

REFORM:- *Homeland*


Who's who in the homelands?

Vrye Weekblad 25.9.92

But you pay for them all

The four "independent" homelands and six "non-independent" ones account for 42,5 percent of South Africa's total population, yet they contribute only 7,6 percent of its gross domestic product and swallow nearly 7 billion South African Rands just in direct budgetary aid. But they also, State President FW de Klerk believes, hold the key to electoral success. In the first part of a two part series on bantustan control, **IVOR POWELL** collects some facts and figures relating to both economy and security which suggest that maybe the words "independent" and "non-independent" should be kept in inverted commas

BOPHUTHATSWANA



BOP is controlled by President Lucas Mangope who also heads the homeland's ruling Bophuthatswana Democratic Party and serves as Minister of Law and Order.

The homeland has a population of 2 419 000. During the 1990/91 financial year it recorded a total budget of R2 791 914 166. Of this sum R607 374 000 was provided through direct budgetary assistance from the South African government, but in fact this represents only the tip of the iceberg in terms of real assistance from the South African state. SA also provided, mainly through the Development Bank, loans totalling R201 263 000. In addition to this it handed over R717 million in Customs union payments, income tax transfers, etc; these moneys are paid on the theory that the independent homelands are due a certain percentage of customs and excise duties to compensate for the untaxed flow of goods etc across its borders. There is also tax compensation to the tune of R95 million, and various other below-the-line handouts.

The most recent SA Institute of Race Relations survey, totalling all these payments up, comes to the figure of R1 528 193 940, which is around 60 percent of the total budget.

If Mangope is the power on the throne in Bop, the power behind it is wielded by former Rhodesian Rowan Cronjé, a onetime member of Ian Smith's UDI cabinet. Cronjé holds no less than three ministerial portfolios, including the key Defence brief and stands at the centre of a highly influential ex-Rhodesian power clique.

Although Bop theoretically allows free political activity and is in theory guided by a Declaration of Fundamental Rights, the true situation is very different. The rights bill is restricted and overridden by parliamentary legislation


and is thus essentially meaningless. The homeland's Internal Security Act makes provision for detentions without trial, for banning organisations, etc. It also denies political organisations other than those registered in terms of the Electoral Act of 1979 the right to hold meetings except with specific written permission from the Minister of Law and Order (Mangope).

Who has never, for example, yet granted permission for an ANC meeting to be held in Bophuthatswana.

Perhaps most crippling for the ANC and other organisations however is a 1991 amendment to the act which prohibits "non-citizens" from engaging in any political activity whatever. Specific legislation extending this prohibition to trade unions - after Cosatu started organising - makes mobilisation at the level of labour equally difficult. It is also unique in SA in having organisations still banned including the Black Sash.

Regarding constitutional negotiations, Mangope has kept his options open. While his BDP is a key player in State President FW de Klerk's new federal alliance, his representatives refused to sign the Codesa declaration of intent, and also abstained from endorsing homeland reincorporation deals. The Bop regime has indicated that reincorporation into a unitary South Africa is an unacceptable option, and that what they will be pushing for is a kind of constellation of strongly decentralised "independent" states.

CISKEI.



WHEN Oupa Gqozo took power in a Ciskei military coup in March 1990, initial indications were that he would be supporting the democratic movement, when he shared a platform with UDF leaders against the backdrop of ANC and SACP flags and agreed in principle to holding a referendum.

However, since that time, particularly since the middle of last year, Gqozo has fallen increasingly under the influence of people close to the SA security forces. Both the head of the Ciskei Defence Force, Brigadier Marius Oelschig, and the head of his police force, Brigadier Jan Viktor, are seconded from the South African security apparatus. The secretary of Gqozo's African Democratic Movement, one Basie Oosthuizen, is a man who operated companies exposed as CCB front organisations in both Namibia and Ciskei, before joining the Ciskeian Civil Service. Though he has reportedly recently fallen out of favour with KwaZulu kingpin Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Gqozo features prominently in a kind of homelands federal alliance along with Buthelezi and Mangope as the other major players. All three strongly oppose reincorporation and have threatened to secede should a centralised government emerge out of Codesa. Under emergency legislation, Gqozo has banned the ANC from operating in Ciskei.

Defector and former Ciskei military intelligence chief Gert Hugo revealed that in security matters Ciskei is closely


linked to and controlled by Eastern Command, and allegations were made in the wake of the Bisho massacre two weeks ago that orders had been given by General Joffel van der Westhuizen, chief of Military Intelligence, to the effect that the planned ANC march should be resisted with whatever force was necessary.

Considered economically, Ciskei (population 846 000) is no more independent than it is politically. The SAIRR estimates that a total of R950 649 702 was paid out by the South African government in 1990/91. The total budget for the same period was R1 578 616 000. That is over 60 percent.

VENDA

VENDA (population 557 000) recorded a total budget of R974 001 400 in 1990/91. Of this total R591 822 288 came from South African government handouts of one sort or another.


It is ruled by Military Council head Colonel Gabriel Ramushwana, who assumed power in a bloodless military coup in May 1991, ousting former leader



Frank Ravele and other senior Venda players in the wake of awful bloodshed in which political motives were often achieved through ritual murders. SA Security Forces officers on secondment to the homeland were expelled, and Ramushwana made it clear he was standing on a law and order ticket, not stopping short of using force to disperse protest action, but allowing formerly banned organisations to operate inside the territory.

Ramushwana has emerged as a strong proponent of reincorporation into South Africa. He was party to the meetings convened by the ANC aimed at setting up a Patriotic Front in opposition to the government's Christian Democratic Alliance. He hosted a conference of homeland leaders on the subject of reincorporation. Bop, among others, was conspicuously absent.

TRANSKEI



TRANSKEI has been ruled by a Military Council headed by General Bantu Holomisa since late 1987, when the Pretoria-backed Matanzima regime was overthrown in a coup. Since then various attempts have been made on Holomisa's life, and a number of coups attempted, allegedly with South African backing. Much of the tension has arisen out of Holomisa's efforts to clean up South African backed and often closely CCB and Military Intelligence connected companies exposed during the first

Harms Commission into Corruption. Cabinet Ministers including Pik Botha and Adriaan Vlok were named as accepting bribes in evidence presented to the commission. Meanwhile Holomisa has emerged as being closely - if not unambiguously - connected with the ANC. He was the first to allow free political activity within the territory and has given a haven to the ANC's military wing, hosting its national congress in 1991. Inkatha accuses Transkei of sending armed guerillas across the "border" in order to wage war on the IFP and KwaZulu. Transkei as a whole is strongly supportive of ANC initiatives and Holomisa favours reincorporation into South Africa.

Transkei, with a population of 3 458 000, is the poorest of the four "independent" homelands, delivering a Gross Domestic product per capita of only R898. Though it has 8,4 percent of South Africa's total population, it generates only 1,3 percent of its GDP. Of a total budget of R3 271 738 000 just under R2 billion (R1 988 642 794) comes from the South African government, making Transkei, though certainly the most militantly politically independent of the homelands, also one of the most economically dependent.

KWAZULU.



WITH Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi serving also as Law and Order Minister and operating a Chief Ministers office which swallows up more than three times as much as does, say, the office of the Transkei Military Council, KwaZulu is very much Buthelezi's fiefdom. This also means that its official structures also clearly and more or less exclusively belong to his Inkatha Freedom party, a point which has been frequently made clear by the requirement that civil servants join the party, by various statements to the effect that the police force is an arm of Inkatha - and by the relentless harassment of ANC structures in the KwaZulu area. Though formally allowed to operate, the ANC is frequently refused permission to hold meetings and meetings are just as frequently disrupted. The situation is horribly exacerbated by the ongoing violence which has left many key ANC leaders dead, apparently targeted for hit-squad type execution - and a significantly smaller number of IFP key personnel also.

In the 1990/91 financial year, KwaZulu (population 5 220 000) received R2,275 billion in direct budgetary aid from the

South African government; this is double what any of the other homelands received and relates to a total budget of R2,819 billion.

KwaZulu is the only one of the non-independent homelands which has its own police force, appointed in 1978; recently it was condemned by the Goldstone Commission for lack of impartiality.

Controlled though it may be by Buthelezi himself, its chief officer is General Jac Buchner, one of the SAP security branch's most feared anti-ANC operators, who is also highly trained in the theory of Low Intensity Conflict. Buthelezi has long been agitating for his own paramilitary units as well, and partial fulfillment of this came when, in 1990, the South Africans granted him the right to issue permits for weapons (G3

assault rifles supplied by the South Africans) to civilian bodyguards of IFP functionaries and IFP-supporting chiefs. His general support base is anyway permitted to bear dangerous weapons on the theory of "cultural usage".

In many of the scandals involving training of IFP members as soldiers at Mkuze and other training bases, Military Intelligence-connected whites - often with long histories of operating front companies in other homelands - were named in key positions.


Inkatha claimed in 1990 a membership of 1,8 million, and its youth brigade a membership in excess of 700 000. This would if it were true make it the largest political party in South Africa. But it is clearly not: the IFP struggles to command more than 4 percent of the total vote in independent surveys.

Despite its relatively tiny support the IFP has until recently been construed as one of the big three negotiations players. Part of Buthelezi's current pique stems from the fact that as the ANC and the government move increasingly into bilateral solutions, he is being sidelined.

The IFP however is the only homeland party to have launched nationally, and even in Bop and Ciskei its representatives have been allowed to organise publicly in the face of bans on free political activity.

Buthelezi has been a strong supporter of federal solutions, and failing these, threatens secession. Buthelezi also threatens "civil war" if the ANC should march on Ulundi.

QWAQWA




QWAQWA is controlled by another of State President FW de Klerk's federalist allies, Chief Kenneth Mopeli, who heads the homeland's ruling Dikwanketla Party, and is strongly opposed by the majority of his own population in mass action, boycotts and other forms of protest.

With a population of 453 000, the territory recorded a total budget of R460 985 000 in 1990/91. Of this R275 356 000 came in the form of direct budgetary assistance from the South African state. In 1991/2 this was raised to R313 105 000.

Like many of the smaller non-independent homelands, QwaQwa is the scene of busy covert action pointing to involvement by "third force" interests, often acting in collaboration with the authorities. For instance in a July demolition action against squatters the job was done by people connected to a Richards Bay security firm working in conjunction with the Mopeli administration. Other violence has been perpetrated against ANC supporters by men who, though locals, identified themselves as "Inkatha". Criminal elements have also, allegedly, been deployed as vigilantes.

Like the other non-independent homelands - with the exception of KwaZulu - QwaQwa has no security forces of its own and is policed by the SAP.


LEBOWA



THE total budget of Lebowa (population 2 279 000) for 1990/91 was R1 515 458 000 of which R1,3 billion was contributed in direct SA budgetary aid. Lebowa is controlled by Lebowa People's Party head, Nelson Ramadike, who is part of the De Klerk federal alliance.

The territory has a long history of suppressing political dissent and of severe police brutality against ANC and UDF opponents. Recently concern was expressed that paramilitary forces were being brought into Lebowa as nature conservation officials.

GAZANKULU




GAZANKULU (population 608 000) is headed by Professor Hudson Ntsanwisi

who was "elected" by miniscule poll and in the face of a huge anti-elections campaign in 1989. His Ximoko Progressive Party supports the De Klerk federal alliance.

SA security forces operating within the area have been guilty of serious violations of human rights in suppressing free political activity in the homeland.

Gazankulu's total budget for 1990/91 came to R752 874 000, of which R627 640 000 was contributed by the South African taxpayer.


KANGWANE



KANGWANE'S former Chief Minister Enos Mabuza, consulting with the ANC, resigned from his post in April 1991, calling for an official dissolution of the homeland's government and reincorporation into South Africa. However his Inyandza National Movement (which favours some form of federal option) continues to control the homeland, allowing however, free political activity and there has been little real tension in KaNgwane since the unbanning of the ANC.

With a population of 497 000, KaNgwane's budget in 1990/91 ran to R415 402 937, of which R352 674 000 was given in direct budgetary aid by South Africa.

KWANDEBELE



KWANDEBELE (population 516 000) has been restored to a condition of relative peace in the past two years after a protracted period of internal struggle in which South African security forces and SA-sponsored vigilante groups played a leading part.

Chief Minister, Prince James Mahlangu was elected in April 1990 after a total collapse of the Legislative Assembly. He has declared his territory in favour of reincorporation.

KwaNdebele's 1990/91 budget stood at R353 549 000, of which the R 275 835 000 was paid by the South African taxpayer.