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Gateway to international victory: the diplomacy of the African National Congress in Africa, 1960–1994

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ABSTRACT

The African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa extended the struggle against apartheid into the international arena when it was banned in 1960. This aspect of its policy became crucial and remained paramount until South Africa's first democratic elections were held in 1994. This paper focuses on the ANC's attempts to secure the support of the community of African states, and singles out three themes that were dominant in the period under review, namely acceptance by the African states; the *modus operandi* of their assistance; and their role in the negotiation process. The findings are based partly on new archival documentation, drawing two main conclusions. First, the ANC only won exclusive backing from African states after a lengthy struggle. Second, their diplomatic support proved to be a pivotal factor during the negotiations in South Africa after 1990, significantly contributing to the ANC's eventual victory in 1994.

INTRODUCTION

The African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa was banned in 1960 and subsequently espoused the domestic and international struggle against apartheid as its primary *raison d'être*. On the international front, the so-called External Mission became of paramount importance in ensuring the movement's survival as its ability to operate effectively within South Africa was increasingly curbed (Alden 1993: 64). In total, the ANC established forty-three Exile Missions during the period under review (Table 1). This paper examines the ANC's attempts to win the support of

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TABLE I
ANC exile missions

AFRICA	ASIA & PACIFIC
Algeria, Algiers: 1962-93	Australia & Pacific, Sydney: Jan. 1984-Jan. 1993
Angola, Luanda: 1975-95	India, New Delhi: Sept. 1967-94
Botswana, Gaborone: 1984-94	Japan, Tokyo: May 1988-May 1994
Egypt, Cairo: Sept. 1964-94	Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: 1991-June 1995
Ethiopia, Addis Ababa: 1980s-95	EUROPE
Ghana, Accra: 1960/61-89*	Belgium, Brussels: 1981-94
Kenya, Nairobi: 1987-94	Denmark, Copenhagen: Jan. 1985-May 1994
Lesotho, Maseru: 1975-94	Finland, Helsinki: Oct. 1988-July 1993
Libya, Tripoli: 1987-94	France, Paris: 1981-94
Madagascar, Antananarivo: early 1980s-94	Germany & Austria, Bonn: Jan. 1984-Jan. 1993
Morocco, Rabat: 1962-?	Germany (East), Berlin: Nov. 1978-89/90
Mozambique, Maputo: 1975-95	Hungary, Budapest: ? (existed in 1990)-1994
Namibia, Windhoek: 1990-94	Italy, Rome: 1972-94
Nigeria, Lagos: 1976-94	Netherlands, Amsterdam: 1988-94
Senegal, Dakar: 1975/76-94	Norway, Oslo: 1970s-92
Swaziland, Mbabane: 1976-94	Romania, Bucharest: ? (existed in 1982)-92
Tanzania, Dar-es-Salaam/Morogoro: 1962-95	Spain, Madrid: 1987/88-94
Uganda, Kampala: Aug. 1989-92	Sweden, Stockholm: 1977/78-94
Zambia, Lusaka: 1964-93	United Kingdom, London: 1960-95
Zimbabwe, Harare: 1980-94	USSR, Moscow: 1987-94
AMERICAS	
Canada, Ottawa: 1969-94	
Cuba, Havana: Dec. 1978-94	
United States, New York: 1974-94	
United States, Washington: Nov. 1989-94	

Note: * The ANC did not have a permanent mission during the entire period under review, but contact remained on an informal basis. See also note 6.

Sources: ANC Mission Records; Directory of Missions and Offices, dated 24 October 1990 (ANC Archive, Botswana Collection, Box 1, File ANC Missions (1990-92)); Appointments to Our Missions Abroad, by Josiah Jele, 4.6.1982 (ANC Archive, Tambo Papers, Box 43, File B 8.7-8.7.1). *Interviews and correspondence:* Interviews, Josiah Jele, 23.4.1999, and George Nene, 22.6.2001. Their biographical data is contained in the text. Correspondence with Yusuf Saloojee, 6.6.2001. He was ANC Chief Representative to Canada (1977-89), served at the Headquarters in Lusaka (1989-90), was Head of Administration (1990-94) and the DIA (1994-98), and South Africa's Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates since December 1998. Correspondence during June 2001 with the South African Embassies and High Commissions in Denmark, Ghana, Norway, and Great Britain. *ANC publications:* ANC Office in Berlin, *Sechaba* 13, 1, January 1979: 24; ANC International, *Sechaba* 18, 2, February 1984: 17. *Secondary literature:* Agbogu 1983: 144; Darbon 1990: 236; *SA Barometer* 31.7.1987: 162; Shubin 1999: 200; Thomas 1989: 528-31; 1996: 44; Schoeman & Schoeman 1993: 190, 370.

African states in this context. It is a case study of the foreign policy of the principal South African liberation movement, and thus makes a contribution to a relatively under-researched topic (Vale 1998: 23).

Three issues dominated the relationship between the ANC and the community of African states, and the presentation of the evidence is organised accordingly. First, the focus falls on the ANC's struggle for acceptance by

African states as the dominant South African liberation movement over the rival Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). Second, the paper examines the ways and means, as well as the relevance, of African continental assistance to the ANC. Third, it assesses the crucial role played by African states in support of the ANC during the negotiations in South Africa from 1990 to 1994. The article builds on previously published information, complemented by documentation from the ANC Archive at the University of Fort Hare,¹ as well as interviews and contacts with several figures involved in the External Mission.

THE ANC'S STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION

The year in which the ANC was banned, 1960, marked the crest of a wave of independence that swept across the African continent. More than thirty African countries gained their independence during the first half of the following decade. They declared the eradication of colonialism as their prime task and Pan-Africanism as their principal aim. This resulted, in 1963, in the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), bringing together all those African countries that were already independent. In the same year, the OAU established the Liberation Committee² to provide assistance to those liberation movements still fighting for the independence of African colonial territories. This Committee was based, until its closure in 1993, in the Tanzanian capital of Dar-es-Salaam. In several countries, the OAU and its Liberation Committee faced the dilemma that multiple liberation movements were involved in the fight for independence. In their approach to this situation, they tried to avoid taking sides and to mete out equal treatment. At the same time, they attempted to reconcile and unite the rival groups (Sheth 1991). This also applied to South Africa, where the ANC and the PAC were in competition for recognition as the sole and legitimate representatives of the oppressed South African people. This long-lasting rivalry significantly hampered the ANC's aim of establishing itself in newly independent Africa and this factor is the basis of the following discussion.

As was true for other African liberation movements, the new political dispensation on the African continent in the early 1960s also raised the ANC's hopes of establishing a support network. As early as 1959, the decision had been taken that in the event of a crisis, Oliver Tambo – ANC secretary general from 1955 to 1958 and deputy president since 1958 – would immediately leave the country and set up an office in Ghana, a country that had attained its independence in 1957. The Sharpeville massacre on 21 March 1960 proved to be the catalyst, and six days later, Tambo

left Johannesburg. He travelled via Tanzania because of its reputation as a champion of African liberation under the leadership of Julius Nyerere, who was to become the country's first president in 1961 (Ellis & Sechaba 1992: 40-1; Ellis 1991: 443; Sampson 1999: 138-9). However, the ANC only made a significant move in establishing connections with African states in December 1961, when it was invited to attend the conference of the Pan African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA), the forerunner of the OAU, in Addis Ababa in February 1962. Mandela was chosen to represent the ANC at this meeting, with the hope of enlisting financial and military support and to boost the movement's reputation in Africa. In January 1962, he left Johannesburg for Ethiopia, travelling via Botswana, Tanzania, and Ghana. *En route*, he held talks with President Nyerere and met up with Tambo in Accra. In his address to the PAFMECA conference, Mandela explained the ANC's aims and thanked African leaders for having put enough pressure on the South African government for it to withdraw from the Commonwealth in 1961.³ Mandela and Tambo also used the opportunity to talk to several political leaders, including Zambia's future president, Kenneth Kaunda. During the following four months, Mandela visited Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Mali, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ghana, Senegal, and again Ethiopia, returning to South Africa in July via the Sudan, Tanzania, and Botswana. He met the heads of state of Egypt, Tunisia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Senegal, visited military training camps of the Algerian liberation movement in Morocco, and received military training for two months in Ethiopia to prepare him as a leader of the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK); the Tunisian government offered him military training and money to buy weapons (Mandela 1995: 341-65; Sampson 1999: 160-70; Thomas 1996: 27-8).

In spite of the ANC's activities, the PAC's policy of black exclusivity was more appealing to the black nationalists in the rest of the continent. At the PAFMECA conference, PAC representative Peter Molotsi actively portrayed the ANC as a tribal organisation with considerable white influence, and presented the PAC as the only hope for South Africa's black population. During his Africa tour, Mandela felt the consequences of the ANC's discredited image on the continent. Political representatives in several countries criticised the ANC's non-racial policy, as Mandela (1995: 361) confirms in his autobiography: 'In the rest of Africa, most African leaders could understand the views of the PAC better than those of the ANC.' However, by the end of 1964, there was an almost equal spread of ANC and PAC networks in Africa. The ANC had established Exile Missions in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tanzania, and Zambia, while the PAC was

represented in Botswana, Egypt, Tanzania, and Zaire. The PAC headquarters were established in Lesotho in 1962 and transferred to Tanzania two years later.⁴ Nonetheless, African countries advocated the idea of a united South African liberation movement that resulted in the short-lived South African United Front (SAUF) (Lodge 1988: 243; Thomas 1996: 44–8, 234). After the SAUF was disbanded at the end of 1962, the competition between the ANC and PAC for recognition as the sole and legitimate representative of South Africa's oppressed people resurfaced. This struggle for recognition imposed severe constraints on the ANC's success in Ghana and Tanzania, precisely the two countries which the ANC appears to have considered as important stepping-stones in achieving recognition in Africa, as can be concluded from Tambo's and Mandela's itineraries in 1961 and 1962 respectively.

Ghana was particularly active in trying to unite the ANC and PAC (Thomas 1996: 34–6). The ANC's position in Ghana deteriorated after the end of the SAUF, and remained difficult throughout the period under review; this was primarily rooted in Accra's preference for the PAC, as had already been evident during Mandela's Africa tour in 1962, when President Kwame Nkrumah refused to meet the ANC leader. In the same year, the ANC's Tennyson Makiwane, who represented the SAUF in Accra, was expelled (Christopher 1994: 443; Sampson 1999: 160–5; Thomas 1996: 28–35). Subsequent contact with the government of Ghana remained informal, and the ANC had no permanent mission there for most of the period under review.⁵ Questioned on this subject, however, several ANC figures downplay the strain that the ANC–PAC rivalry put on the ANC's relations with certain African states, Ghana in particular. In his autobiography, Mandela makes no mention of Nkrumah's rebuttal, while Dan Mavimbela and George Nene – ANC representatives to Ghana (1985–89) and Nigeria (1989–94) – explain the ANC's formal non-representation in Accra in terms of financial constraints. They argue that Ghana, unlike other countries, was not in a position to finance an ANC Exile Mission.⁶ While the financial aspect should not be disregarded, ideological and political differences between the ANC and PAC appear to have been at the heart of the problem.

The most notable clash between the ANC and PAC in Africa occurred at the beginning of the 1970s in Tanzania. The ANC had established its provisional headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam in 1962, undoubtedly motivated by the idea of having close access to the OAU Liberation Committee. However, in 1964, the ANC transferred its headquarters to Morogoro, 150 kilometres west of the capital. The reasons for this move are not entirely clear, but it is a reasonable assumption that it was determined by the PAC's move of its headquarters to Dar-es-Salaam in the same year. It is also

an indication that the PAC was given preferential treatment by President Nyerere, as documented by later events. For the time being, however, the relationship between the ANC and the Tanzanian government remained cordial. From 1964 to 1967, for example, the ANC was given permission to establish four MK military bases (Ellis & Sechaba 1992: 40-1, 135; Lodge 1983: 298; 1988: 237-9). Furthermore, in April 1969, it held its First Consultative Conference, the Morogoro Conference, on Tanzanian territory. This was an event at which major political strategy was devised and organisational decisions were made.⁷ Tambo, acting president since 1967, was elected ANC president, and the Department of International Affairs (DIA) was established to improve the efficiency of the international struggle against apartheid (interview, Jele, 23.4.1999); 42-year-old Duma Nokwe became its head and remained so until he died of alcoholism in 1978. He was a legal draftsman, member of the South African Communist Party (SACP) Central Committee, and ANC secretary general from 1958 to 1969. He participated at OAU and United Nations (UN) meetings in his new capacity, and a number of important ANC Missions, the majority of them in Africa, were opened during his tenure (Table 1).⁸

The beginning of the 1970s, however, did not augur well for the ANC's presence in Tanzania, as the rivalry with the PAC came to a head. Both liberation movements had been implicated in coup plans initiated by Oscar Kambona, minister for foreign affairs from 1963 to 1965 and chairman of the OAU Liberation Committee, against Nyerere. When court proceedings began in May 1970, Tambo refused to testify against Kambona. Nyerere was infuriated to such an extent that he ordered the ANC out of his country and subsequently courted the PAC for many years. After a brief sojourn in Moscow, the ANC set up its new headquarters in the Zambian capital, Lusaka, and it was from this base that the DIA administered the international network. Good relations between the ANC and the Tanzanian government were only re-established after September 1978, when Nyerere received an ANC delegation headed by Tambo (Ellis & Sechaba 1992: 53-4, 59; Lodge 1988: 232-3; Shubin 1999: 208-9). The ANC set up Radio Freedom to broadcast propaganda to South Africa, inaugurated the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College (SOMAFCO) at Mazimbu, near Morogoro, in 1979, and the Tanzanian government apparently offered Tambo the post of attorney-general.⁹

By the mid-1970s, the ANC was still nowhere near its goal of being accepted as the sole and legitimate representative of the oppressed South African people. This was reflected in the results of African lobbying at the UN General Assembly and the UN Special Committee against Apartheid, which will be dealt with in the next section. In 1969, the General Assembly

had given recognition to both the ANC and the PAC as 'authentic representatives' of South Africa's population (Esterhuysen 1989: 34). Five years later, the ANC still had to share the privilege of being granted observer status at the General Assembly and the Special Committee against Apartheid with the PAC (Boutros-Ghali 1994: 47-8; Esterhuysen 1989: 29, 32; Thomas 1996: 40-2, 115-20). This situation gradually began to change in favour of the ANC during the 1980s, the contributory factors for which were domestic, regional, and international in nature. These are examined in turn.

The ANC's improved standing at home, based on its ability to rally the majority of the black population behind its cause, was of crucial importance. This was largely due to the alliances that the ANC formed with two principal grassroots organisations, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the United Democratic Front (UDF). COSATU came into existence in 1979, and by 1985 had become the largest South African trade union. The UDF was a coalition of a wide range of groups from civil society and was established in 1983 in reaction to Pretoria's proposed Tricameral Parliament. Their alliance with the ANC peaked in 1987, when COSATU and the UDF formally adopted the ANC's Freedom Charter (Baskin 1991; Seekings 2000).

The support from several countries in the Southern African region – Zambia, Angola and Mozambique in particular – provided further impetus to the ANC's claim to exclusive legitimacy. The ANC had already been recognised by Zambia's future president, Kaunda, on the occasion of the PAFMECA meeting in 1962, as mentioned above. This was later evidenced when Kaunda expelled a number of PAC members (Esterhuysen 1989: 3). In addition, the ANC was able to establish its headquarters in Lusaka in 1970. As will be shown later, Kaunda's activities further boosted the ANC's standing in 1985. As for the support of Angola and Mozambique, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), which came to power in the former Portuguese colonies in 1975, were part of an alliance with the ANC that had been concluded on the occasion of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) Conference in 1969 in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. After independence, the Angolan and Mozambican governments consequently lobbied at the OAU and the UN for acknowledgement of the ANC as the leading South African liberation movement (Thomas 1996: 234). They took the same stance in two regional organisations, the Front Line States (FLS) and the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). The FLS was formed in 1974 by Botswana, Tanzania, and Zambia, later joined by Mozambique (1975), Angola (1976), and Zimbabwe (1980). SADCC was established in

1979, composed of the FLS member states, with the addition of Lesotho, Malawi, and Swaziland. While the FLS pursued the politico-military objective of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia, SWA/Namibia, and South Africa, the SADCC sought to harmonise economic development among member countries to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa. In the context of the endeavours by the FLS, and due to its alliance with FRELIMO and MPLA, the ANC was able to establish MK training camps in Angola and Mozambique (Khadiagala 1994). This facilitated the MK's ability to launch military attacks against Pretoria and to intensify the armed struggle, thereby increasing the ANC's level of visibility and respect among the black people in South Africa. In the face of this, the South African government devised its destabilisation strategy against the perceived Total Onslaught to stop neighbouring countries from harbouring MK camps (Hanlon 1986; Johnson & Martin 1986). Apart from providing their territories for MK camps, the governments in Luanda and Maputo appear to have been instrumental in convincing the other FLS members to acknowledge the ANC's leading role in South Africa's liberation struggle. As a result, the FLS communiqué after the 1984 Summit referred solely to the ANC, and no longer to the PAC (Thomas 1996: 147-8, 234). SADCC followed the FLS example some five years later. Both the ANC and the PAC were represented at the 1989 SADCC Summit in Harare. However, it was only the then head of the ANC's DIA, Thabo Mbeki, who made a statement at the closing session. Furthermore, with reference to the 1987 Dakar meeting that will be discussed later, a statement in the communiqué obviously referred to the ANC alone: 'the Summit was encouraged by the initiatives taken by different groups of the white population to establish contacts, and engage in consultations with the liberation movement, on the future of South Africa'.¹⁰

Parallel to, and resulting from, the improved standing at home and in the region, the ANC enlarged its international network, both in the East and West. In order to gain a foothold in the Eastern Bloc, the ANC relied on support from the allied South African Communist Party. For example, it gained access to the Helsinki based communist front organisation World Peace Council (WPC) that, like AAPSO, supported the ANC's claim for exclusive legitimacy. The climax was undoubtedly reached with the opening of the Exile Mission in Moscow in 1987 (Ellis & Sechaba 1992; Thomas 1996: 234). In the West, the ANC found support from the international anti-apartheid movement that experienced a tremendous growth during the 1980s, in exerting increasing influence on government policies toward South Africa. In the United States, for example, Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) in October 1986, due to

lobbying by various anti-apartheid organisations and, significantly, against the presidential veto. It also pressured the US government to recognise the ANC. In early 1987, US Secretary of State George Shultz officially received Oliver Tambo, and the ANC was able to establish an office in Washington in late 1989 (Culverson 1999; Love 1985; Waller 1989: 77). The activities of the anti-apartheid movement in other Western nations equally assisted the ANC in extending its network of Exile Missions. From 1981 to 1988, offices were opened in Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and Spain (Danaher 1981; Shepherd 1991; Table 1).

A key to the success of the ANC's international diplomacy from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s was the role played by the successive heads of its Department of International Affairs, Josiah Khiphusizi Jele (1978–82), Johnstone Mfanafuthi 'Johnny' Makatini (1983–88), and Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki (1989–93). Jele was stationed in those places that were most relevant for the ANC's development at the time and significantly influenced the movement's profile. He was the ANC chief representative in Tanzania from 1965 to 1971, followed by an interlude of five years at the WPC in Helsinki, before becoming chief representative at the headquarters in Lusaka from 1978 to 1990. Within the ANC he held the important positions of member of the Revolutionary Council (1976–80) and the powerful Political Military Council (1983–85, 1987–90). With his membership of the SACP Politburo he further personified the close relationship between the ANC and the SACP. Jele's contribution to the anti-apartheid struggle was recognised when Mandela appointed him as South Africa's ambassador to the UN in New York from 1995 to 1999.¹¹ Jele's successor as head of the DIA, Makatini, was said to have had 'little real influence' (*Africa Newsfile* 12.9.1988: 7), although he was a member of the ANC National Executive Committee (NEC) (1963–90) and the Revolutionary Council (1976–83). He recruited MK soldiers to Tanzania in 1962, opened the Exile Mission in Morocco, and represented the ANC in Algeria (1964–75) and at the UN in New York (1977–82); the international network underwent considerable expansion with the opening of nine Exile Missions while he headed the DIA. In particular, he inaugurated the deeply symbolic Mission in Moscow in 1987, a year before he died. Makatini's real contribution lay in building up contacts with African-Americans while in New York, thus strengthening the ANC's links with the US anti-apartheid movement.¹²

All these developments resulted in the ANC's eventual recognition as the sole and legitimate representative of South Africa's black people. The position adopted by the FLS and SADCC in this regard has already been mentioned, and it is safe to argue that their stance imprinted on the OAU.

The earliest evidence of a shift in the OAU's policy from the equal treatment of both the ANC and PAC, can be found in its Harare Declaration of 1989, which will be discussed later. In the section on Guidelines to the Process of Negotiation, the document refers to 'the South African liberation movement',¹³ evidently meaning the ANC alone. The impression that the OAU now sidelined the PAC finds confirmation in two other documents, authored by the OAU Monitoring Group, whose role will be examined at a later stage. The first is a report of May 1991 that speaks of the intention to continue to 'work closely with the National Liberation Movements of South Africa, particularly the African National Congress ANC'.¹⁴ The second details the discussions during a meeting of the Group in August 1991, when Gora Ebrahim, PAC representative in Dar-es-Salaam, complained that 'the arrangements so far by the Group made it difficult for him to participate since a lot of decisions had already been taken by the Group'.¹⁵

Building on its strengthened domestic power base, the ANC had managed to find regional and eventually international acceptance as the leading South African liberation movement in the course of the 1980s. This development could not pass the South African political arena unnoticed. In recognition of the new realities, a number of rapprochement meetings took place from 1985 to 1990 between representatives of South African big business, the Afrikaner intelligentsia, and ANC representatives (Waldmeir 1997: 39–106). The two most significant events were those of September 1985 in Zambia and July 1987 in Senegal. In 1985, Gavin Relly, Tony Bloom, and Zach de Beer of the giant Anglo-American Corporation, joined by Peter Sorour from the South Africa Foundation and three newspaper editors, flew to Zambia in an Anglo plane. Anton Rupert (Rembrandt group), Chris Ball (Barclays), Mike Rosholt (Barlow Rand) and Fred du Plessis (Sanlam) were also due to participate, but President Botha urged them to cancel the trip. The ANC party comprised Tambo, Thabo Mbeki, Mac Maharaj, Chris Hani, Pallo Jordan, and James Stuart. President Kaunda hosted the meeting, putting his luxurious Mfuwe Game Lodge at the disposal of the delegates. It was a major diplomatic coup for the ANC, despite the non-attendance of business tycoon Harry Oppenheimer.¹⁶ The Dakar meeting of July 1987 was organised by Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, leader of the opposition Progressive Federal Party, and involved sixty-one intellectuals from the Afrikaner community and seventeen ANC representatives.¹⁷ While the Anglo initiative helped to remove the business community's suspicion that the ANC was an unreasonable and communist-dominated party, the Dakar meeting allayed fears that all the ANC was interested in was to 'kill the Boer'. These two meetings were of crucial importance, as they reflected the status the ANC had achieved among

important segments of South Africa's white society. There can be little doubt that this contributed to Pretoria's realisation that this liberation movement could no longer be ignored and wished away.

A key figure in both of these meetings was Thabo Mbeki, then head of the ANC Department of Information and Publicity and later head of the DIA. He fled to England in 1962, studying economics at the University of Sussex while living with the Tambo family. He became their protégé, Tambo's key adviser in exile, and therefore won the solid backing of the old guard within the ANC. On completion of his MA in 1966, he represented the ANC at the important London Mission, followed by a brief spell of military training and study in the Soviet Union in 1970. He subsequently served the ANC in various positions in several African countries: Zambia (1971–73, 1974, 1976), Botswana (1973–74), Swaziland (1975–76), and Nigeria (1976–78). His career received a boost in 1978, when he became political secretary in the ANC President's Office and later head of the Department of Information and Publicity, two critically important posts at the centre of the ANC's political life. He was also a member of the ANC NEC, the Revolutionary Council, and the SACP Politburo. Mbeki's diplomatic skills and network of contacts strengthened the ANC's profile internationally, particularly in the West, as well as among the white business community in South Africa.¹⁸ In consequence, Mbeki was involved in the early contacts between the ANC and the government. However, it appears that the consolidation of support structures within the South African political framework, and even within the ANC itself, was neglected. The recent coup allegations against him and the increasing tensions with COSATU can be interpreted as a sign that not enough effort was made in this regard.

MODES OF AFRICAN CONTINENTAL SUPPORT FOR THE ANC

Africa's support for the ANC can be divided into two broad categories, 'hard' material and 'weak' diplomatic assistance, and their relevance is discussed in this section. In general, the OAU's ability to provide financial aid to African liberation movements was limited, as member states themselves could ill afford to be generous. Information on the actual figures is very sparse, and access to the archival documents from the OAU Liberation Committee would undoubtedly shed more light on this.¹⁹ The documentation in the ANC Archive contains very limited information on financial assistance, but allows three tentative conclusions.²⁰ First, it appears that the South African liberation movements received comparatively less material aid than those in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. The OAU's reasoning may have reflected a domino theory, whereby South Africa

would only fall once the neighbouring countries had achieved their independence, so that aid to South African movements initially had a low priority. Second, the few available figures on promised financial assistance for both the ANC and PAC suggest that the ANC was given preferential treatment. For example, the ANC was promised 64,200 South African Rand for the period 1971/72 and 86,200 for 1973/74, compared to 18,300 and 24,600 for the PAC. This is astonishing and does not correspond to the equal treatment they were accorded by the OAU in terms of political recognition at the time. Third, a figure on financial assistance to the ANC presented in the secondary literature strongly suggests that only a minute percentage of the promised amount was actually granted. The example dates from 1967/68, when the amount paid by the OAU Liberation Committee was 2,800 Rand, as opposed to the 57,500 Rand promised initially (Lodge 1983: 300). Once again, research in the OAU Liberation Committee archival documents might provide more insight on this issue.

On this basis, it is justified to say that the OAU's 'anti-apartheid militancy has been practically relegated to the verbalisation of the problem' (Okolo & Langley 1975: 226). It is therefore no surprise that Oliver Tambo often publicly complained that financial aid from the OAU was not substantial enough (Lodge 1988: 243; Thomas 1996: 90). Crucially, this was an important factor that contributed to the ANC's decision to turn to the former Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc for assistance (Thomas 1996: 60, 231; Costea 1990).

While material support from African countries was not of great relevance for the ANC's success as a liberation movement, their diplomatic backing was all the more important, paving the way to international acceptance. However, as has been mentioned in the previous section, these activities were not in support of the ANC *per se*, but against the system of apartheid. The role of the OAU has been outlined earlier and the focus here is on the lobbying tactics of the African Group at the United Nations (Mathews 1988). This largest caucusing group at the UN was responsible for most anti-apartheid resolutions passed by the Security Council and the General Assembly. The African bid for stronger UN action against apartheid also resulted in the establishment of the Special Committee against Apartheid²¹ in November 1962 and the Centre against Apartheid,²² attached to the UN Secretariat, in 1966 (Boutros-Ghali 1994: 8, 18; Pfister 1992).

The African diplomatic anti-apartheid front was exposed to one serious test in the period from 1960 to 1990, while the phase encompassing 1990 to 1994 is dealt with separately in the next section. The crisis was brought about in the late 1960s by the policy of Dialogue, which was part of Pretoria's overall strategy to break out of its international isolation. This

strategy towards African states beyond Southern Africa rested on two pillars: diplomatic cooperation with two key Francophone African countries, Gabon and Ivory Coast, as well as material and technical assistance (Pfister 2003). The Dialogue policy was relatively successful in dividing Africa's unity against apartheid, as evidenced by the Lusaka Manifesto that was adopted at the 5th Summit of Eastern and Central African States in the Zambian capital in April 1969. This first major assessment of African policy towards South Africa represented a compromise between those advocating confrontation and those favouring contact with South Africa. As for the ANC, its ability to effectively counter Pretoria's strategy on this occasion was limited. Significantly, the Lusaka Manifesto was drafted without the ANC's consultation (Sampson 1999: 264; Thomas 1996: 129–30). It also prevented the ANC from receiving any substantial support from Francophone African countries. The ANC established Exile Missions in only three of the twenty former French colonial territories – Algeria, Madagascar, and Senegal – and at a relatively late stage in the case of the latter two.

Two years after the Lusaka Manifesto, on 28 April 1971 and within weeks of the forthcoming annual OAU Summit, Ivorian President Felix Houphouët-Boigny again came out in favour of Dialogue with Pretoria. This time, the ANC actively tried to counter Pretoria's political ambitions in Africa. The June 1971 issue of its *Sechaba* magazine contained a statement condemning the 'imperialist policy' as 'a sinister attempt to prepare for a second rape of our continent and peoples' (see also Makiwane 1971). On 14 June, ANC Secretary General Alfred Nzo addressed the meeting of OAU Council of Ministers in Addis Ababa and urged African states to refrain from seeking Dialogue with Pretoria.²³ The ANC's efforts appear to have been successful, because the subsequent OAU Summit of Heads of State and Government abandoned the idea of Dialogue on the grounds that such communication first had to take place between the government and the black population in South Africa. The final death knell to the Dialogue debate came at a meeting of the Conference of East and Central African States in October 1971 in Mogadishu.²⁴

Thereafter, the unified African anti-apartheid struggle resumed in New York. As a result, the ANC was granted observer status at the General Assembly and the Special Committee against Apartheid in 1974. In the same year, the African Group also achieved the rejection of South Africa's credentials, thereby denying it the right to participate in meetings of the General Assembly. The activities reached a climax in November 1977, when the Security Council adopted a draft resolution from the African Group as Resolution 418, imposing a mandatory arms embargo against Pretoria (Boutros-Ghali 1994: 47–8; Thomas 1996: 115–20).

THE LAST LEAP

The diplomatic support from African states against apartheid was particularly crucial during the negotiation process in South Africa from 1990 to 1994. For the reasons discussed in the first section, the ANC had by now been recognised by the OAU as the leading South African liberation movement. The movement grasped the opportunity to rally African diplomatic support for its own political ambitions during this decisive phase of South African history, as demonstrated by the following sequence of events.

Despite the secret contacts that had taken place between various representatives of the ANC and the South African government, the ANC only openly declared its willingness to talk with Pretoria on 16 June 1989. It later laid down five conditions to be met before substantial negotiations could begin, and had the full support of the African community of states.²⁵ On 21 August 1989, the OAU Ad Hoc Committee on Southern Africa endorsed the ANC position paper in what became known as the Harare Declaration,²⁶ and the UN General Assembly followed on 14 December.²⁷ It was the most comprehensive and detailed statement on South Africa issued by African states since the Lusaka Manifesto thirty years earlier. African states had resolved the regional issues stemming from Pretoria's apartheid policy, and now aimed at ending this very system itself. In order to observe developments in South Africa, the OAU Ad Hoc Committee on Southern Africa formed the Monitoring Group mentioned earlier, which met at regular intervals from 1990.

Negotiations between the ANC and the South African government began after Mandela's release from prison in February 1990. During the ensuing tactical power play between the two main political opponents, it was the ambition of each group to achieve a particular outcome, with both parties trying to manage the elements of the balance of power to their own advantage. This conflict never ceased during the negotiations and was the key feature of the rivalry among the actors (Bacharach & Lawler 1981). In this context, the diplomatic support from African states became vital, something which has not been given enough attention in the secondary literature. This is particularly true for the developments following the Boipatong massacre in June 1992, which significantly changed the course of the negotiations.

Right from the outset, Pretoria had the upper hand in the talks and pressured the ANC into making substantial compromises without fulfilling all the preconditions contained in the Harare Declaration. A case in point was the suspension of the armed struggle by the ANC, although this had 'tremendous emotional and symbolic value in terms of its mass appeal'

(Sarakinsky 1992: 145). Generally speaking, the South African government outmanoeuvred the ANC in the negotiations. By May 1992, a number of apartheid laws had been scrapped, but the ultimate goal of black majority voting rights was not yet within sight, and the ANC seemed to be on the losing side of the battle. For the ANC, the 'book of apartheid' was not yet closed, no matter how successfully the South African government tried to reassure the international community to the contrary.

The international dimension was an important arena in the tactical power play. A comparison of destinations covered by Mandela's and President Frederik Willem de Klerk's overseas journeys reveals that both parties were similarly concerned about the support from certain countries. Mandela made sixteen trips abroad and paid visits to some forty-nine countries from 1990 to mid-1992 in order to maintain international pressure on Pretoria. Twenty of them were on the African continent, reflecting the high priority that the ANC attributed to their diplomatic support. In particular, Mandela attended the OAU summits in Uganda (1990) and Nigeria (1991) to lobby for OAU support for the ANC. The relevance of these two African states, as well as Kenya, within the ANC's strategy is underlined by the fact that Mandela visited these countries twice during this period. The only other countries that he visited twice and even three times were France and Great Britain respectively. As for the South African government, De Klerk's main aim internationally was to explain his reforms in such a way that sanctions would be lifted. Until mid-1992, he made visits to some thirty-one states with a geographic focus similar to Mandela's, going to Great Britain three times and to France on two occasions. However, what had been true for any South African leader since 1961 also applied to De Klerk, namely that international isolation could only end once he had found acceptance in Africa. Consequently, and as in the case of the ANC's strategy, Pretoria paid special attention to Africa. De Klerk's travels on the continent were groundbreaking, with official state visits taking him to Madagascar in August and Senegal in October 1990. Most significantly, he visited the political heavyweights Kenya on 8 June 1991 and Nigeria, then Chair of the OAU, on 9/10 April 1992 (Schoeman & Schoeman 1993: 310-459). In addition, De Klerk also hoped to meet the president of Uganda, OAU Chair at that time, in London in October 1990, but this did not materialise (Pfister 2003). In conclusion, Mandela's and De Klerk's overseas travels from 1990 to mid-1992 reveal that they considered the same group of countries of primary importance, and therefore targeted them. In particular, they viewed the African continental dimension, and the chair of the OAU in particular, to be of seminal relevance in their overall negotiation strategy. The success of their initiatives is discussed below.

In his endeavour to establish contact with African states, De Klerk capitalised on Africa's dire economic situation. As the leading African country in terms of economic performance, and in view of Africa's increasing economic marginalisation, he presented South Africa as an ideal and attractive partner on the continent. This proved to be a strong incentive for many African countries, and South Africa's trade with Africa increased significantly after 1988, followed by the establishment of political contacts. Nigeria became a key target in promoting such interaction through the backdoor of commerce, and De Klerk was therefore accompanied by a very large business delegation when he visited Abuja in April 1992. This mission was a tremendous breakthrough for Pretoria's Africa strategy. Nigeria's preparedness to deal openly with Pretoria inevitably sent the message to other African states that diplomatic contact with Pretoria was now acceptable (Pfister 2003). This revealed the ANC's inability to convince all of the OAU members to retain their pressure on Pretoria. The OAU's own commitment, as formulated in the Harare Declaration, to 'ensure that the African continent does not relax existing measures for the total isolation of apartheid South Africa',²⁸ proved to be not much more than a paper tiger. The OAU Monitoring Group could do little more than acknowledge this fact.²⁹

Some African countries have sent official representations to visit Apartheid South Africa and received officials from that country including President de Klerk himself, in their capitals. Indeed, some of these countries have too opened trade missions with Pretoria. Taking into account that there has been no profound and irreversible change in Apartheid South Africa, the OAU should call upon all its members to maintain sanctions against South Africa.

As new research shows, the South African government believed that it was close to achieving acceptance as an African state, thereby paving the way for the return to the international community, which was its central foreign policy objective. The final step in this direction was re-admission to the UN General Assembly, from which it had been excluded since 1974, and even on that front, Pretoria had made progress. With his visits to Paris (May 1990), London (May and October 1990, April 1991), Washington (September 1990) and Moscow (June 1992), De Klerk had secured the support of four of the five permanent members of the Security Council (Pfister 2003). Although the much hoped-for stopover in Beijing during his tour of Russia, Japan and Singapore did not materialise, De Klerk stated on his return on 8 June 1992: 'South Africa is back in the international community. This time I am more convinced of it than ever before' (cited in *West Africa* 15.6.1992: 1025).

De Klerk's original strategy of reforming apartheid just enough to allow South Africa's return to the international community, but without entirely surrendering to the ANC, appeared to be succeeding. The ANC's worst-case scenario, as formulated in 1989, had become reality: 'we cannot afford to tail behind the regime and allow ourselves to fall into a defensive posture, with the regime maintaining the offensive'.³⁰ However, a massacre with forty deaths in the township of Boipatong, south of Johannesburg, on the night of 17/18 June 1992 changed the course of events. The international media reported it as front-page news and unanimously accused Pretoria as the main culprit. There was agreement that Inkatha members from a nearby hostel for migrant labourers had committed the massacre with axes and spears under cover of night, escorted by white policemen who shot at the township residents. The tragic event was the ideal opportunity for the ANC to reactivate the diplomatic support of the international community, as aptly argued by one author: 'If evidence is produced to substantiate the ANC's repeated allegations of government "complicity" in the violence, international opinion will turn against President De Klerk. Government "complicity", or even failure to act expeditiously against the violence, is the one factor that could reactivate public opinion world-wide and bring it back into the South African arena as a decisive influence' (Uys 1992: 2; Waldmeir 1997: 194-218). The Boipatong massacre provided the ANC with precisely this evidence, allowing it to make recourse to international pressure and thus change the balance of power in the negotiations. Consequently, in an address to the residents of Boipatong on 21 June, ANC President Mandela announced his intention of requesting a special UN Security Council meeting. Two days later the ANC leadership decided to break off its negotiations with the government.

Within days of the Boipatong massacre, the OAU Conference of Ministers took place in Senegal from 22 to 27 June. At the ANC's request, a resolution for submission to the Security Council was drafted. At the subsequent OAU Summit of Heads of State and Government from 29 June to 1 July, a high-powered ANC delegation lobbied for the movement's position. Aware of the importance of diplomatic support from African states at that critical juncture, Mandela, accompanied by six ANC members, flew to Dakar himself, despite ill health and advice from his doctor to rest. Thabo Mbeki, Joe Modise (ANC NEC), Stanley Mabizela (deputy head, DIA), and Tebogo Mafole (DIA) were already there.³¹ Mandela urged OAU member countries to rethink before 'hastily re-establishing relations with Pretoria' (cited in *West Africa* 6.7.1992: 1134). The ANC presence was successful and the OAU Heads of State and Government adopted the resolution drafted by the Conference of Ministers (*ibid.*; Chhabra 1997: 47-8;

Shabazz 1992: 21). On 2 July, and on behalf of the African Group, Madagascar requested a special Security Council meeting to discuss the Dakar resolution (S/24232). After two days of deliberations (S/PV.3095, S/PV.3096), this body adopted Resolution 765 on 16 July, the implications of which are discussed below.

Undoubtedly as a result of De Klerk's visit to Nigeria, Pretoria received some diplomatic assistance from Abuja at this crucial Security Council meeting. Together with Great Britain, Nigeria successfully pushed for a significant alteration of the original OAU resolution, and the sections in which Pretoria was accused of being responsible for the violence and the Boipatong massacre were either greatly toned down or deleted in their entirety.³² The ANC had evidently failed to secure Nigeria's full diplomatic support in the wake of the Boipatong massacre, despite the country's reputation for being a generous supporter of the anti-apartheid struggle.³³ A likely reason for Abuja's behaviour at the Security Council meeting on 15/16 July 1992 appears to be rooted in its favouritism towards the PAC. Both South African liberation movements had offices in the same building in Lagos from 1976, but the Nigerian government was more sympathetic towards the PAC (Agbogu 1983: 144; Esterhuysen 1989: 34; Olutoye 1981: 110). An ANC report that summarises talks between an ANC delegation, led by Joe Modise and Thabo Mbeki, and representatives of the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in May 1989 confirms this claim made in the secondary literature. A statement in the concluding observations reads: 'Taking Nigeria into confidence as we have done on the subject of this report, may have achieved two things: a) Softened/reversed Nigerias [*sic*] concern about ANC relations with PAC.'³⁴

Returning to the UN activities in the wake of the Boipatong massacre, Resolution 765 was a defeat for De Klerk and he could no longer procrastinate on rapid political change. On 20 July, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali decided to send former US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, as special envoy to South Africa (S/24314). Based on Vance's findings, Boutros-Ghali submitted a report to the Security Council that led to the adoption of Resolution 772 on 17 August. It stipulated the deployment of a UN Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) and fifty observers were sent in early September.³⁵ For its part, the OAU deployed a Fact-Finding Mission of Experts to South Africa from 14 September to 3 October, and subsequently decided to send its own observer team.³⁶ Similar to the situation in 1969, Pretoria's approach in Africa had shown some results, but this time the ANC's strategy was more successful. Its history and political ambition were obviously more appealing to the majority of the OAU member states than the economic incentives proposed by the De Klerk government.

The Boipatong massacre proved to be the turning point in the negotiations between the ANC and the government. Pretoria's negotiator Roelf Meyer and the ANC's Cyril Ramaphosa held talks behind closed doors from June to September 1992, at the end of which they concluded the decisive political agreement, the Record of Understanding. From then on, the democratisation process could not be halted. On 2 July 1993, the election date was set for 27 April 1994.



This paper presents a complex, not to say conflicting, picture of the relationship between the ANC and African states. It has rightly been suggested that 'without a Pan-African commitment to racial equality, there would have been no international anti-apartheid sanctions movement' (Klotz 1995: 90). Yet this did not automatically result in comprehensive support for the ANC. This was partly due to the financial constraints imposed on African states. Equally and more significantly, however, the ANC found itself on contested territory. It was in serious ideological competition with the PAC during most of the period under review, and Pretoria strongly challenged its standing in Africa in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In consequence, the ANC became disillusioned with the community of African states, forcing it to turn elsewhere for substantial assistance. This only changed during the second half of the 1980s. By then, the ANC had obtained diplomatic support from the majority of African states, and this became a key factor at the most critical juncture during the negotiations in South Africa from 1990 to 1994.

This description of the situation stands in sharp contrast to the ANC's own view, propagated since the assumption of power in 1994. This has been formulated aptly by one author: 'The ANC continued to praise the African support after its unbanning in 1990 but this carefully construed diplomatic image masked its past disagreements with OAU policies' (Thomas 1996: 72). This can be substantiated by two examples. First, the ANC does not currently allow access to the archival collection that is housed at its headquarters in Johannesburg, very probably to avoid any disturbances of this 'diplomatic image'. Second, a Cabinet decision of 1995 stipulated that figures for trade between South Africa and all African states from 1960 to 1990 are to be kept secret. This step was evidently taken so as not to reveal the existence of economic interaction with every African country in that period (Pfister 2003). For the ANC government to publicly divulge this sensitive data would have caused embarrassment for the

African states involved, as well as bringing to light the limitations of the ANC's diplomacy in Africa.

The ANC's attitude towards this particular aspect of its past is indicated by President Thabo Mbeki's ideas for an African Renaissance, the Millennium African Recovery Plan (MAP), or its most recent brainchild, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Seen against this background, it is reasonable to argue that the current government in Pretoria aims at removing any shadow on the often-praised spirit of Pan-African solidarity.

NOTES

1. The ANC Archive was opened in 1996 and stores the documents from twenty-five of the forty-three Exile Missions (Stapleton & Maamoe 1998; <<http://www.uhf.ac.za/collections/anc.htm>>). Some material from the Exile Missions in London and Lusaka, although of no relevance to this paper, is housed in the Mayibuye Centre at the University of the Western Cape (Schuringa 1994; <<http://www.mayibuye.org>>). Further material is held at the ANC Headquarters in Johannesburg (<<http://www.anc-archives.org>>). However, its extent is unclear and access for researchers is not granted.
2. Originally referred to as Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa.
3. <<http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/speeches/pafmeca.html>>.
4. Lodge 1983: 310. On the PAC External Mission, see <http://www.si.umich.edu/fort-hare/pac_hist.htm>.
5. Telephone interview with Dan Mavimbela, 15.6.2001. He was ANC representative in Ghana from March 1985 to 1989. He does not recall an ANC presence in Ghana before or after his placement. He has served in the Department of Foreign Affairs' Africa Division in Pretoria since 1995.
6. Telephone interviews with Dan Mavimbela, 15.6.2001, and George Nene, 22.6.2001. Nene left South Africa in 1975 and received military training in Moscow. He was a military instructor in Angola and Swaziland (1976-79) worked for the administration of Mazimbu in Tanzania (1982-85), studied politics in Bulgaria (1985-86), served at the Headquarters in Lusaka (1987-89), and represented the ANC in Nigeria (1989-94). He was South Africa's ambassador to Nigeria from 1995 to 1999, and he is currently at the South African Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva.
7. Ellis 1991: 444-5; <<http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/conf/indexmor.html>>.
8. Ellis & Sechaba 1992: 36, 60; Lodge 1983: 298; Thomas 1989: 587-8; <<http://www.sacp.org.za/biographies/dnokwe.html>>.
9. Morrow 1998; Serote 1992; Thomas 1989: 529; <<http://www.anc-archives.org/somafco.html>>; <<http://www.mazimbu.com>>.
10. Communiqué of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference, Harare, 25.8.1989.
11. Interview, Josiah Jele, 23.4.1999; various documents in the ANC Archive; Ellis & Sechaba 1992: 128, 146, 151, 177; Shubin 1999: 133, 185; 'All the deputy president's advisers', *Mail & Guardian* 17.5.1996; <<http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/1993/prog09b.html>>.
12. Documents in the ANC Archive, particularly a brochure of seven pages in the Zimbabwe Collection (Box 2, File 'J. Makatini Obituary'), and in the Tambo Papers (Box 70, File C 3.10); Ellis & Sechaba 1992: 150; *Jeune Afrique* 1451, 26.10.1988: 22-3; Lodge 1988: 243; *Sechaba* 18, 6, June 1984: 7; Shubin 1999: 30, 123, 133, 180, 185, 309-10; Thomas 1989: 584; <<http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/people/jmmakatini.html>>.
13. 'Declaration of the OAU Ad-Hoc Committee on Southern Africa on the Question of South Africa', Harare, Zimbabwe, 21.8.1989, item 21.o. (ANC Archive, New York Collection, Box 17, File 'OAU (1989-93)'. <<http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/oau/harare.html>>).
14. 'Report of the Monitoring Group of the OAU Ad Hoc Committee on Southern Africa', 14.5.1991, p. 1 (ANC Archive, Zambia Collection, Box 8, File 'OAU Monitoring Group (1991)').
15. 'Minutes of the Meeting of the Monitoring Group of the OAU Ad Hoc Committee on Southern Africa', 22.8.1991, Chancery of the Nigeria High Commission, Lusaka, p. 4 (ANC Archive, Zambia Collection, Box 8, File 'OAU Monitoring Group (1991)').

16. ANC Archive, Germany Collection, Box 27, File 'Business Meets ANC'; Sampson 1987: 255-6; Waldmeir 1997: 73-4.
17. 'A Joint Communiqué, 11.7.1987: The Dakar Declaration' (ANC Archive, Tambo Papers, Box 60, File C 1.27-C 1.27.1). See also Everett 1987.
18. Various boxes in the ANC Archive (particularly the document 'Thabo Mbeki, Curriculum Vitae', Fax message, 8.1.1990 (Senegal Collection, Box 7, File 'T. Mbeki, CV'); *Africa Newsfile* 22, 12.9.1988: 6-7; 'Top ANC strategist, diplomat and deep thinker', *New Nation* 20/26.4.1990: 10; Ellis 1991: 446; Ellis & Sechaba 1992: 122, 146; Gastrow 1992: 177-9; Mbeki 1998: xiii-xv; Sampson 1987: 302; Shubin 1999: 133; <http://www.polity.org.za/people/mbeki.html>.
19. They are currently kept at the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation in Dar-es-Salaam, but are not yet available for research purposes. Correspondence with Tor Sellström, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 23.11.2001. He carried out an appraisal of the documentation in July 2001.
20. 'Report of the 21st Ordinary Session of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa to the 20th Session of the Council of Ministers', Addis Ababa, 26.1.1973, pp. 2-3 (ANC Archive, Zambia Collection, Box 8, File 'OAU (1971-93)'); 'Draft Budget of the Special Fund for the Year 1971/72. OAU Council of Ministers, 16th Ordinary Session', Addis Ababa. OAU Document CM/356/Rev.1/Add.1 (ANC Archive, Tambo Papers, Box 77, File C4.37.2); 'Report of the Secretary of the Standing Committee on Administration and Finance', Addis Ababa, OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, 5.5.1975. OAU Document LC.25/DOC.5 (ANC Archive, Tambo Papers, Box 79, File C4.37.6.3).
21. Special Committee on Apartheid from 1971 to 1974.
22. Unit on Apartheid from 1966 to 1975.
23. 'Dialogue: A Viewpoint of the People of South Africa, by the African National Congress (A.N.C.) of South Africa'. Address by Alfred Nzo to the 7th Session of the OAU Council of Ministers, Addis Ababa, 14.6.1971 (ANC Archive, Zambia Collection, Box 5, File 'Reports to the OAU (1969-72)').
24. 'Mogadiscio Declaration', 20.10.1971 (ANC Archive, Tambo Papers, Box 79, File C 4.37.6-C 4.37.6.1).
25. 'ANC Discussion Paper on the Issue of Negotiations', 16.6.1989 (ANC Archive, Sweden Collection, Box 88, File 'Correspondence: ANC DIA (Outgoing faxes, 1990-92)'); Legum 1989: B671-3.
26. 'Declaration of the OAU ...' (1989).
27. 'Declaration on Apartheid and the Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa' (UN Document A/S-16/1989).
28. 'Declaration of the OAU ...', (1989), item 23.5.
29. 'Report of the Monitoring Group ...', (1991), p. 13.
30. 'ANC Discussion Paper ...' (1989), item 14.
31. 'Presidential Delegation to OAU Heads of States Summit', Fax dated 26.6.1992 (ANC Archive, Botswana Collection, Box 3, File 'Faxes Dispatched'); Chhabra 1997: 47-51.
32. Compare the OAU draft resolution of 29.6.1992 (UN Document S/24232, 2.7.1992: 2-3) with Security Council Resolution 765 (16.7.1992); see also *Africa Confidential* 19.6.1992: 2-4; 17.7.1992: 1; *SouthScan* 5.6.1992: 162; 17.7.1992: 209.
33. The ANC representative to Nigeria from 1989 to 1994 rejects this argument (telephone interview, George Nene, 22.6.2001); see also Agbogbo 1983; Akinyemi 1994.
34. 'Report on Mission to Nigeria, 22 to 25 May 1989', undated, prepared by ANC DIA, Lusaka, p. 8 (ANC Archive, Tambo Papers, Box 45, File B 8.7.3.20).
35. UN Documents S/PV.3107 (17.8.1992), S/RES/772 (17.8.), S/24541 (10.9.). See Boutros-Ghali 1994: 104-7; Ndulo 1995.
36. 'Report of the OAU Fact-Finding Mission of Experts to South Africa, 14th September to 3rd October 1992', OAU Document AD-HOC/CTTEE/SA.2 (IX); 'Communiqué' of the OAU Ad-Hoc Committee of Heads of State and Government on Southern Africa, Ninth Session, 15.10.1992, Gaborone, Botswana (OAU Document AD-HOC/CTTEE/SA/COM.I (IX) (ANC Archive, Botswana Collection, Box 2, File 'OAU').

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