journal of Fort of Good Hope, 10 January, 1672.

138. D.E.I.C. Dagverhaal, 11 January, 1672.

139. D.E.I.C. Journal, 10 February, 1672.

140. D.E.I.C. Journal, 11 November, 1672. (H. & O. Cornelius, G. Cloeten.)

141. D.E.I.C. Journal, 4 July, 1673.

142. Resolution of Council of Policy, 11 July, 1673.

143. D.E.I.C. Journal, 12 July, 1673.

144. D.E.I.C. Journal, 25 July, 1673.

145. D.E.I.C. Journal, 20 August, 1673.

146. D.E.I.C. Journal, 26 March, 1674.

147. Governor's Despatch, 20 May, 1674.

148. Despatch from Goske, 15 March, 1676.

Yet a fourth commando went out in March, 1676, again without victory.¹⁴⁹

A fifth commando, in October, 1676, again returned without victory. On this occasion the Khoi-Khoi allies of the Dutch defected and gave Ngounema information about the movements of the Dutch and their allies.¹⁵⁰

Only in June, 1677, after six years of resistance and five fierce battles, did Ngounema sue for peace. Willy-nilly, the conquerors had to treat him as "an African general".¹⁵¹ His envoys were feted in Cruse's own house by order of Governor Bax.¹⁵² The peace terms were fairly heavy: Ngounema had to pay 30 cattle a year to his victors. But the war had seriously impoverished the Cochoquas. In 1679 the Chamber of 17 was told that Ngounema could not afford to pay the tribute,¹⁵³ and in 1682 Simon Van Der Stel reported that he had paid but six cattle a year.¹⁵⁴ With his tribe lying around him in poverty, the resister Ngounema waited for the end. When Van der Stel journeyed to "Amaqualand" that year he found a whole tribe in mourning. Ngounema, their leader, was dead.¹⁵⁵ This symbolised the end of the first series of land wars.

But for the conquerors it was far from the end. The burghers got land on 10 year lease in 1674.¹⁵⁶ After a burgher petition in 1676,¹⁵⁷ the Chamber of 17 granted the booty of war as the personal property of those who went on commando.¹⁵⁸ In 1681 the Governor, R. Van Goens, left a Memorandum for his successor, Simon Van der Stel, saying that the Company and burghers together now had 14,000 sheep, goats and pigs, and 2,300 cattle.¹⁵⁹ Symbolic of the end of the second land war is the fact that, at the moment that Ngounema lay dying, three commando men, Cloete, Cornelius and Pasman, of Stellenbosch, got two-thirds of cattle seized as "a well-deserved booty".¹⁶⁰

After this victory the Dutch rapidly occupied the lands of the conquered or terrorised Khoi-Khoi. It was nearly 100 years before the Khoi-Khoi were able to renew their resistance. During this time many changes took place in the expanding Colony. These changes, which struck the Khoi-Khoi with full force 100 years after Ngounema's resistance, were themselves made possible largely by his defeat, which enabled the Dutch to stabilize and expand their slave colony.

149. D.E.I.C. Journal, 26 March, 1676.

150. Resolution of Council of Policy, 27 October, 1676.

151. D.E.I.C. Journal, 19 January, 1678.

152. D.E.I.C. Journal, 3 June, 1677.

153. Despatch from Van der Stel to Chamber of 17, 23 December, 1679.

154. Despatch from Van der Stel to Chamber of 17, 23 April, 1682.

155. Diary of Van der Stel on Journey: 25 August, 1685 to 20 January, 1686. Entry of Ngounema's death, 19 January, 1686.

156. Despatch, 20 May, 1674.

157. Petition of Burgher Senate, 4 March, 1676.

158. Order of Chamber of 17, 21 October, 1676.

159. Memorandum of R. Van Goens, 20 March, 1681.

160. D.E.I.C. Journal, 2 November, 1686.

SECTION V.

COLOUR SLAVERY.

CHAPTER IX.

SEGREGATION UNDER SLAVERY.

From 1652 until the importation of slaves in 1658 the European "common people" were in effect the only slaves, and barter, not slavery, was the main social relation between the Dutch and the Khoi-Khoi. After the 1658 importation of slaves and the consequent defeat of the Khoi-Khoi in the 1658-1660 war, slavery took root and spread. It became firmly established after the second war of dispossession from 1671 to 1677. There was an intimate relation between exploitation and expropriation, for each thrived on the other.

Before the first conquest, for instance, there was also no slavery. Furthermore, there was no dividing line of colour. Miscegenation and inter-marriage was permitted between slave-owner and slave and between Dutch and Khoi-Khoi. Slaves and Khoi-Khoins could easily become Christians and in the process become recognised as "Nederlanders". There were as yet no "Europeans" and no "Non-Europeans", and

"There does not seem to have been any colour feeling on the part of the Europeans at the Cape in the early days . . ." the distinction was drawn "rather between 'Christian' and 'Heathen' than between 'White' and coloured'."¹⁶¹

This religious distinction hardened into a colour division only after the introduction of slavery, only after the first land war, and only as small-scale vegetable and pastoral farming gave way to large-scale plantations of vineyards. These economic changes produced colour feeling and prejudice here as they did also in the Company's possessions in India and Batavia. They made colour discrimination as an official state policy only possible in theory, but not yet necessary in practice.

The development of discrimination from colour prejudice to colour legislation, the stepping up of discrimination from the personal to the political level, this change did not take place in other colonies, but was peculiar to South Africa and the southern slave states of North America. In the East, the West Indies, South America, West Africa and other places where there was slavery in the period of the rise of trade and industry in Europe—in these countries the conquerors themselves were officials, but ruled through the political services and social support of a privileged and

161. De Villiers Commission of Enquiry into Mixed Marriages, 1939.

wealthy section of the indigenous peoples themselves.

But in South Africa, with its pleasant "Mediterranean" climate, the Europeans could live in comfort. They could occupy the land they owned, could locally profit from the ownership of slaves, could win for themselves personally immense wealth in land and labour by coming out from Europe to South Africa. Hence Europeans from Holland and later from France and the rest of Western Europe came to South Africa in great numbers. The European population grew just as rapidly as did the population of imported slaves and enslaved tribalists.

The European population increased slowly until the defeat of Ngounema and the establishment of large vineyards. In 1672 there were only 64 free burghers. After the opening of the vineyards the European population rose to 537 in 1687, which was 237 more than the number of slaves. By 1707 there were over 1,000 free burghers and 1,100 slaves. For the first 50 years of slavery, then, there was roughly one European on the back of every slave. The former were almost entirely non-productive, as has been seen. They were becoming more and more privileged, having burgher rights, rights to lease and later own land, rights to petition, and some elective local institutions. The slaves who were producing the wealth for these Europeans had no rights at all. There were in actual fact not only two colours, but also two classes: the slave-owning Whites and the enslaved Blacks. The growth of a large European settled, permanent, population, owning or managing or otherwise benefiting from the land and the Black labour—this growth made both possible and necessary the hardening of the colour discrimination into an official state policy of colour-bars and segregation. In this way the very beauty of South Africa, its ideal climate, turned out to be a factor which was used to bring into being one of the ugliest civilizations known to man: colour-bar South Africa, with its doctrine of White supremacy and its policy of colour discrimination.

THE FIRST "EUROPEANS".

The first fountain-head of the habits, morals and ideas of White supremacy was the slave-owning Dutch aristocracy, especially after the expansion of land and labour under Simon Van Der Stel (a "Coloured" man!) Each "common or ordinary" European tried to imitate this wealthy group, which consisted in the first place of rich Company officials. The exploiters were the rulers and their ideas were adopted as the ruling morality. Each family dreamed of being borne by slaves in sedan chairs, of having their feet washed by slaves, of having slaves to chase away the flies and to nurse their children:

"Each child, even of the lower classes, had its own ayah to wait on his every whim, and to carry him about, lest . . . it should too soon discover for what purposes it had been given arms and legs."¹⁶²

On the grape, corn, and even vegetable and cattle farms the European owners, managers and "workers" idled while

"all forms of work passed into the hands of slaves" who "had not merely to supply every need of the white man, but to undertake the work which would have fallen to his lot in any other country."¹⁶³

Slave labour, on the farms taken by force from the Khoi-Khoin, formed the basis for the way of life of the Europeans, a way of life which became a tradition, grew, and remains to the present day.

162. I. E. Edwards: "Towards Emancipation" (1942).

163. *Ibid.*

THE FIRST "NON-EUROPEANS".

Similarly the present-day attitudes and divisions among the Non-Europeans have deep roots, many dating back to those days of colour slavery. The division of labour created three "groups": the "Africans", the "Coloureds" and the "Malays". These groups did different work in the economy and had different attitudes towards each other and their masters. These attitudes survive to the present day.

At the bottom of the social rung stood the "Africans"—slaves from Madagascar, Mozambique and West Africa, who did the heavy manual work which thus became the "natural lot" of all very dark-skinned Non-Europeans. By inter-marriage this "group" later became part of the "Coloured" group, whilst their economic place was taken by the dark-skinned conquered Bantu tribes.

The "Coloured" ("mixed-blood") slaves, the progeny of the Negroes, Malays, Khoi-Khoi, and Europeans, did the domestic work; they became the traditional servants, the "toijings", "meide", "jongens" and "volk" of the Europeans and their literature.

The Malay slaves, coming from the East with arts and crafts, were assigned the skilled work in leatherwork, carpentry, tailoring and building. They became the traditional artisans among the Non-Europeans, a step above the "Coloureds", and two steps above the "Africans". Among them were Javanese rebels and political exiles like Sheik Yusuf.

This division among Non-Europeans, together with the division between slaves and Khoi-Khoi, was later increased when the Bantu tribes were expropriated, and when the Indian sugar workers were imported into Natal; nevertheless the division and all its concomitant attitudes of mind and behaviour began under slavery.

SEGREGATION IN EDUCATION.

The basic segregation between White and Black in the economic sphere was followed by segregation in nearly all other spheres. Most segregation began after the defeat of Ngounema, the opening of large-scale wine plantations on the expropriated Khoi-Khoi lands, and the accompanying increased immigration of Whites and importation of slaves.

Thus, up to 1685, there was no segregation in schools. In April, 1658, the first Dutch teacher, Van der Stael, ran a slave-school, which was really a church to convert slave children and fell directly under the Company's local regime.¹⁶⁴ The State, its Church and Education were unified from the beginning. The children had a "school-feeding scheme", being given brandy and tobacco.¹⁶⁵

Ernestus Back, the next teacher, ran a school mainly for Dutch children, but four out of the first class of 17 were slaves, and one was a Khoi-Khoi child.¹⁶⁶ This "mixed", non-segregatory school was criticised by Governor Goske in 1671,¹⁶⁷ but was not changed until the arrival of Baron Von Rheede, Lord of Mydrecht, in 1685. Von Rheede was the man who ordered the introduction of segregation into South Africa.

He instructed the Council of Policy in July, 1685, to order the following educational changes, in orders issued to Jan Pasqual, teacher under the

164. Van Riebeeck Journal, 17 April, 1658.

165. Van Riebeeck Journal, April, 1658.

166. *Ibid.*

167. Memorandum of Commissioner I. Goske, 23 February, 1671.

Church Minister.¹⁶⁸ He said that

"no white children shall be accepted in the (slave) school" (instruction "G") . . . "no slave children of anyone shall be accepted" (into the "mixed" school).¹⁶⁹

"Mixed" schools continued in practice. In 1779 there were 696 children in general schools, of whom 82 were slave children. Another 84 were in special slave schools. But the policy of educational segregation was, in fact, the legal and official state policy.

SEGREGATION IN MARRIAGE LAWS.

Von Rheede also ordered changes in the marriage laws. Originally the Cape Matrimonial Law rested on the Statutes of Batavia, which followed the Politique Ordinantjie of 1580, after the 1579 Union of Utrecht. The Ordinantjie had no special colour-bar clause. It mainly forbade marriage between a slave and a free person. This practice was followed up to 1685, Eva's marriage being the "classic" illustration.

In 1671 Commissioner I. Goske, later Governor and conqueror of Ngonema, recommended legislation to forbid "mixed" marriages.¹⁷⁰ These recommendations were, however, not implemented until 14 years later. In 1676 a Matrimonial Court was set up by the Council of Policy. Its officers, two company servants and two burghers, were merely to determine whether the would-be couple were blood relations, unmarried, widowed, free or slave.¹⁷¹ There was still no colour discrimination as such.

Von Rheede drastically changed the position. He forbade "illicit intercourse between European males and female slaves or natives".¹⁷²

Further, he ordered that

"the marriage of our 'Nederlanders' to freed slave women must be prohibited, except to daughters of Dutch fathers by slave women".¹⁷³

Thirdly, he ordered the death penalty for slaves and other "heathens" who had relations with Dutch women,

"it being a detestable thing that a Heathen should amalgamate with a Christian".¹⁷⁴

These laws were racial laws, discriminating against Non-"Nederlanders", who, with the immigration of other European groups, became "Non-Europeans". This race discrimination was against slaves, freed slaves and "natives"—i.e. against all the Blacks. After these laws "European public opinion hardened" against "mixed marriages".¹⁷⁵ Illegal intercourse, of course, continued, as well as legal relations and marriages between European men and conquered African women, to increase the "Coloured" population,¹⁷⁶ which grew mainly, however, from the coming together of the different African tribes—!Ke, Khoi-Khoin and Bantu—of the slaves of different nationalities, and of the slaves and tribalists.

168. "Memorien en Instructen" to Council of Policy, by Hendrik Adriaan Von Rheede, 15 July, 1685 (Signed: Melchier Kemels, Secy.)

169. "Belangrike Historische Dokumenten", p. 42.

170. Memorandum, I. Goske, 23 February, 1671.

171. C. G. Botha: "Early Cape Matrimonial Law".

172. De Villiers Commission, 1939. (Note: Report uses "European" instead of original wording: "Nederlanders" and "Duitsch").

173. Memorandum, 15 July, 1685; Dagverhaal, 25 July, 1685; Theal: "Belangrike Historische Dokumenten", p. 42.

174. *Ibid.*

175. De Villiers Commission, 1939.

176. "Nxele": "History of Despotism" in "Torch" 20th, 27th February, 1950, for analysis of effects of Von Rheede's laws.

SEGREGATION IN RELIGION.

Christianity has condoned and worked every known system of oppression. At the Cape the Church and State were officially allied from the start of the Dutch occupation. Christian prayers for the welfare of the slave traffic were regularly offered up.¹⁷⁷

In 1664, after the first church schools and Eva's missionary work had paved the way, the Dutch-India powers authorised the Church to baptise the "Heathens"¹⁷⁸ in order to make the foreign slaves and conquered Khoi-Khoi tribesmen fatalistically accept their lot without complaint. However, it had the side effect of making baptised slaves feel too free, and in 1671 (Goske) baptism was deferred till confirmation:¹⁷⁹ slaves could not become Christians at birth, but had to prove themselves good enough slaves to be confirmed and named. The struggle to acquire the privileges which went with Christianity (he could buy his freedom and, later, could not be sold), and to rise above the "heathen" slaves, threw up a layer from which the slave-owners recruited their Black slave-drivers, informers and "collaborators".

Many slaves became Christians. By 1721 the presence of slaves in churches became an embarrassment to the Whites. It was decided to forbid slaves to stand sponsor or in loco parentis at the baptismal font, nor could they wear adornments in church.¹⁸⁰ Segregation inside the Church began to grow. In 1754 the "good" Ryk Tulbagh forbade slaves from wearing special mourning clothes at funerals, from gathering in a group of more than 200 at a funeral, and from "hanging around" a church on a Sunday.¹⁸¹ Conversion, baptism, confirmation of slaves began to decline. All common denominators between the slave and non-slave, even religion, had to be eliminated.

In 1770 instructions arrived prohibiting the sale of a Christian slave.¹⁸² The slave-owners reacted by stopping the conversion of slaves. For an asset which could not be sold was not a business proposition at all. This law, which therefore had the effect of withholding Christianity from slaves, was revoked by the British in Proclamation 15, 1809, so that slave-owners could freely sell all their slaves, and so that Christianity could help the transformation of chattel-slaves into wage-slaves. But the British continued the segregation of the Non-European from the European congregations.

SEGREGATION UNDER TULBAGH "THE GOOD".

In 1755 the "good" Tulbagh opened segregated hospitals after a scarlet fever and smallpox epidemic of April, 1755.¹⁸³ In the earlier days of slavery White and Black patients lay side by side in the same hospital ward.¹⁸⁴

In 1754 Tulbagh introduced a plakaat which forbade slaves from singing or whistling at night. They could not walk in groups in town at night, and there was a curfew after 10 p.m. Slaves out, with special permits, after this hour had to carry a light. They could not bump against a master, nor "answer back" or be "insolent". A slave who hit his master or mistress could be sentenced to death.¹⁸⁵

177. e.g. Dagverhaal, 5 March, 1673.

178. Letter to Council of Policy, 25 January, 1664.

179. D.E.I.C. Journal, 1671.

180. "Uitgaande Briewen", 24 March, 1722.

181. Tulbagh Slave Code. Plakaat-boek, 1754.

182. Plakaat, 4 April, 1770.

183. V. De Kock: "Those in Bondage", p. 141.

184. D.E.I.C. Journal, 7 April, 1672.

185. Plakaat-Bock, 1754.

In 1765 Tulbagh the "good Governor" (according to official histories) introduced "Sumptuary Laws" which forbade freed slave women from wearing hooped dresses, coloured silk, fineries, ear-rings or curled hair.¹⁸⁶ This law was not merely an anti-slave law. It was an anti-Non-European law.

Tulbagh's laws were continued by Plettenberg and other Governors. In 1780 it was decided that it would be "undesirable" for Black police to arrest White people. Four White police were placed at the fiscal's disposal and Europeans were safe from the black arm of the law.¹⁸⁷ In 1782 the number of White policemen was raised by six, and 12 Asian policemen were dismissed.¹⁸⁸ White police could arrest a Non-European, but, except in extreme cases, a Non-European policeman could not arrest a European.

Under the period of slavery the policy of segregation became the official State policy. It grew with the growth of slavery, becoming intensified and spreading into all walks of life. This policy was enforced with the utmost brutality, which provoked the slaves on many occasions to revolt against the conditions and consequences of their existence.

186. Plakaat, 12 November, 1765.

187-8. H. C. V. Leibrandt: "Memorials", A. to E, p. 22.

CHAPTER X.

SLAVE REVOLTS.

Contrary to the legend that the slaves generally were submissive, there were many slave revolts at the Cape. Some were blind acts of individual terrorism. Others were desperate ventures to escape to distant lands. Finally, there were genuine struggles against the system of slavery itself, against the very conditions of existence of the slaves, and not merely against the consequences of these conditions.

Individual terror became more frequent as the oppressive laws mounted. By the time of Tulbagh it was scarcely possible for a slave to move outside the confines of his labour without breaking some *plakaat* or other. The inequalities in slave society were expressed in inequalities in justice and in punishment. At the beginning more Whites were punished than Blacks, but in the 18th century the official records show punishment lists which in some years affected ten times as many Non-Europeans as Europeans. And this despite the fact that the number of slaves was roughly equal to the number of "free persons". This increase in punishment of slaves was mainly due to the rapid intensification of oppression along colour lines; and to a lesser extent to the growing refusal of many slaves to accept their lot passively.

Brutal treatment of slaves made the conditions more unbearable, driving slaves towards defensive acts of terror. To moderate the social struggle, to ensure the safety of the slave-owners and of their own system, excessive brutality against slaves or Khoi-Khoi serfs was often severely punished. Some slave-owners suffered for breaking this, their own, code. Thus in 1708 Jean de Thuile was sentenced to death for maltreating a servant.¹⁸⁹ In 1767 Jurgen, Jansen and Van der Toek were punished for ill-treating a servant.¹⁹⁰ But even in such cases of "excessive brutality" the complaining slaves often suffered a worse fate than their guilty masters. In 1767 one Braune was prohibited from owning any more slaves after previous slaves had revenged themselves on his brutality by burning down his property. Yet Braune's own slaves, Clarinde and Fortuin, who had suffered at his hands, were burnt alive for arson, whilst he merely lost the right to be a slave-holder.¹⁹¹ Individual terrorism did not cease, despite the prospect of torture by the rack, cross, stake, wheel, axe, thumb-screw, branding irons, references to which fill pages of the Company recitals of punishments effected, mainly and more and more, on the slaves and enserfed Khoi-Khoi.

189. D.E.I.C. Journal, May, 1708.

190. D.E.I.C. Journal, December, 1767.

191. D.E.I.C. Journal, September, 1767.

The second type of revolt against the consequences of slavery took place mainly in the very early days of slavery. The freshly landed slaves still had the memory of their lost homeland. This memory clashed with the memory of their kidnapping, the nightmarish journey overland and across the sea, the total enslavement by the Dutch after landing in Table Bay. Many died soon after landing. Even the arch-fabricator, Theal, admits that:

"It was nothing unusual when one-fourth to one-third of the number taken on board died during the passage. And frequently from one-third to half of those landed died within three months."¹⁹²

Many of those who survived the grim first months of slavery rose in efforts to escape back to their homelands. Thus in the very first year when slaves were imported in bulk, some personal slaves of Van Riebeeck tried in vain to rise and escape to sea.¹⁹³ In 1660, two years after the importation of slaves, 15 slaves and 14 Company servants conspired to revolt, kill the guards at the Schuur and the Fort, defeat the crew of the ship "Erasmus" then in the Bay, and escape in this vessel to another country. The Fort doctor, the Englishman W. Robertson, betrayed his friends and their slave associates and the desperate venture was crushed.¹⁹⁴ In August, 1686, a slave-rebel, "Pieter of Batavia", was hanged

"for inciting various other slaves to abscond".¹⁹⁵

In 1707 "Augustyn of Batavia" led eight slaves in a bid to reach Madagascar. Four were broken on the wheel and the "Queen", who helped in the escape-revolt, was strangled to death.¹⁹⁶ In 1713 a Javanese slave was executed for "inciting" the slaves to a large-scale rising.¹⁹⁷ In February, 1714, 16 slaves tried to rise and escape to Angola. The leaders, "Deuntjie", "Hannibal", "Caesar" and "Courage" fought a last-ditch battle to the death at Wynberg.¹⁹⁸ In many of these escape-revolts the Khoi-Khoi made common cause with the slaves and were severely punished for harbouring a refugee slave. Slaves and their Khoi-Khoi allies escaped to mountain hideouts 4,000 feet up the Stellenbosch mountains or in the caves of Hangklip. Considering the small number of slaves at the time, these risings were not at all insignificant.

Such risings and the many common struggles of the slaves and Khoi-Khoi resulted in various laws to suppress these moves. Thus in 1686 Simon Van Der Stel forbade the carrying of arms or even knives by slaves and Khoi-Khoi herdsmen.¹⁹⁹ In the same year he banned the assembly of large numbers of slaves, fearing a widespread slave revolt.²⁰⁰ These disarming laws followed the revolt attempt led by "Pieter of Batavia" and supported by his Khoi-Khoi tribal friends.

While many slaves had to wait till they landed before they could try to escape, others mutinied on the seas. In June, 1719, 600 slaves rose in the English trader "Elizabethian" whilst at anchor in Table Bay.²⁰¹ In February, 1765, 140 slaves rose on the Dutch slaver "Meermin". Twenty-four of the crew were killed, and the officers forced to turn the ship back.

192. G. M. Theal: "History", vol. 3.

193. Dagverhaal, 19 October, 1658.

194. Dagverhaal, January, 1660.

195. Dagverhaal, 24 August, 1686.

196. Dagverhaal, 17 December, 1707.

197. D.E.I.C. Journal, "Summary of Convictions" for 1713 (e.g.).

198. Dagverhaal, 7 February, 1714.

199. D.E.I.C. Journal, 17 August, 1686.

200. Journal, 19 August, 1686.

201. Journal, June, 1719.

The officers, however, landed the slaves not at Madagascar, but on the coast of Agulhas, where 14 slaves were shot down by local farmers and 112 of the others were imprisoned at the Castle.²⁰²

LIBERATORY REVOLTS.

In the closing period of slavery the nature of the revolts changed. They became revolts for liberty rather than revolts of revenge or escape. In 1808 an Irish labourer, Hooper, an Irish sailor, Kelly, and two slaves, Abraham and Louis, organised a slave demonstration. In October they rode out to the Swartland wheat farms and rallied the slaves. On the 24th of the month Hooper and Kelly deserted their colleagues, but the other two carried on. The slaves marched to Cape Town, many naively expecting emancipation from the Governor. En route the slaves "arrested" many slave-owners. On the 27th of October a strong British force met and rounded up the marchers. Three hundred and twenty-six were arrested and the demonstration smashed. Louis, Abraham and even the deserter Hooper were hanged. Fifty slaves were flogged and some sentenced to life imprisonment by their British "emancipators".²⁰³

Another such "rising", whose aim was also emancipation, was suppressed in 1825 at Worcester. Two rebel leaders were hanged, others sentenced to flogging and life imprisonment. This concluded a long, albeit sporadic and episodic, series of resistance and revolt of the slaves against their masters, and, in the last two instances, against slavery itself.

Noteworthy though these struggles of the slaves were, they pale by comparison with the grim, widespread and fierce resistance of the Khoi-Khoin. Nearly a century after the defeat of Ngounema this resistance flared up again. Its cause was the expansion of the territory owned by the Company and burghers, an expansion which proceeded from the first defeats of the Khoi-Khoin in the 17th century, from the defeats of the 17th and 18th century slave-revolts, and from the stabilization of slavery and segregation.

202. Journal, February, 1765.

203. Records of Cape Colony. October, 1808.

SECTION VI.
THE SECOND SERIES OF LAND WARS.

CHAPTER XI.

THE RISE OF BOER FEUDALISM WITHIN SLAVE SOCIETY

The 1660 and 1671-77 wars dispossessed sections of the Khoi-Khoïn and on these expropriated lands grew up plantation slavery in the Western Cape and primitive feudalism further east. The slave-owners exploited the imported slaves and the conquered tribes; the feudal pastoral farmers exploited tribalists whom they enserfed rather than enslaved. The slave-owning aristocracy dominated the towns; the feudal aristocrats dominated the countryside. The social difference between the urban slave-owning plantation aristocracy and the rural cattle-ranch lords of serfs led to clashes between the two sections of the White exploiters, clashes which went as far as actual rebellions late in the 18th century. But towards the slaves, serfs and tribalists they were absolutely united and equally hostile. Hence there was an ambivalence in the nature of the feudal cattle-farmers.

CONFLICTS BETWEEN FEUDALISM AND SLAVERY.

The first side of this ambivalence expressed itself in opposition to Company laws which restricted ownership and leasing of land. The feudalists wanted unlimited land, without Company boundaries restricting their expansion northwards and eastwards. They therefore opposed the fixing of a firm boundary line in August, 1745,²⁰⁴ and again in November, 1769.²⁰⁵ They objected to being ordered, in February, 1770, to return across the Gamtoos River into the new Swellendam district.²⁰⁶ The Company had made these laws to prevent a premature clash with the tribes to the East, to protect its feudal pioneers, to keep the lines of defence and communication manageably short. But while the regime in the Western Cape viewed the interests of the rulers as a whole, the feudal frontiersmen considered only their sectional or even personal interests. Regardless of the danger to the ruling group as a whole, they tried to ignore Tulbagh's law of April, 1770, forbidding them to graze their cattle or settle on the eastern side of the Gamtoos River, and Tulbagh was forced to impose penalties of confiscation of property, cattle and wagons for failure to return to the western side of the river.²⁰⁷ In their desire to govern themselves they often refused to pay their rent on loan-farms given them by the Company.²⁰⁸

Their differences with the slave-owning Company aristocracy extended to other questions as well. They did not want Company control of their "trading" and opposed a law of February, 1770, which forbade trading "with Hottentots or Kafirs".²⁰⁹ The Company felt that this trade was undermining its own monopoly of "trade with the Natives" and was attracting the formidable Bantu tribes into White-owned areas before the White masters were ready to subject them. In April, 1770, Tulbagh imposed the death penalty for barter with the Bantu tribes.²¹⁰

204. Resolution of Council of Policy, 31 August, 1745.

205. Resolution of Council of Policy, 14 November, 1769.

206. Resolution of Council of Policy, 13 February, 1770.

207. Proclamation, 26 April, 1770.

208. Landdrost Maritz to Tulbagh, 22 February, 1769.

209. Council of Policy Resolution (after Report of de Bruyn and Steyn on 7 February, 1770).

210. Proclamation, 26 April, 1770.

The feudalists provoked wars with the Khoi-Khoi and !Ke and Bantu as they expanded to the north and east. But they were too weak and afraid to see these wars through themselves. They turned to the slave-regime for protection and military aid. But they themselves did not want to be pressed into commando service, although the Company's commandoes repeatedly saved them from annihilation. Thus in 1779 a Corporal Botman writes to the Stellenbosch Landdrost that

"When my men hear that a commando is about to go out they fly to the district of Swellendam".²¹¹

Commando-leader Albertus Van Jaarsveld likewise reported many Boers who did not want to go on commando against the African tribes.²¹² The feudalists did not want Company control, but always looked to the Company to rescue them from the Africans. Had it not been for this Government aid the feudal "Voortrekkers" would early on have become an extinct species.

THE FEUDAL EXPANSION.

The feudal expansion which led to these differences with the central regime and to the frontier wars of the late 18th century was spread over more than 100 years. This expansion took place at the expense of the Khoi-Khoi. Its extent may be gauged from the following outlines of land expansion.

In 1652 the Table Bay Khoi-Khoi began to lose their lands around the Bay. In 1657 the first burghers settled on Khoi-Khoi lands at what is now Rondebosch. In 1678 more settled on tribal lands in Hottentots Holland. In 1679 burghers occupied Khoi-Khoi lands at Stellenbosch. Now, after Ngounema's defeat the Khoi-Khoi lands were rapidly occupied. In 1687 burghers settled in Paarl, along the Berg River. In 1688 the Huguenots were given French Hoek, further east. In 1698 Wellington was occupied. In 1700 what was later Tulbagh was occupied. In 1746 Swellendam was settled, still further east.

Together with this eastwards expansion went an expansion to the north. Jacobus Coetzee crossed the Orange River in 1760 and returned in 1761 with 16 Europeans, 68 Khoi-Khoi and 15 waggons, reaching Keetmansdorp, 150 miles north of the Orange River. In 1762 W. van Reenen reached Reheboth. Both reported to the Cape authorities on the landed and cattle wealth of the Nama, Ovambo and Herero. By 1770, when the new series of land wars began, the feudal pastoral "farmers" had occupied fertile coastal Khoi-Khoi lands as far as 400 miles eastwards from Table Bay.

On these expropriated African lands the White population grew apace, from 1,000 in 1700 to 10,000, including 8,500 farmers, in 1773. From 1768 to 1778 alone the number of new farms taken out on loan totalled 729.²¹³

Together with thousands of square miles of Khoi-Khoi land, the slave-owners and feudalists took vast herds of cattle from the African tribes. By 1773 they had collected, by means of war, barter, breeding and theft, 40,000 cattle and 30,000 sheep.²¹⁴

Land and cattle, however, were of little value to these "gentleman farmers" without labour. This labour was obtained from the ruins of Ngounema's tribe, from kidnapping expeditions, and from wars in which the Boers seized and enserfed !Ke and Khoi-Khoi children. The first major war of the 18th century to secure and extend their landholdings and to enserf the defeated tribesmen began about 1770.

211. C. Botman to Stellenbosch Landdrost, 7 December, 1779.

212. A. Van Jaarsveld to D. B. Van Der Merwe, 19 April, 1779; Stellenbosch Landdrost Report, 13 April, 1779; also K. Van Der Merwe to Stellenbosch Landdrost, 3 September, 1779; also Letter to Landdrost, 4 September, 1779.

213. D. Moodie. Official Report, 1838: "Native Tribes of S.A.", Part III, p. 73.

214. *Ibid.*

CHAPTER XII.

THE TEN YEAR LAND WAR (1771-1781).

The land expansion of the Boers produced a long and bitter war which raged for 10 years. On the one side stood the feudal farmers, the slave-owners, and the Government of Holland. On the other side stood the !Ke, the Khoi-Khoi and the Xhosa-Bantu tribes.

The war was started by the Dutch frontier farmers. They attacked Khoi-Khoi groups and stole their cattle. In February, 1771, the Governor reported to the Stellenbosch Landdrost that the Khoi-Khoins had complained to him of these stock raids.²¹⁵ The Khoi-Khoins knew from long past experience that this was the prelude to a war in which land, not cattle, was the main object. They were by this time in close relationship and often part of the Xhosa tribes, and they felt they could resist the new onslaught of the Dutch. They retaliated to the cattle raids by seizing 900 cattle and killing three members of one J. Joubert's household. The Dutch replied with a commando, led in April, 1772, by Van Jaarsveld.

This first commando killed 92 Khoi-Khoins.²¹⁶ A second commando, in the same month, led by De Klerck, killed 51 !Ke in the Nieweveld, 100 miles north-east of Swellendam, in reprisal for the alleged theft of 102 cattle and 519 sheep.²¹⁷ A third commando, led by G. Van Wyk, shot "31 Bosjesmans" in the Roggeveld, 80 miles north of Swellendam, in October, 1772.²¹⁸ Gerrit Van Wyk's expedition revealed the fact that the Dutch East India Company was 100 per cent. with and behind the frontier farmers in their land-grabbing wars against the Africans. At the time that he complained to the Cape of the alleged stock theft, there were 58 !Ke tribesmen in the Castle on a charge of the murder of a farmer, one, Teutman, his wife and daughter. These !Ke prisoners were finally punished by the slave Company, not so much for murder, but as reprisal for what their tribesmen were supposed to have done to Van Wyk, the feudal frontiersman.

These three commandos were directed against the !Ke to the north of the Swellendam district and the Khoi-Khoi to the east of this district. Further east were the Xhosa tribes, who were at this stage not yet involved in the war. The commandoes were unable to defeat the !Ke-Khoi-Khoi resistance who were drawn into a common struggle despite friction over land and cattle between themselves. This friction arose because of the expansion of the Dutch settlers who, having driven the Khoi-Khoi off their lands in the Western Cape, forced them to go into the hunting grounds of the !Ke, and caused mutual cattle-raiding between the !Ke and Khoi-Khoi. In spite of this division the Dutch were unable to report victory after these three ferocious commandoes had come back.

215. Letter from Governor to Swellendam Landdrost, 15 February, 1771.

216. Report by L. S. Faber, Stellenbosch Landdrost.

217. Stellenbosch Landdrost to Gov. Plettenberg, 10 April, 1772.

218. Stellenbosch Landdrost to Governor, 20 October, 1772.

DIVIDE AND RULE.

In December, 1773, officials met at Stellenbosch and decided that without Khoi-Khoi allies they could not hope to defeat the !Ke-Khoi-Khoi "combination".²¹⁹ So, in March, 1774, 150 Khoi-Khoins were recruited, plus 100 Europeans.²²⁰ The Heemraden and Militia called for more Khoi-Khoi soldiers, fearing failure without their help.²²¹ These Khoi-Khoi troops were recruited from the servants, serfs and impoverished tribes. As in India, one conquered tribe was used to conquer the next. G. Opperman led three well-armed groups into a harrowing carnage.

In September, 1774, G. Van Wyk reported 96 killed and dozens of little orphans captured and distributed as herdsboys and servants.²²² N. Van der Merwe, in charge of the second group, reported that in August, 1774, his party had killed 142 !Ke.²²³ G. R. Opperman reported 265 killed and 129 "prisoners" (serfs) in the Swarteberg, Camdeboo, Sneeberg and Nieuwveld campaigns.²²⁴ In these three commandoes at least 503 were killed and 241 captured and enserfed. But the resistance was not yet broken.

In August, 1775, a seventh commando went out under Z. Marais and D. S. Van der Merwe, shooting 48 !Ke.²²⁵ In September, 1775, an eighth commando under Adriaan Van Jaarsveld set out, made up of "46 Christians and 31 Hottentots". This commando shot 181 !Ke and in one encounter alone captured

"seven little ones"²²⁶

whose fate may be judged from the following typical entry in Opperman's report of February, 1776:—

"Jan Horran had a little Bush gird named Lina registered for 25 years."²²⁷

In 1776 a ninth commando, under J. Joubert, reported 36 killed.²²⁸ But, after four years of war, the Dutch had to retreat from the Sneeberg to Camdeboo.²²⁹ In March the fearful farmers appealed to Opperman that

"so many thousands of Bushmen have united their inward anger"²³⁰ and asked for more help from the Government.

In June, 1776, the Government at the Cape approved a new powerful commando²³¹ which killed 53 !Ke and kidnapped 21 children in April, 1777.²³² Two years later, in March, 1779, the Governor was still busy ordering measures

"for the extirpation of the said rapacious tribes".²³³

The !Ke resistance was still unbroken and that year these hunters, now becoming used to domesticated cattle, seized 750 cattle and 3,062 sheep from the farmers. The farmers, after ten commandoes and eight years of war, now refused to go out on commando any longer. They compared oddly with the almost defenceless !Ke who, in the opinion of a subsequent British militarist,

219. Meeting of Heemraden, Landdrost and Militia, 28 December, 1773.

220. Heemraden, Landdrost and Militia Report, 28 March, 1774.

221. Meeting of Heemraden, Landdrost and Militia, 19 April, 1774.

222. Report of G. Van Wyk, 2 September, 1774.

223. Report of N. Van der Merwe, 7 November, 1774.

224. Report of G. R. Opperman, 13 January, 1775.

225. Report of G. R. Opperman, 15 August, 1775.

226. Report H. Van Jaarsveld to G. Opperman, 4 September, 1775.

227. Report G. Opperman to Stellenbosch Landdrost, 15 February, 1776.

228. Report of G. Opperman, 15 February, 1776.

229. Report of G. Opperman to Stellenbosch Landdrost, 1 March, 1776.

230. Burghers to Opperman. Letter, 18 March, 1776.

231. Resolution of Council of Policy, 11 June, 1776.

232. Report of G. R. Opperman, 10 April, 1777.

233. Governor to Stellenbosch Landdrost, 28 March, 1779.

"have never been known to demand quarter in any situation".²³⁴ The ten commandoes had failed to "extirpate" the !Ke. Now, in 1779, a new aspect entered into the war—the Xhosa tribes from the east. The Dutch faced the possibility of a great all-African tribal combination and devised plans to prevent this spectre from materialising. The Governor Plettenberg himself guided the last stage of the war, which lasted from April, 1779, until July, 1781.

THE XHOSA JOIN THE WAR.

While the Dutch were expanding to the east, the Xhosa were moving westwards in search of new grazing lands. The Great King Palo (1702 to 1775), supposed descendant of Mnguni (circa 1510) had crossed the Bashee River, north of East London, and fought the Khoi-Khoi King Hintsati in 1715 (whilst under the regency of Mdange).²³⁵ His brother, Langa, settled on the Fish River, further south, about 1740.²³⁶ His kingdom divided between his two sons, Gcaleka, who continued the main line, and Rarabe. The Gcalekas and Rarabes clashed and the Rarabes moved along the coast westwards. Rarabe obtained the use of land from the Khoi-Khoi Queen Hoho, between the Buffalo and Keiskamma Rivers, south of East London. The Rarabes had thus been for a long time in touch with the Khoi-Khoi. A section of the Rarabe, led by Ndlambe, had very friendly relations with the !Ke hunters.²³⁷ Although the Dutch may not have known it, there was ample basis for their fears of a united front of the Rarabe-Xhosas, the Khoi-Khoi and the !Ke.

In April, 1779, Van Jaarsveld asked the Stellenbosch Landdrost for a commando to prevent the Xhosa, under Langa, over the Fish River, from sowing their corn.²³⁸ Once again the Dutch provoked and caused the war, or rather its next and higher phase.

In July, 1780, J. Joubert and P. H. Ferreira led an unofficial commando which

"killed a great number of Kafirs".²³⁹

A month later C. Van der Merwe reported that a commando against the !Ke had killed 65 and taken 15 "little ones".²⁴⁰ In October the Government gave official aid to a commando against Langa, son of Palo, and this commando attacked the Xhosa beyond the Great Fish River.²⁴¹ In November the Government commandoes were ordered to drive the Xhosa across the Fish River, the 1778 Dutch boundary line.²⁴² This front of the war occupied the attention of the Dutch to such an extent that the northern (!Ke) front became exposed. In December, 1780, the "Commandant of the Eastern Country", Van Jaarsveld, was told to try to make peace with the Xhosa, in order to intensify the war against the !Ke. He was told that he was "at liberty to put them" (the !Ke) "to death and entirely destroy them".²⁴³

234. R. Collins: Report to Earl Caledon, 1809. Moodie: Part 3, p. 33.

235. J. H. Soga: "The South-Eastern Bantu" (1930). For Xhosa line of Kings, see pages 81, 111, 113, 120, 122 and 125.

236. *Ibid.*, p. 126.

237. Tiyo Soga: "Gxulwe and the Bushmen" in "InNdaba".

238. Report A. Van Jaarsveld to Stellenbosch Landdrost, 8 April, 1779.

239. D.E.I.C. Journal of Council of Policy, 25 July, 1780.

240. Report Serg. C. Van der Merwe to Stellenbosch Landdrost, 16 September, 1780.

241. Resolution of Council of Policy, 24 October, 1780.

242. Resolution of Council of Policy, 14 November, 1780.

243. "Instructions" from Council of Policy, 5 December, 1780.

This effort to divide the Africans by means of a separate peace failed. Van Jaarsveld decided that the strategy had to be reversed:

"The still plundering Bushmen cannot be properly beaten unless the rebellious Kaffers are first forcibly repelled."²⁴⁴

In July, 1781, he reported on the "expulsion of the Kafirs",²⁴⁵ claiming that his troops had defeated "Coba, Magoti, Thatthoe and Zieka", and had taken 4,630 cattle. Langa, who had gone far beyond the Fish River and across the Bushman River, had to retire back across the Bushman River towards the Fish River.

In 1809 Collins said that old residents of Camdaboo put the number of Xhosa killed in these wars at 5,900.²⁴⁶ Despite heavy loss of life and of cattle, the Xhosa had not lost much land and the Dutch were no further at the end of the 10 years' war than they were at the beginning. In effect, the informal "combination" of the !Ke, Khoi-Khoin and Xhosa had successfully frustrated the Dutch feudal land-grabbers and the mighty slave Company standing behind them.

244. Report of A. Van Jaarsveld, 20 July, 1781.

245. *Ibid.*

246. Report Collins to Caledon, July 1809.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE CONQUEST OF THE !KE (1790-1793).

The land war was resumed in 1790. Once more the Government stepped in to rescue the feudalists from the African tribes. The cattle raids of the !Ke.

"would have obliged the settlers to abandon it" (the Koup District) "if the Government had not authorised a general commando against them".²⁴⁷

The !Ke were helped by the Khoi-Khoin, who made common cause in the 1790-1793 war.²⁴⁸ On the other side, B. Van der Walt, the commando leader, was helped by the Khoi-Khoin Afrikaner (whose followers later trekked north to South-West Africa).

The veteran Van Jaarsveld was replaced by Woeke, and then, in 1792, the Governor Sluyskens sent out H. C. Maynier to supervise the land war. Maynier was a Liberal and was filled with "French Revolutionary ideals". He took a swift look at the scene and in December, 1792, outlined a policy of divide and rule to the Governor.²⁴⁹ His policy was to exterminate the !Ke, to buy off the Khoi-Khoin, and to contain the Xhosa by means of treaties.²⁵⁰ The last part of his strategy was not yet practicable, because the missionaries had not yet settled among the Xhosa to bribe and divide the chiefs. He had to revise his treaty policy and attacked the Xhosa in 1793.

He moved swiftly, because a severe drought had aggravated the land-hunger of both Xhosa and Boer²⁵¹ and this gave rise to a situation which was obviously both dangerous and full of possibilities for Maynier. The frontier farmers (e.g. the Prinsloos) had invaded Xhosa lands in the 1780's. In May, 1793, Maynier sent Lindeque into these lands. But Lindeque was driven back by the angry tribes, and in June Maynier decided to attack on a large front.²⁵² His commando took 2,000 cattle in August, but had also to retire. In August Maynier asked Boer Van Jaarsveld to lead commandoes.²⁵³ On August 27th a Maynier-controlled commando took 8,000 cattle and 120 women and children on the Buffalo River; another commando, controlled by Maynier and Faure, took 2,000 cattle in October, 1793.²⁵⁴ In November Maynier made a separate peace with two sons of Langa, and in December the Dutch Government officially approved his actions.²⁵⁵

247. R. Collins: Report, 1809.

248. *Ibid.*

249. Marais: "Maynier and the Boer Republic".

250. Minutes Heemraden, Graaff Reinet, 3 June, 1793.

251. Faure, Maynier to Governor, Journal, 16 December, 1793.

252. Undelivered letter to Governor, 16 June, 1793.

253. Minutes, Heemraden, 10 August, 1793.

254. Journal of Council of Policy, 23 October, 1793.

255. Resolution of Council of Policy, 16 December, 1793.

The Liberal Maynier had secured the lands of the Boers west of the Fish River and had even grabbed the land further than the Fish, as far as the Buffalo River, at whose mouth East London now stands.

The northern frontier of the Boers was, largely through his methods, now safe from the !Ke. After the 1793 war, due to the murderous commandoes of the Government, to the large-scale taking of their beasts, to the kidnapping of their children, the fierce, short 20-year-long resistance of the !Ke hunters collapsed. The survivors fled further to the north, only to be pursued by the Boers after the Boer Trek of 1834, to be hunted down and destroyed. The survivors were isolated from "civilization" by the missionaries, whose Khoi-Khoi missions helped the Government and farmers of the Cape by

"tending to rid them of the deprivations of the Bosjesman, and procure them servants. . . . I think the Bosjesmen should not be allowed to have any communications with the colony, except through the missions",²⁵⁶

This was the view of Collins, after the L.M.S. Missionary, Rev. Anderson, had convinced him of the value of the mission stations. During the 1790-93 war the Moravians had restarted the Baviaans Kloof Mission, which was begun in 1736, but had collapsed in 1745. In 1792 this station began to recruit Khoi-Khoins as servants for the wheat farmers; to draw Khoi-Khoins away from their resistance and into the "quisling" armies which served the Government. By 1809 this station had recruited 800 Khoi-Khoins to work for farmers and fight as mercenaries in the Cape Regiment.²⁵⁷ However, the missionaries did not yet play a major role by 1793. The major role was played by the Liberal, Maynier, and it was this first Liberal who finally broke the resistance of the !Ke and drove them out of the pages of South African history.

256. Report of R. Collins, p. 36.

257. Report of R. Collins, p. 35.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE CONQUEST OF THE KHOI-KHOIN (1797-1807).

Although the !Ke lay shattered after the 1793 war, the Khoi-Khoin and Xhosa resistance was still far from broken. Together with the !Ke they had withstood the combined forces of a Slave Empire, feudal enserfers, and early Liberalism. To these three forces were now to be added a fourth, which had already appeared in 1792, namely the missionary conquistadores. This fourth force was really a twin of Liberalism, both being instruments of the rising industrial powers of Europe. These forces were let loose on the Khoi-Khoin and Xhosa in the next, the fifth, great land war in South Africa.

BOER REVOLTS.

In addition, the central Slave Government had changed hands when the British occupied the Cape in 1795. A mighty Imperial power took the place of a bankrupt, declining Company. Plettenberg, Nederburg and Frykenius (1792) and Sluyskens (1793) tried in vain to keep the financial affairs of the Company's Cape Colony together. The task was made more hopeless by the expenses incurred in the 1790-93 land war. On top of this, the Boers rebelled at Graaff Reinet in 1795, driving Maynier out in February and Bressler in October. The Boer rebels, led by Coenraad de Buys, Van Jaarsveld, Prinsloo, Bezuidenhout, Botha, Faber and de Jager, were dissatisfied with the protection and help given them by Maynier against the Xhosa and Khoi-Khoin. They were brought to their senses in August, 1796, when they surrendered to the British General Craig and accepted Bressler back as Landdrost.²⁵⁸ Having settled this family quarrel between the feudalists and the Slave Government, the British, under Governor Macartney, proceeded to settle the major "question"; the unbroken Khoi-Khoin and Xhosa resistance.

Before this task could be properly undertaken by Macartney, and later by the Acting-Governor Dundas, however, they had to quell yet another Boer Rebellion. This rebellion, at the end of 1798, was provoked by the arrest of the old Boer rebel, Van Jaarsveld, on a charge of forgery, but its real cause was the dissatisfaction of the Boer feudalists with the "protection" and military aid from the Cape Government.

In their second rebellion the Boers, through Coenraad de Buys and Botha, tried to win the Xhosa as allies against the British. At the same time these two sought refuge among the Xhosa from the long arm of the British law.²⁵⁹ The Xhosas did not suffer from amnesia and rejected the proposal. Instead, led by Ndlambe, the regent for Ngqika, who was the son of Rarabe, the Xhosa exploited the quarrel between Boer and Briton by harassing their enemies with sharp, swift sorties during the early part of 1799.²⁶⁰ Caught between the Xhosa and the British forces, the Boers capitulated at Graaff-Reinet. Eighteen leaders were charged for the rising.

258. Cape Colony Records, 1796.

259. Cape Colony Records, 3, pp. 227, 244.

260. Barrow to Dundas, 15 April, 1799.

They in turn blamed Botha and Buys, then in hiding among the Xhosa. The rising ended as a farce and the Boers looked forward to a vigorous period of land-grabbing under the new leadership of the English Government.

BRITAIN PREPARES FOR WAR.

The British had already, before the rebellion, shown their enthusiasm for a new land war. In May, 1797, Ndlambe was defeated by his nephew, Ngqika,²⁶¹ and Ndlambe had to seek grazing lands further west, on the fringe of the Swellendam district. In October, 1797, the British asked the minor chief, Chungwa, to go back across the Fish River, which the Ndlambes had crossed after the clash with the Ngqikas. Chungwa replied that

"we won't retreat, but would continue to reside here in the wood and that he won't speak any more about it".²⁶²

The British order to Chungwa was a virtual declaration of war. The same month the British ordered the Boers to dismiss all their Xhosa servants.²⁶³ Having taken precautions that he would not have civil war in his rear between Boer and Bantu, Macartney told Faure, in February, 1798, to use force against the Xhosa.²⁶⁴ The British continued with war preparations, despite the fact that in October, November and December, 1798, Heemraden Enquiries had revealed that most of the Boer claims that the Xhosa were stealing their cattle were false or grossly exaggerated.²⁶⁵ In the end the British "recovered" for the Boers 10 head for every one allegedly "stolen".

DIVIDE AND RULE BACKFIRES.

Early in 1799 Dundas sent out Vandeleur and Barrow to drive the Ndlambes back across the Fish River. En route to Bruintjies Hoogte they met the Khoi-Khoi guerilla leader, Klaas Stuurman, on his way to join Ndlambe's forces. Barrow disarmed Stuurman's company²⁶⁶ and recruited some as soldiers to fight Ndlambe. Barrow met Chungwa, ordered him to withdraw across the Fish, Chungwa once more refused and the British troops opened fire. The Xhosa formations stood their ground. Barrow had to retreat to Algoa Bay to await reinforcements from Dundas,²⁶⁷ which arrived four months later, in September.

Barrow had dragged the Khoi-Khoins with him to Algoa Bay after the battle with Chungwa. At Algoa Bay Stuurman decamped and joined forces with Ndlambe. Barrow's and Vandeleur's plan had backfired and, as Marais correctly comments:

"The Hottentot-Xhosa combination which Maynier had foreseen and wished to prevent, had become an accomplished fact."²⁶⁸

A battle ensued which was most interesting and revealing. Stuurman had joined Ndlambe with 700 men, 300 horses and 150 guns. A party of 150 Xhosas and Khoi-Khoins met a Boer party of 300, twice as strong, and more strongly equipped. The Africans utterly routed the Boers on June 27th, 1799. News of this victory spread throughout the Graaff-Reinet and Swellendam districts and Khoi-Khoi serfs left their masters to join

261. Graaff-Reinet Minutes, 5 June, 1797.

262. Bressler to Macartney, 12 October, 1797.

263. *Ibid.*

264. Macartney to Faure, 9 February, 1798 (British Occupation Records).

265. Heemraden Reports: 1 October, 1798; 5 November, 1798; 3 December, 1798.

266. Barrow to Dundas, 15 April, 1799.

267. British Occupation Records, 24 May, 1799

268. Marais: "Maynier and the Boer Republic", p. 107.

Stuurman.²⁶⁹ The Boer farmers and troops panicked and fled. Only one man admired them and this man was the London Missionary Society (L.M.S.) missionary, Van der Kemp, who shared his troubles with the fleeing Boers and comforted them in their panic.²⁷⁰ Dundas held a quite different view of the Boers, complaining later on that they

"were very unwilling to assemble under arms".²⁷¹

With the Boers fleeing in disorder, Dundas personally took over the command. He had a background of British experience in India behind him and he advised Vandeleur to try a new divide and rule tactic: to create division among the Xhosa chiefs.²⁷² The ideal man for this job was the tried and tested Liberal Maynier, who was installed as Resident Commissioner on 25th December, 1799, for both Swellendam and Graaff-Reinet. A Liberal was now at the helm. His strategy was twofold: to draw the Khoi-Khoins out of the war by means of land bribes; and to make separate peace treaties with certain Xhosa chiefs in order to conquer the Xhosa piecemeal.

THE NEW DIVIDE AND RULE TACTIC.

Applying the first side of his divide and rule tactic, Maynier introduced a system of labour contracts for Khoi-Khoins. He succeeded in drawing away 700 of Stuurman's men from their camp on the Sundays River. From November 24th, 1799, to January 3, 1801, he succeeded in registering 400 Khoi-Khoins with farmers. Others he tried to settle near Rietvlei in the Western Cape, but this failed. He took his precedent from the Moravian Mission's role in the 1792 war.²⁷³ He organised the nucleus of a Khoi-Khoi police force to protect the White "inhabitants against the attacks of the vagabond Caffres or Hottentots"²⁷⁴ and to help the British "recover stolen cattle" from the Xhosa. By and large, Maynier's policy could only be successfully consummated by the missionary settlements.

To carry out the other side of his divide and rule policy he met Ngqika in November, 1799, but the king was not persuaded to turn traitor.²⁷⁵ It was only after Van der Kemp had "worked among" the Ngqikas that the king betrayed his tribe.

Having only half succeeded in buying off the Khoi-Khoi, and having failed to divide the Ndlambes further from the Ngqikas, Maynier once more fell back upon the Boer commandoes to achieve his purpose. But he could not reorganise the scattered and frightened Boers. In desperation the Boers of Graaff-Reinet revolted for the third time and the misunderstood Maynier had again to leave the district. Maynier was completely exonerated at an official Commission of Enquiry in 1802. He was proved to have been a loyal friend of the Boers, and, in consequence, a confirmed enemy of the African tribes. He was not the only Boer-saver to be maligned and misunderstood by the Boers. For the missionaries of the 19th century were regarded by the Boers as friends of the Africans, whereas nothing would have been left of the Voortrekkers and their 18th and 19th century Republics, were it not for the Liberals, in the first case, and the Missionaries in the second instance.

269. Vandeleur to Government, 31 July, 1799.

270. Journal of Van der Kemp. Entry, 31 July, 1799.

271. Maynier Commission of Enquiry Report, 3 May, 1802.

272. Dundas to Vandeleur, 7 June, 1799.

273. Cape Colony Records, p. 283.

274. *Ibid.*

275. *Ibid.*

THE MISSIONARY TAKES OVER.

The redoubtable "Bushman"-killer, Van der Walt, organised commandoes after the departure of Maynier. The Boer rising subsided, but Van der Walt was even less successful than Maynier. He was defeated by Stuurman in February, 1802,²⁷⁶ in a clash with another combined Khoi-Khoïn and Xhosa force.²⁷⁷

Now that the Boer had failed more dismally than the Liberal, the Government sent out the L.M.S. Missionary Van der Kemp to save the Eastern Frontier for the Boers and for England.

He began by attracting Khoi-Khoïns from Graaff-Reinet, the centre of Boer-British intrigue and founded the mission station of Bethelsdorp at Algoa Bay (Port Elizabeth). But many of his "charges" deserted him in March, 1802, and rejoined Stuurman.²⁷⁸

His next move was a separate peace offer, with land as the bait, to the Khoi-Khoïn leaders, Boesak, Trompetter, Boveland and Stuurman. The first three refused outright; Stuurman feigned acceptance but later joined Chungwa, the Xhosa resister.²⁷⁹ The Khoi-Khoïn and Xhosa front remained unshaken. They saw, however, the great danger which Botha's place, the nucleus of Bethelsdorp, was to them, and attacked this "mission station" in September, 1802.²⁸⁰ In this battle, A. Stuurman, brother of Klaas, was killed.

Van der Kemp's handful of Khoi-Khoïn allies, whom he had bribed over, proved invaluable to the Boer commando-leader Van der Walt, who went to battle in May, 1802, with 132 Khoi-Khoïn troops and 368 Boers.²⁸¹ In June, 1802, covered by 182 wagons, the Boers shot down 200 tribesmen and seized 12,000 cattle.²⁸² In August another commando of Van der Walt shot 27 resisters. On August 8th, 1802, this Boer Sulla met his end in an "ambush" by the Khoi-Khoïn fighters, but not before his commando had plundered another 3,200 cattle.

P. R. Botha replaced Van der Walt and sent out an unsuccessful commando in November, 1802. But Stuurman was defeated at Langekloof and Boesak at Oliphants River by superior forces. In February, 1803, an uneasy peace treaty was signed,²⁸³ without the war having been decisively concluded either way.

THE DUTCH LIBERALS TRY AGAIN.

After the Treaty of Amiens the Dutch returned to the Cape, with Janssens as Governor and de Mist as Commissioner. They came as emissaries of free trade and conquest, continuing the British policy of "fortifications in the interior . . . for defence against the natives" and, like Craig, to find out "how the goodwill of the natives may be won and trade with them advanced."²⁸⁴ They preserved slavery, merely modifying some of its laws, such as the marriage laws, but making it still difficult for slaves to marry or become free.²⁸⁵ They built locations for the Khoi-Khoïn to break their resistance and trap their labour. They issued a Proclamation in May, 1803, to enforce Maynier's service contract system.²⁸⁶

276. Van der Walt to Sherlock, 24 February, 1802.

277. Van der Walt to Dundas, 26 March, 1802.

278. Van der Kemp to Dundas, 18 March, 1802.

279. Journal of Van der Kemp.

280. Van der Kemp to Van Ryneveld, 28 September, 1802.

281. Van der Walt to Dundas, 31 May, 1802.

282. Van der Walt to Dundas, 18 July, 1802.

283. Peace Treaty, 20 February, 1803 (Cape Colony Records, 4, p. 98).

284. Instruction by British Crown to Governor, 30 December, 1796.

285. Political Ordinance, 20 September, 1804.

286. Proclamation, 9 May, 1803.

The after effects of the great loss of cattle and life sustained by the Khoi-Khoen resistors now began to tell on them. From privation and poverty many were forced to leave Stuurman and become labourers under service contract. In March, 1803, Janssens and de Mist succeeded in herding Stuurman on to land on the Gamtoos River, far south of Ndlambe,²⁸⁷ both to divide the Khoi-Khoen from the Xhosa and to provide a labour supply for the farmers. Klaas Stuurman, now in the shadows of surrender, died while out hunting with his brother, David. To the British and Dutch he was a "monster" (Collins' expression), but the tribes mourned the passing of this resistor, who had helped forge the first significant Khoi-Khoen unity with the Xhosa.

Stuurman's granted lands were not intended to remain in Khoi-Khoen hands, but as a bribe to break the united military front of the Khoi-Khoen and Xhosa. In 1806 David Stuurman resolutely "confirmed his independence",²⁸⁸ gave refuge to his Xhosa friends on his land, although this was clearly forbidden by law. He defiantly

"concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with Cungwa" (Chungwa) "against the colony".²⁸⁹

On the eve of realising this alliance David Stuurman was led into a trap by his "friend", a Boer, C. Routenbach. He was surprised, surrounded and arrested with his brother, Boschman, by Cuyler, the Landdrost. His tribe was driven off the "granted" land on the Gamtoos and settled as a buffer group at Bethelsdorp²⁹⁰ where Janssens and de Mist had previously firmly esconsed Van der Kemp. Cuyler himself personally took possession of Stuurman's land, cattle and his children, as serfs. The fate of David Stuurman is worth recording. He was taken to Cape Town, imprisoned on Robben Island, from where he escaped. He travelled overland for 700 miles to live with his old friends, the Ndlambes. In 1819 he returned to the Colony, was re-arrested after 10 free years and sent to Cape Town Prison. From here, in 1823, the great old fighter was sent as a convict to New South Wales, Australia, where he died, a forgotten and unsung hero.²⁹¹

THE MISSIONARIES FINALLY SUCCEEDED.

By the time of Stuurman's defeat and capture the British were back at the Cape again. After the surrender of Von Prophalow and Janssens in January 1806, to Sir D. Baird and Beresford, Lord Caledon was installed as Governor in 1807. Caledon used Van der Kemp of the L.M.S. as his major instrument to finally defeat and atomise the Khoi-Khoens.

Van der Kemp was sent out to corrupt Ngqika, whom he knew well, and whom he had already "influenced" greatly. He betrayed his real role as a spy among the Africans by telling Collins that he

"thought it better that the Natives should have no reason to suppose that he had any connection with the Colonial Government".²⁹²

Van der Kemp had previously helped de Mist to make a separate treaty with Ngqika, in terms of which Ngqika agreed to stay north of the Fish River, while the other chiefs rejected these terms.²⁹³ While Ndlambe defied the Fort Frederick Garrison and refused even to meet de Mist, Ngqika

287. Report of R. Collins, 1809.

288. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

289. *Ibid.*

290. *Ibid.*

291. J. Philip: "Researches in S. Africa" (1828). Appendix 1 to Vol. 2; from Pringle in "New Monthly Magazine", January, 1828, pp. 371 and 372

292. R. Collins Journal. Entry: 3 April, 1809.

293. "Belangrike Historische Dokumenten", Vol. 3, p. 233

had fallen so much under Van der Kemp's influence that he betrayed the Xhosa and accepted the treaty.

Later Ngqika was to tell Collins that

"He wished to strengthen his friendship with the Christians and to come nearer to the colony. That the favours which they had almost exclusively bestowed on him had made every Kafir his enemy."²⁹⁴

Now that Van der Kemp had permanently divided the Ngqikas from the Ndlambes, he was able to turn to the task of dividing the Khoi-Khoïn as a whole from the Xhosa as a whole. He helped the British soldier, Collins, to frustrate Khoi-Khoïn-Xhosa unity negotiations undertaken by Trompetter, Stuurman's old friend and

"noted chief of the former insurgents".²⁹⁵

He recruited the shattered Khoi-Khoïns into Bethelsdorp, and there distributed them as cheap labour among the farmers and used them as troops against the Xhosa. Before his death in 1811, Van der Kemp had done his work well. John Philip gave him this testimonial, saying that in the 1812 war against Ndlambe, the

"Hottentots of Bethelsdorp . . . contributed much to the success of the enterprise".²⁹⁶

Through the work of Van der Kemp the Khoi-Khoïn were converted from staunch allies of the Xhosa into a hostile buffer against the Xhosa. He converted them from enemies to allies. He organised them as a labour and military force serving their British and Boer conquerors and dispossessors. Some Khoi-Khoïn slaves, serfs and tribalists trekked into South-West Africa under Jager Afrikaner, burnt the Warmbad mission of the Albrecht brothers in 1811, and there the Khoi-Khoïn resistance continued for another 100 years. The main Khoi-Khoïn resistance, however, that in the Cape Province, was broken after the Maynier-Van der Kemp war. The Khoi-Khoïn backbone was broken by this war, and from 1809 on a series of laws were passed to subjugate them on the very lands they had lost, after 150 years of resistance, involving five major wars and countless battles.

294. R. Collins Journal. Entry: 20 March, 1809.

295. R. Collins Journal: Stellenbosch, July, 1809.

296. *Supra*, ref. 291, Vol. 1, p. 254.

CHAPTER XV.

THE SUBJUGATION OF THE CONQUERED KHOI-KHOIN.

The conquered Khoi-Khoin were dispossessed of their property and either "distributed as serfs to the neighbouring boers"²⁹⁷ or drawn on to mission labour stations, or employed as "free" labour in the rising towns. This process of "detrribalisation" converted the Khoi-Khoin finally from tribalists to serfs or wage-labourers. This transformation took place against the general change-over in British colonial possessions from slavery to other forms of exploitation, and this again arose from the Industrial Revolution in England and its consequences. The breakdown of the Khoi-Khoin tribal structure coincided with the breakdown of slavery, with the difference that while the former took place suddenly after the defeat of the Stuurmans and Trompetter, the latter was a gradual process. This process brought the slaves and the Khoi-Khoins together into one social layer; the tribalists and slaves met as wage-servants whom the rulers named the "Coloured People".

EARLY FORMS OF WAGE-LABOUR.

Embryonic signs of wage-labour had begun to emerge even under Dutch slavery. Van der Stel, in the 1680's, permitted slave-owners to hire out slaves as artisans. The slave gave part of his "wages" to his master. Some slaves earned a spare-time income through fishing, sewing and odd jobs. In 1775 the Stellenbosch Heemraden accepted the "inboeken" of Khoi-Khoins who had been on farms till the age of 12. They could be "apprenticed" for 13 years.²⁹⁸ This was actually a form of serfdom, transitional from slavery to wage-labour. This transitional form was practised by the British after they finally took the Cape in 1806.

As the power of the Dutch East India Company waned the relative number of "free persons of colour" grew rapidly. By 1806 there were already 20,000 ex-slave and Khoi-Khoin serfs and labourers against 30,000 slaves. The growth of non-slave labour was then speeded up and by 1828 there were 35,000 "free persons of colour" and the same number of slaves, of which 30,000 were in the Western Province and 5,000 in the Eastern Province. This growth of non-slave labour was effected by two methods: "manumission" of slaves; and the breakdown of Khoi-Khoin tribalism.

These two processes were the outcome of a change in the function of the colonies, especially the colonies of England. Previously the role of the colonies was to provide cheap raw materials and precious metals for trade and luxuries for the wealthy. The commodities fashioned in the factories of England were thrown on to the European market, being mainly consumed by the workers and employers and aristocracy of Europe. But, with the Industrial Revolution, the European market became too small and British goods began to flood India, America and Africa. Now the function of the colonies changed, or, rather, increased. It had to fulfill its old role,

297. J. Philip: "Researches", App. 1, Vol. 2, pp. 371, 372.

298. D.E.I.C. Records, 4 September, 1775.

but in addition it had to act as a market for the finished commodities pouring out from Manchester and the other great industrial cities of England. A market means first of all that there must be people with money in their pockets who can pay cash for commodities. That means that slave-labour was of no use as a market, for slaves did not have money and the slave-owners were a very narrow market. Labour had to be "free", had to be paid wages in the form of money, so that it could purchase British finished goods. It meant, too, the forcible dissolution of self-sufficient tribalism. Philip, dominant missionary figure in South Africa for close on 50 years, said:

"By raising all the Hottentots of the colony to the condition of the Hottentots at Bethelsdorp a new and extensive market would be created for British goods."²⁹⁹

From the point of view of British manufacture the additional function of the colony as a commodity market, as an extension of the European market into a world market, meant that slave labour had of necessity to be replaced by "free" wage labour. This motive speeded up the wars of dispossession against the Khoi-Khoi; at the same time it led to the "emancipation" of slaves movement.

The abolition of slavery was, in addition, of advantage to the exploiters settled in the Cape, including the slave-owners themselves. Philip expressed this when he wrote:

"Make the Hottentots free and give them a fair price for their labour and their masters will have double the work that they obtain at present."³⁰⁰

Wage-labour was cheaper, more efficient, and less of an onus on the masters, whether slave-owners or serf-lords.

For these two basic reasons the system of wage-labour began to come to South Africa at the beginning of the 19th century. Its apostles, evangelists, pioneers and most subtle instruments were the missionaries, who therefore made their first important appearance in the 1797-1807 land war and finally brought about the ruin of the Khoi-Khoi.

THE CALEDON SERF LAW.

This war and the consequent breakdown of Khoi-Khoi tribalism took place against the background outlined above. The transition to wage-labour was often not direct, but took the form of serf-labour. In November, 1809, the Earl of Caledon, Governor of the Cape, introduced such a transitional labour-form, through a "Proclamation on Passes and Labour Regulations".³⁰¹ Clause 1 of this law ordered the Khoi-Khoins to

"have a fixed place of abode . . . that they should not be allowed to change their place of abode from one district to another without a certificate from the Fiscal or Landdrost".³⁰²

This law shackled the Khoi-Khoi to the land and made their movement subject to a pass. In this sense it was serf-like labour. But it was intended to be transitional to wage-labour. Thus Clause 2 regulated wages and time of payment by means of an obligatory contract of service. In this sense the Khoi-Khoi servant became the "legal equal" of his master and in 1811 and 1812, for the first time, had some access to a court of law.^{303 304}

299. *Supra*, ref. 297, Vol. 1, p. 365.

300. *Ibid.*, p. 372.

301. Proclamation 14, 1 November, 1809.

302. *Ibid.*

303. Circuit Court Proclamation, 16 May, 1811.

304. Public Judicial Proceedings Proclamation, 25 September, 1813.

The immediate effect of the Caledon Pass Law was to "distribute the Hottentots as serfs among the Boers". Its ultimate effect was to "spew" the Khoi-Khoi on to the labour market.

ABOLITION OF SLAVE TRAFFIC.

At about the same time the abolition of the slave traffic took place. This was adopted in England in 1807 and applied from 1809. It was directly related to the 1809 Caledon Pass Law. For it reduced the importation of slaves and thus the slaves of the Cape became more valuable. Slaves were now expensive to purchase and the farmers wanted a cheaper form of labour. Caledon satisfied them by means of his 1809 law, for conquered Khoi-Khoi semi-serfs were much cheaper than slaves.

The abolition of the slave trade was in the interests of England. Wilberforce, the Wesleyans, Pitt and Fox, had long campaigned for "improvements" in this traffic. Wilberforce had helped Pitt to make the slave trade more comfortable for shipping owners shanghaiing slaves from Africa to the Americas. His "agitation" (which was not then for total abolition) ceased abruptly when he joined Pitt in a crusade against the French Revolution, which threatened the industrial, commercial and colonial supremacy of England. With the fall of the Jacobins he resumed his "agitation" as a consistent Imperialist. He, like Philip later, wanted "an extensive market for British goods"; regarded slavery as wasteful and expensive and inefficient; wanted an end to social instability in the West Indies, where slave revolts were threatening the British sugar investments; at the same time he wanted to stop the importation of slaves which was flooding the slave market, depressing the value of slaves, ruining slave-owners by depreciating their slave assets and by making them feed more slaves than they could put to work. For these reasons Wilberforce and others fought for the abolition of the slave trade, but not yet of slavery itself.

The abolition of the slave trade had the desired and intended effect throughout the British Empire, including the Cape Colony. The capital assets of the slave-owners rose. Further, it hastened the conquest of the Khoi-Khoi, as has been shown. Finally, it led to the capture of non-British slave ships by British captains. The Negroes were not sent back to their homelands, but taken as "prize Negroes" and "apprenticed" for seven years. Again serf-like labour was a transitional form from slave to wage labour. These new supplies of cheap, captured or conquered labour and of land taken from the Khoi-Khoi attracted more European settlers and from 1805 to 1813 the European population increased by 50 per cent.

From all points of view the abolition of the slave traffic was of benefit to the exploiters in the Cape Colony.

FURTHER "SERF" LAWS.

The transition from slavery and tribalism to wage-labour through the transitional labour-form of serfdom was expressed in further laws. In 1812 Governor Cradock introduced his "Hottentot Children Proclamation". All Khoi-Khoi children born on farms and brought up there till they were eight years old had to be "apprenticed" to farmers for 10 years. Thus were the children of the conquered and broken-up Khoi-Khoi resisters enserved by their conquerors.

ORDINANCE 50, 1828.

The process of destroying Khoi-Khoi tribalism and assimilating its manpower as serf or wage labour was formally consummated in 1828. Ordinance 50 of this year was the work, mainly of John Philip, Missionary-

in-Chief, his son-in-law, Fairbairn, Stöckenstroom, and other Liberals. Nominally this law made "Free Persons of Colour" equal in law to Europeans. The seller of labour had to meet the buyer of labour on "equal" terms before parting with his brain, muscle and life. Legal equality rested on economic inequality. John Philip explained that this was the real motive for this Act which he, more than anyone else, inspired and prepared:

"All that is wanted for the Hottentots, more correctly for the natives of South Africa, is liberty to bring their labour to the best market."

Clause 3 of the Act gave "Free Persons of Colour" the right to buy or sell land. This was an empty deception, for few Khoi-Khoins had the money or possibility of buying land. Even as late as 1860 there were only 1,500 Coloured small farmers, against 10,500 White large-scale farmers, despite the fact that these groups were about equal in number.

Twenty-three Clauses of the Ordinance dealt not with "liberty" but with "labour". All defined the European as master and the ex-slaves and Khoi-Khoins "free persons of colour" as servants. It, in effect, even openly defined a Coloured person as a worker and a European as an employer. It equated class with colour. Its very aim was set out in racialistic terms: "For improving the condition of Hottentots and other Free Persons of Colour at the Cape of Good Hope".³⁰⁵ Since it viewed the Coloured people exclusively as cheap labour, most of its clauses dealt with this aspect. To create "an extensive market for British goods" it forbade liquor and tobacco as a form of wages (Clauses 4 and 5). Women and youths over 18 could enter into wage contracts (Clauses 8 and 11). Very young children could be "apprenticed" (enserved) for seven years up to the age of 16 for girls and 18 for boys (Clause 12). Children of "Hottentots, Prize Negroes and Negresses and other Free Persons of Colour" could be "indentured" (enserved) with the parents' consent (Clause 15). Various clauses made it compulsory for a "Master or Mistress" to fulfill their side of labour contracts (Clauses 16, 19, 22, 23). As for the "servants" they could go to court but were liable to 14 days' hard labour if they lodged "untrue and vexatious complaints" against their "Master or Mistress" (Clause 24). This provision did not apply to the "Master or Mistress".

This law legalised the enslavement of the Khoi-Khoins in particular. With the chimera of "equality" it aimed to achieve the wish of Van der Kemp:

"As much as possible to bind the Hottentots to the Government of the land."

These were its economic and political motives. This law, which is hailed by Liberals as the Magna Charta of Coloured Liberty, did not say one word to modify, let alone abolish, slavery. It contented itself with the legal consummation of the conquest, expropriation and enslavement of the Khoi-Khoins.

ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, 1834.

The destruction of Khoi-Khoins tribalism and the assimilation of those conquered into the British system of free trade and wage-labour—this was one side of a process which formally ended in 1828. The other side was the conversion of slave-labour into wage-labour.

The various types of serf and wage labour which grew up inside and around slavery were augmented by other measures to ease the change-over from slavery to capitalistic forms of exploitation.

305. Ordinance 50 of 17 July, 1828.

In 1823 non-Christian slaves were given the right to marry, i.e. to enter into some form of legal contract. In 1826 slaves who worked on Sundays had to be paid wages for this work. Christianity was called in to speed up the great change-over in the forms of labour.

In 1830 slave-owners had to keep punishment books. Punishment, be it noted, was not abolished. It was merely legalised and regulated.

On August 28th, 1833, Royal Assent was given to the emancipation of slaves throughout the Empire. Legally slavery ceased on December 1st, 1834. But, as in other cases, slavery was converted to serfdom before passing into free wage-labour: the "freed" slaves were "indentured" for four years before being thrown on the labour market. This greatly helped the slave-owners to retain their labour and accustom themselves to the change. Further, they got £1½ million in cash and 3½ per cent. stock. Abolition enriched them and removed a burden from their shoulders. The slaves had now no longer to be fed and clothed by them; they now had to work or starve and die.

As for the slaves, they entered a new epoch of enslavement under their old masters. They joined the ranks of other "Free Persons of Colour", of the defeated and expropriated Khoi-Khoins. Thus arose the "Coloured People" of South Africa: born out of slavery and out of pulverised Khoi-Khoin tribalism.

By 1834, then, the !Ke had been physically wiped out. The Khoi-Khoin and slaves had become serfs, servants and "free", cheap labour. But outside and beyond the now stable British system of "civilization" stood the other major African group: the unconquered Bantu, in almost full possession of their land and liberty.

The conquest, expropriation and subjugation of the mighty Bantu tribal monarchies—this formed the essential history of South Africa for the next half a century.

In looking back upon the broad, historic function of the land wars which have been described here, and which followed the expropriation of the !Ke and Khoi-Khoi, we see that these land wars, in their sum total, were fought in order to establish three major historical social systems; and, having served as means to these ends, furnished the material means—land and labour—from which the conquerors built up each of these systems in turn. Thus we see:—

The land wars of 1658-1660 and of 1673-1677 functioned as the means towards the establishment of SLAVERY.

The land wars from 1770 to 1806 were the means whereby primitive Voortrekker pastoral FEUDALISM was established.

The final stages of these land wars and the subsequent anti-Bantu land wars, which lasted from 1812 against the Xhosa until 1896 against the Matabele and Mashona—this last series of land wars was promoted by the interests of British Imperialism—led to the establishment of what is popularly known as CAPITALISM in South Africa, with all its colour bars, segregation and colour discrimination. This last group of land wars furnished wool for the textile factories of England; opened fresh markets for British exports; opened the greatest diamond fields in the world; gave unto foreign hands the fabulous gold-fields, the largest in all the world; supplied the mining, industrial and farming barons with the most mobile, the cheapest, the most subjugated labour in the world.

This last series of land wars forms the subject matter of our next volume.

VOLUME 2: DISPOSSESSION.

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
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SECTION I. THE CONQUEST OF THE CAPE.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE MISSIONARIES.

THE EVANGELICALS.

The missionaries of South Africa, who played a key-role in the wars of dispossession, came from an 18th century evangelical revival led by the Wesleyans. Borne aloft by manufacturers leading the Industrial Revolution, this revival spread into the Church of England, and missionary societies were formed to go out to the colonies. This export of missionaries expressed a rapid industrial expansion in England in the last quarter of the 18th century. Thus the Evangelicals grew swiftly after 1870 when the main technical discoveries were made which made possible the swift expansion of textile manufacture: in 1767 Hargreaves invented the spinning jenny, in 1769 Arkwright invented the spinning frame, in 1779 Crompton invented the mule spinner, in 1785 Cartwright invented the power loom and in 1769 Watt invented the steam-engine. These inventions led to great industrial activity, which was reflected in foreign-trade expansion: from 1783 to 1800 exports rose from £14,000,000 to £34,000,000 and the import of cotton increased 60 times. Hard on the heels of expanding industry and trade came the Evangelicals and missionaries, dragged and pushed along by the rising manufacturers. Their prime task was to find and open up new markets for England's textiles, and new sources of cheap labour to produce raw materials for England's industries. Foremost among those entrusted with this "mission" was the London Missionary Society, whose Superintendent-General in South Africa was John Philip. The Wesleyans followed, led by Shaw.

Having indicated the economic and social origins of the missionaries, let us consider how they fulfilled their "mission".

Their role developed chronologically from simple into more complex functions whose constant factor was the systematic application of the basic strategy of conquest: *divide and rule*.

CORRUPTING THE CHIEFS.

First of all the missionaries would worm their way into the confidence of certain chiefs, exploiting family and other feuds in order to win control over them. Thus Van der Kemp, first L.M.S. man in South Africa, established himself near Ngqika and converted him into a traitor. Such conversions took time, for at first the "rugged pagans" laughed at Christianity. But, as "Christian civilization" advanced, the chiefs tried to use the missionaries as interpreters, translators and go-betweens in their relations with the Governors or army commanders or other British officials. In so doing, however, the chiefs themselves became dependent upon and then subservient to those whom they had "used". They became British allies, the tribes were divided and hence more easily conquered.

The missionaries' "soeten praatjies" lowered the fighting resistance of the Africans. Thus Philip boasted: "*Wherever the Missionary places his*

standard among a savage tribe, their prejudices against the Colonial Government give way."³⁰⁶

The Governors themselves could not have thus undermined the African hostility towards the British. For, like Caledon and Somerset, they were largely drawn from the old feudal aristocracy of England, did not fully express the interests of the British manufacturers, still stood for the past and could not talk the deceptive language arising from free trade and free labour. Hence they frequently clashed with the missionaries, who were the evangelists of the industrialists of England. However, this feudal-capitalist family quarrel was extremely useful. For it made the missionaries appear as opponents of the Government and thus as friends of the Africans—a deception which greatly facilitated conquest. The missionaries understood this well. Thus Van Der Kemp wrote to Major Collins, Governor Caledon's main scout, on April, 1809, that he "*thought it better that the Natives should have no reason to suppose that he had any connection with the Colonial Government*".³⁰⁷

BUFFER STATES.

The process of infiltration was followed by creating "buffer states" of "loyal" tribes. The mission-station was the centre of such buffer-states and was, at this stage, British arsenal, fort and recruiting station. In April, 1805, Van der Kemp wrote that his main purpose in forming "Hottentot" missions was "*as much as possible to bind the Hottentots to the Government of the land*".³⁰⁸ The "loyal" tribes were recruited to defeat the resisting tribes. Thus Philip wrote: "*Mission stations are . . . the cheapest and best military posts that a wise Government can employ to defend its frontiers against the predatory incursions of savage tribes.*"³⁰⁹

This military role of the mission stations converted the defeated Khoi-Khoi (whose resistance was described in Volume I) into soldiers of England. Hence Philip could say of the "Hottentots": "*There is no class of people in that colony on whose loyalty more dependence could be placed.*"³¹⁰

The L.M.S. and Wesleyans envisaged and built up a "ring of buffer states" such as Bethelsdorp (used in the 1812 war), Theopolis (used in the 1818 war), Kat River Settlement (used in the 1834 war), a Griqua buffer and Thaba 'Nchu—a Baralong buffer—(both used against Moshoeshoe), a Fingo buffer (used against the Xhosa), a Tswana buffer at Kuruman (used as planning centre for wars against Matabele and Mashona), etc. This grand plan to conquer the Africans was mainly the idea of John Philip. Yet thesis-scribblers can write that Philip "*saw only one side of the question—the interests of the black man*".³¹¹

MISSIONARY SPIES.

From these missions and buffer-states, missionaries went out as scouts and spies during the wars of conquest. Thus Rev. Ayliff, planted next to the Gcaleka king Hintsá, said that Hintsá "*viewed us as agents of the Colonial Government and as spies*".

These missionary spies acted as British espionage agents: Ayliff at Butterworth spied on Hintsá, Boyce on Maqomo, Davis on Suthu (Ngqika's

306. Dr. J. Philip: "Researches in S.A." Vol. I. Preface, p. 10.

307. R. Collins. Journal. Entry: 3rd April, 1809.

308. Van der Kemp to Gov. Janssens. 19th April, 1805.

309. *Supra*. 306. Vol. 2. p. 227.

310. *Ibid.* Vol. 1. p. 368.

311. C. E. G. Schutte: "Dr. Philip's Observations Regarding the Hottentots of S.A." Archives Year Book 3, part 1, p. 231.

widow), Laing on Faku, Williams on Ngqika, Caldwed on the Fingos, Owen on Dingane, Caselis on Moshoeshoe, Moffat on Lobengula and Khama etc. They admitted that they were spies. Thus on New Year, 1835, Rev. Chalmers gave information to a British Captain Armstrong and pleaded: "*I know you will not betray me in these communications which I make to you. An angry look just now would be enough to send all the Missionaries into eternity.*"³¹²

DRAFTERS OF "PEACE" TREATIES.

Having helped to sabotage and break the African resistance, the missionaries then helped to draft peace treaties in order to complete the conquest and to prepare for the economic subjection of the conquered Africans. Their "Treaty System" was the bridge from conquest to exploitation.

After each war a missionary went out to persuade the chiefs to make "peace", i.e. to submit to British authority and lose their lands, cattle and independence. Rev. Boyce organised such a treaty with Maqomo in September, 1835; Philip was the brain behind the major treaties with Kok, Moshoeshoe and others. He saw the conquered chiefs as potential agents to help the British administer the conquered tribes. In 1835 he proposed, as Boyce did in relation to Maqomo, that chiefs be paid a salary, and be controlled by a White magistrate and missionary; and that the conquered be herded into segregated "Native Territories". This last-named often went under the guise of "drawing up a new frontier-boundary". In outlining his treaty policy, Philip said: "*We must be masters, but rule as we do in India.*" Thus he anticipated the famous statement of Rhodes: "*We must adopt a system of despotism.*"

In organising these "peace" treaties, the missionaries tried to deceive the African chiefs into believing in the goodwill of the Governor. Thus Philip went out to the Xhosa chiefs in the 1834 war and told them that they must stop resisting and wait for the Governor, D'Urban. Philip said: "*The Governor is a just man and will redress your grievances.*" But at the very moment Philip knew that D'Urban "was coming" with armed troops to crush the Xhosa.

In the 1840's, when Philip tried to persuade the Griquas to stop resisting the Boers, he wrote: "*The Griquas must not expect too much.*" *They had to be sacrificed to the Boers as a peace offering.*

FRAMERS OF "NATIVE POLICY".

After each such "peace" the missionaries drafted a "Native Policy" to subject the conquered. Philip and his son-in-law, the Liberal Fairbairn, said: "*We must be masters.*"³¹³ The missionary policy was that England would rule through White officials in control of "loyal" chiefs; segregation of the Africans into tribal groups; protective buffer-states between "loyalist" and "disloyal" tribes and between African and European; forts to protect the frontier; mission-stations as labour-recruiting and soldier-recruiting depots. Philip wanted such "Native Territories" to form: "*a belt of native treaty states to the North and East of the colony.*"³¹⁴

CHEAP LABOUR POLICY.

Within these conquered and subjected areas the missionaries wanted a reservoir of cheap labour. Thus Philip wrote in 1828: "*Under the most*

312. Rev. Chalmers to Capt. Armstrong, 1st January, 1835.

313. Rev. Boyce: "Notes"; "Commercial Advertiser", 7th January, 1835, 24th January, 1835, and 23rd May, 1835.

314. *Supra.* 311, p. 115.

favourable circumstances the great body of Hottentots cannot be in any other condition than that of labourers for centuries to come."³¹⁵ "Freedom", in Philip's own words, meant: "*Make the Hottentots free and give them a fair price for their labour and their masters will have double the work that they obtain at present.*"³¹⁶ Much of this labour came from Philip's missions and was sweated by the Boers.

A MARKET FOR BRITISH GOODS.

The reduction of the conquered tribalists to cheap labour did not complete their "mission". In addition they had to see that the Africans became a market for British goods. With the "fair price" for their labour the conquered Africans had to buy British exports to realise the profits of the Lancashire manufacturers. Philip wrote: "*By raising all the Hottentots of the colony to the condition of the Hottentots at Bethelsdorp, a new and extensive market would be created for British goods.*"³¹⁷

C. Brownlee wrote that: "*In proportion to the spread of missionary influence, the desire for articles of European manufacture grew and spread . . . to the missionaries mainly we owe the great revenue now derived from the native trade*",³¹⁸ and Bishop Gray confessed: "*Many of them*" (missionaries) "*are mere traffickers and books and reports are not to be believed. Moravians, Independents and Wesleyans all grow rich by dealing in tea and coffee, guns and gunpowder, horse and hides, blankets and ivory.*"³¹⁹

MISSION EDUCATION.

The final role of the missionaries, after conquest and subjugation, was to run "Native Education". They believed in separate schools for White and Black. J. Fairbairn wrote that: "*In their filthy carosses they*" (the Africans) "*cannot be admitted in the*" (white) "*schools*". This was part of their broader apartheid policy. Philip, said his admirer Rev. H. Davies, "*emerges as the first and most thorough advocate of segregation, which he approved as a safeguard for the Coloured and African people*".^{319a} They believed in the racial inferiority of the Africans. Said Philip on 1st December, 1948, to the L.M.S.: "*To speak of 'a mixture of the various classes of society' . . . is to use expressions . . . which are most deceptive. . . . Before that mixture can take place without destruction to the weaker party, he*" (the African) "*must be elevated to near the same level in INTELLECT AND FEELING. . . . Separation, not mixture, saved them.*" (My italics.)

Armed with this Aryan doctrine, the missionaries became the educators of the dispossessed. Up to the present day almost the whole of "Non-European education" is entrusted to missionaries.

Other missionaries, like Brownlee, Caldewood, Moffat, and the son of a missionary, Shepstone, became magistrates and Government officials in Native Affairs Departments, guarding and preserving the missionary achievements of the 19th century.

This completed the evolution of missionary functions. It is against this background of their developing, expanding role that we view the part they played in the wars of dispossession now to be related.

315. *Supra*. 306. Vol. 1, p. 379.

316. *Ibid.* Vol. 1, p. 372.

317. *Ibid.* Vol. 1, p. 365.

318. C. Brownlee: "Reminiscences of Kafir Life" (1896).

319. Bishop Gray: "Life of Robert Gray".

319a. "Outspan", 5th May, 1950.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE FOURTH ANTI-XHOSA WAR (1812).

In the last war described (1800) we saw how the Khoi-Khoins, led by Stuurman, had joined forces with the Xhosa, led by Rarabe generals under Ndlambe. We also saw how, with the aid of the Liberal Maynier and the missionary Van der Kemp, the Dutch and then the British divided the Khoi-Khoins from their Xhosa allies, and then defeated and enslaved them. From this point the Khoi-Khoins ceased (for a long time) to be resisters but, instead, became allies of the British, organised as such by the L.M.S. Missionaries.

Thus the British and the Boer frontier farmers began their next land-war at an advantage. This advantage was doubled by the fact that Van der Kemp had won over Ngqika, influential Xhosa chief, to the side of the British. Collins, a British major, and Stockenstrom, an official in the Graaff-Reinet district, set out on missions to consolidate Van der Kemp's work. Their preparations for the next war were many-sided.

COLLINS, STOCKENSTROOM AND VAN DER KEMP PREPARE FOR WAR.

In September, 1807, Ndlambe had heavily defeated the traitor Ngqika in battle.³²⁰ In October, 1808, Stockenstrom told the Colonial Secretary Bird that Ngqika was discredited among the Africans, and that Ngqika could no longer control the minor chiefs, who had returned to Ndlambe and Chungwa. He suggested that they try to buy off Ndlambe as Ngqika seemed to be useless to them. He proposed that they try to arrange peace between Ndlambe and Ngqika in order to get both to cross the Fish River. This would isolate the resister Chungwa whom they could then force across the river.³²¹

To protect the British rear and to prevent farm-workers from joining Ndlambe, Stockenstrom reintroduced an old proclamation of General Craig: "*prohibiting any inhabitant whatever on pain of forfeiting Rds. 500 to keep a Kafir in his service*".³²²

Collins then went on a trip to buy off the chiefs as was proposed by Stockenstrom.³²³ He met Bookoo, brother of Hintsá, Gcaleka prince, and Hintsá was persuaded to retire across the Bushman River in March, 1809.³²⁴

Having thus neutralised Hintsá, Collins met Ngqika and openly bribed him; he offered him cattle at Graaff-Reinet for his new wife. In return Ngqika had to help him against Ndlambe. Ngqika agreed, saying: "*He wished to strengthen his friendship with the Christians and to come nearer to the Colony . . . the favours which they had almost exclusively bestowed on him had made every Kafir his enemy.*"³²⁵

320. J. G. Cuyler to A. Barnard, Col. Sec., 26th September, 1807.

321. Stockenstrom to C. Bird, Col. Sec., 19th October, 1808.

322. *Ibid.*

323/4/5. Journal of R. Collins, 20th March, 1809, p. 48.

With Hints neutral and Ngqika on his side, Collins, in April, 1809, met Ndlambe "*the most powerful as well as the richest among the Xhosa chiefs*".³²⁶ Ndlambe refused to go to Collins, forced Collins to visit his fire and refused to retreat across the Bushman River.³²⁷ Collins went away, bent on crushing this resister.

Next he separated Khoi-Khoins from Xhosa, ordering Landdrost Cuyler "*to prevent whites and bastards remaining among that people*" (*the Xhosa*).³²⁸ In consultation with Stockenstrom, Collins organised "spoor-tracing" commandos,³²⁹ a direct provocation for a war in which, as usual, cattle was the pretext but land the object.

Having completed the divide and rule strategy, Stockenstrom now began to organise the White burghers for the war. In 1810 he told Fiscal Ryneveld that the Xhosa had to be driven across the Fish River; that burgher-commandos be formed to "*shoot kraals*" and "spoor" cattle; and that the Zuurveld be "defended" with the order "*that all Kaffir men entering may be shot dead*".³³⁰

He told Governor Caledon that there must be war against the Xhosa whom he called "*naturally insatiable beggars and thieves*".³³¹

He was helped by Van der Kemp who organised Bethelsdorp to help the Boers. Philip later wrote that in the war about to break out the "*Hottentots of Bethelsdorp . . . contributed much to the success of the enterprise*".³³² This "enterprise" was land-robbery. In 1811 Van der Kemp died, but his work was carried on by Read and Campbell.

WAR AND "PEACE".

This carefully planned war took place in 1812. Helped by Van der Kemp's Moravian and other Khoi-Khoi troops, the British Governor Cradock forced 20,000 of Ndlambe's troops across the Fish River. He built blockhouses, fortified Cradock and Grahamstown, and offered quitrent farms of 2,000 morgen each to Europeans to stabilise the conquest of land.³³³ Already in 1809 Collins had anticipated victory by advocating that foreign White settlers be brought in to occupy the conquered lands of the Xhosa.³³⁴

Thus "peace" meant land-robbery. Cradock repeated his land-offer in June, 1812, but local Boers were too afraid of the Xhosa to accept the offer. A further attempt at White settlement was made by Proclamation in January, 1814.³³⁵ The missionaries made the offer attractive by offering cheap Khoi-Khoi labour from their missions to be herdsmen to protect the farmers' cattle against Xhosa raiders. Again in March, 1817, Governor Somerset advertised for settlers.³³⁶ But it was only after the next war, in 1818, that the settlers came. Then they came not from the frightened ranks of the Boers but as soldiers from England, known as the "1820 Settlers".³³⁷ This was a result of the war we shall now describe.

326/7. *Ibid.* 1st April, 1809.

328. Collins to Cuyler, 6th April, 1809.

329. Collins to Stockenstrom, 10th April, 1809.

330. Fiscal Ryneveld to Stockenstrom: "Private Questions". In Collins' Journal, p. 57.

331. Stockenstrom to Gov. Caledon, August, 1810.

332. J. Philip: "Researches in S.A.", Vol. I, p. 254.

333. Records of the Cape Colony, Vol. 8.

334. Journal and Report of R. Collins, 6th August, 1809.

335. Proclamation, 28th January, 1814.

336. Records of Cape Colony, 29th March, 1817.

337. H. E. Hockley: "Story of 1820 Settlers" (1948).



THE FIFTH ANTI-XHOSA WAR (1818).

Throughout the wars of dispossession the Dutch and later the British Governments launched wars of planned aggression against the Africans. Yet "official history" books consistently accuse the defending Black householder of being the aggressor against the intruding White burglar!

The 1818 war, as usual, was carefully planned by the British. As usual their campaign of aggression was opened up by a missionary: in March, 1817, they sent out Rev. Williams to arrange a conference between Ngqika and Cuyler, Stockenstrom and Somerset, in order to get an African ally against Ndlambe. Ngqika gave them the right of way to spoor cattle, i.e. to declare war.³³⁸

In April, 1816, Rev. Read had failed to buy off Makanda, Ndlambe's General, who refused to give him consent to form an L.M.S. station.³³⁹ No wonder Philip called Makanda "a false prophet to the Caffers and a fearful scourge to the frontier colonists".³⁴⁰ Makanda replied to William's divide and rule tactics by trouncing Ngqika's forces at Amalinde in December, 1818, after Mdushane had left Ngqika to join his father, Ndlambe. Somerset attacked under the guise of defending Ngqika, and a commando took 2,000 cattle from Ndlambe.³⁴¹ Col. Brereton, aided by the regrouped Ngqikas, seized a further 16,000 Ndlambe cattle. Early in 1819 Makanda counter-attacked.³⁴²

MISSIONARIES SAVE BOERS.

Having delivered his first blow against the traitor, Ngqika, he now delivered his second blow against the missionaries, whom he regarded as tricksters. He blockaded Theopolis, while his army advanced on Uitenhage. He realised as well as Philip the strategic role of this mission station built in 1813, in Philip's words: "*at the entrance of the Carrega Kloof and therefore favourable for keeping the Caffres in check in that quarter.*"³⁴³ *The institution of Theopolis has, from its establishment in 1813, proved equivalent to a military station.*"³⁴⁴ This view was endorsed by officials like Cuyler and Barrow.³⁴⁵ The mission-fort thwarted Makanda and saved the Boers. Said Philip: "*Theopolis resistance was such as to merit and to receive the approbation of the Government in the Cape Gazette of 20th March, 1819.*"³⁴⁶ Theopolis further helped the White farmers by sending a Khoi-Khoi levy

338. J. Philip: "Researches in S.A." Vol. 2, p. 169.

339/40. *Ibid.* Vol. 2, pp. 163 and 164.

341. *Ibid.* Vol. 1, p. 257; Records of Cape Colony.

342. Records of Cape Colony, 20th February, 1819.

343. *Supra* 338, Vol. 1, p. 255.

344. *Ibid.* Vol. 2, p. 230.

345. *Ibid.* Vol. 2, p. 233.

346. *Ibid.* Vol. 1, p. 259; Records of Cape Colony, 1819.

to Grahamstown,³⁴⁷ next in Makanda's line of march. Thus Theopolis played in the 1819 war an even more important part than Bethelsdorp had played in the 1812 war.

This missionary force, plus Khoi-Khoins under Boesak, resister-turned-traitor and now a buffalo-hunter, manned Grahamstown's defences while the White residents trembled as Makanda's 10,000 troops surrounded the town in April, 1819.³⁴⁸ Makanda ordered his men to break their assegais and use them as short stabbing spears, thus evolving the same technique as Tshaka.³⁴⁹ However, the Khoi-Khoins and British defences held, and on April 23rd, 1819, 3,000 Xhosa soldiers died in the fight to keep their land.³⁵⁰

THE AFTERMATH.

Governor Somerset now advanced to the Kei and drew up a Treaty with Ngqika in October, 1819, wherein this chief recognised a "neutral belt" between the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers, which was to be a no-man's-land except for Fort Wiltshire and British military police.³⁵¹ But Donkin broke this Treaty in 1821 and Europeans occupied Fredericksburg in "no-man's-land". From March, 1820, to April, 1821, 5,000 British settlers, recruited from unemployed created by the depression after the Napoleonic wars, came on to the lands of Ndlambe.³⁵² Lord Selborne admitted 90 years later: "*The primary motive in colonising the Eastern Province in 1820 with settlers of British nationality was to establish a permanent outpost against the aggression of the native tribes.*"³⁵³

Farmers, traders and missionaries poured into Ndlambe's lost lands.

REWARD FOR TREACHERY.

The Europeans got land, but the missionary-led "Hottentots", who made their victory and land-plunder possible, got no land. Philip, who boasted of his fraudulent land-clause in Ordinance 50 (see Vol. I) rejected Rev. Elliott's plan to grant mission Khoi-Khoins private land-tenure. He opposed the "*proposal to change the tenure of the land and fixed property at the institution into freehold*".³⁵⁴ Private land-ownership would, said Philip, prevent the missionaries from training "*an educated and moral class of labourers or peasantry*",³⁵⁵ and "*would be the ruin of our institution. Canteen-keepers would in a short time be the chief proprietors of the village*".³⁵⁶

Philip knew that private-ownership would make the Khoi-Khoins economically independent and thus they would not go out to work as cheap labour. Accordingly the Khoi-Khoins were not given private land even in the missions. Instead they were given "toys to play with". In the missions they had, said Philip in 1828: "*a large stake to lose; their houses, their gardens, their fields . . . may all be lost by provoking a quarrel with the Colonial Government*".³⁵⁷

347/8. *Ibid.* Vol. 1, pp. 393, 388; Records of Cape Colony. April, 1819.

349/50. Records Cape Colony. April, 1819; Philip's "Researches". Vol. 2, Appendix 7, pp. 385-388.

351. Records of Cape Colony, 12.

352. H. E. Hoekley: "The 1820 Settlers in S.A."

353. Selborne Memorandum (1908). Ed. by B. Williams: p. 28.

354. Letter Dr. Philip to L.M.S., 1st December, 1848, p. 23.

355. *Ibid.* p. 24.

356. Philip to son, Durant, 30th October, 1848.

357. *Supra* 338. Vol. 2, p. 73.

They were not given land of their own. On the contrary, their reward for helping the British was to be "distributed among the Boers". After, as before 1819, missions like Bethelsdorp were *labour-reserves*. Below is a typical letter, written *after* the Khoi-Khoins saved Uitenhage and Grahamstown in 1819:

"Bethelsdorp, 29 August 1820.

Sir,

I forward you the following Hottentots as per request of Colonel Cuyler, from the Institution" (Bethelsdorp) "to repair the roads at Port Elizabeth."

(Signed) G. Barker.³⁵⁸

Philip consistently denied that the missions deprived the Boers of labour.³⁵⁹ Thus were the Khoi-Khoins rewarded by the missionaries for their services in the 1819 war.

MAKANDA.

Makanda was captured after his siege of Grahamstown. He expected to be treated according to Xhosa war-ethics, but was imprisoned on Robben Island. Thence he escaped and was drowned off Blaauwberg beach in December, 1819. The British were responsible for his death, for Stockenstrom refused to intervene when a Xhosa deputation went to him in 1819 to plead for the life of their great general.

NDLAMBE.

After the 1821 Donkin Treaty, the British discarded Ngqika as useless. The traitor died in 1828 despised by his masters and by his people, "*worn out with drunkenness and debauchery*", as Theal put it, a pro-Britisher contemptuous of a British lackey.

In 1824 the British reluctantly adopted Stockenstrom's old policy and recognised Ndlambe as king of the Rarabes. But they got nothing in return from this old resister who had fought for land and tribal liberty for over 50 years before he died, in 1828, honoured by his people. His valiant son, Mdushane, died the same year. His heritage of resistance was continued by Maqomo, son of Ngqika the traitor.

Maqomo rejected the Donkin Treaty and settled near the upper reaches of the Kat River in the mid-twenties. He was regent for Sandile, Ngqika's other son, and he led the next wars of resistance as true heir to the traditions of Makanda and Ndlambe.

358. *Ibid.* Vol. 2, Appendix 11, p. 414.

359. Dr. J. Philip to L.M.S., 1st December, 1848, p. 9.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE SIXTH (1829) AND SEVENTH (1834) ANTI-XHOSA WARS.

Maqomo, Donkin's old foe, was driven westwards by clashes with the Amangwane under Matiwane, as a result of the dispersal of certain tribes fleeing southwards from the Zulu king, Tshaka. The Governor, Sir Lowry Cole, exploited the Xhosa-Matiwane clash to defeat Maqomo. Stockenstroom, made Commandant-General of Grahamstown in July, 1828, attacked Maqomo and his brother Tyhali in 1829.³⁶⁰ In April, 1829, Stockenstroom set fire to Maqomo's huts (the same "Liberal" Stockenstroom who helped Philip and Fairbairn with Ordinance 50—the fraudulent "Magna Charta" of "Free Persons of colour" and which Stockenstroom later referred to as "*my complicity in that great crime*"³⁶¹). Stockenstroom's arson plan having failed, he applied Philip's idea of "buffer states" to the situation by settling 3,000 Khoi-Khoi and Bantu "loyalists" around the L.M.S. station at Philipton and the Glasgow Mission at Balfour to make up the Kat River Settlement. This "Buffer State" was formed on Maqomo's lands to split his force and plant the enemy in his midst.

Whilst one missionary group was using the tactic of "divide and rule", another, led by Wesleyan William Shaw, was arming and settling the Whites in Albany. These farmer-soldiers invaded Maqomo's lands, among them families of Trichart and others who later became Trekboere.³⁶²

THE SEVENTH WAR.

This sixth anti-Xhosa war was a skirmish before the seventh war. In 1834 Philip advocated annexation of the Eastern Province, put forward a post-war "Native Policy" of rule through controlled chiefs,³⁶³ anticipating a British victory in their next aggressive campaign. Sir Benjamin D'Urban, who came out as Governor in January, 1834, had similar orders from the Colonial Secretary Stanley to spend £600 a year on border agents to "control" the chiefs, who were to be transformed into Government police. Governor and missionary held the same ideas.

Together with this policy of ruling through African traitors, the Government tried to neutralise certain other chiefs. Thus in 1822 Rev. Brownlee had tried to neutralise Hintsa. Hintsa, indeed, played a back-stage part in the next war, the brunt of the resistance being borne by Maqomo and Tyhali.

Having laid their plans, the British attacked. In May and June, 1834, Maqomo and Tyhali were ordered to surrender an impossible number of cattle in return for being allowed to remain on their own land (Agreement with Col. Somerset, 1834). In August they called a great meeting of the

360. Stockenstroom: "Light and Shadow Shown in the Character of the Hottentots of the Kat River Settlement".

361. *Ibid.*

362. Campbell to D'Urban, 27th June, 1834. (Official Documents on 1834 War.)

363. S.A. Commercial Advertiser, 22nd February, 1834.

people at Burnshill to discuss their dilemma. Fearing an attack before he was ready, D'Urban sent Philip to meet and buy off the chiefs in October, 1834, and stall for time while British reinforcements were organised.³⁶⁴

While Philip told the chiefs: "*The Governor is a just man and will redress your grievances*", the just Governor's Col. Somerset attacked the Xhosa. Maqomo held them and on December 21st himself entered the colony with 20,000 troops. Retief, Boer leader, held the Xhosa at Winterberg, whilst Somerset defended at Grahamstown. The missionaries shut the "doubtful" Khoi-Khoins up in the missions. Thus Boer, British and missionary stood together against the vast attack of Maqomo, Tyhali, Botmo and Enno, supported by Hintsas, and ranging from Algoa Bay to Somerset East.³⁶⁵ Colonel Harry Smith rushed from Cape Town to Grahamstown to help the Boer-British force massacre the Xhosa resisters.

Now Philip, secret force behind this war, wrote to D'Urban in January, 1835, offering him 210 Khoi-Khoins from the Mission. He proposed to divide the chiefs by punishing the "guilty", but sparing the "innocent".³⁶⁶ But the Xhosa were waging to the missionary treachery in their midst and Lovedale and Burnshill missionaries were removed to the colony because "*They were in imminent peril.*"³⁶⁷ Those who remained acted as British spies.

On January 11, 1835, Landdrost Cuyler and H. Smith drew up a new plan of aggression.³⁶⁸ On the 12th, Smith attacked, backed by Van Ryneveld's Boers,³⁶⁹ killing 33 and burning the huts. On the 18th, Smith told D'Urban that 400 Xhosa had been killed and Tyhali's "kraals" destroyed.³⁷⁰ On the 21st, Smith proposed invasion of Xhosa lands with 3,000 troops,³⁷¹ and on February 13th reported 2,000 cattle taken and 73 Xhosa killed,³⁷² and on the 16th said he now had 1,300 men under arms.³⁷³ In all these attacks Smith used information supplied by missionaries. The result of the campaign was that Maqomo, Tyhali and Ennon were forced to cease resistance. Maqomo was banished to Robben Island but soon returned.

THE "PEACE".

The first phase of the war over, the missionaries set about organising "peace". In February, D'Urban wrote to Rev. Davis to buy off Vandana.³⁷⁴ Three days later Rev. Laing suggested to D'Urban that they buy over Suthu, widow of Ngqika and mother of the future chief, Sandile.³⁷⁵ With the help of Fynn, D'Urban tried to neutralise or win over the Pondos under Faku, and the Thembus under Vandana (Fynn's Diary, p. 235).

In April, D'Urban told Chief Faku, who was under missionary influence, that he was going to punish Hintsas for the "crimes" of Maqomo and Tyhali.³⁷⁶ Six days later Smith reported the capture of 5,000 cattle, "taken" from Hintsas's people.³⁷⁷ To continue the "punishment", Smith and D'Urban

364. D'Urban to Sprigg Rice, Col. Sec., 5th January, 1835.

365. G. M. Theal: "Official Documents Relating to the 1835 Kafir War". Compiled from Government Records.

366. J. Philip to D'Urban, 16th January, 1835.

367. Despatch D'Urban to Sprigg Rice, 30th January, 1835

368. Cuyler to Col. H. Smith, 11th January, 1835.

369. H. Smith to Col. Bell, 16th January, 1835.

370. H. Smith to D'Urban, 18th January, 1835.

371. H. Smith to D'Urban, 21st January, 1835.

372/3. H. Smith to D'Urban, 13th February, 16th February, 1835.

374. D'Urban to Rev. Davis, 21st February, 1835.

375. Rev. Laing to D'Urban, 24th February, 1835.

376. D'Urban to Faku, 22nd April, 1835.

377. H. Smith to D'Urban, 28th April, 1835.

needed more information about the disposition and attitude of various chiefs. The missionaries ably supplied this information.

Thus, Rev. Mr. Ayliff, on May 1st, gave the names and addresses of nine of Hintsas's chiefs.³⁷⁸ Acting on this information, Smith captured Hintsas on May 7th. The treacherous missionaries, naturally, asked Smith to protect them from Hintsas's people.³⁷⁹ The betrayed Hintsas was told to pay 50,000 cattle as indemnity, apart from 15,000 already seized by Smith's commando.³⁸⁰ Hintsas was arrested whilst "negotiating" over this indemnity.

THE MURDER OF HINTSAS.

On May 11th, 1835, he tried to escape, was pursued by Smith, and then by Southey who shot him in the back and head. Hintsas died whilst standing defiant, but helpless, assegai in hand, in a rock-cleft in his native land. He was shot again when already on the point of death.³⁸¹ "Historians" like Eric Walker, of course, say that Southey shot Hintsas in "self-defence". (Walker: "History of South Africa", p. 192, 1928 edn.) Philip was a co-assassin of Hintsas, for he was a supporter of "strong measures" against Hintsas and wanted the annexation of Hintsas's lands.³⁸²

After Hintsas's murder, D'Urban took up Rev. Laing's old suggestion of buying off Suthu, and recognised her son, Sandile, as future chief.³⁸³ Hintsas's son, Sareli (Kreli), was recognised, largely in order to make him pay his father's "debt".

"PEACE".

The land between the Kei and Keiskamma Rivers now became British; the chiefs were told to disarm the people who were forbidden to enter their own former lands without a pass. Government agents and missionaries were forced on to the people.³⁸⁴ This Treaty, made one day after Hintsas's death, was negotiated with the chiefs by the missionaries Boyce and Shepstone.

This and other anti-Xhosa wars enormously increased the export of wool as raw material for England's textile factories. Thus in 1826, before the Hintsas war, Cape wool exports were 40,000 lbs. and skins 192,000. But in 1839, after this war, the exports were 404,000 lbs. of wool and 372,000 skins (1923 Year Book).

D'Urban proposed to settle Queen Adelaide (the conquered area) with Europeans. On the basis of Philip's policy of "buffer states", he decided to settle 17,000 Fingos around Fort Peddie.³⁸⁵ Philip was emboldened by the latest British triumph and wrote in May, 1835: "*An able Governor might in twelve years influence the continent of Africa as far as the Tropics . . . for good, make every tribe know its limits.*"³⁸⁶

At the same time he feared premature White settlement, and, backed by the Colonial Secretary Glenelg, he forced the feudal-thinking D'Urban to evacuate Queen Adelaide in October, 1836. Instead he and Stockenstrom introduced an extensive treaty-system. In August, 1835, shortly after the

378. Rev. Ayliff, letter, 1st May, 1835.

379. H. Smith to sister, Mrs. Sargant, 7th May, 1835.

380. H. Smith to Mrs. Sargant, 7th May, 1835.

381. Queen Adelaide Notice, 18th May, 1835 (Smith to D'Urban).

382. S.A. Commercial Advertiser, 24th January, 23rd May, 1835.

383. D'Urban Treaty, 12th May, 1835.

384. Records of 1835 War; Records of Queen Adelaide.

385. Records of Province of Queen Adelaide. (Official; compiled by G. M. Theal.)

386. S.A. Commercial Advertiser, 23rd May, 1835.

killing of Hintsá, Stockenstroom proposed the building of Batwa and Khoi-Khoi missions to supply farmers with cheap labour, but said that these farmers should get their land through treaties rather than through annexation.³⁸⁷ A year later he armed the Fish River bank against the Xhosas and made treaties with some chiefs³⁸⁸ in line with the policy Philip had fought for all the time.³⁸⁹ Stockenstroom forced Maqomo and Botman to retrieve "stolen" cattle, but Mhela, leader of the Ndlambes, continued to resist grimly.³⁹⁰ The British began to realise that they had won a battle, but not a war.

In passing, with regard to the so-called D'Urban-Glenelg "dispute": there was no essential difference between the policies of D'Urban, Philip, Stockenstroom and Glenelg, for (1) D'Urban wanted annexation, White colonisation and rule through White-controlled chiefs; (2) Stockenstroom preferred White pockets around forts, protected by arms and treaties with White-controlled chiefs, a view to which Glenelg inclined during the sittings of the Aborigines Committee (February to August, 1836); (3) Philip wanted White officials and missionaries to *precede* White colonisation, and to rule through chiefs. All agreed that England must rule, through White-controlled chiefs; disagreeing mainly as to the tempo of occupation of the Queen Adelaide district. Philip's treaty policy resulted in the formation by 1836 of a loose belt of "*native treaty states*" in Griqualand, Basutoland (Dr. Smith's treaty with Waterboer and Moshoeshoe), Transvaal (Smith and Mzilikazi in March, 1836³⁹¹), Natal (Gardener and Dingane in May, 1835, but not sanctioned by Glenelg³⁹²) and with the Xhosa (Stockenstroom's treaties). This system was to serve England well in her next assaults on the Africans.

THE FLIGHT OF THE BOERS.

One curious result of the 1834 war was that the Boers fled from the land-wars on the Eastern Frontier. This flight from the life and death land-war between England and the Xhosas was known as the "Great Trek".

The treks flowed from fear of the Xhosa and dissatisfaction with the fact that England annexed or abandoned the conquered land, leaving the feudal Boer cattle-rustlers as British subjects. Thus after D'Urban annexed the area north of the Stormberg Mountains in October, 1835, Trichart and Van Rensburg led the first trekkers north.

After the Glenelg Dispatch of December, 1835, refusing mass White settlement in Queen Adelaide, the second batch left, under A. H. Potgieter and Liebenberg.

After Stockenstroom had come to "abandon" Adelaide and make his treaties, the third group left, in August, 1836, led by Gerrit Maritz. A fourth party, under Retief, left in January, 1837, after waiting for "protection" from Stockenstroom. Anna Steenkamp's Manifesto on the reasons for the Trek places the emphasis on the Xhosa wars.³⁹³ Slavery was a small factor, for few of these Boers had slaves, and most came from the Eastern Province, not from the slave-holding Western Province. Thus 5,000 Boers fled from the fight raging between England and the Xhosa tribes.

387/8. Records of Province of Queen Adelaide, 1836.

389. Mrs. Philip to John Philip, December, 1836.

390. Records of Province of Queen Adelaide.

391. Official Records of Basutoland, Vol. 1.

392. Eybers Selected Official Documents, p. 143.

393. Preller: "Voortrekkerense"; Cloete; Cory; Chase.

CHAPTER XX.

THE EIGHTH (1845) AND NINTH (1850) ANTI-XHOSA WARS.

In 1838, Governor Napier, through Stockenstroom the Liberal, moved his Fingo allies further away from the Ndlambe resisters and made alliances with the Gunukwebes. In April, 1839, Col. Hare attacked the Tembu at Shiloh and threatened Maqomo. In June, 1843, Napier forced Sandile to permit a fort to be built at Willshire. The British were now trying to win Sandile and to counter the spreading fame and influence of Maqomo. In October, 1843, Governor Maitland built a fort at Block Drift across the boundary and forced Sareli into a treaty. Maitland made a further treaty with Faku, Mpondo chief, in October, 1844. This train of war preparations needed only a spark to set it off. The spark was provided in March, 1846, when Tola, whom Napier had driven from the "no-man's-land" of the 1818 war, rescued a tribesman who had been arrested for allegedly stealing an axe. The hand of the prisoner's Khoi-Khoin guard was severed to free the prisoner. The British demanded the return of the prisoner, the chiefs refused and, using this as a war-pretext, Hare invaded the Xhosa lands.

The Xhosa had decided that as soon as the English fired the first hut, they would defend themselves. Hare's troops fired Sandile's huts and the Xhosa attacked, routed Hare and entered the Colony. In September, 1846, the Xhosa armies drove back 14,000 British troops, including Fingo, Khoi-Khoin and Cape Malay regiments. The British regrouped and, aided by their African and Malay allies, defeated Sareli in January, 1847. In December Sandile's resistance cracked and Sir Harry Smith, fresh from Indian conquests, came to finish the war in his usual brutal and swift manner.

He annexed Victoria East, "Kaffraria" between the Kei and Keiskamma (thereby justifying Philip's policy of first conquering thoroughly before annexing and colonising) and propped up "loyal" chiefs, as prescribed by Philip in his "dispute" with D'Urban. He placed the missionary-magistrate, Rev. H. Caldewood, over the Fingos and introduced the system of White magistrates. He distributed the plundered Xhosa lands among White farmers settled around forts and missions, as prescribed by Stockenstroom in the D'Urban-Glenelg "dispute". The Xhosa had now lost their lands as far east as the Kei River.

Their defeat in the "War of the Axe" was in large measure due to the African and Malay allies of the British. On September 16th, 1846, Cloete

told the Malay "loyalists": "*His Excellency desires them to accept his thanks for the services which they have rendered in arms, for the . . . subjugation of our Kaffir enemies.*"³⁹⁴

Thus, only with the help of one section of the oppressed was another defeated.

The land and livestock plunder in this war was reflected in the rising export of wool and skins to England. Wool exports rose from 404,000 lbs. in 1839, before the "War of the Axe", to 3,700,000 lbs. in 1849, after this war. In the same period skin and hide exports rose from 372,000 to 445,000 (S.A. Year Book, 1912-1923).

THE NINTH ANTI-XHOSA WAR (THE UNITY WAR).

Still the Xhosa resisted. In October, 1850, Sandile refused to discuss with Smith. Smith deposed him and put up Brownlee in his place. (This precedent of not recognising the hereditary chief was later followed by Shepstone in Natal.) The tribes ignored the puppet, and Smith next installed Suthu, as per Rev. Laing's old advice. He put his foot on Maqomo's neck, made Sandile kiss his feet, blew up a waggon with dynamite, outlawed Sandile and then attacked him in December, 1850. The Xhosa rallied and trounced Smith at Boomah Pass while in Basutoland Moshoeshoe trounced Donovan at Viervoet and Cathcart at Berea. These victories roused the Africans throughout the colony and a unity even greater than that of Ndlambe and Stuurman was born.

Sareli joined Sandile and the old Rarabe-Gcaleka division broke down. Jan Tshatshuo, Philip's London exhibit, had previously joined the Xhosa. Now led by Willem Uithaalder, the Khoi-Khoins broke away from Shiloh, Kat River and Theopolis, away from missionary control, and joined the Xhosa resistance. Coloured Cape Mounted Police mutinied and joined the Xhosa. Bantu, Khoi-Khoins, "Coloured" serfs and slaves as far west as the Cape Peninsula swayed towards the Great Rebellion. The qualifications for Coloured voters in the coming (1852) Representative Government Ordinance were hastily doubled, for fear of the political consequences of a military victory by the "Non-Europeans" on the Eastern Frontier. From the north of the colony came emissaries from Moshoeshoe, striving to build a grand alliance with the Xhosa.

Subsequent "historians" have blamed the missionaries for this "disastrous" situation. In fact, Rev. Wardley was speaking the truth when he paid tribute to John Philip in Poultry Chapel, London, in November, 1851, after Philip's death in August, 1851. In his sermon Wardley said the proceeds of the sale of the printed sermon would go to *rebuild* the Missions which the *Africans* had *attacked* in the 1850 war³⁹⁵ He said: "*As to any insinuations against the Missionaries themselves, as countenancing insubordination and rebellion, they have been proved the very opposite.*"³⁹⁶

Indeed, the very opposite. For the missionaries actually saved the day for the British. Their Fingos, Genadendal recruits and some Kat River serfs held the African united front at bay whilst Smith waited for overseas

394. M. Kollisch: "The Musselman Population of the Cape".

395. Sermon by Rev. R. Wardlaw, 27th November, 1851.

396. *Ibid.* p. 37 (Original Printed Sermon).

reinforcements, the Boers being too afraid to "come out on commando" (another repetition of the days of Stuurman). Despite the loss of the "Birkenhead", Smith's reinforcements arrived and in March, 1852, he struck with 11 powerful battalions under him and defeated the African front south of the Kat River settlement.

Now, of course, the Boers plucked up courage, and led by the English Governor Cathcart, helped to loot and pursue the resisters. Cathcart had to promise them loot in cattle before they would shoulder arms. By such means was Sareli defeated in October, 1852. He lost 10,000 cattle and 4,000 of his finest troops.

As a result of the "Unity War" wool exports to England rose from 3,700,000 lbs. in 1849 to 7,000,000 lbs. in 1855, after the war. Skin exports rose from 445,000 to 503,000 in the same period.³⁹⁷

"PEACE".

Cathcart confiscated the lands of the Khoi-Khoi mission rebels at Theopolis and Kat River and gave the land to White settlers. He gave a reserve at Oxkraal and Lesseytown to the "loyal" Fingos. He surrounded "rebel" chiefs with "loyal" chiefs. Well could the dead John Philip rest in peace.

397. 1923 S.A. Year Book.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE TENTH ANTI-XHOSA WAR (THE CATTLE SLAUGHTER).

Despite the combined assaults of England, Boers, Missionaries and African and Malay "loyalists", the Government had not yet won the war against the Xhosa. Indeed, seldom has such resistance been seen in any colonial country anywhere in the world. But, finally, monstrous cunning succeeded where force and deception had both failed.

In 1856 and 1857 disaster overtook the Xhosa. In May, 1856, Nongquase, niece of Sareli's priest-doctor, Mhlakaza, is supposed to have begun preaching a resurrection if the Xhosa killed their cattle and destroyed their harvests. On August 15th, 1856, 400,000 cattle were killed. On the day of the full-moon, February 18th, 1857, the slaughter was repeated and over 50,000 died of starvation.³⁹⁸ In "Kaffraria" alone 60,000 ultimately died.

MOSHOESHOE.

Sir George Grey, Cape Governor at the time, and official "historians", blamed the Sotho monarch, Moshoeshoe, for the slaughter. They said he had an arrangement with Xhosa chiefs to starve the Xhosa so as to force them to invade the Colony for crops and cattle; thereby keeping the British busy while he fought off the Free State Boers who had attacked him in 1856.

Basutoland Official Records of April, 1856, do report attempts by Moshoeshoe to build a grand military alliance with Faku, and (through Tyhali) with Sareli, in order, as Grey said, "to act against the British Government". Grey tried to connect this military front with the cattle slaughter, and accused Moshoeshoe of organising the latter.³⁹⁹ But Moshoeshoe, viewed by most hostile critics as a truthful man, indignantly denied this. In October, 1856, he told Grey that there were rumour-mongers (Grey's own agents) who aimed "At making me out the instigator of the troubles which agitate Kaffraria."⁴⁰⁰ For security reasons he denied his negotiations with Sareli (official Basutoland Records), but implicitly accused Grey of being behind the rumours causing the "troubles" (cattle-slaughter). Was Grey not accusing the innocent of his own deeds? Was Grey not trying to befoul a genuine military unity by making Moshoeshoe out to be a diabolical enemy of the Xhosa?

MHLAKAZA.

Mhlakaza, supposed co-prophet of Nongquase, two days after the first "resurrection" "denies all that has been said of him".⁴⁰¹ This report, by Shepstone to the High Commissioner, implies the existence of what Moshoeshoe called rumour-mongers (those who "said of him"—Mhlakaza—i.e. who

398. E. Roux: "Time Longer than Rope", p. 47.

399. G. Grey to Col. Sec., 16th August, 1856.

400. Moshoeshoe to Gray, 6th October, 1856 (Bas. Rec.)

401. G. M. Shepstone to High Commissioner, 18th August, 1856.

spread rumours about Mhlakaza). The implication was that *others* were *spreading rumours*.

SARELI.

The British also tried to throw the blame upon Sareli. Maclean, Chief Commissioner of the Transkei, said that Sareli had asked Moshoeshoe "to kill also".⁴⁰² Meanwhile, Grey persisted with his propoganda against Moshoeshoe,⁴⁰³ *but did nothing to stop the killing*.

Sareli, Grey's third scapegoat, is said to have at first supported the killing and to have killed his own horse as an example, just as Mhlakaza had killed his own cattle as an example. But, after Sareli had seen the stupidity of the first slaughter, and *before* the second slaughter he "*ordered his people to cease from destroying their cattle*".⁴⁰⁴ Thus Sareli was *against* the cattle-killing.

SANDILE.

The Grahamstown "Journal" of the time reported a meeting between Brownlee, Ngqika Commissioner, with Sandile and his councillors.⁴⁰⁵ Brownlee reported back that Sandile was *against* Mhlakaza, had *prohibited* the slaughter of cattle and that he would retain his own cattle even should his tribesmen "*disregard his word*". Thus Sandile was *against* the killing. At the same time Sandile referred to *others* influencing his tribesmen to a point of disobeying their chief—a very rare event at the time. In fact numbers of Sandile's tribe did kill their cattle, against his orders. Did some of the councillors believe Brownlee's story of the biblical resurrection, *which he related at this meeting*, but regard Mhlakaza's version as a more practical ante-dating of Brownlee's version?

THE "WAR" THEORY.

If Moshoeshoe, Sareli and Sandile were using the killing as a *war-manoevre* (Grey's "theory") why was it that "*The warriors had not been collected at a single point on the border*"?⁴⁰⁶

If *none* of the major Sotho and Xhosa kings were responsible, who then was?

THE WHITE COLONISTS.

In other words, in whose material interests was the crop-burning and cattle-slaughter?

The White farmers of Grahamstown and Kingwilliamstown wrote thus *during* the slaughter interval: "*lean and starving men are always tractable and civil*"⁴⁰⁷ ". . . *hundreds would hire themselves for farm-servants or labourers to the colonists, as they are beginning to suffer from starvation*."⁴⁰⁸ "*The present perturbed state of Kafirland may be turned to ultimate advantage, that is, as far as the Colony is concerned*" (leading article).⁴⁰⁹

From such a group could come many "rumour-mongers". Their motive was cheap labour. The slaughter satisfied their hopes: "*From January 1st*

402. Memorandum of J. Maclean, Chief Comm., 20th March, 1857.

403. Gray to Col. Sec., 23rd October, 1856.

404. *Supra*. 398.

405. Report of Brownlee to Maclean, 1856.

406. *Supra*. 398, p. 47.

407. Kingwilliamstown Gazette, 14th August, 1856.

408. Kingwilliamstown Gazette, 6th December, 1856.

409. Grahamstown Journal. 20th December, 1856.

to April 30th, 1857, some 5,000 Natives were indentured to European applicants for Native labourers".⁴¹⁰

This labour was not alone plentiful, but cheap. For, after the slaughter, wage-rates fell from £1 to 5/6 for men and from 7/6 to 2/6 for youths, women and girls.⁴¹¹ Grey himself set up labour-depots to regiment and recruit this labour.

Though the farmers benefited from, favoured and therefore helped to "spread rumours" about the slaughter, this does not necessarily mean that they were its prime-movers.

SIR GEORGE GREY.

A modern Liberal had to admit that: "*The self-destruction of the Natives helped Grey to carry out his policy . . . enabled him to fill up the empty and confiscated reserves with European settlers.*"⁴¹²

Grey's deeds are revealing: (1) He attacked Sareli, exploiting the exhaustion of the Xhosa. Thus Grey, not Moshoeshoe, had a war-motive.

(2) He confiscated the lands of those who had killed their cattle and settled 4,000 German legionnaires and later another 8,000 White settlers on them. He placed his Fingo allies as a buffer among the Xhosa. Later, in 1861, he shifted Adam Kok's Griquas to Griqualand East as a buffer between Sotho, Zulu and Xhosa. Very amazingly, only Grey's enemies killed cattle, but his friends, like the "loyal" Fingos, did not.

(3) He set up *labour-depots* to recruit the ruined, atomised people whom he drove by force and starvation off their smoking fields to work for the farmers and in the towns. On August 16th, 1856, one day after the first slaughter, Grey told the Colonial Secretary that he had advised "loyal" chiefs to buy up cattle cheaply; he had ordered Government stores to buy up corn cheaply; and that he *expected a large supply of labour to result from the cattle slaughter.*⁴¹³ Yet in the same letter he brazenly accused Mhlakaza of prophesying the coming of an "army of Russians".⁴¹⁴ (It was the time of the Crimean War.) The frame-up covered the deed. For, meanwhile, Grey was ordering troops and magistrates to recruit labour, buy cattle and corn cheaply, and invade the devastated Xhosa lands for further annexations.

Grey's deeds confirm the suspicions of millions of Africans. But were these deeds accident or design?

GREY—THE MAN WITH A PURPOSE.

Sir George Grey was an early advocate of White Union; he proposed the importation of Indian labour to work the Natal cane fields. He was an ideal type to conquer, exploit and oppress colonials in the interests of the British Empire—this was his purpose.

From December, 1837, to 1839, he led two "explorations" to N.W. and W. Australia. Here, in 1837, he shot his first aborigine (in the back).⁴¹⁵ In December, 1840, he became Governor of Australia, where his first act was to quell aborigine resistance upon the Murray.⁴¹⁶ From June, 1845

410. S. van der Horst: "Native Labour in S.A." (1942), p. 28.

411. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

412. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

413. Native Affairs Blue Book, I, p. 4.

414. Grey to Col. Sec., 16th August, 1856.

415. W. L. and L. Rees: "Life and Times of Sir George Grey" (1892), Vol. 1, p. 24. (Also in "Journal of Two Expeditions of Discovery in N.W. and W. Australia" (1841) by Sir George Grey.)

416. W. L. Rees, etc., p. 59 *et seq.*

to 1854, he was Governor of New Zealand, where he saved the Wakefield and missionary land-grabbers. He employed Waka Nene as a "quisling", brutally crushed Heke and Wakiti in January, 1846, and, within two months of his arrival "pacified" the Maoris.⁴¹⁷ He used Bishop Selwyn to divide and corrupt the tribes in order to grab their land,⁴¹⁸ built military roads to Maori strongholds,⁴¹⁹ and kidnapped and exiled the great king Rauparaha.⁴²⁰ He made chiefs into policemen and "magistrates" for "*He perceived that the power of the chiefs must either be broken or enlisted on behalf of the Government.*"⁴²¹

If they could neither be "broken" nor "enlisted" he put up *headmen* in their stead. In 1886 W. B. Chalmers said that Grey applied this policy to the Cape before the cattle-slaughter: "*Our main hope and power, . . . in carrying out the policy of Sir George Grey lay in the councillors; and Sir George Grey wisely foresaw this, hence his instructions . . . without their aid the wise and far-sighted policy of Sir George Grey would have been a complete failure. . . . The instructions of Sir George Grey were that we were to treat the councillors or headmen in such a way as to win them from their chiefs to the Government, and by their instrumentality to win the people to us, and overthrow the chiefs who had always been such a source of anxiety, danger and loss to the whole country and to the Imperial Government. Suffice it to say that the power of the chiefs has been completely and for ever broken.*"⁴²²

Now Chalmers was interpreter for Reeves, Grey's magistrate in "Kaffraria". From Grey "instructions" (according to Chalmers) went out to the magistrate—from the magistrate the "instructions" went through an *interpreter* (of the missionary type) to the *headmen*—from the headmen the "instructions" went to the *nongquases*—from the "prophets" the "instructions" went to the *people*. The chain was complete and explains the seeming paradox that the *chiefs* opposed the killing, while the *people* supported it. The only possible clue is that the people listened to the *headmen*, who were at the end of the line into which spake the voice of Sir George Grey.

Grey, moreover, knew how to speak. For he had made a thorough study of tribal ways in New Zealand and had written a book on tribal customs and myths.⁴²³ There he learnt not only to divide headmen from chiefs, but also to apply the Polynesian myth of *race-suicide*. He knew of annual human sacrifices, infanticide and the strong element of *destruction* in Maori myth.⁴²⁴ The cattle-slaughter began with *sun-rise* and Grey knew of the Maori myth which treated the sun as a *snare*.⁴²⁵ Where Karihi's mother tells this plotter against another tribe: "*You had better let the sun kill them, its rays will destroy them.*"⁴²⁶ Grey knew also that a *priestess* could be very powerful.⁴²⁷ and Nongquase was his instrument. No wonder, when Grey had achieved his purpose in 1857, she was "arrested", but named herself "*Victoria Regina*". But this priestess preached not from Maori or Xhosa lore, but from the *Christian Bible*. Her prophecy was

417. *Ibid.* pp. 94 to 100.

418. *Ibid.* pp. 108, 113.

419. *Ibid.* p. 118.

420. *Ibid.* p. 119.

421. *Ibid.* p. 122.

422. *Ibid.* pp. 229 to 230.

423. Sir G. Grey: "Polynesian Mythology and Ancient Traditional History of the New Zealand Race" (1865).

424. *Ibid.* pp. 1 to 15: "Children of Heaven and Earth".

425. *Ibid.* p. 16: "The Legend of Maui".

426. *Ibid.* pp. 61 and 65: "The Legend of Tawhaki".

427. *Ibid.* p. 144: "Voyage to New Zealand".

couched in biblical terms and it seems certain that a missionary gave her the idea. Be that as it may, Grey knew enough of tribal lore to use her to achieve his diabolical purpose.

Having partly destroyed the Xhosa, Grey disarmed them by sending them to work on farms, and also on the Grey Hospital near Kingwilliams-town. Fitzgerald was the doctor-in-charge and he wrote to Grey: "*We together have witnessed wonderful times during the cattle killing. How wonderfully our good God humbled this proud nation at your feet.*"⁴²⁸ Finally, Maclean, Chief Commissioner in Kaffraria, praised Grey's role in the cattle-slaughter: "*Grey is great and Fitzgerald is his witch-doctor.*"⁴²⁹

Grey's life, policies and deeds give a clear answer to the question: "Who was behind the cattle-slaughter?"

After this war, wool exports trebled, skin exports doubled.⁴³⁰ Xhosa-land was finally annexed and Xhosa resistance was broken. After ten great wars and a century of resistance they lost their land, cattle and freedom and became cheap labour.

THE ELEVENTH ANTI-XHOSA WAR.

In 1865 "Kaffraria" was annexed⁴³¹ and "represented" by a European in the Cape Representative Government, i.e. disfranchisement followed dispossession.

By 1873, however, Xhosa resistance developed against being enslaved as cheap labour on the then rising diamond mines. The magistrates' hold over chiefs weakened for a while. Sir Bartle Frere sent out ex-missionary Brownlee to lure Sareli in August, 1877, but Sareli remembered how Ayliff had trapped his father. He resisted but, being without Maqomo's brilliant generalship for Maqomo died in exile on Robben Island in 1873, Sareli was driven across the Bashee by "loyal" British-led Fingos, recrossed the river, but was finally defeated at Kentani in 1877.

This defeat of the Gcalekas was followed, in June, 1878, by the murder of Sandile, Rarabe chief, after he had twice tried in vain to sue for peace. This war was supported by the Cape Liberals, Molteno and Merriman.

AFTERMATH.

The Ngqika reserves were sold as farms to Whites and Tembuland, Pondoland and Griqualand East were policed by magistrates. In 1879 Transkei,⁴³² in 1885 Tembuland,⁴³³ in 1886 Xesibe lands and Mount Ayliff,⁴³⁴ in 1887 Rhode Valley,⁴³⁵ and in 1894, under threats of violence by Rhodes, Pondoland⁴³⁶ were annexed. These final annexations finally converted the ancient lands of the Xhosa and other Eastern Province tribes into cheap labour reservoirs for the growing mines of Kimberley and Johannesburg. If the first ten wars were waged for land and labour and wool, this last war was waged for land, labour and gold. It cost England £1½ million and was part of a broad attack against all Bantu resisters after the discovery of diamonds.

428. *Supra* 415. pp. 234, 237.

429. *Ibid.*

430. S.A. Year Book, 1923.

431. Act 3, 10th October, 1865.

432. Act 38, 15th August, 1879.

433. Act 3, 14th July, 1885.

434. Act 37, 28th October, 1886.

435. Act 45, November, 1887.

436. Act 5, 25th September, 1894.

SECTION II.

THE CONQUEST OF NATAL.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE FIRST ANTI-ZULU WAR (DINGANE).

We have described the wars against the Batwa, Khoi-Khoi and Xhosa tribes. The next tribal group to be assailed was the Zulu.

In 1687 wrecked "Stavinisse" sailors said Natal was "*Very fruitful and populous. The people used 'metallic ores' and knew the art of smelting them.*"⁴³⁷ Simon Van der Stel wrote in 1689 that Natal was "incredibly populous",⁴³⁸ the people being skilled corn, bean, pumpkin and earthnut farmers, apart from being rich in cattle. Simon and later Willem Van der Stel tried in vain to "buy" Natal from the local kings.

Later writers reported that the Zulu produced "*milk dishes, pillows, ladles . . . a kaross manufacturing industry was also established*".⁴³⁹

On this rich economic soil an expanding tribal monarchy developed, indicating the self-development of Zulu society from tribalism to semi-slavery, semi-feudalism and commerce. This process was hastened and twisted by the southward influence of the Portuguese and the northward influence of the British.

The centralised Zulu monarchy, the Zulu tribe-nation itself, was a product of this process, built up by a combined development of scattering and welding tribes. "Historians" have emphasised the scattering side of this building process, and have therefore seen a Tshaka as a destroyer rather than as a unifier of tribes.

JOBE AND DINGISWAYO.

Up to the death of Jobe, Mthethwa king, in 1795,⁴⁴⁰ Natal was peopled by many small, decentralised tribes. During his reign commerce with the Portuguese stimulated barter, production for exchange, and hence the dissolution and transformation of tribalism. Chiefs began to struggle for a trade monopoly with the Portuguese, as had earlier happened in Table Bay among the Khoi-Khoi in Van Riebeeck's time. Chiefs also vied as military leaders, to defend their land and position against outside enemies or inside rivals. Jobe's son, Mawewe, accused Godongwana (Dingiswayo) of wanting to kill Jobe, who believed this, and Dingiswayo fled. Twice Dingiswayo later defeated Mawewe, Qwabe chief. The second time he used arms bartered from the Portuguese. Mawewe was slain⁴⁴¹ and Dingiswayo built a militarised monarchy, with regiments and companies. He overcame

437. Simon Van der Stel Despatch to Ch. 17, 17th April, 1687.

438. Simon Van der Stel Despatch, 15th April, 1689.

439. H. F. Fynn's Diary (compiled by J. Stuart and D. M. Malcolm, 1950), p. 229.

440. *Ibid.*, p. 8; also Mofolo: "Tshaka"; also J. H. Soga: "South-East Bantu".

441. H. F. Fynn's Diary, pp. 6, 8.

the Qwabes, Qadi, Langeni, Zulu (a small tribe descended from Malandela-circa, 1600⁴⁴²), the Thembu, Swazi and Xhosa. Some of these were absorbed by intermarriage;⁴⁴³ others, like the three last-named, fled and settled elsewhere. Thus the Bantu Diaspora began under Dingiswayo, not Tshaka.

Dingiswayo traded heavily with Delegoa Bay, but the people abhorred and feared the Portuguese because they were slave-traders.⁴⁴⁴

Zwide, chief of the unsubdued Ndwande, defeated and treacherously killed Dingiswayo in 1817.⁴⁴⁵ Tshaka, son of Senzangakhona (d. 1816) and a general under Dingiswayo, was chosen by the army as the new king.

TSHAKA.

He defeated the Qwabes, amongst whom his half-brother Dingane had taken refuge, and compelled Dingane to return. He defeated the AmaNgwane under Matiwane, but Matiwane did not come into the expanding tribal unity. Instead he laid waste some 65 tribes in the path of his flight and many of his deeds were later attributed to Tshaka. In 1826 Tshaka killed Zwide, Dingiswayo's slayer.⁴⁴⁶ In 1824 he defeated the AmaMpondo.⁴⁴⁷ He forced Zwide's successor, Mzilikazi, to trek and found the Matabele monarchy. He was treacherously rewarded for his great nation-building wars by being assassinated on 29th October, 1828 (estimated) by his half-brothers Dingane and Mhlangana, who worked in collusion with his principal servant, Mbopha. He died calling out "*What is the matter, children of my father?*"⁴⁴⁸

Mbopha took over till the return of the army from a battle. Dingane and Mhlangana defeated Ngwadi (Tshaka's brother from his mother Nandi's side). Ngwadi's troops fought to the death without retreating. In November Dingane and Mbopha engineered Mhlangana's death and the same month Dingane became the new king.

Tshaka had unified and built the Zulu from the St. John's River up to Delegoa Bay into the mightiest Bantu tribal monarchy ever, with a superb army and a highly organised social life. This society was organised for trade with the northern Portuguese and for defence against the southern British.

CAPTAIN OWEN.

The British pressure on the Zulu began in September, 1823, when Captain Owen went up the East Coast to look for prospective British colonies. He "*contemplated the cession of the Tembu country to Great Britain. He accordingly brought the Rev. W. Threlfall, of the Cape, with the intention of settling him as a missionary in that country.*"⁴⁴⁹ This passage shows nicely the imperialist role of the missionaries. Owen imparted his findings to Farewell and King, British adventurers (the former being a missionary's son). These facts, collected in Port Elizabeth in June, 1823, were guides to future British conquest of Natal.⁴⁵⁰

442. J. H. Soga: "South-East Bantu", p. 65.

443. Fynn's Diary, p. 10.

444. *Ibid.* p. 229.

445. *Ibid.* p. 15.

446. *Ibid.* pp. 17, 18.

447. *Ibid.* p. 24.

448. *Ibid.* pp. 156, 157, 159.

449. *Ibid.* p. 40.

450. *Ibid.* p. 52.

FAREWELL, KING, AND FYNN.

Using Owen's data, Francis George Farewell "who first projected a British settlement at Port Natal"⁴⁵¹ tried in vain to form a trading station at St. Lucia Bay; then after Fynn had landed in May, 1824,⁴⁵² Farewell built a station near Port Natal⁴⁵³ and the two contacted Tshaka.⁴⁵⁴ Fynn tried to frighten the great king by saying "King George is one of the greatest kings in the world",⁴⁵⁵ a line of intimidation later used by Rev. Owen towards Dingane.

After an assassin had attacked Tshaka, Farewell "doctored" his wounds⁴⁵⁶ and exploited his gratitude⁴⁵⁷ by wresting a tribally illegal "land-concession" from him in August, 1824, "as a reward for his kind attention to me in my illness from a wound".⁴⁵⁸ Backed by Governor Somerset, Farewell wrote out a fraudulent, illegal document which Tshaka could not but understand as *usufruct*, but which Farewell wrote out (for an illiterate to sign) as *ownership*. This invalid "grant" fantastically "gave" Port Natal and a coast-strip 35 miles long and 100 miles deep to Farewell as "full possession in perpetuity . . . with all rights to the rivers, woods, mines . . ." ⁴⁵⁹ Finally the mighty Tshaka was supposed to acknowledge the lone Farewell "as the Chief of the said Country".⁴⁶⁰ On the basis of this fraudulent title English, Portuguese and American traders and missionaries settled in Port Natal, kidnapped Zulu wives, some living, like Biggar and Dunn,⁴⁶¹ as minor chieftains. Many Zulus were enslaved as hunters and porters in a new ivory traffic.⁴⁶²

DIVIDE AND RULE.

Farewell, King, Fynn, Cane, Isaacs, Dr. A. Smith, Rev. Gardiner¹⁶³ in turn played minor chiefs off against each other, fomented tribal feuds, and this made it necessary for Dingane, Tshaka's successor, to intensify Tshaka's unifying work in order to prevent the complete disruption of the Zulu. Particularly dangerous was the creation by Fynn of a Fengu "buffer" at Port Natal, made up of refugees and deserters from Tshaka and later from Dingane.⁴⁶⁴ Later Fynn helped to settle some of these Fengu as a buffer against the Xhosas, as we have already seen. Nqetho, Qwabe chief, had to kill Farewell's fully armed party in September, 1829, because Farewell was playing on his private quarrel with Dingane.⁴⁶⁵

Then Fynn and Cane provoked a dispute between a chief, Jacob, and Dingane.⁴⁶⁶ Jacob was killed, but Fynn had hoped for Dingane's death: "As he set such an excellent example by killing his brother Shaka, no doubt someone will follow it."⁴⁶⁷ Dingane had ample cause for his later actions.

451. *Ibid.* p. 51.

452. *Ibid.* p. 58.

453. Bird: "Annals of Natal", Vol. 1. p. 71.

454. Fynn's Diary, pp. 52, 53.

455. *Ibid.* p. 76.

456. *Ibid.* p. 84.

457. *Ibid.* p. 76.

458. Bird: "Annals of Natal", Vol. 1. p. 193 (1888).

459. Tshaka—Farewell Agreement, 7th August, 1824.

460. *Ibid.*

461. Agar Hamilton: "Native Policy of the Voortrekkers", p. 75.

462. Fynn's Diary, p. 131.

463. N. Isaacs: "Travels and Adventures in Eastern Africa".

Gardiner: "Journey to the Zooloo Country".

Dr. A. Smith's Journal (Basutoland Records, Vol. 1).

464. Fynn's Diary, p. 22.

465. *Ibid.* p. 169.

466. *Ibid.* pp. 197, 216.

467. *Ibid.* p. 214.

SMITH.

In April, 1831, Dingane attacked Cane's settlement, suspecting Cane of cheating him of goods ordered and of planning to attack him.⁴⁶⁸ In April, 1832, Fynn guided Dr. Smith, sent up by the Government, acting on Philip's advice, to embroil Dingane in a "treaty". Smith's report on Natal inspired the Boers to trek there.⁴⁶⁹ The British pioneered, the Boers followed.

REV. GARDINER.

In 1834 missionary Gardiner advised D'Urban to annex Natal, but no action was yet taken.⁴⁷⁰ Envious of Dingane's lands, British settlers in 1835 asked England to annex the country.⁴⁷¹ In May, 1835, Gardiner, ignoring Dingane's scorn for his efforts to convert him, beguiled the king into promising to "cede" (a la Farewell) South Natal to the British settlers.⁴⁷² Dingane, however, "*knew the White people would be the first to break the treaty*".⁴⁷³

True enough, Halstead and Snelder broke the treaty in August, 1835, three months after Durban was "founded", by enslaving Zulu women.⁴⁷⁴ Again, Dingane had cause for his later actions.

In August, 1836, Glenelg made Gardiner Port Natal Magistrate,⁴⁷⁵ and in June, 1837, Dingane "ceded" Port Natal to the "King of England"⁴⁷⁶ and agreed to let the missionary Owen into his city. In December, 1838, Governor Napier sent out Major Charter to occupy Port Natal.⁴⁷⁷ British soldiers now stood on Dingane's soil. Dingane now felt Tshaka's fears when the latter heard a report from Jacob, who had gone with Sotobe, Mbozamboza and King to the Colony in June, 1828, to find out how the Whites felt towards the Zulu.⁴⁷⁸ Dingane now recalled Jacob's report: "*At first the white people came and took part of their land, then they encroached and drove them further back. . . . They built houses (missions) among them for the purpose of subduing them by witchcraft . . . during his stay in Grahamstown the soldiers frequently asked what sort of country the Zulus had . . . if they had plenty of cattle; and had said: 'We shall soon be after you' . . . they would then build a fort, when more would come and demand land, who would also build houses and subdue the Zulus and keep driving them farther back, as they had driven the Frontier tribes.*"⁴⁷⁹

Dingane soon had a taste of what Jacob had called a "house to subdue them by witchcraft".

REV. OWEN.

In March, 1837, Rev. Owen landed in Cape Town, met the Governor, and straightaway showed his anti-Zulu attitude by talking of the "*murderous*

468. Isaacs: "Travels and Adventures in Eastern Africa", Vol. 2, pp. 218, 227.

469. Fynn's Diary, pp. 311, 312.

470. Bird: "Annals of Natal", Vol. 1.

471. Eybers: "Select Constitutional Documents", p. xliv.

472. Gardiner to Dingane: Treaty, 6th May, 1835.

473. Gardiner: "Journey to the Zooloo Country", p. 127.

474. *Ibid.* p. 192.

475. Eybers: "Select Constitutional Documents", p. 144.

476. Treaty with Dingane, 21st June, 1837.

477. Eybers, p. 151, 4th December, 1838.

478. Isaacs: "Travels and Adventures in Eastern Africa", Vol. 1, p. 256.

479. Fynn's Diary, p. 196.

spear of Tshaka".⁴⁸⁰ Journeying through the Eastern Cape he met Shaw, Boyce and Brownlee,⁴⁸¹ gaining knowledge of the art of conquest. At Dingane's capital, Ungungunhlovo, he tried to convert Dingane, but the king smiled at his hocus-pocus⁴⁸² and ground Owen's religious arguments to powder.⁴⁸³ But when Owen, as Fynn had done with Tshaka, spoke of the King of England, Dingane did not smile.⁴⁸⁴ He tried to use Owen as a go-between to negotiate and trade in gunpowder with the British (Owen refused the latter) and thereby himself became dependent upon and used by the missionary. The user became the used and asked the British enemy for advice⁴⁸⁵ when he became suspicious of Retief, who had begun to "negotiate" with him in October, 1837.

RETIEF.

The same month Dingane had defeated Mzilikazi and he considered letting the Boers use North Natal and "*settle in the country near that from which Umzilikazi had lately been driven*".⁴⁸⁶ He did not and could not think of a *sale*; "settle" meant usufruct, not ownership. Gardiner knew the Boers wanted South Natal and warned Dingane (in England's interests) that the Boers "*intended to take possession of the ADJACENT country and setting up a Government of their own*".⁴⁸⁷ (My emphasis.)

In November, 1837, Dingane, now justifiably suspicious, received Retief. An African writer, Sekeze, says Dingane had taken some ex-Boer cattle among the booty he had seized when he defeated Mzilikazi. The Boers "spooed" the cattle (which was no longer theirs in fact) to Dingane's capital.⁴⁸⁸ Dingane himself had lost cattle in raids by Sikonyela. As a compromise he offered Retief 110 of the ex-Boer sheep he had and *cattle* (not *land*)⁴⁸⁹ in return for which Retief had to recover Dingane's cattle from Sikonyela and bring Sikonyela himself back. Dingane also complained that "*a great many cattle have been stolen from me on the outskirts of my country by people with clothing, horses and guns*".⁴⁹⁰ Retief left after Dingane had "*not expressly promised to transfer any land to the Boers*" although Dingane "*knew that they desired Port Natal, but he did not intend to give it to them*".⁴⁹¹

The same month, November, three months *before* Dingane killed Retief, the Boers, aided by "Sothos", attacked the Zulus and were routed.⁴⁹² This increased Dingane's suspicions of the Boers. He also feared the British because they refused to sell him gunpowder.⁴⁹³ In fact the Boers were using the British; thus Retief told Dingane in December, 1837, to obey his missionary.⁴⁹⁴

The Boer-British threat was increased by the defection of Siquabana who had refused to trail Retief's Boers who had spied on Dingane's capital

480. Diary of Rev. F. Owen. Entry: 2nd May, 1837.

481. *Ibid.* August 1837 entries.

482. *Ibid.* 20th August, 1837.

483. R. B. Hully's "Account of Owen's Stay in Natal" (G. Cory, p. 171).

484. Owen's Diary, 11th October, 1837.

485. *Ibid.* 26th October, 1837. Letter Retief to Dingane.

486/7. *Ibid.* 3 November, 1837.

488. Azareele Sekeze: "Account of Murder of Retief". Translated by Rev. R. Ellenberger (Ed. by Sir G. Cory).

489. Owen's Diary, 8th November, 1837.

490. *Ibid.* 8th November, 1837. Letter Dingane to Retief.

491. *Ibid.* 9th November, 1837.

492. *Ibid.* 19th November, 1837.

493. *Ibid.* 26th November, 1837.

494. *Ibid.* Retief to Dingane, 7th December, 1837.

on Retief's first visit, had taken refuge with the British, and was thereore trounced by Dingane.⁴⁹⁵ Having restored internal unity, Dingane awaited the Boer attack.

RETIEF IS THWARTED.

Retief meanwhile met Sikonyela through the missionary Allison, tricked him into being handcuffed, took 700 cattle, 63 horses and 11 guns from him,⁴⁹⁶ but, in violation of his agreement with Dingane, then released Sikonyela (who became an ally of Boer and Briton against the Sotho). Retief reported his "progress" to Dingane and also a Boer victory over Mzilikazi (in the Transvaal) in which they had killed 500 Matabele and taken 3,000 cattle.⁴⁹⁷ Dingane had by now little need to be reminded of the strength of the Boers. In his eyes a commando was an army.

When Retief came to Ungunguhlovo with such an army (60 fully armed men plus Coloured allies), after having been warned by Rev. Champion of Dingane's attitude,⁴⁹⁸ Dingane, in Owen's words, on February 6th, 1838, "*felt . . . that these men were his enemies and being unable to attack them openly he murdered them clandestinely*".⁴⁹⁹

Dingane found that "*when their guns were examined they were all found loaded with ball*".⁵⁰⁰ He told Owen that the Boers had spied on and walked around his city. He held that Retief would have killed him if he had not acted first. On February 10th he wrote to the Cape Governor that he had to kill Retief's party because they had come as an army to him.⁵⁰¹

In passing, Dingane said he would no longer "be deceived by" Owen.⁵⁰² He told Owen openly: "*When the Dutch were put to death you put up a loud cry.*" (Owen had fainted at the sight.) "*Would you cry for me if I were killed? . . . I see that every White man is an enemy to the Black and every Black man an enemy to the White. . . . I believe you are as much my enemy as the Boers whom I killed.*"⁵⁰³

After this classic exposure, Owen left in fear and misery, failed to set up a mission in Bechuanaland and left, later to die in Egypt, after advising Napier to annex Natal. Dingane had taught the missionary as harsh a lesson as he had taught the Boer.

495. *Ibid.* 21st December, 1837.

496. *Ibid.* Retief to Dingane, 22nd January, 1838.

497. *Ibid.* Retief to Dingane, 2nd January, 1838.

498. Joseph Kirkman: "Account of Retief Massacre".

499. Owen Diary, 6th February, 1838.

500. *Ibid.* Dingane to Owen, 9th February, 1838.

501/2. *Ibid.* 10th February, 1838.

503. R. B. Hully: "Account etc."

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE SECOND ANTI-ZULU WAR (BLOOD RIVER).

Dingane followed up his victory over Retief by attacking Boer camps in February. In March the Boers counter-attacked and killed 500 Zulus on an island in the Tugela River.⁵⁰⁴ The British now joined forces with the Boers: "*Settlers of Port Natal intend commencing immediate war with Dingane.*"⁵⁰⁵ An army of 1,000, helped by missionary-led "loyal" Zulus, marched on Dingane,⁵⁰⁶ having decided that "*The Dutch and English will now unite against the Zooloos.*"⁵⁰⁷ In April they took 500 women and children and 400 cattle from the unresisting Siquabana's tribe.⁵⁰⁸ Dingane's troops beat back the British led by Biggar and Cane in April,⁵⁰⁹ and routed a Boer commando after it had killed "500 to 1,000" Zulus.⁵¹⁰ On April 26th the missionaries cried, "*The whole country is at their*" (*the Zulu's*) "*disposal.*"⁵¹¹ With Port Natal at his mercy and with the enemy taking to the boats, Dingane returned to his capital. This major blunder was due to the fact that he thought still in terms of tribal war-ethics; he had shown his superiority and he thought the enemy would now live in peace with him; so he did not extend his sway over the Boer-British force he had routed.

The Boer-British front exploited Dingane's politeness, regrouped and, under Pretorius, killed 3,000 Zulu soldiers at Blood River.⁵¹² Dingane retreated to Hluhluwe, Pretorius occupied Ungungunhlovo, and a Boer sat on the throne of Dingane.

The Boers still were unable to conquer Dingane. So in May, 1839, the British arranged a peace through Hervis appointed by Major Charters whom Napier had sent up. This British-made peace was in the Boers' favour, for Dingane had to hand over 19,000 cattle. In October Mpande, Dingane's half-brother, made a treacherous treaty with the Boers,⁵¹³ and in January, 1840, helped Pretorius to defeat Dingane at Magongo.⁵¹⁴ After losing 36,000 cattle Dingane sued for peace, defeated not by the Boers, nor by the British, but by Mpande's treachery. He saw his two peace-envoys, Tambuza and Slele, foully murdered by Pretorius,⁵¹⁵ and fled to Swaziland where he was tortured and killed before Sobhuza. Mpande was propped up by the Boers as the new king, while they set up their first Republic on the lands seized from Dingane.

504. Owen Diary, 26th February, 11th March, 1838.

505. *Ibid.* 4th March, 1838.

506. *Ibid.* 13th March, 1838.

507. *Ibid.* 17th March, 1838.

508. *Ibid.* 2nd April, 1838.

509. *Ibid.* 13th, 19th April, 1838.

510. *Ibid.* 11th April, 1838.

511. *Ibid.* 26th April, 1838.

512. Hattersley: "British Settlement of Natal", p. 39.

513. Treaty: Mpanda and Volksraad, 15th October, 1839.

514. *Supra.* 512.

515. A. Hamilton: "Native Policy, etc.", p. 30.

THE FIRST BOER REPUBLIC.

While Pretorius asked for British recognition and friendship,⁵¹⁶ his Republic was based on apartheid. In April, 1841, the Volksraad decided that only "*Burghers of this Republic shall be possessors of houses or fixed property.*"⁵¹⁷ In April, 1842, they introduced a pass for Zulus and forbade Zulu guns on Boer property. Thus they both dispossessed and disarmed the Zulus.

THE BRITISH TAKE OVER.

The British, who "*could not permit an independent state to grow up on the south-eastern seaboard of Africa,*"⁵¹⁸ proclaimed British sovereignty over the Boers in December, 1841,⁵¹⁹ defeated the short-lived Republic in June, 1842, forced the Boers to surrender in July, 1843, snatched St. Lucia Bay from the Zulus by treaty in October, 1843,⁵²⁰ annexed Natal in May, 1844,⁵²¹ proclaimed it a Colony in April, 1845,⁵²² and gave the conquered Boers and British settlers a Legislative Council in February, 1847,⁵²³ and Responsible Government in July, 1856.⁵²⁴ Thus, while the Africans were robbed of land and denied rights, the ungrateful Boers were conquered but given full citizenship. England, if not yet the Boers, understood that the European must govern, but the African must be landless, rightless cheap labour. The next question—how to rule this landless, rightless labour—was elaborately worked out for the British by the colonial son of a British missionary, Theopolis Shepstone, who transferred the ideas of Philip, Smith and later Grey from the Cape to Natal.

516. Eybers, p. 166, 14 January, 1841.

517. Law of Natal Republic, 14th April, 1841.

518. Eybers, p. xlviii.

519. Proclamation, 2nd December, 1841.

520. Treaty, 5th October, 1843.

521. Proc., 31st May, 1844.

522. Proc., 30th April, 1845.

523. Proc., 2nd March, 1847.

524. Charter of Natal, 15th July, 1856

CHAPTER XXIV.

SHEPSTONE'S POLICY AND THE THIRD ANTI-ZULU WAR (LANGALIBALELE).

Philip's policy had been to rule through magistrate-controlled hereditary chiefs. Harry Smith, realising the need to break up the power of the chiefs in order to break these rallying points for tribal resistance, held the policy of ruling through magistrate-controlled appointed chiefs. Sir George Grey, further breaking up "the power of the chiefs", believed in rule through magistrate-controlled headmen. Shepstone's policy was the same as all three with regard to the magistrates, but he favoured Smith's and Grey's methods of dispensing with hereditary chiefs, for he did not want them to act as symbols of tribal unity, centres of re-assembling Zulu resistance, and as rival or even hostile authorities. To complete the history of this combination of direct (magistrate) and indirect (chiefs, headmen) rule, we may add that later Rhodes developed the Philip-Smith-Grey-Shepstone policy further by ruling through magistrate-controlled Bungas made up of "loyal", power-stripped chiefs, headmen, subservient intellectuals and relatively well-off African petty landowners, traders and businessmen.

Shepstone outlined his policy in a series of classic statements. He said: "*When in 1846 I first undertook the management of Natives in Natal I at once found myself face to face with the difficulty that, taking the tribes generally, the Government could not command a balance of power: in other words it was uncertain of its ability at any time to put down disaffection among the Natives by means of the Natives themselves. . . . It was obviously impossible to do so by means of the White colonists alone. Instances constantly occurred, however, of individuals, families and even sections of tribes, becoming dissatisfied with their hereditary chiefs. . . . I observed that these malcontents were not unwilling to be placed under headmen of no hereditary rank. . . . Here there seemed to be presented a mode of supplying a serious deficiency. . . . Thus the Government had at its disposal a large force upon whose services it could at any moment rely. . . . It is by the gradual and judicious extension of this system, in combination with and under the control of white magistrates, that I think will be found the shortest and safest means of breaking down the power of the hereditary chiefs, without losing the machinery, as yet indispensable to us, of tribal organisation.*"⁵²⁵ . . . "*The chiefs and their subordinate chiefs and indunas are all in point of fact officers of Government in active service. . . . They carry out the orders of the magistrates.*"⁵²⁶ . . . "*All their importance depends upon the breath of the Government.*"⁵²⁷

This fundamental divide-and-rule policy placed the chiefs in charge of locations, whence cheap labour was drawn for the sugar plantations, towns

525. Shepstone Memorandum, 28th November, 1874.

526. Shepstone Memorandum, 1864.

527. *Supra*, 525.

and public works. Shepstone said: "*Locations were formed for the Natives and they were removed into them by orders of the local Government, sometimes by force.*"⁵²⁸ . . . "*Each location should be under the immediate control of a White magistrate.*"⁵²⁹

CHEAP LABOUR LOCATIONS.

By 1882 40% of the Zulus outside Zululand (itself a vast labour-reserve) were in such locations.⁵³⁰ From these locations the magistrates, through the chiefs, "smoked out" cheap labour. To achieve this a 7/- hut-tax was imposed, raised to 14/- in 1876,⁵³¹ and extended to Basutoland. Secondly money-taxes and duties on goods imported into Zululand were imposed: "*Over the years 1857 to 1874 a total amount of £57,557 was spent on Native development,*" but in one year alone "*direct Native taxation brought in as much as £70,000.*"⁵³² Thirdly, pressure was exerted on chiefs: "*The magistrate will use his legislative influence to cause the chiefs to induce their young men to enter into the service of the farmers.*"⁵³³ Fourthly, a labour-tax was imposed. An 1852 Commission suggested a higher hut-tax, paid by labour on farms and public works. "Kraals" prepared to work for wages would be exempt from this tax: "*By the above measure of Finance the Government would be put into possession of a large and regular supply of youthful Kafir labour.*"⁵³⁴ This Commission also recommended the "*apprenticeship of young Kafirs*". Fifthly, missionaries said it was a sin to be naked and the above Commission stated: ". . . *many would be obliged to work to procure the means of buying clothing*". At the same time this widened the market for the clothes manufactured by England's textile factories. By these five methods Shepstone tried to smoke cheap labour out of the locations.

EDUCATION, LAW AND FRANCHISE POLICY.

The above labour-hunting Commission said that "*Native Education*" should be under missionaries. In 1856 the Natal Government introduced separate schooling for Non-Europeans.⁵³⁵ In 1858 the Central Education Board was made up of eight Europeans, including five Very Reverend Gentlemen.⁵³⁶

Judicial apartheid was adopted. In 1849 Shepstone adapted special Native Law for those "*whose ignorance and habits unfit them for the duties of civilized life*".⁵³⁷ In 1879 Native Civil Law was to be administered through chiefs; criminal law by ordinary Courts; political matters by a Native High Court and Supreme Court, the Governor having power to fine a tribe collectively (as in India). As the Supreme Chief, the Governor could recruit corve labour. While the Africans were denied judicial equality and made quite helpless, the Governor had total, arbitrary powers: "*The Supreme Chief is not subject to the Supreme Court, or to any other Court of law.*"⁵³⁸

528. *Supra.* 526.

529. *Supra.* 525.

530. Natal Government Gazette, 31st October, 1882.

531. Hattersley: "*Later Annals of Natal*" (1938), p. 212.

532. *Ibid.* p. 238.

533. Natal Government Gazette, 13th September, 1852.

534. Report of Commission of Enquiry into Native Labour Shortage, appointed 27th Sept., 1852.

535. Natal Education Ordinance No. 2 of 1856.

536. Natal Government Notice No. 60 of 1858.

537. Eybers: "*Select Constitutional Documents*", p. 220 *et seq.*

538. Act, 17th December, 1875; Act 44 of 1887.

This educational and judicial oppression was coupled with total disfranchisement. The 1856 Responsible Government Charter loaded the vote against Africans, who could not fulfil the high income qualification, did not own private fixed property, and whose communal land-tenure did not entitle them to a vote.⁵³⁹ This was also the pattern of Representative Government at the Cape in 1852.

In 1865 the Natal Government declared: "*It is deemed inexpedient that Africans should vote. . . . It is expedient by law to exclude such of the Native Population, as shall continue subject to Native Law, from claiming the electoral franchise.*"⁵⁴⁰ Before one could even try to qualify, one had to be seven years free from Native law.⁵⁴¹ Thenceforth to the present day the whole Natal African population has remained permanently disfranchised.

LANGALIBALELE'S REVOLT.

It was against this complete, modern, system, shaped by Shepstone, that Langalibalele revolted in 1874. In 1849 his tribe was settled as a "buffer" at Weenen. Later Shepstone tried to shift the tribe and disarm those who had bought guns from wages earned on the Kimberley diamond mines. Fodo and Langalibalele resisted, arrested Shepstone's messengers sent to summon the chief to the capital, and Sir B. Pine, Governor, despatched troops who drove out the tribesmen. Langalibalele was arrested in Basutoland, after being betrayed by a son of Moshoeshoe,⁵⁴² was tried, betrayed by his "defender", Bishop Colenso, who compromised with Shepstone, banished to Robben Island, and released in 1875. His headquarters were at Langa, the present labour-camp at Cape Town. His tribe's lands were "*dispersed among the farmers*".⁵⁴³

INDIAN LABOUR.

Such Zulu resistance, plus their refusal to leave what land was left them, forced Grey to call for cheap Indian labour in 1859, to work the sugar plantations of Natal, to strengthen the British land-wars against the Zulu, to weaken the Zulu, who had to largely pay for the imported labour with higher tariffs on articles of "Native Consumption".⁵⁴⁴ This made many Zulus anti-Indian and began the Natal Indo-African clashes. By Ordinances 14 and 15 of 1859 Indian indentured labour could be publicly or privately imported. In 1860 importation began of landless, conquered Indians ruined by famine and poverty after the quelling of the Indian Mutiny. By 1872 there were 5,000 Indian labourers and by 1886, 30,000. Ninety per cent. of the sugar workers were Indian. In 1880 the indenture-term was raised from three to ten years. Despite trading licence, property and franchise restrictions, many Indians left the labour-market (by 1891 67% were free), importation was difficult, and the rising labour demands of the mines and sugar-barons made a new onslaught on the Zulu imperative and urgent.

539. Charter of Natal, 15th July, 1856.

540/541. Act 11, 24th August, 1865.

542. Chief Letsie at Pitso, Maseru. Official Report, 16th October, 1879.

543. A. F. Hattersley: "Later Annals of Natal".

544. De Kiewiet: "Social and Economic History of S.A.", p. 82.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE FOURTH (CETSHWAYO), FIFTH (DINIZULU) AND SIXTH (BAMBATTA) ANTI-ZULU WARS.

In 1877 Lord Carnarvon told Queen Victoria "*That we have escaped a great and serious war up to this time is entirely due to him*" (Shepstone).⁵⁴⁵ But Carnarvon and Shepstone were busy plotting a new series of land-wars to "smoke out" the Zulus, Sothos, Xhosas and others for cheap labour on the sugar-farms and new diamond and gold mines. At the same time the Zulus were renewing their grand resistance.

In 1856 Cetshwayo overthrew Mbulazi and rivalled the traitor, Mpande. Against Sir George Grey's advice (who wanted to carve the Zulus up under Mpande's sons), Shepstone declared Cetshwayo the heir to Mpande in 1861. When Mpande died in 1872 Cetshwayo became Zulu king. But Grey proved more correct than Shepstone. For Cetshwayo became not a magistrate-controlled puppet, but a rallying point of resistance. He built up his armies, tried to form an alliance with Sekukuni, who routed the Transvaal Boers in 1876, and with the Pondos,⁵⁴⁶ and in 1877 held military manoeuvres.⁵⁴⁷ England feared a "*Combination between Zulu, the Bapedi and other Native tribes against the Whites generally.*"⁵⁴⁸

In 1877 Shepstone annexed Transvaal to rescue the Boers, and later Sir Bartle Frere sent a naval patrol up the Zululand coast. Cetshwayo cleaned his ranks for the coming war by expelling the missionaries from his midst.

In January, 1879, Lord Chelmsford invaded Zululand through Rorke's Drift. Cetshwayo replied to this unprovoked aggression by luring the British from Isandhlwana and routing 1,800 troops, exploiting the "*demoralisation of (British) Native contingents*"⁵⁴⁹ there on January 22nd, 1879.⁵⁵⁰ The retreating British, helped by their Khoi-Khoi, Sotho (under Col. Dornford), and Mcuni (under Chief Pagodi) allies,⁵⁵¹ held the Zulus at Rorke's Drift. While White Natal trembled behind barricades in Greytown, Pietermaritzburg and patrols in Durban, Cetshwayo won another battle at Hlobane, where Piet Uys was slain. But Wood held Kambala against the cream of Cetshwayo's army. In March the Zulu troops retreated under fire from Martini-Henrys and seven-pounders, and Chelmsford defeated them at Ulundi. Cetshwayo was captured in August and sent to Cape Town. Earl

545. Carnarvon to Queen Victoria, 5th June, 1877.

546. Sir H. Bulwer to Carnarvon, 4th October, 1877.

547. Private Report W. Shepstone, Sec., Native Affairs, 27th April, 1877.

548. Sir H. Bulwer to Carnarvon, 31st October, 1876.

549. J. W. Shepstone (Hattersley, p. 162); Soldier Symons' Account (p. 143); Soldier Brickhill's Account (p. 150).

550. Records of Battle of Isandhlwana, 22nd January, 1879.

551. T. Newmarch: "Looking Back on Zulu War Days", in "Cape Times", 17th November, 1951.

Kimberley summed up the war by saying: "*The Zulu power has been broken.*"⁵⁵²

While the British hounded out the Zulus to work on the farms and mines, cut out locations south of the Umhlati from Zulu lands, and propped up 13 petty chiefs, Cetshwayo visited Queen Victoria, was reinstated in 1882, but his power was curbed by a puppet chief, Sibebu, and in 1884 the grand old resister died at Eshowe, killed by British alcohol and "kindness"

FIFTH ANTI-ZULU WAR.

The new king, Dinizulu, son of Cetshwayo, made an alliance in May, 1884, with a Boer, Lukas Meyer, to free himself from British control. He helped Meyer set up a Republic, and Meyer helped him defeat Sibebu, British puppet. But Meyer built his Republic on part of Dinizulu's lands. Having been robbed by his ally, he was further robbed by his enemy when England annexed St. Lucia Bay in December, 1884. The British recognised Meyer's Republic in October, 1886 (it became part of the Transvaal in July, 1888), treated the Boers as rivals, but Dinizulu as an enemy, ultimately annexed his lands⁵⁵³ and banished him to St. Helena for nine years. Dinizulu's alliance with Boer against British cost him his lands and very nearly his life—a sharp political lesson.

SIXTH ANTI-ZULU WAR.

The last echo of Zulu resistance was heard in January, 1906, when increased squatters' tax, raised to 14/- in 1903, laws against stock-theft, poll-tax raids and land-hunger forced Hajongwe, Makanda and Bambatta, quietly backed by Dinizulu, to rise. Local troops crushed the rising. With British consent they executed 12 Zulu rebels on March 31st, 1906.

This brutal massacre incensed the peasants. Troops from Transvaal came down to help Natal troops quell this second phase of the rebellion. Four thousand Zulus were killed or injured, and, on the Government side, 25 Whites and six Africans were killed. Ghandi helped the British. The British spent £1 million to crush the rising. Dinizulu was arrested, kept in suspense till 1908, then in March, 1909, was sentenced to four years' gaol, dating from his arrest, for allegedly harbouring Bambatta refugees. (He had screened his quiet aid to Bambatta by "offering" an impi to the British.) In 1911 he was exiled to the Transvaal and a salary of £500 was restored to him.⁵⁵⁴

Thereafter Zulu chiefs owed "their existence to the breath of the government". Zululand became a vast labour-reserve for the sugar plantations and mines. Thus ended the last spark of Zulu tribal resistance, after a grim struggle lasting 70 years, during which the Zulu won four mighty battles but finally lost their land, labour and freedom to the British conquerors.

552. Earl Kimberley Despatch to Bulwer. 2nd February, 1882.

553. Act of 29th December, 1897.

554. For Bambatta: E. Roux: "Time Longer than Rope" (pp. 95 to 108); Hattersley: "Later Annals"; Dailies, March, 1906 (Durban, Cape Town, Johannesburg).

SECTION III.

THE CONQUEST OF THE ORANGE FREE STATE.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE MISSIONARIES.

The story of the conquest of the Basutoland Bantu opens typically with missionary intrigue.

On Thaba Bosigu, "Mountain of Night", Moshoeshoe built a centralised monarchy, starting with a few hundred scattered triblets in 1820 and ending with a nation-tribe of some 100,000 when he died some 50 years later.⁵⁵⁵ His impregnable natural fortress withstood the assaults of Tshaka, Mzilikazi, Boer and Briton, but was undermined from the beginning of his nation-building saga by a devastating internal enemy, the missionaries; for in 1833 he had admitted the Paris Evangelicals Arbousset, Caselis and Gosselin into his capital.⁵⁵⁶

BA-TLÔKWA BUFFER.

Moreover, he was surrounded by missionary "buffer" states. Sikonyela, Ba-Tlôkwa (AmaDlongwa) chief, whom Moshoeshoe had defeated and then given sanctuary, was controlled by Allison and other Wesleyans who treacherously misused a Boer-missionary drafted usufruct land-grant of July, 1834, from Moshoeshoe.⁵⁵⁷ The missionaries split Mokachane's tribe into Christian and Heathen after he had opposed them;⁵⁵⁸ they did the same to the "Mantatis" when a section rejected the Word.⁵⁵⁹ Now they used the converted Ba-Tlôkwa of Sikonyela as a hostile buffer against their host, Moshoeshoe, in the coming wars.

BARALONG BUFFER.

The deadliest buffer-state was the Seleka-Baralong at Thaba Nchu under Moroka, controlled by Wesleyans Allison, Archbell, Jenkins and Edwards. The pre-history of the Baralong throws much light on their role in the anti-Sotho wars.

Having probably come from the Lacustrine region of Central Africa (c. 1400), the Baralong founded by the (legendary) Morolong, came eventually to settle at Taung under Tau in 1740. He defeated Batwa, Koranna and others and died in battle in 1760. The Batwa, Koranna, Batlhaseng and Bataung then drove the Baralong out to Setlagole and the tribe split up under Tau's sons, one of whom, Seleka, led one triblet. He left Setlagole in 1777 and died in 1786 (approximately). One son, Koi-Koi, trekked to

555. Basutoland Records, Vol. 2; Memorandum by Chiefs, 1853; also Journal of Dr. Smith, 1836, p. 10.

556. Caselis: "Twenty-three Years with the Basuto".

557. Basutoland Records, Vol. 1, 17th July, 1834.

558. J. Blockhouse: "Travels, etc."; Basutoland Records, Vol. 1, p. 27.

559. *Ibid.* p. 34.

near Mafeking, and Moroka I settled at Thabeng. He was killed in battle in 1800 by Gaberone's troops. Mokgosi avenged his father's death and in 1805 his brother, Sefunelo, took over, to be succeeded in 1829 by his son, Moroka II.

The "Mantatee" attacked Thabeng and Tshabadira, Sefunela's brother, fled and was "annexed" by the Rev. Samuel Broadbent and T. L. Hodgson near Wolmaranstad. In February, 1823, Broadbent and Hodgson met Sefunelo, "annexed" his triblet and led it to Maquassi, where they were joined in December, 1823, by part of the Bakwena who were defeated by the Matabele. When the Bataung drove the "Wesleyan-tribe" from Maquassi they pitched camp at Platberg where Moroka was made chief in January, 1830. He was then "*much under the influence of the missionaries*" (says Molema, Wesleyan apologist).

The Platberg mission was reinforced by the influx of 4,000 refugees who had fled from Kunwana in August, 1832, after Langa, Matabele Crown Prince, had sacked the town in reprisal for the murder of Bhoja and Bangela, two of Mazilikazi's tax-collectors.⁵⁶⁰ In April, 1833, Archbell and Edwards led their augmented flock to Thaba Nchu. The Wesleyans met the Catholics, Caselis and Arbousset, on the banks of the Caledon River in May, 1833.^{561 562} There Moshoeshoe gave Thaba Nchu as usufruct and sanctuary to Moroka. Moroka paid a "citizenship-fee" in livestock to become part of Moshoeshoe's tribe. In their written forgery of this verbal agreement Archbell, Edwards, Caselis and Arbousset made the livestock out to be a *purchase price*. Thus was usufruct illegally converted to ownership on 7th December, 1833: "*The said Moshesh and Mosemi hath granted, bargained and sold, and by these presents doth grant bargain and sell unto the said James Archbell, his heirs and assigns, all that spacious country designated 'Thaba Nchu.'*"⁵⁶³ Moroka paid a tribal-membership fee of 7 oxen, 1 heifer, 2 sheep and 1 goat. On July 17th he paid a further tribute of 8 cattle, 34 sheep and 5 goats when Moshoeshoe granted usufruct of extra land. By law the land belonged to the Sotho, and by the forged statement to the Wesleyans ("James Archbell, his heirs, etc."). Even Theal (p. 406 of Volume on this period) doubted that this was a *sale*.

Fifteen thousand Baralong then trekked to Thaba Nchu. By such means did the Wesleyans build this all-important "buffer". Moroka's complicity in the land-fraud was rewarded in November, 1834, when Dr. Andrew Smith gave him a medal and a cloak.

In 1836 Moshoeshoe and Moroka united to repel the Koranna (these and previous inter-tribal wars were forced by White expansion behind the tribes). But already in 1835 Tawana's sons, from Thaba Nchu, began cattle-raids on Moshoeshoe's herds.

When the Boer trekkers entered Basutoland they killed Khoi-Khoi herdsboys. The irate parents retaliated. Carel Cilje and Potgieter asked Moroka for help. He helped them. Likewise he helped A. H. Potgieter against Mzilikazi. For the next 44 years he helped Boer and Britain against his benefactor, Moshoeshoe.

560. S. Plaatie: "Mhudi" (1930); see critique in "Torch", 24th July, 1951.

561. S. M. Molema: "Moroka"; Broadbent: "The Baralong of S.A."; Moffat: "Missionary Labours".

562. "Torch", 21st, 28th August, 1951.

563. Treaty, 7th December, 1833; also Rev. W. Illsley to Basil Fuller, who saw the original document; also "Cape Argus", 7th July, 1951.

GRIQUA BUFFER.

Another missionary buffer, built as part of the "iron ring" around Moshoeshoe was the West Griqua tribe under the L.M.S. They came from Khoi-Khoisan stock. In 1761 Adam Kok was forced by Boer expansion from Piketherg to the Khamiesberg. In 1772 Wildschut had to retreat beyond the Khamiesberg. In 1803 Anderson (L.M.S.) persuaded Adam Kok, Cornelius Kok and Barend Barends to settle in Griqualand West.⁵⁶⁴ In 1813 J. Campbell (L.M.S.) made Kok and Barends captains of the mission with "their own" law-courts, coinage, etc.⁵⁶⁵ In 1818 Andries Waterboer was made head-captain of this "Hottentot Republic".⁵⁶⁶ Governor Somerset built a fair-village near Beaufort West, under Dutch Reformed control, for trade with the Griquas.⁵⁶⁷ In February, 1819, Philip came out⁵⁶⁸ and in 1822 persuaded Somerset to set up Melville as Resident in Waterboer's "court" in Griquatown. In 1830 a Treaty recognised Waterboer as Griqua "king" (two years later Philip suggested British annexation). Inspired by Philip, D'Urban made Waterboer an ally, paid him a salary, armed him with guns and placed him under a Resident Commissioner. Not accidentally, the first such magistrate was the missionary Rev. Wright,⁵⁶⁹ installed in 1835. By 1833 the missionaries were helping the Griquas to lease much land to incoming Boers, then some 700 strong in that area.⁵⁷⁰ Dissatisfied Griquas, rallying around Abraham Kok at Philopolis and Cornelius Kok at Campbell, were silenced in 1838 when the missionaries supported Waterboer of Griquatown and young Adam Kok against the dissentients. With internal opposition crushed, the missionaries now had a well-controlled western Griqua buffer.

North-west of Moshoeshoe the L.M.S. controlled Kuruman, the Koranna and Matsheu. The Germans controlled Montsioa, and the Paris Missions controlled Lepui. The missionary influence from Kuruman especially paralysed potential Tswana support for the Sotho resistance and had the effect of a neutral "buffer".

UNDERMINING TRIBALISM.

While the missionaries built buffers around Moshoeshoe, in his midst they undermined tribalism. The traveller Blockhouse said: "*Moshesh entertains a great value for missionary labours*",⁵⁷¹ but the same missionaries were undermining his society. This was mirrored in the fact that polygamy and other customs were, by 1839, "fast giving way".⁵⁷² Private property was introduced: Moshoeshoe saw this: "*My people are not entirely a pastoral people, they depend a great measure on the cultivation of the soil . . . the selling or renting of lands has been hitherto a practice wholly unknown to us.*"⁵⁷³

THE QUEEN.

Apart from undermining his economy and society, the missionaries also undermined his independence. They placed him under the "Kaross of

564/5/6/7. Records of Cape Colony, XI and XII.

568. *Ibid.* p. 55.

569. D'Urban to Spring Rice, 26th December, 1835.

570. Chase: "Natal Papers II"; Cole to Hay, 15th November, 1833.

571/2. J. Blockhouse: "A Narrative of a Visit to Mauritius and S. Africa" (1839); Basutoland Records, Vol. 1, p. 23.

573. Moshoeshoe to Sec. of Government, 15th May, 1845.

the Queen", where he stayed till his death. In 1842 Philip boasted: "*Moshesh . . . is well affected to the English*",⁵⁷⁴ and Moshoeshoe himself told Sir Harry Smith: "*Tell Her Gracious Majesty in my name that I love her Government*".⁵⁷⁵ This made the Xhosa chiefs (before 1851) see him as "*altogether a Government man*",⁵⁷⁶ while J. J. Freeman (L.M.S.) discussed "*the use the Government may make of him for the future security of the colony*".⁵⁷⁷ While at war with England Moshoeshoe could say: "*I am no enemy of the Queen*".⁵⁷⁸ Ten years after his death his son Tsekolo exclaimed: "*The trust that Moshesh had in the Queen! He died trusting her*".⁵⁷⁹

The missionaries were responsible for this "ring of iron" around his brain, just as they were for the "ring of iron" around his lands.

PHILIP'S TREATIES.

The final "missionary labour" on the eve of conquest was the application of Philip's Treaty System.

In 1837 Boers were stealing Batwa children.⁵⁸⁰ In 1839 Stockenström was told that Boers "*go journey after journey to shoot Bushmen and kidnap the children*".⁵⁸¹ Moshoeshoe, seeing the Boers near him, "*acting as Judges and Executioners*",⁵⁸² and, taught by missionaries to look for help to England, complained to Napier in 1839 that Boers were entering his lands. Philip, exploiting Boer-Sotho feuds in order to extend British control, advised Hare in 1842 to take Moshoeshoe's side; using British aid as a bribe he advised Moshoeshoe to enter into a treaty.⁵⁸³ In August, 1842, he told Napier "*that treaties should be entered into with Moshoeshoe and Adam Kok*".⁵⁸⁴ Napier took his advice.⁵⁸⁵ Montagu sent up a draft treaty to Philip in September, 1843, for Philip "*To fill up the blanks therein and add any suggestion which may occur to you for improving it*".⁵⁸⁶ A month later told Hare that "*Dr. Philip . . . has suggested*", etc.⁵⁸⁷ This correspondence illustrates the fact that Philip was the acknowledged master-brain behind the scenes. In October, 1843, the treaty was signed, binding Moshoeshoe (1) "*to be the faithful friend and ally of the colony*", (2) "*to preserve order in his territory*", (3) "*to receive a Government agent for his tribe*".⁵⁸⁸ The treaty was signed by Napier, Montagu and Philip; and by Moshoeshoe and the French Catholics. There was death in each clause. Thus did Philip "aid" Moshoeshoe against the Boers. Simultaneously he bribed Adam Kok with a subsidy⁵⁸⁹ and tried (in vain) to get Moshoeshoe to agree to give up Thaba Nchu to Moroka. The treaty fanned tribal

574. J. Philip to Col. Hare, 12th July, 1842.

575. Moshoeshoe to Smith, 11th September, 1848.

576. Resident Warden to High Commissioner, 10th November, 1850.

577. J. J. Freeman: "Tour in S. Africa" (1851).

578. Moshoeshoe to Government, 13th October, 1851.

579. Official Report of Maseru Pitso held on 16th, 17th October 1879.

580. Rev. S. Rolland to Colesberg Commissioner, 26th June, 1837.

581. Arend Jacobs to Stockenström, 28th November, 1839; also Kok to Montagu, 25th June 1844.

582. Moshoeshoe to Napier, 26th November, 1839.

583. Philip to Col. Hare, 12th July, 1842.

584. Philip to Napier, 25th August, 1842.

585. Napier to Lord Stanley, 15th September, 1842.

586. Montagu to Philip, 2 September, 1843.

587. Napier to Hare, 6th October, 1843.

588. Treaty signed by British on 5th October, 1843. Signed by French missionaries on 13th December, 1843.

589. Napier to Sec. of State, 15th September, 1842.

feuds. Pushed by the Wesleyans, Sikonyela and Moroka scrambled for British "recognition".⁵⁹⁰ This in turn, as was intended, made Moshoeshoe lean on the British for support against the petty chiefs.⁵⁹¹

ANOTHER PHILIP TREATY.

In 1845 Maitland imposed another treaty on Moshoeshoe, who said of the Boers: "*I could never allow them any right of property.*"⁵⁹² But the treaty was an apartheid *pro-Boer* document. Moshoeshoe had to: (1) *Allow in missionaries and traders.* (2) *Allow a British Resident in (the "agent" of the 1843 treaty).* (3) *Provide 300 men to police Basutoland (until then never in need of police).* (4) *Agree to the fixing of his boundary.* (5) *Allow part of Basutoland to be set aside for "PERSONS OF EUROPEAN DESCENT AND EXTRACTION".*⁵⁹³

Two months later Maitland told Lord Stanley that this *apartheid* treaty was the work of "*Two intelligent missionaries among the Griquas.*"⁵⁹⁴ This treaty was part of the anti-Xhosa war of 1846—it aimed at neutralising Moshoeshoe, whom Maitland did not trust enough to make him an active ally.⁵⁹⁵ The same treaty bribed Griqua chiefs by giving them half of the quit-rent from Boer farms. When Kok had tried to act on his own, by arresting a European for murder in January, 1844, the British released the prisoner to placate the Boer Mocke's followers.⁵⁹⁶ When he tried to arrest a Boer Krynauw for flogging a Griqua, the British themselves taught the Boers a lesson in May, 1845, at Swartkopjes. Maitland installed the Resident Warden at Bloemfontein, an ex-Griqua farm.⁵⁹⁷ But, though treated with such contempt, Kok remained a British hireling. In June, 1846, Moroka helped him against Jan Kok and Winburg Boers. Soon, however, all these hirelings were to help the Boers against Moshoeshoe.

590. Rev. Shaw to Governor, 18th April, 1844.

591. Minutes Executive Council, 6th May, 1844.

592. Moshoeshoe to Sec. of Government, 15th May, 1845.

593. Maitland-Moshoeshoe Treaty, 30th June, 1845.

594. Sir P. Maitland. Letter, 1st August, 1845.

595. Sir P. Maitland to Earl Grey, 14th October, 1846.

596. Despatches, June, July, 1844.

597. Maitland to Sec. of State, 1st August, 1845.

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE FIRST (1847), SECOND (1848) AND THIRD (1852) ANTI-SOTHO WARS.

To enforce the apartheid clause of the Maitland Treaty the Boers, in 1847, used Sikonyela as an ally against Moshoeshoe. Sikonyela admitted later that he "*was induced to make the attack in consequence of the frequent representations made to him by a Boer named Botha*".⁵⁹⁸

In 1848 Harry Smith exploited this war to extend the "*Sovereignty of the Queen of England throughout all the territories over which her Majesty's subjects (the Boers) have spread themselves.*"⁵⁹⁹ This meant, as events proved, that the Sotho, not the Boers, were dispossessed. Smith placed "*all the missionaries . . . under the special protection of Her Majesty the Queen of England*".⁶⁰⁰ Moshoeshoe spurned Pretorius' offer of an anti-British alliance,⁶⁰¹ saying that he regarded the British Governor as "*Chief of all the Whites in South Africa*".⁶⁰² Instead he turned to the British and, with Kok, helped them defeat the Boers at Boomplaats in August, 1848.⁶⁰³ But he soon found the British a greater danger than the Boers.

SECOND ANTI-SOTHO WAR.

By November, 1847, Moshoeshoe knew that Warden was hostile to him.⁶⁰⁴ Harry Smith, too, attacked Moshoeshoe who "*has not . . . adopted the Christian faith*".⁶⁰⁵ He made a boundary award which gave the Boers land at the Sotho's expense.⁶⁰⁶ Typically, England robbed her Bantu ally and rewarded her Boer enemy. This award gave Kok a pension and Moroka land at Moshoeshoe's expense.⁶⁰⁷ Smith spoke of the "*peaceable and exemplary Chief Moroka*", and Warden organised Moroka, Sikonyela, Adam Kok, Taai Bosch and Baatje for war on Moshoeshoe, after Rev. Shaw had assured the British that "*In case of any real difficulties, this people (Moroka's tribe) will be found our true and fast allies.*"⁶⁰⁸

Sikonyela attacked in 1848⁶⁰⁹ using a cattle dispute as excuse. Moshoeshoe, brushing minor issues aside, declared: "*The cause of this war is the disputed territory, and not cattle and horses; cattle and horses are nothing, land is everything.*"⁶¹⁰ Later Warden told Smith that the missionaries were behind the war: "*The boundary question would appear a matter having more relation to the Wesleyan and Paris Societies than to the Chiefs themselves.*"⁶¹¹ Caselis backed Moshoeshoe, fearing that any further loss of

598. Warden to Government Sec., 14th July, 1847.

599. H. Smith to Moshoeshoe, 27th January, 1848.

600. H. Smith's Proclamation on Tugela, 3rd February, 1848.

601. Warden to Sec. of High Commissioner, 24th February, 1848.

602. Moshoeshoe to Pretorius, 28th April, 1848.

603. Smith to Moshoeshoe, 2nd September, 1848.

604. Moshoeshoe to Warden, 29th November, 1847.

605. Smith to Earl Grey, 3rd February, 1848.

606. Warden to Sec. of H.C., 24th June, 1849.

607. Rev. Cameron to Warden, 21st April, 1849.

608. Rev. Shaw to Govt. Sec., 4th May, 1849.

609. Warden to Sec. of H.C., 13th April, 1849.

610. Moshoeshoe to Commission of Enquiry, 8th November, 1848.

611. Warden to Smith, 26th November, 1848.

land would alienate him from England.⁶¹² Fearing that Sikonyela would fail, Southey played on Moshoeshoe's faith in the Queen,⁶¹³ and Warden arranged a truce in November, 1848.⁶¹⁴ Warden suggested recognition of minor chiefs to help defeat Moshoeshoe.⁶¹⁵ In particular he used Moroka as a spy, who wrote "to inform you" (Warden) "of anything I might hear with regard to the dispositions and proceedings of Moshesh".⁶¹⁶

Moshoeshoe, the scales dropping from his eyes, now accused Warden of fanning anti-Sotho wars: "While my tribe was sleeping in the sleep your words have made to come over them."⁶¹⁷ The Governor now saw in Moshoeshoe a great enemy: "Unless Moshoeshoe humble himself," he said, "he must be humbled."⁶¹⁸ He told Warden to make war on Moshoeshoe.

THIRD ANTI-SOTHO WAR.

In January, 1851, the sale of arms and powder to the Sotho was restricted.⁶¹⁹ The British tried to win the Tembus as anti-Sotho allies by a trick: in February, 1851, a British-Boer-Fingo-Griqua force defeated the Tembus (in the anti-Xhosa war), gave the cattle taken to Poshuli, Moshoeshoe's brother, in order to make the Tembus look on the Sotho as their enemies. But Moshoeshoe saw the snare and declined the cattle.⁶²⁰ Cunning having failed, the British turned again to force.

In March, 1851, they annexed the Orange River Sovereignty.⁶²¹ Moshoeshoe's beloved Queen Victoria announced special "Native law" for "Natives . . . whose ignorance and habits unfit them for the duties of civilized life."⁶²²

The Boers complained of the "raids" of a minor chief, Witzi,⁶²³ and England ordered his removal from the Vaal River District. Moshoeshoe wanted to avoid open responsibility for Witzi, but the Queen was bent on war. In May, 1851, missionary Cameron told Warden to use Moroka in battle against Moshoeshoe.⁶²⁴ The Wesleyans stirred up Baatjes against Moshoeshoe.⁶²⁵ Moshoeshoe vainly asked Moroka "to throw off all Government interference".⁶²⁶ By June, 1851, Warden reported that his missionary-won forces were ready for the war.⁶²⁷

In July, 1851, Moshoeshoe met this formidable British-Bantu alliance and thrashed it at Viervoet.⁶²⁸ He was now wide awake and, according to Caselis, acting then as a British spy, suspected "the Government of a disposition to divide in order to reign"⁶²⁹ On the other side, Warden declared: "The year 1851 must decide the mastery between the White and Coloured races".⁶³⁰ for at that time England was also attacking the Xhosa.

612. Rev. Caselis to H.C., 28th December, 1848.

613. Southey to Moshoeshoe, 5th October, 1848.

614. Warden Peace, 8th November, 1848.

615. Warden to H.C., 23rd June, 1849.

616. Moroka to Warden, 4th July, 1849.

617. Moshoeshoe to Warden, 30th July, 1849.

618. Instructions, H.C. to Warden, 16th August, 1849.

619. Bloemfontein Proclamation, 20th January, 1851.

620. Moshoeshoe Letter, 21st February, 1851.

621. Letters Patent (Bas. Rec.), 22nd March, 1851.

622. Instructions from Queen Victoria to Governor, 22nd March, 1851.

623. Basutoland Records, Vol. 1, 18th May, 1851.

624. Rev. J. Cameron to Warden, 26th May, 1851; also Rev. J. Cameron's Letters, 16th August, 1851; 25th November, 1851.

625. Basutoland Records, 29th May, 1851; also Rev. W. Shaw to Major Hogge, 20th October, 1851.

626. Warden to H.C., Bloemfontein, 1st June, 1851.

627. Warden to H.C., 16th June, 1851; also H.C. to Warden, 17th June, 1851.

628. Warden to Smith, 6th July, 1851.

629. Rev. Caselis letter, 8th July, 1851.

630. Warden to Smith, 6th July, 1851.

Moshoeshoe, meeting this challenge, tried (1) to destroy the traitors, (2) neutralise the Boers,⁶³¹ and (3) to build a grand alliance with Sareli and Sandile. Smith told him: "*weekly messengers pass between you and Kreli and Sandile- and . . . it is by your advice they continue enemies of the Queen*".⁶³²

Before Moshoeshoe could co-ordinate this threefold policy, the British invasion began. They defeated a lesser chief in September, 1851. The next June Moshoeshoe thrashed Sikonyela and offered him generous peace terms.⁶³³ The fearful Boers called for British protection,⁶³⁴ and in December Cathcart delivered an ultimatum to Moshoeshoe to return "Boer" cattle.⁶³⁵ While negotiating this matter with Moshoeshoe, Cathcart plotted with Sikonyela and Moroka⁶³⁶ and then attacked in strength.

Col. Eyre rode on Thaba Bosigu and a single division of Moshoeshoe's trounced Col. Napier's army at Berea on December 20th, 1852.⁶³⁷ Knowing that a battle was not a war, Moshoeshoe made peace. In the war the British took 9,000 cattle for the "injured" Boers.⁶³⁸ Cathcart, only too glad to get by peace what he could not get by war, boasted prematurely: "*Moshesh has made full and humble submission*".⁶³⁹

ENGLAND CREATES A BOER REPUBLIC.

In 1853 England decided to give up the Sovereignty,⁶⁴⁰ which was formally renounced in the Bloemfontein Convention of February, 1854.⁶⁴¹ Thus the British handed the Sotho over to the Boers, and in April, 1854, the Free State Boer Republic was formed on Kok's land given to the Boers by the British agents, Green and Clark,⁶⁴² in terms of the Bloemfontein Convention; on Moshoeshoe's lands given by the British to the Boers in terms of the Maitland Treaty,⁶⁴³ and, in 1855, in terms of the British-made Smithfield Treaty, drawn up by Sir George Grey in favour of the Boers: (1) *Sothos had to have a pass to enter and hunt in the Orange Free State (formerly their own land)*. (2) *They could not "squat" on "Boer lands"*. (3) *Boers could spoor cattle into Basutoland*. (4) *Boers could settle on Moshoeshoe's lands with his consent*.⁶⁴⁴

After this treaty, Boshoff, O.F.S. President, thanked Grey "*for the interest you have shown in our welfare*".⁶⁴⁵ while Moshoeshoe later said he had lost his lands "*through Grey's mediation*".⁶⁴⁶ This treaty cost Kok more of his land, for the loss of which Grey promised him an annual grant.⁶⁴⁷

Thus, through the Philip treaty system, the Free State Boers were given land on which they built a serf-employing,⁶⁴⁸ apartheid⁶⁴⁹ Republic, whose midwife was Queen Victoria.

631. Treaty, 3rd September, 1851 (with Vermaak and Linde).

632. Smith to Moshoeshoe, 3rd November, 1851.

633. Moshoeshoe-Sikonyela Treaty, 23rd June, 1852.

634. Erasmus, 13th February, 1852; G. Meyer, 5th November, 1852.

635. Cathcart Ultimatum, 15th December, 1852.

636. Basutoland Records, Vol. 1, 17th December, 1852.

637. Military Reports by Cloete, Napier, Eyre, 21st December, 1852.

638. Cathcart to Legislative Council, 20th May, 1852.

639. Cathcart, 23rd December, 1852.

640. Owen to Moshoeshoe, 23rd August, 1853.

641. Bloemfontein Convention, 23rd February, 1854.

642. Basutoland Records, Vol. 2, p. 159.

643. Volksraad-Moshoeshoe Meeting, 10th March, 1854; again, at Tribal Council on 16th Sept., 1854.

644. Smithfield Treaty, 6th October, 1855.

645. Boshoff to Grey, 11th October, 1855.

646. Moshoeshoe to H.C., 6th December, 1861.

647. Basutoland Records, Vol. 2, p. 165.

648. O.F.S. Ordinance 3 of 1866: Treaties with Molappo, Paulus Mopeli.

649. O.F.S. Constitution, 10th April, 1854 (as adopted in 1864).

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE FOURTH (1856) AND FIFTH (1858) ANTI-SOTHO WARS.

The guerilla leader Witzi, trying to regain his lost land, harassed the Boers in September, 1854, and again in January, 1855.⁶⁵⁰ In April, 1856, Moshoeshoe, though not openly with Witzi, asked the Boers not to use force against this rebel,⁶⁵¹ but in May the Boers decided on war,⁶⁵² attacked and robbed Witzi of 1,900 cattle, 100 horses and 400 sheep.⁶⁵³ Sir George Grey congratulated the Boers on this victory.⁶⁵⁴ In August the Boers announced that "*Witzi and his whole tribe have been dispersed*",⁶⁵⁵ and this time Moshoeshoe said: "*I feel very much for Witzi*".⁶⁵⁶ He accused the Boers of shooting down three peace envoys, of robbing three successive peace delegations of cattle which they had brought from Witzi as peace tokens,⁶⁵⁷ and of turning away Witzi's peace envoys and then attacking.⁶⁵⁸ By such atrocities was Witzi defeated.

The Boers now turned on Moshoeshoe, saying that he was not "returning cattle",⁶⁵⁹ began to survey the Smithfield Boundary as a spying and scouting ruse. Moshoeshoe told Boshoff that "*Major Warden . . . robbed me of my land*" . . . and warned the Boers to stay off his "*mere skirt of land*".⁶⁶⁰

Privately the British said the main issue "*is at bottom the new line. This cattle matter seems to introduce the subject to talk about as a great grievance, but the grand point to be gained is the land*".⁶⁶¹ Moshoeshoe, realising this, prepared a defence strategy: (1) He tried to isolate the traitors. Sikonyela, whom Moshoeshoe pardoned in 1853,⁶⁶² was no longer an obstacle; he died in July, 1856, in a reserve policed by the masters he had served so well.⁶⁶³ Moshoeshoe made peace treaties with Baaitjies and Moroka in June, 1855,⁶⁶⁴ but Moroka rejoined the Boers, his new "protectors".⁶⁶⁵ (2) Moshoeshoe tried in vain to neutralise Grey, who was actually arming Boshoff.⁶⁶⁶ Though England was nominally neutral,⁶⁶⁷ Grey admitted: "*We are not in point of fact preserving a strict neutrality. We permit one party, in procuring arms and ammunition, to obtain the*

650. Basutoland Records, Vol. 2, January, 1855.

651. Moshoeshoe to Winburg Landdrost, 26th April, 1856.

652. Actg. Sec., O.F.S. Govt., to Sec., Native Affairs, Natal, 12th March, 1856.

653. Boshoff to Moshoeshoe, 17th May, 1856.

654. Grey to Volksraad, 7th June, 1856.

655. O.F.S. Government Notice, 2nd August, 1856.

656/7. Moshoeshoe to Boshoff, 16th June, 1856.

658. Moshoeshoe to H.C., 17th June, 1856.

659. Boshoff to Grey, 27th February, 1856.

660. Moshoeshoe to Boshoff, 12th March, 1856.

661. British Agent to H.C., Aliwal North, 15th September, 1856.

662. Sir G. Clerk to Duke of Newcastle, 3rd December, 1853.

663. S. Austin, Reserve Superintendent to Resident Magistrate of Aliwal North, 20th July, 1856.

664. Rev. Daumas to Grey, 16th June, 1855.

665. Memorandum to Government: J. M. Orpen, 26th June, 1861.

666. Boshoff to Grey, 11th October, 1855 (asking for arms); Boshoff to Col. Sec., 21st June, 1856 (thanking England for arms).

667. Proclamation by Sir G. Grey, 24th March, 1858.

means of destroying the other.”⁶⁶⁸ Thus Moshoeshoe could not “neutralise” England. (3) He tried to build an alliance with Sareli, which Grey tried to smear with the blood of the cattle-slaughter.⁶⁶⁹ Moshoeshoe, said an official, wanted a “combination of Kaffirs and Basuto against the White Government as he, Moshesh, was of the opinion that if such could be carried into effect, the White Government could with ease be conquered”,⁶⁷⁰ and Grey said that “encouraged by the result of the battle of Berea” (he) “is endeavouring to form with Krelli a combination of the Kaffir and Basuto tribes to act against the British Government”.⁶⁷¹ Thus Moshoeshoe’s “neutralisation” of Grey was a shrewd cover for a conscious anti-British and anti-Boer manoeuvre.⁶⁷² The cattle-slaughter broke up the alliance he tried to build. At the same time Boshoff, in August, 1856, told Grey he was going to attack,⁶⁷³ and a fortnight later delivered an ultimatum to Moshoeshoe.⁶⁷⁴ In December Moshoeshoe bought much-needed time with cattle.⁶⁷⁵

THE FIFTH WAR.

In July, 1857, Grey cut off all southward retreat of the Sotho by passing a law prohibiting the Sotho from the Cape Colony.⁶⁷⁶ In March, 1858, Boshoff told Grey that he was about to attack.⁶⁷⁷ A few days later he called his burghers to arms.⁶⁷⁸

In March and April the Boers gained episodic victories at Korannaberg,⁶⁷⁹ Vechtkop⁶⁸⁰ and Cathcart’s Drift,⁶⁸¹ but Moshoeshoe said quietly that the Sotho “have not fought any battle as yet”,⁶⁸² on hearing which Boshoff hurriedly asked Grey to arrange a peace.⁶⁸³

Grey at once told the Cape Parliament what was happening. Colonial mediation was moved by Fairbairn and seconded by Molteno,⁶⁸⁴ and the next day Grey wrote to Boshoff and Moshoeshoe offering to mediate.⁶⁸⁵ He arranged a peace in June,⁶⁸⁶ and drew up a pro-Boer Treaty at Aliwal North in October.⁶⁸⁷ After disagreements, in 1861, between Moshoeshoe and Pretorius over Grey’s boundary,⁶⁸⁸ Moshoeshoe naively agreed that Governor Wodehouse arbitrate in 1864.⁶⁸⁹ Wodehouse duly “arbitrated” in October⁶⁹⁰ and six months later boasted to the Cape House of Assembly: “The award which I ultimately gave was of necessity entirely favourable to the Free State”.⁶⁹¹

668. Grey to Sec. State, London, 25th March, 1858.

669. Rev. T. Jousse to H.C., 4th June, 1856.

670. Chief Commissioner G. M. Shepstone to Governor, 2nd June, 1855.

671. Grey to Col. Sec., 14th June, 1855.

672. Report T. Stingfellow, Fort Beaufort Commissioner, to Sec. of Governor, 7th April, 1856.

673. Boshoff to H.C., 4th August, 1856.

674. Ultimatum, Boshoff to Moshoeshoe, 25th August, 1856.

675. Basutoland Records, Vol. 2, 2nd December, 1856.

676. Grey to Moshoeshoe, 27th July, 1857.

677. Boshoff to Grey, 16th March, 1858.

678. O.F.S. Volksraad Proclamation, 19th March, 1858.

679. Report Pretorius to Winburg Landdrost, 26th March, 1858.

680. Report Jansen to Smithfield Landdrost, 28th March, 1858.

681. Report Pretorius to Winburg Landdrost, 14th April, 1858.

682. Moshoeshoe to Boshoff, 16th May, 1858.

683. Boshoff to Grey, 27th April, 1858.

684. Hansard, 5th May, 1858.

685. Grey to Boshoff and Moshoeshoe, 6th May, 1858 (separate letters).

686. Peace Agreement, 18th June, 1858.

687. Aliwal North Treaty, 15th October, 1858.

688. Pretorius Boundary Line, 18th April, 1861.

689. Basutoland Records, Vol. 3, 24th February, 1864.

690. Sir Philip Wodehouse Boundary Award, 28th October, 1864.

691. Sir Philip Wodehouse in House of Assembly, Cape Town, 27th April, 1865.

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE SIXTH (1865) AND SEVENTH (1867) ANTI-SOTHO WARS.

The Provisional O.F.S. President, Venter, said already in 1863 that there would be yet another war.⁶⁹² In February, 1865, President Brand sent an ultimatum demanding cattle from Moshoeshoe,⁶⁹³ in May declared war on Lesaoana in N.E. Basutoland, Witzi's old storm centre,⁶⁹⁴ forced Lesaoana into Basutoland proper, used this as an excuse to invade Basutoland,⁶⁹⁵ and in June declared war "*in the name of God*".⁶⁹⁶ Moshoeshoe replied that the Boers were using the raids of Lesaoana, Poshuli and Mopeli as an excuse for war,⁶⁹⁷ that they murdered his subjects whom he would now defend, and that the Boers wanted his land: "*My great sin is that I possess a good and fertile country.*"⁶⁹⁸ But his defence was severely hampered by the pro-Boer policy of the British.

ENGLAND'S PRO-BOER POLICY.

(1) Wodehouse admitted that only the Boer side could get arms from the British.⁶⁹⁹ He said: "*We profess neutrality, but nearly all our newspapers advocate the cause of the Free State.*"⁷⁰⁰

(2) In June, Brand asked Wodehouse to pass a law preventing Cape (e.g. Mopele) or Natal Sotho from helping Moshoeshoe,⁷⁰¹ and two days later Wodehouse passed this law.⁷⁰²

(3) Shepstone held Molappo responsible for Lesaoana's raids into Natal⁷⁰³ and forced him to be neutral.

(4) Shepstone armed the Natal border,⁷⁰⁴ was ready to attack Basutoland,⁷⁰⁵ but London replied: "*We have not YET a just cause of quarrel with the whole tribe and their chief*"⁷⁰⁶ (my emphasis).

(5) On Grey's advice Kok had been forced to sell his land to Boers in December, 1861, and to move to E. Griqualand in January, 1863, to prevent Sotho-Xhosa unity. (Poshuli and Nehemiah Moshoeshoe had vainly resisted this creation of a new "buffer".⁷⁰⁷)

(6) The British sent J. Burnet in the middle of the war to obtain 10,000 beasts, worth £17,000, from Moshoeshoe as "reparations" for Lesaoana's

692. Venter to H.C., 2nd August, 1863.

693. Brand to Moshoeshoe, 23rd February, 1865.

694. Rev. Rolland to Civil Commissioner, Aliwal North, 25th May, 1865.

695. Brand to Moshoeshoe, 6th (or 2nd) June, 1865 (date blurred).

696. O.F.S. Proclamation, 9th June, 1865.

697/8. Basutoland Records, Vol. 3, p. 360.

699. Wodehouse to Col. Sec., 12th July, 1865.

700. Wodehouse to Col. Sec., 28th July, 1865.

701. Brand to Wodehouse, 25th June, 1865.

702. Proclamation by Governor, C.C., 27th June, 1865.

703. T. Shepstone to Res. Mag., Weenen, 29th June, 1865.

704. T. Shepstone to Molapo, 11th July, 1865.

705. T. Shepstone to Wodehouse, 4th August, 1865.

706. Wodehouse to Officer Administering Natal Govt., 26th August, 1865.

707. Basutoland Records, Vol. 3, p. 178.

raids.⁷⁰⁸ Burnet asked Moshoeshoe if he would not give land instead of cattle. Moshoeshoe replied: "*I would rather part with all the cattle in my country.*"⁷⁰⁹ Seeing the war and the reparation weakening the besieged Sotho, he proposed annexation, saying: "*I think we might take up the matter cheap.*"⁷¹⁰ He worked out that the 30,000 huts would yield £15,000 a year. He proposed three magisterial districts and Basutoland's "*establishment as a Native Reserve*".⁷¹¹ Thus did England sabotage and plan to exploit the Sotho in 1865.

Despite these six methods of British aid for the Boers, Mopele held the invaders,⁷¹² Sotho troops crossed the Caledon⁷¹³ and Poshuli harassed Smithfield⁷¹⁴ in June and July, 1865. But in June the Transvaal Republic joined the Free State Republic.⁷¹⁵ Two Boer States, backed by England, now fought one Bantu tribe. They won a battle at Thothlowane,⁷¹⁶ stormed Vechtkop,⁷¹⁷ burnt Poshuli's village,⁷¹⁸ annexed the conquered territory of Poshuli, Mopele and Letsie⁷¹⁹ and took 3,500 cattle, 1,000 horses and 11,500 sheep from Letsie alone.⁷²⁰ Twice they stormed Thaba Bosigu, the second time with 2,100 Whites, 500 Baralongs (led by Tshipinare) and 400 Fingos. Here the Boer leader, Wepener, was shot while scaling the fortress.⁷²¹ In August Moshoeshoe sued for peace,⁷²² but Brand imposed impossible terms: *Moshoeshoe to evacuate Thaba Bosigu; allow an O.F.S. Magistrate there; pay 40,000 cattle, 5,000 horses and 60,000 sheep within four days; and recognise land taken by Wepener and Fick as Boer property.*⁷²³ Moshoeshoe, surrounded by 30,000 half-dead cattle and 1,800 besieged troops, rejected the terms⁷²⁴ and in September Brand viciously broke the armistice.⁷²⁵

But the Sotho withstood the siege and in October the British reported that "*The Boers, after much mutiny and desertion, have abandoned the siege.*"⁷²⁶ Helped by Baralong, Batlokwa and Fingo allies (all obtained from missionaries) the Boers regrouped their demoralised troops.⁷²⁷ They defeated Morosi on the Orange River (he was paralysed by the Cape law which forbade him from helping the Sotho⁷²⁸); won a battle at Platberg in December,⁷²⁹ repelled Sotho attacks on Winburg in January and March, 1866;⁷³⁰ forced Molappo, whom Shepstone had trussed up, to make a separate peace, accept a Magistrate and become an O.F.S. subject,⁷³¹ after they had taken 6,000 cattle from him,⁷³² and threatened to burn his crops; and in April, 1866, drew up a Thaba Bosigu Peace Treaty with Moshoeshoe which robbed

708. Basutoland Records, Vol. 3.

709. J. Burnet Report, 1st November to 11th December, 1865.

710. Burnet to Wodehouse, 9th December, 1865.

711. Burnet to Civil Commissioner, Aliwal North, 17th December, 1865.

712. Commandant-General Fick to O.F.S. President, 19th July, 1865 (on battle against Mopele on 14th July).

713. Caledon River Landdrost to O.F.S. Govt. Sec., June, 1865.

714. O.F.S. President to Wodehouse, 25th June, 1865.

715. S.A.R. President Statement, 26th June, 1865.

716. Austin to Civil Commissioner, Aliwal North, 1st July, 1865.

717. J. Burnet to H.C., 17th July, 1865.

718. J. Burnet to H.C., 24th July, 1865.

719. Wepener Proclamation, 31st July, 1865.

720. Wepener to Caledon R. Landdrost, 2nd August, 1865.

721. J. Burnet to H.C., 21st August, 1865.

722. Moshoeshoe Peace Request, 23rd August, 1865.

723. Brand's Peace Terms, 23rd August, 1865.

724. Moshoeshoe to Brand, 17th September, 1865.

725. Brand to Moshoeshoe, 18th September, 1865.

726. H.C. to Col. Sec. of State, 13th October, 1865.

727. Austin to Civ. Comm., Aliwal North, 3rd November, 1865.

728. *Ibid.* 1st November, 1865.

729. Report Van den Bosch to Brand, 9th December, 1865.

730. Basutoland Records, Vol. 3, p. 634.

731. Brand-Molapo Treaty, 26th March, 1866.

732. *Supra.* 730.

him of two-thirds of his land; made him pay a cattle-indemnity, while his sons were held as hostages; he was to recognise Molappo as an O.F.S. subject; he was not to "molest" Moroka, "*who has been an ally of the O.F.S. in the war against the Basutos*".⁷³³

SEVENTH ANTI-SOTHO WAR.

The Boers now owned 15/16ths of Moshoeshoe's former lands. A few thousand Boers now tried to enserf 200,000 Sothos. In May, 1866, Brand told the Cape Governor: "*A plan is now being devised by which Basutos as are unable to find a livelihood in Basutoland will be permitted to enter the Free State to seek service under our burghers.*"⁷³⁴ In June, 1866, the O.F.S. introduced a Pass Law for Moshoeshoe's subjects.⁷³⁵ The Free State wheat farmers tried to forcibly "smoke" the Sotho off the land to work for them.⁷³⁶ In March, 1867, "*Boers talked of turning out to destroy the crops on the so-called conquered land*".⁷³⁷

That month they invaded when the Sotho were about to harvest. Fick,⁷³⁸ Deventer⁷³⁹ and a commando against Makoae in May,⁷⁴⁰ burnt, murdered and kidnapped, forcing Letsie⁷⁴¹ in May and Paulus Mopeli in June⁷⁴² to become "O.F.S. subjects" or else lose their crops. In August the Volksraad gave Mopeli 24 hours' notice to leave Basutoland and go to the Witzieshoek location.⁷⁴³ In August 3,000 troops invaded "Basutoland";⁷⁴⁴ from September to December, Fick,⁷⁴⁵ Botha,⁷⁴⁶ Kolbe⁷⁴⁷ and Pansegrau⁷⁴⁸ ravaged the "conquered lands". They raided Berea. They killed more women and children than men.⁷⁴⁹

But, on the other side, "*The Basuto chiefs have all agreed not to give up the country to the Free State without a life and death struggle.*"⁷⁵⁰ Moshoeshoe called for help from Sechele, Mahura, Sekwati (who harassed the Transvaal Boers), and from Sareli and Faku whose allies harassed Kok's E. Griqualand "buffer".⁷⁵¹ Moshoeshoe declared he could not "*leave my people to be hunted down or driven away*".⁷⁵² His troops held Thaba Bosigu, where in December, 1867, "*The Boers were shamefully overcome*",⁷⁵³ despite being helped again by Moroka.⁷⁵⁴ Some of the very "O.F.S. subjects" grew corn and helped the Sotho with food, "*lead, caps and powder*".⁷⁵⁵ The Boers stood helpless and afraid before the "Mountain of Night". England again saved them.

733. O.F.S.-Sotho Treaty, 3rd April, 1866.

734. Brand to H.C., 16th May, 1866.

735. O.F.S. Law, 15th June, 1866.

736. Civil Comm., Aliwal North, to H.C., 18th February, 1867.

737. H.C. to Acting Natal Gov., 17th March, 1867.

738. Journal of Fick's Expedition, 28th March, 1867.

739. R. Van Deventer to Fick, 17th April, 1867.

740. Basutoland Records, Vol. 3, p. 769, 3rd May, 1867.

741. O.F.S. Proclamation, 22nd May, 1867.

742. Basutoland Records, Vol. 3, 1st June, 1867.

743. *Ibid.* 9th August, 1867.

744. Allison to Col. Sec., Natal, 29th August, 1867.

745. Report, Fick to Brand, 27th September, 1867.

746. Reports, T. L. Botha to Brand, 31st October, 7th November, 1867.

747. Report, J. G. E. Kolbe to Botha, 2nd November, 1867.

748. Report, Pansegrau to Brand, 8th December, 1867.

749. Rev. Jousse to Civ. Comm., Aliwal North, 31st October, 1867.

750/751. Superintendent, Wittenberg Reserve, to Civil Commissioner, Aliwal North, 23rd Feb., 1867.

752. Moshoeshoe to H.C., 18th March, 1867.

753. Tsekelo Moshoeshoe to A. Mopeli, 1st December, 1867.

754. Moroka to Brand, 20th December, 1867 (Moroka as spy).

755. Tsekelo Moshoeshoe to A. Mopeli, 1st December, 1867.

BRITISH ANNEXATION.

Seeing the plight of the Boers, and believing that "*The control of Basutoland would . . . place in the hands of the Government the key of all South African politics so far as natives are concerned*",⁷⁵⁶ Shepstone proposed annexation in August, 1867⁷⁵⁷ In January, 1868, Wodehouse told Brand England was about to annex Basutoland⁷⁵⁸ and Moshoeshoe that the Sotho were about to become "*Subjects of the British Throne*"⁷⁵⁹ for which Moshoeshoe, blinded by the Queen, thanked him.⁷⁶⁰ Moshoeshoe asked Brand for peace,⁷⁶¹ but Brand renewed "*hostilities with vigour*",⁷⁶² again burnt Sotho crops⁷⁶³ and Fick seized another 7,600 cattle, 720 horses and 14,400 sheep.⁷⁶⁴ But England had already decided that the Boers could not "handle" the Sotho and in March, 1868, after debate between the Cape, Natal and London,⁷⁶⁵ Basutoland was annexed to England through the Cape Colony.⁷⁶⁶

In May, 1870, Wodehouse defined the new boundary, taking part of the "conquered lands" for England, leaving the rest to the Boers.⁷⁶⁷ Letsie and Molappo returned as British subjects, but Witziesshoek and Thaba Nchu remained Free State property. Thus, when the grand general and diplomat Moshoeshoe died in 1870 his lands and nation were divided up amongst his Boer and British enemies.

756. Shepstone to Col. Sec., Natal, 5th September, 1867.

757. Shepstone Memorandum, 26th August, 1867.

758. Wodehouse to Brand, 13th January, 1868.

759. Wodehouse to Moshoeshoe, 13th January, 1868.

760. Moshoeshoe to Wodehouse, 26th January, 1868.

761. Moshoeshoe to Brand, 29th January, 1868.

762. J. Howell to H.C., 31st January, 1868.

763. H.C. to Brand, 18th February, 1868.

764. Fick to Brand, 28th February, 1868.

765. Keate Memorandum, 8th February, 1868; Shepstone Memorandum, 4th February, 1868.

766. Proclamation of Annexation, 12th March, 1868.

767. Wodehouse Boundary Details, 13th May, 1870.

THE EIGHTH (1880) ANTI-SOTHO WAR.

The Sotho now had England sitting on top of them; north were the two White Republics; east was White Natal; south was the White Cape Colony; to the west Whites were pouring into the diamond fields. The Colesberg lawyer, David Arnot, used Waterboer against Cornelis Kok in 1862, and against Mahura in 1869, to claim Griqualand for England; in 1867 he brought Whites into the area;⁷⁶⁸ diggers rushed to Hopetown, where diamonds were found in April, 1867;⁷⁶⁹ to Pniel, Heilbron and Klipdrift in January, 1870 and to De Beers, Kimberley, Du Toit's Pan and Bultfontein after 1871. In July, 1870, Seaman Parker formed a Diggers Republic on Waterboer's lands; was deposed by John Campbell in December; Governor Barkly sent police up while Keate, Natal Governor, drafted a pro-British boundary award in October, 1871; the same month Barkly annexed Griqualand West⁷⁷⁰ with Lord Kimberley's consent. Thus the Sotho were now penned in from the west as well. To the south-east lay Kok's "buffer", placed under J. H. Orpen⁷⁷¹ who, helped by Kok till the latter's death in 1875, went on to crush Griqua-Pondo resistance by force and fines in 1878, and a year later Griqualand East, too, was annexed. Thus the Sotho had another White-ruled state to their south-east. They were in fact now totally surrounded by Boer and Briton.

But they were surrounded not alone territorially, but also economically: the rise of the diamond and gold mines threw up a host of speculators, adventurers and investors who swarmed around the Sotho clamouring for their cheap labour. To drive the Sotho off their remaining land in order to exploit them a terrible war was fought.

In October, 1879, Sprigg, Cape Premier, backed by officials and the Paris Missionaries, told a vast Pitso of 10,000 Sotho at Maseru⁷⁷² that they would be disarmed and "*Instead of paying 10/- a hut you will in future pay £1*".⁷⁷³ Letsie, the new king, evaded the issue by pleading for more land and schools; Molappo, who had betrayed Langalibalele to Shepstone, said he would accept the tax; but all chiefs opposed disarmament.⁷⁷⁴ But the poor tribesmen were adamant. Mabusetsa rejected the tax; Poshudi rose in anger, attacked the chiefs, especially Molappo, thundering: "*We are impoverished by you chiefs*".⁷⁷⁵ Hiding from the wrath of the commoners, Sprigg called the chiefs into private conference the next day and then told the people to hand in their guns and pay the new hut-tax.⁷⁷⁶ Letsie wavered; Jonathan, son of Molappo, was willing to disarm; but Lerothidi, son of Letsie, and Masupha, son of Moshoeshoe, refused to disarm, branded the others as traitors,⁷⁷⁷ and resisted Cape police sent up on the pretext of "protecting" the traitor chiefs. Letsie was carried with them, and asked the East Griquas to help Lerothidi, saying: "*If they stood aloof while the Basutos were being disarmed their turn would follow*".⁷⁷⁸ The Tembus

768. Arnot and Orpen: "The Land Question", p. 307.

769. Gardiner and Williams: "The Diamond Fields of S.A."

770. Eybers Select Constitutional Documents.

771. Dower: "Early Annals of Kokstad", p. 50.

772/3/4/5. Official Report of Maseru Pitso, 16th, 17th October, 1879.

776/7/8/9/780/781. C. Brownlee: "A Chapter on the Basuto War" (1887). (A Kingwilliamstown Lecture, pp. 14, 17, 25.)

rallied to his call and in October "every tribe, the Griquas included, were against the Government".⁷⁷⁹ Though some Hlubi and Fingos helped England,⁷⁸⁰ such traitors, like Ramohlakoane, were "abandoned by his whole clan, even his sons having gone against him".⁷⁸¹ Mhlontlo, brilliant Mpondomise general, feigned support for the enemy then swiftly ambushed an official, Hope, and his party⁷⁸² and waged guerilla war against the invaders. A section of the Fingos "had actually joined the rebels".⁷⁸³ Cecil John Rhodes admitted that "We were virtually licked by the Basutos".⁷⁸⁴

Though the British got help from missionaries Morris and Brownlee, whose stations acted as arsenals;⁷⁸⁵ from "loyal" Hlubi, Sotho (Jonathan) and Fingos; and from Brand who gave England permission to use the O.F.S. as a base,⁷⁸⁶ they did not defeat the Sotho. They hurriedly ended their aggression by sending Sir Hercules Robinson up to "arbitrate" in April, 1881. He meekly imposed a cattle-fine, but was forced to return surrendered guns. These, however, had now to be registered and licensed, a device which ultimately disarmed the Sotho.

RE-ANNEXATION.

In September, 1881, Rhodes said that because the Cape had wasted £4,000,000 on this war and could not manage the Sotho, England should take over.⁷⁸⁷ He also felt that this would protect his "brethren in the Free State".⁷⁸⁸ He further declared: "Nothing can be done with this uncivilized race" (the Sotho) "until we show them that we are masters."⁷⁸⁹ In pursuance of this ideal England annexed Basutoland in 1883;⁷⁹⁰ installed magistrates on the Shepstone model;⁷⁹¹ threatened resisters with confiscation of their property; introduced pass laws and control of arms;⁷⁹² and converted what was left of Moshoeshoe's country into a cheap-labour reserve for Rhodes' mines and the Boers' farms.

FOOTNOTE.

The story of the conquest of the Sotho is also the story of the creation of the Free State Boer Republic. It remains only to add a note on the fate of Moroka's tribe. After his death in April, 1880, at the age of 85, Tshipinare and Samuel fought for succession, the former was slain by the latter in July, 1884;⁷⁹³ the O.F.S. conveniently did not recognise Samuel, disarmed him and Brand annexed Thaba Nchu's 850 square miles and 20,000 people on 12th July, 1884. Judge Gregorowski in May, 1885, ruled that Tshipinare's lands were inalienable, but was overruled and the land of the Seleka Baralong passed into Boer hands, since by the new judgment they could be sold only to Whites. Half of Thaba Nchu was forced onto farms and urban locations. Thus Mzilikazi's legendary prophesy came true: "They (the Boers) will despoil them (the Baralong) of the very lands they have rendered unsafe for us; they will entice the Bechuana lads to war and the chase, only to use them as pack-oxen; yea, they will refuse to share with them the spoils of victory. . . . They will turn Bechuana women into beasts of burden to drag their loaded waggons to their granaries. . . . When the Kiwas (Boers) rob them of their cattle, their children and their lands, they will weep their eyes out of their sockets."⁷⁹⁴

782. *Ibid.* p. 28.

783. *Ibid.* p. 30.

784. C. J. Rhodes Speech ("Vindex"), 28th September, 1885.

785. C. Brownlee, *supra*, p. 31.

786. *Ibid.*

787. C. J. Rhodes Speech, 25th September, 1881.

788/9. C. J. Rhodes Speech in House of Assembly, 18th July, 1883.

790. Act No. 34 of 1883.

791. Proclamation No. 1 of 1st March, 1884.

792. Proclamation No. 20 of 29th May, 1884.

793. "Bloemfontein Friend", 17th July, 1884.

794. S. 1 at'e: "ud", p. 10.

SECTION IV.

THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL BANTU.

CHAPTER XXXI.

THE FIRST ANTI-ZULU WAR (1836).

The Boer trekkers did not come into a depopulated Transvaal. The area from the Vaal River to the Limpopo River was heavily populated by Bantu tribes, most of them under the "overlordship" of the great centralised tribal monarchy built by Mzilikazi, son of the Zulu Matshebane, and one of the generals who broke away from Tshaka. In the 1820's Mzilikazi had "subjected" the Bapedi under Sekwati, the Bangwato under Sekgoma, the Bakwena under Sechele, the Bakgotla under Pilane, the Baralong under Tawana and the BaTlokwa under Sikonyela.⁷⁹⁵ In return for a tribute of respect these tribes were allowed peaceful possession of their lands. This peace was broken by the Trekboer invasion in the 1830's.

Mzilikazi smashed Liebenberg's trekkers and scattered the trekkers of Trichart, who fled to Lourenco Marques.⁷⁹⁶ In March, 1836, D'Urban sent up Dr. Smith, who drew up a "Treaty of Friendship" with Mzilikazi.⁷⁹⁷ But the Boers forestalled British conquest. A. H. Potgieter invaded Mzilikazi's lands and was routed, with the loss of 4,600 cattle and 50,000 sheep, at Vechtkop on 19th October, 1836. The Boers who were quite unable to win even a battle on their own, then, through the missionaries, inspanned the Baralong of Moroka, the Korannas of Gert Taaibosch, the BaTlokwa of Sikonyela, and the Griquas of P. Davids.⁷⁹⁸ This force plus 107 Boers won a "great victory" at Mosega on January 17th, 1837, by destroying the huts of, and slaying in cold blood, 400 old Zulu men, women and children.⁷⁹⁹ On the Marico River in November, 1837, Potgieter, P. Uys and Baralong allies slew 500 of Mzilikazi's troops. The king, previously weakened by an attack from Dingane, retired across the Limpopo into Rhodesia, where his independence was recognised by the Potchefstroom Republic in 1846, set up on his former lands. On September 9th, 1868, Mzilikazi died, succeeded by Lobengula, after having rebuilt the Matabele nation-tribe which was later to fall before the blows of Rhodes.

AFTERMATH—A BOER REPUBLIC.

Potgieter built a Republic at Oghrigstad on land illegally taken from Sekwati, Bapedi king. Eventually the local Republics of Oghrigstad, Utrecht, Potchefstroom, Lydenberg and the Zoutpansberg united into one Republic, the "*South African Republic*". This Republic rested on primitive

795. Basutoland Records. Accounts to Commission of Enquiry by Moshoeshoc, Moroka, Sikonyela.

796. Diary of Louis Trichart, 1836 to 1838.

797. Journal of Dr. A. Smith.

798/9. Molema: "Moroka", p. 51 (a pro-Boer writer).

feudalism with serf labour;⁸⁰⁰ "apprenticeship"; "corve"-labour; military tenure; an obligatory labour-tax of "14 days in every year",⁸⁰¹ refusal of which was punishable by "25 strokes with a flat thong";⁸⁰² commando-service by vassal chiefs; tributes in labour,⁸⁰³ or cattle, or ivory, or child-slaves;⁸⁰⁴ and serf-squatting on Boer lands.⁸⁰⁵ The "Boer-barons" had extensive disciplinary powers over their serfs.⁸⁰⁶

Not only labour, but also military service was feudal-like. War booty was to be shared equally between "Christians and Kaffirs".⁸⁰⁷ The purpose of commandos was "in case of internal insurrection of the coloured population",⁸⁰⁸ for cattle-booty,⁸⁰⁹ and, of course, for land-seizures. Conquered chiefs had to yield forced labour. Thus a certain "Saul" was allowed to farm a plot if he gave "three Kaffirs". He had to pay 5/- a day if the "Kaffirs run away".⁸¹⁰ In return he got two cattle every 18 months for the labour he handed over. At the 1852 Sand River Convention,⁸¹¹ where England virtually gave the Boers their Transvaal Republic, England ordered the Boers not to sell arms to Africans⁸¹² and later the Republic legalised this clause.⁸¹³ The 1858 pass⁸¹⁴ and prohibition⁸¹⁵ laws were aimed not only at control of labour but also to prevent "insurrections".

Though the Boer economy was largely for subsistence, under the Sand River Convention free trade was legalised. Up to 1871 the Republic was trading with the Portuguese in guns and slaves.⁸¹⁶

Non-Whites were denied property, civil and political rights: "No half-castes, down to the tenth degree, shall be entitled to sit on our meetings as a member or a judge."⁸¹⁷ "No native shall be allowed near any dorp nor be taken into houses without the permission of the full Council."⁸¹⁸ The South African Republic⁸¹⁹ said in 1853 that all Whites could buy property but "all coloured people are excluded from this provision. . . . They may never be given or granted rights of burghership".⁸²⁰ The 1858 Grondwet said: "The people will grant no equality of coloureds with white citizens, neither in Church nor in State",⁸²¹ and repeated: "No coloured persons or bastards shall be allowed at our meetings".⁸²²

This was the apartheid feudal system which took the place of Mzilikazi's tribal monarchy, under which all men were equals and women were treated with the utmost respect.

800. Volksraad Resolution, 21st November, 1853.

801. Edwards Letter, 17th March, 1849.

802. Transvaal Law, 1850.

803. Volksraad Report, 4th November, 1847.

804. Agar Hamilton: "The Native Policy of the Voortrekkers", p. 59.

805. Volksraad Instructions to Field Cornets, 17th September, 1858, Clause 57.

806. Articles of Transvaal Republic, 9th April, 1844, Article 33.

807. Oghrigstad Republic Resolution, 26th September, 1845.

808. S.A.R. Grondwet, 1858. Article 104.

809. *Ibid.* Articles 125, 126.

810. P. Kruger to Volksraad, 20th December, 1870.

811/812. Sand River Convention, 16th January, 1852.

813. Volksraad Instructions, 17th September, 1858. Clause 51.

814. *Ibid.* Clause 3.

815. *Ibid.* Clause 41.

816. "Staats Courant", 2nd August, 1871.

817. 33 Articles of Transvaal Republic, 9th April, 1844. Also Volksraad Law 4, 23rd June, 1890

818. *Ibid.* Article 29.

819. Volksraad Decision, 19th September, 1853.

820. Volksraad Law, 18th June, 1853.

821. S.A.R. Grondwet, February, 1858. Article 9.

822. *Ibid.* Articles 31 *et seq.*

THE SIXTEEN-YEAR WAR ON SOTHO AND TSWANA (1857-1868).

The dispossession of the Zulus was followed by land-wars against the Sotho and Tswana.

ANTI-SOTHO WARS.

The Boers, with Paul Kruger in the field, attacked Sekwati in December, 1851,⁸²³ Sechele and Moila in March, 1853,⁸²⁴ when they were helped by the informer Magota.⁸²⁵ In 1854 Makapane's men killed the hated H. Potgieter. P. Potgieter, M. Pretorius and P. Kruger led 500 troops against Makapane, whose forces took refuge in caves. The Boers besieged the caves and shot down 1,000 in cold blood as they ran out. Thousands more of Makapane's people died of hunger.

ANTI-TSWANA WARS.

Having ruined these Sotho, the Boers attacked the Tswana. Helped by the spy, Rev. Ross, Taungs missionary in Gasibon's capital,⁸²⁶ the Boers killed Gasibon. In July, 1858, Kruger rode with 414 men on Gasibon's successor, Mahura.⁸²⁷ Acting on Pretorius' order: "*To act in the most prudent manner, so that no offence shall be given to Black or White,*" he told Mahura "*I am not bloodthirsty*,"⁸²⁸ then, helped by O.F.S. troops, he crushed Mahura at the Hertz River in August, took 2,800 beasts and 23 waggons, and made him pay the cost of the expedition.⁸²⁹ Like the English in India, the Boers made the conquered pay for their own conquest. In July, 1865, Kruger reported that the British had "driven back" 5,000 "Makatesh" warriors,⁸³⁰ By force the Boers, helped by the English, drove the Transvaal Tswana west into Bechuanaland. There old Mahura fell victim to David Arnot's intrigues. On his death, his son, Mankoroana was installed by England as Paramount Chief of the Batlopin in March, 1874, and was used to keep the diamond lands in British hands.

WARS ON NORTHERN TRIBES.

Having driven the western tribes out, Kruger asked the President for 2,000 men in March, 1868, to fight Mapela, chief of far-north tribes.⁸³¹ In June Boer commandos killed over 300, burnt Mapela's town, took 2,000 cattle⁸³² and started to fire the crops of Mapela, Machem and Callacal.⁸³³ Mapela was ordered to trek and Makapane to give up his cave-strongholds.⁸³⁴

823. P. Kruger to Volksraad, 16th December, 1851, in "P. Kruger's Official Letters", 1851 to 1873. Ed. by F. V. Engelenburg.

824. Kruger to "Uncle Gert", 27th March, 1853.

825. Kruger to A. W. J. Pretorius, 5th June, 1853.

826. Moll to Kruger, 16th July, 1858.

827. Kruger to M. W. Pretorius, 26th July, 1858.

828. Kruger to Mahura, 7th August, 1858.

829. Kruger to Pretorius ("Letters", p. 46); Mahura Molchabang Peace Treaty, 18th August, 1858.

830. Kruger to Pretorius, 12th July, 1865.

831. Kruger to S.A.R. President, 23rd March, 1868.

832. Kruger to S.A.R. President, 16th June, 1868.

833. Kruger and Botha to Pretorius, 22nd June, 1868.

834. Kruger and Botha to Pretorius, 18th November, 1868.

this disturbance at once shook the prestige of the white man in South Africa and placed every European community in peril. That this common danger . . . has imposed the duty upon those who have the power to shield the enfeebled civilization from the encroachments of barbarism and inhumanity."⁸⁵⁵ His first task in Transvaal was to defeat Sekukuni. The latter rejected British Paramountcy in February, 1878. Sir Garnet Wolseley menaced him and in 1879 450 mounted troops and 1,000 Swazi and other Bantu allies captured his royal city, cleared the famous caves, stormed his mountain fortress, captured him, killed his family, put a magistrate over his lands,⁸⁵⁶ and deposed him. His successor, Mampura, is said to have killed him in 1882, but was himself defeated by 2,000 armed burghers after eight months' resistance together with the "Mapoch Njabel" in that year. Thus did England save the Transvaal Republic and complete the conquest of the Sotho.

SHEPSTONE TEACHES BOERS HOW TO RULE.

Before and after Sekukuni's defeat, Shepstone heaped new apartheid laws on the Transvaal Bantu. His policy, in his own words, was: "*Equal justice is guaranteed to the persons and property of both white and coloured—but the adoption of this principle does not and should not involve the granting of equal civil rights, such as the exercise of the right of voting by savages or their becoming members of a Legislative Body, or their being entitled to other civil privileges which are incompatible with their uncivilized condition.*"⁸⁵⁷ From 1877 to 1881 his son, H. C. Shepstone, was Secretary for Native Affairs, a new State Department. He introduced his father's system of magistrates, locations and native law. These laws were retained by the Boers (Law 4, 1885) after they defeated the British at Laingsnek and Majuba in January-February, 1881, and regained their independence in the Pretoria Convention of August, 1881. Clause 13 of this British-inspired Convention read: "*Natives will be allowed to acquire land, but the grant or transfer of such land will in every case be made to and registered IN THE NAME OF the Native Location Commissioner" who would hold the land "in trust for the Natives"*"⁸⁵⁸ (my emphasis). Clause 14 was a pass-law which Kruger passed at the behest of the Chamber of Mines.⁸⁵⁹ England taught the Boers how to rule through apartheid.

856. *Supra.* 848.

857. *Supra.* 854.

858/859. Pretoria Convention, August, 1881.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE EIGHTH (1893) AND NINTH (1896) ANTI-MATABELE-MASHONA WARS.

The defeat of Sekukuni south of the Limpopo and Lobengula north of the Limpopo finally defined the northern boundary of the South African Republic.

In the 1880's the Boers crossed the Limpopo, violating the 1846 Treaty with Mzilikazi. In July, 1887, Grobler made a treaty with Lobengula and got farming rights in Rhodesia. The Tswana killed him.

To forestall his Boer rivals the British High Commissioner, Robinson, sent up the Kuruman missionary official, J. S. Moffat, who tricked Lobengula into "signing" a far-reaching treaty in February, 1888. Lobengula, according to Moffat, promised not to cede land without the High Commissioner's consent.⁸⁶⁰ The concession-hunter, Rudd, partner of Rhodes and Bait in Kimberley, followed the missionary. He wrung another fraudulent "agreement" out of Lobengula in which the latter "granted" the Rhodes-Beit group a monopoly of all minerals found on his land.⁸⁶¹ The soldier followed the concession-hunter. In October, 1889, the British Chartered Company was formed and sent Jameson up with troops to "persuade" Lobengula to permit the Company to enter Matabeleland.⁸⁶² In May, 1890, the Bantu king refused. But Rhodes was bent on fulfilling Livingstone's threat: "*I determined to open the country.*"⁸⁶³ His men, led by the hunter Selous, cut a road into S. Rhodesia in June, 1890. In September they "founded" Salisbury and then built forts at Victoria and Charter.⁸⁶⁴ In April, 1891, Matabeleland was declared a British Protectorate.

The Boers, Adendorff and Malan, backed by a promoter, Vorster, also set out (in March, 1891) to take Lobengula's lands and extend the Boer Republic. In June, Jameson's troops met the Boers on the Limpopo and told them they were welcome, but must not form a republic. Kruger withdrew his men.

The rest of the story is all-British. In October, 1893, Rhodes, exploiting Mashona-Matabele feuds which he had stirred up, won battles at Shangani, Imbebezi and occupied Bulawayo, Lobengula's city, after the latter had blown up the town. Lobengula died on the 23rd January, 1894, in the midst of his perishing armies.⁸⁶⁵ Rhodes, who had won another half-million square miles for England, at once began to rob the Matabele of their land. He said: "*There will probably be Reserves for the Natives . . . free grants to yourselves*" (his troops) "*the balance (would be) Crown Land.*"⁸⁶⁶ In 1894 he appointed Jameson Administrator of the Matabele. In January, 1894, Rhodes celebrated his victory in the Cape Town City Hall where he thanked the missionaries for "*the unanimous support of the religious*

860. Moffat Treaty, 11th February, 1888.

861/2. For Rhodes' Conquests: W. Plomer; S. G. Millin: "Rhodes"; B. Williams: "Rhodes"; J. G. MacDonald: "Rhodes", a Heritage"; Baker: "Rhodes"; Jameson: "Rhodes"; Vindex: Speeches of Rhodes.

863/864/5. W. Plomer: "C. J. Rhodes", p. 31.

866. Rhodes to his troops, 19th December, 1893.

denominations in Mashonaland—religious denominations representing the Church of England, the Roman Catholics, the Wesleyans, and, if I might say it, the Salvation Army".⁸⁶⁷ He praised Moffat, "son of the father of missionaries",⁸⁶⁸ who had blessed Rhodes' army thus: "*Your men go as liberators to do the work of the Aborigine Protection Society.*"⁸⁶⁹

THE 1896 WAR.

In March, 1896, the Matabele and Mashona rose in a great revolt. The reasons for their revolt were: (1) They were being driven off mineral lands which were rich in loam soil. This impoverished their farming. (2) Their herds had been plundered by "indunas"—British boss-boys—and killed under pretext of having rinderpest, and a group of women who refused to disclose their cattle to the British were fired upon, four being shot in cold blood. (3) The British were rounding the people up for compulsory labour-service.

The rising was well-timed, although sparked off by the murder of the four women. For at the time the Administrator, Jameson, was away on his Johannesburg "raid". But in March, 1896, British troops came up with orders to "*shoot down natives indiscriminately*".⁸⁷⁰ In May, Rhodes and the good Boy Scout Baden-Powell took the field.⁸⁷¹ In June the Matabele chiefs were disarmed. Jan Grootboom, a Tembu, arranged a peace and Somabulane and others submitted after two negotiations in August, 1896. This was the end of Matabele tribal resistance.

The Mashonas fought on for a year longer. Rhodes and Baden-Powell, helped by Coloured and Bantu troops and by machine-guns, murdered some 8,000 Mashonas before this tribe was finally conquered.⁸⁷²

Then came the usual aftermath: Bantu lands were given to Briton and Boer; a hut-tax, poll-tax and wife-tax was enforced to smoke the people off the land. The tribes became cheap, landless labourers in Rhodesia: "*This land where an acre of gold is worth a thousand souls, and a reef of shining dust is worth half a people, and the vultures are heavy with man's flesh.*"⁸⁷³

FOOTNOTE --SWAZILAND, TONGOLAND.

The conquest of Swaziland rounds off the story of the Transvaal. The Boers had converted Swazi lands from use to property in 1846, 1854 (Lydenberg farmers), 1855 (Utrecht farmers), 1869, 1875, 1887 and 1888 (when the "ceded" land was incorporated). The Boers traded in Swazi children. Swazi chiefs, as we saw, became Boer allies.

In August, 1890, at the First Swaziland Convention, Kruger and Rhodes wrangled over Swaziland and Kosi Bay, in Tongoland, which England gained in July, 1887, by "treaties" with chiefs. After the Second Swaziland Convention in November, 1893, Rhodes and Loch agreed to let Transvaal annex Swaziland, without the consent of the tribes. Kruger accepted at the Volksrust-Charlestown Conference. The Third Swaziland Conference of February, 1895, ratified this horse deal; Kruger incorporated Swaziland and in April Britain annexed Tongoland. In 1897 Natal took over both states, but Swaziland remained in effect an extension of the Transvaal Republic, whose burghers owned two-thirds of Swaziland.

Thus, with the help of England's diplomats, soldiers, missionaries, and of African traitors, the Transvaal Boer Republic was built and consolidated on the lands of the dispossessed Tswana, Sotho, Matabele and Swazi.

867/8/9. C. J. Rhodes Speech, 6th January, 1894.

870/1/2. Order of Mr. Duncan, Cattle Controller, Bulawayo, on 25th March, 1896.

873. W. Plomer: "C. J. Rhodes", p. 13.

SECTION V.

THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA.

CHAPTER XXXV.

THE FOUR ANTI-NAMA, ANTI-HERERO WARS.

The wars of dispossession won land and labour on which were built the Cape Colony, the Natal Colony, the Orange Free State Republic and the Transvaal Republic—the four states which merged in 1910 to form the four provinces of Union. In 1919, at Versailles, this Union became a mandate over S.W.A.,⁸⁷⁴ with power to “*apply the laws of the Union of South Africa to the territory*” (Article 2 of C-class Mandate). After extending this control in 1921⁸⁷⁵ and 1925⁸⁷⁶ the Union incorporated S.W.A. by Act in 1950, making S.W.A. virtually a fifth province. For this reason, although the conquest of S.W.A. falls outside the main stream of British conquest, the history of its conquest has, albeit by force of later events, become part of the history of South Africa, and must therefore be told.

Before the Europeans came, South West Africa was peopled by !Ke, Khoi-Khoi (Nama), Negro (Bergdamaras) and Bantu (Ovambo, Herero) tribes. The Whites did not enter an empty, unowned land.

In 1484 the Portuguese, Diego Cam, went 60 miles north of Swakupmund. Two years later Diaz tried to contact the tribes by means of African slaves on board his ship. He landed them at Walvis Bay, Luderitzbucht and Angra Pequena. The Portuguese, however, did not return, and the tribes lived in peace for another three centuries.

Then, from 1760 to 1793, the Boers, Jacobus Coetzee, Willem van Reenen and Pieter Pienaar, explored Keetmanshoop, Reheboth and further north. They, too, did not leave behind any “settlement”.⁸⁷⁷

The first to open the land up for conquest were the German missionaries. From 1805 to 1811 the Albrecht brothers “worked” at Warmbad. This station was destroyed in 1811 by Jager Afrikaner, who had led slaves and herders away from the Cape after the defeat of the Khoi-Khoi at about 1800.⁸⁷⁸ But in 1815 missionary J. H. Schmelen went to Namaland, founded Bethanie mission and made a careful study of the tribes.⁸⁷⁹ In 1842 the Rhenish missionaries Hugo Hahn and Heinrich Kleinschmidt settled at Windhoek, near Jonker Afrikaner. In 1844 Kahn formed a mission among the Hereros at Barmen. In 1845 Kleinschmidt did likewise at Rehoboth among the Nama. Now the stage was set for the first land-war.

THE FIRST WAR.

In 1842 Jonker Afrikaner and the Namas defeated the Hereros under Tjamuaha.⁸⁸⁰ Peace did not last long, for Afrikaner got into debt to traders, needed cattle to pay his debt, and in August, 1850, again defeated the Hereros to square his creditors. In 1860 he defeated the Ovambo. In 1863, after his death, his son Christian fought with Maherero, son of Tjamuaha (now also dead). Up to now the missionaries and traders had

874. Act 49 of 1919; League of Nations Covenant.

875. Act 32 of 1921.

876. Act 42 of 1925.

877. Dutch East India Company Journal: Reports of Coetzee (1760, 1761); Report of W. Van Reenen (1762).

878. Dr. Heinrich Vedder, Dr. C. J. C. Lemmer: “Inleidings tot die Geskiedenis van Suid-Wes Afrika”.

879. Captain C. J. Alexander: Report, 1837.

880. Peace Treaty, 25th December, 1842.

backed Afrikaner, trying to use him as their spearhead. But now that Afrikaner was dominant it was necessary for them to support Maharero.

SECOND WAR.

In 1863 the copper miners, Kleinschmidt and a Swede, Andersson, armed Maharero, who defeated and killed Christian Afrikaner in August, 1863. Andersson and the Rhenish missionaries then became Maharero's "advisors", and formed a "buffer" at Reheboth against Christian's successor, Jan Jonker Afrikaner. In January, 1864, the Germans, Hereros and the Reheboth buffer defeated Jan Jonker Afrikaner and took 3,000 cattle. Andersson then became the Herero general and again defeated Afrikaner. Afrikaner's men rose against the Reheboth mission, destroyed it,⁸⁸¹ and the fleeing Kleinschmidt died, followed to the grave two years later by Andersson. In December, 1867, Afrikaner's Nama troops attacked the Walfish Fishing Station. In 1868 Bismarck asked England to protect his Rhenish missions. Sir Philip Wodehouse, Cape Governor, rallied to the German Empire and together with Dr. Hahn (Rhenish Society), traders, Boers and Herero allies, attacked Afrikaner. The Nama, however, adopted "scorched earth" tactics and the Herero had to eat scorpions (hence the war was called the "Scorpion War"). In September, 1870, Hahn organised a convenient peace at Okahandja, and Afrikaner was placed at Windhoek under missionary care. In 1871 the missionaries persuaded Maharero to ask the Cape Government for White officials, ostensibly to prevent Boer occupation of his lands, but really to "control" the tribes. After 1876 Palgrave was sent up. Thus England helped Germany to conquer and police the African tribes. In December, 1880, Maharero fell at Barmen while fighting the Nama. The Afrikaner clan now yielded its leadership of the Nama to the Witbooi clan. Moses Witbooi counter-attacked, and in June, 1882, Hahn left his pulpit in Cape Town to make another "peace". Witbooi and Afrikaner rejected his terms and the former was shot by a traitor on his own side. He was succeeded by the famous guerilla, Hendrick Witbooi, who became virtually the king of the resisting tribes.

THIRD WAR.

With the tribes exhausted from the missionary-fanned wars, Germans began to occupy their lands. F. A. E. Luderitz, from Bremen, "bought" land (illegally, as usual) from the Nama chief "Joseph Frederick" in Bethanie in May, 1883. In August he "bought" the whole coast from the Orange River to 26 degrees South, and 20 miles wide. In April, 1884, Bismarck wired his Consul Lippart in Cape Town that Luderitz's "purchases" were under his Government's "protection".⁸⁸² Luderitz then "bought" the rest of the coast. Dr. Naghtigall, Consul-General for the West Coast of Africa, made defence alliances with African chiefs, and placed them under German "protection". Maharero signed. Witbooi refused.⁸⁸³ In October, 1888, Maharero signed a treaty with an Englishman, Lewis, repudiating his treaty with Naghtigall, but, under pressure from Hahn, rescinded the British in favour of the German treaty. Thus Maharero became a German instrument. He was succeeded, after his death in October, 1890, by his son Samuel.

In July, 1889, German troops under Curt Von Francois landed to quell Witbooi. More troops landed in 1893 and Witbooi was defeated. He

881. G. M. Theal: "History", Vol. 5, p. 96.

882. Bismarck to Lippert, 24th April, 1884 (*supra* 878, p. 66).

883. *Ibid.* p. 67.

sought to make an alliance with Samuel Maherero, but failed. In September, 1894, after an attack by Leutwen, he had to submit. German settlers invaded the country. More land was illegally⁸⁸⁴ "bought" from Samuel Maherero. Thus both the Nama and Herero, despite and as a result of their feuds, were under Germany.

FOURTH WAR.

Brutality and land-robbery bred a great Nama-Herero revolt which shook German rule from 1903 to 1907. The spark was when the Germans seized the old Herero burial ground at Okahandja, hacked down the "sacred trees" and made the cemetery into a vegetable farm. The Hereros, led by Samuel Maherero, then revolted in January, 1904. This rising came after an abortive revolt of the Bondelswartz, led by Morris and Morenga, in 1903 and quelled by Leutwen in January, 1904.⁸⁸⁵

The ruthless General Von Trotha took over command from the Governor Leutwein. German soldiers landed, armed with maxims and rapid-firing Krupp guns. Von Trotha roared: "*Let not man, woman or child be spared—kill them all.*"

At first Maherero's forces, armed with old guns, killed 123 Germans, but on his orders spared all non-Germans, White or non-White, as well as all German women and children.⁸⁸⁶ Von Trotha attacked Maherero at Waterberg. Von Trotha shot Maherero's peace-envoys. The tribes fled into the Sandveld, were pursued and massacred. At Waterberg, Witbooi had helped the Germans, but after this battle, in October, 1904, he and Stuurman also revolted.

From December, 1904, to April, 1905, the Nama continued the struggle which the Herero had to give up. Witbooi, defeated, trekked to the Kalahari to wage guerilla warfare against Von Trotha, but died from a wound after a skirmish. His successor, Samuel Izaak, surrendered.

The rest of the Nama, under Koper, Morris, Morenga, Kornelius and Johannes Christian, fought on. The British Major Elliott helped Von Trotha by defeating Morenga when he crossed the Orange River. Morenga died of his wounds. On Christmas, 1906, Morris had to surrender. Simon Koper continued to harass the Germans with guerilla warfare for another two years, but was also brought down at Seatsub in March, 1908.⁸⁸⁷

In this last war, which sealed the fate of the Africans of S.W.A., 88 battles had been fought against the Hereros and 295 against the Namas. German and other Imperial troops slain by the resisters numbered 2,348. But their own losses were stupendous. Von Trotha claimed that his troops had killed 65,000 Hereros. At the end of the war only 15,000 famished Hereros remained, hiding terror-stricken in the mountains until the next Governor, Lindequist, revoked Von Trotha's extermination command. Leutwein wrote: "*We have, of the three business assets of the Protectorate, mining, farming and Native labour, destroyed the second entirely and two-thirds of the last.*" The conquered people were driven to work on farms, harbours, railways and mines. Many perished in the internment camp at Shark Island, Luderitzbucht. Others rotted in gaols. The rest fled to die in the Kalahari deserts, the Gobabis bushveld or the Waterberg mountains.

By such means did German, Boer and Briton conquer and dispossess the African tribalists of the five states which later became the five provinces of the White Union of South Africa.

884. *Ibid.* p. 78

885/886/887. "Die Dagboek van Hendrik Witbooi" (published 1929); C. J. C. Lemmer (*supra* 878, p. 79 *et seq.*); Memorandum by South African Government on S.W.A. (1915); Sir Charles Dundas: "South-West Africa" (1946); Reports of Leutwen, Von Trotha, Lindequist; Articles by Professor Bonn, Heinrich Vedder.

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SECTION I.

ENSLAVEMENT.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

THE LABOUR MARKET.

The wars of dispossession gave England and the Boers ownership of all the land of South Africa. The next problem was to gain possession of all the labour of South Africa. The conquerors became exploiters.

The labour-market expanded with the land-wars, and in turn expanded the export market. The conquest of the Western Cape enslaved the defeated on plantations, the main Cape export from 1685 to 1834 being *wine*.⁸⁸⁸ The conquest of the Xhosa enserfed them on wool-farms, the main Cape export from 1834 to 1880 being *wool*.⁸⁸⁹ The conquest of the Zulu made them and imported Indians cheap labour on the sugar farms, the main Natal export from 1849 (when the first mill was opened at Compensation, Victoria County) being *sugar*.⁸⁹⁰ The conquest of the Sotho made them farm-serfs, the main export of the Free State being *wheat*. The great series of wars waged against all tribes from 1877 to 1880 made sections of all conquered tribes into cheap diamond mine labour, the main national export from 1880 to 1890 being *diamonds*.⁸⁹¹ From 1890 until today the main labour-market was the goldmining industry, the main national export being *gold*.⁸⁹²

Just as the economy as a whole spread from the Cape round the coast to Natal and thence to the northern Republics, so likewise did the cheap labour policy, and, with it, colour-apartheid and all political oppression. The segregation, begun under Dutch and British slavery, was carried northwards by Boer feudalism. Philip, Smith and Grey "carried" oppression from the Western Cape to the Eastern Province; it was "carried" thence by Shepstone and Grey into Natal; Rhodes (who learnt the Natal system when he came to Umkumaas at the age of 17⁸⁹³) then brought it to diamond-mining Kimberley; and he, his partners Beit and Barnato and others, then "carried" it into Johannesburg's gold-mines, where the whole British segregation system met and assimilated the whole Boer segregation system and created a "new" foundation for oppression. As Rhodes said: "*Remote as our starting point is, the development of South Africa will occur through the Cape Colony.*"⁸⁹⁴ As the economy spread out from the Cape, so it changed and evolved from slavery to "feudalism" to capitalism; and the latter itself developed higher from wine-farming and small industry in the

888. S.A. Year Book, 1923 (£124,000 out of £244,000 in 1826).

889. £383,000 out of £512,000 in 1850; £1,600,000 out of £2,000,000 in 1864.

890. S.A. Year Book, 1941, p. 725: first mills at Compensation, Durban, Alexandra and Victoria.

891. S.A. Year Book, 1941, p. 825. (From 1870 to 1882 diamond exports equalled wool exports from 1840 to 1880.)

892. S.A. Year Book, 1923.

893. W. Plomer: "C. J. Rhodes", p. 14.

894. Vindex: "Rhodes' Speeches.

Western Cape to wheat farming in the Eastern Cape, to sugar-farming in Natal and finally to diamond mining in Kimberley and gold mining in Johannesburg. The last two, the mining revolutions, in particular, had a profound effect. They combined elements from all previous systems in South Africa—tribalism, slavery, feudalism and capitalism—and “created” the unified basis of the present-time system of exploiting and oppressing in South Africa. The elements of the past reacted in the vast crucible of the mining revolution to form the compound of monopolistic exploitation and its consequences—totalitarian oppression. This process took place first in Kimberley and later in Johannesburg.

THE DIAMOND MINES.

The wage-rates on Cape vineyards (3/6 a day plus “tots” for casual work; £1 a month plus food, lodging and a garden lot), and at the Cape Town and Port Elizabeth docks (3/- a day) became the basis for Non-European wage-rates on the Kimberley mines. Diamond miners’ wages in 1867 were 10/-, plus food, per month; in 1871 £1 10s., plus food; in 1874 £2, plus food;⁸⁹⁵ from 1882 on £6 plus lodgings.⁸⁹⁶ The Non-European wage rate has stayed constant ever since. White miners in the early days earned £33 a month. The Kimberley mines founded a high ratio of White to Black wages—a ratio which has widened with time. The White workers were Rhodes’ social mainstay—De Beers employed half the White population of Kimberley.⁸⁹⁷ Under pretext that Africans were stealing £¼ million of diamonds a year⁸⁹⁸ Rhodes penned the African miners into compounds, just as Shepstone had herded the conquered into rural locations. He introduced segregatory liquor laws,⁸⁹⁹ a practice endorsed by Milner⁹⁰⁰ and all Union Governments. These grinding measures became part of “Native Labour Policy” of modern South Africa.

This oppressive cheap labour system created immense wealth. By 1910, on a capital issue of only £10 million, annual dividends were £2 to £3 million.⁹⁰¹ Rhodes alone cleared £1 million, mainly from diamonds.⁹⁰² Capital which before 1867 would not come in at 12% now flooded the country at 4% and 5%.⁹⁰³ Thus wages were frozen but capital was thawed. A stream of wealth poured into the coffer of the De Beers Company, formed in 1880,⁹⁰⁴ and then of the vast monopoly formed in March, 1888, when the Great Diamond Amalgamation took place between Rhodes’ De Beer Company and Barney Barnato’s Companies.⁹⁰⁵ In October, 1889, Beit, A. H. G. Grey, Cawston, and the Dukes of Abercorn and Fife formed another monopoly, the British South Africa Chartered Company,⁹⁰⁶ which had colossal powers north of Bechuanaland and west of Portuguese East Africa.⁹⁰⁷ It could promote “*trade, commerce, civilization and good government*,”⁹⁰⁸ acquire by any concession, agreement, grant or treaty all or any rights, interests, authorities, jurisdictions and powers of any kind or nature”⁹⁰⁹ It could acquire and control ships, banks, roads, railways, tele-

895. S. Van der Horst: “Native Labour in S.A.”, p. 69.

896. *Ibid.* p. 80.

897. Rhodes’ Speech in Kimberley, 19th February, 1900.

898. Rhodes’ Speech in House of Assembly, 30th June, 1887.

899. Rhodes’ Speech, 10th September, 1883; Sir J. G. MacDonald: “Rhodes a Heritage”, p. 87.

900. Milner Papers, Vol. 2. Despatch Milner to Chamberlain, 6th December, 1901.

901. S.A. Year Book, 1941, p. 794.

902. W. Plomer: “C. J. Rhodes”.

903. C. W. De Kiewiet: “Social and Economic History of S.A.”

904. S.A. Year Books, 1937 and 1939 editions.

905. Rhodes’ Speech, 31st March, 1888.

906/907/908/909/910. Charter of British S.A. Co., 29th October, 1889: Article 29; Article 1: Article 1; Article 3; Article 24 (ii).

graphs, docks, mines, industries, lands, immigration, trade, agencies, etc.⁹¹⁰ It financed the destruction of Lobengula and Selborne acknowledged its "service" to South Africa and the Empire.⁹¹¹ Out of Kimberley's diamond mines arose the dominance of monopoly capital in South Africa.

THE WITWATERSRAND. GOLD MINES.

The conventions of Kimberley were continued by the Johannesburg mines, and eventually became the fixed laws of South Africa.

The discovery of gold in the Jukskei River in 1853, in the Murchison Range in 1870, at Eersteling in 1871, at Pilgrim's Rest in 1873, at De Kaap in 1882, in the Struben brothers' Confidence Reef at Wilgerspruit in 1884, in the Sheba mine and Barberton in 1885, led to the founding of the gold metropolis of Johannesburg in 1886, and the mining of gold all along the Witwatersrand for a length of 50 miles and to a depth of 7,000 feet underground.⁹¹² By that year 5,000 White prospectors were digging in the Sheba Valley, Barberton.⁹¹³ The next year the mining companies merged into the all-powerful Chamber of Mines, one of the world's largest monopolies and the greatest single employer of labour in one area in the world.⁹¹⁴ The Chamber was controlled by the Gold Producers' Committee, made up of the "heads of the more important mining houses".⁹¹⁵ It controlled vast labour-recruiting agencies: the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, which had powers to recruit African labour in Nyasaland, Barotseland and N. Bechuanaland, and recruits $\frac{1}{4}$ of African mine labour; secondly, the Native Recruiting Corporation which recruits in S. Bechuanaland, Basutoland, Swaziland and the Union and drags in $\frac{3}{4}$ of African mine labour.⁹¹⁶ This vast recruiting organisation swarms over the whole of Southern Africa, right up to the Congo, in an endless search for cheap African labour. Titanic wealth poured into the lap of this colossal monopoly. In 70 years £3,000 million of gold was unearthed by cheap labour⁹¹⁷ as it dug up 1,600,000,000 tons of earth containing 16,000 tons of pure gold, comprising 45% of the total gold production of the whole world.⁹¹⁸ With this immense wealth in their pockets, the mining barons have stood behind State, church, school, press, radio and cinema, moulding not only the lives but also the thoughts of an entire country.

The Chamber of Mines adopted the Kimberley cheap labour policy, saying: "*Your committee strongly recommends the companies to render all the assistance in their power towards helping the managers to combine for the purpose of controlling and cheapening Native labour.*"⁹¹⁹ African wages were frozen at about £3 a month, where they remain to this day. The compound system, pass laws and prohibition were introduced. White workers were used to police the cheap labour force. The miners were divided along tribal lines, under "boss-boys" and indunas, managers and superintendents in a modern concentration-camp system. White unions were legalised, after some petty struggles,⁹²⁰ but African trade unions were illegal. The non-productivity of White miners is shown by the fact that from 1903 to 1906 they increased by 38% (from 13,000 to 18,000) but in this period production

911. Selborne Memorandum, 1908, p. 144.

912. Natural and Historical Monuments Commission Report, February, 1940.

913. S.A. Year Book, 1941, p. 806.

914. *Ibid.* p. 780.

915/916/917/918. S.A. Year Book, 1946, chapter 22; also Monthly Bulletins of Statistics.

919. S. Van der Horst: "Native Labour in S.A.", p. 130.

920. W. H. Andrews: "Class Struggles in S. Africa"; Rev. M. Cadman: "Socialism for S. Africa".

The LAND—LABOUR—FRANCHISE—EDUCATION ACT OF 1894.

Before the Act, "*for years determined efforts had been made in Parliament and out of it to dispossess the Glen Grey Natives of the area within their occupation*".⁹⁴⁰ The immediate aim of the 1894 Act was to drive the peasants off the land.

This was done by means of a seeming paradox: to grant individual tenure. But this cut up the communal land and made the majority landless. The Act cut the land up into *small* lots of from 1½ to 20 morgen. The titles were worthless, for they could not be sold without Government consent; could not be sub-let; could be confiscated and re-allotted if the owner stole or did not till the soil; could not be sub-divided; could be inherited only by the first-born, and the other sons had to go out to work; no one could own more than one lot.⁹⁴¹ Furthermore, the land was made a financial burden: a tax of 2d. per £ was imposed (huge for rural areas);⁹⁴² a quit-rent of 10/- to 15/- a year was levied; a labour tax of 10/- for young males was imposed (later repealed—the other measures had the desired effect of smoking labour off the land, and this tax became redundant); transfer fees were enforced, many having escaped these after the 1879 Act referred to above.⁹⁴³

Rhodes explained the purpose of his land clauses: "*Every black man cannot have three acres and a cow. We have to face the question and it must be brought home to them that in the future nine-tenths of them will have to spend their lives in daily labour, in physical work, in manual labour.*"⁹⁴⁴ Complaining of conditions before his Act, he said: "*We do not teach them the dignity of labour. . . . They never go out to work . . . it is our duty as a Government to remove these poor children from this life of sloth and laziness and to give them some gentle stimulus to come forth and find out the dignity of labour.*"⁹⁴⁵ Cheap labour was the undisguised aim of the land clauses of the Act.

His cheap labour had to be righteous: "*We have given them no share in the Government—and I think rightly too*", he said.⁹⁴⁶ The allotments were intended to smoke out cheap labour, not to grant a vote: "*They are,*" he said, "*still children . . . insofar as that land is concerned the Native has no right to claim a vote for it.*"⁹⁴⁷ Instead of the franchise he introduced the Bunga system of segregated, dummy toy-councils: "*Now I say the Natives are children. They are just emerging from barbarism. They have human minds and I would like them to devote themselves wholly to the local matters that surround them and appeal to them.*"⁹⁴⁸ He therefore formed local "councils", made up of a White magistrate and nominated or "elected" Africans, whose task was to tax and help oppress the people. Thus Rhodes diverted the wrath of the peasants from the Government and also achieved his ideal of "cheap government". The people had to work their own oppression. They were driven off the land, while the "councillors" were bribed with fraudulent "individual tenure".

Taxes paid to the local councils provided, inter alia, for "Native Education". This was deliberately starved to prevent the rise of a non-labouring class of "agitators". Criticising the missions, Rhodes said: "*They are turning out Kaffir parsons. . . . They are turning out a dangerous class.*"

940. R. W. Rose-Innes: "Glen Grey Act, etc.", p. 12.

941. Glen Grey Act No. 25 of 1894.

942. J. J. Kelly. Letters to Rhodes and Press, 10th April, 1894, to 8th May, 1895.

943. S.A. Year Book, 1941, p. 419.

944/5/6/7/8/9/1950. Rhodes' Speech, 30th July, 1894.

These people will not go back to work."⁹⁴⁹ He preferred Grey's system of "industrial" schools, which trained the Africans for "manual labour". The African must be denied academic education, "*otherwise these Kaffir parsons would develop into agitators against the Government*", said Rhodes.⁹⁵⁰

These land, labour, franchise and educational principles of the Glen Grey Act remain the corner-stone of Government policy in all four spheres up to the present time.

NATION-WIDE EXTENSION OF THE ACT.

In October, 1894, the Glen Grey Act was proclaimed to be operative in Idutywa, Tsomo, Butterworth and Ngamakwe.⁹⁵¹ The missionaries helped to apply the Act: "*On the whole the system had worked well among the mission or station people*", wrote Rose-Innes.⁹⁵² These four areas, joined by Kentani in 1899, formed the Transkei General Council. In 1903 the seven districts of Tembuland and Griqualand East were joined to the Transkeian Council and its name was enlarged to the Transkei Territories General Council (Bunga), which met annually in Umtata.⁹⁵³ In 1911 West Pondoland was included, and the Pondoland General Council was formed, under which East Pondoland fell after 1927.⁹⁵⁴ In November, 1930, the Pondoland and Transkei Councils were fused into the United Transkeian Territories General Council.⁹⁵⁵ Under the 1920 Native Affairs Act the Glen Grey idea could be applied to any "native area".⁹⁵⁶ After 1927 the Act was extended over other parts of the Cape: Mafeking, Kingwilliams-town, Victoria East and Peddie in 1927; East London in 1932; Queenstown in 1937; Taung in 1940. In 1934 the Ciskeian General Council was set up.⁹⁵⁷ The Act spread to Natal (Msinga, 1928) and to the Transvaal (Sebediela's Location, 1927; Sekukuni's Location, 1928; Masibi's Location, 1929; Moila's Reserve, 1929; Pietersberg, 1934; Letaba, 1939; Rustenburg, 1940, etc.⁹⁵⁸ It spread to the O.F.S. (Witzieshoek, Thaba Nchu, Seliba) on the basis of a 1907 O.F.S. Ordinance,⁹⁵⁹ consolidated in 1940.⁹⁶⁰ Here the Native Commissioners were helped by D.R.C. and Methodist missionaries. Missions ran special councils by an Act of 1909⁹⁶¹ and councils (mainly for Coloureds) were formed at Shiloh, Mamre, Goshen, Enon, Zoar, Pniel, Genadendal, Ebenezer, Colonie, Leliefontein, Concordia, Steinkopf and Kommagas.⁹⁶² The Act was indeed a Native Bill for all South Africa.

POPULAR RESISTANCE.

The Act was resisted, which proves that the peasants saw in it not individual tenure, but dispossession. Rose-Innes admitted that: "*the peaceable industrious natives viewed it with grave suspicion*"⁹⁶³ and that: "*we find the professional agitator making his appearance*".⁹⁶⁴ A resident said: "*The natives are so dissatisfied, the bulk of them, that it is doubtful if they will take up the titles*".⁹⁶⁵ A missionary said: ". . . the Tembu . . . were

951. Proclamation, 4th October, 1894.

952. R. W. Rose-Innes (*supra* 940), p. 12.

953/4. S.A. Year Book, 1941, p. 408.

955. Proclamation No. 279, 18th November, 1930.

956. Native Affairs Act No. 23 of 1920.

957. Proclamation No. 34 of 1934.

958. S.A. Year Book, 1941, p. 412.

959. O.F.S. Ordinance No. 6 of 1907.

960. Proclamation No. 164 of 1940.

961. Act No. 29 of 1909.

962. S.A. Year Book, 1941, p. 415.

963. *Supra*, 940, p. 18.

964. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

965. J. J. Kelly to "Cape Times", 13th February, 1895.

very much dissatisfied with the working of the Act".⁹⁶⁶ The people opposed not only the land but also the Bunga Council clauses. Thus a Liberal-influenced African paper wrote: "By all accounts the Government proclamation of the local government provisions have not been well received by the Natives in the Transkei, and in one case, at Tsomo, the magistrate had to resort to blustering language to coerce the people to acquiesce", and that: "So strong is the opposition in the Transkei and the Glen Grey against the Glen Grey Act that they have resolved to have nothing to do with the whole or any portion of the enactment".⁹⁶⁷ Peasants complained that headmen were favoured; that old men who had paid taxes for a long time had been robbed of their land. Many rejected allotments and the labour tax.⁹⁶⁸ Resistance crumbled when the headmen sold out: "The headmen, who have always been looked upon as the mouthpiece of the people, are effectually silenced by the sop of from 20 to 30 morgen of land. . . . Well may the Native cry; we have been robbed and gagged."⁹⁶⁹

EFFECT OF ACT.

The Act drove the peasants off the land. For instance: "The Resident Magistrate of Butterworth, in his report for 1902 to the Government, says that he estimates three out of every four able-bodied men throughout his district have gone out to work."⁹⁷⁰ In addition the peasants had been expropriated: "No more titles are to be issued in the future. Why? There is no more land to survey."⁹⁷¹ Their communal holdings became labour-reservoirs: "The principle of the Act", wrote Rose-Innes, "necessarily involves the creation of purely Native Reserves. . . . This principle must be maintained against every species of opposition. . . . We shall in time be compelled to create more of such areas as 'RESERVOIRS OF LABOUR'"⁹⁷² (my emphasis). Thus, before even the last shots of the land-wars had died away, the conquerors were framing land-laws to expropriate, exploit and disfranchise the conquered. Their next task was to close their ranks, to build a united White oligarchy on the backs of the conquered, dispossessed, exploited, disfranchised Africans. The complete form of this unity was the Union of South Africa. While Glen Grey, chiefly, was the basic pattern of economic exploitation, the Act of Union was the basic pattern of political oppression.

966. Rev. E. J. Warren to "Cape Times", 15th April, 1895.

967. "Imvo Zabantsundu", 17th October, 1884 (see popular analysis of Bunga system in "Boycott the Bunga Sham", by the Transkei Organised Bodies, 15th September, 1950).

968. J. J. Kelly to C. J. Rhodes, 16th March, 1895.

969. J. J. Kelly to "Cape Times", 20th February, 1895; also 6th March, 1895.

970. *Supra.* 940, p. 31.

971. *Ibid.* p. 42.

972. *Ibid.* p. 30.

SECTION II. DISFRANCHISEMENT.

CHAPTER XXXVIII. THE ACT OF UNION.

The South Africa Act of 1909, passed and proclaimed in Westminster, came into force from the 31st of May, 1910.⁹⁷³ Under the Sovereign Guidance of "Almighty God" (section 1) the (Whites of the) Cape, Natal, Transvaal and Free State were united into one legislative union (section 4). A member of Parliament had to be a "*British subject of European descent*" (section 44). A Senator had to be a "*British subject of European descent*"⁹⁷⁴ (section 26d). The old colonial voting laws, which excluded Non-Europeans in Transvaal and Free State from voting, which practically excluded the Africans and Indians in Natal, which loaded the vote with income, property and literacy qualifications against the Non-Europeans in the Cape and the Coloureds of Natal, these were retained (section 36) and entrenched by a clause which needed a two-thirds majority of both Houses to change them (section 35). Thus the Non-Europeans were denied the right to elect or be elected to the Central Parliament.

The Act said: "*No person who at the passing of any such law is registered as a voter in any province shall be removed from the register by reason only of any disqualification based on race or colour.*" Despite this "safeguard" the Africans were struck off the Cape common roll in 1936;⁹⁷⁵ the Cape Coloured and African vote was relatively halved when only White women were given the vote in 1930;⁹⁷⁶ it was further reduced when the qualifications (income, etc.) were lifted from White males, but not from Non-Europeans, in 1931;⁹⁷⁷ and Coloured "voters" were placed on a segregated roll in 1951.⁹⁷⁸ The pre-Union position of almost total votelessness was preserved by the Act of Union not only for Parliament, but also for Provincial Councils and municipalities (sections 70 to 91).

The Act segregated the Non-Europeans *judicially*: the principle of "Native Law" was accepted (sections 96 to 116) and applied in 1917 to Natal,⁹⁷⁹ and after 1927 to the Cape, O.F.S.⁹⁸⁰ and throughout the country.

The Act segregated the Non-Europeans *administratively*. A Native Affairs Department was provided for (section 147), as well as separate administration for Indians. A Coloured Affairs Department was formed on this model in 1943. For ten years after Union there would be four White Senators appointed because they knew the "*reasonable wants and wishes of the coloured races in South Africa*" (section 24). Discrimination in the sale of liquor (schedule 15) and pass laws (schedule 18) were provided for.

This Act drove the Non-Europeans out of the body politic. This oppression was the lower side of the coin of Union. The upper side was White Democracy, White Supremacy, White Union.

973. S. Africa Act, 1909. Assented to on 20th September, 1909; proclaimed royally on 2nd December, 1909; operative from 31st May, 1910.

974. "British" amended to "Union National" in Act 69 of 1934, Section 6.

975. Act 12 of 1936, Section 44.

976. Act 18 of 1930.

977. Act 41 of 1931.

978. Separate Representation of Voters Act, 1951.

979. Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, 1917.

980. Native Administration Act No. 38 of 1927, Sections 10 and 13.

WHITE UNION—A BRITISH IDEA.

The apartheid Act of Union was a British rather than a Boer product, both in conception and in execution.

SIR GEORGE GREY, 1858.

Grey, Governor from 1854 to 1861, advocated White Federation in 1858. He said both Boer and British colonists "*have the same sympathies, the same prejudices, the same habits, and frequently the same feelings regarding the Native races*".⁹⁸¹ White Unity was necessary for military reasons: "*If a state is successful in the war it is waging, a Native race will be broken up, and none can tell what territories its dispersed hordes may fall upon. Nor can the other states be assured that the Coloured tribes generally will not sympathise in the war, and that a general rising may not take place. . . . The smallness and weakness of the states, the knowledge that they are isolated bodies . . . has encouraged the Natives to resist and dare them. . . . Their revenues will be so small that they cannot efficiently provide for their protection. Hence a new incentive is given to the surrounding Native races to attack them*".⁹⁸² Grey's plan for White unity arose out of and mirrored the dominant factor of the time—the wars of dispossession.

CARNARVON, 1875.

The rise of the diamond mines caused the idea of White unity to evolve a step further. Lord Carnarvon, British Colonial Secretary from 1874 to 1878, sounded South African settlers through James Anthony Froude. In January, 1874, Disraeli, his Premier, called for colonial expansion and Confederation in South Africa. In May, 1875, Carnarvon sent a despatch to the Cape advocating Confederation. Some Boers like J. H. Hofmeyr, De Villiers and Brand, were keen, but generally his plan was coldly received. He tried to force federation by annexing the Transvaal through Shepstone in 1877. Though this saved the Boers from Sekukuni, it did not produce an immediate White union. Carnarvon's reasons for federation were already political-administrative, i.e. higher than Grey's. He said: "*The most urgent reason for general union is the formidable character of the Native question and the importance of a uniform, wise and strong policy in dealing with it*".⁹⁸³ In 82 sections, Carnarvon divided South Africa into provinces, suggested two Houses, a Governor-General, Presidents for each Province, and "*due representation of the Natives*".⁹⁸⁴ It was a preview of the Act of Union.

CECIL RHODES, 1880-1900.

The opening of the gold mines, the ending of the wars, and the need to drive out and regiment more cheap labour caused the idea of White union to evolve yet a step further. Cecil John Rhodes was the next instrument of this process. He declared "*I believe in a United States of South Africa, but as a portion of the British Empire*".⁹⁸⁵ He wanted England to

981/2. Sir G. Grey: Despatch to Sec. of State, 19th November, 1858.

983. Carnarvon Despatch to H.C., May, 1875.

984. E. Wa'ker: "Lord De Villiers and his Times", pp. 128, 129.

985. S. G. Millin: "Rhodes", p. 61

use the Boers as her managers and policemen: "*The principle must be recognised in the Old Country*", he said in 1881, "*that people born and bred in this Colony and descended from those who existed in this country many generations ago, are much better capable of dealing with the various matters that arise than people who have to dictate from some thousands of miles away.*"⁹⁸⁶ Many Boers had now accepted the idea. Thus de Villiers said he hoped for "*a Confederation of all the States and Colonies of South Africa under the British Crown . . . subjection to British rule is quite consistent with self-government.*"⁹⁸⁷ Rhodes' White Union was based on disfranchisement of Africans, but on "*equal rights for every White man South of the Zambesi*"⁹⁸⁸ (To bribe Kimberley's Coloured voters he later changed "White" to "civilized"⁹⁸⁹) Earl Grey heard Rhodes "*Bugle call for equal rights and closer union*",⁹⁹⁰ and Lord Milner, Governor of the Cape from April, 1897, to March, 1901, and then Governor of the Transvaal and O.F.S. until April, 1905, replied: "*It is an excellent cry*".⁹⁹¹

ALFRED MILNER AND THE BOER WAR.

Milner, on the eve of fighting the Boers, understood that the Anglo-Boer war had *White Unity* as its chief aim. In November, 1899, he wrote: "*One thing is quite evident. The ultimate end is a self-governing White community supported by well-treated and justly governed black labour, from Cape Town to Zambesi.*"⁹⁹² Conversely, on the eve of war, he and Chamberlain ignored Non-European rights.⁹⁹³ Milner said: "*The Anglo-Dutch friction is bad enough. But it is child's play compared with the antagonism of White and Black.*"⁹⁹⁴ The war was a White family quarrel. Thus Chamberlain told Milner: "*The Queen wishes them*" (*the Non-Europeans*) "*to remain within their own borders as this war is a White man's affair.*"⁹⁹⁵ But, in case of necessity, Milner could use Black troops: "*. . . they may of course protect their own property against forcible seizure by the Boers*".⁹⁹⁶ It was not sentiment but necessity that inspired Milner to work for union with the Boers, for whom he had no high regard. Thus he wrote during the war: "*We have absolutely smashed up the armies of the enemy and his political organisation; a more highly organised and advanced political entity would be annihilated by the loss of its capital, treasury, archives and the whole machinery of Government. But, with their primitive social and political conditions, the Boers can go on merrily for a long time without any of these (which only seem to embarrass them), just as low types of animal organisms will long survive injuries which would kill organisms of a higher type outright.*"⁹⁹⁷ But, because of the common interests of Briton and Boer, Milner tried for two years to bring federation about peacefully, negotiated in May-June, 1899, with Kruger, and only when these methods were exhausted did he resort to war.

In preparing for war Milner took good care to prevent Africans on the south-west border of Transvaal from arming against the Boer Republic. This was admitted even by the Boers.⁹⁹⁸ At one time Milner feared arming

986. C. J. Rhodes' Speech, 18th July, 1881.

987. De Villiers to Pres. Brand, 20th March, 1871 (*supra* 984, p. 50).

988. Rhodes' Speech, 18th July, 1899.

989. Plomer: "C. J. Rhodes", p. 132.

990. Milner Papers (C. Headlam, 1933), Vol. 1. Earl Grey to Milner, 10th May, 1897.

991. Milner to Grey, 6th June, 1897.

992. Milner to P. Fitzpatrick, 28th November, 1899.

993. Chamberlain to Milner, 2nd September, 1899.

994. Milner Papers (South Africa; C. Headlam, Ed.), Vol. 1. p. 180.

995/6. Chamberlain to Milner, 5th September, 1899.

997. Milner to Haldane, 21st January, 1901.

998. Report by P. J. Rickert to Rustenberg Police Commissioner, 15th September, 1899. (Milner

Cape Colonists for fear this "might lead to a conflict of Whites within the Colony and to subsequent unrest and perhaps rebellion on the part of the Natives".⁹⁹⁹ In September, 1899, Milner warned the Governor of Natal and the Commissioner of Basutoland to restrain the Africans "from violence" (against the Boers).¹⁰⁰⁰ In November, 1899, Sir M. Clarke warned the Africans under Linchwe not to attack the Boers.¹⁰⁰¹ Linchwe ignored the warning, attacked his Boer enemies, and the British decided: "we will run no risk whatever of any repetition of such an occurrence".¹⁰⁰² When Boers threatened to invade Griqualand East and the Transkei, Milner was forced by military weakness to threaten to use African forces merely to defend the British there.¹⁰⁰³ He used "Native levies" to frighten off the Boers, to end "unrest" among the Africans,¹⁰⁰⁴ and as scouts. By hardly using African military potential, Milner risked a long, costly war, and imported 170,000 troops for the sake of his political principles of White Unity and equality,¹⁰⁰⁵ and his belief that "A political equality of white and black is impossible".¹⁰⁰⁶ While England oppressed the Africans during the war itself, Lord Salisbury said of his Boer enemy in January, 1900 (during war): "The white races will be put upon an equality".¹⁰⁰⁷ Milner's idea of African "loyalty" was that they should not attack the Boers. For this reason alone he thanked Lerothidi (Sotho chief) for "the loyalty shown by the Paramount Chief and the great bulk of the Basutos".¹⁰⁰⁸ On the other hand, he said: "I am all for a policy of conciliation when war is over, for letting bygones be bygones, for treating Dutch like British."¹⁰⁰⁹

MILNER AND VEREENIGING.

After British victories in the O.F.S. and Transvaal, Milner, though still harassed by Boer guerillas, proposed to *rehabilitate* the conquered Boers on their half-destroyed land.¹⁰¹⁰ The same England that dispossessed the conquered African gave land to the conquered Boer. At the same time Milner insisted that the conquered and other Whites remain exploiting masters, that "The unskilled labour of this country must be black"¹⁰¹¹ and that pass laws, etc., must continue.¹⁰¹²

Long before the Vereeniging Peace Milner and the British Government had decided that, instead of the defeated paying the usual reparations, England should indemnify, compensate and rehabilitate the Boers,¹⁰¹³ whom England wanted to convert into her foremen and police in South Africa. After the Vereeniging Peace Treaty, England gave £16½ millions to the defeated Boers.¹⁰¹⁴ This money, said Milner, would come mainly from the gold mines, i.e. from the wealth produced by the Africans.¹⁰¹⁵ Rehabilitation was actually a clause of the Vereeniging Treaty¹⁰¹⁶ which Milner rightly

Papers, Vol. 1, p. 485.)

999. Milner to Chamberlain, 6th September, 1899.
 1000. Milner Papers, Vol. 1, p. 538.
 1001. Sir Marshall Clarke to Linchwe, 22nd November, 1899.
 1002. Sir A. Lawley to H.C., 14th December, 1899.
 1003. Milner to General R. Buller, 6th November, 1899.
 1004. Milner Papers, Vol. 2, p. 21.
 1005. Milner to Chamberlain, 30th November, 1899.
 1006. Milner to Rev. J. Green, 12th December, 1901.
 1007. Milner Papers, p. 39 (Chamberlain Despatch to S.A.).
 1008. Milner to Sir G. Lagden, 25th March, 1900.
 1009. Milner to Chamberlain, 17th January, 1900.
 1010. Milner to General Pretymann, 20th June, 1900.
 1011. Milner to Chamberlain, 9th May, 1900.
 1012. Milner to Chamberlain, 23rd May, 1900.
 1013. Milner Papers, Vol. 2.
 1014. Milner Papers, Vol. 2, p. 373.
 1015. Milner to Chamberlain, 6th February, 1901.
 1016. Treaty of Vereeniging, 31st May, 1902. Article 10.

called "surely one of the strangest documents in history".¹⁰¹⁷ Milner told a deputation of Coloured "loyalists" that he "thoroughly agreed that it was not race or colour, but civilization, which was the test of a man's capacity for political rights".¹⁰¹⁸ Yet at the preliminary peace meeting in Middelberg in 1901, Lord Kitchener, on the authority of Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, told Louis Botha: "As regards the extension of the franchise to Kaffirs in the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies, it was not the intention of His Majesty's Government to give such franchise before Representative Government is granted to these colonies, and IF then granted" (my emphasis) "it will be limited to secure the just preponderance of the White race."¹⁰¹⁹ And Clause 8 of Vereeniging said: "The question of granting the franchise to Natives will not be decided until after the introduction of self-government", for which clause Milner said: "I must, of course, bear my full share of the responsibility".¹⁰²⁰ Thus Milner coupled self-government for the Boers with disfranchisement of the Non-Europeans.

CUSTOMS CONFERENCE AND MILNER.

To further build the economic base of White unity Milner organised a Customs Conference at Bloemfontein in March, 1903. There, inter alia, it was decided to import Asian cheap labour and to view African labour on a national scale.¹⁰²¹ He assured his Boer allies of an ample supply of cheap labour. With regard to the imported Chinese, they were shut out from 57 skilled categories, and the White workers, led by Creswell, also moved into the expanding ambit of White Unity. In July, 1905, the Pretoria Trades Council accepted "white manhood suffrage". In 1903 the British in the Transvaal and O.F.S. excluded all Non-Europeans from the municipal vote.¹⁰²² In 1904 Milner proposed segregated dummy representation along Glen-Grey lines: "It does seem to me to be worth considering," he said, "a separate Native Council; composed of Natives, elected by Natives."¹⁰²³ Further, he said: "I never can see why the property and education tests need be identical for Black and White. I should deliberately and quite frankly make them higher for the Black."¹⁰²⁴ A Native Affairs Commission, under the Britishers, Sir Godfrey Lagden, Sir Thomas Scanlan, Sir Herbert Sloley plus Col. W. E. Stanford, advocated separate "Native Representation" during its sittings (1903-1905). After importing Chinese, Milner declared: "The Asiatics are strangers forcing themselves upon a community reluctant to receive them",¹⁰²⁵ and anti-Indian laws followed (immigration, registration, finger-prints, trading). Having attacked Indian, Coloured and African, and rehabilitated the Boers, Milner outlined a scheme for White Union, suggested Selborne as his successor¹⁰²⁶ (which Balfour accepted), carefully told Selborne how to work with the Boers, especially with Smuts and Botha,¹⁰²⁷ and departed for England with Smuts' "Bon Voyage" ringing in his ears.¹⁰²⁸ He had won over the Boer leaders to his idea of White Union.

SELBORNE-RAILWAY CONVENTION.

In November, 1906, the dead Rhodes' aide, Starr Jameson, sent Selborne, the new Governor (April, 1905-May, 1910) of the ex-Republic, a despatch

1017. Milner Letter, 31st May, 1902.

1018. Milner to Coloured Deputation, 7th January, 1901.

1019. Cape Coloured Commission Report (1937), p. 222, para. 1103.

1020. *Ibid.* Paragraph 1108.

1021. Milner Papers, Vol. 2.

1022. Cape Coloured Commission Report, O.F.S. Ordinance 35, Section 19c.

1023/4. Milner to H. Ramsay-Collins, 7th September, 1904.

1025. J. H. Hofmeyr: "South Africa".

1026. Milner to Balfour, 10th February, 1904.

1027. Milner to Selborne, 14th April, 1905.

1028. Smuts to Milner, 2nd April, 1905.

from his Progressive Party in the Cape. He said that a settlement of the railway issue would bring them "to the borderline of the larger question of political unification". In January, 1907, Selborne replied in a famous despatch largely drafted by Lionel Curtis, Kerr Duncan and others from Milner's kindergarten, which stressed that political union would solve economic, transport and "Native" problems. Through Botha and Smuts' "Het Volk" party, through the granting of self-government to the Boers (1906), through arming the Boers against Chinese and Africans, Selborne had won a great control over the Boers. Steyn and Botha joined the Natal Jingoos and Cape Liberals in May, 1908, when the "Railway Conference" decided that "the best interests of the permanent prosperity of South Africa can only be secured by an early union". Further, the conference called for a "National South African Convention, whose object shall be to consider and report on the most desirable form of South African Union and to prepare a draft Constitution". Selborne, "by his personal influence with the leading politicians in South Africa . . . was mainly instrumental in bringing about the meeting of the National Union Convention".¹⁰²⁹

SELBORNE—THE NATIONAL CONVENTION.

All parties and politicians danced to Selborne's tune—"Het Volk", Orange Unie, Natalians, Progressive Party, the Afrikaner Bond; Botha, Smuts, Steyn, Malan, Hertzog, Hofmeyr, De Villiers, Sauer—these Boer leaders joined hands with the old instruments of Britain, the Cape Liberals, to build White (rulers') Unity. Smuts and Botha had become such confidantes of Selborne that in 1907, in London, Lord Haldane and General Methuen could discuss defence with them. As a biographer of Smuts remarked: "One hour's talk with Balfour or Milner was more of an education than a month of reading alone in Irene".¹⁰³⁰ De Villiers, likewise, leaned heavily on Selborne. Thus he asked him during the Convention: "It is very important I should know whether the Home Government would agree to a provision that only persons of European descent shall be eligible as members of either House of the Union Parliament." Selborne replied: "I do not think that His Majesty's Government would object to such a provision. . . . May I suggest in conclusion that the position of the Coloured people should not necessarily be identified with that of the Natives."¹⁰³¹ Thus Selborne taught the Boers how to divide and how to rule.

Four incidents symbolise the fact that England was the mother of White Herrenvolk Unity in South Africa. Firstly, at Westminster, "Not one amendment to the South Africa Act was pressed to a division".¹⁰³² Secondly, when the Convention opened in Durban, 14 out of the 37 delegates bore the title of "Sir" or birthday honours from the King. Thirdly, "a squadron of four of His Majesty's ships were in the Durban harbour, sent to do honour to the eventful gathering. Failure indeed would have been not only a South African but an Imperial disaster."¹⁰³³ And, finally, a message came to Convention: "From the Secretary of State for the Colonies, London—His Majesty has commanded me to ask you to receive and convey to the members of the Convention at Durban an expression of his deep interest in the subject of closer union. . . ." ¹⁰³⁴

1029. E. Walton: "The Inner History of the National Convention", p. 31, 32.

1030. H. C. Armstrong: "Grey Steel" (1939), p. 208.

1031. Selborne to de Villiers, October, 1908 (Walker, *supra* 984, pp. 448, 449).

1032. *Supra*, 984.

1033/4. *Supra*, 1029.

CHAPTER XL.

THE LIBERALS AND UNION.

The Cape Liberals played a double role: as link between England and the Boers, and as link between England and the Non-Europeans. This dual role meant that inside the Convention the Liberals persuaded the Boers to accept Union; and outside Convention they persuaded the Non-Europeans to accept it.

THE LIBERALS INSIDE CONVENTION.

The Cape Liberals came to the Convention with a long record of discrimination. In 1852 the Cape Representative Government loaded the Non-European vote with a £50 income qualification, a £2,000 property qualification to enter the Assembly, a £4,000 total property qualification to enter the Legislative Council, and the non-recognition of tribally-owned land and of income-in-kind as qualifications for a vote (this denied the franchise to the conquered Xhosa).¹⁰³⁵ The anti-African discrimination remained when Kaffraria was annexed in 1865,¹⁰³⁶ but White settlers from this area were given representation in 1867. The qualifications were further loaded against Blacks in the 1887 Parliamentary Registration Bill, which drove thousands off the voters roll. In 1892 the income qualification was raised to £75 and a literacy test introduced.¹⁰³⁷ The 1894 Glen Grey Act furthered the political segregation of the Africans. These measures disfranchised the Non-Europeans almost as effectively as if there were open colour-bar clauses as in the Boer states.

This Cape-Liberal discrimination spread to Natal where Shepstone's franchise laws (already described) were followed in 1883 by a higher income qualification of £96; Africans had to escape from "Native Law" and apply to the Governor before they could vote.¹⁰³⁸ Responsible government in 1893 meant self-rule for the Whites over the Africans and Indians.¹⁰³⁹ The Franchise Amendment Act of 1896 excluded all Africans and Indians from the vote on the grounds that they had not previously had electoral institutions.¹⁰⁴⁰ These laws, plus land and liquor discrimination, were extended in 1897 to Zululand.¹⁰⁴¹ Special anti-Indian poll-taxes (e.g. £3 in 1893) and trading restrictions (e.g. licences granted only to those literate in English) accompanied these franchise laws.

From Natal Shepstone brought anti-African and anti-Indian laws (e.g. Law 3 of 1885) to the Transvaal where, in 1896, anti-Indian registration, finger-print and immigration laws were passed, followed in 1913 by immigration restriction laws. Up to 1910 the colour-bar travelled north. Only

1035. Cape of Good Hope Constitution Ordinance, 3rd April, 1852; amended 11th March, 1853; in force from 1st July, 1853.

1036. Act 3 of 10th October, 1865.

1037. Act 9 of 16th August, 1892.

1038. Natal Franchise Amendment Act 2 of 29th March, 1883.

1039. Responsible Government, Natal, Act 14 of 3rd July, 1893.

1040. Natal Franchise Amendment Act, 23rd May, 1896.

1041. Zululand Annexation, 29th December, 1897 (Eybers, p. 215).

after 1910 did it return southwards, in a more concentrated form. But then it was merely coming home to nest.

Armed with a long tradition of disarming, dispossessing, and disfranchising the Non-Europeans, the Cape Liberals were ably equipped to play a leading role in drafting the colour-bar Act of Union at the National Convention.

(1) The first day the Convention began in Durban the Cape Liberal, John X Merriman, moved: "*That after this date the proceedings of this Convention shall be Absolutely Secret; that no records of any speech be made.*"¹⁰⁴² The reason was that delegates did not want to be "*harassed by demands and interference from without*"¹⁰⁴³ which would come mainly from Non-Europeans. Thus a Cape Liberal moved that the Convention be a secret conspiracy against the Non-Europeans.

(2) The Liberal Merriman moved, followed by Smuts, that: "*It is desirable for the welfare and future progress of South Africa that the several British Colonies be united under one Government in a legislative union under the British Crown.*"¹⁰⁴⁴ Thus a Liberal moved the Act of Union.

(3) Merriman and Sauer wanted equality of Dutch and English and supported Hertzog on this issue.¹⁰⁴⁵ The Liberals agreed with the Boers that, as General Joubert put it: "*Daar is nie plek in Zuid Afrika vir twee base nie.*"¹⁰⁴⁶ The Liberals supported White Unity.

(4) The Liberal Merriman moved that the loaded Cape "vote" and the total denial of the vote in the ex-Republics could "*not be altered except in the manner prescribed for altering the Constitution of the Union*".¹⁰⁴⁷ A Liberal moved Non-European disfranchisement. Another Liberal, Colonel Stanford (a former head of the Cape Native Affairs Department) wanted loaded "*franchise rights irrespective of race or colour*" only, because he regarded the vote as an "*outlet for a grievance . . . a safety valve*"¹⁰⁴⁸ and not as a right, and Liberal Sauer said: "*Justice to the Natives would secure the position of the WHITE MAN in South Africa for all time*"¹⁰⁴⁹ (my emphasis). Smuts supported Merriman's view, which was finally accepted by all delegates.

(5) Cape Liberal Sauer wanted White Unity to oppress the Africans on a national scale: "*The only hope of putting the Native question in South Africa on a satisfactory and PERMANENT basis was to have ONE STRONG CENTRAL Government*"¹⁰⁵⁰ (my emphasis). Later he drafted the infamous 1913 Land Act.

(6) Cape Liberal De Villiers, having received a suggestion from Selborne "*for the creation of an impartial board which should apply a test of civilization to coloured applicants for the Franchise*"¹⁰⁵¹ said: "*Since the members of the suggested board would be Europeans and if all applications for the Franchise had to be passed by such a board there would be no fear of being swamped by Native voters.*"¹⁰⁵² Though this suggestion fell through, De Villiers' remarks revealed his whole Liberal outlook.

1042/3. E. Walton: "The Inner History of the National Convention", p. 36.

1044. *Ibid.* (Clause (a) of motion).

1045. *Ibid.* p. 106.

1046. *Ibid.* p. 335.

1047. *Ibid.* p. 118.

1048. *Ibid.*

1049. *Ibid.* p. 127.

1050. *Ibid.* p. 75.

1051/2. *Ibid.* p. 132.

(7) When Botha said: "*On one point there must be no manner of doubt—they could only have Europeans in Parliament*",¹⁰⁵³ Cape Liberal Jameson agreed that "*their first duty was to bring about Union*" and Cape Liberal Malan said: "*If the white people were divided there was no Union for South Africa.*"¹⁰⁵⁴ Without disagreement the Convention decided that "*Only persons of European descent shall be eligible as members of either House of Parliament.*"¹⁰⁵⁵

(8) The Cape Liberals Sauer and Walton sat on a Drafting Committee to work out the details of disfranchisement and also of *separate "Native Representation"*¹⁰⁵⁶ together with the Boers, Smuts, Fischer and Hertzog, and the Jingoes Fitzpatrick, Coghlan, Smythe and Greene. This committee sifted the various proposals on the franchise.

One of these was a proposal from Selborne himself that (a) *While Whites could vote at 21, only "civilized Blacks" could vote while under 31.* (b) *These and those over 31 "to be given a vote equal in value to one-tenth the vote of a European".* (c) *Their sons when 29 would get one-ninth of a White vote "and so on until in the tenth generation the Non-European is entitled at the age of 21 to a vote of full value".*¹⁰⁵⁷ (d) *A Non-European from a White father would enter the harmonic scale at the age of 26 (instead of 31).* (e) *"A Non-European voter judged by an impartial tribunal to have reverted to Native habits, to lose his vote and his son to start fresh in the progress towards a full vote."*¹⁰⁵⁸ (f) *The prospective voter had to be monogamous.* (g) *speak a "European" language,* (h) *work continuously for a certain time,* (i) *own a certain value of property,* (j) *"habitually" wear clothes.* (k) *and live in a house, not a hut.*¹⁰⁵⁹ The Committee adopted a less involved course of immediate disfranchisement.

(9) The Cape Liberal De Villiers declared that the Senate "*had a particular responsibility for the protection of Native interests and should include men specially selected for that purpose since in three of the Provinces the Natives would be unrepresented*".¹⁰⁶⁰ Having disfranchised the Africans, De Villiers used this to foist segregated "representation" on them!

(10) When he discussed delimitation, Sir Percy Fitzpatrick asked Merriman: "*With regard to the population basis, what population was meant.*" Merriman replied: "*European.*"¹⁰⁶¹ Thus Merriman did not seriously intend even the Cape Non-Europeans to be half-voters.

(11) Merriman moved that voters for the Provincial Councils should be voters for Parliament. Thus the Cape Liberals disfranchised the Non-Europeans not only nationally, but also provincially. By moving that only voters could enter Provincial Councils he further disfranchised the Non-Europeans outside the Cape and left those in the Cape with a hollow consolation, a "safety valve".

These were the achievements of Cape Liberalism in the National Convention which drafted the Act of Union.

THE LIBERALS OUTSIDE CONVENTION.

Inside the Convention they drafted the Act of Union, outside they were "champions of Non-European rights".

1053. *Ibid.* p. 136.

1054. *Ibid.* p. 143.

1055. *Ibid.* p. 155.

1056/7/8/9. *Ibid.* pp. 146, 148.

1060. *Ibid.* p. 162.

1061. *Ibid.* p. 170.

In January, 1908, Walton, Jameson, F. S. Malan and Merriman promised Coloured leaders that they would never agree to the colour-bar clauses of the Draft Act.¹⁰⁶² Liberals Schreiner, Sir W. B. Barry and Sauer declared themselves similarly, and, in any case, influenced their instruments like Abdurahman, to beg for rights only for the Coloured people.¹⁰⁶³ Schreiner headed off popular opposition by dragging a Coloured deputation to London.

This deputation arrived while *other Liberals*, Merriman, De Villiers, J. H. Hofmeyr and Sauer (together with Smuts and Botha) were in London *to see the draft Act through Westminster*. When the "Coloured" deputation met the Colonial Secretary Crewe, he told them "*the reason why he did not care to interfere in the matter was because the Cape Colony delegates*" (i.e. the **LIBERALS**) "*had pressed upon him the absolute necessity for passing the Bill as it stood*".¹⁰⁶⁴ Thus the Coloured deputation became a football for the British and the two Liberal groups in London. Schreiner led his disappointed delegation back and said in September, 1909, "*that the hopes they cherished WOULD BE REALISED. They had the Prime Minister of England and the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies expressing their conviction, almost amounting to certainty, that THEIR WISHES WOULD BE MET, and that the South African Parliament would, BEFORE LONG, move in the direction they desired*"¹⁰⁶⁵ (my emphasis). While the Liberals were pushing the Act through, they fed the Non-Europeans on false hopes and empty promises. Their work enabled England to build the first totalitarian state of the twentieth century.

1062. Merriman Speech, 17th January, 1908 (Cape Coloured Commission Report, p. 225, para. 1115).

1063. Resolution at Conference, Cape Town, April, 1909 (*ibid.*, p. 225, para. 1117).

1064. *Ibid.* p. 227, para. 1130.

1065. *Ibid.* p. 228, para. 1142.

SECTION III.

“A SYSTEM OF DESPOTISM”.

CHAPTER XLI.

THE 1911 MINES AND WORKS ACT.

From 1910 on a massive pile of laws was passed to consolidate the conquest, dispossession, enslavement and disfranchisement of the Non-Europeans. In all the laws and events which thus completed the “system of despotism” two basic intertwining principles of rule will be detected: (1) (a) *To subject all Non-Europeans;* (b) *To divide the Non-Europeans;* (c) *To prevent the development of a Non-European settled working class and peasantry;* and (2) *Conversely to these three policies (a) to elevate, (b) unite and (c) permit the full economic stratification of the Europeans.* Democracy for all Whites was built up on totalitarianism for all Blacks.

The first major measure after Union was the 1911 Mines and Works Act.¹⁰⁶⁶ This Act was mainly the work of Jan Christian Smuts, then Minister of Mines in the first Botha Cabinet. Smuts, Boer-bred product of Rhodes, Milner and Selborne (all of whom he had served), towered over South African politics from Union until his death in 1950. He once expressed his guiding principle thus: *“There are certain things about which all South Africans are agreed, all parties and all sections except those who are quite mad. The first is that it is a fixed policy to maintain White Supremacy in South Africa”*.¹⁰⁶⁷ His hand was guided by the mining barons and shaped nearly all oppressive laws for 40 years.

His 1911 Mines and Works Act (and amendments) issued certificates of competency to Europeans as mine managers, overseers, surveyors, engineers, engine drivers, boiler attendants and blasters.¹⁰⁶⁸ It shut 32 skilled jobs to Africans by statute and 19 by “convention”.¹⁰⁶⁹ A 1926 amendment allowed *“Europeans, Coloureds, Mauritiens, Creoles, Malays and St. Helena’s”* to do skilled work, but the 1922 Apprenticeship Act, educational segregation at industrial and technical schools and the 1924-5 White Labour Policy effectively shut out *all* Non-Europeans from recognition as skilled workers.

This Act continued the policy of White Union. It brought into the White Front the skilled White workers. Later the 1925 White Labour Policy drew the unskilled White workers into the united European front aimed at and resting upon Black labour. As Hofmeyr wrote: *“The great majority of wage-earners in South Africa are Native, Asiatic or Coloured.*

1066. Act No. 12 of 1911.

1067. House of Assembly, 13th March, 1945.

1068. Regulations 296 to 326, chap. 27, part 4.

1069. Low Grade Mines Commission No. 34 of 1920.

They are the proletarians upon whose shoulders is borne the South African White Aristocracy of Labour."¹⁰⁷⁰ This applied both to English and Afrikaans Whites, the former forming 65% of the miners in 1911.¹⁰⁷¹ As De Villiers noted long before the Act, "*The typical English colonists . . . demanded . . . a more vigorous policy in respect of the Natives than the old Dutch colonists did*".¹⁰⁷² It was not surprising therefore to find the predominantly English Trade Union Federation, formed in 1911, supporting the above Act. Bill Andrews, one of its founders and later a founder of the Communist Party, demanded more jobs for Whites on the mines and said that "*the Coloured people and Natives should be kept in their own territories*".¹⁰⁷³ The Labour Party used the slogan "*equal pay for equal work*" to shut the Non-Europeans out of skilled jobs. Andrews favoured opening White unions to Coloureds (on a basis of inferiority), but not to Africans, justifying this "divide and rule" tactic as "*a logical step in the pursuit of the White ideal*".¹⁰⁷⁴ This White Labour Aristocrat had taken his ideas from Selborne who had stated that the Coloured man "*who ought to be a permanent support to the influence of the white man, is tempted to turn his face backwards to a more sympathetic understanding with that native population from which he is, in so large a part, derived*".¹⁰⁷⁵

The effect of the Act was not to keep Africans out of work, but to deny them the status and pay of skilled workers. Despite his cheap-labour status, the African miner's output rose from 500 tons a year in 1914 (using the heavy reciprocating machine drill) to 1,600 tons a year in 1930 (using the light jack-hammer drill). African labour is the only economically productive labour on the mines: for the average African miner produces *three times* as much value as he receives in wages; while the White "miner" produces *one-fifth* of the value of his wages.¹⁰⁷⁶ The fact that Black labour subsidises White unproductive labour, plus the shutting out of Black labour from skilled jobs, produces a productivity in South Africa which is *one-third* of that in England. Even in industry Black labour produces *three and a half times* as much value as it receives back in wages, while White labour produces *slightly less* than it receives.¹⁰⁷⁷ The industrial colour bar strangled the workers and the productive development of South Africa.

1070. Hofmeyr: "S. Africa", p. 270.

1071. S.A. Year Book, 1941.

1072. Lord de Villiers Speech at Cannon St. Hotel, London. "Cape Times", 8th June, 1888.

1073. W. Andrews Speech, April, 1913 (E. Roux: "Time Longer than Rope", p. 133).

1074. W. Andrews Speech, Germiston, 1913 (*ibid.*).

1075. Selborne Memorandum, pp. 16, 17.

1076/7. Union Government Monthly Bulletins of Statistics, May 1950, *et seq.*

CHAPTER XLII.

THE 1911 LABOUR REGULATION ACT.

Having defined Black labour as cheap labour, the mining barons set about satisfying their insatiable appetite for this cheap labour. Accordingly, their instrument, the Botha Cabinet, including the Liberal H. Burton, then Minister of Native Affairs, introduced the Native Labour Regulation Act in 1911.¹⁰⁷⁸

This Act placed African labour under the Native Affairs Department, set up under Section 147 of the South Africa Act. A Director of Native Labour, in Johannesburg, was put in charge of Native Commissioners, Inspectors, and Pass Officers. These had limited judicial powers, controlled compounded miners, conditions of employment, housing and food. The Director could repatriate Africans and issued licences to recruiting agencies and compound managers. Labour districts were proclaimed in the four provinces. To protect the farmers, recruiters were barred from recruiting in certain areas.

Working in terms of this Act, the Chamber of Mines recruiters drew 100,000 Africans from Portuguese East Africa;¹⁰⁷⁹ recruited Black labour from tropical Africa, where it ultimately gained almost unlimited powers to recruit,¹⁰⁸⁰ and from the Protectorates and the Union. As further laws drove Africans off the land, the percentage of recruited labour coming from the last two sources rose steadily: 30% in 1904, 45% in 1910, 55% in 1920, 65% in 1950.¹⁰⁸¹ Moreover, the percentage of Union Africans employed through the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association rose steadily: 15% (between 15 and 50 years old) in 1926,¹⁰⁸² 18% in 1936¹⁰⁸³ and 20% in 1950. The migrant workers often have part of their wages kept back till they return "home". In town they are compounded and subjected to Pass Laws. Caged in compounds, they cannot become urbanised despite the lengthening period of their stay "in town": 6 months in 1912, 10 months in 1928, 12 months in 1934 and 15-18 months in 1950. Despite rising costs, money-wages have remained stationary for half a century. In 1925 the Native Recruiting Corporation said: "*The Corporation is convinced that any increase in the level of native wages would be followed, to only a small extent, by an increase in the national standard of living—the main result would be that the native would work for a shorter period than at present; and that, consequently, the native labour available to industry in the Union would be reduced.*"¹⁰⁸⁴ Because of the migrant, "peasant" nature of the compounded urban workers, because, for example, they *save to return to the land*, the normal law of wages is forcibly reversed as far as the mines

1078. Native Labour Regulation Act 15 of 1911.

1079. Union-Mozambique Conventions: 11th September, 1928; 17th November, 1934; 8th June, 1936; 2nd May, 1940.

1080. S.A. Year Book, 1941, p. 430.

1081. W.N.L.A. Reports, 1904, *et seq.*

1082. 1926 Census Returns.

1083. 1936 Census Returns.

1084. Economic and Wages Commission Report, 1925.

are concerned: i.e. *lower wages increase* the supply of labour, and vice versa. The whole policy, said the Chamber of Mines in 1943, "*is a coherent whole and is the antithesis of the policy of assimilation and the encouragement of a black proletariat in the towns*".¹⁰⁸⁵

But the policy of checking the formation of a hereditary settled urban Black working class did not mean that the rulers favoured the growth of a Black peasantry. The very contrary was proven by the fact that the 1913 and subsequent Land Acts followed hard on the heels of the two Acts of 1911.

1085. Lansdowne Commission of Enquiry, 1943.

CHAPTER XLIII.

THE 1913 LAND ACT.

The 1913 Land Act was worked up by three Ministers of Native Affairs, H. Burton,¹⁰⁸⁶ a Liberal, J. B. Hertzog,¹⁰⁸⁷ who founded the Nationalist Party in 1912, and J. W. Sauer,¹⁰⁸⁸ another Liberal. The Land Act was in the air already in 1911, when a Dipping Tanks Advances Act forced Africans to pay special rates for each animal dipped.¹⁰⁸⁹ These rates and the loss of condemned cattle forced many out to work. In 1912 Burton introduced a Squatters' Bill but this was withdrawn "*pending the allotment of new Locations in which Natives evicted by such a measure could find an asylum*".¹⁰⁹⁰ The Bill was followed by the 1913 Land Act. The motive was: (1) The farmers wanted more labour because the expansion of gold mines had stimulated farming and yet reduced its labour supply, and (2) a small number of Africans had acquired titles to land in the Transvaal since 1910¹⁰⁹¹ (the land had been previously "awarded" as "buffers"); around Thaba 'Nchu¹⁰⁹² and in Natal there were 380,000 "squatters"¹⁰⁹³—the Act aimed at the destruction of even these *trends* towards an African peasantry.

Fearing that this Act would drive Africans to the towns instead of to the farms, the Labour Party M.P.s, W. H. Andrews, Boydell, Creswell and Madeley "opposed" it.¹⁰⁹⁴ The Liberals, Sauer, Burton and (in one division) Merriman, supported the Bill.

The Act prohibited (1) *Purchase of land by Africans or transfer between European and African.* (2) *Land-renting by Africans.* (3) *Money-squatting by Africans.* (4) *Share-cropping by Africans.* (5) *New leases with Africans, except with the consent of the N.A.D.* (6) *It empowered White farmers to evict squatters who refused to work for them as LABOURERS.* (7) *It imposed a fine of £10 plus £5 per day for Africans' cattle left on a White farm.*¹⁰⁹⁵

AFTERMATH.

The wanderings, deaths, poverty, homelessness and helplessness of all who were forced off the land into serfdom has been fully described by Sol. Plaatje, who saw the people's plight in a tour of the stricken areas.¹⁰⁹⁶ The Act converted the farmworkers into serfs, 90% of whom are landless tenants living on White farms, the other 10% being migrant labour from the Reserves.¹⁰⁹⁷ Their poverty is shown by the fact that *per head* White "farmers" own 30 times as many ploughs, 60 times as many waggons, 30 times as many cattle and 200 times as many sheep and goats as African farm-serfs.¹⁰⁹⁸ Per head they own 200 times as much land as *all* Africans own and occupy throughout the country,¹⁰⁹⁹ and 1,300 times as much land as *all* Non-Europeans own. While 72.9% of White farmers own their own

1086. Minister of Native Affairs, May, 1910, to June, 1912.

1087. Minister of Native Affairs, June, 1912, to December, 1912.

1088. Minister of Native Affairs, December, 1912, to August, 1913.

1089. Dipping Tanks Advances Act No. 20, 1911.

1090. Hansard, 1912.

1091. Hansard, 18th February, 1913; Minister of Lands told G. L. Lemmer that 78 farms of 144.416 morgen, valued at £94,907, were acquired by Africans in the Transvaal.

1092. Sol Plaatje: "Native Life in S. Africa" (1915), p. 112.

1093. Hansard, 1913: H. M. Meyler (Weenen M.P.).

1094. Hansard, 1913.

1095. Act 27 of 1913. In force from 19th June, 1913.

1096. Sol Plaatje (*supra* 1092), pp. 68 to 70.

1097. S.A. Year Book, 1946, chap. 11, 19.

1098/9/1100/1101/1102/1103. S.A. Year Book, 1941, p. 654; 1946 Year Book; 1948 Year Book; Monthly Bulletins of Statistics.

land, the State owns 95% of the Reserves and only 6% of rural Africans "own" land communally or privately. The land-area owned by Africans is 930,000 morgen (tribally) and 650,000 morgen (privately)—i.e. 1.2% of the whole land area.

LIVESTOCK.

From 1925 to 1947 the cattle per White farmer rose from 31.5 to 41; per Black ruralist it fell from 3.65 to 2.6. The European farmers' relative share rose by *sixty per cent.* Per head the White farmers' sheep and goat population remained steady (neither increased substantially); while the Africans' sheep and goats per head fell by *forty per cent.*¹¹⁰⁰

AGRICULTURE.

The crop deterioration caused by the Land Acts was worse even than the livestock deterioration. White farmers grow a great variety of fruit, vegetables, cereals, etc. African "farmers" grow only mealies, "kaffir-corn" and potatoes. From 1925 to 1947 White wheat crops rose by 100%; barley by 81%; oats by 41%; potatoes by 100%; citrus by 90%; sugar by 200%; tobacco by 100%. All-round European-owned farm production rose by from 100 to 200% per head, African maize production fell by 45% from 1922 to 1945 (Reserves and Farms); "kaffir-corn" by 55%; potatoes (in Reserves) by 75%.¹¹⁰¹ In agriculture the White farmer is from *two to three* times as rich as he was 25 years ago, while the African peasant and serf is from *two to three* times poorer.

SUBSIDISING WEALTH.

Indeed, the wealth of one derives directly from the poverty of the other. In addition, since 1910 no less than 90 laws were passed to assist only White farmers. Using Milner's principle of taxing gold-mines to subsidise White farming, the Governments of South Africa have given (1) over £119,000,000 in direct aid since May 31st, 1910, (2) and, through the Land Bank formed in 1912, £500,000,000 in indirect aid, the rate of this aid growing from year to year;¹¹⁰² (3) further, 13 Land Settlement Acts from 1912 to 1948 virtually gave 18½ million morgen (more than is occupied by *all* Non-Europeans) to 21,277 White settlers¹¹⁰³ for the nominal sum of £17½ millions. The total aid given to White farmers was £636½ million nominally, and, in real worth, over £1½ billions. Further, while African cattle was culled after 1936, Whites got land¹¹⁰⁴ and stud-bulls.¹¹⁰⁵ They got railway rebates, storage facilities, and even their debts were paid by the cheap labour of their serfs and the gold-miners.

RURAL BACKWARDNESS.

Labour being cheaper than machines, both in the Reserves and on White farms technical progress was artificially retarded. Only one-fourteenth of White farms are irrigated.¹¹⁰⁶ There is but one steam, fuel, or electrical engine to every six farms,¹¹⁰⁷ an average of a mere 1½ h.p. per White farm¹¹⁰⁸ and one tractor to about 10 White farms.¹¹⁰⁹ Cheap labour does the work of machines. Non-European farm-workers have been getting £20 a year for half a century. The effect of the industrial colour-bar is paralleled by the effects of the Land Acts—both hold the Non-Europeans in thrall, make social parasites of the Europeans, and hold back the technical development of the entire country.

1104. Act No. 48 of 1935.

1105. State Advances Recoveries Act No. 37 of 1935, Section 5.

1106. S.A. Year Book, 1941, p. 736.

1107. *Ibid.*, chap. 19, p. 737.

1108/9. S.A. Year Book, 1946, 1948.

CHAPTER XLIV.

OPPRESSION IN WORLD WAR I.

The Liberals feared mass resistance to the Land Act. Sir W. B. Barry said: "One of the greatest dangers that could threaten us was to give the Native anything in the shape of a common grievance."¹¹¹⁰ Sauer won over Tengu Jabavu, who accepted the Act. The African National Congress, formed in January, 1912, against the gathering clouds of the Act, was ruled by the Liberals through its founder, P. Ka I. Sema, and through chiefs and "patrons" like Natotsibene, Queen Regent of Swaziland. E. Dower, Secretary of Native Affairs, told the Congress "to make the best temporary arrangements within the four corners of the law."¹¹¹¹ Dube, Rubusane and Plaatje thought the King would settle the "misunderstanding" of the 1913 Act and the Liberals dragged them to London. In August, 1914, the Congress was discussing the work of its London deputation when the first world war broke out. They forgot the Land Act and supported the war. Rubusane offered 5,000 Africans to the N.A.D., but Bourne did not want to employ Black troops.¹¹¹² Instead of men, the A.N.C. gave money.¹¹¹³

While the African leaders were supporting the war, the Free State women of Bloemfontein, Winburg and Jagersfontein were suffering from their down-the-pass campaign of July, 1913; and the African peasants of the Hlubi and Matatiele refused to help Smuts' war, saying that the Land Acts were killing their cattle.¹¹¹⁴

Similarly, the Indian leaders, following Ghandi, gave up the "struggle" following their 1913 anti-tax campaign and Ghandi's "Gentleman's Agreement" with Smuts. But the Indian coal miners of Newcastle, whom Ghandi had marched to Volksrust, still went on suffering; so, too, did the Edgcombe sugar-hands and sanitary workers whom he had betrayed in November, 1913.

Similarly, too, the leader of the Coloured African People's Organisation, Abdurahman, who had condemned the Land Act,¹¹¹⁵ and applauded the Free State African women,¹¹¹⁶ offered 5,000 Coloured troops to Smuts on August 31st, 1914.¹¹¹⁷ But two Coloured men at Willowmore were sentenced to 9 months' hard labour because they said: "If Coloured persons are not fit to fight for the Empire in a war originating entirely among Europeans, they could not be considered fit to drive military waggons in the same war".¹¹¹⁸ And 700 Africans, recruited as labourers by the Non-European traitors, were drowned in the Atlantic on board the "Mendi" on the 21st February, 1917.

Neither abroad nor at home was there peace. New colour-laws were passed. The very South Africa Defence Act¹¹¹⁹ divided the army into

1110. Sir W. B. Barry. Hansard, 1913.

1111. Sol Plaatje: "Native Life in S.A.", p. 115 (deputations in March, 1913, and May, 1915).

1112/3/4/5/6/7/8. *Ibid.* pp. 263, 271, 272, 137-138, 140, 274-285.

1119. S.A. Defence Act No. 13 of 1912.

White soldiers and Black labourers, the latter illegally winning battles for which the former were legally decorated as "Springboks".

The 1914 Riotous Assemblies Act stifled free organisation and assembly. The 1917 Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act recognised "Native Law" and discriminated on colour-lines with regard to habitual criminals and liquor offences.¹¹²⁰ The 1918 Special Justice of the Peace Act¹¹²¹ gave special J.P.s jurisdiction over regulations under the 1911 Native Labour Regulation Act.

The war stimulated manufacture. From 1914 to 1918 the number of factories rose from 3,000 to 6,000, the number of factory workers from 75,000 to 144,000 and the net output from £10 million to £25 million.¹¹²² This expansion created a new demand for cheap labour and new segregatory laws were passed. The 1918 Factories Act and its amendments refused to protect many grades of unskilled workers;¹¹²³ it paved the way for segregation inside factories—separate workrooms, rest-rooms, conveniences, etc.¹¹²⁴ The war ended by bringing the factory into line with the mine and farm.

While segregation at home went on Smuts went overseas to sing the Cardiff miners out of their strike; to help Balfour create a Zionist satellite in the Middle East; to intervene against Bela Kun in Hungary; to help Wilson fashion the League of Nations, as he later fashioned the United Nations Organisation programme; to help ("under protest") to impose Versailles on Germany; and to grab South West Africa for the Union in terms of Versailles. The foreign policy of Smuts was an extension of his domestic policy. He came back in triumph as a "world statesman" to carry on the endless war against the Non-Europeans.

1120. Act No. 31 of 1917, Section 344.

1121. Act No. 2 of 1918.

1122. "Manufacturing Industries" No. 23, chap. 23 (1946).

1123. Act No. 28 of 1918; Act No. 26 of 1931; Act No. 22 of 1941, etc.

1124. Government Gazette, 2nd May, 1919; Act 22 of 1941. Sections 51b, 51h.

CHAPTER XLV.

URBAN REGIMENTATION (1920-1923).

The war-time and post-war industrial growth led to a phenomenal rise of trade union organisation among the newly formed Non-European industrial workers. The American Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.) found a counterpart in the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (I.C.U.) formed in Cape Town in January, 1919. The most modern ideas of social struggles in Germany and Russia and of national struggles in India began to be noted by the young African working class, whose fathers had been tribalists defending an ancient system and ancient ideas. Dock workers struck in December, 1919, in Cape Town; in October, 1920, in Port Elizabeth; and in February, 1920, a giant miners' strike shook the Rand. To check these struggles and to regiment urban labour, the Smuts Government introduced the 1920 Native Affairs Act. The regime tried to prevent the "proletarianisation" of the urban Africans by throwing them back to "tribalism".

1920 NATIVE AFFAIRS ACT.

(1) The Act set up the Native Affairs Commission which had to advise Parliament on "*any matter relating to the general conduct of Native affairs*".¹¹²⁵ It had to be both "*the friend of the Native people . . . (and) the adviser of the Government . . . it should endeavour to win the confidence of the Natives*".¹¹²⁶ Within two years it urged urban pass laws, urban areas control and land laws.¹¹²⁷ (2) The Act extended the Glen Grey council system to the urban areas. These were to comprise not more than nine Africans, and to be controlled by a White Native Commissioner.

The Native Affairs Commission urged action not only against workers but also against peasants. It advised police action against the resisters of Bulhoek, near Queenstown, where, in May, 1921, 163 "Israelites" were shot down, 129 wounded, and their founder, Mgilima, gaoled for six years.¹¹²⁸ In May, 1922, the Bondelswartz peasants of S.W.A. protested against a new Dog Tax. Smuts sent out 400 troops and two bombing planes and over 100 were killed by the Windhoek administration.¹¹²⁹ While Smuts forcibly crushed workers' and peasants' struggles, his Government was drafting a new measure to prevent their organisation and "proletarianisation".

1923 URBAN AREAS ACT.

(1) This Act and its amendments¹¹³⁰ herded Africans into urban locations, put these under Superintendents, and ran them through Location Advisory Boards composed of African agents.¹¹³¹ Thus the principles of Shepstone and Rhodes were fully applied to the towns.

(2) The Act placed all urban African labour under pass law control, limited ingress to towns, subjected urban Africans to pass, beer, tax and other police raids. The town became a concentration camp.

(3) The Act forbade the ownership of land by an African in urban areas, except with the consent of the Governor-General. Thus it stifled not only the working class, but also the urban property owners. The State wanted neither a Black "proletariat" nor a Black "peasantry".

1125. Native Affairs Act No. 23 of 1920.

1126. Native Affairs Commission (functions) April 1921.

1127. Native Affairs Commission Report U.G. No. 15 of 1922.

1128. Native Affairs Commission Report, 1921.

1129. Native Affairs Commission Reports U.G. Nos. 30, 41.

1130. Acts 21 of 1923, 25 of 1930, 46 of 1937, 25 of 1945, 42 of 1946, 56 of 1949, etc.

1131. Section 23 of Urban Areas Act.

CHAPTER XLVI.

THE "WHITE LABOUR POLICY" (1922-1925).

The further subjection of Black labour was supplemented by the further elevation of White "labour".

THE WHITE "REVOLT", 1922.

The Low Grade Mines Commission of 1920 found that the unproductive White miners were reducing mining dividends. It therefore recommended the partial replacement of White by Black labour, who would, however, still be paid one-twelfth of the White wage. In January, 1922, White coalminers' pay was cut from 30/- to 25/- a shift. The same month the gold mines threatened to employ more Africans. The White miners then struck.

White workers unleashed a reign of terror against African workers: shot them down, forgetting that African miners had supported a strike of theirs in July, 1913.¹¹³² They fought Africans in Fordsburg, Ferreiratown and Vrededorp. They made Blacks wear badges to show their "neutrality" in this White family quarrel. They made Africans stop work and starve in order that White miners could retain their dominant position in the mines. Led from "left" to "right" respectively by the Communist Party (W. H. Andrews, etc.), the Joint Strike Committee and the Strike Commandos, the White "workers" said: "*Workers of the world Unite and Fight for a White South Africa!*" When the strike flared up into an insurrection the Communists enthusiastically inscribed on this pogrom-movement the slogan of a "*White Socialist South Africa*".¹¹³³

Smuts stepped in on the side of the Chamber of Mines and, supported by 20,000 troops, police and burghers, machine guns and bombs, bombed the strikers in a Fordsburg school, hung Lewis, Hull and Long and restored not only order but also the previous position on the mines. The White workers had lost the battle but won the war. Two hundred and thirty-three Whites and Blacks were killed and 800 wounded in this struggle of White labour to remain part of the White bloc.¹¹³¹

APPRENTICESHIP ACT, 1922.

Just as Milner rehabilitated the Boers after defeating them in 1900, so Smuts rehabilitated the White workers after defeating them in 1922. In 1922 he introduced the Apprenticeship Act¹¹³⁵ which made skilled labour, in

1132/3/4. Union Government Report No. 35 of 1922. Also H. C. Armstrong: "Grey Steel"; E. Roux: "Time Longer than Rope"; W. H. Andrews: "Class Struggles in S. Africa"; "Rand Daily Mail", January-February, 1922; "Sunday Times", January-February-March, 1922; "Cape Times", January to April, 1922.

1135. Act No. 26 of 1922.

effect, a White preserve. In 1923 Smuts introduced Government control and segregated Technical Colleges,¹¹³⁶ which made it still more impossible for Non-Europeans to learn trades.

INDUSTRIAL CONCILIATION ACT, 1924.

Smuts began and Hertzog and Creswell continued the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act.¹¹³⁷ This Act (1) On the grounds that an African was not an "employee"⁽¹⁾ recognised only Unions without Africans, farm-workers, domestic workers and civil servants. (2) It set up Industrial Councils of White employers and workers to regulate wages and to control African wages (to prevent undercutting). (3) It forbade strikes in essential services. (4) It deregistered Unions with African members.

This Act cemented the unity of White labour, employer and State. It ended the White workers' "class struggle". Thus, whereas from 1915 to 1925 over 200,000 workers struck, from 1926 to 1940 only 54,000 struck. And whereas from 1915 to 1925 3 million working days were lost in strikes, from 1926 to 1940 only $\frac{1}{4}$ million were lost. Since 1940 White strikes have dropped to 50% of the low pre-war figure.¹¹³⁸

At the same time the Act built up strong, segregated White Unions. Before 1924 there were 54 unions; from 1925 to 1929 another 27 were formed; from 1930 to 1934 a further 24. (Thereafter new Unions were mainly Non-European.) In 1915 10,000 White workers were in Unions. After 1925 the figure leapt almost at once to 100,000. The Labour Department itself helped to form strong White Unions.¹¹³⁹

These White Unions both excluded and dominated the Black Unions. Thus Bill Andrews refused the 100,000-strong I.C.U. affiliation to the Trades Council in 1928, saying he feared White labour would be swamped by Black labour.¹¹⁴⁰ Thus the Labour bureaucrat from the Motherwell Trades Congress, W. Ballinger, "organised the I.C.U. out of existence" after he came out in July, 1928. Just as White labour was a "boss" in the factory, with Non-European "boys" serving him, so White labour bossed Non-European trade unions for the next quarter century. Thus White labour became a bulwark helping the rulers to prevent the organisation of Black labour.

WAGE ACT, 1925.

The 1925 Wage Act and its amendments¹¹⁴¹ (1) made White labour and employers sole arbiters of both White and Black unskilled wages;¹¹⁴² (2) excluded certain areas and occupations from Wage Determination, thereby ensuring untrammelled exploitation of Black labour;¹¹⁴³ (3) protected White (legally: skilled) wages by covering certain occupations on a national scale, mostly those with many White workers employed;¹¹⁴⁴ and (4) Clause 6 said that Wage Boards had to pay certain "*classes of employees*" in accordance with "*civilized standards*".

1136. Act No. 30 of 1923.

1137. Industrial Conciliation Act, 1924; Act No. 36 of 1937.

1138. S.A. Year Book, 1941, p. 227; 1946, chap. 6.

1139. *Ibid.*

1140. W. Andrews: "Class Struggles". Appendix.

1141. Act 27, 1925; Act 44, 1937.

1141. Wage Act, Section 5.

1142. *Ibid.* Section 16.

1143. S.A. Year Book, 1941, p. 231 (unskilled trades).

1144. *Ibid* (skilled trades—furniture, diamond-cutting, etc.).

"CIVILIZED LABOUR POLICY", 1925.

This policy was adopted by Smuts and enforced by the Nationalist-Labour Pact Government after 1924. In October, 1924, a Government Circular read: "*Uncivilized labour is to be regarded as the labour rendered by persons whose aim is restricted to the bare requirements of the necessities of life, as understood among barbarous and undeveloped peoples.*"¹¹⁴⁵ That "uncivilized" meant "Non-European" was admitted by a 1926 Government Commission: "*While in England a skilled engineering artisan's weekly wage is the equivalent of the pithead price of three tons of coal, in South Africa it is the equivalent of from 20 to 25 tons. . . . The relatively high wages of White artisans are due to and dependent on the employment of large numbers of unskilled native labourers; and in this the artisan is typical of the whole white community who are enabled to maintain a standard of life approximating rather to that of America than to that of Europe, in a country that is poorer than most countries of Western Europe, solely because they have at their disposal these masses of docile, lowly paid native labourers.*"¹¹⁴⁶

To ensure a high ratio of White workers in factories the 1925 Customs and Excise Act¹¹⁴⁷ could deny import rebates to firms which maintained "*unsatisfactory labour relations*". Firms which did not employ "*a reasonable proportion of civilized workers*" could be excluded from the list of tenderers for Government works. Firms employing Africans where this was made illegal, could be refused registration (e.g. in printing) and could then hardly operate.

"POOR WHITEISM" SOLVED.

By 1923 there were 160,000 unemployed unskilled Whites. The State now used them to break the trend towards Non-European urbanisation and organisation. Through subsidising farmers, some were re-employed on farms. Others were absorbed into public works and industry. From 1925 (after the adoption of the White Labour Policy) to 1926 the number of Whites in industry rose by 5,000 and the number of Non-Europeans fell by 3,000. From 1926 to 1930 the number of Whites in industry rose by 15,000 and the number of Non-Europeans (which should, on previous ratios, have risen by 27,000) rose by only 10,000. From 1924 to 1933 the ratio of White to Black in industry rose from 0.6 to 0.83.¹¹⁴⁸ When the ratio fell down to 0.5 after the second war, this was because the "Poor White" problem had already been "solved".

Within three years of the "civilized labour policy", 10,000 "Poor Whites" were absorbed into railways; by 1947 there were 100,000 Whites in railways against 88,000 Blacks.¹¹⁴⁹ There they were paid up to three times the pay of Black labour for the same or less unskilled work.

European unemployment was solved at the expense of the Non-Europeans.¹¹⁵⁰ Moreover, by this means the unskilled European joined the industrialists', farmers' and skilled workers' White United Front. As Tielman Roos later told the "Poor Whites": "*Everyone of you is a ruler and an aristocrat*".

1145. Government Circular No. 5, 31st October, 1924.

1146. Economic and Wages Commission Report, 1926.

1147. Act No. 36 of 1925.

1148. "Manufacturing Industries", U.G. No. 23, 1946, p. 3.

1149. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, May, 1950, p. 10; also S.A. Year Book, 1946, 1948.

1150. Carnegie Commission Report, 1932.

CHAPTER XLVII.

RURAL REGIMENTATION (1925-1934).

Backed now by European mine-magnates, industrialists, farmers and workers, the State unleashed new onslaughts upon the helpless Africans. The 1921-23 *urban* regimentation was followed by new laws which extended *rural* regimentation. The first of such attacks was the Native Taxation and Development Act,¹¹⁵¹ popularly called the Poll Tax Act.

1925 NATIVE TAXATION ACT.

The Act (1) imposed a £1 poll tax on males over 18, and a 10/- to £2 hut tax, in order to smother more labour out of the Reserves. (2) The funds from these taxes were supposed to be for African education, agriculture, health, etc. This taxation had to be high enough to provide cheap labour, but low enough to starve the people's health and education services. (3) An army of police, magistrates, Commissioners and chiefs was placed over the people to collect taxes, register taxpayers and issue receipts. Thus the system of police-raids was legalised. Annually 60,000 Africans were convicted by this Act¹¹⁵² for being unable to pay taxes which, relative to income, are three times heavier than European taxation.

1927 NATIVE ADMINISTRATION ACT.

The 1927 Native Administration Act¹¹⁵³ adapted tribalism to police, regiment and retard the people. (1) It set up Headmen's and Chief's Courts, Native Commissioner's Courts (Section 10), Native Appeal Courts (Section 13), Native Divorce Courts (Section 10), for civil inter-African cases; (2) Headman's, Chief's, Commissioner's and the Natal Native High Courts, for criminal cases. (3) It recognised "Native Law". Thus it segregated the Africans *judicially*. It further removed Africans from the pale of the law by (4) giving the Governor, as "Supreme Chief of all the African tribes", arbitrary power to deport *by proclamation* whole tribes and individuals; (5) to issue or cancel letters of exemption from pass laws, curfews, Native Law (Section 31); (6) to prevent "disorders" and (7) control the "*mode of living*" of Africans. The whole Act anticipated in full the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act. Finally the Act (8) gave the Governor powers to proclaim segregated deeds registries for African-owned property in Scheduled Areas (Section 6); this clause was applied to the Ciskei after 1931,¹¹⁵⁴ and was later embodied in the 1936 Land and Trust Act.

1151. Acts 41 of 1925, 28 of 1926, 37 of 1931, 56 of 1949 (Section 18).

1152. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics; S.A. Year Book.

1153. Acts 38 of 1927, 9 of 1929, 56 of 1949 (Sections 19 to 27).

1154. Proclamation 119 of 1931.

LIQUOR ACTS, 1928-32.

The 1928 Liquor Act¹¹⁵⁵ was used to introduce prohibition into the Transkei in 1933,¹¹⁵⁶ and later to all Non-Europeans all over. These laws legalised liquor raids and annually 150,000 Non-Europeans are convicted under liquor laws.¹¹⁵⁷

1932 MASTERS AND SERVANTS ACT.

The 1932 Native Service Contract Act¹¹⁵⁸ extended regimentation of *Reserve* Africans to those on *White farms*. The Act said (1) An African farm worker could not be employed if he was without a pass, (2) and if his former master had not freed him for service. (3) He could not be absent from work without the farmer's consent, i.e. farm-strikes were illegal. (4) The farmer, under pain of a £5 penalty per head, had to see that all able-bodied Africans from 18 to 60 on his land had to work for him for at least six months under a labour-service contract. (5) Corporal punishment by farmers of Africans under 18 was legalised for contravention of the Act. The farmer was recognised as feudal overlord. (6) Youths under 18 could only work on another farm with the consent of their guardian and their old master. (7) Children from 10 to 18 could, with the guardian's consent, be entered into Labour-Service contracts. This Act legalised *serfdom* and regimented all African farm-labour.

1934 PASS LAWS.

In the Reserves *tribalism* was used for regimentation. On the farm *feudalism* was used for regimentation. In the towns *industrialism*—in a totalitarian form—was used to regiment cheap labour. Thus South African Fascism rested on a peculiar combination of three historic systems of oppression.

This regimentation was extended by the 1934 and later Pass Laws, which consolidated pre-Union Republican and Colonial Pass Laws.¹¹⁵⁹ Even exempted persons have to carry a pass to show that they do not have to carry one.¹¹⁶⁰ Annually over 115,000 are convicted for being without one or other of 13 passes.¹¹⁶¹ This brings the total number of Non-Europeans who are convicted annually for breaking *discriminatory* laws to just on *one million*. The Police State gaols, on the average, a member of *every Non-European family every year*.

1155. Act No. 30 of 1928.

1156. Proclamation 53 of 1933.

1157. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, May, 1950.

1158. Act 24 of 1932; Proclamation 54 of March, 1933.

1159. Proclamations 150 of 1934, 180 of 1934, 18 of 1935, 186 of 1940.

1160. Proclamation 150 of 1934, Section 14.

1161. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, 1951.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

THE 1936 LAND ACT.

After the depression of the 1920's South Africa went "off the gold standard" (i.e. gold became more precious and basic to the economy); mining, industry and farming boomed. There was a new demand for labour, and also a new United South African Party plus Nationalist Party Government, called the United Party, to obtain this cheap labour. The result was the 1936 Native Land and Trust Act and its subsequent amendments.¹¹⁶² Whereas the 1913 Land Act covered mainly the farms, the 1936 Act dealt mainly with the Reserves.

(1) Section 2 of the Act said that only in "released areas" could Africans "buy" land. (2) Section 4 set up a "South African Native Trust" to buy more land and see to the "moral welfare" of Africans. (3) Section 6 vested in the Trust all Crown and Trust Reserves, locations, and unsold land in "released areas". (4) Section 10 empowered the Trust to obtain 7½ million morgen, including 5 million in the Transvaal. To date only 20% has been bought, which includes land already in African hands. The purchases ceased since the second world war. (5) The 1913 Act was extended to the Cape with regard to its land-ownership provisions. This meant, together with Section 10, that the area of land occupied by Africans was frozen to 10 million morgen in practice, with a theoretical maximum of 17 million morgen, which is 12% of the whole land area. In practice, Africans occupy 7½% of the whole land area.

(6) A Locations Reclamation Committee was to define residential areas, arable areas, grazing areas and to recommend the limitation of stock. This was the start of the Rehabilitation Scheme which led to violence and fierce resistance in the Transkei,¹¹⁶³ Witziesshoek¹¹⁶⁴ and Zululand¹¹⁶⁵ after the second world war, when the Government tried to drive more peasants off the land to supply the labour needs of the new post-war O.F.S. gold mines

(7) The Act provided for the tribal division of rural Africans. It thus anticipated the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act.

(8) It placed control of land for schools, etc., under the Minister of Native Affairs¹¹⁶⁶ and heralded the 1949 policy of *Educational Retardation*,¹¹⁶⁷ which aimed at throwing male students and teachers on to the labour market.

1162. Acts 18 of 1936, 17 of 1939, 56 of 1949 (Sections 31 to 34).

1163. "Torch", 21st, 28th February, 1949; 7th, 14th, 21st and 28th March, 1949.

1164. Witziesshoek Trial. Press Reports, 1951; U.G. Commission of Enquiry Report, 1951.

1165. All-African Convention Conference, December, 1951 ("Torch", December 1951—January 1952); Non-European Unity Movement, Natal Tour, February, 1952 ("Torch", February-March 1952).

1166. Act 18 of 1936, Sections 24 (i), 24 (iii), 18 (iv), and 23.

1167. Cape Education Gazette, 14th July, 1949.

AFTERMATH.

This Act, with its above-mentioned wide scope, added to the poverty of the Reserve peasants in particular. Today, even in the Ciskei, where individual tenure is higher than elsewhere, 70% of the men go out annually to work; 30% are completely landless; there is only "One plough to 2.6 farms; one harrow to 12 farms; one planter to 81.4 farms; one cultivator to 31.5 farms".¹¹⁶⁸ In the Transkei 24% own no cattle at all; 36% own five or less.¹¹⁶⁹

A Government Commission reported on the health which results from the general poverty: "The Native infantile mortality rate is not less than 150 (per 1,000) anywhere and in some areas is as high as 500 or 700."¹¹⁷⁰ In the Transkei there is one doctor to 25,000 people; one hospital bed to 2,500. In N. Transvaal there is one doctor to 150,000 people. Fifty-nine per cent. of African schoolchildren have eye-diseases.¹¹⁷¹ Flu, which killed 127,000 Non-Europeans in 1918¹¹⁷² and T.B. which entered the country in the lungs of White immigrants, especially after the 1880's¹¹⁷³—these and other social diseases annually lay untold thousands low.

The 1936 Land Act all but completed the "anatomy of African misery".

1168. O. Walker: "Kaffirs are Lively" (1948), p. 44 (Report by Assistant Director of Native Agriculture).

1169. *Ibid.* p. 58 (Report by Veterinary Officer).

1170. National Health Commission, 1942.

1171. Speech by Col. O. L. Shearer, M.P., 1947.

1172/3. S.A. Year Book, 1941, p. 132, p. 136; 1946 and 1948 S.A. Year Books.

THE 1936 NATIVE REPRESENTATION ACT.

Further dispossession was followed by further disfranchisement. With Hertzog and Smuts now in one United Party, each had little need of the half-vote of Cape African men still on the roll. With an easy two-thirds majority they (1) shifted these voters on to a segregated *Cape Native Voters Roll*; (2) foisted on the Cape "voters" three White Native Representatives in Parliament and two in the Provincial Council; (3) "represented" the Africans of Natal, O.F.S.-Transvaal, Transkei and the rest of the Cape by four White Senators, chosen Advisory Boards, Bungas and other "Glen Grey" bodies; (4) foisted on the Africans a Native Representative Council (N.R.C.) of four nominated and 12 "elected" Africans sitting at the feet of five White Native Commissioners and the Secretary of Native Affairs.¹¹⁷⁴ The N.R.C. was abolished by the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act, and the Glen Grey councils of "intellectuals" replaced by councils of chiefs, tribal councillors, headmen, etc., in line with the basic plan of Shepstone and the 1927 Native Administration Act. This 1937 Act of the Boer Hertzog realised the policy of the Britisher, Lord Milner, who said in 1901: "*I do think that in any South African Parliament the interests of the Blacks should be specially represented. Perhaps this can be done by White men.*"¹¹⁷⁵

In 1931 Hofmeyr had stated of the 1923 Urban Areas Act that: "*In the main this and other similar legislation has been sound and progressive.*"¹¹⁷⁶ He believed that the African was "*different from the White man*".¹¹⁷⁷ He said that "*The Transkeian system . . . (Bungas etc.) . . . has become the acknowledged ideal of South African Native Policy*",¹¹⁷⁸ and five years before the Act, said: "*A settlement should be reached, at least as far as the present Cape Native franchise is concerned. Such a settlement can, it would seem, not be arrived at WITHOUT A CHANGE IN ITS EXISTING BASIS BEING MADE.*"¹¹⁷⁹ Thus, openly and unmistakably, the Liberal proposed while the Nationalist merely disposed.

After the Act four Liberals, Welsh, Reinallt Jones, Malcomess and Brookes stood for and were returned to the Senate in June, 1937.¹¹⁸⁰ Three Liberals, Molteno, Hemming and Mrs. Ballinger stood for and were returned to the Assembly in June, 1937.¹¹⁸¹ Two Liberals, Burman and Moulton, stood for and entered the Provincial Council in June, 1937.¹¹⁸² Thus, openly, the Liberals themselves worked the Disfranchisement Act.

They also broke the back of the African resistance to the Act by forming and dominating the very organisation, which arose in Bloemfontein in December, 1935, to resist the Act—namely the All African Convention. In 1936 their agents threw out of Convention a boycott resolution.¹¹⁸³ In August, 1936, their followers, Xuma, Selopa Thema, Msimang and others including Mfotsanyana of the Communist Party, called for "*Organisation for election of members of the Native Representative Council, Senator and Electoral College*".¹¹⁸⁴ They worked out a "compromise" with a Convention delegation to Cape Town. The upshot was that Matthews¹¹⁸⁵ and others accepted the Act. Resistance collapsed. Four chiefs were nominated to the N.R.C.,¹¹⁸⁶ and Dube, Thema, Baloyi, Godlo, Jabavu and others were "elected" to the first N.R.C.¹¹⁸⁷ These victims of the Liberals helped the Government to disfranchise the Africans.

1174. Act No. 12 of 1936. 1175. Milner to Rev. J. Green, 12th December, 1901 (Headlam).

1176/7/8/9. J. H. Hofmeyr: "South Africa", pp. 312, 315, 323.

1180. S.A. Year Book, 1941, p. 400.

1181/2. *Ibid.* p. 401.

1183. I. B. Tabata: "The Awakening of the People" p. 40.

1184. Circular from the Transvaal A.A.C. issued on 15th August, 1936, convening a conference for 5th October, 1936.

1185. "Programme of Action" presented by Matthews to the June 1936 A.A.C. Conference.

1186-7. S.A. Year Book, p. 401.

CHAPTER L.

THE EISELEN EDUCATION PLAN (1951).

When slavery began in 1658 the first schools for slaves were run by the Church. Mission control of Non-White education has remained ever since. Today 91% of Coloured schools¹¹⁸⁸ and 95% of African schools¹¹⁸⁹ are run by denominational churches.

After 1685 Baron Von Rheede and Simon van der Stel began separate schools for White and Black. Today Europeans and Non-Europeans are in separate schools, and most Coloured, Indian and African children segregated into Coloured, Indian and African schools respectively. There is a segregated Non-European university at Fort Hare, and only two of the seven big Universities accept Non-Europeans, who comprise only 7% of the University population.¹¹⁹⁰

Dr. Philip, Sir Harry Smith and Sir George Grey began to build up a system of African education whose basis was training for cheap labour, with a bias towards manual training. In 1890 Sir Langham Dale stated the policy of training White children "*to maintain their unquestioned supremacy in this land*".¹¹⁹¹ In 1894 Rhodes called for African education based on manual work. In 1919 a "*Commission on Native Education*"¹¹⁹² proposed "Local Authorities" to run segregated African education. A 1935-1936 Inter-Departmental Commission on Native Education reported: "*The education of the White child prepares him for life in a dominant society and the education of the Black child for a subordinate society*".¹¹⁹³ In 1949 the Cape Education Department began a "Retardation Scheme"¹¹⁹⁴ which drove 30,000 Transkei children out of school in one year.¹¹⁹⁵ And in 1951 the Eiselen Commission drew up a complete plan for "Bantu Education", based on and extending the previous policies outlined above. Its terms of reference were: "*The formulation of the principles and aims of education for the Natives as an independent race in which . . . their inherent racial qualities*" (*inter alia*) "*are taken into consideration. . . . To modify syllabuses and teacher-training to conform to the proposed principles and aims and to prepare Natives more effectively for their future occupations*".¹¹⁹⁶ Indeed, the aim of education for the last 300 years has been: cheap labour.

The Eiselen Commission recommended the creation of "*Bantu Local Authorities*",¹¹⁹⁷ Regional Authorities,¹¹⁹⁸ and a Union Board of Bantu

1188. S.A. Year Book, 1948.

1189. Eiselen Commission on Native Education, 1949-51. U.G. 53/1951, p. 35.

1190. *Ibid.* p. 71.

1191. Report of S.G.E. G.6.A. 1890.

1192. Commission on Native Education, C.P. 4/1919.

1193. Inter-Departmental Commission on Native Education, 1935-6, U.G. 29.

1194. Cape Education Gazette, 14th July, 1949.

1195. "Torch", 26th December, 1950 (report by parents at Bloemfontein Conference of All-African Convention, 16th December, 1950).

1196. Report of Commission on Native Education, 1949-51, U.G. 53/1951.

1197. *Ibid.* p. 133.

1198. *Ibid.* p. 137.

Education¹¹⁹⁹ under a Government Division of Bantu Affairs¹²⁰⁰ (a grander Native Affairs Department). The Local Bantu Authorities (set up under the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act) would run education. Thus African education is to be completely segregated, from top to bottom. The aim of this segregation is: *cheap, migrant, "tribalised", landless labour*.

Thus the Commission recommended "Volunteer Camp Training Centres" for Africans not in schools ". . . to teach them to earn a living with their hands . . ." and "to provide a reservoir of skilled and unskilled labour for their prospective employers".¹²⁰¹ The Union Board of Bantu Education would prescribe special syllabi¹²⁰² with a bias towards manual work and with "mother tongue medium"¹²⁰³ (Bantu languages) for at least four years,¹²⁰⁴ the aim being to isolate the African child from world literature and culture, and provide him with enough English or Afrikaans "to follow oral or written instructions; and to carry on a simple conversation with Europeans about his work . . ."¹²⁰⁵ To preserve the docility of this slave-educated child, the Commission recommended compulsory religious instruction.¹²⁰⁶ These recommendations, which, in large measure, have been current practice, now will become the official education laws of South Africa.

This policy is part of the whole official policy of White supremacy in all walks. The educational starvation flowing from this policy is shown by the fact that 92% of Non-Europeans are effectively illiterate. Out of 2.1 million Africans of school-going age (6 to 16),¹²⁰⁷ only 760,000 or 37% were in schools in 1949.¹²⁰⁸ Of these 50% are in *sub-standards* and 97½% in *primary classes*.¹²⁰⁹ Only 2½% are in secondary and high schools, against 16.6% for White children.¹²¹⁰ Only 1 in 1600 is in Standard X¹²¹¹ against 1 in 40 for Europeans.¹²¹² The figures for Coloured and Indian children are about the same.¹²¹³

This policy of mental enslavement and of educational segregation and starvation essentially completes and preserves the conquest, dispossession, enslavement, disfranchisement and regimentation of the African people of South Africa.

1199. *Ibid.* p. 136.

1200. *Ibid.* p. 135.

1201. *Ibid.* p. 142.

1202. *Ibid.* p. 144.

1203. *Ibid.* p. 145.

1204. *Ibid.* p. 146.

1205. *Ibid.* p. 146.

1206. *Ibid.* p. 147.

1207. *Ibid.* pp. 14, 51.

1208. *Ibid.* pp. 51, 111

1209/10. *Ibid.* p. 51.

1211. *Ibid.* p. 72.

1212/3. S.A. Year Book. 1948.

CHAPTER LI.

ANTI-COLOURED LEGISLATION (1937-1951).

The fate of the African foretold the fate of the two minority Non-European groups—the Coloured and Indian. They were steadily reduced towards the level of subjection of the Africans. Despite differential treatment, oppression of all three groups became more and more *equal*, but also more and more *separate*. Separate jobs, locations, trade unions, schools, sports, etc., segregated and divided the oppressed themselves. Each fell more and more under a separate State Department—of Native Affairs, Coloured Affairs and Asiatic Affairs. It was a perfect application of divide and rule.

Whereas in general the main economic “interest” of the Africans was *land*, and of the propertied Indian *trade*, that of the hard core of the Coloured was *skilled jobs*. The loss of the franchise in 1910 was followed by the loss of these skilled jobs after the 1925 “Civilized Labour Policy”. Having been driven out of their old political and then economic positions, the Coloureds were driven down towards the administrative, judicial and educational position of the Africans as a result of the steady implementation of the recommendations of a Smuts-Liberal-inspired “Commission of Enquiry Regarding the Cape Coloured Population”. This Commission was dominated by the Liberals du Plessis, Wilcox, Buchanan, Fowler and De Villiers, who, aided by de Vos Malan and Dr. A. Abdurahman, published their findings in August, 1937.¹²¹⁴

1937 CAPE COLOURED COMMISSION.

This Commission recommended (1) segregated jobs for Coloureds,¹²¹⁵ (2) segregated areas,^{1216 1217} (3) housing schemes in which “*the Coloured people should be separated from the Natives*”,¹²¹⁸ (4) segregated education,¹²¹⁹ (5) bribing off the “upper crust”¹²²⁰ from which traitors could be drawn to help, (6) in the formation of a Coloured Advisory Council,¹²²¹ and (7) a Coloured Affairs Department.¹²²² (8) The Commission implicitly recommended a “*limitation of the Franchise*,”¹²²³ rejected the restoration of the pre-Union loaded franchise,¹²²⁴ and (9) looked upon Coloureds only as *labourers*, declaring: “*An improvement of the physical and moral well-being and education of the Coloured will increase their value to the country as a whole as workers.*”¹²²⁵

These recommendations were carried out in their totality. From 1938 housing schemes were built to herd Coloured people into locations into

1214. Union Government, No. 54 of 1937.

1215. *Ibid.* p. 46, para. 228.

1216. *Ibid.* p. 74, para. 414.

1217. *Ibid.* p. 78, para. 437; p. 78, para. 441.

1218. *Ibid.* p. 125, para. 732 (a).

1219. *Ibid.* p. 196, para. 943; p. 197, para. 949.

1220. *Ibid.* p. 211, para. 1026.

1221/2/3. *Ibid.* p. 230, para. 1159.

1224. *Ibid.* para. 1060 (a).

1225. *Ibid.* p. 230, para. 1160.

which they were driven by means of poverty, ejections, expropriations and the application of the Housing (Slums) Act.¹²²⁶

In 1943 the Smuts-Lawrence Government, helped by Bishop Lavis and other Liberals, introduced a Coloured Advisory Council.¹²²⁷ The Anti-C.A.D. movement boycotted this Council, made up of Coloured traitors, out of existence,¹²²⁸ but the United Party started a Coloured Affairs Department inside the Department of Interior: "*to deal exclusively with matters affecting the Coloured people because there was a special Government Department to deal with matters affecting the Natives and a Commission for Asiatic Affairs*".¹²²⁹

This United Party-Liberal policy was extended by the Nationalists, who were returned in May, 1948. After introducing complete apartheid in all trains and post offices throughout the Union, in 1948 and 1949, Malan and Havenga decided in October, 1950, to place Coloured voters on a segregated voters' roll (as Smuts and Hertzog had done to the Cape African voters in 1936).¹²³⁰ This agreement resulted in 1951 in the Separate Representation of Voters Act.

SEPARATE REPRESENTATION OF VOTERS ACT.

This Act (1) removed the Coloured voters of the Cape from the common roll; placed them on a separate roll. (2) Introduced White "Coloured Representatives" in the Parliament and Senate. (4) Introduced separate "Coloured Representation" in the Cape Provincial Council. (5) Restored the Coloured Representative Council, and (6) segregated all Coloured people into a Coloured Affairs Department.

In 1952 a Nationalist Party Conference mooted removing the municipal Coloured franchise in the Cape. The application of these disfranchisement measures under the Coloured Affairs Department would place the whole Coloured population in labour-locations where they would be regimented, starved of education, separately administered by "Local Coloured Authorities" and ultimately thrown out of the body-politic, even judicially—in short, be completely reduced to the position of the African people, the position of propertyless, rightless, ignorant, disease-ridden, segregated cheap labour.

1226. Act No. 35 of 1920.

1227. "Cape Times", 30th January, 1943.

1228. Minutes. Anti-C.A.D. Conference, Cape Town, June, 1943.

1229. *Supra* 1227.

1230. "Cape Times" and "Die Burger", 14th October, 1950.

CHAPTER LII.

ANTI-INDIAN LEGISLATION (1946-1950).

The Africans had been driven off the land to become cheap labour. The Coloureds had been driven out of their skilled jobs to become cheap labour. It remained for the State to drive the independent Indians out of trade and property to convert the bulk of the Indian population into cheap labour, and to drive the remainder across the sea to India. The major anti-Indian legislation thus comprised *expropriation* and *repatriation*.

Pre-Union trading and immigration laws in the Cape, Natal and Transvaal and total exclusion of Indians from the O.F.S. were followed by the disfranchisement of the Indians in 1910. In 1913 the Immigration Regulation Act forced Indians to carry a pass in order to cross provincial borders. In 1920 Smuts' Asiatic Enquiry Commission recommended stripping the Indians of more land and trading rights. In 1923 Smuts told them their rightless position would be frozen. In 1927 the Union and Indian Governments concluded the "Cape Town Agreement"¹²³¹ which accepted the permanent inferiority of the Indians. In January, 1932, at the Second Cape Town Conference, the Indian Government accepted a Repatriation Scheme. In March, 1939, a Smuts Asiatic Land Laws Commission reported¹²³² the need for segregating and diminishing the trading opportunities of the Indians. In 1944, during the war, Smuts introduced the Pegging Act and in 1946 extended this through the Asiatic Land Tenure and Representation Act,¹²³³ whose aim was "*To impose restrictions with regard to the acquisition and occupation of fixed property in the Province of Natal . . . and Transvaal*" and to introduce a "*special franchise*" for Indians. The Act (1) prevented transfer of property in Natal between Indian and Non-Indian,¹²³⁴ (2) gave the Minister power to take over illegally transferred properties,¹²³⁵ (3) segregated Indian from European in Natal¹²³⁶ and Transvaal,¹²³⁷ (4) it provided for "Group Areas",¹²³⁸ by which Smuts paved the way for Malan's 1950 Group Areas Act, (5) it set up a Land Tenure Advisory Board¹²³⁹ which was later incorporated in the Group Areas Act, (6) and gave inspectors powers to enter premises, seize books and question persons.¹²⁴⁰ This extended to the Indians the police-raids legalised by the 1925 Anti-African Act, and was later incorporated in the Group Areas Act. (7) The Act gave Indians separate White Representatives in the Assembly, Senate and Natal Provin-

1231. S.A. Year Book, 1938. Agreement followed conference of 17th December, 1926, to 11th January, 1927.

1232. Union Government Publication No. 16 of 1939.

1233. Union Statutes Act 28 of June, 1946.

1234. *Ibid.* Section 2 (1).

1235. *Ibid.* Section 3 (5).

1236. *Ibid.* Section 4.

1237. *Ibid.* Section 5.

1238. *Ibid.* Section 6 (4a).

1239. *Ibid.* Section 10 (1).

1240. *Ibid.* Section 14 (2).

cial Council¹²⁴¹ This part was repealed by the Nationalists. (8) The Act scheduled 22 segregation areas in Natal alone. In 1949¹²⁴² and 1950¹²⁴³ the 1946 Act was extended, loopholes closed and the "franchise" clause repealed. In 1950 the Group Areas Act finally segregated, and threatened the total ruin of, the small and big Indian property owners and traders, who made up 30% of the Indians.

AFTERMATH—THE 1949 POGROM.

As a result of 89 years of anti-Indian laws and propaganda organised by all sections of the rulers; of intense propaganda in 1948 amongst Africans to "drive the coolie into the sea",¹²⁴⁴ of using African businessmen's jealousy of their Indian rivals;¹²⁴⁵ and of exploiting the political isolation of the Indians from the Africans—the Jingoos of Durban set African against Indian in January, 1949.¹²⁴⁶ Egged on by the White populace, the Africans killed hundreds of Indians. Then the White police and army stepped in and shot down 80 Africans.¹²⁴⁷ A "scandalous" Commission Report¹²⁴⁸ covered up the role of the Jingoos and rejected the real reasons for the riots given in evidence¹²⁴⁹ even by African and Indian collaborators, and confirmed by Sastri College students,¹²⁵⁰ namely that it was an *organised pogrom*. The White supremacists celebrated the reduction of the Indian to the status of the African and Coloured by means of a racial bloodbath, which diabolically consummated their age-old policy of divide and rule.

1241. *Ibid.* Section 43, chap. 2.

1242. Asiatic Land Tenure Act No. 53 of 1949.

1243. Act No. 15 of 1950.

1244. Report Commission of Enquiry into Durban Riots, February, 1949; "Natal Mercury", "Cape Times", January, 1949.

1245. "Torch", 21st February, 1949: Report of meeting on 6th February between African Congress and Indian Congress leaders.

1246/7/8. *Supra* 1244.

1249. African National Congress and Natal Indian Congress Evidence to Commission, 16th Feb. 1949.

1250. Non-European Students' Representative Council Statement, Natal University College, Feb. 1949.

CHAPTER LIII.

COMBINED ANTI-NON-EUROPEAN LEGISLATION (1950-1952).

Having reduced African, Coloured and Indian successively and separately to the same status, within which each was divided from the other, the State now unleashed a series of laws which simultaneously attacked *all* three groups, but at the same time fostered their mutual separation. These laws came after the end of the Second World War in 1945, when an industrial and farming boom, plus the opening of immense new gold-mines in the Free State, pushed the totalitarian state forward in a new, frenzied search for cheap labour from all sections of the Non-Europeans.

Rehabilitation Schemes and Retardation Schemes, more efficient tax-raids, the rising cost of living, mounting rural poverty, relatively higher wages in towns than on farms, organised recruiting on a vast scale—these combined to produce a steadily increasing flow of Non-Europeans, especially Africans, to the new industries and mines in the cities.

This increased labour-force had to be kept apart from the Whites by measures like the Mixed Marriages Act; had to be regimented into labour-locations by laws like the Group Areas Act; had to be labelled as Black labour and nationally controlled by laws like the Population Register Act; had to be prevented from assembling, reading and organising by laws like the Suppression of Communism Act; and had to be prevented from organising into free industrial unions by measures like the projected 1952 Trade Union Bill. These combined anti-Non-European laws provided amply for the legal consolidation of a system of total fascism over all the Non-Europeans throughout South Africa.

IMMORALITY AND MIXED MARRIAGES ACTS (1949-1950).

The 1949 Mixed Marriages Act said: "*A marriage between a European and a Non-European may not be solemnised*".¹²⁵¹ Mixed marriages contracted by Union Nationals outside the Union were made illegal upon their return home.¹²⁵² In 1951 the Nationalists hinted at an extension of the Act, so as to prevent marriages between African, Coloured and Indian.

The 1950 Immorality Act amended an Act of 1927 which forbade relations between Africans and Europeans (on penalty of death for the African), by changing the word "Native" to "Non-European". Its aim was "*to prohibit illicit intercourse between European and Non-European*".¹²⁵³ Violent anti-Indian pogromist propaganda by Nationalist and Jingo-controlled African racialists in 1951¹²⁵⁴ pointed to an extension of the Act so as to forbid relations between the three main Non-European groups.

1251. Act No. 55 of 1949, Section 1.

1252. *Ibid.* Section 1 (2).

1253. Act No. 21 of 1950 (amended Act 5, 1927).

1254. "Natal Native Medical Council" leaflet: "A Clarion Call to the Bantu People of Natal", February, 1952; joint statement by Rev. Z. R. Mahabane and Dr. G. H. Gool for the Non-European Unity Movement, February, 1952; "Torch", 26th February, 1952 (pp. 3, 5).

GROUP AREAS ACT, 1950.

The 1950 Group Areas Act created the legal machinery to (1) segregate White from Non-White, (2) segregate African, Coloured and Indian from each other, (3) segregate each of these three groups according to "*ethnic, linguistic, cultural or other*" criteria, including segregating Africans according to "tribes".¹²⁵⁵ Whites will not be divided according to Jew, Afrikaans, German, etc., for this would divide the United White Bloc.

The Act incorporated previous anti-Coloured land laws.¹²⁵⁶ It took over the anti-Indian Land Tenure Board to cut the whole Union up into "Group Areas" both for occupation¹²⁵⁷ and ownership.¹²⁵⁸ It provided for segregatory Local Government bodies to run each group area.¹²⁵⁹ While Whites will enjoy municipal franchise, Non-Whites will be controlled in group areas by White-dominated "Glen Grey" Councils, whose "colour" is to reflect that of its group area.

The Act permitted inspectors to enter and inspect premises "*at any time during the day or night*".¹²⁶⁰ It placed all the Non-Europeans into closed-in, police-ridden, cheap-labour camps.

SUPPRESSION OF COMMUNISM ACT, 1950.

The 1950 Suppression of Communism Act extended the provisions of the 1914 and 1930 Riotous Assemblies Acts¹²⁶¹ and of Smuts' war-time measures. It was drafted by the Nationalists, with the aid, in Select Committee, of the United Party and Liberals. In order to break the trade unions and the Non-European liberation movement the Act equated "Communism" with "*any doctrine or scheme . . . which aims at bringing about any political, industrial, social or economic change within the Union by the promotion of disturbance or disorder by unlawful acts or omissions or by the threat of such acts or omissions*".¹²⁶² By definition every Non-European was made a "Communist". The Act banned the Communist Party and gave the State powers to ban any organisation which, if regarded as "Communist" "*may be declared unlawful by proclamation without notice to the organisation concerned*".¹²⁶³ The Act provided for a "liquidator" of such organisations¹²⁶⁴ and for a "black list" of "Communists"¹²⁶⁵ to be drawn up by an "Investigating Officer".¹²⁶⁶ One became a "*member of an unlawful organisation*" if "*he attended any meeting . . . or has distributed any periodicals*" of the body.¹²⁶⁷ In 1951 this clause was made *absolutely retrospective*.¹²⁶⁸

The Act provided for the banning of publications,¹²⁶⁹ and of meetings,¹²⁷⁰ for the deportation, territorial confinement, removal from organisations, and political gagging of "named" persons,¹²⁷¹ and for designated authorities to enter and search premises and question individuals without notice.¹²⁷²

1255. Act No. 41 of July, 1950. Sections 1, 2 (2).

1256. Coloured Persons Settlement Act No. 7 of 1946; Coloured Mission Stations and Reserves Act No. 12 of 1949.

1257. Act No. 41, 1950. Section 3 (1).

1258. *Ibid.* Section 3 (2).

1259. *Ibid.* Sections 6 (1), 6 (2).

1260. *Ibid.* Section 31.

1261. Act 27 of 1914.

1262. Act No. 44 of July, 1950. Section 1 (ii) b.

1263. *Ibid.* Sections 2 (1) and 2 (2).

1264. *Ibid.* Sections 3 and 4.

1265. *Ibid.* Sections 5 and 8.

1266. *Ibid.* Section 7 (1).

1267. *Ibid.* Section 12.

1268. Amendment to Suppression of Communism Act, 1951.

1269. *Supra* 1267, Section 6.

1270. *Ibid.* Section 9.

1271. *Ibid.* Section 10.

1272. *Ibid.* Section 7.

Penalties included confiscation of property and three years' gaol for using premises for "*unlawful purposes*"; and, for other offences, gaol up to 10 years.¹²⁷³ (The United Party pressed for the death sentence.) This Act provided for the total destruction of organisations, publications and resistance of exploited and oppressed people, particularly of the Non-Europeans.

POPULATION REGISTER ACT, 1950.

The 1950 Population Register Act extended the passes of Africans to all Non-Europeans. It provided for a Register listing racial and other details of all Union inhabitants.¹²⁷⁴ The Register classified persons as "*a White person, a Coloured person or a Native, as the case may be*".¹²⁷⁵ It further divided each Non-European group (but not Europeans) "*according to the ethnic or other group to which he belongs*".

The Act provided for "*Identity Cards*" for all,¹²⁷⁶ which will show one's "race", religion, and, for Africans, one's "tribe".¹²⁷⁷ In order to apply the divide and rule policy in its entirety to all spheres the details on the Register can be used by any State Department.¹²⁷⁸ By means of this Act the whole Non-European population is pigeon-holed, regimented and under constant police surveillance; while the White's Identity Cards entitle them to all the privileges of their Greek democracy, resting as it does on the slave-labour of the Non-Europeans.

TRADE UNION REGIMENTATION, 1952.

Following the recommendations of the Industrial Legislation Commission,¹²⁷⁹ the Speech from the Throne in January, 1952, announced a Trade Union Bill whose main effect would be to (1) segregate White and Black workers into separate Unions; (2) to segregate African, Coloured and Indian into separate Unions; (3) to place Non-European Unions under trusteeship of the White Unions; (4) to place African, Coloured and Indian Unions under the Native Affairs Department, Coloured Affairs Department and Asiatic State Department respectively. This Police-State Trade Union measure completes the idea of the Industrial Conciliation Act; to wed White labour to the employers and the State; to divorce White from Black labour; to divide and atomise Black labour; to stifle the Unions and subject them to the will of the State.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE.

All these legislative measures evolve out of, serve and maintain the interests of the employers and the totalitarian State. This class of mine, factory, and farm owners, commercialists, bankers, etc., comprises 150,000 companies and persons, some 600,000 people including families, or 5% of the population. It enjoys 60% of the national income.¹²⁸⁰

It is supported by the rest of the White population, which is 16% of the population and yet receives 24% of the national income.¹²⁸¹ This White "working class" is composed of a White Labour Aristocracy and a semi-middle class White Bureaucracy. The economically unproductive White Labour Aristocracy comprises some 300,000 "physical" workers in all

1273. *Ibid.* Sections 11, 12, 13.

1274. Act No. 30 of June 1950.

1275. *Ibid.* Section 5 (1).

1276. *Ibid.* Section 6.

1277. *Ibid.* Section 7 (1).

1278. *Ibid.* Section 17 (1).

1279. Industrial Legislation Commission U.G. 1951.

1280/1/2. Monthly Bulletins of Statistics, September, October, 1951.

spheres, and layers are peeling off steadily to augment the White Labour Bureaucracy of white-collar unproductive, etc., workers who comprise some 300,000 in all spheres,¹²⁸² including over 150,000 non-labouring civil servants. This Bureaucracy administers the economy and State for the rulers. This Nazified industrial, commercial, financial and State Bureaucracy co-exists with and grows out of the White Labour Aristocracy.

At the base of society stand the 10 million Blacks. Though 80% of the population, they draw but 16% of the national income.¹²⁸³ Some four million are more or less fixed farm-serfs and Reserve-peasants.¹²⁸³ Some four million are migrant peasants in or from the Reserves.¹²⁸⁴ Some two million, half African and half Coloured and Indian, are more or less stable in the towns.¹²⁸⁵ The peasantry, 80% of the Non-Europeans, runs all major sectors of the economy—farming, mining, heavy engineering, power, and transport.¹²⁸⁶ The settled workers, 20% of all Non-Europeans, run light industry, commerce, etc. This set-up, whereby the migrant peasants run the key, hub, basic, heavy industries, while the settled workers run secondary, peripheral, light industries, serves enormously to prevent the “proletarianisation” of the workers. This economic functional segregation combines with colour-segregation to put the brake on the process of urbanisation and the formation of a stable urban working class. With the basic workers shut up in compounds and migrant between Reserve and town; with the others shut off from urban life by locations, passes and regimentation as a whole; and with Non-European workers divided along “colour” lines and further along tribal and religious lines, the totalitarian State has erected a perfect structure for despotic divide and rule.

NAKED FORCE.

It has maintained this “legal fascism” by open police force. This tyranny rules night and day and, on occasion, uses armed warfare against the Non-Europeans. In December, 1942, it shot down 14 and wounded 111 Marabastad workers; in August, 1946, it crushed a strike of 100,000 African miners, killing nine (officially) and wounding hundreds;¹²⁸⁷ in May, 1950, it massacred 18 in Johannesburg¹²⁸⁸ after dusk to dawn raids on locations;¹²⁸⁹ in 1951 it mowed down the Witzieshoek peasants and gaoled their leaders.

Together with this naked police brutality goes destruction on all fronts. The first year of the Welkom gold-mines killed over 100 Africans in accidents.¹²⁹⁰ Outside the industrial sphere, in the locations and compounds and farms and Reserves, the Non-Europeans die at the highest death-rate in all the world; the infant mortality rate and the T.B. death rate are also the highest in the world.¹²⁹¹ In short, the totalitarian state has reduced the Non-Europeans to the most exploited, oppressed, illiterate and unhealthy people in the world.

A HISTORY OF STRUGGLE.

Yet these same Non-Europeans more and more became the main force of future change. The objects now became subjects. The history of South Africa is a history of 300 years of struggle between oppressors and

1283/4/5. Native Laws Commission U.G. 28/1948.

1286. Monthly Bulletins of Statistics, September, October, 1951.

1287. “Rand Daily Mail”, “Star”, 12th to 17th August, 1946.

1288. “Cape Argus”, 1st May, 1950.

1289. “Cape Times”, 15th February, 1950.

1290. “Cape Argus”, “Cape Times”, March, 1952.

1291. S.A. Year Book, 1948; M.O.H. Report, Cape Town, June, 1949; G. E. Stent, National Secretary of S.A. Tuberculosis Association, in “Cape Times”, 7th May, 1951.

oppressed. Under *slavery*, oppression produced numerous slave-revolts. Under Boer *feudalism*, the !Ke and Khoi-Khoi and Bantu resisted fiercely their forcible dispossession. Under British *Imperialism* this African tribal resistance was long and stubborn. Finally, under the combined Boer-British *Totalitarianism*, workers and peasants have struggled not only to keep alive, but also to get reforms—as at Bulhoek, Bondelswartz, Marabastad, Johannesburg, Witzieshoek and Mount Ayliff. There have been strikes and even open revolts. Moreover, these struggles and the rise of new ideas took place despite and because of segregation, division and deproletarianisation and slave-education of the Non-Europeans. Indeed, instead of submission, every act and aspect of oppression more and more produced an increasing liberatory reaction. Segregation, division, disfranchisement, illiteracy, landlessness and disease produced ideas, organisations and methods of struggling for their opposites—for national unification, Non-European unity, full democratic rights, education, land and health. The fact that Non-Europeans are in general *all* exploited and oppressed and the resultant spread of *common* ideas of freedom tended to overcome all devices of segregating, dividing and “de-culturising” the Non-Europeans. The very system of migrant labour bridged the usual worker-peasant gulf. The urban locations united peasant-workers and settled workers. Mass production and the concentration of workers in Reserves and compounds or locations neutralised the policy of atomising the people and the federal type of organisation united the separate African, Indian and Coloured locations. The very methods which maintained the status quo produced the forces and the means to abolish it. Those who had slavishly adapted themselves to the oppressive system now set out to change the system. The submissive adaptation of the people to their social environment now changed into its very opposite, namely the adaptation of society to satisfy the wants of the people. Especially after the Second World War the struggle against oppression became more purposeful, more deliberate, more far-sighted—more *conscious*. Boycotts of the Rehabilitation Scheme, of the N.R.C., the Bunga, the C.A.D. and Asiatic Advisory Board showed that the idea of non-collaboration had taken root. These *political* struggles were on a much higher level than the former half-blind *economic* ones. The scope, content, form and level of the struggle was changing, under the impact of post-war liberation movements in the Far East and Middle East, and under the influence of new ideas bred in South Africa. From being a struggle against the *effects* of the system of oppression it became more and more a struggle against the very *system itself*. This profound change in the nature of the struggle in South Africa meant that *both* the rulers and the ruled were aware of their actions and acting consciously. The planned, deliberate, conscious policy of White domination now was faced and met by a more than equally conscious and purposeful policy of liberation. Symbolic of this change in the struggle was a 95% nation-wide Non-European boycott of the Van Riebeeck Tercentenary celebrations held in April, 1952.¹²⁹² These celebrations symbolised the completion of 300 years of White supremacy and the beginning of the end of this supremacy. While the rulers celebrated, the sword of Damocles hung over their heads, for those whom they had conquered and held in thrall for 300 years had become metamorphosed into potential liberators.

1292. “Die Burger”, “Cape Times”, “Cape Argus”, “Eastern Province Herald”, “Torch”, from 14th March to 7th April, 1952; Non-European Unity Committee (W.P.) leaflet, 30th March, 1952.




HOSEA JAFFE

A BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

"*Mnguni*", the author of this seminal work, is the pen name of Hosea Jaffe. He had been an active member of the NEF, an active participant in the national liberatory movement and a tireless researcher in the field of economics, politics and the history of struggles. He was an energetic tutor of countless young cadres who had entered the political struggle in the critical years of 1935-1945 when the foundations for the truly *national* liberatory movements – of which the Unity Movement was the first – were laid.

"*Mnguni*" (Hosea Jaffe) grew up in Oudtshoorn (Cape). Trained at the University of Cape Town as an engineer, he finally adopted teaching as a career. He fled the country during the repression after Sharpeville, was hounded out of Kenya by the government, and then commuted between Britain and Europe where he now lives. The author of numerous works on the history of struggles of the colonial peoples against Imperialism and works on economic analysis, he has joined such authors as Wilfred Burchett (*Southern Africa Stands Up*), Samir Amin (*Neo-Colonialism in West Africa*) who provides the preface to Hosea Jaffe's recent work "*A History of Africa*" and other distinguished writers who contribute to "*The Contemporary Crisis*", a theoretical journal of contemporary Marxism-Leninism. Jaffe's "*The Pyramid of Nations*" is banned in this country. Several of his writings have been published in Spanish and Italian. A "*History of South Africa*" is being prepared at the present time.



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